aya-ay v arpaphil.pdf

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G.R. No. 155359. January 31, 2006.*

SPOUSES PONCIANO AYA-AY, SR. and CLEMENCIA

AYA-AY, petitioners, vs. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP.,

and MAGNA MARINE, INC., respondents.

Labor Law; Death Compensation Benefits; Substantial

Evidence; Unless there is substantial evidence showing that (a) the

cause the employees death is reasonably connected with his work,

or, (b) the sickness or ailment for which the employee died is an

accepted occupational disease, or, (c) the employees working

conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he

died, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded.Under the

October 15, 1994 Contract of Employment, Aya-ay ceased to be an

employee on September 26, 1995, hence, he was no longer an

employee when he died on December 1, 1995. It is, therefore, crucial

to determine whether Aya-ay died as a result of, or in relation to,

the eye injury he suffered during the term of his employment. If the

injury is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk, of his

death for which compensation is sought, recovery may be had forsaid death. Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a)

the cause of Aya-ays death was reasonably connected with his

work; or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an accepted

occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk

of contracting the disease for which he died, death compensation

benefits cannot be awarded.

Same; Same; Same; If the disease the employee died of is not

listed as a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) StandardEmployment Contract, it is incumbent upon the claimants to present

substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence to justify the

conclusion that the injury sustained by the employee under whom

they are claiming was sustained during the employment or that

such employment increased the risk of contracting the same; The

evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent.

Aya-ay died due to CVA or stroke, a disease not listed as a

compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the POEA Standard

Employment Contract. Hence, it was incumbent on petitioners to
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present substantial evidence, or such

_______________

*THIRD DIVISION.

283

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 283

Aya-ay, Sr. vs. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.

relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to justify a conclusion, that the eye injury sustained by

Aya-ay during the term of his employment with respondentscaused, or increased the risk of, CVA. Substantial evidence is more

than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial,

and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or

work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.

Same; Same; Same; Bare allegations do not suffice to discharge

the required quantum of proof of compensability.That a seaman

died several months after his repatriation for illness does not

necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the same illness; (b) his

working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illnesswhich caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless

there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise. This Court finds

that under the circumstances petitioners bare allegations do not

suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of

compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations

or presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a

positive proposition.

Same; Same; Same; Without an expert witness to evaluate and

explain how the statements contained in medical sources actually

relate to the facts surrounding the case, they are insufficient to

establish the nexus to support their claims.While petitioners

attempted to scientifically establish that Aya-ays eye injury

resulted to, or increased the risk of, CVA by resorting to a detailed

medical discus-sion lifted from medical sources and subjecting them

to their own laymans interpretation and randomly applying them

to the circumstances attendant to the case, the same fails. Without

an expert witness to evaluate and explain how the statements

contained in such medical sources actually relate to the facts


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surrounding the case, they are insufficient to establish the nexus to

support their claims.

Same; Administrative Law; Quasi-Judicial Bodies; Technical

Rules of Procedure; The fact that administrative bodies are not

bound by technical rules of procedure in adjudication of cases does

not mean that basic rules on proving allegations should be entirely

dispensed withany decision based on unsubstantiated allegation

cannot stand as it will offend due process.That administrative

quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules

of procedure

284

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


in the adjudication of cases does not mean that the basic rules on

proving allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party

alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with

substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated

allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. x x x the

liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to

limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this

Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in

administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders

without a basis in evidence having rational probative value. More

specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC: It is true that

administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not

bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of

cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a

license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsanganfor petitioners.

Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for private

respondents.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:


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Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the

January 24, 2002 Decision1

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA-G.R. SP No. 50576 which denied due course to the

petition for certiorari filed by spouses Ponciano, Sr. and

Clemencia Aya-ay (petitioners), a reconsideration of which

decision was denied by Resolution2

of September 10, 2002.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Respondent Arpaphil Shipping Corporation (Arpaphil), adomestic manning corporation, engaged the services of

Ponciano Aya-ay, Jr. (Aya-ay) to work as seaman for

respondent

_______________

1Rollo, pp. 32-39.

