avoiding intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement

AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN

APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE

ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA JUNE 2011

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE

ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA

AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

Submitted by:

JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI

Certificate of Approval: ________________________________

David J. Grabelski Assistant Professor Department of Intelligence Studies ________________________________

Timothy Lauger Assistant Professor Department of Criminal Justice ________________________________

Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs

June 2011

iii

Copyright © 2011 by Jeremy J. Sieminski All rights reserved.

iv

DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my fiancée, Brandi, who has always supported and believed

in me.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank David Grabelski, my thesis advisor and primary reader, for his

assistance in the development of this study.

I would like to thank Dr. Tim Lauger, my secondary reader, for his continued analytical guidance

and encouragement throughout the course of this work.

I owe thanks to Lieutenant John Denk, Dallas Police Department - North Texas HIDTA RISC

Co-Program Manager, for the idea that inspired the direction of this thesis.

Lastly, I would like to thank Lance Sumpter, North Texas HIDTA Director, for his vital

assistance in the data collection phase of this study.

vi

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Avoiding Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement

A Critical Examination

By

Jeremy Sieminski

Master of Science in Applied Intelligence

Mercyhurst College, 2011

Assistant Professor David J. Grabelski, Chair

The purpose of this study was to determine the level to which intelligence irrelevance has

translated from military and national security settings to law enforcement. Furthermore,

determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permitted the development of prescriptive

framework to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished through contextually-

focused survey analysis of HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker populations directly addressing

intelligence-policy relations, intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of

intelligence irrelevance. The results of this study demonstrate that general or estimative

intelligence is modestly irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers primarily due to low levels

of intelligence marketing, low quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, a high

level of cognitive bias, and likely high organizational inertia (strong indicators of high inertia).

Additionally, study results suggest one of two conclusions regarding the relevance of strategic

intelligence in law enforcement policymaking: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement

intelligence irrelevance is unknown because of disparity between this study’s concept of strategic

intelligence and the law enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the

vii

former in law enforcement, or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement

policymakers because of a demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not

strategic (by the definition accepted for this study). The latter conclusion appears more

reasonable than the former.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………… viii

LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………….. xi

LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………..... xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………......... xiv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………. 1

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………….. 6

Key Terms…………………………..…………………………………... 7

Intelligence Irrelevance…………………………………………………. 10

Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System… 13

Intelligence as a Causal Locus…………………………………………. 20

Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus….…………………………….. 25

Policymakers as a Causal Locus………………………………………... 31

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY……………………………………………… 38

Survey Sample...………………………………………………………... 42

Demographics...………………………………………………………… 43

Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials ……………… 44

Measures……...…………………………………………………….…... 44

Data Analysis...…………………………………..……………………... 50

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS……………………………………………………..… 53

Intelligence Irrelevance………………………………………………... 53

ix

Cognitive Bias…..………………………………………………………. 56

Cognitive Dissonance….……………………………………………….. 58

Security………………………………………………............................. 60

Filtering………………………………………………............................. 62

Organizational Inertia………………………………………………....... 64

Marketing………………………………………………......................... 66

Volition………………………………………………............................. 68

Communication………………………………………………................. 69

Time……………………………………………….................................. 71

Confidence………………………………………………........................ 74

Summary………………………………………………........................... 76

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………... 83

Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement…………………………... 83

Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement……………….. 85

Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence

Irrelevance……………………………………………………………….

87

Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence

Irrelevance……………………………………………………………….

89

Limitations and Future Research……………………………………….. 91

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………...... 95

APPENDICES………………………………………………………………...... 103

Appendix A……………………………………………………………... 103

Appendix B………………………………………………....................... 106

x

Appendix C……………………………………………………………...

Appendix D……………………………………………………………...

115

124

Appendix E……..………………………………………………………. 127

Appendix F………….….……………………………………………….. 129

Appendix G..…………………………………………............................. 130

Appendix H..…………………………………………............................. 134

Appendix I…………..………………………………………………....... 135

Appendix J...……………………………………………......................... 143

Appendix K..…………………………………………............................. 147

Appendix L…..………………………………………………................. 157

Appendix M……………………………………….................................. 159

Appendix N...……………………………………………........................ 173

Appendix O……………………………………………........................... 177

xi

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 2.1 Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations 25

Table 2.2 Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source 35

Table 3.1 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix:

Negative Correlations

51

Table 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix:

Positive Correlations

52

Table 4.1 Cognitive Bias Results 58

Table 4.2 Cognitive Dissonance Results 59

Table 4.3 Security Results 62

Table 4.4 Filtering Results 64

Table 4.5 Organizational Inertia Results 66

Table 4.6 Marketing Results 68

Table 4.7 Volition Results 69

Table 4.8 Communication Results 71

Table 4.9 Time Results 74

Table 4.10 Confidence Results 76

Table 4. 11 Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:


79

Table 4.12 Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:


80

xii

Table 4.13 SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:


81

Table 4.14 SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:


82

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 2.1 Bifurcated Intelligence-Policy Relations 10

Figure 2.2 Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces 16

Figure 3.1 HIDTA Program Counties 2010 40

Figure 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process 42

xiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACH – Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

A-SR/I – Analyst reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

COMINT – Communications Intelligence

DCI – Director of Central Intelligence

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

FinCEN – Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

HIDTA – High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HUMINT – Human Intelligence

IA – Intelligence Analyst

LEI – Law Enforcement Intelligence

MCIIS – Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies

NDIC – National Drug Intelligence Center

ONDCP – Office of National Drug Control Policy

PM – Policymaker

P-SR/I – Policymaker reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant

SI – Strategic Intelligence

US – United States

1

INTRODUCTION

The post-9/11 environment and global war on terror have provided a fresh focus for

foreign policy as well as justification for considerable expansion of intelligence programs. A

recent outgrowth of traditional military and national security intelligence efforts has been the

introduction of intelligence-led policing. While crime prevention and deterrence is a relatively

new application for the ancient craft of intelligence, the effective implementation of this effort is

likely to confront many of the same obstacles as those confronted by traditional applications.

This thesis aims to assist law enforcement intelligence and policy professionals avoid one such

obstacle, intelligence irrelevance.

Intelligence is a craft essentially as old as man. Historians and scholars recognize, “the

desire for advance information is no doubt rooted in the instinct for survival” (Dulles, 1985, p.9).

