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Background on Development of

Introductory Course on Advanced Microgrids

John Eddy October 24, 2016

Discussion Outline

Background and history of infrastructure security and assurance Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) drivers

Sandia concepts, approaches, and applications

Lessons Learned

Microgrid considerations/applications for electric power security and assurance Sandia approach and strategic considerations

Chronology of Sandia microgrid efforts

Lessons Learned

Advanced microgrid training strategy and approach Emerging DoD and DOE drivers

Role and content of Introductory Course in Advanced Microgrids

Changing Values of Critical Infrastructures

“…the nation is so dependent on our infrastructures that we

must view them through a national security lens. They are essential to the nation’s security, economic health, and social well being.” President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1999

Most infrastructures depend on energy for operation

telecom, water, transportation, government, health, agriculture making energy assurance of local and regional importance

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

2006

Strategic

Plan

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Quadrennial

Defense Review

Report

DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

2008 Plan for

Protecting

Critical

Infrastructure

More flexible, reliable, cost and energy efficient,

sustainable and secure energy supplies

Critical Infrastructure Protection Changes in System Performance Metrics

Undesired

Output

Desired

Output

Non-normal

Input

Normal

Input

Normal

Environment

Non-normal

Environment

Function

Malfunction

Compliance-based

High probability, low

consequence

Performance-based

Low probability, high

consequence

6

Insider

Operational Trade-offs

How well are

you protected?

Consequences

Liabilities

What’s important?

Terrorist

Criminal

What to protect

against?

Undesired

Events, Hazards

Targets Natural,

Man-made

Events

Reduce Consequences

Risk Acceptable?

Cost Options

Decisions

Meet Standards?

Improve Protection

Other Impacts

What are Risk Assessment Methodologies (RAMs) trying to determine?

How much protection is enough?

Characterize

Facilities

Define

Threats

Determine

Consequences

Identify

Mitigations

Analyze

System

Make Changes & Reassess

PA

PE

R

Sufficient Assurance

?

Y

N

Risk = PA x (1-PE) x C

C

End Until Change

Risk

Compare System

Performance to Energy

Security and Mission

Assurance Goals

2001 Sandia Risk Assessment Methodology – Energy (RAM-E)

A quantitative approach to assess energy system Performance against a range of threats and vulnerabilities

8

RAM-D (Dams) RAM-T (Electrical Utility Transmission Systems) RAM-W (Municipal Water Systems) RAM-C (Communities) RAM-CF (Chemical Facilities) RAM-P (Prisons) RAM-E (Energy Systems) RAM-FAA (Airspace management facilities) RC RAM-W (DHS RAMCAP/NIPP compliant version) BioRAM (bio hazards) RAM-CI prototype (all sectors) Automated RAM-W (Water/Wastewater Systems)

Sandia Infrastructure Security Risk Assessment Methodologies (RAMs)

Circa 2005 DoD and Utility Electric Power Security and Reliability Concerns

Practice of providing power security based on back-up generators was

problematic

Frequently over-sized and under-maintained, low probability of start (<60%)

Dedicated to one building or facility

Operations for extended periods problematic

Stating 9’s of reliability – did not adequately factor in the erosion of critical mission capability for extended outages

Safety requirements forced renewable energy technologies to go offline during a power outage

Several large events highlighted that energy assurance was not impacted only by intentional event – Fires in the west with multi-state outages, large eastern multi-state outages due to weather

Sandia started looking at advanced microgrids as a likely energy assurance solution

Advanced Microgrids To Support Smart Grid Initiatives

Gen

Bulk supply connection

(sub-transmission)

Partial Feeder

Micro-grid

Gen

Single

Customer Microgrid

Feeder

Other

FeedersFull Feeder

Microgrid

Full Substation

Microgrid

Distribution Substation

Gen

Gen

Gen

Bulk supply connection

(sub-transmission)

Partial Feeder

Micro-grid

Gen

Single

Customer Microgrid

Feeder

Other

FeedersFull Feeder

Microgrid

Full Substation

Microgrid

Distribution Substation

Gen

Gen

Nanogrid Less than 10-kW, single-phase, residential

Small microgrid From 10-kW to 500-kW, typically three phase

Commercial microgrid Greater than 1 MW up to 20MW

6

Ref EPRI

Chronology of Sandia Advanced Microgrid Program

Initial microgrid program with DoD in 2007 Evaluation and demonstration of microgrids at Ft. Sill and Maxwell

AFB as part of 2005 Sandia microgrid LDRD

Issues with DoD funding, Corps of Engineers RFP process slowed demonstrations

Focus on safe integration of renewables and energy security

Initial microgrid program with DOE in 2009 (OE and FEMP) Focus on ‘advanced microgrids’ that support Smart Grid

Operate islanded and grid tied, integrate renewables and distributed generation better, energy security

Use DoD bases as test beds – they own their own infrastructure

Leverage DoD funding to evaluate microgrid options

From DoD lessons learned, identify commercial advanced microgrid evaluation and implementation approaches

