axworthy and julie bruch(2010)closing the implementation gap.pdf

66
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY Policy Studies Building, Room 335 138 Union Street Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6 Tel: 613 533-6273 Fax: 613 533-2135 www.queensu.ca/csd Closing the Implementation Gap: Improving capacity, accountability, performance and human resource quality in the Canadian and Ontario public service Thomas S. Axworthy and Julie Burch January 2010

Upload: carlos-roberto-zamora-bugueno

Post on 16-Dec-2015

11 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • C E N T R E F O R T H E STUDY OF DEMOCRACY Policy Studies Building, Room 335 138 Union Street Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6 Tel: 613 533-6273 Fax: 613 533-2135 www.queensu.ca/csd

    Closing the Implementation Gap: Improving capacity, accountability, performance and human resource quality in the Canadian and Ontario public service Thomas S. Axworthy and Julie Burch January 2010

  • ContentsAcronyms 3Acknowledgements 4ExecutiveSummary 5.....................................................................................................................CapacityandPerformance 5..................................................................................................Attractingandretainingemployees 6............................................................................................Improvementtoaccountabilitydesign 6ForewordbyThomasS.Axworthy 8.....................................................................................................................................GoldenMoments 11.........................................................................................................................................TruthtoPower 15.....................................................................................................................VirtuesoftheMandarins 17........................................................................................................................................TheWayAhead 21..............................................................................................................CapacityandPerformance 21..........................................................................................AttractingandRetainingEmployees 22....................................................................................ImprovementtoAccountabilityDesign 22Introduction 24Sectionone:Thestateofthepublicservice 29.............................................................................................................................................Surveysays 30........................................................................Oncapacityandperformanceimprovements 31.....................................................................Onattractingandretainingqualityemployees 32.................................................................................................................Onaccountabilitydesign 34......................................................................................................................................Commonthemes 36Sectiontwo:Thepathtoreform 37...................................................................................Capacityandperformanceimprovements 37................................................................................Attractingandretainingqualityemployees 40...........................................................................................................................Accountabilitydesign 46Sectionthree:Goingforward 51Recommendations 53..................................................................................................................CapacityandPerformance 53..............................................................................................AttractingandRetainingEmployees 54......................................................................................ImprovementstoAccountabilityDesign 56References 59Appendices 66Appendix1:ComparativeAnalysisofPublicServiceEmployeeSurveysAppendix2:SummaryofRoundtablesAppendix3:RecruitingtheBestandBrightestforEmploymentinCanadasPublicServiceAppendix 4: A Report on Human Resources in the Public Service: The Quest to MakeGovernmentanEmployerofChoice2

  • Acronyms

    ADM AssistantDeputyMinisterCIDA CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyCSD CentrefortheStudyofDemocracy,SchoolofPolicyStudies,QueensUniversityCMHC CanadianMortgageandHousingCSDES SurveydesignedandexecutedbytheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracy, Queen'sUniversityDM DeputyMinisterDFAIT DepartmentofForeignAffairsandInternationalTradeFAA FederalAccountabilityActEEIT EmployeeEngagementInterjurisdictionalTeamEHR ElectronicHealthRecordsH1N1 Newstrainofpandemicin`luenzaIPAC InstituteofPublicAdministrationofCanadaLGBT Referscollectivelytolesbian,gay,bisexual,andtransgenderpeopleMPA QueensMastersofPublicAdministrationprogramalumniNPM NewPublicManagementOPSES 2009 OntarioPublicServiceEmploymentSurveyPAC PublicAffairsCommissionPCO PrivyCouncilOf`icePEP QueensPublicExecutiveProgramrespondentstoCSDESPMO PrimeMinstersOf`icePS PublicservicePSES 2008FederalPublicServiceEmploymentSurveyPSMA PublicServiceModernizationActSSHA SmartSystemsforHealthAgency

    Closing the Implementation Gap

  • Acknowledgements

    ThisstudyonthepublicserviceispartofalargerprojectattheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracyonthecurrentperformanceofcriticalinstitutionsforCanadiandemocracy,likeParliamentandthepartysystem.Mr.L.R. (Red)Wilson,aformermemberofthepublicservicewhounderstandshowvitalanassetagoodpublicservicecanbe,agreed thatthe timewasripeforan independentthinktanktolookatthefutureofthepublicservice.Wearemostgratefulforhissupportofthisproject.ThisstudywasalsogreatlyassistedbyagrantfromtheAureaFoundation,andwethankthemfortheirgenerouscontribution.We are especiallyindebted to PeterMunk, the founderof theAureaFoundation,andAllanGotlieb,itschair,formakingtheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracyoneofthebene`iciariesoftheFoundations`irstgrants.Thispaperisricherforthevarietyofcontributorstowhomweoweadebtofgratitude.Weextendour thanks to Glenda Fisk, Tyler Johnson, Mathew Johnson, Craig Jones, Amie Skattebo, Kyle G.Toffan,andBenWinningerfortheirresearchinput;DeborahAartsforasuperbjobinconsolidatingallthedisparatepieces;andSaraFrenchforeditingthe`inalpaper.The twoyears of time spenton this project hasseen the investments of research, opinions, andassistancefromagreatnumberofinterestedCanadians.Alltold,fourroundtableshavebeenheldone inToronto and one inOttawa with former studentsof the Queens School of Policy StudiesMastersofPublicAdministration,andattwoatQueenswithacademicsandpolicyexperts,manyofwhom formerlyworkedinthe federalorprovincialcivilservices. AppendixTwocontainsa listofthosewhoparticipatedandwewishtothankthemall.TheCSDmethodistocompletepenultimatedraftsofreportsandthensubjectthemtopeerreviewand public scrutiny. Closing the Implementation Gap incorporates many of the insights of theRoundtableparticipantsandtogivereadersa`lavouroftheirinput,weincludeasummaryoftheirremarksinAppendix2.We alsohave animmensedebttotheformerstudentsoftheQueensSchoolofPolicyStudiesMPAProgram,whotookthetime tocompleteoursurvey.Weareequallyindebtedtotheparticipantsinthe Senior Public Executive Program of the Queens School of Business and the Civil ServiceTrainingandDevelopmentInstituteoftheGovernmentofHongKong.Theresponsesoftheseseniorpublicservantsallowedustocompareand contrasttheirinsightswithmore recententrants.TheheartofthisstudyisthesurveyincludedinAppendix1andwewanttothankallwhorespondedfortakingthetimenotonlytoanswertheposedquestions,butalsoinprovidingdetailedandinsightfulcommentsintheopenendedsections.

    4

  • Executive Summary

    TherecentcontroversyateHealthOntariohasputthespotlightonthepublicservicein2009,justastheGomeryInquiryintothe SponsorshipScandaldid in2005.Publicadministration`indsitselfas the unlikelycentrepieceofbitterdebates. Thisstudy`indsthatithasbecome evidentthat thecornerstoneof theWestminstermodelof responsiblegovernmentwhoisaccountabletowhomfor what?has broken down, and that the resulting confusion has soured the relationshipbetweenpoliticiansandpublicservants.Onimplementationissuesthisstudyaf`irmsthenecessityofreducingtheturnoverrateinstaf`ingpositions,particularlyatthemoreseniorlevels.TheGomeryCommissionconcludedthatthepublicservice isdemoralized.Thisstudyseeksto`indoutwhy this is so. Through evaluation of surveys conducted byCanadas public service and theCentre for the Studyof Democracyat the Schoolof PolicyStudies, QueensUniversity(CSD),wehavecomparedandcontrastedtheattitudesofcivilservantsinboththeOntarioandfederalpublicservices. Graduatesof theQueensMasterof PublicAdministration (MPA) andparticipants intheQueensPublicExecutiveProgramsconstitute theCSDsurvey(CSDES)sample.TheMPAsample isparticularlyinstrumentalinthatitcapturestheviewsofyoungerpublicservants.The`indingsofthe surveyrevealseriousconcerns,amongemployees,aboutinternalmanagementissues that affect employee engagement, these in`luence performance, which in turn in`luenceimplementation. We put forth recommendations under three broad categories: capacity andperformance;attractingandretainingemployees;andaccountability.Capacity and PerformancePerformance improvementmechanismsneedtobe revampedtoprovide the autonomy, `lexibility,andcreativitythatpublicservantswant.Thesurveysindicatethatpublicsectoremployeesfeelthattheexcessive rotationofseniorstaff (31%havehadthreesupervisorsinthreeyears)1isamajorissue for performance improvement. With deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministersspending lessthantwoyears intheirpositions,publicservantsare constantlyreadjusting tonewmanagement,whichaffectstheirabilitytodotheirjob.1. Recognition that the neutrality, merit-based recruitment and expertise of the public

    service are fundamental features of our democracy and must be preserved.

    2. Implementation must become as important to the policy process as analysis or communication is. Cabinets should regularly review implementation issues. A Results Unit should be created in the Treasury Board to fulfill this function.

    3. The norm for holding senior management jobs in the public service should be five years.

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    1 2008 Public Service Employee Survey, Treasury Board . The public service refers to the core public administration (thosedepartments and agencies for which the Treasury Board is the employer) and separate employers (principally the Canada RevenueAgency,theParksCanadaAgency,theCanadianFoodInspectionAgency,andtheNationalResearchCouncilofCanada).

  • 4. Discourage the use of consultants in line positions in favour of building up the capacity of the regular public service.

    Attracting and retaining employeesWhile 8090% of respondents say they are content in their job only 55% believe they haveopportunitiesforpromotionandmostthinkthatthejobpostingthattheyrepliedtodoesnotmatchthejobthattheyendedupdoing.Only2%ofCSDESrespondentsfeltthatthecivilservantseffortsto identify, recruit and retain young people are working very well. Complaints about therecruitmentprocesswereprevalent.However,complaintsinthisareaseemtogotwoways,asthestudyconcludedthatyoung recruitshavehighdemands:theydonotwantorexpectanentryleveljob;theywantfreedomtochangejobsregularly;andtheyhaveunreasonablyhighexpectationsforcompensationandperks.5. Improve the recruitment process. To improve the attraction of employees this study suggests that the publicserviceneeds to be realistic in its hiringgoalsbalancing the needs for bothgeneralistsandforexperts.Longtermplanningneedsto includedialoguewithschoolsofpublic administrationanddealingwithemployment barriersduetocitizenshipevenwhenCanadiancredentialshavebeenearned.6. Expand Interchange Canada and make it work much more directly as a focus of

    Canadas development policy.Canadaneeds to develop anexchangeprogram thatwould see its federal andprovincial public servants working abroad in their respective homedepartments around the world, while other countrys civil servants come towork inCanada.Ourideais togreatlyexpandInterchangeCanada andmakeitmuchmoredirectlyafocusofCanadasdevelopmentpolicy.7. Establish a Mentoring Program AformalmentoringprogrammodelledontheSingaporeexperienceneedstobeadoptedbybothfederalandOntariopublicservices.Openended comments from the CSDES sample and interviews with publicservants for this study reveal great interest in the potential of mentoringprograms.Winninger, inAppendix4, citestheSingapore Administrative Servicewhereeachnewof`icerisassignedamentorwhocanofferfriendlyadviceandshow you the ropes. The 2001 OECD report highlights that mentoring isespecially critical for women and underrepresented minorities because ofperceptionsofanoldboysnetwork.Improvement to accountability designTheQueensCSD surveyfoundthatwhile75%of respondentsknewwhatwasexpectedof themregarding accountability, only52% thought thatthesemechanismsmeasure the right factors.Anareaof concern, according tothesurveys,ishowaccountabilityissharedamongpoliticalstaffand

    6

  • civil servants. Most respondents felt that neither they (66%) nor political staff (54%) areadequately trained towork together. This has left public servants feeling vulnerable topoliticalpressures51%saythat theyare NOTfree fromundue politicalpressure andthis`igure risesto80%formunicipalemployees.Toaddresstheaccountabilityissuethisstudyrecommendsthat:8. A task force or Wise Person Group is established to create an Accountability Code

    that will clarify the responsibilities of public servants, ministers and the staffs that ministers employ. This code, passed as a non-binding resolution in Parliament and the provincial legislatures, would become the benchmark to guide future accountability disputes.

