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WARFAREA N C I E N T

Karwansaray Publishers

VOL IV, ISSUE 3

Also:

• The Theban Sacred Band• Debate: Don’t get stuck on linen

And more

With:

• Analyzing Belisarius’ fortune• Death from above: the Plumbata

Justinian’s fireman:Belisarius and the Byzantine empire

www.ancient-warfare.com

€ 7,10 £ 6,25 US/CN$9.99

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Ancient Warfare 3

33 SOURCE FOR A

HANDBOOK Reflections of the Wars in the Strategicon

and archaeology

38 DEATH FROM ABOVE Mattiobarbuli and plumbata

43 SPECIALBoeotian crack troops

48 THE DEBATE Don’t stick on glued linen

54 REVIEWSBooks, games and models

58 ON THE COVER

4 NEWS

THEME Justinian’s fireman

6 INTRODUCTION Secrets and lies

15 A GOOD GENERAL , AND LUCKY TOO

fortune as a factor in Belisarius’ campaigns

20 CHAMPIONS AND TRADITION

Single combat in the age of Belisarius

26 DEFENDING THE ANCIENT CAPITAL

The long siege of Rome, AD 537-538

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WARFAREA N C I E N T

CONTENTS

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painted above the battle scene. I must

admit I have a problem with theories

which attempt to interpret the physi-

cal evidence through the use of writ-

ten sources, which may not be entirely

accurate. There are so many ways in

which the images of these cattle in

the painting could be interpreted and

a lure to the Ploughman must rank as

one of the more far-fetched. The single

mountainous feature however, bears

an uncanny resemblance to Monte

Calpazio approximately 8 kilometres

to the east of Paestum. I have worked

in Paestum on a number of occasions

and know the area and archaeology

extremely well. Monte Calpazio rises

abruptly over the flat plain beforePaestum and has long been recognised

as an extremely important strategic

point which dominates the region. I

think it is much more probable that

the prominent mountain depicted in

the tomb painting from Paestum is

Monte Calpazio than a generic symbol

for mountains in far away Samnium.

Mercifully, the author states that

Briquel’s theory is only speculation. I

was a bit disappointed that Cowan did

not mention the capture of Paestumby Alexander of Molossus in 335 and its

subsequent recapture by the Lucanians

several years later in 331. Interestingly,

Alexander was killed by a Lucanian

exile, who cast a javelin at him at long

range. These were events which would

have been extremely significant to the

Lucanian aristocracy of Paestum and

would certainly have been within the

attributed dates of this tomb painting

presented by either Briquel (310-300) or

Pontrandolfo and Rouveret (330-320). I

am not proposing that this tomb paint-

ing depicts Alexander’s demise but it is

certainly possible that it represents an

episode from that turbulent period in

the history of Lucanian Paestum.

Thank you

Mike Burns

Leeds, UK

Christian Koepfer responds:

Dear Editor,

The originals I used for the reconstruc-

tion by Mr. Schulz are 16,4 (left) and16,8 (right) cm high, and each weighs

roughly 210gr. They are anatomically

formed exactly like a human ankle and

both sport holes, which are in the exact

A multitude of peoples

Dear Editor,

I read with great interest the issue

entitled ‘A multitude of peoples: Before

Rome ruled Italy’, as I have been actively

involved in the research of the military

equipment and methods of warfare in

ancient Southern Italy for many years.

All in all I enjoyed the issue, especially

the battle scene illustration between

the Romans and Samnites on pages 30

and 31. There were however a number of

things in this issue which I found to be

not entirely accurate. On page 18 there

is an illustration of an Apulian warrior

wearing what have been erroneouslyinterpreted as ‘ankle-guards’. These

guards are depicted tied around the

warrior’s foot and lower leg. During the

course of my research I have examined

dozens of these so-called ankle-guards

first hand and after careful analysis

have found they are much more likely

to be a type of abbreviated greave, a

distinctively Italic item of equipment.

Actual examples of these guards aver-

age between 21 to 27cm high and 12.5

to 16cm wide – much larger than thosedepicted on the illustration of the

Apulian warrior. There are no known

representations of the so-

called ankle guard from

tomb or vase paintings to

show us how this piece

of equipment was used, nor are they

mentioned in literary sources. Most

provenanced examples come from

Apulia, and date from the 5th to the

late 4th centuries, and are sometimes

associated with the Apulo-Corinthian

helmet, as several have been found in

tombs together. The true purpose of

these guards is not immediately evi-

dent and one of the most perplexing

problems is how they were worn. Using

the measurements of my own leg I

compared them with the dimensions

of the guards and the various ways

in which they might have been worn.

Their dimensions and form make it

clear they were meant to be a type of

abbreviated greave and this is typicalof Italic armour design in which there is

a preference for lighter forms of equip-

ment. The most telling evidence comes

from tombs 4 and 10 at Gravina, which

show the ankle guards placed in front

of the shins of a skeleton whose legs

are in a flexed position. In both cases

the guards have the narrower portion

pointed up towards the knees. So far

this is the most explicit evidence there

is to indicate how these guards were

worn.

I also wanted to bring up a point con-

cerning Ross Cowan’s article

‘Victory by divine intervention’

in which the author proposes

a link between the exploits

of the Roman consul Iunius

Bubulcus in 311 BC against

the Samnites at Bovianum in

Samnium and a Lucanian tomb

painting from Paestum dated by

Pontrandolfo and Rouveret to

around 330-320 BC. The author

presents Dominique Briquel’s

view that this Lucanian tomb

is actually later in date 310-

300 and that the battle scene

depicted on the wall painting

is meant to represent the defeat

of Bubulcus by the Samnites (and

Lucanians). The key to this inter-

pretation seems to be based on the

depiction of a mountain and cattle

NEWS

4 Ancient Warfare

Inside view of a regular greave on the

right and an example of the smaller

guard under debate on the left. Both

in the Mougins Collection.

© M i k e B u r n s

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NEWS

Ancient Warfare 5

position to secure them with a strap

over the dorsum. I am aware that the

function of the larger pieces with the

outstretched flange is debated, and I

tend to agree to your argument. In

this special case, however, the purpose

of the pieces can hardly be disputed.

If you require pictures or publishing

information, please contact the editor,

he will gladly notify me, so that I can

forward them to you.

Christian Koepfer

Ross Cowan responds:

Dear Editor,

Regarding Dr. Burns’ Monte Calpazio

conjecture, this is interesting but

speculative. Regarding Alexander ofMolossus, that fascinating character

had no place in an article about a

battle fought 20 years after his death.

Readers may be interested to note that

Alexander features in my recent book,

The Roman Conquests: Italy .

Ross Cowan

© B r e n d a n K e e l e y

News items

Additions for this section – bothnews and letters to the editor are

very welcome through the follow-

ing address:

Ancient Warfare magazine

PO Box 1574

6501 BN Nijmegen

The Netherlands

Or even easier, send them in by

email to: editor@ancient-warfare.

com

Themes and deadlines- IV.4 The Sea-Peoples and the end of the Bronze Age empires (April 20th)

- IV.5 Warfare and religion in the ancient world (June 15th)

- IV.6 Hellenistic armies of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC (August 15th)

If you have a proposal that fits our themes, we’d be interested to hear from

you to discuss the possibility of publishing an article. Send your proposal –

including the angle you propose to take, ideas for illustrations and artwork

and your qualifications – to [email protected]. Do make sure you

send them before the proposal deadlines mentioned above.

As has become tradition, we will canvass our readers for suggestions for

themes of 2011. If you want your input to count, keep an eye on www.

ancient-warfare.com and/or the Ancient Warfare page on Facebook at face-

book.ancient-warfare.com.

Special 2010: Core of the legions

This issue was printed at the same time as our second Ancient Warfare

Special. Weighing in at 84 pages, it is our biggest issue yet. It focuses

entirely on that building block of the Roman legion: the Roman centuria

and features contributions by Mike Bishop, Duncan Campbell, Ross Cowan,

Christian Koepfer, Jona Lendering, Philip Matyszak, Paul McDonnell-Staff,

Graham Sumner, Michael Taylor and Mike Thomas. More pages than before

also means more artwork than ever as well! In short: this Special is not to

be missed.

The Ancient Warfare Special issue 2010 Core of the legions: the Imperial

Roman centuria is now available from our webstore at www.ancient-war-

fare.com for 13.95, excl. shipping.

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Justinian dispatched his best general

to whichever front was the hottest. In

a career spanning nearly four decades

Belisarius would double the Byzantine

Empire’s territory, prevent Justinian’s

overthrow, and save Constantinople

itself from barbarian conquest.

Much of what we know about

Belisarius comes from Procopius of

Caesaria. A respected scholar and jurist,

Procopius was assigned as Symboulos

or advisor to Belisarius in 527 when

the young general received his first

major command. Procopius accompa-

nied Belisarius on his campaigns for

approximately 15 years as counselor and

chronicler. The two primary works men-

tioning Belisarius are Procopius’ eightvolume History of the Wars of Justinian

and his Secret History . The books are

completely different in tone. Wars

paints a detailed picture of Belisarius

as a dynamic, competent commander,

and also praises the emperor. The Secret

History , in contrast, describes Justinian

as cruel, avaricious, fickle and inde-

cisive, a schemer who is himself eas-

ily manipulated by his scheming and

murderous wife Theodosia. Belisarius

is depicted as a spineless cuckold domi-nated by his malicious and murder-

ous wife Antonina, who allegedly plied

him with potions to keep him infatu-

ated. Procopius also writes that in later

years the general allowed his marital

problems to interfere with his mili-

tary obligations, leading Belisarius to

commit strategic errors. Of course the

Secret History could only be covertly

distributed as long as the author and

the book’s subjects lived. The extreme

vitriol of Procopius’ words lead many

scholars to believe the chronicler was

seeking revenge for perceived wrongs

by his erstwhile benefactors.

Campaigns of BelisariusAccording to Procopius’ Wars, Belisarius

campaigned for Justinian in three major

theaters of operation: the Byzantine-

Persian border region, North Africa, and

Italy.

Belisarius’ first major command led

him to the East in 527/528 to strength-

en border defenses against Sassanidincursions. In 530 AD Justinian appoint-

ed the young officer – aged somewhere

between 25 and 30 years old – as

Magister Militum for Mesopotamia, in

By Justinian’s death in 565, much had

changed. Italy, Moesia, North Africa and

southern Spain had been conquered

and annexed by Byzantium. A tenta-

tive peace agreement was in force with

Persia. Much of this success can be

attributed to the military leadership of

Byzantine general Flavius Belisarius.

Varying fortunesThe story of Belisarius is one of twists

and turns, ups and downs. He was

presumably born between 500 and 505

to an aristocratic family in the city of

Germania in southwestern Bulgaria.

He is thought to have been of Thracian

or Greek origin. Joining the Byzantine

military, he distinguished himself as

a staff officer and cavalry regiment

commander in the personal retinue

of Justinian before the latter became

emperor upon the death of his uncle,

Justin I, in August 527. In the Spring of

527 Justinian – who had been appointed

co-regent and Magister Militum of theeastern realm – entrusted Belisarius

and another young commander named

Sittas with a raiding expedition into

Persian Armenia. The young command-

ers devastated a large tract of enemy

territory and returned with many pris-

oners, confirming Justinian’s faith in

them.

From then on, the emperor’s trust

would be a major factor in Belisarius’

life. Justinian granted and withdrew

his favor several times – sometimes

because of marginal success, but also

when Belisarius was at his most suc-

cessful, out of fear his triumphant

commander would try to supplant

him. Ironically, the gravest danger the

general would ever face would result

from intrigues composed by his own

wife, Antonina, and by the emperor’s

wife Theodosia. One story popular in

the Middle Ages even claims that the

general, who once was honored with

an official Roman Triumph, ended his

days blinded after conviction on bogus

charges of treason.

Yet despite the court intrigues and

the emperor’s suspicions, Justinian

I remained largely dependent onBelisarius, calling upon him time and

again when the fate of the Empire – or

its sovereign – hung in the balance.

From East to West, South to North,

THEME: JUSTINIAN’S FIREMAN

6 Ancient Warfare

THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PORTION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE DISINTE-

GRATED DURING THE 5TH CENTURY, TO BE REPLACED BY NUMEROUS BAR-

BARIAN KINGDOMS. CULTURE, SCIENCE, AND CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRA-

TION – THE KEY ELEMENTS OF WHAT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED ‘WESTERN

CIVILIZATION’ – WERE PRESERVED IN THE EASTERN ROMAN OR BYZANTINE

EMPIRE CENTERED AROUND CONSTANTINOPLE. BUT AS JUSTINIAN I ASCEND-ED TO THE BYZANTINE THRONE IN 527 AD, HIS DOMAIN WAS UNDER PRES-

SURE FROM ALL SIDES. THEODERIC THE GREAT RULED THE OSTROGOTH

EMPIRE IN ITALY AND MOESIA, PURSUING AN ANTI-BYZANTINE POLICY. THE

VANDAL FLEET BASED IN NORTH AFRICA PREYED ON BYZANTINE SHIPPING

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. TO THE EAST, THE COLD WAR WITH THE PERSIAN

SASSANIDS WAS TURNING HOT.

By Sidney E.Dean

Justinian’s firemanHistorical introduction

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Ancient Warfare 7

charge of a 25,000 man army with

orders to expel the Persians from occu-

pied Byzantine territory. Procopius

reports that Belisarius defeated a vastly

superior Persian force at Dara in June530, but lost the subsequent battle

at Nisibis. He also suffered a narrow

defeat the next year at Callinicum. To

end the conflict – known as Justinian’s

First Persian War – Constantinople was

compelled to negotiate a peace treaty

which included considerable payments

to the Sassanids. In the first of many

twists of fate, the young general was

relieved of command after a board of

inquiry faulted his leadership.

Belisarius regained Justinian’s faith

by ruthlessly suppressing the Nika riots

in Constantinople in 532. This massive

unrest by political factions associated

with various racing clubs threatened

to overthrow the emperor. Together

with lower ranking generals, Belisarius

supervised the killing of up to 30,000

people in the Hippodrome. This brutal

suppression of the Nika riots did not

simply preserve Justinian’s position as

emperor but swept away most poten-

tial opposition, enabling a more auto-

cratic reign.The grateful monarch entrust-

ed Belisarius with the reconquest

of the Roman Empire’s heartland. In

533 the general assembled a force of

15,000 men, 500 transport ships and

92 dromon-type warships for the so-

called Vandal War. Approximately

one-third of his army consisted of cav-

alry, including 1,000 Hun and Herulimercenaries to serve as scouts and

as a screening force. Using Sicily as a

staging ground, Belisarius landed in

Tunisia and marched his army north-

ward to the Vandal capital of Carthage.

Byzantine victories at Ad Decimum

and Ticamerum forced the surrender

of the Vandal king Gelimer. Belisarius

was honored with a Roman Triumph

upon his return to Constantinople in

534 – the first such award to a non-aris-

tocrat since 19 BC, and the last Triumph

awarded to any leader. Belisarius was

also appointed sole Consul for 534.

With the southern flank secure,

Belisarius proceeded to invade Italy

in 535 (Justinian’s Italian or Gothic

War). Staging from North Africa, the

Byzantines occupied Sicily, then crossed

onto the continent in 536, taking

Naples and Rome. Belisarius held Rome

against a year-long Gothic siege, then

in 538 marched northward, taking the

offensive to the enemy. In late 539 he

laid siege to the Ostrogoth capital atRavenna. In 540 he captured the city by

ruse. The Goths had offered to crown

him the western Roman emperor if

he switched sides. Belisarius feigned

agreement, and was allowed into the

heavily protected city with his retinue.

Once inside he took the Ostrogoth king

Witigis hostage, forcing the enemy to

surrender.Although Belisarius only accepted

the Goths’ offer as a feint, the ever-

suspicious Justinian feared his general

could become a rival, and recalled him

to deal once again with the Persian

threat (the Sassanids had broken the

peace treaty in Spring of 540, initiating

what is known as Justinian’s Second

Persian War). According to Procopius’

Wars, Belisarius managed to recov-

er Byzantine territories in Syria and

Mesopotamia, and even conducted

raids into Persian territory. In his Secret

History , however, Procopius accuses

Belisarius of failing to capitalize on

Persian defeats and temporary weak-

nesses in 541. By recalling his forces

from Persian territory, the Magister

Militum missed the chance to strike a

crushing blow, writes the chronicler.

This enabled the Persians to rally for a

counteroffensive in 542. What is worse,

Procopius writes that Belisarius had

neglected his duties as commander

because he was preoccupied with hiswife’s infidelity. According to the Secret

History , Theodosia in 542 fabricated

evidence against Belisarius so that he

was charged with treason. Belisarius

© C a r l o s d e l a R o c h a

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tion devolves on the various types of

mounted troops, from light scouts to

heavy shock troops armed with lances

to mounted archers dedicated to such

high volume fire that they could be

classified as mobile artillery. Maurice

also enjoins his generals to adapt their

tactics to the enemy of the day.

Belisarius’ legacySome gains made under Justinian I

were short lived. A year after his death

the Lombards invaded Italy, ousting

the Byzantines from the northern por-

tion by 582. The Avars would repeatedly

invade the Balkans over the coming

decades, requiring constant Byzantine

efforts to secure the region. And inthe East the Persians again invaded

Byzantine Syria in 572, sparking several

more decades of on-again, off-again

warfare among the two evenly matched

powers. In 616 the Visigoths expelled

the Byzantines from their Spanish

enclave. By contrast, Belisarius’ gains in

North Africa lasted more than a centu-

ry, with the final Byzantine stronghold

at Carthage falling to Muslim invaders

in 698. Byzantium’s protectorate over

Rome lasted one century longer, untilPope Leo III crowned Charlemagne Holy

Roman Emperor in December of 800.

The campaigns led by Belisarius

increased the size of the Byzantine

Empire by nearly 50 percent, returned

the Mediterranean to the status of

Roman Mare Nostrum, and restored

Rome to the Roman Empire for a quar-

ter-millennium. For that, many histori-

ans recognize Belisarius as truly being

one of the ‘last Romans.’ n

Sidney E. Dean is President of Transatlantic

Euro-American Multimedia LLC and edi-

tor of Hampton Roads International

Security Quarterly (www.teamultime-

dia. com). He is contributing editor and

US correspondent to several European

military and security policy magazines.

was cleared for lack of evidence, but

publicly disgraced. He was removed as

Magister Militum, and even his person-

al bodyguard was divided up among

other officers.

One of Theodosia’s prime motives

was envy of the general’s wealth. Here,

she found fertile ground with her hus-

band. According to Procopius, “the man’s

wealth had for a long time excited the

jealousy of Justinian and Theodosia,

who considered it too great, and fit

only for a king.” They accused him of

embezzling most of the Vandal trea-

sure captured in North Africa. Given the

general’s popularity in Constantinople,

however, Justinian feared a public con-

frontation with Belisarius on this issue,writes Procopius. As a compromise,

thirty Centenars of gold were seized

for the imperial treasury, and the rest

of Belisarius’ fortune returned to the

general.

By now all trust and friendship

between sovereign and general were

hopelessly lost, but Justinian still found

Belisarius indispensable. In 544 he

reappointed Belisarius commander in

Italy. By this time the Ostrogoths – now

under Totila – were waging a success-ful counteroffensive throughout the

Peninsula, and had even managed to

capture Naples. In 546 Totila besieged

Rome and captured the city before

Belisarius could relieve it. Belisarius

retook Rome in 547, but he was inca-

pable of decisively defeating the enemy

elsewhere in Italy. Justinian – still suspi-

cious of Belisarius’ ambitions and jeal-

ous of his fame – refused to allocate his

general the resources needed to win.

Finally Justinian recalled Belisarius in

549. The eunuch Narses would finish

the reconquest of the Italian peninsula

by 553.

Belisarius retired, but would be

recalled one final time in 559 to defend

Constantinople itself from a 7,000 man

strong Slavic and Bulgarian force which

had invaded Moesia and Thrace and

was driving on the Byzantine capital.

With only 300 veteran soldiers and

an untrained citizen militia at his dis-

posal, Belisarius led the enemy into

an ambush and defeated the invaders,driving them back across the Danube.

In 562, just three years after saving

Constantinople, Belisarius was charged

with corruption, convicted and impris-

oned. The record shows the magistrate

presiding over the trial was named

Procopius, but it is unknown whether

he is identical with the general’s for-

mer Symbolous. In his final turnabout,

Justinian pardoned Belisarius, who

died in November 565, only a few weeks

before the emperor himself.

Byzantine way of warWhile Belisarius achieved remarkable

victories, his record is subject to criti-

cism. Some of his victories were due to

mistakes of his opposing leaders rather

than to his own strategy. For exam-

ple, the Vandal forces at Ad Decimum

were on the threshold of victory when

Gelimer – distraught over the deathof his brother – foolishly ordered their

retreat.

On the other hand, much of the crit-

icism needs to be taken in context. For

example, some modern historians criti-

cize Belisarius for failing to employ his

cavalry and infantry in a coordinated

manner, and for generally neglecting

his infantry. Belisarius did in fact rely

heavily on his armored cavalry and his

light auxiliary horsemen, but this was

a common aspect of Byzantine warfare.While a field army would consist of var-

ious distinct types of unit – including

light and heavy infantry armed with

bows, throwing darts or javelins, spears

and axes – the predominant offensive

arm remained the heavily armored

Cataphract cavalry armed with lance

and sword, as well as bow and javelin.

The most important support arm for

the Cataphracts were the light cavalry,

recruited from barbarian peoples and

armed with bows, javelins and lances.

This predominance of the cavalry is evi-

dent from the Byzantine military man-

ual Strategikon composed by (or under)

the ‘soldier emperor’ Maurice. Written

some two decades after Belisarius’ last

battle, the Strategikon is the source of

much of our knowledge of Byzantine

military organization, strategy and tac-

tics. A former general, Maurice devotes

considerable space to discussion of

cavalry organization and tactics, and

to analysis of various campaigns and

battles of the 6th century, includingthose of Belisarius. Mobility, flexibil-

ity, and combined arms operations are

principles Maurice stresses, whereby

much of the ‘combined arms’ func-


8 Ancient Warfare

Further Reading:- I. Hughes, Belisarius, the Last

Roman General . Yardley PA 2009.- P. H. Stanhope (Lord Mahon), The

Life of Belisarius. Reprint, Yardley

PA, 2005.

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THE SOURCE

10 Ancient Warfare

By Duncan B. Campbell

In total, Procopius wrote three works.

First and foremost is the Wars, an eight-

volume history of Justinian’s conflicts

with “the barbarians of the east and of

the west” (Wars 1.1.1), namely the Sas-

sanids in Persia, the Vandals in Africa

and the Ostrogoths in Italy. Much of it

is based on personal observation, from years spent accompanying Justinian’s

general Belisarius as his aide-de-camp.

In a shorter work, the Buildings,

Procopius catalogues Justinian’s con-

structions in the guise of a panegyric

to the “builder of the world” (Build-

ings 4.1.17). In pursuing this theme, his

tone is breathlessly sycophantic, and

he is sometimes all too ready to give

the emperor credit for his predecessor’s

achievements.

Finally, there is the Anecdota, nowa-

days usually called the Secret History .

(The name Anecdota literally means

“unpublished”.) For a long time, the

very authenticity of this document was

doubted, and its generally slanderous

LIKE THUCYDIDES AND ATHENS, THE

NAME OF PROCOPIUS IS INEXTRICA-

BLY LINKED WITH CONSTANTINOPLE.