Intelligence sources have transformed over millennia from prophets, seers, oracles, soothsayers

and astrologers of Greek mythology to the postal workers and families of the Roman, Persian,

Byzantine and Mongol Empires to the secret police of the 18th and 19th centuries to modern spies

and professional agents (Dulles, 1985, p.9-28). Thus, the craft of intelligence transformed from a

superstitious and supernatural institution to one that is human and secular. Sun Tzu is credited as

creating the first organized intelligence service in the fifth century BC. He prescribed the use of

five categories of spies to obtain foreknowledge, rather than through the elicitation of spirits,

inductively or analogously through experience, or deductively through calculation (Tzu,

Connors, & Giles, 2009). Although his analysis continues to be widely embraced, modern

intelligence and policy often operate inductively and deductively as well.

Yet just as the employment of intelligence is a timeless phenomenon, so is incident of its

disregard. At its best, intelligence provides policymakers with the greatest amount of relevant

2

reality that can be achieved by filling gaps in knowledge and expertise crucial to tactical and

strategic success. At its worst, intelligence is ignored and becomes irrelevant to policy

considerations. Troy ignored Cassandra’s warning regarding their fall and the Trojan Horse

(Dulles, 1985). Xerxes ignored his advisor’s intelligence estimate stating King Leonidas and his

three-hundred men were preparing for war prior to the Battle at Thermopylae, ultimately losing

large numbers from his force (Dulles, 1985). Stalin ignored as many as eighty-seven separate and

credible warning of a German invasion prior to Operation Barbarossa (Steury, 2005). And, more

recently, President Nixon largely ignored the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the point

where he stopped reading his daily intelligence summary and rarely met with the Director of

Central Intelligence (DCI) (Rovner, 2011). Intelligence irrelevance is an issue arising with the

first efforts towards foreknowledge and which pervades numerous areas in which intelligence

operates. This thesis aims to determine if it pervades one of the latest applications of intelligence,

law enforcement intelligence.

Law enforcement intelligence (LEI) is recently constructed intelligence architecture. An

outgrowth of military and national security intelligence, LEI applies traditional communications

intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) methodologies to the law

enforcement context to exploit telephone records and confidential informants or sources

(Peterson, 2005). Advocacy for intelligence-led policing processes originated from the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States (US) Department of Justice

(Peterson, 2005). LEI functions began to be instituted in the 1970’s with little success. Many

were shut down voluntarily, by court order, or from political pressure due to the lack of

governance over their practices (Peterson, 2005). LEI failed to gain real traction until after

September 11, 2001. September 11th, considered a focusing event, reinforced the need to enhance

3

intelligence operations. This reinforced LEI initiatives such as the National Drug Intelligence

Center (NDIC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the High Intensity

Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. Thus, currently, instituting efficacious LEI initiatives

is a top priority (U.S. Department of, 2003).

Yet effectively integrating intelligence into the investigative and enforcement culture

continues to be a struggle. Law enforcement professionals continue to misuse the words

intelligence, analysis, tactical, operational, and strategic and confuse intelligence missions and

values (Peterson, 2005). A recent study conducted on the HIDTA program found that they

erroneously considered some of their reports as strategic intelligence documents when, in fact,

they performed little to no strategic intelligence analysis, suggesting intelligence irrelevance is

already occurring to some level (“Assessment of HIDTA,” 2009). Also, as there is no common

definition of intelligence in military and national security spheres, there is no common definition

for intelligence-led policing within the law enforcement community (McGarrell, Freihlich, and

Chermak, 2007). Federal law enforcement agencies define LEI differently than State, Local, and

Tribal law enforcement agencies because of difference is sources and missions (Carter, 2004).

Nor is there agreement on its practical implications for police agencies’ mission, structure or

processes (McGarrell, Freihlich, and Chermak, 2007). Regardless of definition, however,

intelligence must be embraced across the entirety of an organization to be effective, rather than

viewed as the responsibility of an intelligence unit. But before a law enforcement agency can

become intelligence-led, it must first understand what intelligence is, how it functions at

different levels, and how it is advantageous to law enforcement efforts. Thus far this appears to

be more natural for tactical and operational intelligence than for strategic intelligence.

4

Irrelevance to policy considerations is a significant fear of intelligence analysts and yet

also a pathology of intelligence-policy relations that is not well understood. Among causes of

failed intelligence-policy relations, politicization has drawn the most attention (Rovner, 2011).

Politicization involves the corruption of objective intelligence processes and products through

manipulation by policymakers, politically biased analysts, or both. Politicization of intelligence

occurs, however, because that intelligence is considered important by policymakers (Rovner,

2011). Intelligence irrelevance, ignoring that which is intended to objectively improve the

soundness of policy logic, can be just as or more damaging for intelligence stakeholders who

have a vested interest in the success of their policies. Thus, in order to prevent intelligence

irrelevance in the law enforcement intelligence setting one must understand the nature of the

developing law enforcement intelligence-policy relationship and relate this dynamic to likely

causes of intelligence irrelevance outlined in previous scholarship. In employing this strategy,

this thesis will seek to illuminate and outline a preemptive plan intended to avoid strategic

intelligence irrelevance in the law enforcement context. Survey analysis of High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) employees, both on the analysis side and the policymaking side, will

be conducted through a set of questionnaires that will gauge the intelligence-policy relationship

and the relevance of intelligence at HIDTA at the strategic level. The questions in each

questionnaire will gauge the major variables discussed in the literature review. These include:

intelligence irrelevance, level of volition (act of willing), inertia (preference or not to modifying

strategy), level of confidence in intelligence (strategic), current level of or potential for cognitive

dissonance and bias, level of security, level of filtering, level of intelligence marketing, quality

and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, and available time to devote to strategic

intelligence. After exploring the relationship and strategic intelligence dynamics, a plan can be

5

developed that mitigates or, more favorably, prevents the potential causes of intelligence

irrelevance for HIDTA’s.

Unfortunately, there are a couple limitations to this study. This study focuses on the

relationships between intelligence, strategic analysts, and intelligence consumers rather than the

bureaucratic environments in which intelligence operates. Although study analysis will be

inclusive of organizational forces such as inertia, security and filtering, we assume that the most

significant causes of irrelevance as well as the greatest potential for their displacement arise from

intelligence-policy relations rather than bureaucratic idiosyncrasies. Further research is needed to

validate this assumption. Additionally, study representativeness and generalizability were

directly dependent upon survey participation and the level of response that was elicited. The

study sampling plan aimed to gain maximum participation as all relevant members of the study

organization could have been potentially sampled. These limitations, though, need not undermine

the development of a preemptive framework to mitigate or avoid intelligence irrelevance.