2Id., at p. 40.

285

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 285


Magna Marine, Inc. (Magna Marine), a Greek shipping

company.

After the parties executed an 11-month Contract of

Employment3

dated October 15, 1994 which bore the

approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA), Aya-ay departed on October 26,

1994 from the Philippines on board the vessel M/V Panoria.4

On June 1, 1995, as Aya-ay was cleaning the vessels air

compressor, a sudden backflow of compressed air containing

sand and rust hit his right eye. As the vessel was then

plying near the Port of Hawaii on its way to Australia, Aya-

ay asked the vessels captain, G. Livarados, that he be

brought to a hospital for medical treatment, but the captain

advised to just relax and take it easy. His eye was washedwith salt water and treated with eye drops, and he was given

oral antibiotics.

On arrival of the vessel at the Port of Brisbane, Australia

on June 16, 1995, Aya-ay was referred to Dr. Lawrence W.

Hirst of the University of Queensland who performed a

corneal graft and vitrectomy.

In his Medical Report5

dated June 20, 1995, Dr. Hirst

stated that Aya-ay had a large central corneal perforation

with iris prolapse which appeared to be a result of a severe
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corneal infection. He concluded that there was evidence of

infection in the front of the eye although the back of the eye

was not grossly infected.6

On examination on July 4, 1995 by Dr. John S. Ambler,

also of the University of Queensland, the doctor, in his

Medical Certificate7

of even date, opined that Aya-ay had

been totally incapacitated for work since June 16, 1995 and

would remain to be so until August 16, 1995.

_______________

3Id., at p. 58.

4Id., at p. 155.

5Id., at pp. 59-60.

6Id., at p. 59.

7Id., at p. 61.

286



On examination by Dr. Michael Whitby, consultant

physician for infectious diseases at Brisbane, Australia, who

was requested to be involved in the management of the

eye injury of Aya-ay, the doctor, in his letter8

to Dr. Hirst

dated July 10, 1995, noted the details of the continued

treatment of Aya-ays eye injury and stated that he had not

made any further arrangements to follow the patient

further.

On July 5, 1995, Ponciano was repatriated to Manila.9

In a Medical Report10

dated September 7, 1995, Dr.

Ramon J. Ongsiako, Jr. and Dr. Carmela Ongsiako-Isabela

stated that Ponciano repaired to their clinic on August 1,

1995 for redness and blurring of vision of his right eye, and

that upon examination, they found that there was cornealgraft rejection in Aya-ays affected area. They thus

recommended a repeat corneal transplant once the

inflammation in his eye had subsided, and expenses to be

incurred therefor were, upon Aya-ays request, therein

itemized.

In a Medical Report11

dated November 21, 1995, Dr.

Ongsiako-Isabela stated that Aya-ay was awaiting a corneal

donor and directed that in the meantime he is to be cleared

cardiopulmonary wise for surgery.
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By still another Medical Report12

dated November 27,

1996, Dr. Ongsiako-Isabela stated that:

Mr. Ponciano Aya-ay, Jr., was referred to Dr. Anthony King last

November 21, 1995 for cardiac clearance prior to corneal transplant.

At that time, he was not complaining of any symptoms refer-rable to

the heart, like chest pains, palpitations, difficulty of breathing. Past

medical history and family history was (sic) unremarkable.His physical exam showed a normal blood pressure of 130/85,

normal cardiac rate of 62 per minute. Cardiac exam was negative

for

_______________

8Id., at p. 174.

9Id., at p. 16.

10Id., at p. 175.

11Id., at p. 176.

12Id., at p. 70.

287

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 287


murmurs or abnormal heart sounds. There were no rales or

wheezes. An electrocardiogram (ECG) showed sinus arrhythmiawhich is a finding compatible with his age. Attached is a copy of his

ECG.

