Efforts To Prevent Heroin From illicitly Reaching The United States E-764031(2)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Department of Justice

Department of State

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHlNGTON DC PO548

B-164031(2)

Dear-Mr Rangel*

This 1s our report on efforts to prevent heroin from llllcltly reaching the United States by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justxe, and by the Department of State, This review was made m accordance with your request of December 7, 1971 You also requested a report on the Bureau of Customs efforts at Kennedy International Airport and at the Fort of New York We will issue you that report at a later date

Copies of this report are bemg sent today to the Attorney General and to the Secretary of State.

We belleve that the contents of this report would be of Interest to commlttees and other members of Congress Therefore, as you have agreed, w.e are dlstrlbutmg this report to such committees and mem- bers of Congress

Sincerely yours*

Comptroller General of the Unlted States

The Honorable Charles B. Range1 House of Representatives

DIGEST

Contents Page

1

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 3

2 THE HEROIN PROBLEM 5 Morphine-base trafficking system 5 Morphine-base smuggling methods 10 Heroin laboratories 10 Heroin smuggling 11

3 PROGRESS TOWARD PREVENTING FLOW OF NARCOTICS BNDD'S achievements BNDD'S GEO-Drug Enforcement Program Suggestions for improving BNDD operations

Language training District office staffing Reward payments

Recommendations to the Attorney General

15 15 19 19 19 19 21 21

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN HOST COUNTRIES' EFFORTS TO CONTROL ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC 23

Host countries' actions to improve narcotics law enforcement 23

Control of opium production 23 Opium Licensing and Control Law 23 Ban on opium cultivation 24

Border inspections being improved 25 Increased penalties for narcotics

violations 25 Narcotxcs police forces increased 25

Need for police forces to improve effectiveness 27

Need to recruit and develop in- formants 27

Need to change laws to permit undercover work 27

Need for granting umnunity or reduced sentences 28

CHAPTER

Need for effective intelligence exchange

Conclusion Recommendations to the Secretary of

State

5 SCOPE OF REVIEW

APPEtiDIX

I Letter of December 7, 1971, from Congressman Charles B. Range1 to the Comptroller General of the United States

II Principal officials responsible for the administration of activities discussed in this report

ABBREVIATIONS

BNDD Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

PaPe

28 29

30

31

33

35

GAO General Accounting Office .

CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTION

At the request of Congressman Charles Rangel, the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed the actlvrties of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) III Europe and in Turkey. We also Inquired into the progress of se- lected European and Near East countries in controlling illicit narcotxs traffic, especxally the flow of heroin to the United States.

The data In this report,unless lndrcated otherwise, was either told to us by BNDD officials or was obtained from BNDD records.

BNDD, an agency of the Department of Justlce, takes an agressive role in assisting foreign law enforcement agen- cies to stop the flow of illicit narcotics traffic, Fol- lowing accepted protocol, BNDD does not maintain formal contact with the various ministries of the foreign govern- ments. Matters requiring actlon by a foreign mlnlstry are brought to the attention of the responsible U.S. Ambassador.

BNDD's responslbllltles in the foreign countries where it maintains offices include:

--Assisting foreign narcotics units In the elimination of raw materials, processors and processing faclll- ties, and distribution systems.

--Collecting and analyzing intelligence.

--Assisting in political and diplomatic matters.

--Assisting in training.

--Assisting in material and operations.

At the end of fiscal year 1972, BNDD had allocated 45 special agent positions and had filled 36:

--23 in region 17, headquartered in Paris, France, with 11 dlstrlct offi"ces throughout Europe.

3

--13 In region 19, headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, with seven district offices throughout the Near East,

During fiscal year 1972 combined operating expenses for re- gions 17 and 19 amounted to $1,085,000. According to BNDD, this represents about one-fourth of 1 percent of the dollar value of drugs seized in these regions during the same year. The operating expenses include purchase of narcotics for evidence, paym ents to informants for lnformatlon on drug trafflcklng, and other miscellaneous items,

CHAPTER 2

THE HEROIN PROBLEM

Most of the world's opium poppy is grown in a zone extending from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province In China. Of primary importance to the United States is the Near East area where raw opium (opium gum) produced in Turkey for legitimate medical requirements is diverted through illegal channels to the United States. Opium gum is converted into morphine base and smuggled to France where it is refined into heroin in clandestine lab- oratories. BNDD officials estimate that about 4,000 kilo- grams of heroin are produced annually In the Marseilles area of France--mostly for shipment to the United States.

A complex distribution system prevents immediate solu- tion of the heroin problem. The system consists of a series of separate and independent transactions handled by various groups brought together by the tremendous proflts involved. (The retail price for 1 kilogram of heroin in New York is about $400,000, but the poppy grower only receives about $200 a kilogram.)

