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Establishing Integrity Operating

Windows (IOWs)

IPEIA Conference

February 2, 2006

Banff, AlbertaJohn Reynolds

Steamboat Springs, CO, USA

Recently retired from

Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.


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Outline for this Presentation

The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI)

The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative

Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)

Integrity Operating Windows (IOW) Standard and Critical IOWs

Integration of IOWs into the 10 PSIs

Training of Operators on IOWs The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid


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Ten Process Safety Initiatives

(PSI) Initiated in May, 2000

PressureEquipment Integrity (PEI)- IOW creationprocess

Ensure Safe Production (ESP) -IOW monitoring process

Operator Training and Procedures- IOW knowledgetransfer

Management Of Change (MOC)- IOW change process

Investigations3 Levels up to RCA

Protective Instrument Systems (IPFSIL) Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

Causal Learning

Audits and Assessments

Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)


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Process Safety Initiative

Metrics Each of the 10 PSIs were required to have fourmain metrics to track implementation progress (10

X 4 = 40 metrics total)

For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked:

- Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCDs) completed- Numbers of process units with RBI completed

- Numbers of process units with all IOWs implemented

- Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOWs

But there was only one bottom line metric for the

aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives>numbers of process safety incidents peryear


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Results of the Process Safety Initiatives

YTD Totals

19

23

20

15

9

3

0

5

10

15

20

25

1999 2000 2001

2002 2003 2004Numbers of

Process Safety

I ncidentsin last 6 years

A real success

story


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Primary Aspects of the Pressure EquipmentIntegrity (PEI) Initiative

Identify all necessary Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs)

Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering - Maintenance - Inspection) in each

operating area to create and manage CCDs and IOWs

Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCDs), which document all process IOWs

Train operators on the CCD and IOWs

Implement IOWsand Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)

Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR) to monitor progress of the

PEI Initiative


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Corrosion Control Documents Contents Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment degradation

Description of the process unit and process conditions

Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and degradation mechanisms, as well as normal

operation

Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram (modified PFD showing construction

materials)

Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g. overhead system, slurry system,reflux system, etc.

All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and history of problem areas

Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms

Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc.

Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes, construction materials changes, etc. Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs)


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Corrosion Control Documents Construction Unit specific CCDs completed by an OEMI team which includes:

- Site corrosion engineer/specialist

- Unit process engineer

- Unit inspector

- One or more experienced unit operations representatives- Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer)

Final document represents an agreement between the OEMI Team

involved and clearly benefits by the synergistic interaction of all team

members


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Establishing Integrity Operating Windows Historical operating, maintenance & inspection records

Design data; lab data; operating data

Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules

Process chemistry and engineering knowledge

Reactive chemistry knowledge

Recommended practices (industry and company)

Process and corrosion modeling tools

Subject matter expertise and experience(heavy dose)

Result: Reasonable, practical IOWs not too conservative not non-conservative


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Integrity Operating Windows

Operating

Window

Operating

Window


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Integrity Operating Windows Examples Typically fall into 2 categories:

Physical- Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design, operating, partial pressures, dew

points, dry points, heating and cooling rates, delta P, etc.

- Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on Alky contactor motors, slurry

content, hydrogen flux, vibration limits, corrosivity probes, etc.

Chemical- pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in crude, NH4HS content, NH3

content, TAN, acid strength, amine strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels,

oxygen content, etc.


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IOW Example Hot Hydrogen Service Mechanical design window set by the

design code e.g. ASME

IOW set by material limit for high

temperature hydrogen attack in API RP

941

SOR process temperature definitely within

the IOW

EOR process temperature possibly beyond

the IOW need to know the hydrogen

partial pressure and duration of EOR

conditions

Temperature

Pressure

Mechanical Design Limits

SOR Process Temp

EOR Process Temp IOW

Based on H2 pp Based on

Total Pressure


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Integrity Operating Windows Typical Numbers per Operating Unit(before after an intensive review)

Typically start with 5 -10IOWs that may already be in place, along withother operating quality variable limits

Typically end up with 30 50IOWs with about5 -10% being critical limits (requires drastic and/or immediate action),

and the rest being standard limits (requires attention within a specified

timeframe to get back into control)


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Definitions: IOW Critical LimitA limit at which the operator has one last opportunity to return theprocess to a safe condition and, if exceeded, could result in one ofthe following in a fairly short timeframe:

A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous fluids

Loss of Containment

Non-orderly Shutdown

Significant Environmental Impact

Other Unacceptable Risk


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Critical IOW Limit Examples Boiler Feed Water Level

- Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube rupture

Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature

- Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise to brittle fracture

Heater Tube Skin Temperature- Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused, for example, by a no flow or hot spot

condition.

Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation

- Too low acid strength could cause runaway reaction


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Definition: Standard LevelA limit that, if exceeded over a defined period of time, could cause oneof the following to eventually occur: A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids

Loss of containment

Non-orderly shutdown

A negative impact to the long term unit performance and its ability to meet turnaround run

length

Excessive financial impact


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Standard Level Examples REAC NH4HS Concentration

- Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping

Heater Tube Skin Temperature- Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.

Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature- Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to fractionator internals or potential loss of

containment.

pH of Crude Tower Overhead- Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to corrosion of tubing and piping and potential

loss of containment.

Desalter Outlet Salt Content- Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion and potential loss of containment


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Integrity Operating Windows Successes In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous project had installed the

wrong construction materials immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage

An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process engineer and said that weactually operate much hotter than you think because we use the by-pass immediate

inspection revealed significant localized damage

A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS in the REAC system of an

HCU immediate inspection revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant

corrosion

An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another refinery, which then began to take

routine lab samples soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high and took

steps to increase wash water and adjust feedstock


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Operator Training on CCDs and IOWs Level 1

- Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative

- SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training

Level 2

- Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents

- What they contain; where theyre stored; how to use them

Level 3

- Details contained within each operators unit-specific CCD- Specific IOWs and the reasoning behind them

- What can happen if the IOW is exceeded


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ESP

RBI

CCDs & IOWs

OEMI TEAMS

101 Essential Elements

PEI PSI

Pyramid


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Implementing Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) Another major partof our pressure equipment integrity process safety initiative

We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI (S-RBI), as well as themore quantitativeAPI RBI, both successfully for different needs at different

sites

But RBI will not be covered today a topic for another day, if you like

Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be it risk-based, condition-based,or time-based may not be fully reliable without effective identification andimplementation of integrity operating windows (IOWs)


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Integration of CCDs, IOWs RBIConfidence in plant integrity

Creating the CCD:

Type of degradation

Location of degradation

Susceptibility to degradation

Degradation rates

IOW limits:

Determination & management of the operating limits to avoid degradation

RBI planning:

Method of inspection

Where to inspect

Frequencyof inspection

Feedback


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Integration of Multiple Work Processes Leading To Sustained AssetIntegrity

Design andMaterials Selection CorrosionControl IOWs

Risk-BasedInspection

Long Term Asset Integrity

Asset integrity management is a balancing process designed to achieve lowest total cost ofownership

Focused Asset I ntegrity Reviews


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Along with Asset Integrity Comes Proven Better Process SafetyPerformance

YTD Totals

19

23

20

15

9

3

0

5

10

15

20

25

1999 2000 2001

2002 2003 2004

Numbers of Process

Safety I ncidents

in last 6 years in

Shell (US) Ref ining

Operations Facts,

not just hopes for

the future


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