aw luttwak review

7/27/2019 AW Luttwak Review

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Andi WidjajantoS6016 The Study of War 2007

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Review Essay:

The Paradoxical Logic of Strategy1 Andi WidjajantoG0701818L

In Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace Edward N. Luttwak argues that „the entirerealm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic‟ [2]. Luttwak‟s method inidentifying the paradoxical logic that rules strategy is by analysing five levels of strategystarted from the technical level of strategy until the grand strategy level of strategy. Healso adds the horizontal and vertical dimensions of strategy that will also increase thelevel of paradoxical logic of strategy.

Luttwak‟s argument is not a new one. In On War Clausewitz offers explanationon why it is difficult to construct the „absolute war‟ (Clausewitz 1976, 78). This concept

of pure war entails „a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones‟ leading to acomplete and perfect decision‟ (Clausewitz 1976, 78). For Clausewitz, the concept ofabsolute war is developed to provide a measure of how different war really is in practice(Smith 2001, 34). He indicates several independent variables that will determine theoutcome of real war such as friction, the internal dynamics of war, as well as the socialand political context of specific states engaged in war.

Similar with Clausewitz, Luttwak also considers absolute war as a theoreticalproposition. For him, the paradoxical logic of strategy is a given strategic setting thatmust be anticipated by any military and political leaders.

By focusing in the persistence of the paradoxical logic of strategy, Luttwak triesto create awareness for all decision makers of the demanding process in making acoherent strategy. The process will be very challenging because it must cover five levelsof strategy and two dimensions of strategy. In analysing all levels and dimensions ofstrategy, Luttwak hopes that he can „devise and implement a grand strategy that willharmonize policy on all levels‟ [265]. For him, the paradoxical logic of strategy can beovercome by „great intellectual effort, sheer tenacity, and much political ingenuity‟ [265].

It is hard for me to simply accept Luttwak‟s solution for addressing theparadoxical logic of strategy. For Luttwak, a coherent strategy that will impose a linearlogic for all levels and dimensions of strategy can only be created by a military geniusand can only be employed in an absolute war. Luttwak is waiting for the reincarnationof Napoleon to lead NATO in a nuclear war against a non-nuclear country.

1 A Review of Edward N. Luttwak: Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Rev. and enl. ed. (Cambridge,

Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2001. xii, 308pp.)




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In this essay, I will try to incorporate several theoretical propositions in strategic

studies into Luttwak‟s framework to address the paradoxical logic of strategy in eachlevel strategy.

The first level of strategy is the technical level. In this level, Luttwak makes usaware of problematic interactions between soldiers, technicians, and politicians indeciding types of weapon system that should be developed [93-101].

Luttwak‟s depiction of the paradoxical logic in the technical level of strategy canalso be explained by using the concept of arms dynamic developed by Buzan andHerring (1998). For both of them, the revolution in military technology has presentednew challenges in internalizing new technological innovation into a militaryorganization. By combining Luttwak‟s proposition and Buzan and Hering‟s „domesticstructure‟ models (Buzan and Hering 1998, 82), it can be said that the rise of politicalinfluence of military-industrial complexes have become the determinant factors thatlead to the rise of paradoxical logic in the technical level.

If this synthesis is accepted, the paradoxical logic in this level might be overcomeby improving the relationships between civil and military technology development. Therelationships can be improved by creating a strategic planning to control phases oftechnological innovation that might lead to the invention of a new weapon system. Ifthis can be done successfully, a state will find itself as the leader of Revolution inMilitary Affairs (Knox and Murray 2001, 176).

The second level of strategy is the tactical level. For Luttwak, the source of theparadoxical logic in this level comes from „the full complexities of the human dimensionof combat‟ [109]. The outcome of war mainly depends on intangible factors such asindividual morale, group discipline, and unit cohesion [105]. Since the interplay of these

factors cannot be instantaneously controlled by any military commander, the result isthe unpredictable outcomes of combat [110].

However, Biddle‟s comparative study on three military operations presents anew solution to overcome the paradoxical logic in the tactical level (Biddle 2004). Biddlediscovers that a modern-system force employment can significantly reduce tacticalvulnerabilities (Biddle 2004, 2-3). This modern-system force employment has tactical keyelements such as „cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver,suppression, and combined arms integration‟ that can be employed in both offensiveand defensive tactics (Biddle 2004, 35). For Biddle, in any warfare, a non-modern-systemmilitary will be unable to defeat a modern-system opponent (Biddle 2004, 191).