With these findings, Dr. Anthony King said that there was no

evidence of an active heart disease and granted Mr. Aya-ay cardiac

clearance for the procedure.13

(Italics supplied)

Aya-ays corneal transplant was thus scheduled on

December 7, 1995.14

On December 1, 1995, however, Aya-ay

died. The Certificate of Death15

issued by Dr. Isidoro A.

Ayson, Medical Officer IV of the Caloocan Health

Department, indicates that the immediate cause of death

was cerebro-vascular accident (CVA).

Having died without issue, Aya-ays parents, herein

petitioners, claimed death benefits from herein respondents

Arpaphil and Magna Marine which claims were rejected.

Petitioners thereupon filed on August 2, 1996 an

Affidavit/Complaint16

before the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC OCW Case No. 00-
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08-2327-96, praying that respondents Arpaphil and Magna

Marine be ordered to pay them death compensation benefits

in the amount of USD 50,000 under the POEA Standard

Employment Contract;17

burial assistance in the amount of

USD 1,000; moral, actual and exemplary damages in an

amount not less than P300,000; and attorneys fees

equivalent to 10% of the total claim.

Respondents in their Answer

18

contended that since Aya-ays contractual relationship with them had already ceased

at the time of his death, the cause of which was in no way re-

_______________

13Ibid.

14Id., at p. 66.

15Id., at p. 72.

16Records, pp. 2-6.

17Rollo, pp. 167-172.

18Records, pp. 11-16.

288



lated to the eye injury, they could not be held liable for any

death benefits.

After the parties had filed their respective position

papers,19

Labor Arbiter Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz, by

Decision20

of July 4, 1997, ordered Arpaphil to indemnify

herein petitioners death benefits in the amount of USD

50,000 and an additional USD 1,000 as burial assistance for

the death of their son.

In granting death benefits and burial assistance to

petitioners, the Labor Arbiter held:

The death of complainants son is compensable. It is sufficient that

the risk of contracting the cause of death was set in motion or

aggravated by a work-related injurysustained during the lifetime of

their sons contract of employment.

Otherwise stated, where the primary injury is shown to have

been suffered in the course of employment, every natural

consequences (sic) that flows from the injury likewise arises out of

employment.

In the case at bar, there is a proximate connection of the primary
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injury sustained by the deceased to the cause of his death. The risk

of contracting cerebro-vascular accident (CVA) is greater during

state of depression like what the deceased was suffering and

complaining before his untimely demise.

As what actually happened the deceased felt so sorry for himself

having been deprived of his only means of livelihood at the prime of

his youth and for having to think that had the master of the vessel

gave (sic) him prompt and proper medical treatment he could haveprobably been saved from the misfortune that befell upon him; a

circumstance that alone should make the respondents answerable.21

(Italics supplied)

_______________

19Id., at pp. 30-46 and 75-83.

20Id., at pp. 109-113.

21Id., at pp. 112-113.

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VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 289


On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision22

of October 31, 1997, set

aside the July 4, 1997 Decision of the labor arbiter but

ordered respondents to pay petitioners the amount of

P20,000 for humanitarian considerations in light of the

following considerations:

It is clear from the records that the deceased seaman sustained an

injury to his right eye while on board the MV Panoria. It is equally

true that no competent evidence has been adduced by the

complainants to bolster their contention that the work-sustained

injury has a direct bearing and/or influence on the cause of death.

