ay 2012-2013 legal history final paper - valdez

7/31/2019 AY 2012-2013 Legal History Final Paper - Valdez

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INTRODUCTION

The death of Jesse Robredo, the Department of the Interior and Local Government

Secretary, brought much dread and morning to the Philippines. Robredo was an esteemed father

and statesman, having received awards for actualizing the potentiality of Naga City from a

shabby, underperforming city wallowing in corruption, to the efficient bureaucracy it is today 1.

On August 18, 2012, around 5:00 PM, the Piper Seneca plane carrying Robredo, his aide

Police Senior Inspector Jun Abrazado, pilot Capt. Jessup Bahinting, and co-pilot Kshitiz Chand,

crashed 200 meters off the shores of Masbate 2. Abrazado managed to swim his way to safety

after releasing himself from his seat; however, Robredo, Bahinting, and Chand were not as

fortunate. Although hopes that Robredo was still alive flickered for two days, the DOTC,

through the Philippine Coast Guard, confirmed the worst , after finding the DILG Secretary s

body under the plane s wing in an exhaustive search-and-rescue operation 3.

Robredo was supposed to leave Cebu via a Cebu Pacific flight. He had just attended a

ground breaking of a new Philippine National Police Regional Training Center. Due to last

minute changes, Robredo opted to fly to Naga via a private charter operated by Aviatour Flight

School, owned by Bahinting. Robredo wanted to come home in haste to see his family, and rode

a private charter instead. 4

1 Y. Arquiza, Jesse Robredo Made Naga City a Happy Place,http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-made-naga-city-a-happy-place (lastaccessed October 9, 2012)2 J. Cabiles and P. Tubeza, Robredo, 2 others missing after plane crash, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crash (last accessed October 9, 2012)3 K. Boncocan , Robredo s body found Roxas, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxas (lastaccessed September 25, 2012)4 Ibid.
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-made-naga-city-a-happy-placehttp://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-made-naga-city-a-happy-placehttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/254488/robredos-body-found-roxashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/252450/robredo-2-others-missing-after-plane-crashhttp://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/270553/lifestyle/people/jesse-robredo-made-naga-city-a-happy-place


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I. Statement of the Problem

Despite no case having been filed against Aviatour or the CAAP, the issue of

transcendental importance remains at hand: could the incident have been prevented? In line with

the question, are CAAP officials or the private airline liable? Are there enough legal safeguards

to prevent such incidents from happening? If there were, were they followed?

A. The plane

The facts before us reveal that the plane was already 40 years old, being manufactured in

197210

. The plane had already experienced a minor mishap, landing awkwardly in one of its

earlier flights, but showed no serious damage 11 . Earlier during the flight, Abrazado recalled

seeing a di splay panel that said that aviation e xpired on 2010. The right engine malfunctioned

while the carrier was still in operation, and efforts to restart the engine failed to revive the

engine. As the tragedy was looming, one of the plane s wings also broke o ff. After the plane had

crashed into sea, the Coast Guard experienced difficulties locating the remains of the plane

because the ELT failed to activate 12.

There were speculations that Bahinting told former Senator Sonny Osmena about planes

being bought at a reduced price in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the United States 13. The

type of plane the Piper Seneca has an extensive record of crashes. Sec. Robredo was also

trying to make it in time to meet his family, and thus rode the charter in haste 14.

10 Ibid. 11 C. Santamaria, Meet the Piper Seneca, http://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-seneca (last accessedSeptember 19, 2012)12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.
http://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-senecahttp://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-senecahttp://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-senecahttp://www.rappler.com/nation/10766-meet-the-piper-seneca


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There is no proof pointing that Bahinting and Chand exercise due care prior to embarking

on the private charter operation. It is also assumed that the maintenance crew also failed to

follow the procedure in ensuring that all the components of the plane were fully functional, due

to the immediacy of the situation and the number of planes that arrive and depart from the

aerodrome.

