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TRANSCRIPT
BACKGROUND CHECKS & INSIDER
THREATS
Anton Olivier : Border Police
FOUNDATIONS Anton Olivier
34 Yrs Policing Service
26 Yrs Commission Officer
2 x GM Award recipient
(ACSA)
THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VALUES
& ETHICS
SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING
• SAPS with a clear and critical role in the NASP
• The work of policing demands maximum cooperation with
stakeholders and Government departments
• Departments represented or operational at the airport
Dept of Home Affairs
Dept of Defence
Dept of Agriculture &
Fisheries
Dept of Transport
Dept of State Security
Dept of Environment
DIRCO
SARS
Dept of Health
Dept of
Communications
Dept of Energy
Dept of Tourism
Dept of Public
Enterprise
Dept of Public Works
Tourism Board
Traffic Police
SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING
KEY AGENCIES
SACAA Regulatory agency
• Standards
• Practices
• NASP/LASC
• Reporting of Acts of Unlawful Interference
• Implementation and compliance to Annex 17
ACSA - Specific Aviation security arrangements as per NASP
- Infrastructure& coordination of Aviation security role
players
AIRPORT COMMITTEES OF NOTE
• Security at an airport is coordinated through various statutory
committees which include among others:
• Local Airport Security Committee (LASC) Chaired by ACSA
Security
• Joint Planning Committee(JPC) chaired by ACSA(Landlord)
• Joint Operational Coordinating Committee (JOCOM) Chaired
by SAPS.
• Such collective functioning and approach plays a pivotal role
in all measures put in place to counter insider threat in the
environment.
SECURITY APPRECIATION &
CONSIDERATIONS
• SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider:
• SAPS have a command and control responsibility
during security related incidents and operations
• SAPS have a directing and managing responsibility
during security related incidents and operations
• Irrespective of other security deployments SAPS
operate in various critical areas
SECURITY APPRECIATION &
CONSIDERATIONS
• SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider:
• Acknowledge the presence of both long term and
short term security contracts taking care of a variety of
safeguarding and processes
• A Variety of airlines utilising contract security to secure
their aircraft and processes
• SAPS had to keep cognisance of their mandate
pertaining to the illegal movement of goods and
people
RECRUITMENT
• SAPS is present and deployed at airports that have
international status.
• Categories due to their status - commercial values.
• The busier the airport, the higher the number of personnel is
deployed.
• Police members recruited to be assigned with border policing
functions are recruited by the broader SAPS and are subjected
to security screening that includes their previous backgrounds;
this recruitment will also include the minimum requirement on
educational aspects.
SAPS PERSONNEL PLACEMENT
All SAPS members deployed at airports -
• Undergo an induction program
• The induction program is conducted in conjunction with ACSA
that includes all aspects of Aviation Safety and Security.
• Subjected to security checks - Z204 forms
• Committed offences or not conforming to the standards set,
are either removed from sector /permits confiscated / removed
from the environment
• Those found to have committed grossly misconduct are dealt
either departmentally or criminally.
SAPS STRATEGY
All operational areas in the airport have been demarcated
into smaller and manageable areas, and this concept has
been designed to cover the whole operational area to
include access points, inner perimeter control, outer
perimeter, terminals, land side and parking areas.
SAPS DEPLOYMENT Outer Perimeter – Access control
Baggage makeup area
Cargo Area /Warehouses
CSC(Crime Prevention)
Terminal Contact points
Valuable Cargo
Passenger movements
Firearm permits
Air side Sector
Land side Sector
OTHER SERVICES
• Permit application checks
• K9
• Intelligence gathering(CIG)
• Specialised
Investigations(DPCI)
• Explosives Ordinance
• Document specialists
• Firearm Officers
• Hostage negotiators
• Incident Investigators
• Response capacity
SAPS PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT
• All members charged with the functioning at air side are
subjected to the same AVOB training in which all stake
holders are subjected to.
• Aviation Learning Program -Understanding the ICAO
security standards , Annex 17 understanding the
corruption concept ,risks & threats
• Subject specialist training
BACKGROUND CHECK
A background check is the process of looking up and
compiling criminal records, commercial records and
financial records of an individual or an organization.