The nature and order of this study will be as such: First, the researcher will review the

current body of relevant scholarly literature including those works addressing the nonuse of

intelligence, largely supported by works addressing the issue of strategic surprise, to identify the

key causes of intelligence irrelevance. Next, the researcher will explain the research

methodology and subsequent results. Finally, the researcher will objectively interpret the study

results and deduce their implications for avoiding future incidents of intelligence irrelevance in

law enforcement.

6

LITERATURE REVIEW

As mentioned above, this study aims to facilitate the preemption of strategic intelligence

irrelevance in law enforcement by investigating the current and developing relationship between

law enforcement intelligence analysts and their decision-making counterparts. To achieve this

objective, however, it is necessary to review the concepts and debates relevant to the phenomena

of intelligence irrelevance. While resolving the debate by illuminating some sort of perfect

functioning intelligence-policy machine is outside the scope of this study, augmenting the debate

by introducing a new application for scholarly findings related to intelligence-policy relations

and intelligence irrelevance is not. Intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement setting

are currently developing parallel to the progression of intelligence-led policing efforts. It is here

we find a new and particularly useful application for scholarly findings from a particularly

mature debate.

This chapter will begin by defining and discussing key terms to be employed throughout

the study including: information, intelligence, strategic intelligence, strategic intelligence

irrelevance and intelligence-policy relations. Next, the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance

will be discussed generally as well as in the context in the loosely coupled system in which it

occurs. This section will largely be supported by contributions from the debate between two key

schools of thought, the orthodox and revisionist schools. Next, this chapter will discuss the likely

causal sources of intelligence irrelevance: intelligence work itself, imperfect analysis, and

imperfect policymaking. The result of all this investigation and debate leaves the reader without

denouement, but rather with this study’s hypotheses.

7

Key Terms

This study employs key terms that are conceptually complex in nature. The context of

their application, however, typically dictates the specific meaning intended to be expressed. With

this understanding, definitions for these key terms are delineated here in the context and for the

purposes of this study, namely, understanding the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance through

intelligence-policy relations.

The concept of information is both elusive and central to debate in numerous fields of

study. It is elusive precisely because it is broad enough to apply to so many fields of study.1 The

standard, and intuitive, definition of information described as “data that has been processed into

a form that is meaningful to the recipient” and “data….that is processed and refined” will be

used for this study (Davis & Olson, 1985, p.200; Silver & Silver, 1989, p.6). Opting for this

definition not only avoids unnecessary obstacles but also allows the study to focus on the

research questions outlined below.

Just as the practice of processing and refining is central to the creation of information, so

is it central to the creation of intelligence. While the ingredients in the recipe for information are

data and meaning, the ingredients in the intelligence recipe are information and meaning, created

through analysis. Lowenthal (2006) describes intelligence trichotomically as a process, product

and organization. He asserts intelligence can be thought of as “the means by which certain types

of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated”, “the product

of these processes”, and “as the units that carry out its various functions” (2006, p.9).While

highly accurate, Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence is missing a central aspect, reducing

uncertainty. Clark notes this (reducing uncertainty) as the central aspect in his definition of

1 See Floridi (2005) for various definitions of information, some that include elements that only complicate its understanding in the context of intelligence.

8

intelligence and explains intelligence reduces uncertainty by collecting and exploiting

information that the opponent prefers to (2007). The Mercyhurst College Institute for

Intelligence Studies (MCIIS) introduces two additional aspects to the concept of intelligence: a

process that is focused externally and that considers information derived from all sources (Chido

& Seward, 2006). This study will employ a concept of intelligence that incorporates all these

attributes. For this study intelligence will be described as the process of acquiring, processing,

analyzing and disseminating externally focused information that reduces uncertainty for decision

makers, as the final product of that process, and as the organizations that engage in that process.

This definition integrates all aspects of intelligence that have been acknowledged by scholars and

intelligence professionals.

Moving forward, strategic intelligence then exemplifies a certain classification of

intelligence. Clark describes strategic intelligence similarly for both government and business

sectors as dealing with long-range issues such as strategy and policy for senior leadership with

greater complexity due to the longer predictive time frame (2007). Strategic intelligence has

elsewhere been described as “the aggregation of all other types of intelligentsia to provide value-

added information and knowledge toward making organizational strategic decisions” (Liebowitz,

2006, p.22). Both Clark and Liebowitz describe the central tenet of strategic intelligence as

intelligence produced to support strategy. Although strategy is often associated with long-term

measures, its intelligence support need not furnish long-term prediction. Intelligence may be both

current and have significant strategic implications; however, most or all current intelligence is

not strategic. The Pentagon defines strategic intelligence as “intelligence required for the

formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels” (“Joint publication 1-

02:,” 2001, p.456). To effectively support strategy, strategic intelligence must be actionable and

9

multi-disciplinary (Heidenrich, 2007). This sort of support allows for maximum comprehensive

advantage. Strategic intelligence thus provides a framework for lower decision levels, is time and

resource intensive, far reaching in nature, infrequently produced, and often includes too many

variables for the strategist to understand and anticipate alone (Fleisher & Bensoussan, 2007;

Heidenrich, 2007). Cumulatively, then, strategic intelligence is both the intelligence process

creating strategic intelligence and ultimate product of that process that provides multi-

disciplinary, actionable and forward-looking support for an organizational or national strategy.

This is the definition that will be employed for this study.