MORPHINE-BASE TRAFFICKING SYSTEM

The illicit morphine-base trafficking in Turkey con- sists of a number of separate but interrelated activities.

1. Interior trafficker--This person operates in Turkey and initiates the smuggling process by buyrng opium gum from farmers. Some traffickers pay farmers in advance for a given quantity of opium gum, others simply send representatives to buy the amount needed to meet their requirements.

2. Conversion into morphine base--The conversion of opium gum Into morphine base is a fairly simple cooking process. The basic equipment in a conver- sion workshop usually consists of such utensils as large tubs, enameled pans, buckets, Jugs, drying trays, and an oven or stove. The equipment is generally set up in a large room in an isolated

i private residence. Mayor traffickers have their own conversion facilities.

3. Exterior trafficker--The exterior trafficker LS normally the lraison In Turkey between the internal trafficker and foreign customers. There are a num- ber of individuals in a maJor exterior-trafficking group, Each group usually has one leader who over- sees the entire operatron, including negotiations with connections in France, purchase of narcotics, and smuggling. On equal footing with the leaders, but divorced from the actual operations, are the silent partners. These indivrduals are generally high-ranking figures in the Turkish underworld who own legitimate businesses.

4. Commission man --The commission man 1s a middleman who receives a fee from both the interior trafficker and the exterior trafficker if he is successful in locating opium gum or morphine base for the latter,

6

7

TOP-Poppy pod and opium seeds CENTER-Turkish peasants harvestmg crude opwm

BOTTOM-Opium bemg scraped from the poppy pod

CLANDESTINE LABORATORY REFINING

LEFT-CA LMET HEROIN LABORA TOR Y This laboratory had a production of 25 30 kllograms of herom a week BNDD Agents m cooperation with French pohce seized the clandestme operation m March 1969

RIGHT-MINET HEROIN LABORA TOR Y produced 75 kilograms of heroin a week This laboratory was seized by French Police and BNDD Agents

BOTTOM-CA LMET, mterlor view

9

MORPHINE-BASE SMUGGLING METHODS

AvaIlable evidence indicates that overland smuggling has become the most common means of transporting morphine base to France. The methods a smuggler may use to trans- port narcotics are llmited only by the scope of his imagl- nation. A common practice is to use specially constructed compartments or tttrapstt built into passenger cars, commer- cial trucks, and touring buses.

A large part of all narcotics shipped overland is believed to pass through Germany. Trafficking operations In Germany are often similar to those in Turkey. The German groups usually employ a commission man who finds a connection and then the groups hire a courier to transport the morphine base to France.

Smuggling by sea also accounts for a large quantity of narcotics entering France. There are two prlnclpal methods: the first is to unload the narcotics before enter- ing a port by either transferring the shipment to a smaller craft or by throwing the shipment overboard at a prearranged location; the second method involves delivery at the port.

The overland and sea smuggling methods are sometimes combined--the narcotics are hidden in a car which 1s shipped from Turkey to a Western European or Mediterranean port and then driven to France.

HEROIN LABORATORIES

Most of the illegal heroin-producing laboratories are located on the southern coast of France, between Nice and Marseilles, and possibly in Corsica. BNDD estimated that at least five and possibly 10 groups operate laboratories at any one time and employ up to 100 individuals. Each group appears to have its own purchasing, trafficking, and courier operations

The laboratories are not large and a number are un- doubtedly mobile. A laboratory requires the services of a chemist and is usually owned by the chemist. No central organization commands the entire operation, although co- operation among groups is not unusual.

10

HEROIN SMUGGLING

Heroin-smuggling methods are numerous and the value of heroin relative to its weight eliminates transportation cost as a factor in deciding which method to use. The Strategic Intelligence Office of BNDD made a study to iden- tify the transportation and marketing patterns for heroin entering the United States. The study analyzed significant drug seizures from 1967 through 1971. The following show the results of the study.

Number of Heroln-smugglrng Routes

1967 1968 1969

France-U S 5 4 4 Other European-U.S 2 5 6 Europe-Canada-U S 3 2 1 Europe-U S via Latin

America or Carrbbean 2 2 2 Far East-U.S 1 1 Middle East-U S. 2

Number of Herorn-smuggling Methods

1967 1968 1969

Body pack 7 7 6 Suitcase (note a) 3 1 2 Concealed aboard ship 1 1 Mail Concealed rn vehicle ; i Concealed aboard alrplane

(note b> 3 Clandestrne flight (note c> - Other concealment devices

(note d) Unknown

1 i

3 2

aSultcases with false bottoms or sides, but m one instance carried loose in a suitcase and m another shopped as unaccompanied baggage

b Scheduled commercial passenger flzght

1970

tables

1971

3 1 3

8 3

'Prtvate flight or unscheduled commercial flight made ostensibly for another reason, but the true purpose was to Introduce heroin into the United States

d Oscrlloscopes, food cans, ski poles, two straw-covered bottles lnsrde flight bag, frozen food boxes, picture frames