    9. It should be a condition of employment in any ministers office that exempt staff be required to attend a two week course on the essentials of government and the political-civil service relationship.

    10. Develop an Exempt Staff Code of Conduct and Ethics. 11. Adopt the title Executive Assistant to more accurately reflect the duties of political

    advisors.

    12. Exempt staff post-employment activity restrictions should be reduced to one year.

    Ultimately, the public service is a re`lection of the political and institutional context where itresides. In orderfor public servants tohave the clarity, `lexibility, and creativity theyrequire toimplementpoliciesproperly,aworkableaccountabilitybargainbetweenministers,theirstaffs,andthepublicservice needstobe recreated.Untilthisisachieveditwillbe verydif`iculttoclosetheimplementationgapidenti`iedinthisreport.

    Closing the Implementation Gap

  • Foreword by Thomas S. Axworthy

    The civil service in a democracy worksunder very peculiar conditions. The controlexercised over it from the top is both more lax and more severe than in otherbureaucracies.BecauseoftheconBlictingandunreconciledinterestsintheelectorate, inthelegislature,andinpoliticalparties,direction ofthe civil service isoften vacillatingandlacking in vigoron theotherhand,because thecivil servicedealssomuchwiththeprivate interestsof groupsand individualswhose rightsmustbe respected to theletterexceptinsofaraslegislationauthoritizesinterference,thereisveryrigidcontroloftheactionsoftheservicefromthetop.Thereismorerelianceonthebitandtightreinthanthespur.2The subjectmatter of this study is the peculiar conditions in which Federal and Ontario publicservantswork. J.A.CorryandJ.E.Hodgetts,twoofthegreatestteachersofpublicadministrationinthehistoryofQueensUniversitydevotedtwochaptersoftheirseminalDemocraticGovernmentand

    Politics tothe issueofdemocraticvaluesandtheroleof the publicservice incontributingtotheirattainment.Writtenmore than a generation ago, the insight thatpoliticians, parliament, and thepublicrelymoreon restraintandcontrolthebitandtightreinin theirrelationshipwiththepublic service, rather than encouraging risk taking and creativity (the spur) could serve as adescriptionofourcurrentageofaccountabilityoverdrive.ThepublicservicetodayenduresadailybarrageofcriticismfargreaterthaninthedaysofCorryandHodgettsthebitcutsdeeperthanitdid thenandasthe surveyin thenextsectiondemonstrates, this is taking a toll onthemorale,expectations,andcareerprospectsof themenandwomenwhohavededicatedtheirlivestopublicservice.The centrepiece of this study is the Canadian Public Service CareerSatisfaction Survey(CSDES)designedandcarriedoutbytheCentrefortheStudyofDemocracy(CSD),attheQueensUniversitySchoolofPolicyStudies.Twogroupsweretargetedforthesurvey:i)alumnioftheQueensMastersofPublicAdministrationprogram(MPA), halfofwhom are young recruitsandhave less thantenyearsexperience;and ii) seniorpublicexecutives attending the PublicExecutive Program at theQueensSchoolofBusiness.Therespondentsare,byandlarge,dividedequallybetweentheFederalandOntarioPublicServices. Althoughnotintegrated intothedata presented, some referencesarealsomadetotheresponsesofseniorHongKongpublicservantswhocompletedasurveyin2009.3TheHongKongresultsshowthatconcernsaboutaccountabilityresonatefarbeyondourborders.OnecanarguethatsamplesrestrictedtoQueenspublicadministrationgraduatesorparticipantsofQueensexecutiveprogramsaretoonarrowtogeneralizeaboutthestateofpublicserviceaswhole.Suchcaveatsaredulynoted,buttheCSDresultsarebroadlyinlinewithmanyofthe`indingsof thepublic service employee surveysconductedona regularbasisbyboth the federal andprovincialgovernments.TheCSDsurveyresultsweresupplementedbyaseriesofinterviewsandroundtableswith Ontario and federal public servants who reinforced the survey `indings by augmenting8

    2 J.CorryandT.Hodgetts(1960),488.3 ThomasAxworthyfacilitatedDirectorateSeminarsfortheHongKongSARProgram,April2009.

  • statisticaldatawithpersonalcolourandanecdotes.Further,the2009CSD studycomplementsthe`indings and research of the 2007 PublicPolicyForum studyCanadas PublicService in the 21stCentury4 andthethreereportsofthePrimeMinistersAdvisoryCommitteeonPublicService.5Iamverycon`identthatthissurveyisanaccuratesnapshotofthecurrentviewsofmanyin the federalandOntariocivilservices.Public servants do a variety things ranging from senior of`icialswhomanage crisesand adviseministersto the verydifferent rolesof those whodeliver frontline servicesthrough interactionwithcitizens. JamesQ.Wilson(1990),inhisclassicBureaucracy, dividespublicservicesintothreecategories:operations,managers, andexecutives.6 Allaremembersof thepublicservice,yetsomepartsmight be in crisiswhile others are working perfectlywell. For example, senior executivesdealingwithministersand legislaturesona dailybasismaybemalfunctioningwhencomparedtootherparts of themachine, like those providing passports orconstructing highways. Ora policyframeworkmaybe well thought out and articulated at senior levels, such as in Canadas PublicHealth Agencys H1N1 strategy, but the implementation at the delivery levelvaccinationsforexample, mightbe `lawed. In bodies so vast (estimated employment levels in the federal publicservice:401,0007;Ontario:68,6458),itisprudenttobecarefulaboutgeneralizations.AsthePublicPolicy Forum Report, A Vital National Institution warned in its summaryof several roundtablediscussions there is toomuch emphasis on the 5,000 employeeswho provide high level policyadvisetopoliticians, andfartoolittle on the400,000 including Crowns, theCanadianForcesandotherorganizations,whoimplementprograms,deliverservicesandworkdirectlywiththepublic.9Certainlymany use the word crisis10 in describing todays public service. Donald Savoie, a veryastute observer of comparative public administration, for example, quotes a former Canadiansenior government of`icial who remarked: the civil service has simply lost its way.11 Savoieexamines, in great detail, the relationship between politicians and civil servants in Canada andGreatBritain and concludesthattheoldcooperativemodelisnowbroken12 Politiciansdirectingpolicybutstaying outof administration,andcivilservantswilling tospeaktruth topower,havebeen replaced by court government where individual public servants may `lourish (if they

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    4 Green,Baird,Fawks,(2007).5 See the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, andSixteenth:Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada within the annexes the`irst, second, thirdreportof the PrimeMinisters AdvisoryCommittee on the PublicService chairedbyTheRight Honourable Donald F.Mazankowski, P.C., O.C., A.O.E., LL.D.http://www.pcobcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=arra/162009/3rd3eme/20090226eng.htm6 JamesWilson,(1990).7 StatisticsCanada,2009.Retrieved27November2009.http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dailyquotidien/090529/t090529b1eng.htm8 Howlett, (2009). http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontarioshrinkscivilserviceby1500jobs/article1376568/.Retrieved:25November2009.9 PublicPolicyForum,(2007).P12.10 Whether crisis is the right word or not can be debated, but manywhowork in the public service responded that they perceivethemselvestobe undersigni`icantstress. Graham Lowe, forexample,cites the StatisticsCanadaCommunityHealthStudytoshowthatinselfperceived workstress respondents saying that almost always at work they were quite a bit or extremely stressful, publicadministration employeeswere nearthe topofthosemost underpressure.With37%of the public administration sampleindicatedthattheywere stressed, compared to 22% in primary occupations, like agriculture or processmanufacturing. Only employees in `inancialmanagement or the healthsector recorded higher percentagesof stress than public administration employees generally. Source: Lowe,2007.www.cprn.org.Retrieved:4January2009.11 DonaldSavoie,(2008).P1512 Ibid,P16.

  • implement the wishesof thecourt),butthedistinctpersonalityand independentrole of the civilserviceasawholehaswithered.TheCSDsdata,however, demonstratesthatwhile the civil servicemayhave somedents, itis farfrombroken. Heavymajoritiesof the respondents to the CSD survey reported high levelsof jobsatisfaction80%of the Queenssampledescribe theirjobassatisfyingandover50%ofFederalrespondentsthinkthattheirorganizationisperformingbetterthanitdidwhentheystartedoveradecade ago. In generalabouttwothirds of the respondentsare happywith theirwork, withtheotherthirdthinkingaboutleavingorareactuallyseekinganotherjob.TonyDean, thenSecretarytotheOntarioCabinet, inhis2007Framework forActionReportto thePremiertookmanyinsightsfromaMarch2006surveyofOPS employeesandhisconclusionsareroughlysimilartotheQueensstudy.ThereportfoundthatOntarioemployeeswerefairlysatis`iedandreasonablyengagedwith theirjob13.About twothirdsof those surveyed said that theworkthattheydogivesgoodvalue fortaxdollarsandthattheirunitplaceshighvalueongoodservice.The2009OntarioPublicServiceEmployeeSurveyevenshowsanincreasefromthetimeDeanwroteof job satisfaction among public servants (67% satis`ied and 12% not), which represents anincreasefrom3.50meanin2006to3.77meanin200914.Yet,liketheQueensCSDsurvey,Deanalsohighlightedareasforimprovementonly38%feltthattheyhadopportunitiesforcareergrowth,only22%feltleaderswereprovidingcleardirection,andonly35%saidtheamountoftraininganddevelopmentreceivedmettheirneeds15.Eventhoughjobsatisfaction isrelativelyhigh,theQueensCSDsurveydemonstratesthattherearesigni`icant problem areas, particularly in the political civil servant relationship that Savoiehighlighted. Over half of the respondents believe that their organization suffers from unduepolitical interference (this number is 10% higher among MPA graduates) and 53%of the MPAsample believe that political staff are seldom capable and trained adequately for theirresponsibilities16. Savoie argues that civil servants should have a legal basis for resistinginstructions from elected politicians to perform essentially partisan acts, and the Queens CSDsampledemonstratesthathehasidenti`iedarealconcern17.Whatwe heard from ourroundtable experts, however, is that the problem isnotsomuchaboutinterferenceasitisaboutunderstandingthe relationshipbetweencivilservantsandexemptstaff.Thisrelationshipissueismoreaboutmisunderstandingsratherthanmalignintent.Savoie wonders if there ever reallywasa golden age of the political civilservantrelationship.Regardless, he believes that it is not possible to turn the clockback to the way thingswere.18Perhaps he isright. Compared to theirpredecessors two generationsago, todays public service