The concept that is most important to clarify as well as central to this study is that of

strategic intelligence irrelevance. Strategic intelligence irrelevance will be understood as the

tragic phenomena of intelligence that does not perceivably satisfy the requirements necessary for

efficacy, the prerequisites of which are timely, actionable, multi-disciplinary, and value-added

properties. Reflecting the tendency for policymakers to ignore intelligence, Walter Laqueur

(1993) states:

[A]fter much research and discussion with the leading consumers of intelligence, I

have concluded that, far from being an invisible government, far from wielding

great influence in the councils of state, intelligence has frequently been

disregarded or ignored by decision makers. No one claims that intelligence has

been of major importance in the conduct of affairs of state. (p.3)

Handel, a well-respected intelligence scholar, parallels Laqueur’s sentiments in stating, “Let this,

then, be the first axiom; fighting commanders, technical experts, and politicians are liable to

ignore, despise, or undernote intelligence” (1987, p.24). These scholarly perspectives support

Rovner’s argument that policymakers ignore intelligence for psychological and political reasons

and that the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of ana

work is disregarded (2011). Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevanc

occurs when strategic intelligence is requested, produced and disseminated to relevant policy

parties, but is not incorporated into policy discussions

Intelligence-policy relations will provide the context

within which this study will examine the phenomena of

intelligence irrelevance. For the purposes of this study,

intelligence-policy relations are understood as bifurcated

where the intelligence node may signify eith

products or intelligence analysts

graphic display of this relationship)

previous scholastic contribution to intelligence

irrelevance will highlight how each node, policy, intelligence analysts

potentially possess the ability to cause intelligence irrelevance

Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers

If it fails to complete this basic, but interminable, mission then it fails altogether

great deal of collection, processing and analysis effort wasted, but the failure also amounts to

fiscal waste in terms of billions of dollars

throughout history, especially so in supporting military operations

the military operations support arena, however, serve consumers that are more jaundiced to

intelligence products. This includes

the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of ana

Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevanc


parties, but is not incorporated into policy discussions or policy formation.

relations will provide the context

within which this study will examine the phenomena of

For the purposes of this study,

policy relations are understood as bifurcated,

where the intelligence node may signify either intelligence

(See Figure 2.1 for a

graphic display of this relationship). The discussion of

previous scholastic contribution to intelligence

irrelevance will highlight how each node, policy, intelligence analysts, and intelligence products,

potentially possess the ability to cause intelligence irrelevance, particularly at their nexus.

Intelligence Irrelevance

Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers

If it fails to complete this basic, but interminable, mission then it fails altogether.


fiscal waste in terms of billions of dollars. Intelligence has clearly demonstrated value

especially so in supporting military operations. Intelligence efforts outside


des intelligence efforts to: support American diplomacy, support

Figure 2.1: Bifurcated IntelligencePolicy Relations

10

the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of analysts whose

Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevance


ntelligence products,

particularly at their nexus.

Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers.

. Not only is a


ce has clearly demonstrated value

Intelligence efforts outside


intelligence efforts to: support American diplomacy, support

Bifurcated Intelligence-

11

monitoring of treaties and other agreements, support defense planning, economic intelligence,

counter activities abroad that threaten U.S. interests, support criminal justice and regulatory

agencies, environmental intelligence, and to support world health problems (“Preparing for the,”

1996). Maintaining relevance in support of these intelligence missions requires a great deal of

careful thought and constant effort (Davis, 2002).

Much of the difficulty in maintaining intelligence relevance relates to the quality of

intelligence products. Conscious of this issue, numerous scholars have promoting standards by

which to make intelligence useful to policy. Kovacs describes the ingredients of usability for

intelligence as, “timeliness, suitable level of detail and aggregation, mode of presentation and in

particular the perceived reliability and accuracy of the information” (1997, p.147). Lowenthal

puts forth a somewhat parallel recipe for acceptable, useful intelligence: timely, tailored,

digestible and clear regarding what is known and unknown (2006). Both of these recipes

highlight the significance of policymaker preferences and likely perceptions. Analysts, therefore,

must become just as knowledgeable about their policymaking consumers as they are of their

intelligence subject matter. Yet, intelligence that meets these standards is not guaranteed to be

used in the policymaking process, not guaranteed to be relevant. To maintain its usefulness and

acceptance into policymaking, then, intelligence must strive toward greater standards.

Policymakers are quick to point out additional shortcomings of intelligence products.

Politicians and senior executives, acclimated to and informed of political environments and

discussions, naturally notice when intelligence products fail to introduce anything new and

valuable to the policy table. Intelligence may simply regurgitate what is already known by

policymakers through their own arsenal of resources. This was the case for intelligence prior to

the Iranian revolution (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004). Intelligence became irrelevant in this case

12

because it “did not truly question basic assumptions upon which U.S. policy rested, at least until,

many agreed, it was too late” (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004, p.12). In essence, then, intelligence

must become a vehicle for detailed consideration of policy options (Best, 2007; Davis, 1996).

This type of intelligence has been referred to as opportunity analysis, value-added analysis, and

targeted tactical analysis (Davis, 1995). One policymaker suggests analysts “give them

something they will really miss if they do not get it” (Davis, 1995, p.11). This concept of value-

adding intelligence has been clearly described in scholarly debate and has gained traction in

recent years. Yet, even value-adding intelligence efforts can fall between the policymaking

cracks if policymakers are not aware of them.

To maintain relevance, then, intelligence analysts are required to also increase the quality

of intelligence processes. More specifically, policymakers and scholars suggest intelligence

professionals significantly increase their efforts to market their products. One policymaker goes

as far as to suggest analysts should spend a third of their time assuring they impact the

policymaking process or enough time establishing and maintaining an effective intelligence-

policy relationship that they begin to feel guilty about not having enough time for their other

duties (Davis, 1995). Another suggests a rule of thumb he dubs the “Riedel Rule”, after Bruce

Riedel, a CIA analyst, whom felt he was not doing his job of marketing his analyses unless he

got at least two parking tickets a month outside policymakers’ offices (Haass, 2007). Haass

insists that intelligence analysts:

Understand that to devote 99 percent of their effort to conducting and writing a

study and only 1 percent to marketing it is both foolish and a disservice to

policymakers. To produce results, they have to market their work relentlessly. If

13

analysts have something to say, they should not only say it, but press to say it

directly to the policymakers most involved in the issue. (p.13)

Time, however, is a limited commodity. A significant increase in effort on the part of

intelligence analysts to market their products detracts from their ability to increase the quality of

those products. Thus analysts are faced with a tradeoff between increasing the quality of

intelligence products and increasing the quality of intelligence processes, a tradeoff that appears

to essentially ensure intelligence irrelevance to some level.

Aside from highlighting the difficulty of avoiding intelligence irrelevance these

discussions highlight the significance of the relationship between intelligence analysts and their

policymaking consumers to the phenomena. To avoid intelligence irrelevance analysts must meet

or exceed the expectations their jaundiced customers have for their products. Additionally,

analysts must force policymakers to digest intelligence appraisals: seemingly against their will.

Quality intelligence products and processes thus require a synergy between the two parties. We

are beginning to see intelligence-policy synergy does not occur naturally.

Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System

Since the first employment of intelligence-type faculties, their relations with their

customers have been riddled with gaps and tensions. It seems intelligence consumers have

always been skeptical of its utility, opting to use it selectively. Sun Tzu noted in the fifth century

BC that although intelligence officers are often of critical importance to an army’s ability to

move and achieve success, they are also potential threats to those same ends and thus must be

managed with a certain intuitive sagacity (Tzu, Connors, & Giles, 2009). This practice involved

controlling the flow of information to intelligence, rewarding intelligence efforts liberally as a

means of preventing treason, and harsh punishment for any intelligence behavior that

14

undermined or threatened policy or strategy. For better or worse, intelligence had become a crux

between success and defeat. This double-edged sword conceptualization of intelligence has been

maintained through today as intelligence consumers continue to engage intelligence producers

skeptically, and interestingly also use their products as both tools and weapons. That skepticism

is reciprocated by analysts who guard their analytical integrity against potential political

pollution.

The relationship between modern intelligence and policy is noteworthy precisely because

of its significant influence on and consequence for both policy and strategy. Policymakers note

that “successful policy depends upon bridging the intellectual gap between imperatives of the

present and the potential of the future. In turn, this often depends on bridging the gap between

policymakers and the Intelligence Community” (Haass, 2002, p.1). In other words, if intelligence

is a crux between strategic success and defeat then deductively it is politically advantageous to

maintain close relations with intelligence professionals, or at least when success or defeat

depends on it. As intelligence analysts learned, policy can exist and function without support

from the intelligence community (if only temporarily), but the opposite is not true (Lowenthal,

2006). This policymaker stance forces the weight of the relationship nearly exclusively on the

analyst’s shoulders. After all, this crucial relationship for both policymakers and analysts does

not fall naturally in place, but requires careful thought to set right and constant efforts to keep

effective (Davis, 2002). The discovery that intelligence is not always a strategic necessity or

threat allowed policymakers to take the driver’s seat, however, both policymakers and

intelligence analysts are active participants in the relationship. Thus both parties are responsible

for and highly influence not only the success or demise of policy and strategy but the efficacy of

the relationship.

15

Yet a central challenge for analysts to maintain effective ties has been a historical,

conscious, artificial separation between intelligence and policy parties. This separation has been

motivated by analysts’ efforts to balance the seemingly intrinsic and endured trade-off between

analytical integrity and policy relevance - separation despite advice from both analysts and

policymakers to not merely produce literature, but strategic and politically relevant results

(Haass, 2002; Davis, 2002; Davis, 1995; Kent, 1949; Goldman, 2006). To produce results,

analysts are required to close the gap between themselves and their policymaking counterparts,

which is an uncomfortable proposition for many. Historically analysts have avoided the politics

of policymaking by consciously positioning themselves in positions of limited utility to policy as

prescribed by the “red line”, or a demarcation between intelligence and policy prohibiting

intelligence officers from advocating policy options (Steiner, 2003). This school of thought,

attributed to Sherman Kent, warns of the danger of intimate intelligence-policy relations as

having the strong potential to fall prey to aggressive policymakers who may wish to slant or

distort intelligence work in their political favor. Policymakers and scholars can and have applied

the same logic, however, to suggest analysts are wishfully biased in perceiving the

appropriateness, reliability, relevance and accuracy of their own work and project these biases to

intelligence consumers (Davis, 1995; Levite, 1987; Betts, 2004; Kam, 2004). As Crocker notes,

“American leaders, it should be acknowledged, are by no means the only ones susceptible to

linear thinking about world affairs. Nor are they alone in imagining that their own norms and

benchmarks have universal validity” (Crocker). In this sense, analysts pollute their own analyses

by distancing themselves from the politics of policymaking. In fact, analysts who distanced

themselves from the policymaking process learned to their sorrow that their policymaking

counterparts judged their intelligence products as less or not useful for policymaking (Davis,

2002). Thus analysts continue to be challenged to find the appropr

hazards as neither objectivity without relevance nor relevance without objectivity satisfies the

mission of intelligence (Davis, 2002; Goldman, 2006).

Thus the operating environment for intelligence

that is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence

close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2

Figure 2.2) In this sense not only do gaps and tensions within intelligence

to dysfunction, but the lack of gaps and tension

also lead to dysfunction. The excessive

harmony pathology embodies instances of

complacent tunnel vision shared by both

intelligence and policy in which both sides fail

to challenge basic assumptions —

tension creates ineffective relations (Rovner, 20

rationalizations for policymaker decisions in which policymakers employ intelligence to support,

rather than shape, pre-fabricated policy and political strategy (Rovner, 20

occur in numerous ways including: direct

assumptions, intelligence subverts policy, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism,

partisan intelligence and intelligence as a scapegoat

is politicized because it is considered

perceivably important intelligence

intelligence-policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has beco

analyst’s duty to achieve such a calibration.

Thus analysts continue to be challenged to find the appropriate balance between both


mission of intelligence (Davis, 2002; Goldman, 2006).

environment for intelligence is one of opposing threats

is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence

close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2

) In this sense not only do gaps and tensions within intelligence-policy relations lead

to dysfunction, but the lack of gaps and tension

The excessive

harmony pathology embodies instances of

complacent tunnel vision shared by both

intelligence and policy in which both sides fail

— the lack of

tension creates ineffective relations (Rovner, 2011). Politicization involves post hoc


fabricated policy and political strategy (Rovner, 2011). Politicization can

occur in numerous ways including: direct manipulation, indirect manipulation, embedded


partisan intelligence and intelligence as a scapegoat. As Rovner points out, though, “intelligence

d because it is considered important” (2011). Analysts thus struggle to produce

perceivably important intelligence that avoids threats of political pollution. Effective

policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has beco

achieve such a calibration.

Too close:

Politicization

Excessive Harmony

To great a distance:

Irrelevance

Figure 2.2: Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces

16

iate balance between both


is one of opposing threats. Intelligence

is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence that is too

close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2011). (See

policy relations lead

n involves post hoc


Politicization can

manipulation, indirect manipulation, embedded


As Rovner points out, though, “intelligence

Analysts thus struggle to produce

Effective

policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has become the

To great a distance:

Irrelevance

Intelligence Environment

17

Despite recent assertions that the red line has either faded or disappeared, metaphorically

lifting all or some of the weight off the analysts’ shoulders, this separation continues to be

concept-driven. During a 2004 Roundtable, intelligence and policy discussants expressed

frustration with regard to artificially imposing a red line and agreed communication failures

between parties was a more significant threat than violations of the red line concept

(“Intelligence and policy:,” 2004). In fact, these sentiments parallel Kent’s argument that too

great a distance was the more harmful hazard to the analyst and national security (Kent, 1949).