11

INTERNATIONAL

On March 7, 1972 this shrimp boat was stopped between MarseJle,

Toulon and Nice by French Port and Customs Authorities-search

disclosed twenty laundry bags, three sea bags, one plastic shoppmg

bag contamtng 439 kllograms of pure herom

Data tndlcates shop was destined directly for south Flol Ida, lJ S A

In summary, once the opium poppy is cut and the opium gum is dlverted to the illicit market and processed into heroin, it is a formidable task to prevent the heroin from entering the United States.

14

CHAPTER3

PROGRESS TOWARD PREVENTING

FLOW OF NARCOTICS

BNDD's mission in Europe and the Near East is to assist host governments in preventing the flow of narcotics from Europe to the United States by helping them identify and apprehend those persons and organizations engaged in the acquisition of illicit opium, its conversion to heroin, and its transportation to the United States. BNDD's principal functions are to (1) provide foreign law enforcement agen- cies with strategic intelligence on the movement of illicit traffic to enable them to make drug seizures and arrests, (2) encourage local officials to use techniques and tech- nology which have been proven effective in suppressing illicit drug traffic, and (3) provide a communication link between the various foreign narcotics units, thereby insur- ing rapid dissemination of all information on traffickers

In carrying out these functions, BNDD has used inform- ants and undercover agents whenever feasible and has em- phasized improving the collaboration, coordination, and ex- changes of intelligence within and among foreign law en- forcement agencies, It also has frequently used diplomatic channels to persuade foreign countries to be more concerned about the international heroin problem and to persuade its foreign counterparts to use effective methods in suppressing the flow of narcotics.

BNDD'S ACHIEVEMENTS

BNDD officials believe that the efforts described above are paying off in increased seizures, arrests, and intelli- gence information. They believe also that BNDD has been effective if the amount of narcotics seized m Europe by BNDD and its foreign counterparts during the year increases 20 percent over the preceding year. In 1970, 461 kilograms of heroin and morphine base yere seized in Europe. In 1971, 1,341 kilograms of heroin and morphine base were seized in Europe, representrng 28 seizures. In the first 7 months of 1972, 1,312 kilograms were seized, representing 14 seizures.

From January to June 1972, the Turkish narcotrcs units, with help from BNDD, seized 288 kilograms of narcotics rep- resenting four seizures of opium gum and two seizures of morphine base.

Although the credit due foreign law enforcement agencies partlcipatlng in the investigations IS not to be diminished, BNDD has been primarily responsrble for drug serzures be- cause it has inrtlated and coordinated most of the narcotics investigations. For example, approximately 65 percent of the seizures in Europe resulted from rntelligence either supplied by informants recruited by BNDD or obtained through the undercover work of its agents.

The effectiveness of BNDD's enforcement effort in Europe can be measured by the number of trafficking arrests in which BNDD has particrpated since 1970. In 1970, 74 inter- national traffickers in narcotics were arrested as a result of morphine base and heroin seizures This number nearly doubled during 1971, with the arrest of 145 traffickers. By the end of 3uly 1972, 170 international traffickers had been arrested

Most of the individuals apprehended at the time of these seizures were courler,s or controllers; that IS, persons who delivered the contraband or made arrangements with customers in the United States. However, through mformatlon obtained from cooperating defendants and through postseizure investi- gations by BNDD, major traffickers were later arrested in both the United States and France For example, indictments filed III the United States in connection with two seizures in France resulted in the arrest of 23 suspected traffickers, including the customer and several leaders, suppliers, and controllers of the two organizations mnvolved. The customer and his associates were responsible for supplying, or at- tempting to supply, the U S. market with over 971 kilograms of heroin between May 1970 and October 1971

BNDD has been successful m obtarnlng the cooperation of foreign law enforcement agencies and rn getting them to accept its operation methods. The following case illustrates the high degree of cooperation obtained,

16

Several months ago the BNDD district office in Rome recruited the services of an informant who formerly was associated with a Marseilles trafficker. The informant trav- eled to Marseilles and contacted the trafficker, who told the informant that he was no longer engaged in heroin traffic but that he would introduce the informant to another traf- ficker who could supply any amount of heroin The following day the informant met this heroin trafficker and plans were formulated for the delivery of 50 kilograms to a city in Italy.