B. The pilot

Bahinting is a pilot who owns AviaTour, a business that offers private charters and tours.

It is also a flight school, which accommodates local and international students such as Chand.

Bahinting held a Commercial Pilot Licence and a Flight Instructor License, which qualify him as

an aviation expert. To date, he has logged more than 5,000 flight hours, from being an aviation

student in 1975 at the Mindanao Aeronautical School. He also holds an Aircraft Maintenance

degree from the same school. He has the status of a local hero in Cebu, after flying through

turbulence to transport cobra venom for a child 15

The law presumes the carrier to be at fault in case of deaths or injuries are sustained

while the aircraft is in operation, unless disproven 16. The Civil Code provisions uphold a degree

of utmost care and diligence that common carriers must adhere to. The law must impose a safety

culture that binds the pilot, the maintenance crew, and government officials involved to

minimize flight risks, as enforced by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines.

15 T. Alberto-Masakayan, Ill- fated plane s Bahinting an avid pilot , a local hero , http://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.html (last accessed October 7, 2012)16 Civil Code, art. 1756
http://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.htmlhttp://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.htmlhttp://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.htmlhttp://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.htmlhttp://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.htmlhttp://ph.news.yahoo.com/ill-fated-plane-s-bahinting-an--avid-pilot---a--local-hero-.html


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II. Negligence, generally

A. The Blacks Law Definition

Central to the issue at hand is negligence. In relation to its definition according to the

Black s Law Dictionary, negligence is The failure to exercise the standard of care that a

reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar si tuation, or any conduct that falls

below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except

for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly or wilfully disregardful of others rights 17. The first

definition implies a standard to be followed in similar situations.

B. The Civil Code Definition

The Civil Code definition of negligence is

the omission of that diligence which is required by nature of the obligation

and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place 18

The definition implies diligence by nature of the obligation and corresponds with the

circumstances of the persons, the time, and the place.

III. Existing Legislation Pertinent to Aircraft

The Civil Code provides specific legislation pertinent to aircraft, and the obligations

thereof, particularly in Book Four. Under Article 1732, airplanes, being engaged in the business

of carrying and transporting passengers and goods, are classified under common carriers.

17 Black s Law Dictionary, 1133, N, 9 th Edition (2009)18 Civil Code, art. 1173


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A. Article 1755

Article 1755, under subsection 3, Section 4 of the Book 4 of the Civil Code stresses the

obligation of carriers to carry their passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can

provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the

circumstances. It is clear, by the very rule of verba legis, that the law expects utmost care and

meticulousness of those held responsible for transport through common carriers.

B. Article 1756

Article 1756 answers the question of imputability. Article 1756 of the Civil Code

presumes that common carriers were at fault or have acted negligently, unless proven otherwise

as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755.

Article 1759 implies that common carriers are still liable if their employe es negligence

was the cause of the death or injuries of their passengers, no matter how small or big the fares

are.

C. Articles 1761-1763

Articles 1761 until 1763 cover the common carriers liability in the event that their

passengers negligence causes deaths or injuries, even if the common carriers employees, with

the diligence of a good father of a family, could have prevented said deaths or injuries.

The Civil Code clearly presumes the common carrier to be liable at all times for the

deaths and injuries in the process of transporting and carrying passengers or goods, unless it is

proven that the common carrier exercised due care and utmost diligence in preventing deaths and


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injuries. The law used the phrase the diligence of a good father of a family , implying that

common carriers ensure their passengers are extremely safe, without regard to the fare.

The provisions in the Civil Code are not without basis internationally. Article 1 of

Chapter 1, as well as Articles 17, 20, 21 25, and 27 of the Warsaw Convention seek to make the

carrier liable in case of damages incurred by the passenger aboard the aircraft or in any of the

operations of embarking and disembarking 19.