Others have recently found the line, at minimum, to be blurred (Steiner, 2003). This is

motivating considering, as Paul Wolfowitz has pointed out, “both the policy and intelligence

sides suffer, as does the national interest, whenever principals or practices are allowed to

interfere with close professional cooperation” (Davis, 1996, p.35). Red line, gray line or no line,

however, the true foundation for integrity is not an intelligence-policy separation, but “a high

level of professionalism, combined with high standards of intellectual integrity generated by

education, and nurtured by the ambient culture of the organization” (Kovacs, 1997, p.406). The

fact that irrelevance still plagues intelligence-policy relations illustrates that such concepts do not

saturate intelligence and policy cultures.

Organizational cultures, in fact, significantly contribute to gaps and tensions in

intelligence-policy relations. Tensions plague intelligence-policy relations originating from

differences in their organizational, or “tribal”, mindsets (Lowenthal, 1992). One example arises

from their professional attitudes toward odds. Analysts naturally focus their efforts on

phenomena judged to be likely, highly likely or all but certain, and hopefully also high-impact

low-probability phenomena, while policymakers focus their efforts on what is optimistically

18

possible, a much lower standard (Davis, 2003). This disparity would seem to facilitate, if not

promote, analysts to ignore numerous hot-button issues for policymakers.

Additionally, what issues analysts address that are on policymakers’ substantive schedule

are not likely to be communicated effectively. While analysts are inclined towards words and

complexities, their decision making clientele tend to prefer short, short-term, simplified, value-

adding reports inclusive of raw data (Westerfield, 1995; Rovner, 2011). These preferences

effectively devalue intelligence’s core competency. In fact, many, if not most, policymakers

view themselves as top-level analysts with a wider point of view than intelligence producers.

They view themselves as more than capable of developing not only their own conclusions, but

superior ones at that (Betts, 1978; Best, 2007). With this view, then, what policymakers desire

from intelligence is customized, current support providing explanation rather than prediction,

evidence rather than opinion, and reduction of uncertainty rather than ambivalent, although

reflective, interpretation (Davis, 1996, p.1; Davis, 1995). Former Director of Central

Intelligence Robert Gates suggests analysts:

[Provide] a frank, evenhanded discussion on the issues. If [analysts] know that a

policymaker holds a certain viewpoint on an issue that is different from [their]

analysis, [they] ought not lightly dismiss that view but rather address its strengths

and weaknesses and then provide the evidence and reasoning behind [their] own

judgment. (Goldman, 2006, p.174)

These preferences remain even if the message to be delivered is negative (Davis, 1995).

Analysts are forced to continue to risk being ignored, however, in recognition of the alternative

risks associated with oversimplifying reality and desensitizing policymakers to the ambiguities

and forecast motility — the greater the ambiguity the greater the impact of preconceptions and

19

wishfulness (Jervis, 1970, p.132). Latent cognitive, behavioral and communicative tensions

between decisive, aggressive and confident policymakers and reflective, introspective and

cautious analysts seemingly naturally inhibit efficacious relations by frustrating professionally

and personally disparate parties.

Mutual ignorance about the each party’s role and capabilities, induced by artificial

separation and communicative failures, also undercut effective relations. Gates (1989) has noted

that:

[I]ntelligence collection and assessment are black arts for most presidents and

their key advisors, neither adequately understood nor adequately exploited. For

intelligence officers, presidents and senior level views of the intelligence they

receive and how they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar. (p.36)

This gap depreciates intelligence as it provokes mutual mistrust between the intelligence and

policy factions. Tensions are further frustrated when the void creates unrealistic expectations.

Intelligence practitioners expect their products to be consumed and appreciated regardless of

whether their endeavors were at the direction of policymakers. Conversely, policymakers expect

intelligence to serve their substantive policy needs in a timely and calibrated fashion regardless

of whether they posed appropriate questions to proper intelligence capabilities. Treverton speaks

to this gap when observing that “questions that go unasked by policy are not likely to be

answered by intelligence. If intelligence does provide the answers without being asked, those

answers are not likely to be heard by policy” (2001, p.192). Unfortunately, however,

intelligence staffs do little to replace unrealistic expectations of their policymaking consumers

whom serve a public so attentive to the performance of the Intelligence Community (Kovacs,

20

1997; “Intelligence and Policy:,” 2004). Policymakers, on the other hand, continue to fail to

effectively engage intelligence capabilities too often.

This intelligence operating environment, a loosely coupled intelligence-policy system,

significantly influences the utility of intelligence products, processes and organizations and sets

the tone for intelligence-policy success or failure. Intelligence and intelligence-policy relations

are only effective when calibrated correctly. Thus the relevance of intelligence depends on such

a calibration. Intelligence analysts must actively manage both the quality of their products and

the quality of their strained relationship with policymakers to avoid irrelevance. Mismanagement

of either will breed irrelevance.

Intelligence as a Causal Locus

Yet there are real and concrete limitations to what intelligence can provide. These will be

discussed below in terms of their severity within two categories: intelligence difficulties and

intrinsic limitations. Intelligence difficulties are problematic properties of intelligence that

exacerbate the process of serving policy. Intrinsic limitations, on the other hand, are realities of

human interaction that are inherently impossible for intelligence to unveil. The combination of

these two properties of intelligence work contributes to numerous instances of intelligence

irrelevance.

Most difficulties inherent in intelligence work relate to the operating environment that is

rampant with uncertainty, nonlinearity and complexity. These properties also translate into the

nature of intelligence information. Generally, intelligence collects ambiguous and inconsistent

data. Stein notes that information collected by intelligence is often open to several plausible and

conflicting interpretations (1982). These chaotic dynamics are not conducive to intelligence

forecasting or probabilistic reasoning as distinguishing a priori between signals and misleading

21

noise is exceedingly difficult (Wohlstetter, 1965). In fact, it has been argued that patterns arising

in such complex systems only show retrospective coherence — they can be identified ex-post,

but not predicted (Fruhling, 2007). It has been asserted that “paradoxical logic” also pervades

such systems, compounding the friction, by opposing ordinary, linear logic in favor of choices

that are aimed at deceiving an enemy (Luttwak, 2001). As Luttwak notes, “surprise in war…is…

not merely one advantage among many… but rather the suspension, if only brief, if only partial,

of an entire predicament of strategy (Luttwak, 2001, p.4). If true, such a configuration,

paralleling Clausewitz’s concept of general friction, would not lend itself to pattern- and trend-

based forecasting.