On the appointed day the trafficker met the informant in Italy but without the heroin because he felt that police activity U-I France during the recent roundup of high-level traffickers might make delivery too risky. Another date was set for the delivery. On the revised delivery date, the trafficker met the informant and two undercover agents-- an Italian Jaw enforcement officer and a BNDD special agent The trafficker took the three to an Isolated area on the outskirts of the city, where another car arrived with 25 kd- ograms of heroin, The trafficker explained that the remain- ing 25 kilograms would be brought from Marseilles the follow- ing morning.

The delivery of the first installment was monitored by BNDD and three Italian law enforcement agencies.l Survell- lance was maintained throughout the night on the trafficker and the driver and passenger of the vehicle in which the heroin was delivered.

The next morning the trafficker advised the informant and undercover agents that he must be paid before the second installment could be delivered. The authorities therefore decided to arrest the trafficker--Italian law forbids sus- pected felons to depart from the country. Arrested with the trafficker were the two individuals who delivered the contra- band.

1 Publica Sicurezza --usual urban police functions Guardia di Finanza--customs control. Arma Carabinieri--a police element of the army, subordinate

to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime.

17

The trafficker had been under intensive investigation by the French police and was known to BNDD as a trafficker, He also was suspected of operating one or two heroin labo- ratories in the Marseilles area The driver of the vehicle in which the heroin was transported was a known heroin cou- rler; the passenger was thought to be a relative of another Marseilles trafficker.

Although the amount seized and the number of arrests were relatively small, the case was amportant because (1) it was the largest seizure of heroin in Italy, (2) it was the first time that BNDD had coordinated an investigation in which all three Italian law enforcement agencies participated, (3) it was a cooperative effort by the narcotics enforcement agencies of two foreign countries, and (4) it immobilized a suspected heroin laboratory operator. BNDD also believes that the intellrgence developed from this case was of ben- efit to the French authorities in their seizure of a clan- destine heroin laboratory approximately 2 months later.

BNDD and foreign law enforcement agencres also cooperate in forming special task forces to combat illicit narcotics traffic. One such task force,which will utilize available information and intelligence to organize and exploit leads, has been established in northern Italy. Profiles will be developed of the characteristics of smugglers and vehicles used in smuggling. Activities based on these profiles will be set up at and behind border points (in cooperation with existing enforcement offices and units) to identify the most likely suspects When seizures are made, the task force plans to attempt to gain the cooperation of, and ade- quate control over, the smuggler so that, in cooperation with the French police, a controlled delivery of morphine base can be made to a laboratory in France

BNDD officials said that many more task forces are being planned, including one in Germany, and that this con- cept has become an important part of BNDD's strategy. Al- though the task forces are to operate only for limited periods of time, representatives of the natlonal law en- forcement agencies should receive valuable training by par- ticipating in the point effort

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BNDDIS GEO-DRUG ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

BNDD officials advised us that, during July 1972, they Implemented a program referred to as the GEO-Drug Enforce- ment Program. Under this program, BNDD plans to direct its enforcement effort at many illicit drug distrlbutlon systems, which are defined by maJor drug categories and geographic ar- eas of the world. A violator-rating system and regional work plans are essential components of the program. BNDD plans to direct 80 percent of its enforcement resources to the pro- gram.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING BNDD OPERATIONS

We noted several areas where BNDD could further improve the effectiveness of its European and Near East operations.

Language training

BNDD, sn less than 1 year, doubled Its entire overseas staff and assigned a number of special agents to European and Near East countries. Some were fluent in the language of the host country because of ethnic background, some were sent to school but received only mlnlmal training In the language, and, because of the lack of time, some were sent overseas with no training in the host country language

BNDD agents advised us that they could function without being fluent in the host country language because busrness with foreign officials could always be conducted through an interpreter. They indicated, however, that, without lan- guage proficiency, rt had been difficult to develop the rap- port with their foreign counterparts that was so important in narcotics control work. We believe that language profi- ciency in its agents would aid BNDD in Its undercover work.

District office staffing

The district offices of regions 17 and 19 were generally staffed by only two special agents. We were told by the special agent in charge at two district offices that with their present staff they had not been able to follow up on all leads and had not been able to do all the necessary m- vestigative work, i.e., monitoring truck traffic at ferryboat

69

crossings, etc. They said that addItIona staff would In- crease their potential for solving cases.

We noted that the special agent In charge of a dlstrlct offlce had numerous responslbllltles In addltlon to his In- vestlgatlve work. He performed admlnlstratlve functions, co- ordinated BNDD's actlvltles with the actlvltles of other U.S Government agencies at overseas posts, partlclpated In dlplo- matic matters, and malntalned llalson with foreign law en- forcement officials.

BNDD headquarters offlclals stated that the European staff should be increased by at least 25 percent and that addltlonal agents are needed at the district offices coverlng such key llllclt narcotics traffic centers as Istanbul, Tur- key 9 and Munich, Germany.