    10

    13 TonyDean,(2007).http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/121594.pdf.Retrieved:25November2009.14 IpsosReid,2009).15 TonyDean,(200716 Formore informationonpolitical staff,seeLiane B.Benoit. MinisterialStaff: the life andtimesofparliamentsstatutoryorphansinCommission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities: Restoring Accountability, Volume 1. (Ottawa:PublicWorksandGovernmentServicesCanada,2006.)17 DonaldSavoie,(2008).P338.18 Ibid,P335

  • mustmanage in a worldwith a twentyfourhour news cycle, much less deference to authority,articulate thinktanksandinterestgroupsof everypersuasion,and the pervasive in`luenceof theCharterofRightsandFreedoms,whichhasmade the judiciarymuchmoreof apolicyfactor19.Addtothisfrequentdeputyministerjobswitchesthatoftenresultindeputiesbringingwiththemtheirclosestassociates,sothattherearewholeteamsofseniorof`icialsonthemove.In2007, thePublicServiceCommissionhighlighted thisproblem initsannualreportwithastudyof payrecordsthatshowed that 40% of public servants started and ended the year in different jobs; 58% of thegovernments5000executivesmovedtodifferentjobs.LindaDuxbury, ahuman resourcesexpert,told theOttawaCitizen: Its abigdance.Someonemoveswhichcausessomeone else tomove toactingpositionandsomeoneelsetopositionthemselvesforthenextpromotion20.Managersdonotstaylongenoughtoknowtheir`ilesorgain the trustandloyaltyoftheiremployees.Churnmeansthat there is no one tomentor or train new recruits. Duxbury further re`lected that this trendresultsinnocorporatememory,soitslike apingpongpolicygame21.HenryMintzberg,Canadasleadingmanagementtheoristwiselyconcludes that: thewhole issue of musicalchairs in seniormanagement is destructive. The managers Ive seen who are effective are devoted to theirdepartment22.Golden Moments Stability,however,wasthenorminthe1960s.IfthePearsonerawasnotinfactagoldenage,therewerecertainlygoldenmomentsandweshouldnotforgettheachievementsofthepastintryingtoconstructa betterpublicpolicyfuture. Incertain keyareas, suchasthe constantshuf`le todayofseniorpublicservantscomparedtothestabilityandacquiredexpertiseevidentinthe1960seraofcivil service leaders, there is no doubt that in the past the public service wasmanaged moreintelligently. C.E.S Franks reports, for example, that in September 2009 eleven out of the coretwentytwodeputyministersin Canada had beenintheirof`ice forlessthan twoyears,nine lessthanoneyear23.Yet, thePublicAccountsCommitteewastoldbyaSecretarytotheTreasuryBoardthat it tookabout twoyears fora deputyministertobecome fullyeffective in a post. AsFranksconcludes,totheextentthatthisistruemostdepartmentsinCanada,muchifnotmostofthetime,areoperatingwitha lessthaneffectivedeputyminister24.Constantpersonnelchangesarealsonotsimply an Ottawa phenomenon. Our study frequently references the recent controversy overOntarioselectronichealthrecordinitiative(orlackthereof).TheAuditorGeneralofOntariofoundthat a contributing factor to the implementation woes of that project was that, the recentreplacements of eHealth Ontarios board Chair and CEO mark the fourth such overhaul ofleadershipateHealthOntarioanditspredecessor,SSHA.Eachoftheseoverhaulsbroughtwithititsown period of transition where progress on the initiatives objectiveswas slowed or, at times,

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    19 Savoie(2008),P94123hasanexcellentchapteronsocietythenandnow.20 OttawaCitizen.Toomuchreshuf`linginPSranks,expertsays.OttawaCitizen.November2007.21 Ibid.22 VicPakalnis,CanadasManagementGuruinCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.13.No.1.2007.P6.23 C.E.S.Franks,fromanunpublishedpaper:"The Functioning of thePresentDayCanadianHouse ofCommons:a paperpreparedfortheconferenceinhonourofPeterAucoin,"Halifax,November2009.TableV,page824 Ibid.

  • halted25. The Auditor rightly notes that on eHealth (and his observation applies to the publicserviceasawhole)thatwitheveryseniorchangeinpersonnelthereisapricetobepaidintermsoflosttime,lostexpertise,andworkingrelationships.Iwasfortunatethatmy`irstexperienceinOttawapolicymakingwasinthe1960sduringthegreatcreative periodof the Pearson government. Thiswasalso the tailend of thesocalled MandarinEra26. Iobserved `irst hand themen (and a fewwomen)whowere responsible for establishingCanadasreputation ashaving one of the bestpublic services in theworld.ThatwasalsoanerawhenpoliticalpartiesactuallydebatedpolicyLiberalPartydelegatesatthe 1961Rally, not theleadersadvisors,made theCanadaPensionPlanaplatformpriority.Again, in1966, LiberalPartydelegatesresistedanyattempttoundulydelaymedicare27.Mr.Pearson,withagoodeyeforCabinettalent, broughtthreenewfacesintoCabinetinApril1967eachofwhomeventuallybecamePrimeMinister. The cabinet that these young menPierre Trudeau, John Turner and Jean Chrtienjoinedwasmuchmorethanatalkshop.EquallycriticaltothesuccessofthePearsonGovernmentwasthestrengthof thepublicservice.Vibrantvolunteerbasedparties,strongwilledCabinets,andapowerfulpublicservicemadethe1960sagoldeneraofpublicpolicymaking.Todayeachofthesethreepillarsparty,cabinetandpublicservicehasbeenweakened.Inthesummerof1967,IbeganworkasajuniorresearchassistanttoWalterGordon,PresidentofthePrivyCouncil.GordonhadworkedatFinanceduringthewarasadollara yearman28 andin1946hechairedaRoyalCommissiononAdministrativeClassiBicationsinthePublicService.IhappilyaccompaniedMr.GordonwhenhemetoldfriendslikeW.A.MacIntosh29whohadalsoheldseniorpositionsintheDepartmentFinanceandReconstructionandIlistenedattentivelyastheyswappedanecdotes. In discussing the successes of the postwar Mandarite and their preference foranonymity, Iremembertheirinsightthattherewasnolimitonwhatonecould achieve inOttawaprovidedyoudidnotcare forpubliccredit.Thisisaninsightthatpoliticalassistantsanxioustogettheirnamesinpoliticalgossipcolumnsshouldre`lectoncarefully.Consideringacareerinpublicservice,Iwrote theForeignServiceexamsandwasofferedpositionsinbothExternalAffairsand thePrivyCouncilOf`ice,butthe sirensongof politicswastoostrong.KeithDaveyand Jim Couttshad little dif`iculty in persuadingme to become apoliticalassistant.Priortothe1960stherehadcertainlybeenpoliticaladvisorstoministersinOttawa,buttheywerefewinnumber30. The bestknownwasJackPickersgillwhodespitebeing amemberof the public

    12

    25 Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009).P10.26 Granatstein, (1982).P118. Gordon Robertson, one of the great public servants of that era has written an insightful memoir ondecisionmaking in Ottawa. See Gordon Robertson, Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant: Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau. (Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,2000).27 Incontrast, the policy forum at the 2006 Liberal leadershipconventionwas a sea of emptychairs, devoid of anydiscussionof theLiberalRenewalCommissionsreportthatIhadchairedthatyear,whichhadgarneredthecontributionofhundredsofvolunteers.28 DollaraYear Man, a term used during WWII to describe those business executives who were brought to Ottawa to work ingovernment, largely inthe Department ofMunitionsandSupplyand intheWartime PricesandTrade Board.Theircompaniespaidtheirsalaries,whileOttawaprovidedlivingexpenses.Source:TheCanadianEncyclopedia29 W.A.MacIntoshbecamea distinguishedPrincipalatQueensUniversity,asdidJ.J.Deutsch, anotherofthe famousmandarinswhoalsoretiredtoQueenstoeducategraduate students, myselfincluded. Fora descriptionof theMandarinsat theDepartment ofFinance intheGoldenAgesee:DavidW.Slater.EconomistsattheDepartmentofFinance,19451980inCanadianBusinessEconomics.(1997).30 Foranexaminationofthe role ofpoliticalstaffpriortoMr.Trudeaus initiative in creating a formalclassof exempt politicaladvisorssee:J.R.Mallory,TheMinistersOf`ice:AnUnreformedPartofthePublicServiceinCanadianPublicAdministration.Vol.10.No.1(1967).

  • service gave partisan advice to both Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent (a transgression ofneutralitythatwouldnotgounnoticed today).Iwasamemberof the `irstgeneration ofpoliticalassistants, a cadre that hasgrown in in`luence eversince. The data from the CSD survey showsclearly how uneasymany public servants are about the expanding role of political assistants.However, political advisors make a real contribution to policymaking and this should not beforgotten when we assess the relationship between ministerial of`ices and the regular publicservice.Oneof thegreatcontributionsofapublicservice iscautionitmustoutline theobstaclestoministerialorpolitical goals.Ministers are often frustrated, because the main word that theyhearfrompublicof`icials is no. Yet, thisisa real service, because of`icialsare trying toprotecttheir minister from trouble. Political advisors, however, have an opposite virtuethey areexceedingly energetic, passionately loyal, and keen to tackle what appear to be impossibleobjectives.Thereisarole forthewisdomandmemoryof the publicservice,butalsoanequalroleforthecommitmentandenergyof thepoliticaladvisor.Weneedgoodpoliticaladvisors, justasweneedgoodpublicservants.The 1968 innovation of Pierre Trudeau of formally creating a new type of public of`icialthepolitical advisoris often cited as the beginning of the aggrandizement of primeministerialpower31.But, infact,Trudeaupreservedoursystemofa professionalpublicservicebyrecognizingthatpoliticswascentraltoanygovernment,ministersneededstafftohelpthemdotheirjobs,andthatitwasinappropriatetoasknonpartisanpublicservantstotakeonthesetasks.Advancingtheagenda of the government, following uponministerialdirectives, interpretingpublicopinion, anddevelopinganarrativeandcommunicatingaconsistentmessageareallvitaltasks;asimportanttothesuccessofagovernmentastheprofessionalandtechnicalexpertiseofthepublicservice32.Thus,the public servant category of exempt staff was born. Exempt, because unlike career publicservants,politicalstaff arenotsubjectto themeritbased rulesof the PublicServiceCommission,but public servants still, because: political advisorsmake a legitimate contribution to the policyprocess,aresubjecttovariousstatutes, suchasthePublicServiceEmploymentAct,theCon`lictofInterestAct,andtheLobbyingActandarepaidfromallocationsauthorizedbyParliament.In2008,therewere oversix hundredministerial staff inOttawa serving twentyseven ministers and `ivesecretariesofstate,includingapproximately80staffpositionsinthePrimeMinistersOf`ice33.Ministersneedassistance frompoliticalprofessionals justastheyneedexpertpolicyadvice fromthepublicservice.Publicservantsmayoftenbe frustratedin theirdealingswithpoliticalservantsastheevidenceinAppendix1demonstratesbuttheymightfeelfarworse iftheywerethrownintothemaelstromofpoliticallifeintodayspartisanenvironment.Theoutsideimpressionmaybeof anallpowerful PMO, butinside thebellyof the beast it isa constantbattle to stay on top ofevents, manage a myriad of priorities, and move an agenda forward inch by inch in a federalcountryinaglobalizedworld. Icant imaginebeinganybusierthan Iwasindirecting thePMOin

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    31 See,forexample,anearlycritiqueinWalterStewart,Shrug:TrudeauinPower.(Toronto:NewPress,1971).32 Foradescriptionofthe strategic roleofthe PrimeMinistersOf`ice see:Thomas S.Axworthy. Of Secretaries toPrincesinCanadianPublicAdministration.Vol.31.No.2(1988).33 Alex Smith. Ministerial Staff Issues of Accountability and Ethics, December 2008, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0602e.htm(Accessed:4January2010).