IV. Cases Relevant to Negligence

A. Pilapil v. Court of Appeals

In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals , it was held that the presumption of negligence against the

common carrier is a disputable presumption, and that contrary facts may disprove the presumed

negligence. In the case, the injury was outside the ambit of the common carrier to prevent, as

petitioner sustained injuries after a bystander hurled a stone at him, injuring his left eye. The

Court held that a common carrier is not an insurer of risks; the laws only bind him to perform his

duties with extraordinary diligence. What the plaintiff suffered was outside of human foresight 20 .

In the Robredo incident, Bahinting can be held liable, as it was upon him as a pilot to

check whether the components of his plane were fully functional, such as the ELT and the right

engine, and that his aircraft had safety vests in case of distress. There was no sign of turbulence

or any air disturbances during the incident, and the accident was within human foresight had they

checked pre-flight that the damaged components had to be replaced.

B. Lara v. Valencia

19 The Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal,http://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdf , 1975, (last accessed October 12, 2012)20 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 33 (1989)
http://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdfhttp://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdfhttp://static.vayama.com/pdf/warsawConvention.pdf


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The case of Lara v. Valencia then asserts the negligence of the passenger according to

Article 1761 of the Civil Code, which binds the passenger to observe the diligence of a good

father of a family to avoid injury to himself. Plaintiff, the w ife of the deceased, sought to impute

the defendant, who drove a pickup truck. The deceased was an accommodation passenger who

merely requested that defendant take him to Davao, because no other form of transportation was

available. Sitting in the rear area of the pickup truck, defendant fell at some point, sustained

injuries, and died. The highest court held that the incident which befell the deceased was only an

unfortunate happening due to an unforeseen accident. The Supreme Court conjectured that the

deceased must have fallen asleep as the pickup passed through a rocky part of the road. TheCourt applied Article 1761 and reversed the decision of the trial court which held the defendant

liable 21.

The Robredo incident again differs, because the incident was borne out of the failure to

check whether components of the plane were functional. It can be contended that Robredo was

allowed to board the plane at his behest because of his public position, and that he wanted to

leave in haste, but the issue was that the accident could still have been prevented had the pilot

exercised due diligence in inspecting the components of the plane and refusing the passenger

once the faults were recognized.

C .Necesito v. Paras

The case that bears the closest resemblance to the Robredo incident is the case of

Necesito v. Paras. German Necesito, husband and father of the two deceased, filed actions for

damages against the carrier after the driver lost control of the bus, which fell into a creek,

21 Lara v. Valencia, 104 SCRA 65 (1958)


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drowning Necesito s wife and injuring Necesito s child. The Court of First Instance found out

that the bus traversed in a road with a bad condition, thus causing the fracture of the right

steering knuckle, which was already defective prior to the trip, as it was bubbled and cellulous.

The defective condition of the steering knuckle could not have been discovered prior to the

flight, even though it was periodically checked and that there was no finding of recklessness on

the driver. The highest court ruled that the incident was due to a fortuitous event, caused by the

reduced strength of the steering knuckle, caused by the defects in its manufacture and casting.

The issue boiled down to whether the common carrier was also liable for the manufacturing

defect of the steering knuckle. The Supreme Court still held the carrier liable, as the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and

appliances in use by the carrier. The Supreme Court held that the common carrier shall be held

liable in case his equipment is flawed, and if those flaws were discoverable, since the passenger

has no knowledge whether the carrier manufactured his means of carriage or relied on

manufactured machines. The Court held that:

In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to

the steering knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if

any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at

any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard,

or that it had no hidden flaws that would impair its strength. And yet the carrier must

have been aware of the critical importance of the knuckles resistance; that its failure or its


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breakage would result in loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous

effects upon the passengers. 22

In the same vein, it was not ascertained in the Robredo incident whether Bahinting

performed the necessary checks before the flight. What was known was that it underwent

maintenance in November of the previous year. It was not shown that it was maintained in

between 25-hour intervals. Yet, Bahinting, as a veteran pilot, must be well-aware that the engine

was vital to the functioning of the aircraft. The diligence of a good father of a family requires

him to ascertain whether the ELT of his plane was fully functional and that his planes had

security vests in case of distress and turbulences.