BNDD has also had a problem In retaining experienced agents In charge at its overseas district offices. Such agents expressed concern about extended overseas tours be- cause they believed It was a career-llmltlng assignment. They indicated that the authorized grade level was not com- mensurate with the responslbllltles of the offlce and that the present organlzatlonal structure provided little opportu- nity for promotion. At the time of our review In April 1972, a dlstrlct office agent In charge, GS-13, held the highest grade posltlon authorized outside the regional offlce. Be- cause only a limited number of higher grade posltlons are available In the reglonal offlces, the agents In charge be- lieve they will not advance as fast overseas as they normally would In the larger offices In the United States.

The need to mlnlmlze employee turnover has been brought to the attention of the State Department by Its overseas Em- bassies. The U.S. Embassies emphasized to the Secretary and BNDD the Inadequacy of normal placement procedures to meet the need of keeping the experts In the field longer, rather than replaclng them with agents with little or no knowledge of the language or the particular sltuatlons In the most sen- sltlve countries abroad.

We discussed this sltuatlon with BNDD Washlngton offl- coals and explalned that, in our oplnlon, BNDD policy should permit key personnel promotions, especially promotions of

20

agents In charge with special language skills and knowledge of a country.

BNDD Washington offlclals indicated that they had been aware of both the staffing and language-tralnlng problems and that they would take some corrective action. On July 9, 1972, BNDD promoted the agent In charge of the district of- fice In Bonn, Germany, to GS-14 which 1s commensurate with his responslblllty. We believe that this should help to al- leviate the concern of the experienced agents in charge in extending their tours of duty overseas.

Reward payments

As indicated on page 27, Intelligence on illicit narcot- ics traffic frequently must be purchased. In this regard BNDD pays informers for lnformatlon about traffickers and also offers rewards for certain other types of lnformatlon. In fiscal year 1972, three rewards were paid for lnformatlon which led to the seizure of three heroin laboratorles, two of which were In Europe. The rewards were determined by us- ing $10,000 as the basic reward for the laboratory with an addltlonal amount for each kilogram of heroin, morphine base, and opium seized. The maximum reward paid as of July 1972 was $50,000.

In an attempt to obtain more lnformatlon, suggestions have been made that the reward for lnformatlon leading to the seizure of a heroin laboratory be Increased to $200,000.

At the June 1972 Franco/Canadlan/Amerlcan Conference held In Ottawa, Canada, BNDD announced that it had adopted a new reward policy for laboratory seizures. BNDD stated that this policy allowed payment of rewards up to $200,000 In laboratory seizure cases.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

We believe that BNDD has been effective in Its efforts toward preventing the organized llllclt narcotics traffic In Europe and the Near East. However, BNDD can further Increase the effectiveness of Its European and Near East operations. We recommend that the Attorney General take the necessary action to:

21

--Establish a policy which would encourage agents with special interests and skills to accept long-term over- seas assignments.

--Insure that special agents assigned to foreign posts are proflclent In the host country language,

CHAPTER4

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN HOST COUNTRIES' EFFORTS

TO CONTROL ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC

U.S, Embassy and BNDD officials have succeeded in per- suading foreign countries to be more concerned about the international heroin problem and to take action to improve their capability to control illicit narcotics traffic. How- ever, we believe that the narcotics control efforts of these countries could be improved if certain actions were taken to increase the effectiveness of their narcotics law enforce- ment agencies.

HOST COUNTRIES' ACTIONS TO IMPROVE NARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT

We analyzed the actions taken by Turkey, France, Ger- many, and Italy to improve their narcotics control capa- bility. Much of the herorn entering the United States flows from or through these countries.

Control of opium production

The Government of Turkey has enacted the Opium Llcens- ing and Control Law and has issued an edict prohibiting poppy cultlvatron and opium production after the 1972 har- vest. Embassy offlclals believe that the Government will make a thorough effort to implement the law.

Opium Licensing and Control Law

The Opium Licensing and Control Law, enacted in August 1971, requires poppy farmers to be licensed. To obtain a license, a farmer must file an annual appllcatlon with the Turkish Sol1 Products Office. The size of the poppy-growing area and an estimate of the quantity of opium gum to be pro- duced must be included In the application, with a simple sketch of the area to be planted. The law further provides that:

--A single agency, the Soil Products Office, is respon- sible for all opium operations. Until 1971, the

23

Mlnlstry of Agriculture was responsible for control- llng opium cultlvatlon, and the Sol1 Products Offlce was responsible for purchasing and exporting opium gum in legal trade.

--Penalties are prescribed for persons cultlvatlng poppy wlthout a license or In an area not covered by a license.

--Bonuses can be paid to informants who provide infor- mation leading to the seizure of llllclt opium.