  • Mr.Trudeauslasttermandthatwasinanerathatpredatedthe24hournewscycle,Youtube,andemail! This study has several recommendations on how to recruit and retain quality men andwomen forthe public service.We need tobeequallydiligent in encouraging and supporting theexemptcategoryofpoliticaladvisor.Tothatend,we needtorealize thatthepoliticaladvisorgrouparenolongerunreformed,asJ.R.Mallorywrote about the breed in 196734. The Privy Council Of`ice, for example, describes thepoliticaladvisoryfunction inAccountableGovernment:AGuideforMinistersandMinistersof Stateas:toprovideMinistersandMinistersofStatewithadvisersand assistantswhoare notdepartmental public servants, who share their political commitment, and who cancomplementtheprofessional,expertandnonpartisanadviceandsupportofthePublicService.Consequently, theycontribute a particular expertise or point ofviewthat thePublicServicecannotprovide35.TheAccountabilityGuide speci`icallyinstructsthatexemptstaffdonothave the authoritytogivedirectionstopublicservantsandinmeetingtheirresponsibilitytorespectthenonpartisanshipof public servants, exempt staff have an obligation to inform themselves about the appropriateparameters of public service conduct, including public service values and ethics and to activelyassesstheirownconductandanyrequeststheymake todepartmentalof`icialsinthelightofthoseparameters36.TheConBlictofInterestActhasseveralprovisionsthatapplytoministerialstaff(suchasnottousetheir position to in`luence a decision to further private interests) and sets rules for postemployment activities(suchasnotentering into contractsoracceptemploymentof aperiodofoneyearwithanentitythattheyhavesigni`icantof`icialdealingswith).Formerministerialstaff ina particularly excessive restriction are prohibited under the Lobbying Act from engaging inlobbying activitiesfor`iveyears!Inshort,ministerialstaffinOttawaalreadyoperateunderastrictethicalcodewithsigni`icantprohibitionsonpostpoliticalemployment.Theproblemisthatfewrealizethisfact,certainlynotthepublicservants,whowereinterviewedforthisstudy.Thepredominantimpressionarticulatedbymanypublicservantsinoursamplewasthatwhilepublicservantsare guidedbywellarticulatedcodesof conduct,politicalstaff aremotivatedonlyby partisan needs. Yet, ethical standards for political behaviourexist inmanystatutes andpoliticalguidelinesforPCOstaff. Thisde factocode shouldbemadeexplicit inaCodeofEthnical

    Conductfor ExemptStaff, asrecommendedbythe GomeryCommission37.Suchacodewould helpdispel the image of political staff as amoral political warriorsand putexempt staff on an equalethicalfootingwiththepublicservice.

    14

    34 J.R.Mallory(1967)35 PrivyCouncilOf`ice,AccountableGovernment:AGuideforMinistersandMinistersofState,2008,P.37.36 Ibid,P.3738.37 Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities: Restoring Accountability, Recommendations.(Ottawa:MinisterofPublicWorksandGovernmentServices,2007),Chapter7.

  • The Gomery Commission also advocated that exempt staff receive training for their importantduties.Trainingandprofessionaldevelopmentarethehallmarksofourprofessionalpublicservicesand there is no reason that such opportunities should be denied to exempt staff given theirlegitimateandcriticalroleinthepolicyprocess.AsPrincipalSecretarytothePrimeMinister,Imetregularlywiththeexemptstafffromeachministersof`iceandsometimesseminarswereorganizedaround political topics (usually the latest in political management techniques from the UnitedStatesortheUnited Kingdom), butsucheffortswere adhoc. Asa juniorassistanton ParliamentHill,I receivedverygoodadvice,especiallywhenmeetingveryseniorpublicservants,tokeepquietandtakenotes.Butbeyondthispersonalmentoringtherewasnoorientationsession.TheInstituteofPublicAdministrationofCanada in2006produced anExecutiveBriefonTrainingand Recruitment of Political Staff at Queens Park, which contains ideas worthy of widerapplication38.Theyrecommendedthatthereshouldbeorientationtrainingfornewpoliticalstaffbycurrentandformerministerialpersonnelandbypublicserviceexecutives.Thereshouldalsobeasystemofmasterclasses,formoreindepthexecutivedevelopment.Justasimportant,thereshouldbe similarclassesforpublicservantsonhowtobuildeffective relationshipswithministerialstaffandthepremiersof`ice.ThedatainAppendix1showsthatmanypublicservantsfeelthattheyarenotadequatelytrained to dealwithpoliticiansand thatministerialassistantsare notadequatelytrainedtodealwith theirpublicadministrationduties.The IPACprogramwouldmeetboththeseneeds.Aswell as the developmentof a Code of Ethical Con`lict forExemptStaff and better educationalopportunitiesforexemptstaff,akeydisincentiveforpoliticalstaffrecruitment,shouldberemoved.Theprovisionin theLobbyingAct,whichprohibitsemploymentinlobbyingactivitiesfor`iveyearsafterleavingaministerialof`ice,istoodraconian.Bylimitingcareeropportunitiesforsuchalengthoftime,itdissuadesmanyfrombecomingexemptpoliticalstaff.Aoneyearprohibitionissuf`icient.There is one change, however, which shouldbe made tomore accuratelyre`lect the function ofpoliticaladvisors.Theyareassistantsnotdecisionmakers. TodaysdesignationofChiefofStaffimpliesanexecutiveauthoritythatsuchapositionshouldnotpossess.Inthe1960sseniorpoliticaladvisorswerecalledExecutiveAssistantsandthatisamoreaccuratedescriptionforwhattheydo.Truth to PowerAlthough I decided against a public service career, I had the good fortune to work with publicservantswhowere experts in implementationandmaintained the higheststandards in speakingtruth to powercareer public servants like Ian Clark, Sylvia Ostrey, Gordon Smith, RobertRabinovitch, Robert Fowler, Arthur Kroeger, Maureen ONeil, Huguette LaBelle, Ed Clark, BobAdamson, Ian Stewart, AllanGotlieb, TommyShoyama, and Gordon Osbaldeston. In particular, Ilearnedmuch fromMichaelPit`ield, Secretarytothe Cabinet. Pit`ieldsapproachtopublicpolicymaking was often criticized for being unnecessarily complicated. He was trying to achieveequilibrium between collegial cabinet debates combined with the longterm perspective of the

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    38 PatrickDutil. Working withPolitical Staff at Queens Park: Trends, Outlooks,Opportunities.(Institute of PublicAdministration ofCanada,2006).

  • Canadianpublicservice.IcanpersonallyattestthathewasforthrightinbringingproblemstothePrime Ministerhe certainly never had trouble speaking truth to powerand he was a stoutdefenderof thepublicserviceagainstsomeofthemoreproblematicideasof thePrimeMinistersOf`ice(manyofwhichIoriginated).InOttawa inthe1960sand70sonedidnotnecessarilyhavea long personalrelationship, likeMr.Pit`ield did withMr. Trudeau, to speaktruth to power. I saw this characteristic displayed manytimes.The`irstthingtomakeclearisthatspeaking truthtopowerdoesnotmeansubstitutingthevalues of appointed public of`icials over those of the elected politicians. By running for of`ice,politiciansdothe heavydemocratic lifting anddemocratic accountabilitygivesthemthe primaryjobofallocatingvalue.Butinassessingtheimpactof the valuechoicethatpoliticiansmake,publicservants have the duty to give their ministers theirbest professional advice. I have mentionedWalter Gordon as my `irst Ottawa boss and an anecdote about his controversial 1963 budgetillustrateswelltheframeworkofahealthytruthtopowerrelationship. Inthe1970s,IgottoknowClaudeIsbister,whowasacivilservantwhoheldmanyseniorjobs,including servingasAssistantDeputyMinisterofFinanceatthetimeofthe1963budget.Isbisterandhisfellowof`icialswerenotinfavourofmanyofthemeasurestoreduceforeigninvestmentthatwereattheheartofGordonsbudget. But, Gordonsviews on the subjectwere wellknown, he had campaigned on itand theDepartmentacceptedthatasaministerhehadthe righttopromotepoliciesthathebelievedwereinthepublicinterest.Speakingtruth topower, however,doesimplythedutyofpublicservantstogivepoliticalsuperiorsthebestpossible informationandadvice.AsadevoteeofMr.Gordon,yearslater when I was a member of the PMO, I asked Isbister if the Department of Finance haddeliberately let him down by not pointing out the implementation dif`iculties and `inancialtechnicalities in many of the budgets provisions (many had to be withdrawn and Gordonsreputation tooka severe hit). Isbistertoldme thathisconscience was clearhe and others hadsuggestedproceeding, in stages, ratherthan througha boldprogram allatonce. Gordonrejectedthisadvice,ashewasentitledtodo, buttheDepartmentfelt ithaddoneitsjobbynothidingtheprobablereactionofthe`inancialmarkets,nortellingtheministerwhathewantedtohear39.ThiscaseillustratesthetruthtopowerdynamicsthatJamesR.Mitchellrecentlyoutlinedtoagroupof civil service leaders. The `irst thing to remember, he said, is that this whole business ofspeakingtruthtopowerisnotaboutyou;itisaboutyourdutyasaseniorpublicservant.Itisaboutthefacts,anditcanbeaboutideas,butnotaboutyouandnotyourideas40.Of course Isbisterscautionsaboutthe 1963 budgetand the doubtsof LouisRasminsky, the thenGovernorof the BankofCanada,were given toMr.Gordon con`identially. TherewasnoAccess toInformationActor24hournewscycle totrumpetthatseniorof`icialshadreservationsaboutthespeed of the minister. David Zussman contrasts the situation twenty`ive years ago when theCanadianPublicServicecouldbecharacterizedasanonymous,wellhidden,andtheunchallengedprimarysource of policyadvice. Asa result, publicservantscould be candid with theirpolitical

    16

    39 The story of the 1963 budget is welltold in Steven Azzi.WalterGordonand the Rise of CanadianNationalism. (Montreal:McGillQueensUniversityPress,1999).P.95110.IsbisterwasalsoakeysourceforAzzisaccount.40 JamesR.Mitchell. Can I ReallySpeakTruth toPower? PracticalAdvice for New Executives,Ottawa. March 25, 2007 at the SussexCircle.