Energy Surety Microgrid Experience with DoD Conceptual

Designs/Assessments

Small Scale

Microgrid Demos

Large Scale

Microgrid Demos

Operational

Prototypes

• Philadelphia Navy Yard – FY11,

DOE OE/PIDC

• Camp Smith – FY10, DOE

FEMP

• West Point FY12, DoD/DOE

• Indian Head NWC – FY09, DOE

OE/DoD

• Ft. Sill – FY08, Sandia LDRD

• Ft. Bliss – FY10, DOE FEMP

• Ft. Carson – FY10, DOE FEMP

• Ft. Devens (99th ANG) – FY09,

DOE OE/DoD

• Ft. Belvoir – FY09 DOE

OE/FEMP

• Cannon AFB – FY11, DOE

OE/DoD

• Vandenberg AFB – FY11, DOE

FEMP

• Kirtland AFB – FY10, DOE

OE/DoD

• Maxwell AFB – FY09, DoD/DOE

• Soto Cano – 2012, DoD/OSD

• Creech AFB – 2012, DoD/OSD

• Bagram – 2013, DoD/OSD

• 29 Palms – 2014, DoD/ESTCP

• Maxwell AFB – FY09,

DoD

• Ft. Sill – FY09, DoD w/

SNL serving as

advisor

• SPIDERS JCTD –

FY11, DOE/DoD

• Camp Smith

• Ft Carson

• Hickam AFB

• H.R. 5136 National

Defense Authorization

Act

The 2010 QDR Provides Guidance on Energy Security and Energy Assurance For DoD

Defines Energy Security

“Energy security for the Department means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs”

Directs facilities to:

Address energy security while simultaneously enhancing mission assurance

Conduct a coordinated energy assessment to prioritize critical assets

Promote investments in energy efficiency Ensure that critical assets are prepared for prolonged

outages: natural disasters, accidents, attacks

Advanced Microgrid Design Course Strategy Team with USACE/CERL to provide a DoD process for energy

evaluation and designs to support QDR (2011-2012) Course 1 - Vulnerability analysis and general conceptual design

training (Sandia) Provide preliminary design and cost ROM for DoD 1391 for MILCON

Developed based on lessons learned from site evaluations

Course 2 – Training on the use of analysis and design tools for final microgrid design, construction, control, and operation (Sandia/CERL) Technical engineering, procurement, operation and construction support

Based on lessons learned from SPIDERS

Assessments at several DoD sites - Kirtland, Philadelphia Navy Yard, and West Point suggested military and civilian microgrid applications have significant similarities Suggested courses, tools etc. support could be very similar

Interest from DOE, MWCOG, MA, and KIER (2012-2014)

Energy Surety Design Methodology

Evaluate Performance

Define Design Basis

Threats (DBT)

Define Performance Goals

& Objectives

Determine Consequences

Formulate Possible

Solutions

Make Changes and Reassess Meet

Objectives? Implement

No Yes

Characterize System &

Define Boundary

Initial Assessment Phase

Analysis Phase

Analyze, Optimize

Identify Critical Loads and

Infrastructure

Iterate, Validate

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Fundamentals of Advanced Microgrid Evaluation and Conceptual Design Course

Developed for generally non-technical, mid-management participants, stakeholders, etc. Base/city managers, base/city engineers, base/city planners, base/city

utility managers, public safety officials, state and utility representatives

Focus on initial phases of Sandia ESDM Background on energy infrastructure and components, energy

assurance, and microgrid applications

How to set energy system performance goals/objectives

How to identify critical infrastructures, services, buildings, missions

How to identify threats and outage durations

How to assess the vulnerability/performance risk of the current energy infrastructure relative to the performance goals

How to develop ROM cost estimates of upgrade options to identify funding needs for various risk reduction options

Fundamentals of Advanced Microgrid Evaluation and Conceptual Design Course

Developed as a 3-day course Includes two course books

Text book with background information, presentation summaries, technical information

Workbook with example problems, worksheets, example evaluation

2- days of lectures and example problems, final day an example city/base evaluation

Developed from funding from DOE/OE (FY 12), KIER (FY13-14), Rivermoor Energy (FY13), and DOE/EERE (FY14) Worked on initial content and approach with Northampton, MA in 2013

Taught “alpha” version with KIER in May 2014

Prepared “beta” version in August- December 2014

DoD and DOE EERE interested in using in 2015 (3 different locations)

Advanced Microgrid Course Organization

Module 1 – Introduction to Electric Power and Energy Surety

Module 2 – Introduction to Microgrids

Module 3 – Energy Surety Design Methodology

Module 4 – Defining Energy System Boundaries

Module 5 – Ranking Critical Assets and Services

Module 6 – Identify Design Basis Threats

Module 7 – Developing Performance Goals and Objectives

Module 8 – Performance Risk Analysis

Module 9 – Load Estimation Techniques

Module 10 – Formulating and Evaluating System Reliability and Availability Options

Module 11 – Design Option Cost Estimation