At the time of our review, the Sol1 Products Office was implementing a program to control poppy production during the 1971-72 season. The program requires control teams to be organized In the four provinces authorized to cultivate POPPY* These control teams will determlne whether the actual planted area conforms to the area recorded on the farmer's license and will estimate the amount of opium that must be turned In to the Turkish Government.

To discourage opium production during the current sea- son, the Government 1s wllllng to compensate farmers for wlthdrawlng from productron. Farmers who voluntarily wlth- draw can receive 525 Turkish llra (about $40) a kilogram for the quantity of opium gum sold to the Government In 1971.

Ban on opium cultlvatlon

By decree dated June 30, 1971, the Government of Turkey banned opium production after the 1972 harvest. This decree 1s not Irrevocable. A Government offlclal stated that:

"The government, In banning opium by Its decree of June 30, has not entered Into any bilateral or unl- lateral declslon. If our economy, our farmers, cannot fill the gap created by this ban, we have no commitment to prevent our returning to plant- ing."

The Unlted States agreed to grant the Government of Turkey $35 mllllon to help it make the transltlon from poppy to other crops. About $20 mllllon was to be used to help finance a crop substltutlon program, and the balance was to

24

be used to provide subsidies to the farmers while the crop substitution prolects were being developed.

The Government of Turkey completed its study on means of rmproving farm income in poppy regions and planned to select proJects to be started sometime in 1972.

Border inspections being improved

Germany and France were making a special effort to im- prove inspections at border crossings. German customs au- thorities established groups with special equipment to screen vehicles for hidden drugs. Plans were also being made for concerted raids by German border lice units at specific border crossings. informed us in July 1972 that Germany was trucks coming from Turkey.

and security po- BNDD officials inspecting all

BNDD's records indicated that French customs officials became particularly thorough after a radical change of pol- icy in 1969 when they were directed to search every indi- vidual and vehicle that appeared out of the ordinary. One of the more important drug seizures during 1972 was made by French customs officials at an Italian-French border cross- ing.

Increased penalties for narcotics violations

Persons now convicted of narcotics offenses can be im- prisoned for longer periods of time because of amended nar- cotics laws. For example, in December 1970 France increased its penalty for narcotics trafficking from a maximum of 5 years to 20 years, and Germany raised its penalty from 3 years to 10 years in November 1971. Individuals convicted in Turkey of exporting heroin or morphine base or of at- tempting to perpetrate such offense are subJect to life im- prisonment.

Narcotics police forces increased

The Director of BNDD and U.S. Embassy officials have directed extensive and largely successful efforts to per- suade the governments of foreign countries to expand their police forces assigned to narcotics control. In 1969 the

25

French Police Judiciarire had only 33 policemen assigned ex- clusively to narcotics control. This force was increased to 63 in 1970 and to 145 in 1971 largely because of encourage- ment from the Director of BNDD and from the U.S. Ambassador. Furthermore the narcotics squad at Marseilles has been ordered to devote its entire efforts to international cases.

Italy has three national police forces, each of which has personnel assigned full time to narcotics work through- out Italy. As indicated below, the number of policemen as- signed to this work has increased significantly.

Number of personnel assigned full time to narcotics control December 1970 March 1972

Publica Slcurezza 9 54 Arma Carabinreri 20 25 Guardia dl Flnanza 16 22 -

Total

The number of policemen asslgned to narcotics control has also increased In Turkey and Germany.

Most of the countries that took the actlons mentloned above did not have a heroin addiction problem; therefore, their actions demonstrated an lncreaslng concern about the heroin problem In the Unlted States.

26

NEED FOR POLICE FORGES TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS

Progress toward immobilizing the major traffickers en- gaged in Illicit narcotics traffic will be limited until national police forces begin using more effective law en- forcement practices and have an effective means of exchang- ing intelligence,

Need to recruit and develop informants

BNDD pointed out that, unlike other crimes, a narcotics crime does not produce a victim who furnishes law enforce- ment officials with the details of the crime. Intelligence on illicit narcotics traffic has to be developed from other sources. BNDD officials advised us that in the United States such information was frequently obtained from paid informers (usually underworld figures) who provided infor- mation which law enforcement authorities needed to direct thexr surveillance activxties toward appropriate traffxkers. BNDD has inltnated most of the investigations which re- sulted in the major drug seizures in Europe, and these in- vestigations resulted from rnformation provided by informers

The police forces of the countries we visited generally did not use Informers, BNDD officials advised us that this investigative technique is not a normal practice in Europe.

BNDD officials have frequently stated that one of the greatest weaknesses of police narcotics units is a lack of informants and that national police forces should not be dependent on BNDD but should develop their own sources of information.