HIS HISTORY OF THE WARS OF THE

EMPEROR JUSTINIAN AND HIS GEN-

ERAL BELISARIUS IS OUR PRIMARY

SOURCE (AND OFTEN OUR ONLY

SOURCE) FOR EVENTS DURING THE

MIDDLE DECADES OF THE SIXTH CEN-

TURY. HOWEVER, PROCOPIUS IS ALSO

THE AUTHOR OF AN ‘UNPUBLISHED’

WORK, WHICH CASTS A COMPLETELY

DIFFERENT LIGHT ON THE EMPEROR

AND HIS GENERAL. THIS IS THE ANEC-

DOTA, OR “SECRET HISTORY”.

SECRETS AND LIESBelisarius and the Anecdota of Procopius

tone led one historian to condemn it as

a “venomous pamphlet”.

The venomous pamphletThe Wars and Buildings were well-

known to other Byzantine writers, who

took up the challenge of continuing

Procopius’ historical narrative. (The his-

torian Agathias, in particular, chronicles

Narses’ reconquest of Italy.) However,

the scurrilous Secret History , with its

scandalous treatment, not only of the

emperor Justinian and his wife Theodo-

ra, but of Procopius’ patron Belisarius

as well, was presumably circulated pri-

vately for the amusement of friends.

Detail of the so-called Barberini diptych, an ivory imperial work of art celebrat-

ing the emperor Justinian (though other emperors have been suggested as well).

Thrusting down with his spear at barbarians under his horse, the image of a tri-

umphant emperor is reminiscent of earlier cavalry tombstones. Now in the Lou-

vre, Paris.

© L i v i u s . o r g

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Ancient Warfare 11

THE SOURCE

It seems to have been a relatively

late work, for Procopius claims that “a

period of 32 years has gone by” (Secret

History 24.29) under the rule of Justin-

ian. (He repeats the figure of 32 years at

Secret History 18.33, 23.1, and 24.33, as ifto emphasize the point.) Astonishingly,

we must wait four centuries for the

first official hint of the Secret History ’s

existence.

The work is first mentioned in the

Byzantine encyclopedia known as the

Suda, in the entry for Procopius, which

is thought to have been excerpted from

Hesychius’ Biographical Dictionary of

Learned Men. (Hesychius of Miletus was

What Belisarius did nextProcopius’ historical narrative is not strictly chronological, so it will

be helpful to set out the main events and Belisarius’ involvement

in them.

527: Coronation (1 April) and accession (1 August) of Justinian.

Belisarius is appointed “commander of the troops in

Dara”, and Procopius accompanies him as his aide-

de-camp.

529-531: Belisarius is appointed “General of the East”, wins

a victory over the Persians at Dara (June 530), but

is defeated at Callinicum (April 531)

531: Belisarius, accompanied by Procopius, is recalled

to Constantinople.

532: “Endless Peace” concluded with Persia.

The Nika riot in Constantinople, witnessed by

Procopius, is crushed by Belisarius.

533: Belisarius is sent to Libya, accompanied by

Procopius. He wins a victory over the Vandals at

Ad Decimum (September), captures Carthage, and

defeats the Vandals at Tricamarum (December)

534: Belisarius returns to Constantinople to celebrate

Justinian’s triumph, leaving Procopius (?) and his

household troops in Africa.

535: Belisarius is rewarded with the consulship. He sails

to Sicily and secures the island.

536: Mutiny in Africa is witnessed by Procopius, who

flees to join Belisarius at Syracuse (Easter).Belisarius briefly returns to Africa, but is ordered

to invade Italy, where he captures Naples and

Rome. (In this year, Procopius observes “a most

awful phenomenon” as the sun becomes darkened

for 12 months.)

537: Procopius and Belisarius are in Rome, which is

besieged by the Goths.

538: Procopius is sent to Naples to gather

reinforcements and supplies, and is joined by

Belisarius’ wife, Antonina. (He observes a

minor eruption of Vesuvius.) The Goths raise

their siege of Rome after a little over a year and

besiege Rimini.

539: Procopius accompanies Belisarius to relieve

Rimini. (Procopius records the sighting of a comet.)

540: Belisarius besieges Ravenna, and is offered the

kingship of the Goths. Procopius observes Belisarius’

entry into Ravenna (May). The Persians break

the “Endless Peace” and Belisarius is summoned to

Constantinople.

541: Belisarius arrives in Constantinople with

Procopius, is sent to the eastern frontier, and

returns to Constantinople for the winter.

542: Belisarius, probably accompanied by Procopius, is

sent to the eastern frontier again, and is again

recalled to Constantinople. (Procopius describes the

plague in Constantinople.)

545: Belisarius is sent to Italy again, based first at Ravenna

and then at Dyrrachium. Procopius probably

remains in Constantinople and begins writing

the Wars. Justinian begins payment of tributeto the Persians.

546: Procopius, engaged in writing Book 6 of the Wars,

claims that it is the eighth year since the

wounding of Belisarius’ bodyguard Trajan, during

the first siege of Rome in 538.

547: Belisarius recaptures Rome from the Goths.

548: Death of the empress Theodora (June).

(Procopius records the capture of Porphyry the

whale, at Constantinople.)

549: Belisarius returns to Constantinople, where he is

granted the honorific title of “commander of the imperial

bodyguard”.

550: Procopius describes events down to “thetwenty-third year of our Lord Justinian holding the

imperial power” in Book 2 of the Wars.

551-553: Belisarius in Constantinople. Procopius writes

Books 3-7 of the Wars and (probably) Book 1 of the

Buildings (and perhaps the remainder as well)

554-556: Procopius writes Book 8 of the Wars, chronicling

the events down to AD 553, when “the eighteenth

year came to an end in this Gothic war, which

Procopius chronicled”.

558: Collapse of the dome of S. Sophia in

Constantinople (May 7)

559: Belisarius, now an “aged general” (Agathias,

Histories 5.15.7), defends Constantinople against

the Huns.562-3: Belisarius implicated in plot to assassinate

Justinian, but is later exonerated.

565: Deaths of Belisarius (March) and Justinian

(November)

“Procopius. Distinguished man of Caesarea in Palestine. A public speaker and a

grammarian. He wrote a Roman History; or at any rate, the wars of Belisarius

the patrician, and his accomplishments in Rome and in Libya. He lived in the

time of the emperor Justinian, when he was made secretary of Belisarius and

accompanied him on all the military events and actions recorded by him. Healso wrote another book, the so-called Anecdota (“Secret History”), about the

same events. Both together make nine books. Procopius’ book which is called

Anecdota contains criticism and mockery of the emperor Justinian and his

wife Theodora, and even of Belisarius himself and his wife.”

Suda P 2479

a contemporary of Procopius, and had

perhaps been admitted to the histo-

rian’s circle of trust.)

The Secret History only surfaced dur-

ing the late Renaissance, when a manu-

script containing it was rescued from

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12 Ancient Warfare

THE SOURCE

A suspicious emperorWhile in Africa, some of Belisarius’ gen-

erals had secretly slandered him to the

emperor, accusing him of planning a

coup. Procopius believed without doubt

that envy was the cause. He even sug-

gests, somewhat diplomatically, that

Justinian paid no heed to the false ac-

cusation.

The Secret History places an interest-

ing spin on these events. There, Procop-

ius alleges that Justinian “straightaway

summoned Belisarius without delay,

charging him with tyranny, of which he

was completely innocent” (Secret His-

tory 18.9). Secret, or lie? If envy was at

the root of Belisarius’ recall, then it may

have been Justinian’s jealousy of hisgeneral’s success.

There is no doubt that Justinian

had a suspicious nature. At the end of

Belisarius’ consular year, the emperor

enacted a new law code (“Regarding

the consuls”), intended to curb any ex-

travagance that might detract from his

own majesty. His pronouncement ex-

pounded at great length on the follow-

ing basic point:

“We do not permit the consul toscatter gold, either of the smaller

or larger or medium coinage or

weight, but only silver, as we ex-

plained above. For scattering gold

is reserved for the emperor, whose

height of fortune permits him

alone to despise even gold; but sil-

ver, which is next in value to gold, is

appropriate for other consuls to dis-

tribute lavishly.”

Justinian, Novel 105.2.1 (28 Decem-

ber 536)

This was no doubt in response to re-

ports of Belisarius’ entry into Syracuse,

on the last day of his consulship, “to the

enthusiastic applause of the army and

the Sicilians, and throwing gold coins

to everyone” (Wars 5.5.18). Justinian of

course, had sent his general to Syracuse

to plan for the reconquest of Italy, but

the resources he provided were mea-

gre.

DisillusionmentHard fighting in Italy culminated in

the capture of the Gothic king Vitigis,

in 540. Belisarius’ sudden recall by Jus-

the obscurity of the Vatican library.

The first English translation in 1674 set

the trend for bowdlerising the more

obscene passages, in which Procopius

waxed lyrically on Theodora’s sexual

proclivities. Edward Gibbon famouslyrelegated the description of her mul-

tiple couplings (Secret History 9.18) to a

footnote quoted in the original Greek,

“veiled in the obscurity of a learned

language”.

A problem of dateScholars continue to dispute the date of

the Secret History . A vocal majority claim

that the period of 32 years ought to be

calculated, not from Justinian’s corona-

tion in April 527, but from the accessionof his predecessor Justin, in July 518. The

argument turns on two observations.

First of all, Procopius surely could

not have slandered his beloved patron

in 559, at the very moment of his heroic

return. (In that year, Belisarius emerged

from retirement to save Constantinople

from an invasion of the Huns.) Conse-

quently, the Secret History must have

been written at an earlier date.

Secondly, Justinian had been his un-

cle’s regent in all but name during his

nine-year reign. It would be natural to

include those years in any calculation

of Justinian’s years as emperor, count-

ing from 518 rather than 527.

So far, so good. But it should be not-

ed on the other hand, that in the Wars,

Procopius scrupulously reckoned Jus-

tinian’s reign by counting from 527, not

from 518. Out of many examples, there

is the dating of the ‘Endless Peace’ of 532

to Justinian’s sixth year (Wars 1.22.17), or

the dating of Narses’ recapture of Rome

in 552 to Justinian’s twenty-sixth year(Wars 8.33.26).

Counting from 527 was not merely

a snap decision made by Procopius.

For Justinian’s own official pronounce-

ments, enshrined in Roman law as the

“new constitutions” (Novellae constitu-

tiones), reckoned the years of his reign

from April of 527. As an example, Novel

141 (“Justinian’s edict to the people of

Constantinople on debauchery con-

trary to nature”) was “given at Constan-

tinople on the ides of March in year 32of the reign of our Lord Justinian, in the

eighteenth year after the most distin-

guished Basilius was consul”; this was

15 March 559. By April of that year, Jus-

tinian could officially be said to have

reigned for thirty-two full years.

Procopius and BelisariusNaturally, one of the central figures in

Procopius’ works is Belisarius, who wasundoubtedly the most famous general

of the day. His rapid elevation, before

the age of 30, from Dux Mesopotamiae

(“Commander of Mesopotamia”) to

Magister Utriusque Militiae per Ori-

entem (“Master of Both Military Servic-

es throughout the East”) during Justini-

an’s first Persian War, demonstrated his

early promise. And he appears to have

retained this prestigious rank, even

while campaigning in the west.

But he reached the height of hisgood fortune during Justinian’s Van-

dalic War in North Africa. On his return

to the seat of imperial power at Con-

stantinople, he was held in high esteem

as the captor of Carthage and the con-

queror of the Vandal king Gelimer.

Procopius accompanied Belisarius

throughout this period as his aide-de-

camp, so it seems likely that in 534, he

returned to Constantinople with his

patron. But even if he did not witness

Belisarius’ triumphant return (for there

is some doubt), he must have heard

many first-hand accounts, not least

from his patron’s own mouth. Belisari-

us was permitted to walk in procession,

followed by his chained prisoners and

wagonloads of loot, from his house to

the great Hippodrome, where he and

the Vandal prisoners fell on their faces

before Justinian’s throne.

The vast treasures confiscated from

Gelimer and displayed to the people

of Constantinople included “the heir-

looms of the Jews, which Titus, son ofVespasian, brought to Rome along with

other things after the capture of Jeru-

salem” (Wars 4.9.5); a century earlier,

Gelimer’s Vandal forebears had looted

them from Rome.

The triumph of course, was Justinian’s.

Belisarius’ reward was reserved for the

following year, when he became consul,

an office which was no longer annual

but only intermittently granted by Jus-

tinian as a signal honour. The largesse

the general distributed, as he was car-ried aloft through the crowds, came

from the spoils of Carthage.

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Ancient Warfare 13

THE SOURCE

tinian was again tainted with rumours

of treachery. Certainly, his subordi-

nates may have been worried by the

Goths’ offer to make him ‘Emperor of

the West’, or were envious of his good

fortune, which is perhaps more likely.Again, Procopius excuses the emperor,

saying that he summoned Belisarius,

“not so much through belief in these

slanders, but because the Persian War

was already weighing heavily on him”

(Wars 6.30.2).

However, we have been here be-

fore. Certainly, Justinian’s second Per-

sian War had indeed broken out. But

Belisarius’ return was greeted with

none of the public celebrations that fol-

lowed his African successes, and he wasrewarded with no second consulship.

Procopius’ disillusionment is clear,

both with Justinian, for jeopardising the

reconquest of Italy, and with Belisarius

for acquiescing in the emperor’s petty-

minded tyranny. For, although “he had

begun to annexe Italy for the emperor

Justinian” (Wars 2.1.1), the job was in-

complete.

“Belisarius was distressed, consider-

ing it to be a great misfortune if he

was not permitted to achieve the

victory of the whole war, which was

possible without difficulty.”

Procopius, Wars 6.29. 4

Meanwhile, Belisarius failed to score

any dramatic victories against the Per-

sians, although his adept diplomacy

succeeded in quietening the conflict.

Nevertheless, with tedious predictabil-

ity, accusations of treachery resurfaced,

and in 542, when Justinian lay ill inplague-bound Constantinople, Belisar-

ius was accused of disloyalty.

Languishing for two years in the capital,

he was finally sent back to the West to

try and salvage the deteriorating situ-

ation there. A contemporary chronicler

noted that “Belisarius, summoned from

the East for having incurred displea-

sure and grave danger, was sent back to

Italy again, a victim of spite” ( Additions

to the Chronicle of Count Marcellinus

545.3). But resources were tight, and theresurgence of Gothic power in Italy was

destined to end Justinian’s dreams of a

Western Empire.

Procopius was no longer serving as

Belisarius’ aide-de-camp, and from this

point onwards, he takes a rather more

negative view of his erstwhile patron.

A renewed threat of war in the East

forced Justinian to recall him, although

his tenure of the post of Magister Utri-usque Militiae per Orientem had lapsed

in 542, no doubt again owing to the em-

peror’s pettiness.

It is true that peace had been

bought from Persia in 545, but the Ar-

abs continued to cause trouble, and

an eastern assignment for Belisarius

would have been quite credible in 550.

Nevertheless, Procopius’ Secret History

again places a different spin on events:

“In despair, Belisarius begged theemperor that he might be released

from there (i.e. Italy) as soon as pos-

sible. And when he found out that

the emperor approved his entreaty,

he returned immediately, rejoicing

greatly as he made the news known

to the Roman army and the Ital-

ians.”

Procopius, Secret History 5.17

Earlier in the Secret History , Procopius

alleges that Belisarius had begged to be

reappointed to his eastern command as

early as 545, but his wife had forbidden

it. The idea is preposterous, of course.

But Belisarius’ wife, Antonina, is an-

other victim of Procopius’ innuendo, to

such an extent that there was perhaps

personal enmity.

The two faces of ProcopiusIn 550, Belisarius’ military career was

essentially over. Procopius’ more sober,

official account records that he was re-warded with the position of “command-

er of the imperial bodyguard” (perhaps

comes domesticorum), along with the

restoration of his old title, Magister

Utriusque Militiae per Orientem. This

may by now have been purely honorific,

but his fame was officially recognised

in his designation as a “renowned pa-

trician” ( gloriosus patricius).

By contrast, in the Secret History ,

Procopius alleges that “everyone jeered

at him with chattering tongues, havingrejected him, and rebuked him because

he was guilty of foolishness” (Secret His-

tory 5.27).

We can only guess at Procopius’ mo-

tives for twisting the truth in his “ven-

omous pamphlet”. Likely reasons are

again, tied up with the date. We have

seen that, technically speaking, it ought

to have been written during the twelve

months from April 559, when Justinianhad reigned for 32 years.

Scholars have pointed to Procop-

ius’ particularly scandalous treatment

of the empress Theodora, who died in

June 548. Such hostile lampooning, it is

argued, would have been pointless ten

years after her death. The Secret History

surely could not date from 559. It would

be much better to place it in 550, when

memories of the empress were fresh,

and the great conqueror Belisarius had

contented himself with a sinecure inConstantinople.

However, 32 years from 550 takes us

back to the accession of Justin. We have

seen that officially, this was impossible.

The nine years of Justin’s reign could

not be attributed to another emperor,

as all of Procopius’ readers would have

well known. But perhaps that is Procop-

ius’ point. In his repeated references to

a particular year, he may be indulging

in further disrespect. It is no doubt part

of his purpose to lampoon Justin, just

as much as Justinian and Theodora.

He describes Justin as “an old man on

the edge of the grave, ignorant of book

learning, which they call being alpha-

bet-less” (Secret History 6.11), a fact he

pointedly fails to mention in his official

version, where Justin seems quite capa-

ble of reading a letter from the Persian

king (Wars 1.11.10).

The Secret History continues to baf-

fle scholars with its curious relationship

to Procopius’ other works. But, when its

author claims that “it will be necessaryfor me to report in this book both the

things which so far have remained un-

spoken, and the causes of the things

which were revealed before” (Secret His-

tory 1.3), he doesn’t claim to be telling

the truth. Nor, indeed, the whole truth.

Amongst the secrets there are certainly

lies. n

Duncan B. Campbell is a regular

contributor.

Further ReadingA. Cameron, Procopius and the

Sixth Century . London 1985.

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Ancient Warfare 15

unexpectedly encountered a Vandal

force advancing towards Carthage.

After a brief pause, the Vandal forces

were completely routed. In the second,

Belisarius’ advance guard under John

the Armenian surprisingly encoun-

tered Ammatus, the brother of the

Vandal King Gelimer, who was advanc-

ing to block the pass at Ad Decimum.The Vandals were routed and Ammatus

killed. In the third encounter, Gelimer

arrived at Ad Decimum and surprised

and routed a second force of foederati

under Solomon sent ahead by Belisarius

to find John. However, Gelimer then

halted in confusion after finding his

brother’s body. Finally, Belisarius him-

self advanced and routed Gelimer, who,

unsurprisingly, was taken by surprise.

It is probably during this final

encounter that Belisarius, taking per-sonal control of the battle, first saw

that the spear-armed Vandals could not

cope with the intensive, accurate fire

from his highly-trained horse-archers.

The observation was to play an impor-

tant part in the coming battles, and it is

to Belisarius’ credit that he spotted this

fact.

Yet during this battle Belisarius had

very little control of events. It was only

in the final stage that he personally

took control and guided the battle. This

is the first major battle where luck was

to play a vital role in Belisarius’ success.

If Ammatus had followed orders, he

would not have been killed. Without

his death, the whole course of the bat-

tle would have been different. Most

importantly, Belisarius would not have

been able to surprise Gelimer in the

rear and quickly rout him.

Furthermore, the victory masked

the fact that Belisarius had been out-

generalled. Gelimer had anticipated

Belisarius’ route and speed of march,and Gelimer’s timing would probably

have been perfect if his brother had

completed his orders in a more sen-

sible fashion. Moreover, not only had

Belisarius is acknowledged as being

one of the greatest –if not the greatest -

generals of his era. His successes at the

battle of Dara (530) against the Persians,the battles of Ad Decimum (September

533) and Tricamerum (December 533)

against the Vandals, and his tactics

during the siege of Rome (537-8)

against the Goths, clearly show that

Belisarius was of a higher calibre than

most of his contemporaries. In fact, it

was most probably his brilliant success

at the battle of Dara which prompted

Justinian to choose him for the daring

attempt to reconquer Africa in 533. The

speed of his success in Africa further

prompted Justinian to send Belisarius

in the attempt to reconquer Italy in

535, a campaign which lasted far lon-

ger than either of them had anticipat-

ed. Yet the fact that Belisarius was an

outstanding general does not tell the

whole story. There are many examples

in Procopius where a closer analysis

shows that Belisarius was blessed with

more than his fair share of luck.

It was during Belisarius’ lifetime

that the East Romans, or Byzantines,

changed from a strong dependenceupon heavily armed foot troops to win

their battles to using heavily-armed

and -armoured hippotoxotai (“horse

archers”), possibly under the influence

of the Huns and of the Byzantines’

major adversary, the Persians. Although

accepted as a major change in both

strategy and tactics, usually no attemptis made at analyzing the impact upon

the generals in command at such a

crucial stage in the transformation.

Belisarius is the most successful gener-

al of his era when it comes to using the

‘new’ troops. In fact, this appreciation

of the need to change military meth-

odology was one of the factors which

underpinned his success.

Luck in battleIt is probable that Belisarius first appre-

ciated this fact during the battle of

Ad Decimum (Sept 533). Shortly after

the initial Byzantine landings in Africa,

Belisarius, marching along the coast

road towards Carthage, was forced to

cross the pass of Ad Decimum. King

Gelimer of the Vandals, learning of the

invasion whilst in the south, also knew

this and ordered his brother Ammatus

to hold the pass in the hope that he

could then attack Belisarius in the rear

as he attempted to force the pass. This,

the first battle in the African campaign,is confusing in its complexity, consist-

ing as it does of four separate encoun-

ters. In the first, a unit of Huns, which

Belisarius had deployed on his left flank,

JUSTINIAN’S FIREMAN

A good general, and lucky tooFortune as a factor in Belisarius’ campaigns

THE VAST MAJORITY OF WORKS COVERING THE EXPLOITS OF FAMOUS GEN-

ERALS INEVITABLY FOCUS UPON THE MILITARY ABILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE ROLE OF LUCK IS USUALLY RELEGATED TO

THE SIDELINES AS BEING IRRELEVANT. HOWEVER, AS THE FAMOUS QUOTE

FROM NAPOLEON SAYS, IN THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL ERA IT WAS RECOGNIZED

THAT LUCK PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN WARFARE, AND BEING SEEN AS ‘FORTU-

NATE’ OR AS ‘FAVOURED OF (THE) GOD(S)’ COULD PLAY A MAJOR PART IN THE

FORMATION OF A REPUTATION. NOWHERE DOES THIS SHOW ITSELF MORE

THAN WITH THE CAREER OF BELISARIUS.

By Ian Hughes

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16 Ancient Warfare


Belisarius, who was expecting to be

heavily outnumbered in hostile terri-

tory, made the mistake of dividing his

troops into five groups (the Huns on

the left flank, John the Armenian in

the vanguard, Solomon with the foede-

rati , himself with the rest of the cavalry,

and the infantry back in the camp), he

had failed to maintain contact with hisforces to ensure that they could mass

together if a battle was imminent.

These are not the actions of a military

genius.

