Bad History

The Bay of Pigs Revisited

Something sensational

happens

Media coverage for

a week

Press Releases

“Spun” to multiple

agendas on talk shows and in op ed pieces

CYA for all parties and agencies

Revisited only for political

purposes

One liners or one

paragraph in history books

(maybe)

Media coverage becomes popu lar h is to ry

via the internet

(and Wikipedia)

Current Events As History

Virtually every time the Kennedy administration is discussed the Bay of Pigs is mentioned

It is described as either a sign of

naiveté in a new President – or a

failure of will/courage

The failure is

almost universally blamed on the President’s refusal to commit air strikes promised to the Cuban

Brigade

The CIA’s own Inspector General’s report is rarely mentioned

The President’s inquiry (Taylor commission) is never mentioned

CIA officer condemnation of the President appears in numerous books such as Grayston Lynch’s Decision for Disaster – Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs

Bay of Pigs as an Illustration

•“That day carries many memories for me,” said Bay of Pigs veteran Francisco “Pepe” Hernandez, 70, who co-founded and now heads the Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation, the most powerful Cuban exile lobby in the world. “More than anything, they’re bitter memories because of so many young men who died needlessly because of the extraordinary errors of the Kennedy Administration.”

•The United States never sent the air and naval support it had promised the Cuban exiles. It also failed to gather intelligence about, and prepare for, the numerous obstacles that the fighters encountered.

•“It was a total fiasco,” said Frank Argote-Freyre, author of books about Cuba and a professor of Latin American studies at Kean University. “It was a terrible, botched job by Eisenhower and Kennedy, one of the worst military operations conceived. Kennedy sent hundreds of Cuban exiles into a hopeless struggle.”

•The fiasco left many Cuban exiles with an enduring lack of trust in Democrats, and a preference for Republicans. A 2004 survey of Cuban-American voters in Florida found that nearly 70 percent identified themselves as Republicans

Bay of Pigs 50th Anniversary Articles - 2011

The Wikipedia View

10/31/60 11/29/60 1/4/1961

On November 29 1960, President Eisenhower met with the chiefs of the CIA,

Defense, State and Treasury departments to discuss the new concept. No objections

were expressed, and Eisenhower approved the plans, with the intention of persuading

John Kennedy of their merit. On 8 December 1960, Bissell presented outline plans to the 'Special Group', while declining to commit

details to written records

On 18 August 1960, President Eisenhower approved a budget of $13M for the operation. By October 31 1960, most guerilla infiltrations and supply

drops directed by the CIA into Cuba had failed, and developments of further guerilla strategies were replaced by

plans to mount an amphibious assault, with a minimum of 1,500 men

Further development of the plans continued, and on January 4 1961

they consisted of an intention to carry out a "lodgment" by 750 men at an

undisclosed site in Cuba, supported by considerable air power

Wikipedia continued….

On January 28 1961, President Kennedy was briefed, on the latest plan that involved 1,000

men to be landed in a ship-borne invasion at

Trinidad, Cuba

When that scheme was subsequently

rejected by the State

Department, the CIA went on to

propose an alternative plan.

The “deniable” effort involved

transport ships, landing ships including tank

transports, paratroop

drops, and over 30 B-26 aircraft

Several US Navy

destroyers were stationed

offshore to give the appearance of an impending invasion fleet.

A diversionary landing by

some 146 exiles led by Nino Diaz

failed on two consecutive

nights, April 15 and April 16 – both attempts

aborted

1/28/1961 4/15/1961

Following the air strikes on airfields

on April 15 1961, the Cuban Air Force could still field at

least four T-33s, four Sea Furies and five

or six B-26s. CIA planners had failed to discover that the

US-supplied T-33 jets had long been armed

with M-3 machine guns

The B-26 pilots claims of success in their strikes gave an

initial false confidence to the

CIA but U-2 photos on April 16

confirmed that at least half the Cuban Air Force was still

operational

.........there is no evidence this was

communicated to the President

nor was this communicated to the

Brigade commanders; Air

Operations had been totally

compartmentalized from them by Bissell

Late on April 16 President Kennedy

ordered cancellation of further airfield

strikes planned for dawn on 17 April

Wikipedia continued….

4/16/1961

Air Support over the Beaches

Invasion day plus one April 18

Brigade B-26s attacked a Cuban column of buses

and trucks carrying tanks

and other armored vehicles

Invasion day plus two April 19

During the night a Brigade C-46 delivered arms

and equipment to the Girón airstrip

occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces

The final air attack mission (code-named

Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s.

Cuban planes including two armed

jet trainers shot down two of the B-26’s two of these B-26s, killing four American airmen

Combat air patrols were flown by Jets operating

off the USS Essex. Sorties were flown to

reassure Brigade soldiers and pilots, and

to intimidate Cuban government forces

without directly engaging in acts of war.