BACKGROUND CHECK
• A background check will investigate an individual`s
background based on criteria determined by their
prospective or current employer.
• A check of an individual`s background may include
previous employment, education, criminal record, credit
history, vehicle and license record checks.
• Each type of check will reveal different information
pertinent to that check and it forms part of the
employment process
• It again becomes part of the permit process
• The check is limited to a criminal background check
ADVANCED FORMS OF BACKGROUND
CHECKS & INVESTIGATIONS
• Banking business
• All forms of communication data
• Tracking
• Lifestyle Audit
• Advanced Linkages
• Polygraph
• Forensic Investigations
• Cloning
INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS
• ID number,Surname and date of birth.
• The information that the system
• retrieves and displays, will
• determine as to what is depth
• the applicant will be scrutinised.
• The information submitted by the applicant i.e. his/her home
address can also be used when scrutinising the information
the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject
criminal convictions.
INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS
• On the crim system the 1st phase check is
running by entering the applicants
surname, date of birth, population
group and gender. (The population group
is a mandatory requirement).
• Again the information that the system retrieves and displays, will determine as
to what is depth the applicant will be scrutinised. The information submitted by
the applicant i.e. his/her home address can also be used when scrutinising the
information the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject criminal
convictions.
INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS
THE 2ND PHASE OF THE SEARCH IS THE APPLICANTS ID NUMBER ONLY.
• Often the applicants do not supply their ID numbers during their arrests.
• Spelling and typing errors also play a crucial role.
• Applicants do not always provide their given names, but nick names or “street
names”.
• Regional and local spelling of names and surnames.
• Applicants do not always provide their correct dates of birth during arrests.
• False ID documents have been presented, male person with female persons ID
number.
• ID fraud has on occasion found, the applicants ID number and/or names have
been used by someone else.
• If necessary conduct and interview with the applicant.
• The police official whom is conducting the checks might have a sense
• which's alerts him/her to conduct an in depth scrutinising of the applicant.
INSIDER THREAT
• An insider threat is a malicious threat to an organization
or industry that comes from people within the
organization, such as employees, former employees,
contractors or business associates, who have inside
information concerning the organization's security,
practices, data and procedures and systems
• In the aviation environment it alludes to the core of
aviation security and safety from within
CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH
• People working for or within our environments are aware of the
mechanisms in place and use this knowledge to circumvent our systems
• There is a gap between initial background checks and the time the
threat is unexpectedly materialise
• We need an approach to address these challenges by delivering these
capabilities in an solution that does not require a long-term data analysis
project.
• We need to know what to do when the warning signs are there
• Law enforcement structures historically focused on `successful` criminal
prosecution
• We need parallel solutions to close the gap between initial background
checks
CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH
We need to develop a purpose-built program that speak to the heart of the
insider threat,
We need to detect multi high-risk activity, access, and events(activities) in
the aviation environment associated with insider threats.
There should be room for Insider Risk Intelligence within the framework
There is a need for visible rapid matrix indicator that can be populated to
indicate potential insider risk and threat levels
We need to consider a to develop a multi dimensional program that can
be multi populated though suspicious activities witnessed
CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
ADVANTAGES
• It serves as an Insider threat intelligence tool to monitor , investigate and
report on risks in the aviation environment
• It serves as a predictive threat detection(Early detection)
• It serves as a contingency to mitigate the impact of a threat
• It serves as a program to close security gaps in a proactive manner
• It address comprehensive threat response and investigation
• It serves as a quantified, non-subjective threat and risk reporting tool
• It clean the industry / Mitigating threats
• It address both risk & loss management
• Industry Claim Credit / Earn respect
INSIDER THREAT CASE STUDIES
Insight in to insider threat incidents:
• Human smuggling/facilitation
• Contravention of Part 108
• Baggage manipulation(CTIA & ORTIA)
• Collaboration between staff
• SAPS Insider threats
• Syndicate linkages
WHEN SAPS & INDUSTRY WORK
TOGETHER
THANK YOU