However, in his defence it should be

noted that the major cause of victory

was his quick appreciation of the facts

surrounding the rout of the foederati ,

and his decision to advance towards

Ad Decimum at full speed. It was these

actions which allowed him to catch

Gelimer off-guard, and which result-

ed in Gelimer being heavily defeatedin the first battle in the campaign. A

defeat at this early stage could easily

have resulted in the campaign ending

in disaster.

During the second, and final bat-

tle of this campaign, the battle of

Tricamerum, Belisarius’ observations

helped to ensure victory. During the

Justinian stands surrounded by court

officials and clergymen. The bearded

man at the emperor’s right hand is

often identified as Belisarius. Mosaic

panel in the Church of San Vitale,

Ravenna, Italy.

© I a m H u

g h e s

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Ancient Warfare 17


of Naples decided to maintain their

allegiance to the Gothic king Witigis.

Belisarius’ strategy dictated that Naples

had to fall before the end of the year,

allowing him to reach and, hopefully,

take the strategic city of Rome. Despite

cutting the aqueduct which supplied

water to the city, the defenders held

out and, after a series of unsuccessful

and costly assaults, Belisarius began

preparations for the raising of the siege

and an advance upon Rome.

At this point he was helped by a

‘sightseer’ from within his own army.

An unnamed Isaurian went to the

now-dry aqueduct to “look upon the

works of the ancients.” Here, he real-

ized that the dry aqueduct actuallyoffered undefended access to the city.

Belisarius quickly dispatched a body of

men through the aqueduct, ordering

one of his men who spoke Gothic to

hold the guards attention and so cover

any noise from the aqueduct. The men

entered the city and it was taken for the

empire. Belisarius’ luck had struck yet

again. Without the capture of Naples,

Belisarius would have had no port on

the West coast of Italy, and would also

have been forced to leave men behindto guard against attack from the rear.

The second of these sieges, and the

one which probably demonstrates the

most fortune, is the siege of Urbinus.

After two years of frustration, Justinian

finally managed to send reinforcements

to Italy under the eunuch Narses in 538.

Unfortunately, the presence of Narses

divided the Byzantines into pro-Narses

and pro-Belisarius factions. Claiming

that he was still the sole leader of the

invasion, Belisarius decided to lay siege

to Urbinus. However, Narses listened

to John, nephew of Vitalianus, who

had earlier decided that an attempt

to besiege Urbinus was futile. Refusing

to take part in the siege, Narses led a

large part of the army away. This was a

heavy blow to Belisarius’ prestige and

a setback at Urbinus would reduce the

morale of his remaining men and their

trust in their general. With the reduced

force, Belisarius was preparing to

assault the city when his luck returned

to help him. As the troops massed forthe attack, the garrison appeared on

the walls and surrendered. The spring

upon which the garrison relied for

water had inexplicably failed, and the

early stages of the battle the Byzantine

centre on two occasions approached the

opposing Vandal centre and unleashed

a devastating fire from the horse

archers. On neither of these occasions

did the Vandals attempt any manoeu-

vre of their own except a limited charge

to drive the Byzantines back and relieve

the pressure. During the third sortie

in the centre the Vandals gave way.

Belisarius immediately ordered an

advance of the remaining Byzantine

forces, sweeping away all before them.

Shortly afterwards the Vandal War was

over.

However, although the victory is

perceived as demonstrating Belisarius’

genius, the reality is far different.Belisarius’ decision to split his forces

again – he had left his infantry behind

and had only arrived on the battlefield

with his bodyguard after the deploy-

ment of the two armies – almost result-

ed in disaster. The confusion of having

to fight without the leading general’s

input was extremely risky. Belisarius

was only saved by John’s profession-

alism. Belisarius was fortunate that

John was a skilled commander who

was able to deploy the troops correctlyat a moment of crisis. Without this, the

army could easily have been defeated.

This battle demonstrates one of the

least-appreciated aspects of Belisarius’

campaigns in the West: he was blessed

with good commanders.

After landing in Italy in 536

Belisarius made quick progress up the

peninsula, capturing Rome itself in that

same year. He then had to defend the

city against siege by the Goths under

Witigis. However, after some successes

in skirmishes Belisarius finally faced

the Goths in open battle. It was to be

his only defeat in the West.

In Africa Belisarius had noted that

the spear-armed Vandal cavalry had no

response to his horse archers. During

the siege of Rome he realized that the

same was true of the Goths. Therefore,

for the battle Belisarius decided to only

take the cavalry, leaving the infantry

behind to act as a rallying point for the

cavalry. As the infantry were extremely

unhappy about this perceived slight,two of Belisarius’ guards, Principius

and Tarmatus, volunteered to lead

the infantry in battle. Belisarius gave

way and the infantry took up a more

advanced position, directly behind the

cavalry.

During the battle the Byzantine

horse archers slowly used up their

arrows, becoming tired in the process.

At this point, a furious Gothic cavalry

charge swept them away. All would

have been lost, and the losses cata-

strophic, if it were not for a core of men

around Principius and Tarmatus, who

held their ground and delayed the

Gothic pursuit. After the infantry had

finally succumbed, the Goths retired

in good order. Principius died on the

field, and Tarmatus died of his wounds

two days after the battle, yet without

their steadfast example, the whole of

the Byzantine army would have routed,pursued by the Gothic cavalry.

Again, it is clear that Belisarius was

extremely lucky that the infantry under

Principius and Tarmatus held fast and

covered his retreat. In the heat of the

pursuit it is unlikely that the Goths

would have halted as they did, instead

pursuing the Byzantine army up to

the walls of Rome, killing and injuring

many. Yet the decision to position the

infantry immediately to the rear of the

cavalry was only made after Principiusand Tarmatus had convinced Belisarius

that the infantry would fight if well led.

He was extremely lucky that these two

men made their offer, as without them

the losses on the day could easily have

changed the course of the campaign.

Luck in siegesHaving seen that in all three major

battles in the West Belisarius was

extremely fortunate, it is possible to

look at some of the events that made

up the majority of the campaign in

Italy: namely, sieges.

There were many sieges during

the long campaign in Italy, and it is

possible to analyze two to highlight

Belisarius’ good fortune. The first, and

most important of these, concerns the

siege of Naples. Following the inva-

sion of Italy, Belisarius advanced north,

with the whole Gothic garrison of the

south of Italy surrendering to him

without a fight. Belisarius came at last

to Naples, the first Gothic town, whichwas defended by walls and manned

by a Gothic garrison. Unfortunately

for Belisarius, unlike the rest of the

south of Italy, the garrison and citizens

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Ancient Warfare 19


defenders lost hope.

The unexpected surrender of the city

was extremely fortunate for Belisarius.

Obviously it obviated the need for a

major assault, saving many casual-

ties on his reduced army. Furthermore,

politically the timing could not have

been better. Belisarius was the hero

of the hour, and was obviously sup-ported by God in his mission in Italy.

Furthermore, Narses, who had listened

to the advice of John that the city would

never fall, was made to look foolish.

Shortly afterwards Narses was recalled

to Constantinople, although the rival-

ries that had emerged during his stay

in Italy remained to hamper Belisarius’

operations.

The positive morale effect on his

own troops no doubt had an opposite

counterpart for the Goths. One of theirstrongest cities, and one which was

deemed to be impregnable, had fallen.

Hope began to dwindle for the Goths.

Yet there can be little doubt that the

siege would, in normal circumstances,

have failed. Belisarius could easily have

been the one made to look foolish, with

a massive morale drop amongst the

men he was leading. A severe defeat at

Urbinus could easily have given hope

to the Goths and caused fresh opti-

mism and action from Witigis, with

untold consequences for Belisarius’

ever-diminishing forces.

Unlucky opponentsThis brings us to the other aspect,

which is usually overlooked, of the

quality of Belisarius’ opponents. He

was extremely lucky that during the

campaign in Africa the Vandals were

led by Gelimer, who although an able

general, was let down by his brother

Ammatus. If Ammatus had completed

the deployment as ordered, it wouldappear that Belisarius would have been

trapped in the pass of Ad Decimum,

with unknown results. Belisarius’ luck

resulted in a Gothic defeat.

In Italy, Belisarius was faced by

generals of relatively low ability and

morale. The fact that the south of Italy

surrendered without a fight was very

lucky. The fact that Witigis proved

himself to be militarily inept was also

extremely fortunate. Yet possibly his

greatest fortune was that the best

Gothic commander did not assume

command until after he had left. It is

possible that if Totila had been elected

king when Belisarius had first invaded,

then the whole campaign would have

been of far longer duration, and that

the outcome may have been in seri-

ous doubt. It is hard to believe that the

Gothic commanders in the south of

Italy would have abandoned a capableleader such as Totila. Forced to fight his

way up the peninsula, Belisarius could

easily have been defeated and the inva-

sion might well have collapsed.

ConclusionThe outstanding question is of wheth-

er Belisarius’ career was one in which

he was overly reliant on luck. There is

no doubt that Belisarius was a first-

class general. His deployment at the

battle of Dara had anticipated, and infact encouraged, the Persian assault.

In almost total control of the battle,

Belisarius’ success was complete, and it

is only commanders such as, for exam-

ple, Hannibal at Lake Trasimene, who

could dictate so decisively the manner

of the combat and the final outcome

of a battle. However, in contrast to

Hannibal, Belisarius actually went on

to at least nominally win the wars in

Africa and Italy.

Yet the question remains as to

whether Belisarius relied almost wholly

on luck, or whether his skills as a gen-

eral allowed him to take full advantage

of the luck that came his way. The most

conspicuous example of this is the vic-

tory at Ad Decimum. Although it must

be admitted that chance played a very

large part in the victory, it is obvious

that it was Belisarius’ abilities as a

general that allowed him to make the

most of the opportunities that arose.

Without his determination to succeed,

he would not have rallied the fleeingcavalry and brought himself up to date

with events before determining what

action to take. It was his speedy coun-

terattack upon Gelimer that ensured

success in the battle.

At the battle of Tricamerum, he was

lucky in that John the Armenian had

devised a plan, which would be able

to defeat the Vandals. However, it is to

Belisarius’ credit that when he arrived

on the scene, he did not interfere with

matters, as such interference would

almost certainly have resulted in con-

fusion and the possibility of a heavy

defeat for the Byzantine forces.

Only at the battle of Rome did

Belisarius fail as a general. His deci-

sion to fight was a mistake, and it has

to be recognized that his acceptance

of Principius and Tarmatus’ request to

lead the infantry was not central to

his overall tactics. This was probablythe greatest stroke of luck of his career.

Without their insistence that the infan-

try was capable of fighting, the losses

suffered during the rout would have

been much larger, and, with only a lim-

ited supply of troops, this could easily

have been the end of the campaign.

Belisarius’ luck had nearly broken, with

catastrophic results.

With this analysis in mind it is clear

that, although the level of luck in his

campaigns was very high, when he hada lucky break, Belisarius had the skill

and wisdom to make the most of his

chance. His skills outweighed his luck,

but on those occasions where he was

forced to rely on luck, it did not desert

him – but only just. n

After receiving an MA in Late Roman

History, Ian Hughes became a teacher,

but he is now a professional author and

freelance copy-editor and cartographer.

His first book was Belisarius: The Last

Roman General (2009) and his second

book is Stilicho: the Vandal Who Saved

Rome (2010). He is currently working on

the third: Aetius: Attila’s Nemesis.

Further reading:- A. Cameron, Procopius and the

Sixth Century . California 1985.

- G. Greatrex, Rome and Persia at

War 502-532. Francis Cairns 1998.

- J. J. Norwich, Byzantium The EarlyCenturies. Bungay 1998.

- J. Wacher, The Roman World.

London 1990.

Justinian and some dismounted

heavy cavalrymen. In the foreground

a Hunnic horse-archer. Their prowess

at fast-flowing ranged combat helped

Belisarius keep the Gothic cavalry at a

distance.

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20 Ancient Warfare

The Romans traced a tradition of single

combat back to the very foundation of

their city. Romulus was the first Roman

duellist. He killed king Acron of Caenina

in single combat and then captured

the little Latin town. Another legend-

ary duel, or rather battle of champi-

ons, between the three Roman Horatiibrothers and the three Alban Curiatii

brothers, resulted in the absorption of

Alba Longa by Regal Rome.

Roman traditionLater historic single combats in the

Republican period were rarely so deci-

sive, but still important because they

demonstrated Roman virtus (valour

and excellence) and the favour of the

gods. The defeat of Gallic and German

and Spanish warriors of chiefly rank,

normally in the space between armies

prior to battle, served to encourage

the Romans and to dismay the enemy.

However, the incident at Nola in 89 BC

is particularly notable as an example

of a decisive single combat. The defeat

of a Gallic champion by a Moorish cav-

alryman – perhaps the commander of

his unit – in Roman service, caused

the Gallic mercenaries employed by

Samnite rebels to panic and flee. This

exposed the Samnites, who in turn

fled, and were cut down in their thou-sands as they attempted to enter Nola

through a single gate.

The Roman sources typically distort

the reality of these duels by nearly

always having a tall and mighty enemy

champion stride (or ride) into the no-

man’s land between the rival armies

to abuse the Romans and chal-

lenge any who are brave enough

to fight him. No one will.

Eventually a young Roman

officer, usually the scion ofan aristocratic gens (clan),

apparently small in stat-

ure and inexperienced

in hand-to-hand com-

bat (in contrast with

the barbarian cham-

pion), can take no

more of the enemy’s

taunts and accepts

the challenge.

However, in keeping

with the Roman tra-

dition (or cherished

fantasy) of discipline,

he does not rashly

rush out at the enemy,

but first seeks the per-

mission of his general to

fight. Then, in typical David

and Goliath style, and some-

times aided by the interven-

tion of the gods, he vanquishes

the arrogant barbarian.

Despite the clichéd elements in

the accounts of single combats won bythe tribunes Titus Manlius Torquatus on

the Anio (361 BC) and Marcus Valerius

Corvus in the Pomptine Marshes (349

BC), there can be no doubt that they

Champions and traditionSingle combat in the age of Belisarius

THE SIXTH CENTURY AD WITNESSED A REVIVAL OF THE PRACTICE OF SINGLE

COMBAT BY ROMAN CHAMPIONS, USUALLY OFFICERS OF CONSIDERABLE

RANK AND PRESTIGE, BUT THESE MEN WERE OFTEN OF NON-ROMAN ORIGIN

OR DESCENT. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THEIR NATIVE WARRIOR TRADITIONS

INFLUENCE THE REVIVAL OF SINGLE COMBAT?

By Ross Cowan

Early 7th century depiction of David

fighting Goliath. Part of a series of

silver dishes depicting the life of

King David, it is interesting to con-

sider the possibility of an increased

interest in that iconic story of single

combat. Found at Lambousa, Cyprus.

Copy in the Römisch-Germanisches

Zentralmuseum, Mainz,Germany.


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Ancient Warfare 21

leaving the battle line to insult the

enemy and deliver a challenge to single

combat, for example, by the aristocrat

Antistius Turpio at Munda in 45 BC. This

is probably indicative that the Romans

were far more active in issuing chal-

lenges than the sources would admit.

And if the Romans really were so dis-

ciplined, commanders from the Elder

Torquatus in 340 BC to the Caesar Titus

in AD 70, would not have had to issue

orders against unsanctioned duels and

acts of bravado in combat.

Single combat was generally the

practice of the aristocracy, but there

are some examples of duels fought by

ordinary Roman soldiers. Interestingly,

the cavalryman Priscus, who acceptedthe challenge of the Jew Jonathon at

Jerusalem in AD 70, is the only Roman

recorded to have lost a single combat in

the Regal, Republican or Early Imperial

eras. What is more, this duel reverses

the usual David and Goliath scenario:

Priscus is the experienced and formi-

dable Goliath figure but as he charges

towards his apparent victim, he slips

and the small Jonathon seizes the

opportunity to kill his momentari-

ly defenceless opponent.The brief fight between

Jonathon and Priscus seems

to terminate the Roman tra-

dition of single combat (see

Cowan 2007). While there is

no doubt that there were

countless one-on-one com-

bats involving Romans

and their opponents, it

is not until AD 422 that

another certain example

of a formal single combat

presents itself. In that year

Areobindus, a Roman gen-

eral of Gothic extraction,

fought a battle of champions

against a Persian ‘immortal’

somewhere in Mesopotamia.

The duel seems to have been

proposed by the Sasanid Persian

king Bahram V, who wished to avoid

a full-scale pitched battle. When

Areobindus won the single combat

(thanks to his lasso), Bahram conclud-

ed a peace treaty with the Romans.Areobindus’ feat became famous but

seems not to have spurred a wider

revival of the old tradition of single

combat (see ‘Heroes of the Roman

Army’, Ancient Warfare III.3). The revival

came a century later.

The revival of single combatSingle combat of the classic Roman

type, that is an apparently junior and

inexperienced Roman accepting the

challenge of a boastful enemy cham-

pion, reappears in the skirmishing

leading up to the battle of Dara in

July AD 530. The cavalry on the left

wing of Belisarius’ army won a skirmish

against cavalry from the right wing of

the Persian army:

“Seven of the Persians fell and

the Romans gained possession

of their bodies. Then both armiesremained quietly in position, but

one Persian, a young man, riding

up very close to the Roman army,

began to challenge all of them,

calling for whoever wished to do

battle with him. And no one of

the whole army dared face the

danger, except a certain Andreas,

one of the personal attendants

of Bouzes.”

Procopius, Wars 1.13.28-30

Thus the scene is set. The Thracian gen-

eral Bouzes commanded the cavalry

on the left wing of the Roman army.

Procopius asserts that Andreas was

simply a servant, “not a soldier or one

who had ever practised at all in the

business of war, but a trainer of youths

in charge of a certain wrestling school

in Byzantium [i.e. Constantinople],”

and who had the honour of being

Bouzes’ bath attendant (Wars 1.13.30-31).

However, it seems unlikely that Andreas

was a simple servant considering his

background in unarmed combat and

his skill as a horseman, and because

he was fully armed and armoured. It is

probable that he was a senior member

of Bouzes’ bucellarii . So-called because

of their biscuit ration (bucellatum),

the bucellarii were military retainers

employed by wealthy officials and gen-

erals, and thus they are often viewed

as private bodyguards, but they also

swore an oath of loyalty to the emperorand were placed at his disposal.

This man alone had the courage,

without being ordered by Bouzes or

anyone else, to go out of his own accord

helped inspire the Romans to impor-

tant victories over the Gauls. Moreover,

their feats in combat ensured their

reputations for virtus and hastened

their rise to the highest military and

political offices.

Of course, not all Roman duellists

were relatively junior military tribunes.

For example, Marcus Claudius Marcellus

was consul, the chief magistrate of

Rome, when he slew Viridomarus, king

of the Gaesati at Clastidium in 222 BC.

Marcellus claimed the spolia opima,

that is the greatest spoils – arms and

armour and sometimes the head –

taken by a Roman king or chief magis-

trate from an enemy king or general in

single combat. Sometimes, we do

hear of a Roman


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22 Ancient Warfare

to halt, he could force Iaudas into a

battle of champions. If Iaudas won his

army would drink; if Althias won, the

Moors would hand over their booty and

captives.

Iaudas, a powerful man and expe-

rienced fighter, was emboldened to

accept the terms because of Althias’

lack of stature and slim build. Spurring

his horse forward, burly Iaudas hurled

his spear at the Roman commander,

but with lightning speed the much

slighter Althias caught the missile with

his right hand!

This filled Iaudas and the enemy

with consternation. With his left hand

Althias instantly drew his bow, for he

was ambidextrous and [presumablyhaving ditched the spear] hit and killed

Iaudas’ horse. As he fell, the Moors

brought up another horse for their

commander, upon which Iaudas leaped

and straightaway fled. The Moorish

army followed him in complete disor-

der.” The Moors abandoned all of their

booty and captives as they raced to

catch up with their chief, and “Althias

won a great name in consequence of

his deed (Procopius, Wars 4.13.11-17).

Excepting Iaudas’ unfortunatesteed, Althias’ victory was bloodless.

As in the earlier age of Roman single

combat, Roman champions of the sixth

century AD did not lose duels, but they

did not always survive them.

In the spring of AD 542, near

Faventia (see Procopius, Wars 7.3.22 for

the location), the army of the Gothic

king Totila was vulnerable to attack as

it made a difficult river crossing. The

senior officer Artabazes urged his fel-

low-commanders to attack the Goths,

but they refused. The Goths completed

their crossing unopposed and advanced

to confront the Roman army. A Goth

named Valaris then spurred forward

and challenged any Roman who would

dare to single combat. Artabazes was

still simmering with rage and immedi-

ately accepted the challenge:

“So they rode their horses

towards each other, and when

they came close, both thrust their

spears, but Artabazes, anticipat-ing his opponent, delivered the

first blow and pierced the right

side of Valaris. The barbarian,

mortally wounded, was about

great haste to rise to their feet,

but the Persian was not able to

do this easily because his size

was against him, while Andreas,

anticipating him (for his practice

in the wrestling school gave him

this advantage), smote him as

he was rising on his knee, and

as he fell again to the ground

dispatched him. Then a roar

went up from the wall and from

the Roman army as great, if not

greater, than before; and the

Persians broke their phalanx and

withdrew to Ammodios, while

the Romans, raising the paean,

went inside the fortifications.”


One wonders how exactly Andreas

managed to sneak out again to con-

front the second Persian warrior. We

hear no more of Andreas after this

feat. Procopius – who, as a member of

Belisarius’ staff, may have witnessed the

duels – does not tell us if Andreas was

punished for disobeying Hermogenes’

order.

Andreas’ two victories certainlyboosted the morale of the Roman army,

but it is probably coincidental that

the Persians withdrew after the death

of their second champion. The duels

were fought late in the day (cf. Wars

1.13.25) and because a general engage-

ment had not developed (contrast, for

example, the battle that erupted after

Valerius Corvus’ duel in the Pomptine

Marshes), the Persians would have

intended returning to their fortifica-

tions before nightfall. They came back

to Daras the next morning, and were

defeated in a pitched battle.

The vagaries of single combatIn AD 535, a Roman victory in single

combat did persuade an enemy army to

quit the field. When the Moorish chief

Iaudas plundered Numidia, Althias,

the comes foederatum (commander

of allied troops) based at Centuriae,

realised he could not confront Iaudas

in open battle: he had only 70 Huns

under his command. Althias reckonedthat if he occupied the easily defended

spring at nearby Tigisis, the only major

source of water in the region and where

Iaudas and his thirsty army would have

to meet the man in single combat.

Andreas caught the barbarian while

still considering how he should deliver

his attack, and hit him with his spear

on the right breast. And the Persian

did not bear the blow delivered by a

man of such exceptional strength, and

fell from his horse to the earth. Then

Andreas slew him with a small knife

like a sacrificial animal as he lay on his

back, and a mighty cry was raised from

both the city wall [of Dara] and from

the Roman army. (Wars 1.13.31-32)

Unlike most of the famous Roman

duellists of old, Andreas did not seek

the permission of his commander to

fight. (Quintus Occius Achilles is a nota-

ble example of a Republican Romanofficer who did not seek permission

to accept a challenge, but the duel

was not fought in a battle situation.)

When Andreas returned to the Roman

battle line, Hermogenes, the deputy of

Belisarius, forbade him to accept any

more challenges, but Andreas was not

able to resist when a second Persian

champion rode out. He was a bigger

man than Andreas – the David and

Goliath theme again – and we can

assume he was of senior rank.