4/18/1961

CIA Inspector General’s Report

The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from guerrilla support to overt armed action without

any plausible deniability.

Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately

communicate information and decisions internally and

with other government principals.

Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.

Failure to sufficiently organize internal

resistance in Cuba.

Failure to competently collect and analyze

intelligence about Cuban forces.

Poor internal management of

communications and staff.

Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.

Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training

facilities and material resources.

Lack of stable policies and/or contingency

plans.

JFK was not told is that the 1961 operation that the CIA (Helms and Bissell) asked him to sign off on was as a far cry from what his predecessor, President Eisenhower, had initially approved.

What Eisenhower had actually approved was covertly landing a force of Cuban exiles to escalate anti-Castro revolutionary activities. The initial plan, as drafted by Jake Esterline (in January 18, 1960) called for infiltrating a very select group of

Cubans, training them and putting them back on the island (in the Trinidad area)

Esterline has stated that the Trinidad Plan (approved by Eisenhower on March 17, 1960) never had a chance to evolve – It was taken away by the senior CIA officer in charge’s (Richard Bissell’s) decision to go for more, much more, and create an invasion

force.

Bissell’s operation had become a daylight military invasion with a fleet of boats, WWII era landing ships and landing craft, tanks, paratroop drops, heavy weapons units – something that in no way could have matched the Eisenhower’s original stipulation of

“avoiding any appearance of US intervention”

The Rest of the Story

An August ’60 briefing for Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs discussed a paramilitary force of some 500 trainees and

37 radio operators. They would be

“available to use as infiltration teams or as an invasion

force.” The paper did note that any

successful large scale paramilitary operations would be “dependent

upon widespread guerrilla resistance

throughout the area.”

The Taylor Commission could

find no specific date nor set of orders

which changed the original Trinidad

plan but by November, 1960 a

cable from Washington directed

a reduction in the guerilla teams to 60

men and the formation of the rest into an amphibious

and airborne assault force.

Military commander Colonel Hawkins

advised the senior operations officer

Jake Easterline of the particular emphasis on the amount of air support required for

success, including the amount of aircraft and number of missions. He specifically stated

that if policy considerations did not permit an aggressive tactical air campaign

that the project should be abandoned.

The Taylor Commission also determined that

while Esterline did forward Hawkins memo to Bissell,

The Devil is in the Details

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD EVER GONE

BEYOND BISSELL’S OFFICE, AND

CERTAINLY THAT IT WAS NOT

PRESENTED TO EITHER PRESIDENT KENNEDY OR HIS

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR.

Hawkins states that Bissell had made his own military decisions about dramatically increasing the side of the landing force, adding a parachute battalion and even a tank platoon – changes not recommended by either Hawkins or Esterline.

Col. Hawkins had specifically warned that the use of parachute troops and tanks would unquestionably brand the invasion as a US undertaking; Bissell remained firm in his decisions and there was no further discussion of the point.

Esterline eventually learned that it was Bissell who had banned him from high level Washington meetings and came to the conclusion that Bissell was giving the new President assurances and commitments on deniability that were not being shared with his force commanders.

Esterline also concluded that at some point, possibly even before the transition to the Bay of Pigs landing site, Bissell had given a commitment to President Kennedy that the operation would indeed be low key and would use absolutely minimal air power – an agreement not communicated to Esterline or Hawkins

Major Disconnect

Days before the invasion Easterline and Hawkins drove to Bissell’s home and gave him a detailed account as to why the invasion plan was not

adequate to ensure complete destruction of Castro’s air force - that if “any” of his fighters and bombers survived the first attack they would make

beachhead operations suicidal. defeat the Brigade. They also protested the fact that Air Operations were not under their control.

Both officers then stated they would resign if the invasion were not cancelled - Bissell responded by saying that was impossible but made a firm

promise that he would gain Kennedy’s authorization for more aircraft and more strikes. Bissell “solemnly pledged to Hawkins and that he would

ensure we would get the total number of planes, he would go to the President and explain why it simply had to be

Within two days, completely unknown to the two officers, Bissell actually committed to Kennedy that he would cut the attacking B-26 force in half!

Bissell was aware that post-strike intelligence confirmed that only something like half of the Cuban fighters and bombers were taken out in the

first B-26 strike – he made no response to that information

Single Point of Failure

Esterline found “most

unacceptable” that even

while the Brigade

was going in, Kennedy offered both Bissell and Air Force General (and Air

Operations Commander

) the opportunity

to talk about

additional air support

Both men

elected not to talk to

the President

At that point

Bissell did not even

personally communicate with the task force

military officers, he

sent General Cabell to

deliver the bad news and greet

the firestorm

Most Unacceptable

The Bay of Pigs Revisited