If hastening pre- flight procedures to meet the public s demand for public transport entails

skimming over safety procedures, it would definitely lead to occasional accidents, due to failure

to check the most important components of an aircraft, and the failure to supply tools and

equipment necessary for distress situations. The government has instituted the Civil Aviation of

the Philippines, and it is this authority that must enforce strict safety pre-flight and emergency

situation measures. As the law demands an extreme of diligence from common carriers, it must

assist in its pursuit of regulating quality public air transportation.

V. Republic Act 9497

The President issued Republic Act 9497, entitled An Act Creating the Civil Aviation

Authority of the Philippines. The CAAP was designed to restructure the civil aviation system,

the promotion, development, and regulation of the technical, operational, safety, and aviation

22 Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958)


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security functions under the civil aviation authority 23 . Like the Philippine Coast Guard, the

CAAP is attached to the Department of Transport and Communication (DOTC), and such,

allocations are derived from the DOTC. The CAAP is headed by its Director General and

Board 24,

Stated in the CAAP s policies is its adherence to consider .

(d) Ensuring the safety, quality, reliability, and affordability of air transport services for the

riding public; 25

Notable in said Republic Act is the creation of the Flights Standards Inspectorate Service

(FSIS), which shall perform the following functions:

(1) Airworthiness inspection

(2) Flight operations inspection and evaluation

Furthermore, the Board shall create, but not limited to, the following offices

which will provide support to the functions of the FSIS, namely: Aircraft Registration,

Aircraft Engineering and Standards, Airmen Examination Board, and Office of the Flight

Surgeon 26

There already is existing legislation and a committee devoted to the safety and

airworthiness of aircraft. There must, however, be existing safety standards so fixed for aircraft,

as much as standards are fixed for airmen. It is no question that the pilot, Capt. Jessup Bahinting,

23 RA 9497, An Act Creating the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.html (lastaccessed October 11, 2012) 24 Ibid. 25 Rep. Act No. 9497 (2008), Sec. 2126 Rep. Act. No. 9497, Sec. 40
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9497_2008.html


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had already been in service for decades, and it is highly likely the aircraft was already faulty due

to its old age. Whereas the common carriers are liable for the deaths and injuries incurred by

their passengers while aboard in the aircraft and while the aircraft is in the process of embarking

and disembarking, there should be legislation fixing certain safety measures strictly adhered to,

as well as standards for aircraft before an aircraft can truly be deemed airworthy.

The FSIS is tasked, among other things, to conduct airworthiness inspections and flight

operations inspection and evaluation, according to RA 9497. In its website, the FSIS, under its

Airworthiness and Flight Operations Department, one of the FSIS s function is to provide for a

body of regulations relating to airworthiness of the aircraft, and to approve and inspect aircraft

maintenance organizations. Legislation should provide a special and more refined legal standards

that the FSIS can enforce, and measures that will deny flights if conditions are unfulfilled.

VI. A Safety Culture for All Public and Private Charters in the Philippines

The author wishes to propose a safety culture that will be binding on the pilot and his

maintenance crew, as well as the FSIS, to minimize the safety risks and to ensure that the aircraft

exiting any aerodrome in the Philippines shall have been thoroughly checked. Only through a

culture that promotes safety will technical and mechanical errors be minimized.

Although a tedious and repetitive exercise, the CAAP should make sure, through its

FSIS, that more stringent technical and mechanical standards are met. The FSIS shall collate the

standards and furnish their pilots and mechanics a checklist to ensure that the standards are met.