“The Persians were deeply vexed

at the outcome and sent forth

another horseman for the same

purpose, a manly fellow and well

favoured as to bodily size, but

not a youth, for some of the hair

on his head already showed grey.

This horseman came up along the

hostile army, and, brandishing

vehemently the whip with which

he was accustomed to strike his

horse, he summoned to battle

whoever among the Romans

was willing. And when no one

went out against him, Andreas,

without attracting the notice of

anyone, once more came forth,

although he had been forbid-

den to do so by Hermogenes. So

both rushed madly upon each

other with their spears, and the

weapons, driven against their

corselets, were turned aside with

mighty force, and the horses,striking together their heads, fell

themselves and threw off their

riders. And the two men, falling

very close to each other, made


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The ambidextrous comes foederatum Althias catches a spear thrown at him dur-

ing single combat at the spring of Tigisis in AD 535.

© Johnny Shumate

Ancient Warfare 23

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24 Ancient Warfare

(Wars 7.23.2; unfortunately, Procopius

does not describe any of his duels).

These two men are likely to have been

familiar with the Greek and Roman

heroic traditions. Despite the paucity

of evidence for single combat from the

later first to early fifth centuries AD,

the Romans always remained aware of

the tradition. For example, in c. AD 260

the emperor Gallienus challenged the

Gallic usurper Postumus to single com-

bat; Postumus declined. At the battle

of Mursa in AD 351, the rival Roman

commanders Romulus and Menelaus

(aptly heroic names) met in what may

have been a single combat rather than

a chance one-on-one encounter (see

‘Heroes of the Roman Army’, AncientWarfare III.3).

In his excellent book Soldiers and

Ghosts, J. E. Lendon considers the tradi-

tions of heroic leadership and single

combat in the Greek and Roman worlds.

He notes the similarities of the heroic

leadership of Caesarian centurions,

such as Baculus and Pullo and Vorenus,

and the tribunes of the Roman army in

the fourth century AD: “The tribunes

of Julian’s army, like the centurions of

Caesar, had a much higher chance ofbeing killed than the men they led…

This habit of heroic command was to

last into the sixth century, where it

flowered again into a tradition of chal-

lenge between the lines before battle.”

Even if men like Althias and Artabazes

drew on non-Roman warrior traditions,

these were entirely compatible with,

and complementary to, Roman practic-

es. Despite their ethnicity, Althias and

Artabazes were exemplars of Roman

virtus. n

Ross Cowan is a regular contributor

A Roman tradition revived?Althias was probably a Hun. Artabanes,

a Persarmenian deserter, won fame

for challenging one thousand cho-

sen Persians at the battle of the River

Hippis in AD 549 (Procopius, Wars

8.8.23-25). The origin of Ioannes is

unknown, but Artabazes and Anzalas

were Armenians. The latter defeated

Coccas, one of Totila’s officers, at Busta

Gallorum (AD 552):

“Coccas had a great reputation

as an active fighter, rode his

horse out and came close to the

Roman army and uttered a chal-

lenge, if anyone was willing tocome forth against him in single

combat […] Immediately one of

the guardsmen of Narses stood

forth against him, a man of

Armenian birth named Anzalas,

who was likewise mounted on a

horse. Coccas then made the first

attack and charged his foe in

order to smite him with his spear,

aiming the weapon at his belly.

But Anzalas, by suddenly turn-

ing his horse aside, caused thecharge of his enemy to be futile.

By this manoeuvre he was placed

on his enemy’s flank and he now

thrust his spear into his left side.

Coccas fell from his horse and lay

there a dead man. Whereupon a

tremendous shout rose from the

Roman army.”


Anzalas, Artabazes and Althias came

from the edge of the empire or from

beyond its frontiers. Were they the

inheritors of the old Roman tradition

of single combat or were they inspired

by native warrior traditions?

Coccas, killed by the Armenian

Anzalas, was not a Goth. He was a Roman

deserter and his name is Thracian; he

was from the interior of the Roman

empire. Was his challenge inspired by

Gothic practice or because he knew of

the old Roman tradition from his ser-vice in the Roman army? Andreas of the

double victory at Dara was a native of

Constantinople, the New Rome, as was

Martinianus, another noted duellist

to fall backward to the earth but

his spear, resting on the ground

behind him and being braced

against a rock, did not permit

him to fall.”


Artabazes, still being carried forward by

his horse, slammed into Valaris’ spear. It

went through his cuirass and drove up

through his body up to his neck, where

it severed an artery. He died three days

later (Wars 7.4.26-29). The victories of

Roman champions in the single com-

bats of the Republican era prefaced

victories in battle, but this was not

always the case in the sixth centuryAD. Despite his victory, the accidental

mortal wounding of Artabazes thor-

oughly dispirited the Roman army (its

morale would have been low following

the recent retreat from Verona), and it

succumbed to panic when surprised in

the rear by a detachment of 300 Gothic

cavalry.

At the battle of Thacia (autumn AD

545), the Roman general Ioannes (John),

son of Sisiniolus, defeated the rene-

gade guardsman Stotzas in a singlecombat in the no-man’s land between

their armies:

“As soon as the fighting was

about to come to close quar-

ters, both rode out from their

armies and came against each

other. John drew his bow and,

as Stotzas was still advancing,

made a successful shot and hit

him in the right groin. Stotzas,

mortally wounded, fell there, not

yet dead, but destined to survive

this wound only a little time. “

(Procopius, Wars 4.24.10-11)

One would have expected this to have

inspired and heartened the Roman

army; that was certainly the usual

result of a successful single combat in

the Republican period. And perhaps it

did, but it also enraged Stotzas’ Moorish

allies to such an extent that their furi-

ous charge put Ioannes’ smaller armyto flight and the general was captured

when he was thrown from his horse.

Stotzas lived long enough to learn of

his execution.

Further reading- R. Cowan, For the Glory of Rome:

A History of Warriors and Warfare.

London 2007

- J. E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts:

A History of Battle in Classical

Antiquity . New Haven 2005.


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Ancient Warfare 27

their shining metallic scale and mail

armor, put terror in the hearts of the

Romans. In wonder, they saw their com-

mander laughing at the approaching

barbarian army, ordering his men to

wait to shoot. When the enemy was in

the moat, Belisarius stretched back his

powerful composite bow and with his

first hit brought down a Gothic com-

mander. Then he ordered his men to

fire, and the oxen were easily killed by

the dense volleys from the archers. The

Gothic machines were immobilized.

The Goths then pushed their attack

towards the Porta Praenestina, beside

the Praetorian camp. The attacks devel-oped in the direction of the Porta

Aurelia and of the old Mausoleum of

the emperor Hadrian, which had been

transformed into a fortress and had

did not recognize him, resulting in a

refusal to open the gates. The Magister

Militum saved himself with a strata-

gem. Urging all his men on, he fell

upon the pursuing Goths, who sup-

posing that a second body of Roman

soldiers was arriving from the city, fled

immediately at top speed. Belisarius

then returned straightaway to the

walls. The Goths had lost the flower

of their cavalry. Vandalarius, a warrior

who was amongst those who had tried

to kill Belisarius, had been pierced by 13

arrows, was found still alive amongst

the dead bodies, and was taken to

receive medical attention.

Witigis prepared the attack on

the city which was protected by four-teen gates. The Goths erected seven

entrenched camps: six from the Porta

Flaminia to the Porta Praenestina

(probably in connection with the six

great thoroughfares towards the North:

the Viae Flaminia, Pinciana, Salaria,

Nomentana, Tiburtina, Praenestina),

and one in the so-called Campus

Neronis (“Plain of Nero”). The strategy

was to keep control of the communi-

cation between the two areas of the

camps on each side of the river.Witigis cut all the aqueducts

and built battering rams, which are

described in detail by Procopius as hav-

ing large iron heads, mounted upon

wheels and moved by not less than

fifty men. He also built wooden towers

equal in height to that of Rome’s walls,

mounted on wheels and pulled by oxen.

He then prepared a great number of

ladders and a lot of bundles or faggots,

made of pieces of wood and reeds, to

throw into the moat.

Belisarius from his side, placed

throwing machines (ballistae and

onagers) on the towers in the wall. In

front of the gates, which were carefully

blocked, he placed so-called “wolves”

(lupi ): constructions with spiked points

which could be swept down onto the

attackers. He put himself in command

of the Porta Salaria, near the Porta

Pinciana, which he considered the

weakest point in the defenses, and at

the same time, the best location for sor-

ties.A delegation of Goths was received

by Belisarius and the senate of Rome.

Witigis, who knew the citizens were

afraid of a long siege and were indis-

posed against Belisarius for exposing

them to the dangers of war, tried to

convince the senate and the people

to abandon the imperial soldiers to

confront the huge Ostrogothic army

alone. But the bravery and the tena-

cious attitude of Belisarius made them

understand that the only way to take

Rome was by siege.

The attackAfter eighteen days of waiting, between

February and March, Witigis finally

decided to attack the walls and the

gates. The main attacks concentrated

on the Salarian Gate with the towersand battering rams. The spectacle of the

advancing war machines of the Gothic

warriors, protected by large, rectangu-

lar, wicker and wooden shields, with

Head of a Roman Magister Militum, from Constantinople, 6th century AD.

Now in the Archaeological Museum, Istanbul, Turkey.

© R a f f a e l e D ’ A m a t o


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28 Ancient Warfare

of the city. Soldiers and citizens were

mixed together on patrols, and divided

into companies charged with the duty

of guarding the walls. Twice in a short

period of time he destroyed all the

locks and keys of the gates and had

new ones made, and every night he

put different men in charge of those

who were guarding the fortifications. It

was their duty to go around and check

the guardsmen, as well as to record

and report to Belisarius the names of

guardsmen missing from duty and

their replacements. Moreover, the gen-

eral ordered musicians to play their

instruments at the fortifications on

night continually, and sent out detach-

ments of soldiers, especially Moors withdogs, to patrol the moat.

Witigis, having ordered his men to

slaughter the Roman senators taken

hostage in Ravenna, took the fortress of

Porto, leaving 1,000 men as a garrison.

He intended thereby to deprive the

Romans of their communication by sea.

In April 537 AD, twenty days after the

conquest of Porto, the generals Valerian

and Martinus arrived from the East

with a contingent of 1,600 cavalrymen,

recruited amongst the nations of theHuns, Antae and Sclaveni living along

the Danube. Belisarius launched small

detachments of 200/300 horsemen

and guardsmen (hypaspistai ) out of

the Porta Salaria under the command

of his doryphoroi Trajan, Mundilas and

Diogenes, in an attempt to draw the

Goths under the city wall, and destroy

them with the fire of the archers and

the ballistae.

Witigis’ answer was prompt. In

response, he launched groups of 500

cavalrymen to combat the Roman sal-

lies, but they were surrounded and

slaughtered by the imperial soldiers.

Other similar actions followed, which

gave further victories to the Romans.

As Belisarius himself explained to his

men, the reason for these victories was

that the Romans and Huns were the

best mounted bowmen. Gothic caval-

ry, mainly trained to fight with spear

and sword, had no means to defend

themselves against expert bowmen on

horseback.

Belisarius salliesBelisarius, convinced that the enemy

was sufficiently frayed, decided to

their swords. When the Goths were

thrown into disarray, and were rush-

ing in different directions, Belisarius

ordered a general sortie from the city

by his entire army. Many Goths were

slaughtered and their war-machines

were destroyed by fire.

Thus ended the first attack against

the city, with the Gothic losses report-

edly as high 30,000 men, though the

veracity of that number should be

doubted. That night, the Romans sang

the song of victory, lauding Belisarius

and carrying the spoils stripped from

their slain enemies.

War of attritionHaving asked for reinforcements from

the Emperor, Belisarius transferred the

servants, the women and children of

the citizens and soldiers to Naples to

relieve the pressure caused from the

lack of provisions. Meanwhile Roman

raiding parties, especially those com-posed of ferocious Moors, harassed the

small companies of the Gothic army.

Showing great strategic acumen,

Belisarius reorganized the defense

been incorporated into the Aurelian

walls since the age of Honorius. A group

of Gothic soldiers approached the mau-

soleum, covered by large shields. The

Roman soldiers who defended the place

pushed back the assailants by throwing

down great pieces of marble, broken

from the statues that decorated the

monument. All the attacks were useless,

as well as those conducted towards the

Porta Pancratiana and Porta Flaminia.

The most vulnerable part of the walls,

the area of the so-called Muro Torto,

was spared by the Goths because of

their belief that the wall was protected

by Saint Peter.

At the Porta Salaria, the battle

ended when a tall Gothic warrior, pro-

tected by a corselet and a helmet, was

hit by a bolt from ballista, which passed

through armor and body, pinning him

to a tree and leaving him suspended! A

last attempt by the Goths to penetrate

into the city through the area of theVivarium (i.e. where lions and wild ani-

mals for the circus spectacles were usu-

ally confined), was repulsed by Roman

soldiers, who were armed only with

Diagram of the helmet of Heraclea Lyncestis, 6th century AD, drawing after

Maneva.

© A n d r e a S a l i m b e t i


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Ancient Warfare 29

was kept as a reserve close to the moat,

so that in the event of a rout of the

cavalry, they would have a fresh body of

men to retreat behind.

According to Procopius, Belisarius

consented to the insistent suggestion

of Tarmatus and Principius, command-

ers of Belisarius’ household infantry,

that part of the infantrymen would

take position in the rear of the cavalry,

leaving only a small number of soldiers

and the rest of the population to guard

the walls. This error nearly cost him a

complete defeat as Witigis arrayed his

troops in a traditional manner, with the

infantry at the centre and the cavalry

on the wings.

In the area in front of the PortaSalaria, the Romans had the upper

hand from the morning to the after-

noon. Archery allowed the Romans to

kill a huge number of Goths. When the

supply of arrows was exhausted, the

battle lines approached. Three Roman

Doryphoroi , Athenodorus, Theodoriscus

and Gregorius, dispatched a good num-

ber of the Barbarians alone with their

spears. On Nero’s plain, the Moorish

auxiliaries harassed the Goths by hurl-

ing their javelins.While Belisarius planned to with-

draw behind the walls with the cav-

alrymen, a violent battle developed

across the Tiber, in the area of Nero’s

Plain, and the Roman army routed the

Ostrogoths into the hills (Mons Marius)

with a furious attack. However, when

victory was almost in hand, the troops

from the city, instead of performing an

ordered action, created chaos in the

army by prematurely plundering the

Gothic camp. Capitalizing on the disor-

der among the Romans, the Ostrogoths

struck back, furiously slaughtering

the plundering parties, and from this

moment the situation on the battle-

field changed for the worse.

The Gothic spearmen on Belisarius’

side of the river charged as well and

pushed the Romans back towards the

gates. The infantry and cavalry were

not able to stand, and they routed. Not

all Romans gave in so quickly, how-

ever. Principius and Tarmutus, unlike

the rest of the Roman forces, contin-ued to fight. The first fell where he

stood, his body hacked to pieces. The

second, holding two Isaurian javelins

(akontia), continued to thrust them

arrange the army for battle in the open

field. He launched attacks in two differ-

ent areas separated by the Tiber, one

between the Porta Pinciana and Porta

Salaria, and the other in the so-called

‘Plain of Nero’.

The Roman army, mostly mount-

ed troops, marched out from the

Pincianan and Salarian Gates, as well

as from the Porta Aurelia. Valentinus,

the commander of a cavalry detach-

ment, engaged the enemy on the Plain

of Nero. Attached to this detachment

was a body of citizens, and even sailorsand servants, who were arrayed like a

phalanx, thus forming the rear-guard.

Many of the Romans did not even pos-

sess real suits of armor. The infantry

A triumphant general (Belisarius?)

offering a Victoria to the emperor.

Detail from the Barberini Dyptich.

© W i k i m e d i a C o

m m o n s


(Overleaf) The plate represents the

death of Maxentius, Doryphoros

(“spear-bearer”) of Belisarius, in the

fight in front of the bridge over the

Aniene, as narrated by Procopius.

During the fight, Belisarius was rec-

ognized by the deserters of the Roman

army through his horse, a race called

balan by the Goths and phalius by

Greeks. The whole body of the horse

was dark grey, except that his face

was pure white from the top of his

head to the nostrils. All of the Goths

threw their missiles and javelins at him

while screaming, “shoot at the white-

faced horse!” According to Procopius,the Gothic cavalrymen of Witigis were

armored, fought with long spears, and

their horses were covered in armor as

well.

into the Goths, until he was rescued by

his brother Ennes, commander of the

Isaurians. He was lifted on a shield and

carried into the city, where he died two

days later from his wounds. Only the

firing of the archers from the walls and

the towers saved the Roman army from

a complete rout.

Spoiling attacksBelisarius, this time more prudent,

again engaged the Gothic army in

small skirmishes, both in the area of

the Porta Salaria and on Nero’s Plain.

These actions kept the Gothic camp in

a constant state of alarm. The attacking

detachments were mainly composed

of Massagetae, Huns who knew howto shoot the bow with great accuracy,

even when riding at great speed. Single

struggles and combats between cav-

alrymen ended almost always with a

Roman success.

Belisarius experienced a good deal

of success at the Porta Pinciana, but

suffered a major setback when his

Doryphoros Bochas was lost. Procopius

describes the incident of his death:

“Although surrounded by twenty

enemy spearmen, Bochas had a corse-let that withstood all the blows, until

a Goth was able to pierce him at the

place where his body was uncovered in

the right armpit.” It is probable there-

fore that Bochas was wearing a lamel-

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© Igor Dzis

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32 Ancient Warfare

Behind all of the minor skirmish-

es, the expeditionary army proceeded

along the Via Flaminia, ignoring the

Gothic garrisons of Auximus (Osimo)

and Urbinus, took Ariminum (Rimini)

and threatened Ravenna. Matasuntha,

wife of Witigis and niece of Theodoric

the Great, who hated her husband

because he had forced her to be his wife,

tried to negotiate with the Romans.

Witigis then decided to abandon the

siege and burn the entrenched camps.

Belisarius re-armed all of his returning

infantry and cavalry. When half of the

approaching Gothic troops had passed

the Milvian Bridge, Belisarius ordered

a general attack. At first the Goths

withstood the assault, but afterwardsthey turned around and rushed to cross

the bridge. The retreating troops over-

crowded the bridge in their panic, and

allowed the Romans to slaughter them

at will. A good many Goths ended their

lives like the Praetorians of Maxentius

almost 224 years previously.

After one year and nine months

of non-stop siege, the epic defense of

Rome came to a close. It is a noteworthy

episode, not because of the tactics used,

but also of the bravery and strengthof the Roman army, supported by the

intelligence of a great general. Witigis

besieged not only Rome, but Belisarius.

The city would have been easy to cap-

ture and had fallen to weaker foes in

years past, but Belisarius’ intervention

preserved the city. n

Raffaele D’Amato is a scholar of

Byzantine law and a regular contribu-

tor to Ancient Warfare.

The siege is brokenAt the news of the arrival of reinforce-

ments, Belisarius again launched raid-

ing parties in the areas between the

Pincianan and Flaminian Gates. At the

beginning of the siege, Belisarius had

walled the Flaminian Gate, opposite

Ostia. During the night, he ordered the

removal of the bricks, and arrayed his

army there.

From Porta Pinciana, a contingent

of 1,000 horsemen attacked the Gothic

camp in the morning. When the Goths

pursed the raiders, Belisarius opened

the Flaminian Gate and sent his army

against the Barbarians.

A huge Gothic warrior clad in armor

tried to stand against the Romans, butMundilas beheaded him with a sin-

gle stroke of his sword. Although the

Romans were not able to capture the

Gothic camp, the Goths suffered seri-

ous losses, which pushed Witigis to

sue for peace. These proposals were

rejected by Belisarius, and the Goths

then requested an armistice to discuss

the peace at Constantinople.

Belisarius granted them a three

month truce (November 537 AD), while

Roman ships from Naples came up theTiber to Rome with supplies of men and

rations. Another Roman commander,

Ildiger, in the meantime arrived from

Africa with further reinforcements

(25 December 537 AD). The army upon

which Belisarius could now rely, was

about 9-10,000 men strong.

The Goths abandoned Porto,

Centumcellae and Albano. Belisarius

launched an expeditionary army along

the Via Valeria, composed of 1,400

cavalrymen and 800 buccellarii . They

conquered Alba Fucens (Albe, on Lake

Fucinus), and marched up the Adriatic

Coast, in the direction of the Gothic

capital, Ravenna.

AftermathWitigis, having lost his confidence in

the peace negotiations, broke the armi-

stice and tried to occupy Rome by a

new stratagem. He followed the inter-

nal workings of an aqueduct, but the

Romans were successful in neutralizing

the attack. A massive attack towardsthe Porta Pinciana was repulsed with

heavy losses amongst the Goths. A sec-

ond attempt from the side of the walls

on the Tiber also failed miserably.

lar corselet similar to that found in

the Niederstotzingen grave, which cov-

ers the body, but leaves the armpits

exposed.

In the meantime, the Goths were

successfully threatening the Romans

along the Via Appia. This was the only

way Rome could communicate with

southern Italy. The Goths fortified

what was called in the Middle Ages

the Campus Barbaricus (“The Barbarian

Plain”), the rhomboid-shaped area in

which the crossing aqueducts Aqua

Marcia and Aqua Claudia sit. That way,

they were able to stop the flow of sup-

plies to the City, arriving from Capua,

and those coming from the Tiber to the

Porta Praenestina.By the summer solstice (22nd of

June), Rome suffered severely from dis-

ease and the bubonic plague. Panic

wracked the city. The people of Rome

asked Belisarius to allow them to die

by fighting the Goths in an open bat-

tle, instead of by famine. The situation

placed Belisarius in dire straits, but

he suddenly received the news that a

reinforcing army was on its way from

Constantinople. He tried then to give

the city a breath of relief by taking thetown of Tivoli, on the Via Praenestina,

which resulted in a serious crippling of

Gothic supply.

Arranging raiding parties against

the Goths, Belisarius was able to collect

500 men and new supplies through

Procopius, who was sent on mission

in Campania, under the protection of

cavalry commanded by his bodyguard

Mundilas. The Huns, under the direc-

tion of Valerianus, camped outside of

Rome. Their main goal was to neu-

tralize the attacks of the Goths, who

quickly found themselves dealing with

a lack of provisions. The blockade of the

Campus Barbaricus on the Via Latina

was practically neutralized.

In the meanwhile, the Roman com-

mander Zeno arrived with 300 men

from Samnium. In Naples the rein-

forcements from Byzantium landed.

3,000 Isaurian warriors, armed with

their feared javelins and 1,800 caval-

rymen, many of them from Thrace.

They were joined by 500 mixed troopsfrom Calabria. The expeditionary force

moved towards Rome along the coast

and on the Via Appia, with the fleet

covering the seaside flank.

Further reading:- R. Boss, Justinian’s wars:

Belisarius, Narses and the recon

quest of the West . Stockport

1995.

- A. Pertusi, ‘Ordinamenti

militari, guerre in Occidente e

teorie di guerra dei Bizantini’,

in Ordinamenti militari in

Occidente nell’Alto Medioevo, II.Spoleto 1968.

- G. Ravegnani, Soldati di Bisanzio

in età Giustinianea. Roma 1988.


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Ancient Warfare 33

530-1.