  • masters in the full knowledge that their advice would be con`idential. Today, however, heconcludes, there appears to be less interest in speaking truth to power given the extremelypartisanenvironment41.RuthHubbard,a formerDeputyMinisterandChairofthePublicServiceCommissionaddsafurtherdimension tothenecessityofspeaking truthtopowerbymaking thepointthatthe exercisedoesnot have to be a zero sum game. It is a mistake to start every conversation at the politicalbureaucratic boundarywith a mindset that presumes thatwhat is intended is forone party toconfront the other42. She gives the example of of`icials understanding the objectives of theministerwhile suggesting bettermeansof obtaining the goal or public servantsbeing attentiveenoughtopoliticalrealitiestofashionresponsesthattakeintoaccountthepoliticalvaluesoftheirministers. With a newly elected government, she recounts, instead of relating choices to thecollective good,the value frame of thepreviousgovernment,of`icials instead talked intermsofreducing crime, a reference more in keeping with the goals of the new minister. This skill inunderstanding thevalueframeofthepartyinpowerandthenusing thattohighlighttradeoffswasbrought home to me through observation of the effective performance of Tommy Shoyama, aDeputyMinisterofFinance.Membersof the Liberal caucus, supportedbythePMO,wantedmoredone forsmallbusiness ina forthcoming budget. Shoyamadidnotoppose thisgoalheadon, butinsteadusedaLiberalprinciplewellenunciated invariouscampaigns ofhelping `irstthose whoneedhelpmosttoshowthatmoreresourcesdevotedtosmallbusinesswouldtakeawayfromtheenvelopethatwastobeusedforpoorseniors.Shoyamawonhispointnotbyconfrontation,butbyskilfuluseofframingandlanguage.AsHubbardstates,ministersareneitherfoolsnormalevolent.Therefore, the greaterburdenlieswith thedeputyhead(orotherseniorpublicservants) ratherthanwithelectedof`icialsto`indeffectivewaystoenable the highestqualityconversation to takeplace43.Virtues of the MandarinsBeyond speaking truth topower,whatwere theothercharacteristicsof thepublicservantsthatIknewinthe1960s,1970sand1980sandhowdotheycontrastwithtodayspublicservice?The `irst is that the senior public servants in Ottawa in the 1960s1980s had tremendoussubstantive knowledge of theirdepartments`ield. Therewasnothing about Finance that SimonRiesmandidnotknow.DavidGoldenhadhimself inventedtheDepartmentofDefenceProduction.BobAdamson of CMHC kneweveryaspectof housing. Seniordeputies stayed in their jobs longenoughtogainexpertdepth inthe subject.Advancementdepended onthe abilitytodemonstratesubstantive competence. Ministers relied on the expertise of theirdeputies. Today, as discussedabove,wehaveamadmerrygoroundofdeputiesjumping toanotherjobwithineighteenmonthswhenittakesyearstomasteraportfolio.Publicservantsneedtoprovideexpertiseandpoliticiansenergyand communication skills. Seniorpublic servants, therefore, shouldstayin theirpositions

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    41 DavidZussman.Whitherthefearlessadviser?inCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).42 Ruth Hubbard. Speaking truth topower:A matter of imagination and courage in Canadian Government Executive. Vol. 15. No. 1(2009).P11.43 Ibid

  • foraminimumof`iveyears.ThisisnotanewideaitwasrecommendedbytheRoyalCommissionFinancialManagementandAccountabilityin197944.Second,when I`irstcame toOttawa in the 1960stherelationshipbetweenpoliticiansand seniorpublic servantswas largelyone of trust. The essence of trust,writesPaulThomas, ispositive,con`ident expectations about the motives, intentions, competence, and anticipated behaviour ofinstitutions and their leaders45. As Principal SecretarytoMr. Trudeaumyof`ice could nothavesurvived excepton a systemof trustbetweenmyselfand theClerksof thePrivyCouncilMichaelPit`ieldandGordonOsbaldeston.WithbothclerksIestablishedtheruleofnoendruns.WithboththePMOandPCOhavingaccesstothePrimeMinisteritwas imperative toargueissuesopenlyinfrontof him,ratherthanattemptingtokeep theotherinstitutionin thedark.UsuallythisentailedthePMOaddingapoliticalbrie`ingnotetotheCabinetpackageassembledbythePCO.Wereliedonthe PCO to inform us about the agenda, they reliedonustoalertthem topoliticalmine`ieldsoropportunities.Trustmeansthatpoliticians,politicaladvisors,andpublicservantscandisagreewithoutimpugningeach others motives or character. Senior public servants, a generation ago, certainly had thecourage tosayno to aminister andministerscould saynoto thePrimeMinister. The head of apoliticalof`icewasanExecutiveAssistantnota ChiefofStaff,anddeputieswerepolite toEAsbuttheywouldnevertakeanorderfromthemnorallowthemselvestobeshutoutofmeetingswiththeminister.TheMandarinswerepowerful,becausetheytoldthetruthandtheyhadtheexpertiseandexperiencetobackuptheirclaims.Trust, however,nowseemstobe inshortsupply,inOttawa.Civilityisa companionvirtue totrust.Previousreports fromthe Centreforthe StudyofDemocracyhaveshownthatthealwayspresentpartisanship atQuestionPeriod in the House of Commonshas nowseeped throughto affect theworkof House Committeesandrecentlythe same disease hasbeenallowed topoison the publicservicepoliticalrelationship. LindaKeen, theformerHeadoftheNuclearSafetyCommission,wasdismissed inadispute withtheMinisterof Energy,butnotbefore shewaswrongly labelledasaLiberalappointee46.RichardColvin,adiplomatdoinghisjobreportingthefactsfromAfghanistanondetaineetransfershasbeensimilarlypersonallyattackedbytheMinisterofDefence.ColvinhasbeensupportedpubliclybymanyformerAmbassadors,butnotbytheSecretaryoftheCabinet,whoissupposedtobetheof`icialdefenderofthepublicservice47.AndwhenColvingavehistestimonytoa House Committee, he did so alone, instead of being accompanied by the DeputyMinister ofForeignAffairs and Trade. Steven Covey, a world renowned management consultant, saysabouttrustthatwejudgeourselvesbyourintentionsandothersbytheirbehaviour48.Thebehaviourof

    18

    44 RoyalCommissiononFinancialManagement andAccountability.FinalReport. (Hull:CanadianGovernment Publishing Centre,1979).P.194.45 PaulC.Thomas.Trust andParliamentAgenciesin The Evolving PhysiologyofGovernment,UniversityofOttawa Press (2009).21524846 CBC News. Nuclear safety watchdog head `ired for 'lack of leadership' January 2008,http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/01/16/keen`iring.html?ref=rss.Retrieved:5January2010.47 Steven Chase and Campbell Clark. Former ambassadors condemn Ottawa's attack on diplomat December 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/formerambassadorscondemnottawasattackondiplomat/article1392248/. Retrieved: 5January2010.48 StephenM.R.Covey.CommitmenttotrustinCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).

  • theConservativeGovernmentinattackingtheperformanceofpublicservantsinafashionsimilartothe usual cutandthrust of party slanging is a radical departure from the norm of the socalledGoldenAge andmakesurgentthe necessityofdefendingpubliclythe traditionof ameritbasednonpartisanprofessionalpublicservice.Inthecurrentcontext,arespondenttotheCSDsurveysharedthisopinion:Often, the politiciansgo overboard in responding to issuesthe response ispolitical,notpractical.Forexample,withrespecttoEHealth,theorganization ignoredtherulesthe rules did not need a major overhaul. It is not necessary to implement a newreportingregime.Sometimesyoucanbringinaconsultantforasmallamountofmoneytoaccomplishsomethingquickly.So forthebadactionsofone organization, everyoneelse thathadbeingobeying theruleswaspunished,resulting inmore"administrative"work(process) lesseffectiveness. Sometimesthe senior executivesshould say"no"tothose political responsesrecognize the workload that the political response willrequireand supportthepublicservantsacknowledgetheirexpertise, judgmentandintegrity.(Fall,2009)Third, the senior members of the public service that I worked closely with throughout the1960s1980s had great pride in their profession. Deputy ministers in that era were primarilyconcerned abouttheirowndepartments, but theyalsomet and socialized informally and had awider commitment to the government and public service as a whole. The term horizontalgovernmentwasnotinvogue,buttherealityofgovernmentwideprioritieswasclear.MinistersinthePearsonGovernmenthadwide leewayintheirownportfolios,butalsoenthusiasticallydebatedissuesoutside of their particular remit. AsPresident of the PrivyCouncil, Mr. Gordon had greatinterest in foreign affairs issues, like the VietnamWar. We would discuss the overall agenda ofCabinetasmuchasthedetailsoftheTaskforceontheStructureofCanadianIndustry,whichwashismain focus at the time. In the early 1970s when Iworked forRonald Basford, the Minister ofHousing, one of my speci`ic dutieswas to prepare brie`ing notes for him on cabinet issues ofimportanceoutside of hisportfolio.Cabinetwasnotsimplya focusgroup forthe PrimeMinister,buthadintensedebatesthatdecidedissues.Indeed,MichaelPit`ielddesignedacabinetcommitteesystemwhereministersintheEconomicandSocialAffairsCommittee of cabinetwere givenbroad resourceenvelopesthat theycouldallocateaccordingtotheCommitteeswishes.TherewasnoPMOmicromanagementofthisprocess.Deputyministers served inmirror committees of the cabinet structure, so that Pit`ield would have theadviceofhiscivilservicecolleaguesonthebroadissuesofgovernment.HebroughtthisperspectivetothePrimeMinisterinthedailybrie`ingsandpoliticallyPrimeMinisterTrudeauencouragedwidedebate in cabinet committees and in the caucus. Trudeau loved to compare and contrast thepolitical and public service perspective on issuesandwouldhave been dismayed if one side hadconsistentlydominatedthedebate.Itistrue thatTrudeaubeganthe processtocreate amuchmorepowerfulPMO,butourmandatewas to work on and direct the issues he waspersonally interested in, not every issue in everydepartment. The public service and the political staff interacted on many different levels