Whereas aircraft fail to meet standards, the FSIS, through the CAAP s authority, s hall refuse the

flight of the aircraft, without regard to the nature of their duties. This is in line


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Despite the CAAP s involvement in maintenance and quality checks, common carriers

shall still be liable for deaths and injuries incurred by its passengers which are within its ambit

and those from extrinsic causes.

A. Safety

Black s Law Dictionary does not define safety, but it has a working definition for safe:

Safe, adj. 1. Not exposed to danger; not exposed to danger;

which is a meaning too broad and too absolute, as the standards set forth by the

definition are clearly not attainable.

The FSIS will be primarily tasked to center its operations on safety, to minimize the

effects of pilot negligence and provide safety measures in case of accidents outside the pilot s

calculation. Safety, in the aviation sense, the acceptability of risk in a specific operation 27.

Another definition of safety is culled from Airservices Australia, which posits that safety is

being in a situation where the risks of an aircraft accident or air safety incident are reduced to a

level as low as reasonably practicabl e28. The law demands extreme care from the common

carrier, but not absolute safety, hence, risks are still present, but kept at a low, and within

measures that are reasonably practicable.

B. Culture

Culture here is construed in its corporate and organizational sense, where the

organization adopts a specific mindset to keep the corporation or the organization working. As

defined by Charles W. L. Hill, culture is

27 Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation , University of Newcastle 200128 Airservices Australia, Safety Management Manual, 2001


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the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and

groups in an organization that control the way they interact with each other and with

stakeholders outside the organization 29.

The keywords in this definition are norms, organization, and stakeholders. In

organizational culture, its constituents are bound to norms that govern their actions within and

outside of the organization. In another definition by MIT professor Edgar Schein, he says that

culture is

A pattern of shared basic assumptions invented, discovered, o r developed by a

given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal

integration that have worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be

taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those

problems 30

This is the definition of culture which will be adopted herein, as it is suitable to the workings of

the CAAP and the aviation industry.

VII. Providing Legislation to Ensure a Safety Culture in Philippine Aviation

The proposed legislation will seek to espouse a safety culture which will minimize the

hazards and accidents in a heavily technical industry, the aviation industry. An ideal safety

culture is defined as:

29 C.W.L. Hill and G. Jones, Strategic Management, 33430 E.H. Schein, What is culture? In P.J. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R. Louis, C.C. Lundberg, & J. Martin (Eds.),

Reframing organizational culture (1991)


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the engine that drives the system toward the goal of s ustaining the maximum

resistance towards its operational hazards, regardless of the leadership s personality or

current commercial concerns 31

In a paper entitled Safety culture: Theory and Practice , James Reason interposes that a

safe culture can be engineered through an informed culture - that is - gathering information to

better prevent organizational accidents. He espouses a reporting culture, where the stakeholders

submit their information so the organization responds better to provide solutions 32.

The F SIS duty is to be the enforcing body, which will exercise its functions of certifying

airworthiness, inspecting aircraft, monitoring airworthiness information, evaluating aircraft and

its on-flight employees, and imposing violations upon those fail to measure up to the exhaustive

standards that the FSIS will set.

It will then be the goal of the FSIS, if not the entire CAAP, to prioritize safety above

everything, to prevent so-called organizational accidents, defined as accidents which

happen to systems o r subsystems. They have multiple causes involving many

people operating at different levels within their respective companies. Though extremely

rare within any one domain, organizational accidents can have devastating effects on

uninvolved populations, ass ets, and the environment 33

Flight operations consist of many layers: the aerodrome personnel, the maintenance crew,

the CAAP/FSIS officials, and pilots and co-pilots. Errors are like holes in each layer, eventually,

eventually allowing for the probability of accidents to pass through. The idea is to make the

31 J. Reason, Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress, 294 (1998)32 Ibid., 294 33 Ibid., 295


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layers reduce the size of hole only, as absolute safety is not attainable in aviation, and because

the measures must be reasonable 34.