The conflict at Mindouos, between

Dara and Nisibis is explained by

Procopius (Wars 1.13.1-8) as Belisarius

attempting to build a fortification on

the frontier near Dara. This provoked a

Persian military response and led to aRoman defeat in battle. Belisarius’ fort

building, at the order of the Emperor

Justinian, is reminiscent of part of

the later Emperor Maurice’ appar-

ent instructions in the Strategicon, so

let us first consider what advice the

Strategicon offers regarding the con-

struction of such structures in Book 10:

Building a Border Fortress by

Stealth and Without Open

Battle

Thorough reconnaissance should

be used to find a strong site capa-

ble of being walled about with

dry materials in ten or twelve

days and of being defended by

a small garrison in the event of

an enemy attack. The reconnais-

sance party should also find out

if there is stone, wood or brick

readily available in the vicinity,

and if there is water there or if

ways can be devised to procure

it. A sufficient force of artisans

should be organised, gates and

machines for the walls gotten

ready, and a good-sized support-

ing force of brave, well-armed

infantry under intelligent and

courageous officers should be

chosen and given provisions for

three or four months…

Strategicon 10.4.

This can be compared with Procopius’

account of the attempted construc-

tion of a fortlet in the place named

Mindouos. Justinian, who ascended

This article is not intended to be an

exhaustive list of all possibilities but

merely an indication in the form of

detailed analysis of two specific exam-

ples.

It should be borne in mind thatthe accounts of Belisarius’ actions in

the 520s and 530s were probably com-

posed by Procopius in the 540s and

550s and then published ‘in every cor-

ner of’ the Roman Empire. His work was

clearly well received: Menander the

Guardsman praised his eloquence half

a century later, other historians relied

on him and Agathias even published

a continuation of Procopius’ work. This

amounts to a literary continuum and

indicates that his work was probably

available to the compilers of Maurice’

Strategicon which was probably pub-

lished between 592 and 610

Procopius wrote in classicising

Greek, inspired by Herodotus and

Thucydides, to entertain his audi-

ence in a particular way. This included

multiple references to classical texts

ranging from Homer to Greek drama,

which should be remembered as his

account can be somewhat dramatic: it

was certainly not written as a military

manual. Agathias imitated Procopiusin his style, whilst the Strategicon was

written in contemporary Greek as its

intended audience was military.

Surviving topographical evidence,

which can be viewed via Google Earth

or Google Maps, will also be referred to

with coordinates, when relevant. The

satellite images date from September

and October 2004.

The first example of where Procopius’account of Belisarius’ actions may be

reflected in the Strategicon, concerns

the construction of a frontier fortifica-

tion named ‘Mindouos’. Both this site’s

location, near Dara, and its name are

disputed: it was also referred to as

Minduos, Mindonos and Mindon. The

second is related to Belisarius’ tactical

actions at the battle of Dara, 530. As

there is not space for a third example, I

recommend that readers consider com-

paring the advice that the Strategicon

offers in Book 10.3. ‘Withstanding a

Siege Expected to be Lengthy’ with

Procopius’ famous description of the

siege of Rome (Wars 5.14 ff, see the

article elsewhere in this edition).

The fort at MindouosMindouos is the site where the

Romans attempted to construct a fort

as part of several such attempts in

528 (e.g. Thannuris) after numerous

Roman-Persian conflicts in Arzanene

and Mesopotamia in 527 (the battlesof Nisibis, Beth Arabaye, Thebetha,

Thannuris and Melabasa). It was fol-

lowed by negotiations in 529, but these

failed and led to major campaigns in


Source for a handbookReflections of the Wars in the Strategicon and archaeology

“THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO COMPARE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE TO

EVALUATE WHETHER SOME OF BELISARIUS’ ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THE MID-

SIXTH CENTURY BY PROCOPIUS ARE REFLECTED IN A MILITARY HANDBOOK

KNOWN AS THE STRATEGICON, AND PERHAPS AS WELL IN ARCHAEOLOGY.”

By Christopher Lillington-Martin

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34 Ancient Warfare

that these were standing orders from

earlier times.

Site of MindouosRegarding Mindouos, surviving archae-

ology offers suggestive, but only sug-

gestive, evidence for relevant structural

remains in an area (figure 1), which

is 6 km south east of Dara (mod-

ern Ouz, Mardin, Turkey) en route to

Nisibis (modern Nusaybin, Turkey) 21

km further east. It is located on the

edge of the hills where they meet the

plain near what was the sixth century

Roman–Persian frontier in northern

Mesopotamia.

The method used to arrive at this

potential site consisted of reconcilingProcopius’ text with the topography of

the conflict area by analysing satellite

imagery and field visit photography. At

Wars 1.10.14, Procopius describes the rel-

ative location of Dara and Nisibis with

“Dara, [...] distant from […] the bound-

ary line […] about twenty-eight [sta-

des]”. At Wars 1.13.2, he states the “place

called Mindouos, […] is over against

the very boundary of Persia, on the left

as one goes to Nisibis.” Therefore, it

is reasonable to argue for its locationapproximately 28 stades (6 km) from

Dara en route towards Nisibis.

The relationship between textual

and material evidence is problematic,

especially when using Procopius in

a quite literal way, but at least one

Justinianic tower has been identified in

this way. In addition, analysis of satel-

lite imagery has convincingly located a

Roman fort 30 km east of Nisibis. I have

used a similar methodology to relocate

the battlefield of Dara 2-3 km south of

operations, the Persians in order

to hinder the work with all their

power, and the Romans to defend

the labourers. And a fierce battle

took place in which the Romans

were defeated, and there was a

great slaughter of them, while

some also were made captive

by the enemy. Among these was

Coutzes himself. All these cap-

tives the Persians led away to

their own country, and, putting

them in chains, confined them

permanently in a cave; as for the

phrourion , since no one defend-

ed it any longer, they razed what

had been built to the ground.

Wars (c.549), 1.13-1-8

Comparing these texts suggests that

the Romans under Belisarius had found

a strong site with relevant materials,

water and artisans on hand but per-

haps had not allowed enough time to

make it defendable. Justinian’s decision

to send another army created the possi-

bility for a pitched battle and we know

that Bouzes commanded cavalry at

Dara in 530. The Strategicon (10.4) lateradvises using additional infantry forces

to “pitch camp around the fortification

and dig a deep ditch if the ground per-

mits” perhaps because one candidate

for the site of Mindouos (37° 8’09.56”N,

41° 0’18.25”E) has bedrock all around.

Therefore, it is conceivable that lessons

learnt from the defeat at Mindouos

may have been fed into Roman military

training to emerge later as part of the

advice contained in the Strategicon. On

the other hand, it could also be the case


First quarry near Kasriahmethayro at

37° 8’25.60”N, 40°59’56.07”E.

© Christopher Lillington-Martin

the imperial throne in 527, decided to

strengthen the position of the fortress

of Dara by building an outlying for-

tress. Procopius records:

“[N]ot long after this Justinus,

who had declared his nephew

Justinian emperor with him,

died, and thus the empire came

to Justinian alone. [ Aug. 1, AD

527 ] This Justinian commanded

Belisarius to build a phrourion

[ fort or watch-post ] in a place

called Mindouos, which is over

against the very boundary of

Persia on the left as one goes to

Nisibis. He accordingly with great

haste began to carry out thedecision of the emperor, and the

ochyroma[ rampart or strong-

hold ] was already rising to a

considerable height by reason of

the great number of artisans.

But the Persians forbade them

to build any further, threaten-

ing that, not with words alone

but also with deeds, they would

at no distant time obstruct the

work. When the emperor heard

this, inasmuch as Belisarius wasnot able to beat off the Persians

from the place with the army he

had, he ordered another army to

go thither, and also Coutzes and

Bouzes, who at that time com-

manded the soldiers in Libanus.

These two were brothers from

Thrace, both young and inclined

to be rash in engaging with the

enemy. So both armies were gath-

ered together and came in full

force to the scene of the building

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Ancient Warfare 35

the city, rather than immediately out-

side its walls (see Ancient Warfare II.1).

There are quarries and foundations

of possibly Roman structures in thisvicinity, which may include at least

one candidate for the site of Mindouos.

Building that fortification or others in

528 would have required materials from

a quarry and there is a pair of these

nearby (at 37° 8’25.60”N, 40°59’56.07”E

and at 37° 8’29.03”N, 41° 0’4.49”E) situ-

ated just behind the modern Turkish

village of Kasriahmethayro. These may

date from another period. Although

they could date from another period,

the size and proportions of the stone

cut marks resemble those of the quar-

ries just west of Dara, which were used

to build that fortress. The location of

the quarries would be consistent with

a border fort or watch-post strikingly

sited, perched nearby at the base of a

limestone spur with superb control-

ling views overlooking the Syrian plain:

north-westwards to Dara (6 km) and

Ambar church (5.5 km); south-west-

wards towards Ammodios (7 km) and

south-eastwards to the frontier zone

and Nisibis (21 km). Procopius’ use of the words phrou-

rion (fort or watch-post) and ochyroma

(rampart or stronghold) on a frontier

location suggest a somewhat small

building that can be relatively quickly

constructed. The “great number of arti-

sans” would have required accommo-

dation, water and provisions as wouldthe army of Belisarius combined with

that of Coutzes and Bouzes via tem-

porary fortified camps. This may have

left archaeological traces nearby. The

“fierce battle” and “great slaughter” is

likely to have left battle debris in the

landscape. As the phrourion was “razed

[…] to the ground” only foundations

might remain as in figure 2 and the

insert in the map above, which mea-

sure 19 m by 26 m.

Having used military terms to

describe the attempted construction

at Mindouos, Procopius modified his

vocabulary used in the final reference

to the location (tellingly absent from

his Buildings). It is amusing to read

Procopius portray it in an appropriately

diplomatic, or perhaps satirical, phrase

when he composed Kavad’s speech to

Justinian’s ambassador, Rufinus:

“[W]hen lately we made a pro-

test regarding these matters

and demanded that one of twothings should be done by you,

either that the army sent to the

Caspian Gates should be sent by

both of us, or that the city of

Daras should be dismantled, you

refused to understand what was

said, but saw fit to strengthen

your plot against the Persiansby a greater injury, if we remem-

ber correctly the building of the

oikodomias [building or even

house ] in Mindouos.”

Wars 1.16.7.

The battle of DaraThe second example of where Procopius’

account of Belisarius’ actions may be

reflected in the Strategicon concerns

the tactics deployed at the battle of

Dara in 530. To avoid repetition of

the background, I refer readers to my

account of the battle published in

Ancient Warfare II.1, but it is worth

remembering that the fortress of Dara

had been constructed on the orders of

the Emperor Anastasias after 506.

It was planned as a forward post to

launch potential Roman attacks east-

wards towards Nisibis and to deter,

or delay, potential Persian attacks

westwards towards Antioch (modern

Antakya, Turkey) and north-westwardstowards Amida (modern Diyarbakir,

Turkey). Figure 1 illustrates Dara and

Ambar within the landscape: Ammodios

(modern Amuda, Syria) is about 4 km


© A n d r e w B r o z y n a , a

j b d e s i g n . c o m

Locations of suggestive evidence for structures near the Roman – Persian frontier.

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36 Ancient Warfare

even behind their own flank”, and this

was true of the Herul ambush led by

Pharas at Dara. He deployed against the

Persian right wing when it attacked the

Roman left. Belisarius and Hermogenes

may have been applying tactics which

were later to appear in the Strategicon

as “the Scythian Ambush.” This reads:

“[...] some commanders draw up

[...] part of the army. When the

charge is made and the lines

clash, those soldiers quickly turn

to flight; the enemy starts chas-

ing them and becomes disor-

dered. They ride past the place

where the ambush is laid, and

the units in ambush then chargeout and strike the enemy in the

rear. Those fleeing then turn

around, and the enemy force is

caught in the middle.”

Strategicon 4.2

This is very reminiscent of the actions of

Roman commanders at Dara on at least

their right and perhaps their left wing,

but space only permits limited quotes

from Procopius here. Procopius’ narra-tive is here interspersed with quotes

from the Strategicon (4.2) in brackets.

Suffice it to say that, referring to the

Roman left cavalry wing led by Bouzes,

Procopius dramatically reports (Wars

1.14.38-52) that the Persians “routed

their enemy” (or perhaps “those sol-

diers quickly turn to flight”) and were

“crowding hard upon the fugitives”

(or perhaps the “enemy starts chas-

ing them and becomes disordered”).

When the Persians rode up (“past the

place where the ambush is laid”), the

300 Heruls under Pharas attacked (“in

ambush then charge out and strike the

enemy in the rear”). The cavalry on the

Roman left wing apparently returned

(“Those fleeing then turn around, and

the enemy force is caught in the mid-

dle”). Sunicas and Aigan (incidentally,

Massagetae or ‘Scythians’) also led 600

troops to hit the Persian right wing’s

left flank via crossing points along the

trench line.

Things are clearer on the Romanright wing as Procopius vividly records

that the Persian commander-in-chief

sent his reserve to support his left

wing. Belisarius and Hermogenes

south of Ambar over the modern Syrianborder and Nisibis is to the east. In the

520s Justinian ordered that Dara be

used as a base from which to fortify the

frontier and a major Roman victory was

one there against the Persians in 530.

Since writing my Dara articles about

Procopius relating Roman deployment

and tactical manoeuvres to the trench

and hill in the landscape, I have consid-

ered how book four of the Strategicon,

which discuses ambushes, may relate

to Belisarius’ tactics at Dara and per-haps explain how the Roman cavalry

wings operated during the battle in

the vicinity of the trench line which had

many crossing points.

The Strategicon (4.3) discusses

‘Ambushes from Both Sides’ using

trenches to set ambushes and the sec-

tion opens with:

“Some commanders have dug a

trench eight or ten feet deep [...]

extending a good distance […] At

various places in the middle of

the trench they left some solid

crossings of firm ground, well

marked and made known at the

proper time to their own army.”

Strategicon 4.3.

This is similar to Procopius Wars 1.13.13-

14, which, describing Belisarius and

Hermogenes’ preparations for the bat-

tle of Dara, reads: “they dug a deep

trench with many passages across it […]to a very great distance.”

The commentary with the trans-

lation of book 4.3 continues to dis-

cuss how enemy troops may be tricked

into falling into trenches and it citesan example of how the “Nephthalites

defeated Peroz, King of the Persians.”

The related footnote refers to the

year 468 and cites Procopius 4.4 and

Agathias 4.27.4 (who merely summaris-

es Procopius 1.4.7-13 and 32). However,

there seems to have been some con-

fusion. Whilst this citing of an earlier

action supports the idea that the com-

pilers of the Strategicon had Procopius

and other authors’ historical accounts

available to them, this example seemsto have conflated the details from the

two battles of Dara in 530 and that of

the trench between the ‘Ephthalitae’

and Perozes, which the commentator

dates to 484. It may be significant that

the Strategicon specifies a Nephthalite

victory over the Persians, which relied

on trenches, but avoids mentioning a

similar Roman one. Perhaps it did not

want to draw attention to any particu-

lar Roman general.

Book 4 of the Strategicon opens

with “Ambushes and Stratagems

against Superior Enemy Forces”, which

was the situation at Dara where the

25,000 Romans faced 50,000 Persians.

It continues, “Well-planned ambushes

are of the greatest value in warfare. In

various ways they have in a short time

destroyed great powers before they had

a chance to bring their whole battle line

into action.” This can also be applied to

Dara as springing ambushes against

both the Persian attacking wings led to

the total defeat of their army.Further, “Other commanders [...]

would not place the ambush close

to the enemy line, but on the flank

between the enemy lines and theirs or


Figure 2: northern edge remains of foundations for a 19 m x 26 m structure (37°

8’09.56”N, 41° 0’18.25”E) 6 km SE of Dara.

© C h r i s t o p h e r L i l l i n g t o n - M a r t i n .

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Ancient Warfare 37

ordered Sunicas and Aigan to the

right trench angle to join the troops of

Simmas and Ascan (again, Massagete)

and supported them with many ofBelisarius’ men. When the Persian left

wing charged the Roman right wing,

it “beat a hasty retreat” (or perhaps

“those soldiers quickly turn to flight;

the enemy starts chasing them and

becomes disordered. They ride past

the place where the ambush is laid”).

The Roman troops in the right trench

angle advanced against the Persian left

wing’s unshielded right flank (“and the

units in ambush then charge out and

strike the enemy”). Then the pursuing

Persians stopped as they were vulnera-

ble. Procopius here specifies, “[...] those

in flight before them understood what

was happening and turned back again”

(“Those fleeing then turn around”) and

“[...] the Romans, [...] made a circle [...]

around them, killed about 5000” (“and

the enemy force is caught in the mid-

dle”).

Therefore it seem likely that what

Procopius describes in his entertaining

way for a certain audience, reflects mil-

itary tactics which were later writtenup in the Strategicon to at least some

extent. No archaeological remains

of the trench have as yet been found

although a full survey of the site might

one day reveal the trench design and its

exact position.

ConclusionTo conclude, this article has compared

historical evidence to evaluate the

extent to which some of Belisarius’

actions described by Procopius are

reflected in the Strategicon and per-

haps in archaeology. It has analysed

specific examples: Mindouos and Dara.

Procopius and other authors’ historical

accounts were available to the compil-

ers of Maurice’ Strategicon. Procopius

wrote in a particular way with refer-

ences to classical texts which influ-

enced his descriptive method whilst

the Strategicon was written in the style

of a manual.

I hope that other possibilities will

occur to readers or that they may wish

to follow up this method to apply to

other evidence from this or other his-

torical periods. n

Christopher Lillington-Martin is an inde-

pendent researcher, working in Somerset.

He has recently been nominated for a

prestigious Arts & Humanities ResearchCouncil award to research ancient histo-

ry full-time in the coming academic year.

He welcomes correspondence about this

article at [email protected].

He would like to acknowledge the sup-

port received from Dr Roger Palmer

(Aerial Archaeology Research Group,

Cambridge) and to thank the British

Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (BIAA)

which granted him funds to revisit SE

Turkey in October 2007 when Professor

Metin Ahunbay was kind enough to

guide him and discuss Dara on site.

During that same visit Kasriahmethayro

and Guneyli koyu farmers were most

helpful in showing him around quarries

and sites. The commander of the mod-

ern Turkish garrison, Kamil Gündüz, J.

Bcvs, Oguz J.Krk.K was extremely kind

in facilitating his visit to Detvin tepe.

However, only Deniz Beyazit’s excellent

translation skills permitted communica-tion in the latter two situations. Last but

not least, he should also like to thank

the organisers of LAA 2007 (Oxford) and

BSANA’s BSC 2007 (Toronto) for provid-

ing the opportunity to present his ideas

at conferences.


Further readingGoogle Earth leverages Landsat sat-

ellite imagery and Shuttle Radar

Topography Mission data, http://

earth.google.com/

- G. Greatrex, Rome and Persia at

War: 502-532. Leeds 1998.

- G. Greatrex and S. Lieu (edd.), The

Roman Eastern Frontier and the

Persian Wars, Part II, A. D. 363-628.

(London and New York 2002.

- C. Lillington-Martin, “The

Archaeological and Literary

Evidence for a Battle near Dara, AD

530: Topography, Text & Trenches”,

in A. Levin, The Late Roman Army in

the East, from Diocletian to the Arab

Conquest . BAR International Series,

299-312.

- G.A. Wood, ‘The Roman Fort at

Qubur al Bid, Mesopotamia’,

Journal of Roman Archaeology 17

(2004), 397-405.

- Maurikios, Strategikon. Tr. Dennis

(1984).

- Procopius, Wars. Tr. Dewing (1914).

- Procopius, The Secret History . Tr.

Williamson and Sarris (2007).

- Prokopios, The Secret History withRelated Texts. Tr. Kaldellis (2010).

- Agathias, The Histories. Tr. Frendo

(1975).

©

C a r l o s d e l a R o c h

a

Battle of Dara, detail of the map from issue II.1. Key: 1. Belisarius 2. Nicetus 3.

Bouzes 4. Sunicas 5. Pharas 7. Baesmanas 8. The Mirranes 9. Pitiaxes.

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38 Ancient Warfare

Two of the hard-bitten legions from

Illyricum immediately received the

favour of Diocletian and his co-emperor,

Maximian. These regiments had served

with distinction and were known for

their rapid victories in battle. The writ-

er Vegetius tells us only that they were

known as the Mattiobarbuli after a

distinctive weapon that they used onthe battlefield. Each legion was granted

the honour of carrying the name of an

emperor’s patron god, and together

they became a field replacement for the

now out-of-favour Praetorian Guard.

They were to be known as the Joviani

and the Herculiani, since Diocletian

styled himself as Jupiter, and his co-

emperor Maximian, styled himself as

Hercules.

What was the peculiar weapon

that had given the Mattiobarbuli theirstrange nickname, and which seemed

to have served them so well in war?

The word itself is presumed to be an

error, and should have originally read

martiobarbulus, meaning “little Mars-

barb.” What were these darts from the

gods?

Design and constructionVegetius describes the mattiobar-

bulus as a lead-weighted throwing

dart, thrown by hand. Although such

a weapon might sound quite ineffec-

tive, almost a weapon of last resort, it

was not. Referred to by another writer

as plumbata (from the Latin word for

lead) these weighted darts became a

feature of Late Roman warfare after

their introduction towards the end of

Death from aboveMattiobarbuli and Plumbata

FROM THE REIGN OF EMPEROR DIOCLETIAN ONWARDS, THE HISTORY OF

THE LATE ROMAN EMPIRE CAN TRULY SAID TO HAVE BEGUN. FIFTY YEARS

OF CHAOS AND UNCERTAINTY WERE BROUGHT TO A CLOSE BY THIS RUTH-

LESS CAVALRY OFFICER WHEN HE TOOK THE REINS OF POWER BY FORCE. HE

WAS ONE OF MANY ILLYRIAN OFFICERS IN THE ARMY, THESE WERE HARD-

FIGHTING MEN WHO HAD RISEN THROUGH THE RANKS AND PROVED THEIR

METTLE. ILLYRICUM POWERED THE LEGIONS OF THAT ERA, CHURNING OUT

TOUGH FIGHTING MEN THAT WERE READY TO SPILL BLOOD AND WIN WARS,

AS LONG AS THEY WERE PAID … AND PROMOTED.

By Paul Elliott

Reconstruction of plumbata 48cm in

total length. Note the leather ‘bucket’,and also the fact that in this flight dem-

onstrator, the lead weight is mount-

ed onto the iron shank. This allows

snapped shafts to be repaired.

© Paul Elliott


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Ancient Warfare 39

the 3rd century AD. The early Roman

legions had their iconic curved rectan-

gular shields, while the later legions,

those of Constantine and Belisarius,

had their plumbata. It was a weapon

unique to the age, an effective and

widely used missile that could be dev-astatingly effective, as modern tests

have shown. A later Emperor of the

East, Maurice, was still talking about

the usefulness of the plumbata as late

as 600 AD, indicating a period of use at

least three centuries in length.

Several examples of plumbatae have

been found in Britain, they consist of a

short iron shank with a barbed head.

These iron shanks would have been

attached to a wooden shaft either bysocket or tang. The lead weight which

gave the plumbata its name encircled

the fragile junction between wood and

iron. Typically, this iron shank is 110-

140mm in length; of course none of the

wooden shafts have survived, and there

is some mystery as to their length.