    Closing the Implementation Gap

  • departmental,cabinetcommittee,andprimeministerial,witha realbalancebetweenthepoliticalandtheadministrative.TrudeauvaluedtheexpertiseofthepublicserviceasmuchashevaluedtheelectoralexpertiseoftheLiberalParty.Fourth,seniormembersof thepublicservice in thePearson andTrudeaugovernmentshadgreatin`luence becauseof theirexpertise and longevityin theirposts. But theyalsohad a passion foranonymity49. J.E.Hodgetts, inhishistoryof theCanadianpublicservice from1867to1970whichconcludesatjustaboutthe timeIwenttoOttawa,writesof the erathere isaparadoxinthe factthat the administrative branch of government by far the largest of our public and privateinstitutionsandyet, even to theinformedmembersof thegeneralpublic, it isthe leastvisible.50Ministers appeared before parliamentarycommitteesto defend and take responsibility for theirownactionsandthedecisionsoftheirdepartments.Sometimestheypaidaprice.Itisraretodayforaministerto resignoverprinciple orpolicydifferencesbutthe `irstministerforwhomIworked,WalterL.Gordon,resignedtwice.Today,incontrast,picturesofpublicservantsaredisplayedinthefrontpagesofa newspaperorarethe lead storiesinthe televisednewsastheyaresummonedtoappear before parliamentary committees. Ministers publicly blame of`icials for mistakes andof`icialshavehadtolearnpublicrelationsskillsinordertosurvive.Thismaybethe single largestdifferencefromtheOttawaIexperiencedinthe1960sandtheOttawaoftoday.Fifth, thecivilservice Iknewalsosharedaparsimoniousculture thatshunnedpublicdisplayandwasveryconsciousabout expenseaccounts. Ioncewastohave lunchwithTommyShoyama, theDeputyMinisterof Finance and hadmade a reservation in the ChteauGrill. Uponhearing this,Shoyama said, ahno,neverforgetthatwearepaidbytaxpayerswhohavea lot lessthatwe do.WeateinsteadatMurraysintheLordElginHotel.Sixth,anothergreatchangesincetheGoldenEraoftheMandarinsistheexplosionoftheconsultantculture inOttawa.Agenerationago, departmentshadexpertise inhouse,and ifconsultantswereemployed,itwouldbetotestoutideasalreadygeneratedbythebureaucracyorto`ixashorttermproblem.Today,thereisanundergroundpolicytriangleofregularof`icials,consultants(oftenlongtermand retiredpublic servants) and lobbyists. It ishard to believe, butwhen I `irstarrived inOttawa therewasnotasingleprofessionallobbyistof`ice.Lawyersmightdiscretelyperformwhatwe would now call lobbying, but there was certainly no industry. Bill Lee a former ExecutiveAssistanttoPaulHellyer,openedthe `irstlobbyistsof`ice,calledExecutiveConsultantsin thelate1960s.Today,therearenearly5000 lobbyists,a neardoublingofthebreed,sincethe `irstregisteroflobbyistsin198951.Theremaybeevenagreaternumberofconsultantscarryingoutjobsthattheregularpublicservice used todoitself.If theprivate sectorwantstopaylarge retainerstotrytoin`luence policy through lobbying, there is little that can be done about it, except making theprocessastransparent,aspossible.Withthefederalgovernmentnowrunninganannualde`icitof

    20

    49 Foragooddescriptionof the traditionalpublicservice ethos, includinganonymitysee:JohnTait. AStrong Foundation,Report of theTaskForceonPublicValuesandEthicsinCanadianPublicAdministration.Vol.40.No.1.1997.Writtenin themid1990s theTaitReportdiscusseda faultline inthe publicservice around the concept ofaccountability, a continuing preoccupationofthe publicservice,as thedatainAppendix1testi`ies.50 Hodgetts,1973.P341.51 AndrewMayedaandJackAubry.LobbyingAliveandWellinOttawa.EdmontonJournal.January2008.

  • over$50billion,thereissuretobesigni`icantattemptstoreigninpublicsectorspending.Onegoodplace to startwould be to cutbackradicallyon the use of outside consultantsand to insist thatdepartmentsshouldbuildinternalcapacity.ThisthemewillbeexploredlaterinthepaperwhenwediscusstheeHealthdisputeinOntario.The Way AheadOne cannot turn the clockback two generations, butwe can suggest improvements that try tocapture the strengthsof the Mandarinera while being true toourown time andconsistentwithtodaysvalues.Certainly, the greaterdiversity,of todayspublicservice,particularlyin genderandemploymentofFrancophones, isagreatimprovementoverthepublicserviceI`irstencounteredinthe1960s.But,themanagementskillsandthepolicyexpertiseofseniorpublicservantsatthateraisanassetthatweshouldtrytorecreate.Similarly,therewasaclearaccountabilitybargaininthe1960s between ministers and public servants. Ministers had the public pro`ile and the publicservantshadanonymitythatallowedthem tohavegreatpolicyin`luence.Thisbargaincannotbeexactlyreconstructed,giventhe24/7roleofthemedia,butitispossibletohavemuchmoreclarityintherelationshipsbetweenministers, theirstaffs,parliament,andpublicservants.There isgreatconfusion today, for example, overthe accounting of`icerconcept.Deputyministers in theirnewrole as accounting of`icers, since the passage of the Federal Accountability Act in 2006, holdresponsibilityintheirownrightfor:thestatutoryauthoritytheyhavebeengranted, forthepublic`inancesforwhichhe orshe isanswerable,andfortheef`icientadministrationofthedepartment.Ministerial responsibility is still the overarching concept, but within that framework deputyministersnowhave personal responsibility forcertain keyactivities. However, the PrivyCouncilOf`ice has provided one set of guidelines to help public servants assess their duties under theAccountabilityAct,butthePublicAccountsCommitteehasdevelopedadifferentprotocol tospelloutthe responsibilitiesandaccountabilityofaccountingof`icers.Theircompetingde`initionof theaccounting of`icer concept, which was designed to eliminate confusion over responsibility andaccountability,nowappearstohavemademattersworse52.In integrating past bestpublicpolicypracticeswith todays challenges, I thinkwe shouldhave apublicpolicysystemthatachieves/incorporatesthefollowing:Capacity and Performance

    1. Recognition that the neutrality, merit-based recruitment and expertise of the public service are fundamental features of our democracy and must be preserved.

    2. Implementation for too long has been the orphan of the public policy system. Management is at least as critical a function as policy analysis. The importance of this function must become central to the career prospects of public servants and the most senior level of political decision-makers must devise systems to regularly assess

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    52 Savoie, (2008),P58. C.E.S.Frankswasthe `irst to raise the issue ofthe dueling protocolsbetweenthe Public AccountsCommitteeandthePrivyCouncilOf`iceoverwhattheaccountingof`icerconceptimpliesinpracticefortheprincipleofministerialresponsibility.

  • implementation issues. A Results Unit, as described in the next section, located in Treasury Board should make regular reports to cabinet.

    3. A public service with less turnover based on the understanding that it takes time to learn a subject and to manage intelligently.

    4. The use of consultants for long-term or line jobs in the public service should be discouraged so that internal capacity within departments is cultivated.

    Attracting and Retaining Employees

    5. To maintain a strong public service in the future such a career must be attractive to a new generation of recruits, especially in light of the rapidly approaching retirement of the baby boom generation. To achieve an improved public service, greater attention must be paid to mentoring, opportunities to learn and develop, and lifestyle-work balance.

    Improvement to Accountability Design

    6. Our traditional system of a partnership between a professional non-partisan public service and strong ministers advised by competent political assistants is worth preserving. Politicization of the public service must be resisted as should the diminution of cabinet as the central decision-making institution. Political staff should be regarded as a legitimate part of the policy process and enjoy professional development and post-employment opportunities comparable to the public service.

    7. There must be a new accountability bargain between politicians, their political advisers, parliament and the public service through the advice of a wise persons task force. Relationships must be clarified and a new accountability framework voted on and approved by legislatures to help guide the inevitable debates that will occur over questions of accountability. As the CSD has argued in earlier studies, accountability would be enhances by an improved policy development process in our political parties and an improved oversight role for parliament53.

    8. Building on existing provisions in several statutes and the PCO Guide to Accountability there should be a CodeofEthicalConBlictforExemptStaff, comparable to the 2003 ValuesandEthicsCode.

    9. Institute training for exempt staff on the essentials of government and the political-civil service relationship. Public servants also need course on how to develop an effective relationship with ministers offices.

    10. The provision of the Lobbying Act which discriminates against political advisors by prohibiting post-employment opportunities for five years should be reduced to one year.

    22

    53 The Centre for the Study of Democracy in itspreviousreport entitledEverything Old isNewAgain:Observations on ParliamentaryReform made a series of recommendations to improve parliaments role in the policymaking process.:http://www.queensu.ca/csd/documents/2008_EverythingOldIsNewAgain_CSDreport_ExpertiseInParliament3.pdf).Anextensiveplanonhowtorenewat least oneofthe Canadian parties can be found in: Thomas S. Axworthy. The Four Key Questions: An Essay on Liberal Renewal. http://www.queensu.ca/csd/publications/Axworthy_4_Key_Questions.12.4.06.pdf.

  • Expertise, integrity, pride, and trustthese were the civil service attributes and ethics that Iwitnessed, learned from, and sawimplemented. It iscertainlypossible torestore thesevaluestopublic servicestoday. Imaybe wearing rosetinted glasseswhen I re`lect upon policymaking agenerationago,butittrulywasagenuinepartnershipbetweenthepublicserviceandtheministersandstaff from the political realm. The comparative surveydata presented in this studyindicatesthatpublicservants todayhave greatconcern about theconfusedaccountabilityrelationship andthat this in turn negatively impactstheirabilitytoachievesuperior implementation.The publicservice must be con`ident in order to achieve optimum policymaking, we must restore thecon`idencetothepublicservicethatitoncedemonstratedonadailybasis.ThomasS.Axworthy

    Chair,CentrefortheStudyofDemocracyDecember2009

    Closing the Implementation Gap

  • Introduction

    Public administration hasrecentlybecome the stuff of high politics. In Ontario, questionsin thelegislatureabouttheexpenseaccountsofconsultantsandthesolesourcingofcontractsled,inJune2009,totheresignationoftheCEOandChairoftheBoardofeHealthOntario,theagencymandatedtodevelopelectronichealthrecordsforOntarians.InCanada,in2005,theGomeryInquiry intotheSponsorshipScandalmadepublicits`irstoftworeportsandin2006theaccountabilityissuesraisedby Gomery helped lead to the defeat of the Liberal Government. Public administration, longrelegated to government reports that fewread or academic papers (that even fewer read), hassuddenlybecomeascythetocutdowngovernments.If the Gomery report focused public attention on the shortcomings of Liberal management ofsponsorship activities in Quebec, the October 2009 Special Report by the OfBice of the AuditorGeneralofOntario, foundseriouslapsesin theplanningof the ElectronicHealthRecordInitiative(EHR), the oversightof eHealthOntariobythe MinistryofHealthand questionable managementpractices within the eHealth Agency itself. The Auditor Generals blockbuster report, in turn,precipitatedtheresignationoftheMinisterofHealthhoursbeforethereportwasmadepublicandamonthlaterthedepartureoftheDeputyMinisterofHealth.The eHealth debacle in Ontario containsmany lessons for policymakersand students of publicadministration.Oneof themostimportantconcernsa central issue of this studythe capacityofourpublicservices.BothCanadaandOntariofaceatsunamiofretirementsintheirpublicservicesoverthenextfewyearsasthebabyboomgenerationmoveson. Itisnecessarytomakethepublicservice an attractive careerchoice, sothatrecruitsare attracted and retained. Thiswillaffectourcapacitytomaintainorevenimproveuponthedeliveryofpublicservices,whichisakeyconcernofthisstudy.AsurveyofQueensgraduatesintheOntarioandfederalpublicservicesaskedaseriesofhumanresource questionsconcerning:performance improvements, jobsatisfaction, learning anddevelopment,worklifestyle balance, and such. Thispaper comparesand contraststhe resultsofthis survey with the larger surveys of public service employees commissioned by the twogovernments.The Ontario AuditorGenerals report on the eHealth controversy demonstrates that a capacityimplementation gap exists today, not only that there is a projected one for the future54.Implementation isthe job of the public service. In an idealpublicpolicyworld, politiciansbringenergy, creativity, communication skills and knowledge of public opinion; public servants bringexpertise,memory,andmanagementskills.MinistersofHealth,asthetextbookssaytheyshoulddo,decidedin2000 thatelectronicrecordswereahealthpriorityacrossCanadabothtoimprovecareandtoin`luencecosts.Yet,nineyearsandabilliondollarslater,astheOntarioAuditorconvincinglydemonstrates, Ontariohas little to showforallof thiseffort.Near the bottom in comparison tootherprovincesinachievingelectronicrecordgoals,theAuditorwrotethat, OntariosprogressinEHRprojectshasbeenslow, andEHRprojectshave for the mostpartnotmetexpectations. In

    24

    54 See C. David Crenna. The Role of Governmental Effectiveness in a New Liberalism: Four Key Gaps in Searching for the NewLiberalism:Perspectives,PoliciesandProspects.HowardAsterandThomasS.Axworthy(eds)(Oakville:MosaicPress,2003).