The third level of strategy is the operational level. In this level, Luttwak tries toshow correlation between the choices of operational strategy of attrition and maneuverwith the national styles in war [118]. This correlation creates the paradoxical logic in theoperational level. According to Luttwak, „neither attrition nor relational maneuver isever present in pure form, but their relative weight will usually reflect national self-images as well as the overall approach to the business of war‟ [136].




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The deterministic influence of national self-images is accompanied by normativemind-sets that influence strategic choices in the theater level. Similar with the previouslevel, in this fourth level of strategy, the paradoxical logic of strategy is transpired dueto the governing nature of political and cultural attitudes [158]. Luttwak presents a verystrong case on how strategic choices between several types of defense strategy such aselastic, defense-in-depth, guerrilla warfare, and active defence could not beautonomously selected by military commanders. Strategic choices are made underconstant pressure bestowed by political struggle in the national level.

The paradoxical logic in the third and fourth level can be best understood byapplying an approach best described as a „strategic culture approach‟ (Gray 1981; Johnson 1995; Kier 1995; Rosen 1995). This approach emerged in the early 1980s focusedon explaining three levels of inputs into a state‟s strategic culture: a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics, and history;a societal level consisting of social and economic, and political structure of societies; anda micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristic of civil-military

relations (Johnston 1995, 37).Gray believes that strategic culture as part of the celebration of community beliefs

about historical strategic experience can be utilised as a guide to action (Gray 2007, 148).He argues that strategic culture expresses comparative advantages that should be usedby military leaders to design military operations (Gray 2007, 144-5). If it is usedeffectively, strategic culture can strengthen the solidity of the home front by expressingto general public a nation way of war.

The fifth level of strategy is the grand strategy level. For Luttwak, in this level theparadoxical logic of strategy will come to an end in two dimensions of strategy: verticaland horizontal dimensions. He argues that „grand strategy may be seen as a confluence

of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, forming strategy's"vertical" dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy's"horizontal" dimension‟ [209]. Sources of the paradoxical logic of grand strategy willcome either from the failure to create an integrative defense strategy that coherentlycements policies of all levels of strategy, or from incapacity in managing securitydilemma resulted from strategic interaction between states.

The problem of disintegrative defense strategy can be overcome by implementingKnox and Murray‟s Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) that will impose a unificationof national strategic concept that should in principle determine the structuring,composition, and employment concept of armed forces (Knox and Murray 2001, 180-

181). For them, a state should try to launch RMA not only to adapt the latest advances inmilitary technology but also to increase the consistency of its national defenceconception in all levels of strategy.

A coherence national defense strategy should also be able to solve the difficultyin managing security dilemma. Jervis‟s conception of cooperation under the securitydilemma can be used as a starting point to explore policy alternatives (Jervis, 1978). Jervis‟s security dilemma concept is used by Glaser and Kauffman to come out with an




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alternative theory of offense-defense balance. One theoretical component provided byGlaser and Kauffman that is relevant to the problem of the paradoxical logic inhorizontal dimension of strategy is the measurement of offense-defense balance at thelevel of whole wars (Glaser and Kauffman 1998, 73-74). They argue that the difficulty onintegrating across levels of warfare has been exaggerated (Glaser and Kauffman 1998,72). For them, the integration of strategy across levels of warfare can be achieved byassessing the direction and magnitude of the effect of all levels changes on the strategicoffense-defense balance (Glaser and Kauffman 1998, 73-74).

In this essay, I accept Luttwak‟s conception of the paradoxical logic of strategy.

But, I refused to accept it as a given strategic setting that cannot be overcome. I offeredseveral theoretical conceptions developed by strategic studies scholars to be utilized intackling the paradoxical logic in specific levels and dimensions of strategy. Thisincorporation method is used simply to show that academic engagements are stillreliable in solving theoretical and empirical puzzles of the real war situations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Biddle, Stephen. Military Power. Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2004).

Buzan, Barry and Eric Herring. The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, 1998).

von Clausewitz, Carl. On War, trans. and ed. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Glaser, Charles L. and Chaim Kaufmann. “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Secur ity, Vol.22, No.4. (Spring, 1998).

Gray, Colin S.. “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example,” InternationalSecurity, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Fall 1981).

-----------------. Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Johnston, Alistair Iain. “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol.

19, No. 4. (Spring 1995).Kier, Elizabeth. “Culture and Military Doctrine” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4.

(Spring 1995).Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-

2050 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Rosen, Stephen Peter. “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International

Security, Vol. 19, No. 4. (Spring 1995)Smith, Huge. “Clausewitz: Apostle of Modern War” in Smith, Huge (ed.) The Strategist

(Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Center, 2001).

aw luttwak review

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