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Appendix D

Bacon and Descartes

Descartes is remarkably united with Sir Francis Bacon in his logic of discovery.

They both doubted and rejected the ancient systems of knowledge and theunexamined evidence of the senses. The human mind, said Bacon in The NewOrganon, (Hereinafter, B) is beset by idols of four kinds: Idols of the Tribe, Idols

of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace, and Idols of the Theater. The Idols of theTribe represent general human failings in virtue of humanity's mental make-up;Idols of the Cave represent failure owingto the peculiarities of the individual;Idols of the Marketplace reflect the poor choice of language that obstructs the

understanding; and finally, Idols of the Theater represent the various outmodedancient and modern philosophical systems. The mind had to be purged of these

idols in order that true inquiry could begin.

But one also has to cast out the old logic:

As the sciences which we now have do not help us in findingout new works, soneither does the logic which we now have help us in finding out new sciences.

(B, 41)

Again:

The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which

have their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after

truth. So it does more harm than good. (B, 41)

So learned disputations had to be replaced by experiments. Experiments must

be performed that are of no use in themselves but simply serve to discovercauses and axioms (B, 96). These experiments are called Experimenta lucifera,experiments of light, which are to be distinguished from Experimenta fructifera,

experiments of fruit. The experiments of light will give us a collection of the firstparticulars ; however, the understanding must notbe allowed to jump and fly

from particulars to axioms (B 98). It should move cautiously and carefully.

But then, and then only, may we hope well of the sciences when in a just scaleof ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from

particulars to lesser axioms, and then to middle axioms, one above the other;and last of all the most general. (B, 98)

Both Bacon and Descartes wanted to create a new system of knowledge on well-

founded truths: Bacon began with simple, careful observations and experiments,Descartes with simple, powerful intuitions. The generalizations and higher

generalizations came later, emphatically not before. What role did the syllogism

play in Bacon's logic of discovery? Not much.

The syllogism is not applied to the first principles of science, and is applied in

vain to intermediate axioms, being no match for the subtlety of nature. It

commands assent therefore to the proposition, but does not take hold of thething. (B, Aphorism 13, p.41)

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The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words aresymbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the

matter) are confused and over hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be nofirmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.

(B, Aphorism 14, p. 41)

What we find in Bacon is remarkably parallel to what we find in Descartes. The

first principle in Descartes' terminology, the first item of knowledge is not tobe founded on a syllogism. To take hold of the thing, one needs to directly

experience it. To rely on a syllogism is ultimately to rely on words, and wordsare often confusing, whence the Idols of the Marketplace. On such a foundationone cannot erect a superstructure of knowledge. Bacon concluded that the wayto search for and discover truth is to derive axioms from the senses and

particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at themost general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (B, 43)

Descartes concluded likewise: It is certain that if we are to discover the truth

we must always begin with particular notions in order to arrive at general oneslater on (CSM II, 271; AT VII, 206). There is simply too much similarity in thestructure of their respective enterprises. Perhaps, then, these are powerful

historical reasons to conclude that the cogitowas not intended by Descartes to

be an argument. If it were, then it would not be the first item of knowledge.

-286-

Publication Information: Book Title: Descartes' Cogito: Saved from the Great Shipwreck.Contributors: Husain Sarkar - author. Publisher: Cambridge University Press. Place of

Publication: New York. Publication Year: 2003. Page Number: 286.