The anonymous author of De Rebus

Bellicis (see also Ancient Warfare II.6),

roughly contemporary with Vegetius,

describes the use of plumbata anddepicts two of these mysterious weap-

ons fitted with short wooden shafts.

Each is fletched with two flights set 180º

apart, and fitted with a wooden shaft

The author demon-

strating the under-

arm ‘lob’ wearing

period equipment.

© Paul Elliott


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40 Ancient Warfare

vate collections stands at around 120.

Most of these examples come from

western provinces of the empire, with

none so far discovered in Africa or Asia

(apart from 4 found in Georgia and

Abkhazia). A relatively large number

have been unearthed in Britain. From

the Strategikon , however, we know

that the eastern legions (at least in

the 6th and 7th centuries) were as

keen on the plumbata as their west-

ern counterparts. Despite the modern

find statistics which may be influenced

by the current state of archaeological

research, the plumbata was undoubt-

edly an empire-wide weapon.

Battlefield deploymentA reader of Vegetius or Maurice’s

Strategikon might think that the ‘metal

darts’ recommended for use on the

battlefield are some kind of innocuous

‘thrown arrow’. A good reconstruction

dispels that misconception, however.

A plumbata might be short but it is anugly, effective looking weapon, with a

wickedly barbed head and a satisfy-

ing weight that hints at the damage

it will cause on impact. It is only after

are no centres of plumbata manufac-

ture listed in the Notitia Dignitatum,

and it is likely that regiments would

make their own as needed. The fabrica

(workshop) of any fort could forge the

barbed heads in quantity, then mount

them onto hardwood shafts. After melt-

ing the lead weight over the vulner-

able joint between the two, the shaft

required fletching.

All of this could also be done on

campaign, and in the field, without

recourse to a fabrica. As long as there

were barbed heads available, they

could be attached to the wooden shafts

and weighted on the spot. In a mod-

ern experiment a bucket of sand was

impressed with a rounded form (such

as the tip of a tool handle) and the iron

head and attached shaft pushed into

the centre, so that the joint sat well

within the hollow. Lead, melted over

a camp-fire was then poured into the

sand mould. Upon cooling the plumba-

ta was removed and the back end ofthe lead hammered or filed into the

typically aerodynamic almond shape.

An unofficial estimate of plumba-

tae currently in museums and pri-

that approximately matches the length

of the metal head (if indeed the blue

paint in the illustration does represent

metal). De Rebus Bellicis has never been

regarded as a reliable document, how-

ever, and so modern reconstructions of

plumbata have been made with vary-

ing lengths of shaft. The author has

thrown reconstructions with shafts as

long as a metre, but the best throwing

distances were always achieved with

the shorter plumbata, mounted on

feathered shafts not much longer than

the iron-shanks themselves.

De Rebus Bellicis provides our only con-

temporary written description of a

plumbata:

“To the end of a trued and

straightened rod attach a spheri-

cal piece of iron drawn out into

a point, with lead and feath-

ers affixed as in the case of the

tribulata [lead weight covering

the joint; feathers mounted near

the tail of the shaft], so that the

weapon, because of its spherical

shape reinforced by the weightof the lead and the speed lent

by the feathers, may be able to

penetrate easily the shields of an

opponent and such-like obsta-

cles.”

De Rebus Bellicis XI

The author differentiates between two

types of plumbata, the mamillata, with

its with rounded lead weight, which

seems to fit the description of the many

archaeological finds, and the tribulata.

No example of the tribulata has ever

been discovered and. like a number

of other weapons in De Rebus Bellicis,

it may have been an invention of the

author himself. He describes the tribu-

lata as resembling a mamillata dart

with the addition of caltrop-like spikes

(hence the name, from tribulus, caltrop)

projecting from the lead weight. If it

missed its target, it could still, there-

fore pose a hazard to soldiers moving

through the area.As finds on the Continent become

more numerous, it is becoming clear

that there was a degree of variation in

the way the weapon was made. There




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Ancient Warfare 41

lead, to finish its flight

deep in the ground

50-60m away. Most

thrown plumbata enter

the ground at an angle

close to 90º. Obviously

the heads and shoul-

ders of an enemy unit

are the intended tar-

gets with this weapon.

Foes of the Roman

Empire who had no

access to helmets and

body armour would

have looked on the

Mars-barb with some

horror.

Can we say anythingabout the deploy-

ment of this unique

weapon? Vegetius tells

us that the Joviani

and Herculiani usu-

ally carried up to five

plumbatae each. He

also recommends that

the heavily armoured

front-rankers of any

Roman battle-line carry

five of the weapons, “tobe thrown at the first

assault.” This makes

sense in light of the

room needed to make

an effective underarm throw. It would

be a mass discharge of darts, a shock

attack to try and break up the enemy’s

charge. Cavalry was especially vulner-

able to the plumbata, since the horses

had a large unarmoured surface and

their riders did not carry the large pro-

tective shield of the heavy infantryman.

Hundreds of falling plumbatae from an

infantry volley must have evoked sheer

charge-breaking horror in the cavalry-

man.

Two hundred years later, the writer

of the Strategicon, the drill manual of

the early Byzantine army, is in complete

agreement with Vegetius. This wonder-

fully comprehensive book insists on

plumbata training for both heavy and

light infantry, and exhorts command-

ers to equip both types of soldier with

a number of the lead-weighted darts.Extra plumbatae for each squad are to

be carried in the equipment wagon.

The author (or compiler), Maurice,

provides us with a detailed description

although few would claim any accuracy

beyond a maximum effective range

of 70m. To achieve such tremendous

ranges, the thrower needs a good 3-4m

clearance in front of him, or his under-

arm throw risks killing men within his

own unit.

The complete manoeuvre can be

described as follows: with left foot for-

ward and shield ready in the left hand

to act as both cover, and as a counter-

weight during the throw, the soldier

stands ready. He holds the fletched end

of the plumbata loosely by his right

side with thumb on top as one might

hold a dog lead. The thrower pulls

back the plumbata and in one move-

ment throws back his shield arm, piv-

oting forward with his right foot, and

bringing the dart up past his knees tobe released at head height. The dart

continues to climb in a lazy arc until it

stalls and then falls almost vertically,

gaining speed due to the weight of the

practicing with the lead-weighted dart,

however, that you can truly appreci-

ate what a devastating weapon the

plumbata might have been. It is a lethal

spike of iron from the heavens – truly a

Mars-barb!

“If soldiers throw them at the

right moment, it seems almost

as if the shield-bearing infantry

are imitating the role of archers.

For they wound the enemy and

his horses before they can get

not merely to close quarters, but

even within range of javelins.”

Vegetius 1.17

This remark of Vegetius is crucial – the

range of a plumbata thrown under-arm (the ‘lob’) far exceeds that of any

javelin or other hurled weapon. Modern

tests thrown in armour and carrying a

shield, can regularly reach beyond 50m

© A n d r e w B

r o z y n a , a



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42 Ancient Warfare

is used again on the battlefield until

the emergence of the plumbata in the

reign of Diocletian. The Roman writer

Pliny does mention an obscure hunt-

ing weapon, the plumbatis iaculis, a

weighted arrow used by Arab tribes for

hunting birds. Was there any connec-

tion between the kestrosphendon, the

plumbatis iaculis and the plumbata?

The lack of an established battlefield

presence in the intermediate four cen-

turies would suggest a coincidence, but

who knows where the designers looked

for their inspiration?

We do know that plumbatae seem

to have emerged towards the end of the

3rd century AD just as the fighting style

of the legions underwent a revolution.A more mobile and more adaptable

type of Roman legion was required, and

the traditional heavy javelin, the pilum,

began to be superseded. Troops turned

to the light javelin of the cavalry, the

metre-long verutum, and also began

to favour a much lighter version of the

pilum called the spiculum, tipped with

a barbed head for inflicting maximum

damage on an unarmoured foe. The

plumbata then, seems to have been yet

another evolved form of the pilum, onethat quickly proved itself in battle and

then remained in Roman arsenals for

at least the next three hundred years.

n

With a degree in ancient history &

archaeology, Paul Elliott is a writer and

sometime re-enactor. His last book, The

Last Legionary , is an in-depth look at the

life of a legionary during the final years

of Rome’s occupation of Britain.

this context “slotted inside” could sim-

ply mean “held behind” the shield.

The Strategicon (see Ancient Warfare

III.4) advises light infantry to carry their

darts in leather cases, and interestingly

makes no mention of Vegetius’ slotted

shield method. A leather case or quiver

has the advantage of being able to

carry a dozen or so plumbatae, can be

tied to a soldier’s belt, and can be eas-

ily passed forward within an infantry

formation on the move. It seems likely

that front-line troops about to engage

the enemy held a clutch of darts in the

shield hand, and may have drawn these

out of a leather quiver. Light troops will

certainly have had a quiver, we know

that javelins much longer in lengthcould be carried into battle this way.

Aurelius Mucianus, a legionary of the

3rd century, is actually depicted on his

tombstone with a quiver of five light

javelins, and the writer Josephus com-

mented that the Roman cavalryman

typically went armed with a spear and

a quiver-full of javelins.

PrecursorsOne wonders where this popular

weapon, used by skirmishers, spear-men and even wagon-drivers, originat-

ed. An adaptable people, the Romans

often utilised armour and weaponry

encountered during their clashes with

barbarian cultures. However, nothing

like the plumbata seems to have been

employed by any of Rome’s enemies of

the period.

That isn’t to say that nothing like

it had ever existed before. Some four

hundred years earlier, when the legions

of the Republic faced the last of the

Macedonian phalanxes during the Third

Macedonian War, a weapon called the

kestrosphendon (a contraction of the

Greek words for sling and arrow) was

used against them. Livy later recorded

a few sketchy details of this weapon

which resembled a fletched metal-

tipped dart that was launched from a

traditional hand sling. The dart seems

to have been around 50cm in length,

and its use may have been a short-

lived experiment to give the tried and

trusted lead sling bullet the capacity topierce flesh, like an arrow. Along with

the kingdom of Macedon, the kestros-

phendon seems to have been consigned

to history, and nothing remotely like it

of the ideal time to deploy this lethal

weapon. The infantrymen are ordered

to close ranks two or three bow shots

distance from the enemy. As the bat-

tle lines draw near the archers begin

to pepper the foe with arrows. Next

“the heavy infantry, who are drawn up

in the front line, advance still closer

to the enemy. If the men have darts

or missile weapons, they throw them,

resting their lances on the ground. If

without such weapons, they advance

more closely, then hurl their lances like

javelins…” (Strategikon 12.B.16)

Skirmish troops, armed with jav-

elins and darts, are to be stationed

either directly behind the heavy infan-

try files, or on their flanks. Clearly theyare using the same weapon, not this

time as a shock attack, but in support

of the front-line troops. The aim is to

harass and demoralize enemy troops

who are otherwise engaged in hand-to-

hand combat to properly defend them-

selves from weighted barbs falling ver-

tically from the heavens.

Slotted in the shieldControversially, Vegetius states that the

heavy infantry “carried up to five mattio-barbuli each, slotted inside their shield.”

This has been interpreted to mean that

five plumbatae were strapped to the

back of the large Roman shield of the

period, ready for instant use. Modern

reconstructions of this method place

the straps in the top right quadrant of

the shield back, allowing the soldier to

easily reach in with his right hand and

draw out a plumbata. A satisfactory

arrangement has a leather or rawhide

‘ledge’ running horizontally into which

the sharp points of the darts sit, while

individual leather loops higher up hold

the fletched shafts close to the shield

board.

Although such reconstructions

undoubtedly work, there is no evidence

for them. Plumbatae were designed to

be used rapidly in the pre-contact phas-

es (particularly by the heavy infantry)

and there would be no need of such an

elaborate system of straps. The author’s

own experiments have shown that five

of the weighted darts can easily be heldin the left hand for a short time, along

with the shield grip, as one approaches

the target. This is an authentic method

of transport for light javelins and in

Further Reading- W.B. Griffiths, ‘Experiments with

plumbatae’ in: Arbeia Journal 4

(1995)

- P. Southern and K.Dixon, The Late

Roman Army . London 1996

- I.P. Stephenson, Romano-Byzantine

Infantry Equipment . Stroud 2006.- R.M. Vermaat, ‘Plumbata. De dart-

pijl van het Late Romeinse Rijk’ in

Momentum 2.2 (2008)


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Ancient Warfare 43

Spartans seized the Theban acropolis,

the Cadmea. They installed a garrison

there, and imposed a pro-Spartan gov-

ernment in the city. The Thebans did not

long endure this unprecedented trans-

gression of their sovereignty, shocking

even by the increasingly reckless stan-

dards of Spartan expansion. In a dar-

ing guerilla operation in 379, a small

group of Theban conspirators quickly

dispatched the leaders of the pro-Spar-

tan oligarchy, rallied the populace, and

expelled the Spartan garrison.

The Thebans knew that the Spartans

would not simply accept their abrupt

dismissal and quickly took several mea-

sures in anticipation of their return. In

short order, they concluded an alliance

with Athens and re-established the

Boeotian Confederacy, which ensuredthe support of the surrounding towns

and populace. Finally, in 378 the promi-

nent Theban general Gorgidas, almost

certainly inspired by the Spartan use

Thebes had traditionally exercisedpolitical sway over the territory in

central Greece known as ‘Boeotia’. But

in the early 4th century, Sparta, flush

from its victory over Athens in the

great Peloponnesian War, was seekingto extend its hegemony throughout

Greece. In 386 BC, the Spartans forced

the Thebans to dissolve the Boeotian

Confederacy. Then in 382, the voracious

THE GREAT STONE LION OF CHAERONEA RISES IN MAJESTIC SOLITUDE ABOVE

THE PLAINS OF CENTRAL GREECE. BEARING NO INSCRIPTION, IT SPEAKS

WITH SILENT, BUT PROFOUND ELOQUENCE OF THE VALOR AND SACRIFICE

OF THE WARRIORS INTERRED BENEATH ITS FEET. THE SACRED BAND WAS

BORN OUT OF ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF

THE ANCIENT CITY OF THEBES. DURING ITS FOUR DECADES OF EXISTENCE, IT

ESTABLISHED A REPUTATION FOR INVINCIBILITY, WHILE THEBES ENJOYED ITS

PERIOD OF GREATEST TRIUMPH. THE STORIED DEMISE OF THE SACRED BAND

AT CHAERONEA IN 338 BC NOT ONLY SIGNALED THE END OF THEBAN GRAN-

DEUR, IT HERALDED THE DEATH OF GLORY FOR ALL OF GREECE.

By David Balfour

Boeotian crack troopsThe Theban Sacred Band

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Ancient Warfare 45

SPECIAL

quarters their very reputation sufficed

to terrify their opponents” (Pelopidas

17.6). The stunning victory of the Sacred

Band so emboldened the Thebans

that at a peace conference in Sparta

in 371, Epaminondas, the leader of the

Theban delegation, deliberately scut-

tled the negotiations in order to draw

the Spartans into a decisive encoun-

ter. His audacious scheme succeeded,

and Epaminondas commanded the

Theban-led Boeotian army, which faced

off against the Spartans at Leuctra in

July of the same year.

LeuctraWhen the Spartan king Cleombrotus

brought his troops onto the plain ofLeuctra from the south, he found the

Boeotians already occupying the slopes

to the north. Cleombrotus probably had

at his disposal about 10,000 infantry

and 1000 cavalry, including allies and

mercenaries. A reasonable estimate for

the Boeotians under Epaminondas is

about 7000 infantry and 700 cavalry.

The best troops on the Spartan side

were the Lacedaemonians, consisting

of hoplites drawn from the towns sur-

rounding Sparta as well as the elite

lessons well.

A particularly crucial military les-

son came in the mid 370’s. By this

time Gorgidas had died, and Pelopidas

had succeeded him as captain of the

Sacred Band. Under the leadership

of the brilliant Pelopidas, the Sacred

Band achieved its greatest glory and

established its reputation for invinci-

bility. The first vital step in this pro-

cess took place in 375/4. Pelopidas was

leading the Sacred Band and a contin-

gent of about 200 cavalry back from

an aborted expedition to Orchomenus.

As the Thebans were making their way

along broken ground at the foot of the

mountains near Tegyra, a scout spied a

detachment of approximately 1000 to1800 Spartans, approaching through

a narrow pass. The scout reported to

Pelopidas, “We have fallen into the ene-

my’s hands.” Pelopidas replied coolly,

“Why any more than they into ours?”,

and began to draw up his forces for bat-

tle (Plutarch, Pelopidas 17.1). He brought

his cavalry to the front for a charge, but

it seems to have had little impact, per-

haps because the uneven terrain limit-

ed the effectiveness of mounted troops.

In any event, it is said the Spartansadvanced with assurance against the

enemy line. Their confidence proved

unwarranted.

The Sacred Band, organized by

Pelopidas into a compact formation,

engaged the larger force in furious

fighting and soon both Spartan com-

manders, Gorgoleon and Theopompous

lay dead. Panicking, the leaderless

Spartans opened a gap in their lines,

hoping that the Thebans would seize

the opportunity to ‘escape.’ Instead the

Theban warriors exploited the gap to

outflank the Spartans and inflict fur-

ther slaughter. Soon the enemy was

put to flight. Wary of possible reinforce-

ments, Pelopidas prudently chose not

to pursue, no doubt appreciating the

significance of what he and his small

band had already accomplished; for the

first time in open battle, the Spartans

had been defeated by a smaller force.

And for the first time, Pelopidas had

demonstrated the deadly proficiency of

the Sacred Band, operating as a singleunit.

Plutarch records that after Tegyra,

the Thebans “were of an irresistible

courage, and when they came to close

of crack, professionally-trained troops,

created the Sacred Band.

The Sacred Band was to be an elite

hoplite unit, consisting of 150 paired

companions. Plutarch later cited the

Theban rationale for this as, “[A] band

that is held together by the friendship

between lovers is indissoluble...and

both [partners] stand firm in danger toprotect each other” (Plutarch, Pelopidas

18.2). As was the case with their elite

Spartan counterparts, the Spartiates,

the members of the Sacred Band would

devote themselves entirely to military

pursuits. They were to be trained and

maintained at the expense of the city,

and garrisoned on the Cadmea.

As captain of the Sacred Band,

Gorgidas did not utilize his new forces

as a distinct unit, but dispersed them by

pairs among ranks of the larger Thebanphalanx. His theory was that the elite

pairs would serve as an example and

generate greater élan among the rank

and file. Deploying them in this man-

ner, in 378 he was able to counter a

Spartan invasion force of 30,000, led by

the greatly respected and experienced

King Agesilaus. In the following sum-

mer, again employing defensive tactics,

he once more fought the Spartans to a

standstill in Boeotia.

Although the Spartans inflicted con-

siderable damage to the Boeotian coun-

tryside on each of these occasions, they

were never seriously able to threaten

Thebes itself. In the meantime, on the

other hand, the agrarian Thebans were

becoming seasoned, capable, and con-

fident fighters. Once, when Agesilaus

was being led wounded from a clash

with his increasingly formidable oppo-

nents, another Spartan is said to have

remarked to him wryly, “Indeed, this is a

fine tuition-fee which thou art getting

from the Thebans, for teaching themhow to war and fight when they did

not wish to do it” (Plutarch, Pelopidas

15.2). The Thebans, led by Gorgidas and

the Sacred Band, were learning their

The Lion of Chaeronea, re-erected

after having been destroyed during

the Greek war of Independence. Upon

examination of the area, it appeared

to have been set up on one of the cor-

ners of a mass grave to what are very

likely the Theban dead.

© L i v i u s . o r g

Not much is known of the distinguish-

ing features of the Theban Sacred

Band. We assume the presence of the

Boeotian helmet, later so prevalent

among Alexander the Great’s cavalry,

while the ‘club’ is traditionally associ-

ated with the city of Thebes.

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46 Ancient Warfare

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Ascent of MacedoniaLeuctra opened the way in the following

year for a massive Theban invasion of

the Peloponnesus that forever humbled

the once mighty Spartans, and initiated

a period of Theban hegemony in Greece.

The deaths of Pelopidas in 364 and

Epaminondas in 362 brought an end to

unrivalled Theban military dominance

in Greece, but the Sacred Band itself

remained unvanquished, and Thebes

continued to be a strong and secure

state. Boeotia had been the scene of

such frequent and violent incursions

before Leuctra, that Epaminondas had

dubbed it “the dancing floor of war”

(Plutarch, Moralia 193E). Conversely, as

Victor David Hanson has pointed out,after Leuctra Boeotia hosted not a sin-

gle major conflict until 338 (Hanson,

75).

Yet, even as Thebes was enjoying

its period of greatness, events were

underway which would eventually

bring about not only its own downfall,

but that of all of Greece. The Greeks

had traditionally looked upon their

Macedonian neighbors to the north as

crude barbarians of no particular con-

sequence. But under a series of capablemonarchs in the 4th century, the for-

merly weak and disunited kingdom

of Macedon was being molded into a

unified and militarily potent force.

The Macedonians borrowed much

from the ascendant Thebans in their

efforts to strengthen themselves. In

the early 360’s for instance, Alexander

I created an elite force of heavy infan-

try, the Foot-Companions, modeled on

the Theban Sacred Band. More signifi-

cantly, from 368 to 365, the teen-aged

heir of Macedonia, Philip, was a hos-

tage in Thebes. The precocious Philip no

doubt eagerly absorbed many military

and political lessons in his time there.

When he ascended to the Macedonian

throne in 359, he applied what he had

learned to great effect. He created the

most powerful and efficient army in

the Balkan Peninsula and consolidated

control of Macedonia. Then he adroitly

exploited the chronic disunity among

the Greek poleis to ease his way increas-

ingly into the affairs of the city-states,and to establish a considerable mili-

tary presence in Greece. By the 340’s,

some prominent Greeks were warning

that Philip presented a grave danger

alry in front of his own infantry.

At around mid-day, Epaminondas

initiated the battle with a cavalry

charge. The inferior Spartan mounted

forces were quickly pushed back into

their own infantry lines. When through

the dust and confusion of this clash

Cleombrotus finally spied the unusual

disposition of the Boeotian forces, he

attempted a hasty reformation of his

own ranks, drawing troops from his

center and left to counter and per-

haps outflank the Theban phalanx.

In turn, when Pelopidas saw the dis-

order that Cleombrotus was sowing

among his own troops through this

ill-coordinated, last minute maneuver,

he ordered the Sacred Band forward ata charge, apparently in advance of the

bulk of the Theban phalanx. It is likely

that prior to the battle, Epaminondas

had authorized Pelopidas to act on his

own initiative in order to maximize

the element of surprise against the

Spartans. As the Sacred Band engaged,

the rest of the Boeotian forces to the

right of the Theban phalanx, following

Epaminondas’ plan of battle, drew back

from the enemy lines. Epaminondas

calculated correctly that if theLacedaemonians could be broken, the

allies and mercenaries of the Spartans

would have little heart to fight. The

issue was to be decided between the

Lacedaemonians and the Thebans

alone.

Seizing on what he must have

seen as the most opportune moment,

Epaminondas charged with remain-

der of the Theban phalanx. The

Lacedaemonians were pushed back

under the irresistible, crushing weight

of the combined Theban forces.

Cleombrotus fell, and in short order the

battle turned into a rout.

It is estimated that the Boeotians

lost about 300 troops total at Leuctra.