  • addition,thenetworkbuiltbySSHA(SmartSystemsforHealthAgency)isnotbeingmanagedcosteffectively55.AfterpagesofdetailtheAuditorwrote:tosumup, toomanyprocurementsat the eHealth OntarioAgencyand to a lesserextent at the ministryseHealth programbranch andat SSHAwere the product ofrushed decisionmaking, the acceptance of expediency over thoroughness ... poor,absent,orcontradictingdocumentation;and,aparticularconcern,theconcentrationof decisionmaking power in the hands of few individualswith no compensatingcontrolstoensurethattheirdecisionswereappropriate"56.Thisisnotanimplementationgap,butratheran implementationabyss, andOntarioisnotalone,nor is the eHealth controversy an isolated example. Implementation is a vitalthough oftenneglectedpartofthepolicyprocess.Publicpolicyrequiresideasandoptimalsolutions,hencethenecessity for good analysis. Ideas, in turn, need to be communicated and adopted, thus theemphasisonpoliticalleadership.Iftheproofofthepuddingisintheeating,the`inalcriticalstepisimplementationtocarryout,accomplish, ful`ill,produceandcomplete. Implementationdependsontheoperationaldemandsof theprogram, theresourcesorcapacitythatarerequiredtoachievethegoals,andtheexperienceinlearningonthegroundwhatworks.Whatisneededarestreetlevelbureaucratsorpeoplewhoknowhowtomakethingsworkontheground.Implementationisoftenneglectedpolicyadviceandcrisismanagementaretheglamourtasksofthepublicservice.Yet,itisoftenimplementationfailuresthatleadtopolicydebacles.Thereislittledoubt that the goal of having eHealth electronic records is an important one, but the `lawedimplementation process led tomajorcontroversy. The goalof raising federal visibility inQuebecafter the 1995 Referendum could certainly be defended, but the implementation shortcutspractisedbysomepublicservantsandpoliticaladvisorseventuallydestroyedagovernment.Because of the centrality of implementation, some governments have made the process morecentraltotheagendasofseniordecisionmakers. IntheUnitedKingdom, theCentralPolicyReview

    Staff (CPRS) chaired by Lord Rothschild in the 1970s gave British cabinets an overview ofhorizontal policy issues and an evaluation of the efforts of departments to cope with thesechallenges57. Cabinettherebygainedanondepartmentalperspective.Later,Mrs.Thatchercreatedthe EfBiciency Unit under Lord Rayner, which carried out evaluations and suggested managerialimprovements58.TonyBlairin2001establishedaDeliveryUnitintheCabinetOf`iceandTreasury.In2005, the British Cabinet Of`ice began a program of capability reviews, which focused on theimplementationandmanagementabilitiesofvariousdepartments.Twothirdsofthe170capabilityassessmentsinthe`irstroundratedadepartmentlessthanwellplaced59.In Canada, we need to develop a similar implementation focus in public policymaking. Once amonth,Cabinetshould reviewtheprogressorloomingobstaclesof implementationforitscritical

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    55 Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009),P1011.56 Ibid,P13.57 LordRothschild,(1977),58 PeterHennessy(1989),P59559 UnitedKingdom(2009).NationalAuditOf`ice.ReportoftheComptrollerandAuditorGeneral.London:TheStationeryOf`ice.

  • programs. AResultsUnitcomposed ofrepresentativesof the TreasuryBoard, ControllerGenerals,andthePrivyCouncilOf`iceshoulddevelopanimplementationevaluationreviewasrobustastheregularpolicyandcommunicationaspectsofthecabinetagenda.Suchaunitisrecommendedbecause implementationgapsabound.Withgreatfanfare Parliamentpassed the Pledge To Africa Act (2004) to produce generic drugs to help poor countries `ightdiseaseslikeAIDS.Yet,yearslaternotasinglepillhadbeenexported60.TheGunRegistry,asensibleideatoaidpolice forcesandprotectcitizenswassubjecttohuge costoverrunsandcoverupsthatmadeitaneasytargetforitsopponentsandlesseneditspubliccredibility.Evenassimpleataskasdeveloping a nocall registryfromnuisance telemarketerstookyears to create. In thepreface tothisreportreference ismade tothe creativityof the PearsonGovernmentof the 1960s;within a`iveyearperiod the federal government launchedMedicare, the Canadian Pension Plan, CanadaAssistance Act, the Federal Student Loans Programand uni`ied the Armed Forces. These were allcomplicatedprogramsinvolvingmanyfederaldepartments, theprovinces,privatesectorinterests,and millions of individual Canadians. The Mandarins carried it off; politicians in the Pearsongovernmentgavethemarchingorders,butitwasthepublicservicethatputthewheelstotheroad,guided the throng towards the desired destination, and concluded the trip with most citizenssatis`ied.Whatcancompareinrecentyearswithsucharecordofimplementation?61ThecontroversyovereHealthcentredonconsultantsexpense accountschargingforminorlunchitemswhilecommandinglargedailyfeesbutintrackingtheimplementationwoesofeHealth, theOntarioAuditorraisedamuchmoreprofoundissueaboutcapacity.TheeHealthprojectwasoneofthemostvisible initiatives inthe largestandbestfundeddepartmentintheOntariogovernment,buttheprojectwaslargelyrunbyconsultants,notregularemployeesoftheDepartmentofHealth.TheAuditorofOntariowroteonthispoint:

    Thefact thatthedevelopmentofanEHRhadbeenon the governmentsagendaasfarbackastheearly2000scausedustoquestiontheheavy,andinsomecasesalmosttotal,reliance on consultants. This reliance continued to increase over time. This wasparticularly the case at the Ministry, which in 2007 consolidated all of its eHealthprojectsintoaneHealthProgramBranch.By2008,theBranchwasengagingmorethanthreehundredconsultantscomparedtofewerthan thirtyfulltimeministryemployeesevenanumberofseniormanagementpositionswereheldbyconsultants.62If capacitywithin the Department of Health was lacking presumably the Governmenthad littlechoicebutto gooutside thepublicservice todrive the project.Thisbegsthe questionwhywascapacitylackinginsuchapowerfulministry?Andwhywasitlackingoversuchanextendedperiod?Theprioritywassetin2000,buttheuseofconsultantscontinuedtoincreaseovertime.Onemighthaveguessed thatconsultantswouldhave beenused initially, butgrowing internal expertise and

    26

    60 Axworthy,(2006).61 A September 2008 survey of public sector leaders in Canada by Deloitte Research found that 41% of respondents deemedgovernmenttobe lesssuccessfulatimplementing large projectsthantenyearsago.61%ofCanadianrespondentsbelievethatpoliciesaredesignedwith little or no input from the people expected to implement them. PaulMacmillan and ToddCain.Closing the GapbetweenpolicydesignandexecutioninCanadianGovernmentExecutive.Vol.15.No.1(2009).62 Of`iceoftheAuditorGeneralofOntario,(2009).

  • knowledgeinpublicsectormanagerswouldhavemadesenseforsuchalargeproject.Theoppositehappened. This study surveys public sector employees with the intent to assist a dedicatedworkforcetodevelopthecapacitytoruncreativelycomplicatedprojects.TheeHealthstoryshowsthatthisisanurgentnecessity.Manystudiesshowthe interrelationship between the humanresources issueshighlighted in thisreport and the effectiveness of the public service in implementation. Ralph Heintzman, anexperiencedpublicservant, capturedtherelationshipwell inhistalkonPeople,ServiceandTrust:Exploring the Public Sector Service Value Chain63. Heintzman argued that employee engagementleads to service satisfaction by citizens, which in turn leads to greater citizen trust in publicinstitutions.Thedriversofemployeecommitmentarefactorslike:meaningfulwork,colleaguesandsupervisors(eachofthesefactorscanbeassessedintheCSDsurveyinAppendix1).Supervisorsormiddle managers encourage employees to use their skills, give recognition and organize amanageableworkload.Ifobtained, these leadtobetterorganizationalperformance. Citizensvaluetimeliness, competence, courtesy and fairness in service delivery. Heintzmans advice is to usedriversof engagement, like the clarityof the mission andmanagementperformance to improveimplementation. As common sense would argue, superior internal workplace practices lead tobetter performance. Yet, many reports demonstrate that human resources do not receive theprioritytheyshould fromseniorpublicsectormanagers.LindaDuxburymakesthe pointthat thethings thatattractpeople toapublic sector jobpayand bene`itsare not the thingsthatkeepemployeesmotivated.Engagementdependsoncareerdevelopment,recognition,andworklifestylebalance64.It isnotonly the public sector, of course, where engagement is an issue. An engaged employeeaccordingtoGerardH.SeijtsandDanCrim:isa personwhois fullyinvolved inandenthusiasticabouthisorherwork65.Theycitea2005surveyinwhich17%ofCanadianworkersreportedbeinghighlyengaged,66%weremoderatelyengagedand17%wereactivelydisengaged.SeijtsandCrim,likeRalphHeintzman,arguethatanengagedworkforceisamoreproductiveworkforce:employeeengagementdoesnotmerelycorrelatewithbottomlineresultsitdrivesresults66.Ifengagementandpublicsectorcapacityisonethemehighlightedbythesurveydata,thesecondisaccountabilityand the nature of the politicalcivil servant relationship.The eHealthdisputeoverimplementation cost a CEO, a chairof the board, a ministerand his deputy their jobs, but thesponsorshipaccountabilityscandaldefeatedagovernment.

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    63 RalphHeintzman(2007).64 Linda DuxburyandChrisHiggins.WorkLife Con`lict inCanadaintheNewMillennium:A StatusReportOttawa:CareltonUniversity,2003. These `indingswere also reiterated ina presentation byLinda Duxburyentitled, You,Me and Them:Dealing with GenerationalDifferencesintheWorkplace.http://www.calgaryeconomicdevelopment.com/`iles/Misc/DuxburyPresentation.pdf.65 GerardHSeijtsandDanCrim.(2006).66 Ibid.P2.