The legislation will be binding on both pilots and employees of public charters and

carriers, as well as CAAP officials assigned in the FSIS. The safety culture will be engineered by

setting certain goals enumerated in a checklist to be followed pre-flight.

Central to the operation of the safety culture will be the Information Center, which will

gather a history including logbooks, manuals, technical reports, and other pertinent documents

- of recent casualties to determine the recurrent trends. The FSIS shall identify the technical and

mechanical threats and hazards to produce a checklist that will offset or seek to prevent these

threats and hazards. Legislation will be based off these possible dangers, and hereunder is

legislation as an example, culling from errors that could have been prevented in the Masbate

plane crash:

First, the FSIS shall impose an age limit for planes.

Seeing that the Piper Seneca was 40 years old by the time it had crashed, and that it

needed a check every 25, 50, and 100 hours of use, certain care must be had with regard to older

aircraft 35. The FSIS shall impose a maximum age of 40 years old, with additional safety

measures once the aircraft ages to 20 years of age.

Second, the FSIS shall mandate the need for safety vests in every aircraft, even for

private charters.

34 Ibid. 29535 C. Yamsuan, No sign of foul play in Robredo plane crash, say probers, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/267942/no-sign-of-foul-play-in-robredo-plane-crash-say-probers , (last accessed October 9, 2012)
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The Piper Seneca was not equipped with safety vests, as Abrazado said that what kept

him afloat the waters was his backpack 36. None of the bodies recovered were wearing life vests,

and none were reported to have been seen. In the absence of such, it is assumed that the plane

was not equipped with life vests.

Third, the FSIS shall mandate that the FSIS check on the aircraft s engines and turbines,

to make sure that they function to a working level that will enable the aircraft to traverse the

whole trip.

Fourth, the FSIS should ensure the slats, spoilers, ailerons, flaps, elevators, rudders,

vertical and horizontal stabilizers, winglets and in some cases the propellers, be checked for

durability, as these control the drag, lift, and pitch of the aircraft.

Fifth, the FSIS shall make a routine check of the aircraft s fluids, including the carrier s

fuel, the oil, and such.

Sixth, the cockpit shall test correspondence with the control center, to test if

communication is clear and viable.

Seventh, reserve fuel, ELT, emergency lights, distress signals and the like shall be

checked, to ensure that the aircraft is equipped in cases of distress.

Lastly, the FSIS shall adhere to the standards and procedures set by the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding safety and implementation.

36 B. Romualdez, Robredo plane crash: Coincidental questions,http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=840783&publicationSubCategoryId=66 (last accessed October 1,2012)
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No aircraft shall be allowed to leave any aerodrome without complying to the necessary

inspection conducted by trained officials of the FSIS. The safety culture shall strictly ban any

flights 37 that fail to comply with the heightened safety standards. Failure to comply will result in

violations to be determined by the CAAP.

The abovementioned measures are yet to be exhaustive. These measures are based off the

Masbate incident, and the more information that the Information Center or Committee gathers,

the more stringent legislation and the stricter the measures will be.

VIII. Limitations of the Study

The study has come up with a weak legislation based off only the recent events. The

CAAP has no contemporary data regarding recent plane crashes, as the only present data they

have is for year 2009. The proposed legislation came from a single incident, and no doubt there

are many others in documentation that will contribute to legislation.

The study also assumes that common carriers and the FSIS have the wealth of time and

the financial allocations to execute such safety culture. Due to the number of flights and the time

constraints on aviation operations, the proposed legislation might be too exhaustive and taxing

on all stakeholders, and might thus curtail progress and activity in the aerodromes.

The study might have also been helped by an interview from an actual official from the

CAAP and the FSIS, but due to the time constraints, the author of the study was not able to

37 RA 9497, 2008, Sec. 39.Authority to Prevent Flight (a) The Director General is authorized to direct the operator or airman of a civilaircraft that the aircraft is not to be operated in situations where:

(1) The aircraft may not be airworthy;(2) The airman may not be qualified or physically mentally capable for the flight;(3) The operation would cause imminent danger to persons or property on the ground

(b) The Director General may take such steps as necessary to detain such aircraft or airmen.