As the respondents have so aptly discussed, and with which We

agree, to wit:

CVA or Cerebro-Vascular Accident, or stroke, is defined in the text

Principles of Internal Medicine (International Student Edition, McGraw

Hill Book Company, New York, 1966 Ed., Chap. 204, p. 1146) as follows:

The clinical picture resulting from vascular disease is in most instances so

distinctive that the diagnosis is more readily made than any other in the realm

of neurology. The cardinal feature is the stroke, a term which connotes the

sudden and dramatic development of a focal neurologic deficit. In its severest

forms, the patient falls hemiplegic and even unconsciousan event so striking
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as to deserve its own separate designation, namely, apoplexy, stroke, shock,

cerebrovascular accident. x x x.

x x x

The neurologic deficit in a stroke depends, of course, on the location of the

infarct or hemorrhage in the brain and the size of the lesion. Hemiplegia is the

classical sign of vascular disease and occurs chiefly with massive lesions of the

brainstem. In the most serious cases of hemorrhage, the patient literally falls

in his tracks, paralyzed on one side, and soon passes into deep coma and dieswithin a few hours.

_______________

22Id., at pp. 268-275.

290



CVA is classified under the broad umbrella of the term

Cerebrovascular Diseases, which is defined and the underlying

causes for which are discussed in the same above-cited text (Id., at

p. 1146) as follows:

The term cerebrovascular disease is intended here to denote any disease

in which one or more of the blood vessels of the brain are primarily

implicated in a pathologic process. By pathologic process is meant anyabnormality of the vessel wall, an occlusion by thrombus or embolus,

rupture of a vessel, a failure of cerebral flow due to a fall in blood

pressure, a change in the caliber of the lumen, altered permeability of the

vascular wall, or increased viscosity or other quality of the blood. The

pathologic process within the vessel may be described not only according

to its grosser aspectsthrombosis, embolism, rupture of a vessel, etc.

but also in terms of the more basic vascular disorders, i.e.,

hypertensive arteriosclerosis, arteritis, trauma, aneurism, developmental

malformation, etc.

Nothing therein can in any way support the complainants

submission and the Honorable Arbiters conclusion that CVA may

result from an eye injury, or from infection (which incidentally was

already corrected), or from depression. Thus, it is clear that

respondents are not liable for death benefits arising from seaman

Aya-ays death.

Be that as it may, We are of the opinion that on grounds of

humanitarian considerations, the deceased seaman having, in his


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own little way, dedicated his efforts to respondents endeavors, that

the latter be ordered to grant the complainants financial assistance

in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). (Italics in

the original)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration23

of the October 31,

1997 NLRC Decision having been denied for lack of merit

by Resolution24

of January 27, 1998, they filed a Petition for

Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Prelimi-

_______________

23Id., at pp. 278-287.

24Id., at p. 333.

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VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 291


nary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order25

before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133524.

After respondents and the NLRC, through the Office of

the Solicitor General, filed their respective Comments,26

this

Court referred the petition to the CA by Resolution27

of

December 9, 1998, in view of its ruling in St. Martin Funeral

Home v. NLRC.

28

By Decision of January 24, 2002,29

the CA denied due

course to the petition, it finding that indeed no substantial

evidence enough to establish petitioners entitlement to the

various benefits and damages claimed was presented.

Their Motion for Reconsideration30

having been denied

by the CA by Resolution31

of September 10, 2002, petitioners

filed the present petition for review on certiorari32

raising

the fol-

lowing issue:

WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM THE

BENEFITS UNDER THE POEA CONTRACT WHICH AROSE

FROM THE DEATH OF THE SEAFARER PONCIANO AYA-AY,

JR. AND WHAT AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED FROM

THE PETITIONERS TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT

THERETO.33

The pivotal issue for resolution is whether petitioners are

entitled to the death benefits provided for under the POEA
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1.

3.

a.

c.

Standard Employment Contract.

_______________

25CA Rollo, pp. 8-26.

26Id., at pp. 42-58 and 98-109.

27Id., at p. 110.

28

G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.29 Penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo with Justices Ruben T.

Reyes and Renato C. Dacudao concurring.

30CA Rollo, pp. 134-145.

31Rollo, p. 40.

32Id., at pp. 12-31.

33Id., at p. 20.