  • Thereisalargeliteratureonthesponsorshipissue,thesubsequentGomeryreportsandtheFederalAccountabilityAct(2006)67.TheGomeryCommissionfoundclearevidenceofpoliticalinvolvementintheadministrationof theSponsorshipProgram;insuf`icientoversightattheseniorlevelsof thepublicservice;anabsenceof transparency;andtherefusalofministers,seniorof`icials,thePrimeMinisters Of`ice, and public servants to acknowledge their responsibility for the problems ofmismanagementthatoccurred68.The Sponsorship Program had its origins in 19941995 when the advertising section of PublicWorksandGovernmentServicesCanadabegantodispersefundsforspecialprojects.Thisactivityintensi`ied after the Quebec referendum in 1995, leading to newspaper articleswhich began toquestionaspectsof thisspending.Aninternal auditof the programwasordered in2000andtheAuditorGeneralofCanadamadeadramaticreportinMay2002withcertain`ilesbeingreferredtothe RCMP. In December 2003, the Martin Government cancelled the Sponsorship Program andcreated the Gomery Commission in February 2004, which attracted considerable attention andreportedin2005.TheMartinGovernmentwasdefeatedlargelybecauseofthisaccountabilityissuein2006.TheSponsorshipScandalisa particularlyvividexampleof thedif`icultiesthatcanoccurbetweenpoliticaldemandsandcivilserviceresponsibilities,buttheissueoftheproperrelationshipbetweenthenonpartisanmeritbasedpublicservice andapartisandominatedexecutiveandparliamentishardlynew. LucJuilletandKenRasmussen inDefendingaContestedIdeal, a historyof thepublicservicecommission,arguethat,adecisiontobuildaprofessionalandimpartialbureaucracyisoffundamental importance to the development of modern democracy69. Democratic governmentsrequire legitimacyand legitimacyisderivedinno smallmeasure from the effectivenessofpublicservants, indelivering importantpublicgoodsand fromcitizensabilitytotrustthattheywillbetreatedwithfairnessandimpartialitybythestatebureaucracy70.Theinteractionsbetweenanonpartisancivil serviceandverypartisanstaffs,however, isoftenadialogue ofthedeaf fraughtwithmisunderstanding, incomprehension, `ingerpointing, and as the Sponsorship Scandal showed,sometimes outright larceny. Accountability, writesDavid Johnson in ThinkingGovernment, haspolitical, legal,andsocialdimensionsanditincludesconcernsofministerialresponsibilityandthedeveloping and functioning of a ministerial chainof commandand discipline alongwith broaderquestions about the responsiveness of public policies to the needs and interests of society71.Accountabilityisoftencomplicatedandalwayscrucial.Who is responsible, as Judge Gomery asked, is the basic question in accountability. The CSDESsurveypointsoutthattheanswertothisquestionisdif`icult,becauseofthelackofclarityabouttheproperrolesofthepublicserviceandtheministersof`ice.TheseconcernsarenotonlyaCanadian

    28

    67 See the reports of The Commission of Inquiry intothe Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities:Whois Responsible (2005)and Restoring Accountability (2006). See also: Francois Perreault. Inside Gomery. Translated Carl Angers (Toronto: Douglas andMacIntyre,2006)andRuthHubbardandJilles Paquet.GomerysBlindersandCanadianFederalism (Ottawa:UniversityofOttawaPress,2007).68 TheCommissionofInquiryintotheSponsorshipProgramandAdvertisingActivities:WhoIsResponsible?,P7.69 JuilletandRasmussen,(2008),P2.70 Ibid,P2.71 Johnson(2009),P222.

  • preoccupationasCSDESdatafromHongKongdemonstrates.HongKonghasrecentlyintroducedaministerialsystemandresponsestotheCSDESdemonstratethattheeliteHongKongpublicserviceisascon`lictedaboutaccountabilityaspublicservantsinOttawaandQueensPark.Thesurveydatathatfollowscomparesthe viewsof juniorandseniorpublicservants,whohave attendedcoursesrelatedtopublicadministrationatQueensUniversity(sample described indetailinthe followingsection).Thisdatapointsoutveryrealissuesincapacityandaccountability.Section one: The state of the public service

    Thecapacityofagovernmentdependsonthequalityofitspublicservice.Whileelectedpoliticiansinfuse the executive process with momentum and political savvy, public servants provide theexperience, technical expertise, and longterm perspective needed to govern effectively. Thecapacity of governmentdepends on the motivation and calibre of the people whomake up thepublic service. This has always been the case, but achieving this objective for a 21st centurygovernment workforce will only occur if we understand the aspirations, global outlooks, andexpectationsofthecurrentgenerationofcivilserviceaspirants.Canada hasbeen lacking in thisarea. In several recenthighpro`ile incidents, the governmenthasfailed to conduct its business ef`iciently and sometimes even failed to conduct it legally. Thesescandalshave put culpabilityat the feetof seniorpublicof`icials,mostnotoriouslyin theGomeryCommissionofInquiryintotheSponsorshipProgramandAdvertisingActivities.As a result, public service reform is on the agenda. But where to start? There has been somemovementtowardsanewgovernmentorder,butithasnotbeenbalanced.Manyproposedreformshave centredon the Gomeryrecommended issuesof accountabilityand control.While these areimportant,theyonlyaddresspartofwhatmustbedonetoimprove theperformance ofthepublicservicecomprehensivelyandeffectively.What are the challenges affecting the performance of the Canadian public service, and whatmanagementdirectionsandinstrumentsaretheretoimprovethesituation?Surveys of public sector employees reveal a moderatelydissatis`ied and unmotivated workforcewithmiddlingoptimismforthefuture.Thiswillnotsuf`icegoing forward.Canadaneedsacreative,risktaking,globallyinformedpublicservice.Toachieveit, the publicservicemustattracttalentedyoungpeopleandcreateaworkenvironmentstimulatingandeffectiveenoughtoretainthem.Inhis2004paperTheDeadGeneralist,EdStrawarguesthatahighperformingpublicorganizationaligns`ive things: a compelling proposition tothemarket, a clearand comprehensive strategytodeliver that proposition, a structure wholly built around it, instruments to guarantee that allfunctions (systems, incentives and performance measures) all point in the same direction, and,`inally,asetofsharedvaluestosupportthewhole.72Ole IngstrupandPaulCrookallhavea similar

    Closing the Implementation Gap

    72 Straw,(2004).P10.

  • view.Their1998workThe ThreePillarsofManagement: Secrets of SustainedSuccessdeterminedthat the three pillars of wellperforming public organizations are: aim (a mission and cleardirection of where itis headed), character (a strong sense ofwhat itisandwhatis importantnamely, trust, communication, andpeoplecentred ideas) and execution (the ability to get thingsdonethroughinnovation,teamwork,andopennesstochange).73Ifeffectiveorganizationsarebuiltontheseprinciples,itis`ittingtomeasurethecurrentstateoftheCanadianpublicservice againstthem.Thisapproach formsthebaseonwhichourresearchbuildstocomeupwithrecommendationsforimprovementstothreekeyareasofpublicsectorcapacity:CapacityandPerformanceimprovements:howcanoptimumperformancebeencouragedconsidering the political versusadministrative tradeoffsthatpermeate all corners of thepublicsector?Attractingandretainingqualityemployees:whatreformsandmodi`icationswouldmakethepublicsectoravaluedanddesirableplacetowork;aplacethatwouldattractandretaincreativeandinnovative,publiclyspiritedCanadians?Accountability design: howmight a better environment be cultivated which facilitatesbetteraccountabilitytoParliament, themediaandtheCanadianpublic,whileencouragingcreativityandmanagerial`lexibility?

    Survey saysThe engagement and satisfaction of Canadian public service employees, and the ability for thepublic sector to attract and retain new talent, is of the great interest and concern given thedemographicpressuresthatunderpinpublicsectorreform.Thisinterestisre`lectedin threekeysurveysregarding thejobsatisfactionlevelsofpublicserviceemployeesworking at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, namely: the Canadian PublicService Career Satisfaction Survey(CSDES)74; Public Service Employee Survey (PSES)75;OntarioPublicService Employee Survey(OPSES)76.Lookingatengagementandsatisfactionfactorsacrossthesectorthroughthewindowsprovidedbythesurveysallowsamorecompleteviewthananyoneofthethreecouldonitsown.These informedouraimtosuggestimprovementsinthethreecriticalareas: capacity and performance, attracting and retaining employees, and improvements toaccountabilitydesign.

    30

    73 IngstrupandCrookall,(1998).P7.74 Respondents to the Centre for the Studyof Democracys selfadministered Web survey(referred to as CSDES in this document)includes alumni ofQueensMastersof PublicAdministrationprogram (emailinvitationdelivered to 689people inOctober 2009;returnrate of29%)and three groups of participants in the Public Executive Program, Queens SchoolofBusiness (September 2008, January2009,September2009,n=98).75 The Public Service Employee Survey was administered to all employees in the Public Service for which Treasury Board is theemployeraswellas employeesofparticipating separateagencies.The surveywasa voluntarycensus,andthecollectionwasdoneusingan electronic questionnaire, between 20081103 and 20090109. Data was also captured from 6172 paper questionnaires receivedbetweenNovember2008andJanuary2009. The target populationfor2008consisted of 257,764individuals. The overallresponse rateforthe2008PublicServiceEmployeeSurveywas65.8%(169,600).76 The OPS Employee Survey is a census survey;all69,340OntarioPublic Service employees were invited to participate (online ormanually)to a 98question survey. In 2009, 41,604 employees participated (response rate of almost 60%). Ipsos Reid presented thesurveyresultsonJune1,2009.

  • The comparisonsclearly indicate that public servantswanttomake a differencewith integrityintact;theywantautonomy,greater`lexibility,opportunitiestobemorecollaborativeandcreative,but are oftenworking in a rigid environment thatdoesnot reward creativity; they are proud oftheirworkandatthe same timeembarrassedbythepublicperceptionandattitudestowardwhattheydo.Severalexpressedconcernabouttheprevailing'goodenoughforgovernmentwork'attitudeanattitudethattheyfeelunderminesthereputationofthepublicservice.Common themes emerged that suggest that public servants want to streamline activities tomaximizeef`iciencies,ensure fairness,andimprovecommunications.Theywanttobeempoweredand rewarded for good performance. Employees value crossdepartmental collaboration andshouldbeencouragedtodoso.On capacity and performance improvements Studiesshowthatprideinonesworkandapositiveinterpersonalrelationshipwithonesbossaresaidtohavefourtimesgreaterimpactononesdiscretionaryworkeffortthanotherfactorssuchaspay.77Yet,theprevalenceofrotatingseniorstaffhasbeentaggedbysurveyrespondentsasamajorissuethataffectsaccountability,productivity,andengagement.Imaginethe impactof having three differentsupervisorsinthreeyearswhiledoing the same job!Thisiswhat31%ofFederalemployeesreported in thePSES2008, and in realtermsthatmeans58,000federalcivilservants.Coincidentally,only31%oftheFederalCSDESsurveyrespondentsfeelthatchange ismanagedwellwithintheirdepartment.Experienceandspecialistknowledgearelostwhenseniormanagers are rotated from department todepartment.Employeesare in a constantstateof`luxastheyadjusttodifferentworkstyles.Seniorof`icials(DMsandADMs)spendtoolittletimeinoneplace(generallylessthan2years).Thisnegativelyimpactsthedepar