By contrast, at the battle’s end, more

than 1000 Lacedaemonians lay dead,

including 400 of the 700 Spartiates,

consistent with an 80-shield front,

cutting cleanly through the 12-deep

formation that faced them (Hanson,

49). The devastating toll among the

Lacedaemonians demonstrates thelethal effectiveness of the Theban pha-

lanx, and particularly the Sacred Band,

which literally spearheaded the victory.

Spartiates, up to this time the most

feared warriors in the ancient world.

On the Boeotian side, Epaminondas’

best troops were the Theban phalanx,

fronted by the 300-strong Sacred Band.

The Lacedemonians and Thebans were

probably roughly equal in number at

about 4000 each.

By Epaminondas’ design, the bat-

tle would be decided between the

crack troops in each army. In a radi-

cal departure from accepted strategy,

he placed the Theban phalanx on the

Boeotian left, directly confronting the

Lacedaemonians, and arrayed the rest

of his troops slanting away from the

opposing forces. Since the late 5th cen-

tury the Thebans had been deepeningtheir phalanx beyond the traditional 8

ranks, no doubt to take maximum advan-

tage of the great individual strength

of their soldiers. This was a quality

for which they were widely noted. But

Epaminondas carried the deepening of

the phalanx to a dramatic extreme at

Leuctra, arranging his phalanx 50 ranks

deep, and with an 80-shield front. By

contrast, the Lacedaemonians facing

them were probably only 12 ranks deep,

though with a much wider shield front.Epaminondas realized his deep, but

narrow phalanx was very vulnerable

to flanking. It is clear however, that the

Theban commander was counting on

surprise and the overwhelming pen-

etrating power of his phalanx to negate

any flanking threat.

Epaminondas’ strategy testifies to

his considerable faith in the Sacred

Band, which formed the first three

or four ranks of his phalanx, and in

its captain, Pelopidas. Epaminondas

and Pelopidas were close friends and

allies, united by their “desire to see

their country become the most power-

ful and glorious in their day” (Plutarch,

<I>Pelopidas<I> 4.3). Both possessed a

remarkable degree of political and mili-

tary genius, and both contributed sig-

nificantly to Thebes’ supreme moment

at Leuctra.

In one more departure from tradi-

tion, Epaminondas placed his cavalry in

front of his infantry, rather than on the

flanks. It is likely that he did so to hidefrom his foes the untraditional forma-

tion of his infantry. It was probably in

response to this move by Epaminondas

that Cleombrotus also placed his cav-

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Ancient Warfare 47

SPECIAL

In the aftermath of Chaeronea, a

great marble lion, rising twenty feet on

its pedestal, was erected at the west-

ern end of the battlefield. Pausanias

identifies this sculpture as a memo-

rial to Thebans who had fallen there

(9.40.10). Excavations in 1879-80 uncov-

ered the skeletal remains of 254 indi-

viduals interred beneath it, essentially

confirming it as the final resting place

of the Sacred Band. Though they fought

to the last man, not every fallen mem-

ber of band would have died immedi-

ately on the battlefield, and in any case,

the unit may not have been at its full,

300-man complement at Chaeronea.

Battlefield trophies, dedicated to the

vanquished are virtually unknownamong the ancient Greeks. That Philip

at least acquiesced to this memorial,

if he did not commission it himself, is

a testament to his deep respect for his

most valiant foes. The Lion of Chaeronea

serves as an extraordinary tribute to

the warriors of the Sacred Band, who

sacrificed themselves not just for their

city, but for all of Greece. n

David Balfour has a Ph.D. in Medieval

History from the University ofConnecticut. He is a professor of his-

tory at College of St. Joseph in Rutland,

Vermont. Previous publications relat-

ed to military history include three

entries in Amazons to Fighter Pilots:

A Biographical Dictionary of Military

Women (2003).

regards to experience and professional-

ism. His strategy seems to have keyed

largely on them.

Combat commenced at dawn

with Philip leading his right against

the Athenians. The battle was “hotly

contested for a long time…so that for

a while the struggle permitted hopes

of victory for both” (Diodorus Siculus

16.86.2). After a time, Philip feigned

a retreat on the right wing, calculat-

ing that the eager, but inexperienced

Athenians would pursue. They did

so, which apparently stretched and

opened gaps in the Greek line. It was

probably at this point that Alexander

spurred the Companion Cavalry into

action. Plutarch asserts that Alexanderwas the first ever to break the ranks

of the Sacred Band (Alexander 9.2). It

is extremely doubtful that he did so

with a direct frontal assault. His cavalry

almost certainly exploited a gap in the

Greek line to outflank the Thebans.

In the meantime, Philip’s own infan-

try had wheeled and counterattacked.

Under this onslaught, most of the

Greek forces eventually broke and ran.

The Sacred Band, pressed on all sides,

continued to wage battle. Outmannedand outreached by the lances of the

Companion Cavalry, and the 20-foot

sarissae of Philip’s pike-men, they

fought until the last man had fallen.

Greek freedom died with them.

Now the master of Greece, Philip

treated Athens with considerable

respect. Alexander himself delivered

the ashes of the Athenian slain to the

city, and Athens was afforded a posi-

tion of influence within the League

of Corinth, through which Philip man-

aged Greek politics. By contrast, the

Thebans needed to ransom their

dead, and accept the installation of a

Macedonian garrison on the Cadmea.

That Thebes had betrayed its alliance

with Philip in order to join the coalition

with Athens, was at least one factor in

his harsh treatment of that city. Yet,

whatever ill will Philip may have felt

generally towards Thebes, apparently

did not extend to the Sacred Band. It is

said that while surveying the aftermath

of the carnage at Chaeronea, Philipwept over their bodies and exclaimed,

“Perish miserably they who think that

these men did or suffered aught dis-

graceful” (Plutarch, Pelopidas 18.5).

to Greek independence. But it was not

until 338 that the Athenians persuaded

Thebes to abandon its alliance with

Philip and join them in an anti-Mace-

donian coalition. In August this coali-

tion, which also included troops from a

few other poleis, made their final stand

against Philip at Chaeronea.

ChaeroneaThough it ranks as one of history’s most

consequential battles, the few ancient

accounts for Chaeronea are late and

very sparse. What can be gleaned or

surmised from them is that the Greek

forces established themselves in a

sound defensive position on the rela-

tively level river valley between thetown of Chaeronea on the west, and the

river Cephisos on the east. Ancient and

modern writers have disagreed over

who had the numerical advantage at

Chaeronea. N.G.L. Hammond’s conten-

tion that the Greeks with 35,000 troops

total had a slight overall edge is reason-

able (Hammond, Macedonia, 599). But

it is significant that the Macedonians

had about 2000 cavalry, whereas the

Greeks had none.

The key action at Chaeronea tookplace on the wings. Philip placed him-

self among “picked men” on the right

wing, opposite the Athenians (Diodorus

Siculus 16.86.1). He placed his elite

Companion Cavalry on the left, near

the river Cephisos, facing the Sacred

Band-fronted Theban phalanx. The

Companions were under the command

of Philip’s 18-year old son, Alexander.

The future Alexander the Great was

already noted for his “valor and swift-

ness of action.” (Diodorus Siculus

16.86.1). Nevertheless, Philip was careful

to surround him with experienced and

competent commanders.

Diodorus Siculus reports that both

sides were eager for battle, and “well

matched in courage” (16.85.6). But the

Macedonians were certainly better led.

The Greeks were commanded by the

Athenian Chares, a soldier and general

“no better than…average” (Diodorus

Siculus 16.85.7). Likewise, Philip’s troops

were on the whole, better drilled and

more seasoned. The Macedonian com-mander clearly understood that the

Thebans, and particularly the Sacred

Band, were the only troops on the Greek

side who were on par with his own in

Further reading- J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and

Practice in the Age of Xenophon.

Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970.- J. Buckler, John. The Theban

Hegemony 371-362 B.C.. Cambridge,

MA and London 1980.

- G.L. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon.

Baltimore 1994.

- V.D. Hanson, The Soul of Battle.

New York 2001.

- J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army .

Chicago 1985.

- M. Munn, “Thebes and Central

Greece, “ in L.A.Tritle (ed), The Greek

World in the Fourth Century: Fromthe Fall of the Athenian Empire

to the Successors of Alexander .

London and New York 1997.

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48 Ancient Warfare

THE DEBATE

‘tube’ or ‘box’ that wrapped around

the body, was scalloped to fit under

the arms, and had a raised panel to

cover the upper chest. Many of these

corslets show broad bands across the

upper chest and midsection decorated

with a key pattern or similar design.

Just above the hips, the bottom of the

tube was cut into strips, pteryges, which

facilitated bending, while covering the

lower abdomen. Usually there was a

double layer of pteryges, which were

staggered so that the inner layer filled

gaps created in the outer layer as the

hoplite moved.

Most images show hoplites fasten-ing the tube by means of thongs tied

at the left front to form a cylinder, per-

haps because the left side of a hoplite

was covered by his large shield. There

seems to have been variation in exact-

ly how the tube section was brought

together. The side panel may have sim-

ply been butted to the front panel and

secured, but the single extant copy

of the armor from Vergina is double

breasted, overlapping the chest region

from both directions. Other images, like

that on a vase from the Museo Etrusco

Gregoriano (inv. 16583), shows what

may be a tab with no pteryges overlap-

ping the front panel. This would serve

to cover the seam where the sections

meet.

Affixed to the upper back of the

tube, or sometimes apparently cutfrom the same piece of material, was

a panel that protected the shoulders.

Two flaps, epomides, arose from this

and extended over the shoulders like

The earliest depictions of hoplites show

them to be armored in bronze plate, but

the 6th century BC saw the emergence

of a new type of corselet that was prob-

ably constructed of organic materials

given the lack of archaeological evi-

dence. Woven linen and leather have

been suggested for the base material,

but there is no agreement as to which

is more likely. I will present arguments

for and against each, and hope to foster

a consensus.

This armor was used from Scythia

to North Africa, and remained in use

alongside the plate cuirass throughout

the Classical and Hellenistic periods.

Almost all of the details of its construc-

tion are garnered from vase images,

many of which are quite detailed, with

archaeological finds limited to metal

fittings and a single rendering of the

type done in iron from a late 4th centu-

ry Macedonian royal tomb at Vergina.

Armor in detailThe armor consisted of two main por-

tions. The torso was protected by a

Don’t stick to glued linen

The linothorax debate

THE ANCIENT GREEKS KNEW THAT

ARMOR COULD BE MADE OF LINEN,

WOVEN FROM FIBERS OF THE FLAX

PLANT LINUM USITTATISIMUM.

(L.) ANYONE AT A RECITATION

OF HOMER’S ILIAD WOULD HAVE

HEARD AJAX THE LESSER DESCRIBED

WITH THE TERM ‘LINOTHOREX’,

THUS “LINEN CUIRASSED” (IL.2.529).

THE CURRENT DEBATE CENTERS ON

WHETHER OR NOT WE CAN APPLY

THE TERM ‘LINOTHORAX’ TO A SPE-

CIFIC TYPE OF ARMOR THAT IS WIDE-

LY SEEN DEPICTED ON VASE IMAGERY

AND IN SCULPTURE.

Detail from a red-figured Greek dish, showing a fully equipped hoplite. The con-

struction of his armor is clearly visible, with the epomides and pteryges clearly

displayed. From Attica, now in the Royal Museums for Art and History, Brussels,

Belgium.

©

K a r w a n s a r a y P u b l i s h e r s

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Ancient Warfare 49

THE DEBATE

a ‘yoke’ to be tied down to the chest

panel. The epomides were generally

long and broad, especially in the early

period, extending well down the chest

and flaring out laterally from alongside

the neck to just before or beyond the

shoulders. The manner in which the

flaps were tied down could be complex,

with thongs simply attaching to lateral

rings, crossing the chest to secure on

opposite sides, meeting in the center,

or apparently passing through lateral

and central attachment points. One

advantage of this system was to allow

the epomides to be secured and ten-

sioned independently. For a hoplite this

was important because he spent much

of his time with his arm raised for over-hand strikes with the spear. If weight

were distributed evenly between the

shoulder flaps when the arms are low-

ered, then it would have been dispro-

portionally borne on the right shoulder

as the arm was raised. Another aid

in the overhand strike was that the

thongs on the epomides emerge close

to their inner edge. Thus, when the arm

was lifted, the shoulder flaps naturally

hinged up on their inner edge. Between

the two shoulder flaps a square sectionarose to stand up behind the back of

the neck.

Because the term linothorax implies

a mode of construction, I will use a term

for the armor based on the morphol-

ogy just described: the ‘Tube and Yoke’

(T-Y) corslet. It is difficult to determine

when this armor type first appeared

in the Greek world. Hoplites wore only

a simple tunic or chitoniskos beneath

their cuirasses, so there was nothing

like an arming doublet that could have

developed into an organic armor. There

also was no armor with these charac-

teristics seen outside of Greece that

could have been imported.

The earliest image of a corslet with

epomides is on the Francois Vase, an

Athenian black-figure krater, attrib-

uted to Kleitias and Ergomitos, found

at Chiusi, Italy, and now in the Museo

Archeologico Etrusco (inv. 4209), dated

to around 570 BC. In a depiction of the

Kalydonian Boar hunt, Atalanta wears

a tube-like body armor with an obvi-ous yoke, fastened with thongs to the

chest section. Interestingly, the yoke

is somewhat reduced, sitting high on

the shoulder and the tube section ends

abruptly just above the waist, a broadbelt showing below. Her armor also

shows the band across the upper chest

seen in later corslets.

The appearance of a yoke prior to a

full-length tube section may indicate

where hoplites were most in need of

protection. In close combat a hoplite

could shelter most of his body behind

his shield, but his head and often his

shoulders would go uncovered as he

fought. Attacks coming from above

might glance off the helmet onto the

shoulders or impact them directly.

When battles came to pushing, othis-

mos, the broad, flat surface of the flap

as it lies over the left front chest pro-

vided a perfect surface to rest the flat

underside of the shield rim against.

Interestingly, while the broad epomides

seen on some vases overlapping the

shoulder would have allowed the inner

rim of the bowl-shaped shield to rest

upon them when marching, push-

ing with the shoulder in this position

would force the flap into the hoplite’sneck.

Many cultures had armors made

of textile or leather, and quilted armor

may have existed in Greece during the

Mycenaean period. These armors usu-ally look like a vest or jacket. One reason

for the T-Y’s shape would be that the

material from which it was constructed

was particularly stiff. Much has been

made of images that show epomides

springing back to stand straight up

when unsecured, but the need to cut

pteryges into the bottom of the tube to

allow for freedom of movement when

bending also indicates stiffness. These

corslets are shown holding their form

when not being worn, as on a vase

at Zurich University (L5). The apparent

stiffness of the corslet has meant that

any material that cannot be rendered

this stiff has been rejected as a base for

the armor.

The form of the T-Y corslet has a

major advantage over vest-cut armor

that pulls over the head. Hoplites could

quickly undo the thongs tying the

armor together to allow for air flow.

Anyone who has worn body armor or

sports pads, such as football shoulder

pads, knows that simply unfasteningthem in this manner cools the body

greatly. There are vase images that

show hoplites in a characteristic state

of undress, with the tube unfastened



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50 Ancient Warfare

THE DEBATE

Thorakes lineoi to the temple of Athenaat Lindos (2.182) and Sparta (3.47).

Thorakes can mean anything covering

the chest, so we cannot be certain that

these were armor at all, and not simply

a fine garment, but Herodotus describes

the Assyrians (7.63) amd Phoenician

marines (7.89) as wearing linen thorakes

and here it is surely armor. Interestingly

he describes the Persians as making use

of “Egyptian thorakes” (1.135). A century

later Xenophon, describing the armor

of a 6th century Persian, Abradatas,

tells us that he wore a “linen cors-

let as was the custom of his country”

(Cyropedia 6.4.3), so linen corslets may

have been common throughout Egypt

and the Near East.

Xenophon also describes another

Anatolian people of his own day, the

Chalybians, as wearing linen thorakes

with “a thick fringe of plaited cords

instead of pteryges” ( Anabasis 4.7.15).

This is a reference to the T-Y corselet

based on the pteryges, but we must be

cautious in reading too much into thereference. He does not clearly state that

the Greek corslets are linen as well, only

of similar form.

There is a somewhat muddled ref-

up for the epomides reduction in size.

References to linenThe first reference to linen armor that

is truly relevant to the T-Y corslet comes

from the poet Alcaeus, born to an aris-

tocratic family from Mytilene on Lesbos

around 620 BC. In a poem of the early

6th century, he describes arms and

armor, hanging in a temple or a pri-

vate home. There are obvious hoplite

accoutrements, such as bronze greaves

and hollow shields, but among these he

writes of “White corslets of new linen”

(fr. 5.140). This puts a description of

an organic armor in the characteristic

white color within a few decades of

the depiction on the Francois vase, and

must be considered a T-Y corslet unless

another candidate armor emerges.

He and his older brother Antimenidas

served as mercenaries for the Egyptians

and Babylonians respectively. Hoplite

mercenaries serving abroad may have

brought home new types of armor,

or ideas for making armor from newmaterials.

Herodotus describes a number of

linen corslets in foreign use. He tells

us that Amasis, King of Egypt, sent

and hanging opened on the left sideand the shoulder flap on the opposite

side undone.

They are usually portrayed as white

on black-ware vases of the latter 6th

c BC. Usually, white was reserved for

organic components, such as the flesh

tone of female figures, sword hilts,

and chitons that were probably tex-

tile. Some of these chitons extended

to mid-thigh and show a crosshatched

pattern that might show quilting, per-

haps indicating that these were a light

armor in their own right. Note that the

Francois vase described above does not

show the armor in white, but the body

of Atalanta was rendered in white so

perhaps contrast was sought.

Early T-Ys show very broad epo-

mides, often meeting in the middle of

the chest. By the end of the 4th c BC,

the epomides are moved to the side of

the chest and are generally reduced in

length and width. Perhaps this reflects

a move away from hoplite tactics. The

corslet also becomes higher waistedand one or two additional tiers of

pteryges are added extending down the

thighs. Pteryges are sometimes seen at

the shoulders as well, perhaps to make



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Ancient Warfare 51

THE DEBATE

on vase portrayals of the armor and

some have doubted the stiffness of

stitched or quilted fabric. To the first

objection, it must be noted that some

vase images do show cross-hatched

patterns or vertical lines that may best

be explained as quilting. The Pompeian

‘Alexander Mosaic’ of the battle of Issus

shows some of the retreating Persians

in what looks very much like quilted

armor. Recall that Alexander was said

to have taken a two-ply linen armor in

this battle, and two layers, filled with

batting could be effective protection.

The stiffness of stitched linen is gov-

erned by how close the rows of stitches

can be made and the number of layers

of fabric used. Dan Howard has cham-

pioned a style of close stitching that

renders stiff panels as seen today on

the flaring shoulder protection usedin the Japanese sport of Kendo. Such

close stitching might not be prominent

enough to have been rendered by art-

ists.

Strabo (11.2.17) tells us that the export of

linen was used as a basis by some in the

assumption of kinship between Colchisand Egypt. For such an idea to flourish,

high quality and/or high volume pro-

duction must have been a rarity.

Linen fiber quality is tied to length,

with short fibers known as tow and

limited in their uses. Linen is inelastic

and presents a challenge to the weaver

in forcing one thread over another if

they are thick and a dense weave is

desired. The solution to this problem

can be seen in a pseudomorph, a mold

formed during decay, of an Etruscan

textile at Newark Museum, NJ, USA. By

simply doubling the warp threads that

the weaver forces the weft line around,

you get a denser weave without having

to force the linen to bend around each

individual warp thread. This cloth could

be made very heavy.

We have seen that a candidate

material needs to be stiff, light in color,

and show broad flat panels or rounded

surfaces. Many cultures made textile

armor by stitching many layers of fabric

together or stuffing padding betweentwo shells to form a thick quilted

structure. Objections to this type of

construction include the fact that we

generally do not see stitching patterns

erence to linen armor in Xenophon’s

day that is often cited in support of

the T-Y being a textile armor. Cornelius

Nepos, in his life of Iphicrates, men-

tions that among the other military

reforms the general enacted was a

switch from “linked or brazen” to linen

armor (Iphicrates 1.4). Not only is his

mention of mail armor anachronistic,

but this change in armor is missing

from our other main source for his

reforms (Diodorus Siculus 15.44). More

troubling, and seemingly overlooked by

proponents of linen being commonly

used during the Classical period, this

shift was described as a reform, a new

addition to the panoply, and so not a

common item.Probably the most reliable evidence

for the use of linen armor in the 4th

century comes from Aeneas Tacticus

written about 350 BC. In describing

how weapons in one instance were

smuggled into a city, he lists among

the armor brought in Thorakes lineoi

(29.1-4). We shall return to this refer-

ence later.

When Alexander the Great was rein-

forced in Asia by allied and mercenary

troops, they also brought along newsuits of armor for his men, so he burnt

his men’s old armor, which must have

been organic (Curtius 9.3.21). He him-

self wore a linen armor. We are told at

the battle of Gaugamela: “a breastplate

of two-ply linen from the spoils taken

at Issus” (Plutarch, Alexander 32.5). This

of course is very likely of Persian make

and so may not inform us on the other

organic armors worn by Macedonians.

Pausanias relates a note of caution

on the use of linen armor. He tells us

that “Linen breastplates are not so use-

ful to fighters, for they let the iron pass

through, if the blow be a violent one.

They aid hunters, however, for the teeth

of lions or leopards break off in them.”

(Pausanias 1.21.7).

Linen constructionOne problem with linen as a base for

armor is that it is notoriously expensive

to grow. Both Virgil (Georgics 1.91) and

Pliny (Natural History 19.2.7) remarked

on the fact that flax seriously depletesthe soil, so Greeks with limited till-

able land probably imported most of

their high quality linen. Egypt, Syria,

and Colchis were famed for their linen.

© K a r w a n s a r a y P u b l i s h e r s

The stiff nature of the epomides and

T-Y corslet as a whole is clearly visible

on this hoplite. From Attica, now in theRoyal Museums for Art and History,

Brussels, Belgium.

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52 Ancient Warfare

THE DEBATE

LeatherWe have previously seen

that Xenophon was

familiar with a thorax

made of linen, but he

never describes his fel-

low Greeks as wearing

them. Instead he uses

a specific term when

describing items which

appear to be armor, but

are not bronze cuirass-

es. On the long retreat

back to Greece after find-

ing themselves on the

wrong side of a civil war

in Persia, Xenophon and

the other Greek merce-naries needed a force of

cavalry ( Anabasis 3.3.20).

They cobbled together a

troop of fifty horsemen

from the few horses they

had along with them.

They needed body armor

because Greek horsemen

did not bear shields at

this date, and the armor

types donated to these

men were described as spolades and thorakes. Paul McDonnell-Staff, to

whom I am indebted for much of the

discussion of the T-Y corslet, in studying

Xenophon’s use of the term thorakes

suggests that when the term is unqual-

ified by another term like lineon, it is

equated with the bronze cuirass. For

example, a little later Xenophon finds

himself afoot and heavily encumbered

by his cavalry thorax (Xen.Anab.3.4.48),

probably metal plate. Note that

Xenophon is not encumbered by a spo-

lados and thorax , suggesting that the

spolados is not simply a type of under-

garment.

Although there are exceptions, gen-

erally when a wound is described as

occurring through a piece of equip-

ment, it is because it was expected to

protect from such attack. Xenophon

described the death of the Laconian

Leonymus when an arrow pierced

both his shield and his spolados (Xen.