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schedule an interview with such officials, in view of his studies and his employment on

weekends. The study did not delve into statistics, but was a case study based solely on what had

happened in the Robredo incident.

As such, the study did not investigate the aviation industry s common practices. One

pressing question was whether private charters are allowed to accommodate passengers

impromptu or upon request. Is it a common practice to skim over safety procedures? How often

does the CAAP or the pilot check his engines? A more hands-on and in-depth study will no

doubt yield more accurate legislation.

IX. Related studies

James Reason s Achieving a safe culture: Theory and Practice , is a mix of a theoretical

and practical treatise on safety culture. Like this study, it tries to define a safety culture, albeit in

a broader horizon. He tackles four issues, namely, (a.) unsafe cultures as a cause for the

trajectory of organizational accidents; (b.) pathological adaptations of unsafe cultures; (c.) the

recurrent accident patterns and their relevance to safe cultures; and (d.) the practical application

and engineering of a safe culture. He espouses that an informed culture is central to a safe

culture, and reinforces the concept of violations and punishment in an organization 38

John A. Flannery s Safety Culture and its Measurement in Aviation provides a more in-

depth study of how safety culture penetrates the aviation industry. His study attempts to provide

measurements to quantify the success of safety culture in its intervention in the aviation industry.

He proposes that safety measures be quantified, and although the quantitative tasks are

38 J. Reason, Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress, 295 (1998)


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meticulous, they will serve the aviation administration through feedback. He proposes that these

measurements be answered in the form of surveys and questionnaires 39.

X. Conclusion

It was held in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals that although the law expects a high degree of

diligence and care from common carriers to provide safety, the common carrier cannot insure

absolute safety 40. However, it is not outside the ambit of the law to provide stricter legal

safeguards and preventive measures pre-flight to assist in reducing errors, as stated in RA 9497.

In the Necesito case, the Supreme Court said that

It may be impracticableto require of carriers to test the strength of each and

every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for

the carrier s obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to

determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may

endanger the s afety of the passengers 41.

Indeed, it may be an exhaustive and impracticable process to subject each and every

aircraft to technical and mechanical checks for each and every flight, even if the carrier looks

unscathed and relatively new; however, the toil and the hassles of minimizing the risk and

ensuring that the aircraft is well-equipped to handle distress situations will be worth more than

the disasters it will have to face in case of injuries and deaths to the passengers. The current

Constitution places a high regard on human life, and a few hours of preparation will further

reduce the risk that human lives are lost.

39 Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation , University of Newcastle 200140 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 140 (1989)41 Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958)


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The Civil Code repeatedly emphasizes the phrase the diligence of a good father of a

family 42. Secretary Robredo no doubt exercised such, foregoing his safety in order to see his

family. It was unfortunate that upon his observance of such diligence that he had to suffer

unforeseen consequences which could have been avoided. Hopefully, the government takes into

consideration placing a primer on stricter safety guidelines to give the general public the safe

society that they so deserve.

42 Civil Code, art. 1163


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Airservices Australia, Safety Management Manual, 2001

Hill, Charles W. L. & Jones, Gareth R., Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach,Houghton Mifflin (2006)

Rex Bookstore Incorporated Editorial Staff, The New Civil Code, 1949

Periodical Articles

Flannery, John, Safety Culture and its Management in Aviation, University of Newcastle (2001)

Reason, James, Safe culture: theory and practice, Vol. 12, Work & Stress (1998)

Schein, Edgar Henry, What is culture? In P.J. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R. Louis, C.C. Lundberg, &J. Martin (Eds.), Reframing organizational culture (1991)

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ay 2012-2013 legal history final paper - valdez

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