292



Part II, Section C, Nos. 1 and 3 of the POEA Standard

Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All

Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels provide:

C. Compensation and Benefits

In case of death of the seaman during the term of hisContract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the

Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000

and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under

the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children

at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of

payment.x x x x

The other liabilities of the employer when the seaman dies

as a result of injury or illness during the term of

employmentare as follows:

The employer shall pay the deceaseds beneficiary all

outstanding obligations due the seaman under this

Contract.

x x x x

In all cases, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries of

seamen the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount

of US$1,000 for burial expenses at exchange rate prevailing

during the time of payment. (Italics supplied)


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In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be

shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract

of employment.34

Part I, Section H, Nos. 1 and 2(a) of the POEA Standard

Employment Contract provide:

Section H. Termination of Employment

1. The employment of the seaman shall cease on expiration of the

contract period indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Masterand the Seaman, by mutual consent, in writing, agree to an early

termination in which case the seaman is entitled to earned wages

and benefits only.

_______________

34Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 144665, September 8,

2004, 437 SCRA 608, 617.

293

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 293


2. The master shall have the right to discharge or sign off the

seaman at any place abroad in accordance with the terms and

conditions of this Contract and specifically for the following reasons:

a. If the seaman is incompetent, or is continuously incapacitated for theduties for which he was employed by reason of illness or injury (Italics

supplied)

Upon mutual consent of Aya-ay and respondents, he was on

July 5, 1995 repatriated on account of his eye injury. Thus

his employment had been effectively terminated on that

particular date.35

At all events, under the October 15, 1994 Contract of

Employment, Aya-ay ceased to be an employee on

September 26, 1995,36

hence, he was no longer an employeewhen he died on December 1, 1995.

It is, therefore, crucial to determine whether Aya-ay died

as a result of, or in relation to, the eye injury he suffered

during the term of his employment. If the injury is the

proximate cause,37

or at least increased the risk, of his death

for

_______________


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35Id., at p. 618.

36Part I, Section D of the POEA Standard Contract provides:

Section D. Commencement of Employment The employment relationship

between the employer on the one hand and the seaman on the other, shall

commence upon approval of this Contract and the seaman has been cleared for

travel and departure by all government authorities to his port of embarkation

overseas.

37Belarmino v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No.

90204, May 11, 1990, 185 SCRA 304, 308 (1990) provides:

x x x proximate cause x x x is the efficient cause, which may be the most remote

of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to

be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective

cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage

without the intervention of an independent cause.

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either

immediately or by setting other events in

294



which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for said

death.38

Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a) thecause of Aya-ays death was reasonably connected with his

work; or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an

accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions

increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he

died, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded.39

Aya-ay died due to CVA or stroke, a disease not listed as

a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the POEA

Standard Employment Contract.

Hence, it was incumbent on petitioners to presentsubstantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a

conclusion,40

that the eye injury sustained by Aya-ay during

the term of his employment with respondents caused, or

increased the risk of, CVA.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.41

The

evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely

appar-


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_______________

motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each

having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final

event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and

probable result of the cause which first acted x x x.

38 Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Commission, 388 Phil. 906, 914-915; 333 SCRA 236, 243

(2000).

39Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, supra(citation omitted).

40 Reyes v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 93003,

March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 726, 732 (citation omitted), Rodriguez v.

Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 46454, September 28,

1989, 178 SCRA 30, 33 (citations omitted).

41 Government System Insurance System v. Court of Appeals , 357

Phil. 511, 531; 296 SCRA 514, 534 (1998) (citation omitted), Gelmart

Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, No. L-70544, November 5, 1987, 155

SCRA 403, 410 (citation omitted).

295

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 295


ent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-

aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely

apparent.