Need to change laws to permit undercover work

Narcotics policemen in the countries we visited did not work undercover--i.e., buy narcotics to gain the con- fidence of traffickers and to gather intelligence on the movement of narcotics--because the policemen would be sub- Ject to penalties or to criminal prosecution. Thus an ef- fective method of penetrating a criminal organization could not be used,

27

The following situation in one country, as told to us by a BNDD agent, was representative of conditions noted:

"One handicap under which [local] law enforcement agencies must operate is the provision of ** [local] law whereby the buyer of narcotics [whether he is a law enforcement officer or not] is as guilty as the seller of narcotics, This restric- tion eliminates the possibility of conducting un- dercover investigations in the drug field in the most effective manner. In order to penetrate any criminal organization, the agent must be able to gain the confidence of the people with whom he is dealing, In effect, he must often appear to be as much of a criminal as the criminals. Because the ** [local] law enforcement officer cannot 'buy' narcotics, but must arrest the violator for possession as soon as he delivers the drugs, he is already working at a serious handicap. The vio- lators know that the officers cannot purchase nar- cotics and this makes their enterprises much more successful."

Need for granting immunity or reduced sentences

A major law enforcement tool in the United States is plea bargaining-- the ability to grant immunity or reduced prison sentences to defendants who cooperate with the police. Persons charged or convicted of a crime are rewarded for providing information about other individuals involved in criminal activities. The value of such inside information in narcotics control work is obvious.

Law enforcement authorities in only one of the countries we visted (Turkey) had this bargaining power. Elsewhere, persons convicted of illicit trafficking in narcotics had no incentive to implicate others.

Need for effective intelligence exchange

We believe that national narcotics control efforts in European countries will not be fully effective until a re- liable means of exchanging intelligence has been established. A natural rivalry among the various narcotics law

28

enforcement authorities prevents free exchange of intelll- gence.

In one country, all law enforcement was under the jurls- diction of the various state police departments; however, efforts were complicated by regional rivalries and a lack of communication and coordination, Another country had two police forces, the city police and the rural police. The city police forces were given the responsibility of central- izing and coordinating both national and international nar- cotics investigations. This stifled the lnitlative of the rural police to develop information, Still another country had three distinct national police agencies. Each agency was jealous of its prerogatives and cooperation among the agencies depended upon personalities.

Germany is developing a program to improve collection of criminal intelligence and to promote the rapid exchange of that intelligence, The plan calls for the Federal Crim- inal Office, an agency without law enforcement responsibil- ity, to serve as a central office for the collection and processing of criminal intelligence. Such a program appears to have great potential as a means of exchanging intelli- gence.

BNDD Washington officials informed us that BNDD is es- tablishing an international narcotics data bank which they hope all foreign law enforcement agencies will contribute to and use.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the governments of the countries men- tioned In this report were concerned about the heroin prob- lem of the United States. However, it appears that the na- tional police forces of the various countries were not making much progress toward immobilizing the major systems respon- sible for the flow of illicit narcotics traffic because their capabilities were limited by national laws and they were not using some methods which BNDD considered to be effective.

29

RECOMMEJ!IDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The national pollee forces are responsible for stemming the flow of illict narcotics traffic through their countries, Therefore we recommend that the Secretary of State, with technical advice and assistance from the Director of BNDD, take actlon to insure that a maJor goal of the ambassadors to the various countries is to achieve the improvement of the law enforcement capabillty of natlonal police forces. The ambassadors should impress on host country officials that special attention should be given to

--modifying laws whlc'n prohibit undercover work or plea bargaInIng-- two proven methods of gaining lntellr- gence ,

--encouraging police forces to develop and use paid informants, and

--establishing exchange of lntelllgence between all narcotics law enforcement authorities by encouraging them to contribute to and use the international nar- cotics data bank being developed by BNDD.

We recognize that any approach to correcting the prob- lem should be responsjve to the needs of the individual govm ernments and should not infringe upon the sovereignty of that country.

38

CHAPTER .5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We examined the progress that was being made to stop the flow of illicit heroin from Europe to the United States, We were primarily concerned with the activities of BNDD, but we also reviewed the narcotics control activities of U.S. Embassies. We performed the review at the following loca- tions.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, European Regional Office, Paris, France

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Near East Regional Office, Ankara, Turkey

U.S. Embassies at Paris, France; Bonn9 Germany; Brussels, Belgium; Rome, Italy; and Ankara, Turkey

U.S. Consulates at Munich and Frankfurt, Germany, and Istanbul, Turkey

We reviewed BNDD's investigative files and other in- formation related to the U.S. agencies' efforts to stop the flow of narcotics into the United States. Discussions were held with officials at the U.S. Embassies, BNDD's regional headquarters, and BNDD's district offices in both Europe and the Near East. We also drscussed our findings and conclu- sions with BNDD's Washington offrclals.