Anab.4.1.18).

Julius Pollux, a late 2nd centuryAD professor of rhetoric at Athens

tells us that the “spolas is a thorax of

leather, hanging from the shoulders,

so that Xenophon says ‘and the spo-

tion of wood or exotic procedures likethe wrapping of Egyptian mummies

in gummed linen bands. In the end the

argument boils down to that fact they

could have made glued linen given the

technology of the day and it seems to

provide adequate protection.

Recently, a group at the University

of Wisconsin, Green Bay, headed by

Greg Aldrete and Scott Bartell have

tested a variety of linen armors, both

quilted and glued of between eleven

and twenty layers. Using authentic

hand woven linen and either rabbit or

flaxseed glue, they found glued linen to

be superior in protectiveness to quilted

or stitched linen against period appro-

priate weaponry. These findings are

counter to what others have found in

the past, and problems with reproduc-

ibility in tests such as this will ensure

debate. As a scientist, my advice to

those attempting such tests is that

it is far more important to work off

of a standard protocol than it is to

use authentic weaponry. Luckily, textilebody armor is back in vogue, so we can

tailor future tests to protocols such as

that of the National Institute of Justice

(NIJ).

An ingenious solution to the prob-

lem of making stiff, flat linen panels was

suggested by Peter Connolly. Instead of

stitching layers of linen together, he

glued them together in 0.5 cm thick

panels. The resultant armor weighed

3.6 kg, which is less than a bronze

cuirass of similar size. Following his

suggestion, many have constructed T-Y

corselets of linen and glue. The prod-

uct is stiff and hard, but vulnerable

to moisture, sweat being the biggest

threat. Once soggy, it becomes gummy

and gains weight as it absorbs water, so

a waterproof layer of resin, lanolin, olive

or linseed oil, or beeswax is needed.

Glued linen construction seems to

have become the default for the T-Y. This

is troubling, because there is no arche-ological data or pre-existing industry

on which to base glued construction.

Analogies must be drawn from far dif-

ferent applications, such as the lamina-

© K a r w a n s a r a y P u b l i s h e r s

The hatching on the body of the corsletof this hoplite may suggest incorpora-

tion of different materials or stitching

to connect upper and lower layers of

the armor. Now in the Louvre, Paris.

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Ancient Warfare 53

THE DEBATE

the spolas, then it may have been used

interchangeably with thorax of organic

materials. Alternately, these two words

may refer, not to different material, but

to a different construction.

ConclusionClearly the term ‘linothorax’ is inap-

propriate for the T-Y corslet, or at least

incomplete. There is every possibility

that a single corslet could be of com-

posite linen and leather construction,

perhaps, either in mixed layers that

maximize the properties of each, or

perhaps a linen tube and leather yoke.

Either we must agree on a term that is

purely based on morphology, not mate-

rial, like ‘tube and yoke corslet’, or wemust add some variant of spolas/stolid-

ion or ‘skutinothorax’ to indicate those

armors that are made of leather. n

Paul Bardunias is an entomologist,

working on self organized group

behavior in termites and ants. His

interest in ancient warfare is hereditary,

for his family comes from Sparta. He is

currently applying his scientific training

to provide new insights into hoplite

combat at www.hollow-lakedaimon.blogspot.com

influenced his politics.

Leather can easily form broad flat

surfaces, but as to stiffness, we must

consider what type of leather is to be

used. Vegetable tanned leather, which

relies on the use of tannins from bark,

nut hulls, or other vegetable matter, pro-

duces fine leather than will not putrefy

in water. Its resilience recommends it

for a wide variety of clothing applica-

tions, but a single layer of tanned ox

hide will not produce the stiffness seen

in the T-Y without further processing. It

can be rendered hard enough to hold

a molded form by boiling it in water,

oil or wax. The result is stiff, but brittle.

A second method would be to sim-

ply laminate multiple layers of leathertogether. Unlike linen, leather will stick

to itself via its own collagen, but casein,

from milk, in an alkaline solvent is com-

monly used as well.

A tanned hide is usually not pale

enough to warrant it being illustrated

in white. Buff leather, tanned in oil,

alum tawed leather, and rawhide might

be pale enough for this. Alum tawed

leather in particular is vivid white and

can be either very stiff like rawhide or

creamy soft depending on the process-ing, but like rawhide it is unstable and

vulnerable to moisture. Perhaps the

most likely candidate is a combination

of processes. Buff or vegetable tanned

leather could be treated with alum in

order to produce a stiff, white product.

I previously presented only part of

a passage by Aeneas Tacticus on smug-

gling weapons into a city, the expanded

list of items reads: “Thorakes lineoi, sto-

lidia, perikephalaia, hopla, knemides….”

(29.1-4). The first item is of course linen

corslets, but the second is leather cors-

lets! Aeneas is describing both types of

T-Y in use concurrently. This is not the

only instance of their joint appearance.

Both leather and linen armors can be

found side by side in the records of a

temple treasury on Delos. Ruben Post

pointed me to a series of redundant

fragments of inventory lists from 342-

340 BC (ID 104.26, 28, 29), which include

a version of the line “Thorakia skuti-

nous...Linou...spoladion.” The first item

is leather thorakes and the second isfragmented, but lists something that is

linen and may well describe a stoladi-

on, confounding all of our terminology.

If leather construction does not define

las instead of thorax ’” (Onomasticon

7.70). This definition is corroborated by

Hesychius of Alexandria, 5th century

AD, who apparently drew from an inde-

pendent source. He wrote of the spo-

las that is was a “short leather chiton,

the leather thorax .” The words used for

the leather associated with the tho-

rax are different, but in both instances

are associated with animal hide. Pollux

uses a term that could also be used to

describe a lion skin wrapped around

a hero or the facing of a shield (Iliad

10.23, 6.117), while the word Hesychius

uses implies rawhide such as that of

the drumhead described by Euripides

(Bacchae 513). Perhaps the yoke section

of the T-Y originated as a separate piecelike a hide hung from the shoulders.

Pollux goes on to say that “Sophocles

called it a Libyan: a Libyan spolas, a

leopard skin.” Leopard skins can be seen

on vase depictions worn like an exomis,

or short cloak, hanging from the left

shoulder. Short length, hide or leather

construction, and suspension from the

shoulders may be the defining char-

acteristics of the spolas. These are also

clearly characters of the T-Y corselet.

There is another mention of theword spolas in the latter 5th century.

This occurs in a comedy by Aristophanes

(Birds 933), where a priest’s acolyte is

asked to remove his spolada and give it

to another. Here it is unclear what the

garment is, but it is something worn

over his tunic, and a leather apron,

such as workmen wear or a frontlet

to protect from the blood of sacrificed

animals is a possibility that fits with

the other definitions.

As well as mentioning leather armor,

what Xenophon doesn’t mention may

be just as important. In two separate

works he describes Ephesus preparing

for war (Hellica 3.4.17, Agesilaus 1.26). He

lists all the craftsmen required to equip

an army, including leather workers, but

there is no weaver or linen processor.

The ancient Greeks imported much

of their leather from the Cyrenaic and

Pontic regions, but cities like Athens

had thriving tanning industries. The

general and demagogue Cleon was

lampooned by Aristophanes based onthe smells associated with the tanner-

ies that made Cleon’s father rich. Cleon

was a notorious warmonger, and profi-

teering, perhaps in armor, may have

Further readingNo better discussion on the topic

can be found than that on http://

www.romanarmytalk.com I wish to

thank all of the contributors to the

discussions there whose opinions

are to be found in this article.

- P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at

war . London 1984

- J.K. Anderson, Military theory and

practice in the age of Xenophon.

Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970

- A. Williams, The knight and the

blast furnace: a history of the

metallurgy of armour in the

Middle Ages & the early modern

period. History of warfare, vol.12.

Leiden 2003.

Websites:

http://www.comitatus.net/http://www.uwgb.edu/aldreteg/

Linothorax.html

http://www.hippeis.com

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REVIEWS

54 Ancient Warfare

It has been a good while since there has been a thorough

narrative of the Roman conquest of Italy, a niche that Ross

Cowan fills with competence. Many readers will recognize

the author as a frequent contributor to Ancient Warfare

Magazine, and the author of several books on the imperial

Roman military from Osprey publishing. Cowan delivers

what they have come to expect from him: a well researched,

well written account of early Roman warfare.

Writing a book on the period from 509-264 BC is in

many ways a thankless task. The sources for this period are

spotty, and often highly suspect. The historian must walk

a fine line between naively accepting the sources at face

value, and discarding them as fundamentally unreliable

and subsequently having nothing to work with. Cowan is

by no means uncritical, but he certainly leans towards theformer position. This is not necessarily a fault. If he were

supercritical, it would be virtually impossible to write

anything book-length on the subject. It seems to me that

how much one accepts as historical from the story of early

Rome is largely a matter of personal taste. Still, in a few

cases, I feel that Cowan is a tad too trusting. For example,

he accepts out of hand that the siege of Veii lasted an epic

10 years. This is suspiciously identical to the length of the

Greek siege of Troy. If true, it would also suggest that either

the Roman siege was terribly incomplete, or that Veii had

incredible reserves of supplies. It seems far more likely that

later Romans decided to “Homer-ize” their own militarytradition. Cowan actually gets more critical of the sources

as the book progresses, somewhat opposite of the common

(but not necessarily correct) tendency to become more

trusting of the quality of Roman accounts the closer they

come to the dawn of Roman historical writing the late 3rd

century.

Nowhere is Cowan ‘wrong’. In all of his statements, he

has plenty of scholars who agree with him. But readers

should be aware, particularly in his early chapters, that

there is also a great deal of scholarly doubt on matters he

treats as relatively accurate facts. For example, he accepts

as largely historical the idea that Valerius Corvus killed a

Gallic chieftain wearing a raven helmet, and that Manlius

Torquatus executed his son in the 4th century BC version

of a ‘teachable moment.’ These things may well have hap-

pened – they pass the basic test of plausibility – but they

may equally be edifying fictions, invented by self-defining

aristocratic families hundreds of years after the fact.

Cowan usually suggests that these tales may be relatively

accurate because they are the product of a ballad tradi-

tion. He may well be right. However, one only has to sing

a few bars of “The Ballad of Davy Crockett,” (he killed him

a b’ar when he was only three) to realize that the ballad

tradition can quickly embellish and degenerate into pure

fiction. But, before I go too far, I should here note that Imyself have published in this magazine the idea that the

tale of the Fabii at Cremera reflects “accurate folk memory.”

Ultimately, when writing the history of early Rome, some

faith is necessary.

ISBN:

9781844159376

Pages:

xxii + 162

Author/editor:

Ross Cowan

Publisher:

Pen and Sword Books

Publisher website:

www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Reviewer:

Michael J. Taylor

Cowan manages to incorporate a great deal of evidence

beyond literary sources. He is familiar with Osco-Umbrian

linguistic evidence, wall-paintings from across Italy, and

a great deal of relevant archeological finds. The book

includes a well-rounded bibliography of works in English,

Italian and German. A series of illustrations includes four

full-page color reconstructions of various Italian fighters

by Graham Sumner.

The book, the first part of Pen and Sword’s Roman

Conquests series, is targeted towards a sophisticated lay-

audience. The writing is accessible and does not presume

knowledge of Latin or Greek, but goes into plenty of detail.

I particularly liked the fact that Dr. Cowan chooses to trans-

late many of the Latin cognomina, reminding readers that

magnificent sounding Latin names often had less than

Roman Conquests: Italy

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REVIEWS

Ancient Warfare 55

magnificent connotations. Roman generals who conquered

Italy had names like “the Ploughman” (Bulbucus), “the

Bald” (Calvus) and “A Hundred Misfortunes” (Centumalus).

The frequency aristocratic cognomina with negative con-

notations is interesting. It may reflect the need of mutu-

ally jealous aristocrats to cut each other down to size with

humbling nicknames, or it may reflect the kind of elite

self-deprecation necessary after increasing plebian success

in the struggle of the orders.

The book is unapologetically a narrative. At first, part

of me found this frustrating. I wished, for example, more

discussion of how ongoing social strife in Rome may have

related to Rome’s Italian conquests. For example, in 326 BC,

a law banned Roman citizens from being entrapped in a

type of debt bondage called nexum. This might enhance

Roman conquest in two ways: Firstly, indebted Roman

peasants could serve in the Roman army rather than toil-

ing for aristocrats. Secondly, the aristocratic need for newlabor streams in the form of war captives to replace liber-

ated debtors may have encouraged further conquests. Yet

successful conquests prior to 326BC may have produced

enough captured slaves so as to convince aristocrats that

they no longer needed the labor of hapless citizen-debtors.

In early Rome, social developments had military implica-

tions, and visa versa.

However, the art of the narrative is one that is often

lost in modern historical writing. In particularly, while the

advent of ‘new military history’ has much to recommend in

integrating the study of war into the social, economic and

political structures that support military operations, it has

had the negative effect of discouraging old-fashioned nar-

ratives of campaigns and battles. Yet, before one can get

to any sort of in depth analysis, one needs to simply know

what happened, how ‘one damn thing after another’ turns

into history. Cowan gives the reader a strong foundation

with the year-in, year-out pulse of campaigns and battles.

His extended narrative of the Samnite and Pyrrhic wars is

particularly good.

My musings on the pitfalls of writing early Roman his-tory should not obscure the fact that this is a fine book.

Persons interested in the military history of the Roman

Republic should have it on their shelves.

Dacian War Host Warlord’s 28mm Dacian war host is a mixed metal and plastic set enabling you to build a

unit of 30 warriors with command. The plastic components reuse the Celtic warrior sprues,

and there are metal additions to convert these to Dacians. The former have been reviewed

in Ancient Warfare II.5. The metal additions are good castings, close in style to the plastics,

and designed to mix in seamlessly when assembled. Assembly of the mix of plasticand white metal is slightly more difficult, however, due to the mix of mate-

rials, and while the challenge isn’t that great it may prove more

frustrating to novices.

The set includes a Dacian chieftain in

scale armour, cloak and tall metal crest-

ed helmet, and a musician with boar

headed carnyx . The metal carnyx is an

improvement over the plastic version

included on the sprues. There is a draco

style standard, with a very fine pole that

bends rather easily.

The extra Dacian heads are mainly

bearded heads in soft Phrygian cap. In

addition there a couple of variants of

helmeted heads, which appear to be

based on the depictions of Phrygian

influenced helmets on Trajan’s column.

There are three metal upper bodies swing-

ing a falx, each wearing a Phrygian cap and a mix of

clothing. These men use the long falx two-handed, but

there is also a sprue of individual blades to represent the sica,

used single-handed, more like the Thracian rhomphaia. Between

them about a third of the unit will be falx or sica armed, the rest will

use spears and La Têne style swords from the Celtic sprues, but mixed with the

extra heads it is possible to make a distinctively Dacian unit. Also included are enough oval metal shields to equip the whole unit when mixed with

the appropriate plastic parts. There is a top class set of water slide transfers to ensure that

the shields can be intricately decorated in Dacian style with plenty of extras to allow for

mistakes.

Scale:

28mm

Manufacturer:

Warlord Games

Address of Manufacturer: www.warlordgames.co.uk

Reviewer:

Ed Haines

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REVIEWS

56 Ancient Warfare

Order code:

54-10, 13, 15

Scale: 54mm

Designer:

Alan Ball and Martin Julle

Manufacturer:

Thorsberg Miniatures

Address of Manufacturer:

www.thorsberg-miniatures.de

Reviewer:

Dr. Mike Thomas

These three figures form a group and are sold as such. They show the Cherusci

chieftain known to the Romans as ‘Arminius’, a standard bearer and a warrior of

the Germanic tribe, celebrating their victory over the provincial three-legion army

of Varus in AD 9.

Each figure contains between eight and twelve separate parts, although some

of these are alternatives and others are ’set dressing’. The base itself appears to be

made from something like dental plaster and represents a tree stump, groundwork

and what may be a muddy puddle. There is also an embedded dolabra (Roman

pickaxe) and a small cast label for the display.

The quality of the casting is more than adequate in all cases, with good surface

detail on the whole although some of this is on the ‘soft‘ side. The cleaning up

required is minimal and the dry-fit of all parts was also acceptable. The figures are

on the small side and have presumably been modelled on the ‘overall-54mm’ stan-

dard, rather than taking the measurement to eye level. Anatomically, the figures

are in proportion.There should be few problems with assembly although some care will be

required as all three figures have a cloak, which will obviously affect the order in

which pieces are brought together. The kits also come with full historical and paint-

ing information, including a colour photograph of the completed group.

In terms of accuracy, there is little that can be said - we only have the Romans’

word for what their enemies of the 1st century AD looked like. One error is the

Roman eagle standard - which did not have the discs on the pole, these being

used only with the cohort signum. An interesting group that will look good when

painted up.

‘The Victors’, Teutoburg Forest, AD 9

ISBN:

9781841763865

Pages:

96

Author/editor:

Nic Fields

Publisher:

Osprey PublishingPublisher website:

www.ospreypublishing.com

Reviewer:

P. Lindsay Powell

Osprey Publishing has made a name for itself for offering short, tightly focused and highly

illustrated books on the history of soldiers, arms and equipment and warfare. The Roman

Army of the Principate 27BC - AD117 appears under Osprey’s ‘Battle Orders’ series, which is

pitched as covering “command, deployment, organization and evolution of forces in battle,

describing elements of doctrine, training, tactics and equipment.” Author Nic Fields covers

the required elements well enough. The seven chapters cover the legion, vexillations and

auxiliaries, their weapons and equipment; the officers; the Roman army in battle; and how

the army used engineering to build camps and siegeworks. There are three ‘case studies’,

which show the army in action, and biographies of key generals of the period.

Nic Fields certainly knows his ancient sources. He quotes extracts from the usual names

– Caesar, Cassius Dio, Frontinus, Josephus, Tacitus and Vegetius – but also mines the not so

widely known, such as Festus and Varro, for tidbits. The text is also peppered with examples

of surviving inscriptions and letters from the archaeological record. At the end there is

a chronology, glossary and a short bibliography. So while being a relatively short read at

96-pages it is rich in content.

Complementing the narrative are graphics and maps the style of which have become

Osprey’s hallmark. The graphics explain the organization of the Roman army covering the

legion, century, and various auxiliary cohorts. The maps detail the extent of the empire

in AD 14 and 117, yet oddly there is not one for the start of the period under discussion,

27 BC. Battle plans explain the engagements of Arminius and Varus at Kalkriese (Saltus

Teutoburgiensis?) in AD 9; Boudicca and Paulinus (Mancetter?) in AD 61; Flavian versus

Vitellian factions at the Second Battle of Cremona in AD 69; and Agricola and Calgacus atMons Graupius (Mither Tap o’Binnachie?) in AD 83.

The book is not without its shortcomings and errors. The subject of recruitment and

training is largely omitted. Neither the cornicen or tesserarius discussed in the text appear

in the schematic of the typical centuria. The long thrusting spear (hasta) used by the auxil-

The Roman Army of the Principate 27BC-AD117

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REVIEWS

Ancient Warfare 57

Order code:

AM75-05

Scale:

75mm

Designer:

Yury Serebryakov

Manufacturer:

Alexander MiniaturesAddress of Manufacturer:

www.alexanderminiatures.com

Reviewer:

Dr. Mike Thomas

Republican milesThis model represents a legionary soldier of Republican

Rome at the onset of Caesar’s war to conquer Gaul (the

Gallic Wars were fought between 58 and 50 BC), for which

Legio X is an apposite choice as it is reputed to have been

Caesar’s ‘favourite’ legion. The figure is equipped with

a suit of mail armour (lorica hamata), a ‘Montefortino’

helmet and a large oval shield, here shown in its leather

cover.

This kit contains 16 separately cast components. The

body and legs are cast as one unit, then there are the twoarms, alternate heads (the model may be completed bare-

headed or wearing the helmet), the helmet crest, spare

helmet, shield, sword, pilum, helmet cheek guards, helmet

carrying straps, shield grip, pilum point and finally the

base. All parts are well cast, with excellent surface detail.

There is very little cleaning of the castings required and

the fit of all parts on a ‘dry-run’ showed that little or no

filling would be needed. The base is a substantial piece of

metal, which has been modelled to represent rocks and

foliage. It is necessary because of the chosen stance for the

figure, with one foot raised, although of course it could be

replaced if desired.

Perhaps inevitably, there are issues concerning the

assembly order. The shield is meant to be carried on the

back (there is a woefully small lug to attach this heavy

piece to the main figure). This means that the inside of the

shield and the rear of the figure will have to be finished

before they can be joined together. Note that the kit does

not contain anything to make the strap passing over the

shoulder that would be needed to carry the shield. I would

also suggest that despite there being substantial holes

in the main figure to attach the arms, recourse should be

made to a drill and steel pin for these as the contact area is

actually quite small.

On the positive side, the overall standard of modellinghere is excellent. The size and shape of the Montefortino

helmet is accurate. If the bare-head version is required,

then the helmet will have to be attached somehow to the

chest at the front. There is a small casting meant to rep-

resent the strap that would pass around the neck for this

purpose. However, in practice it will be far better to make

this from some form of sheet material (I would favour a

thin shim of epoxy putty for this but lead sheet or plastic

electricians’ tape would also serve). One mixed blessing

is the fact that both the helmet crest and the pilum shaft

have been cast around some thin steel rods. While this

does ensure that the latter does not bend about easily as

is so often the case, it does mean that a very tiny cast piece

representing the spear point will have to be added. Good

luck with this - the piece really is minute and the contact

area vanishingly small! I have one serious reservation. The man is shown with

some form of cloth binding strips around the legs that

extend from the ankle right up to the thigh area. I do not

know where the sculptor has obtained the evidence for

this, as I can find no reference to it at all. The Ahenobarbus

reliefs (roughly contemporaneous) in the Louvre Museum,

for example, show the soldiers barelegged. These bindings

look tight and if so, this man could not possibly bend his

leg at the knee to any degree. It would be easy enough to

remove, however.

In summary, this is a well-constructed kit produced to

a high standard. The choice of alternate heads allow the

modeller some personal choice in how the figure is com-

pleted, which is a nice touch. Some care will be required,

however, in the assembly order and I‘d have a file handy for

those leggings!

iaries is not once mentioned even though iron spearheads of the weapon are shown in a photograph

(Nic Fields repeatedly cites the lighter lancea). He devotes just a third of a page to a biography of

Marcus Agrippa, yet a page-and-a-quarter to Germanicus, while Drusus the Elder is a mere footnote

in both the biographies of his brother, Tiberius, and of his son. Several of the photographs, particularly

those of sculptures and reliefs, are not of sufficiently high contrast to bring out meaningful detail. In

one case, the coin supposedly of Drusus the Elder is in fact of Drusus Caesar, Tiberius’ son.

That Nic Fields is very well read is clear, however, the author can sometimes be self-indulgent or

eccentric. Where else could you find the words of Henry Kissinger speaking on communist leadership

quoted in a biography of Vespasian, or the racist-rant of Cecil Rhodes on the superiority of the ‘whites’

when comparing the achievements of the British Empire to the Pax Romana?

The new book stands on its own merits but is perhaps better seen as a successive chapter in the

larger story of the development of the Roman army being told by Nic Fields and published by Osprey.

The Roman Army of the Principate 27BC - AD117 does not offer new insights or material but makes a

subject of popular study easily accessible to a general audience.

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