42

To buttress their position that there is a causal link

between Aya-ays eye injury and his death, petitioners

argue as follows:

If only Aya-ay, Jr. was immediately medically treated by a

competent doctor and not by the respondents Captain with, among

others, salt water, severe corneal infection (admitted and stated in

paragraph 11 of the respondents Answer) could have been

prevented. If the same was prevented, there will be no need for a

corneal graft (Annex 2, respondents Answer). If corneal graft

have (sic) been unnecessary, there will be no corneal graft

rejection and repeat corneal transplantation (Annex 4,

respondents Answer). If not because of the recommended repeat

corneal transplantation, Dr. Anthony King could not have granted

cardiac clearance. The seafarer was subjected to extreme anxiety

and depression about the thought of totally losing his right eye. His

blood pressure would not have risen and would not have suffered

from CVA or stroke. He would not have died on December 1, 1995.
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Clearly, it is the negligence and fault of the respondents in taking

for granted the situation of Aya-ay, Jr. that led to his untimely

demise. The complications in his eye triggered the series of

infections and operations and other procedures on the poor seafarer.

These (sic) series of events logically presented, were (sic) more than

enough to constitute substantial evidence.43

Refuting petitioners arguments, respondents aver that,

among other things, there is no established link between

seaman Aya-ays eye injury and the CVA that killed him;

otherwise stated, the former is not the cause of the latter.

CVA is not a natural consequence of such an injury.

That a seaman died several months after his repatriation

for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the

same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of

_______________

42Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission, 387 Phil. 612, 619;

331 SCRA 596, 603 (2000) (citation omitted).

43Rollo, p. 23.

296



contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the

death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis

to support otherwise.44

This Court finds that under the circumstances

petitioners bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the

required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of

compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions.45

The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive

proposition.46

While petitioners attempted to scientifically establish

that Aya-ays eye injury resulted to, or increased the risk of,

CVA by resorting to a detailed medical discussion lifted

from medical sources and subjecting them to their own

laymans interpretation and randomly applying them to the

circumstances attendant to the case, the same fails. Without

an expert witness to evaluate and explain how the

statements contained in such medical sources actually

relate to the facts surrounding the case, they are insufficient


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to establish the nexus to support their claims.

Petitioners nevertheless argue that there is no need to

resort to the intricacies of the Rules on Evidence to establish

that the death of Aya-ay was caused by the eye injury,

citing Section 10, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the

NLRC:

Section 10. Technical rules not binding.The rules of procedure

and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be

controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable

means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,

without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the

interest of due process.

That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are

not bound by technical rules of procedure in the adjudica-

_______________

44Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, supraat p. 621.

45Kirit, Sr. v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.

48580, July 6, 1990, 187 SCRA 224, 227.

46Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission, supra.

297

VOL. 481, JANUARY 31, 2006 297


tion of cases47

does not mean that the basic rules on proving

allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party

alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with

substantial evidence. Any decision based on

unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend

due process.48

x x x the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subjectto limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this

Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in

administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders

without a basis in evidence having rational probative value. More

specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:

It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are

not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases.

However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to
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disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.49

While this Court commiserates with petitioners plight,

absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for

the grant of death benefits prayed for can be drawn, it is left

with no alternative but to deny their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 24, 2002 and the Resolution datedSeptember 10, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are

AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing (Chairman), Carpio and Tinga, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

_______________

47IBM Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commision, 365 Phil.

137, 147; 305 SCRA 592, 600 (1999) (citation omitted).

48De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 364 Phil. 91, 102; 304 SCRA 448, 459 (1999).

49IBM Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supraat

pp. 147-148; pp. 600-601 (citations omitted).

298


Philippine National Oil Company vs. National College of

Business and Arts

Notes.The death of a seaman during the term of his

employment makes the employer liable to the formers heirs

for death compensation benefits unless the employer can

successfully prove that the seamans death was caused by an

injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

(NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor

Relations Commission, 284 SCRA 239 [1998])

The captain, as the general agent of the shipowner, could

be held liable for failing to make the workplace safe. (Singa

Ship Management Phils., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations

Commission, 288 SCRA 692 [1998])
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aya-ay v arpaphil.pdf

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