31

APPENDIX I

December 7, 1971

ZitMor@ble Elmer Staats Compt&sller General of the

Wnited States Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Xx. Staats-

As you may know, since my electron to Congress I have bean devotLng the malor part of my efforts to fzghtrng the flood of herozn that 1s destroying my community, Harlem. Ae a result, I am greatly concerned by the obvzous failure of American attempts to block that flow of narcotics, both before It reaches the United States and once it arrives at our borders

For thus reason, I am requesting the General Aor=ountLng Office to prepare two reports for me dealing wzth this cr%tzcal matter

The first would be an analysis of the Bureau of Customs efforts at Kennedy International Airport and the Port of New Ybvk, wzth reconmiendations as to how the Bureau could do a more effective Job an-sgtssoiepting and confiscating illzc+t drugs, primarily heroxn, being smuggled into the United Sf;afes. Observing the search procedures of lndlvlduals jsntenng the country at Kennedy International tirport, for example, one can easily see that Customs inspectors often make little more than cursory examlnatlons of lug$age . Recommendations from your. office to make Customs inspections more effective can help us block at least part of thus deadly traffic.

33

APPENDIX I

Honorable Elmer Staats December 7, 1971 Page Two

The second report would be an analysis of the effectiveness of European operations of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, with recommendations for increasing the Bureau's ablllty to fight narcotics overseas

I certaznly appreciate your attention to this most urgent problem

Charles B Range1 Member of Congress

CBR b cc Hon. Ben]amln Rosenthal

Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe

34

APPENDIX II

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF

ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of office From To -

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:

Richard G. Kleindienst Richard G. Kleindienst

(acting) John N. Mitchell Ramsey Clark

June 1972

Feb. 1972 Jan. 1969 Ott 1966

DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS*

John E. Ingersoll Aug. 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE William P. Rogers Dean Rusk

AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE* Arthur K. Watson R. Sargent Shrrver, Jr.

AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY- artin J. Hillenbrand Vacant Kenneth Rush Vacant Henry C. Lodge

Jan. Jan.

June 1972 Mar. 1972 July 1969 Feb. 1969 &Y 1968

1969 Present 1961 Jan. 1969

1970 Aug. 1972 1968 Apr. 1970

Present

June 1972 Feb, 1972 Jan. 1969

Present

Present %Y 1972 Feb. 1972 June 1969 Jan. 1969

35

APPENDIX II

Tenure of office From To

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (continued)

AMBASSADOR TO ITALY Graham A. Martin H. Gardner Ackley

Oct. 1969 Present Apr. 1968 Sept. 1969

AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY' William J. Handley Robert W. Komer

July 1969 Present Dec. 1968 June 1969

36

ates has travel

termlne what progress was being and the Near East

1111cit narcotics

Tf

Near East IS to help host govern- ments to stop the flow of opium/ heroin at its most vulnerable

hese act‘rons have resulted ln 2gmflcantly increased seizures of

I’( Even with increased drug seizures 'and arrests on the part-of host governments with United States help,@!-, much remains to be done to overcome the following obstacles

point before it reaches the Urn ted States BNDD and U S Embassy of-

11c7t narcotics traffic

C&National police forces lack a re- liable means of exchanging intel- llgence and make little effort to recruit and use informers

&National laws prevent police forces&qn,,doxng undercover work

c&National laws in some countries do not permit law enforcement au- thorities to grant lmmunlty or to bargain for reduced sentences

Id +BNDD special agents assigned overseas do not have enough lan- guage training

BeA BNDD policy encouraging agents with special interests and skills to accept overseas assignments ing

long-term IS lack-

take the necessary actions to

I Insure that all special agents assigned to foreign posts have proficiency in the host country language

Establish a policy which would encourage agents with special interests and skills to accept long-term overseas assignments

@Wc~- Secretary of State &M&II en-

adors w to continue

goveFn:ents in getting the host

to improve the narcot- ics control capabllltles of their law enforc attention

I* -Modifying the laws which pro- hIbIt undercover work or plea bargaining--two proven methods of gaining intelligence

I+ -Encouraging police forces to de- velop and use paid informants

3 I Establlshlng exchange of intel- llgence between all narcotics law enforcement authorities by encouragTng them to contribute to and use the international narcotics data bank being devel- oped by BNDD

id not submit this re

rt and told GAO

ommendatlons colnc~de artment's ongoing programs.

Coptes of this report are avaIlable from the U S General Accounting Offlce, Room 6417, 441 G Street, N W , Washington, D C , 20548

Copies are provided wlthout charge to Mem- bers of Congress, congressional commIttee staff members, Government offlcla Is, members of the press, college Ilbrarles, faculty mem- bers and students The price to the general public IS $1 00 a copy Orders should be ac- companied by cash or check