Yet logic for strategic reversals and historical discontinuities exists. As do political

opportunities to stabilize beneficial patterns and destabilize those that are antithetical to preferred

futures (Fruhling, 2007). This is precisely because strategy-context paradoxical propositions,

although intellectually appealing, suffocate under rigorous logical analysis — what appears a

paradox is truly irony (Echevarria II, 2010). It is “ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the

competent general must both protect his soldiery and endanger them by use, and that he cannot

do one without forgoing the other,’ similarly, it ‘is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the

individual soldier cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk” (Echevarria II, 2010, p.vii)

Thus, the logic of war is precisely linear and intelligence possesses the ability, and hopefully the

resources, to inform policy of strategically constructive opportunities to manipulate political

levers, despite extreme difficulty. Central to the identification of these opportunities is a crucial

distinction between uncertainty and risk where, “conditions of risk are those that prevail in

casinos or the stock market, where future outcomes are unknown, but probabilities can be

estimated. Conditions of uncertainty, by contrast, are those where there is no basis even for

22

estimating probabilities” (Fitzsimmons, 2006, p.5-6). Within the first environment intelligence

enjoys the freedom to act. While in the latter, it cannot do so usefully. Jervis asserts that

intelligence, given these conditions, ought only offer estimated probabilities of several plausible

scenarios to policymakers (1986, p.29). Such a halt in efforts, however, is not likely to be praised

by intelligence consumers who demand more than calculated risk (Lowenthal, 2008).

Intelligence analysts tread into dangerous waters, however, when advancing their analyses with

ironic logic to meet these policymaker demands in an effort to ensure their products are relevant

to political and strategic discussion.

Several tools and mechanisms are at intelligence analysts’ disposal, however, to assist

them both in differentiating between signals and noise and managing uncertainty and risk.

Richards Heuer is arguably at the forefront of this school of thought insisting that analysts

develop the capability to extract relevant data patterns through their training and experience

(1999). To assist in diagnosing an issue, managing a large amount of information, and

recognizing pattern analysts also naturally develop schemas, a collection of stored knowledge

associated with a concept (Honig, 2007). Yet developing schemas creates another difficulty,

consciously managing the interplay between top-down (schema driven) and bottom-up (data-

driven) information processing and analysis (Khong, 1992). Quality analysts, critical of their

analyses, will alter schemas in the face of new and strongly incongruent information to maintain

analytical relevance to political reality. Others may fall prey to uncertainty and ambiguity. Thus

the quality of the analyst is central to successful prediction in recognition that intelligence

involves subjective judgment and knowing how to utilize one’s experience (Honig, 2008).

Relating this to the medical field, Honig notes that “diagnosing a rare disease requires both the

appearance of unique symptoms as well as the availability of excellent doctors” (2008, p.4).

23

Ultimately, however, analysts’ tools for achieving methodological professionalism are wrought

with paradoxes and barriers to analytical accuracy — or, in other words, difficulties. Skills and

common sense gained through experience, rather than marginal reforms, remain pivotal to

successful intelligence appraisal, and therefore to the relevance of intelligence that is produced

(Betts, 1978).

Additionally, there are two less attractive but equally pervasive difficulties inherent in the

intelligence process — security and filtering. Security and intelligence, in fact, go hand in hand

so much that secrecy is viewed as one of the most notable characteristics of intelligence

(Shulsky, 2002; Warner, 2007). Security impedes useful intelligence in numerous way including:

limiting use due to the need to protect sources, limiting use by requiring the use of data links that

reduce timeliness and availability, security considerations limiting connectivity between

information systems, encouraging group-think and inertia by limiting availability to a select few,

providing shelter to mediocrity, hindering accountability, and finally, limiting the visibility of

capabilities to decision makers (Kovacs, 1997). Security is but one example, though, of a more

comprehensive difficulty facing analysts, filtering. Filtering is inherent in the intelligence

process and is a more subtle means of limiting availability and impeding intelligence relevance.

Filters color information that reaches the decision-maker and often affect its timeliness (Kovacs,

1997). Beyond security, additional filters include: the mere act of processing raw information

into intelligence, privatizing intelligence as a means of furthering an organizations own interest,

the narrowing of the policy and intelligence vision by focusing on perceived areas of strategic

interest (which creates blind-spots), the reluctance to accept or bear bad news, and the “cry-wolf”

syndrome (Kovacs, 1997). Unfortunately, stress and time pressures, often present in intelligence,

24

escalate the negative effects of these difficulties exponentially, significantly increasing chances

of intelligence irrelevance and strategic surprise.

If the scene is not daunting enough, intelligence also suffers from intrinsic limitations.

While intelligence difficulties arise from epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge),

intelligence’s intrinsic limitations arise from the combination of aleatory uncertainty, also known

as randomness, and uncertainty arising from the enemy (or human subject) (Fruhling, 2007).(See

Figure 3) In essence, the intelligence community is expected to function as society’s soothsayer,

or, to be able to foretell and predict future events regardless of the commonsensical impossibility

of this feat (Kovacs, 1997). As Lowenthal notes, “We ask intelligence analysts to describe the

actions of people who are geographically distant and culturally remote. Worse yet, they are

people. They react to emotions, to stress, to miscalculation and they sometimes make

profoundly bad decisions” (2008, p.313). These unrealistic expectations have been likened to

expecting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to stop bank robberies before they occur

(“Intelligence and policy,” 2004). In truth, the intelligence community is on par cognitively with

their policymaking consumers, the media, and the general public. Cognitive skills necessary for

successful careers are not innate to intelligence work, but are developed and employed better and

worse in all professional contexts. If we accept that not every patient will survive admission into

the emergency room then we must accept the fallibility of intelligence. To expect any more of

intelligence professionals would submit them to unnecessary abuse.

Ultimately, some obstacles of intelligence work are insurmountable and cause

intelligence irrelevance, the intrinsic limitations of intelligence work. As Lowenthal argues, “we

will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is

difficult” (2008, p.315). We must therefore focus our efforts on those causes of intelligence

25

irrelevance that are rectifiable, those attributed to intelligence analysts and policymakers and the

degree to which they effectively manage the quality of intelligence products and intelligence-

policy relations.

Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus

The fundamental function of the intelligence analyst, again, is to reduce uncertainty for

decision makers. They must actualize this function within an environment in which intrinsic

limitations prevent complete success and intelligence difficulties further antagonize efforts to

meet professional expectations. Intelligence analysts thus become causal loci for intelligence

irrelevance when they fail to overcome intelligence difficulties due to avoidable mistakes, most

often due to psychological or professional pathologies. These occurrences were likely

maintained by the fact that intelligence had traditionally been understood and described as more

an art than a science (Marrin, 2005). Progress in professionalizing intelligence, however, began

with efforts of Sherman Kent to create an analytic code, the CIA’s intelligence journal and the

CIA Center for Study of Intelligence (Marrin, 2005). More recently, a CIA study found that

although intelligence operations may be appropriately conceptualized as tradecraft, intelligence

Table 2.1: Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations

26

analysis is and should be part of a scientific process (Johnston, 2005). Increasing the quality and

efficacy of intelligence thus requires that it be reconstructed in the context of some scientific

method, alloyed with intelligence’s traditional arts (Kerbel, 2008). Intelligence analysts ought to

be conscious of this transition on two planes in particular: information-processing skills and

maintenance of professional norms. Both scholars and their customers surely are.

Information-processing Skills

Information-processing skills are needed to generate comprehensive assessments based

on voluminous, specific, reliable and factual information (Honig, 2007). Limitations in human

intuitive cognition, however, undercut analysts’ ability to process such large quantities of

information into concise, coherent and comprehensive intelligence products. While speed and

efficiency are strengths of intuitive human cognition, inherent limitations in human cognition

provoke bias in intelligence analysis (Brasfield, 2009). Cognitive mindsets have been identified

as a major cause of intelligence and policy failures for decades (Feder, 2002). Humans have a

limited mental capacity. The complexity of the world, however, requires us to adopt and employ

a simplified mental model of reality within which to work. We behave rationally within the

constructs of our model; however, the models we construct are not always adapted to the

requirements of the real world (Heuer, 1999; Simon, 1957). When disparate from reality,

analyst’s falls prey to cognitive dissonance. As mentioned above, quality analysts alter their

mindsets in the face in strongly incongruent evidence. Under these circumstances, however,

analysts are required to employ cognitive shortcuts to cope with the volume of information,

shortcuts that inevitably lead to mistakes in judgment (Wohlstetter, 1962).

These shortcuts also produce a number of cognitive biases that include, but are not

limited to, the following:

27

1. tendencies to allow perceptions to be influenced by expectations,

2. tendencies to maintain initial perceptions despite strongly incongruent information,

3. tendencies to allow available evidence, memory or imaginable scenarios to drive an

analyst’s estimate of probabilities,

4. tendencies to establish cognitive anchors and then adjust estimated probabilities from that

initial anchor point as new evidence is collected,

5. tendencies to achieve more confidence in a small body of consistent data than a large

body of inconsistent data,

6. tendencies to process less-than-perfectly-reliable evidence as if it were wholly reliable,

7. tendencies to ignore the absence of evidence in judgments,

8. tendencies to favor causality over randomness, accident or error explanations, and

9. tendencies to fall prey to deceptive tactics (Heuer, 1981).

Intelligence analysis ought to be a neutral process that does not slant the raw information.

Analysts who are not mindful of these cognitive pitfalls are likely to have their analyses ignored

as they filter information into intelligence.

The value of information processing skills really surfaces when the analyst needs to

decipher and differentiate vital incoming information from superfluous noise, which can be

exceedingly complicated (Wohlstetter, 1962). Analysts that have developed sufficient and

realistically accurate mindsets, however, can employ them to recognize patterns in voluminous

data without being distracted by contradictory noise (Heuer, 1999). Such mindsets are developed

through training and experience so that one should expect a positive relationship between the

seniority of intelligence professionals and pattern recognition skills. This, of course, assumes that

such accretionary mindsets adapt to transformations within an enemy or target. As Betts notes,

28

experience can cause greater error than ignorance when the enemy does not follow the patterns

of past behavior (2007). Analysts therefore must remain aware of scenarios and hypotheses that

have proven historically inconsistent with their schemas as changes within a target may cause

them to become more likely. These considerations increase the time needed to produce

intelligence and, therefore, potentially eliminate the usefulness of the product.

To analysts’ and policy’s detriment, however, biases pervade additional elements of

intelligence work as well. Not only do analysts have the daunting task of assessing the reliability

and relevance of information that has been collected, but they also must assess the reliability of

human sources behind information. HUMINT sources are masked from intelligence analysts as a

means of preserving the extremely fragile relationship between case officer and agent

(Lowenthal, 2006). While reports supplied to analysts may include information on the access of

the source or the past reliability of the source, the ultimate lack of details regarding the human

source of the information is likely to bias the interpretation of the information (Lowenthal,

2006). For example, information consistent with previous perceptions or expectations will tend

to be valued more than information that discredits previous perceptions or expectations. These

security measures ultimately deny the analyst the opportunity to compare and contrast reliability

between human and other sources of intelligence information. This causes them to intuitively

apply some analytical rubric based on skill and common sense to their collection of evidence

(Honig, 2008). The cautious and critical analyst cannot assume perfect reliability; however,

analysts must ensure the same attributes prevent them from miscalculating the value of

HUMINT.

The final critical element of the analysts’ information-process skill is temporal. In order

for intelligence to do any good it needs to be in the right hands at the right time. Intelligence

29

analysis, production and dissemination, therefore, ought to conclude at a point when the product

is still relevant to policy considerations — remember, timeliness is a prerequisite to usable

intelligence. Rapidly shifting and changing situations, such as war, decrease this window of

opportunity. Ultimately, analysts must ensure the appropriate consumers of intelligence have

access and availability to their products before their perishable date.

Thus, again, the quality of the analyst becomes central to the ability of intelligence to

process information. Quality analysts, mindful and self-critical of potential perceptual

distortions, employ evidence in judgment based on its balanced and fair diagnostic value in a

timely manner. Newly developed scientific methods for intelligence analysis, such as Analysis of

Competing Hypotheses (ACH), are assisting this effort (Brasfield, 2009). Additionally, quality

analysts have developed cognitive tools (schemas) through their training and experience that are

representative of the real world, flexible enough to adapt to evolution within targets, and that

allow analysts to accurately detect significant patterns within volumes of information. These

skills thus become central to producing intelligence that is useful and relevant to policy.

Maintaining Professional Norms

In addition to the methodological quality, analytical integrity becomes central to the

maintenance of intelligence relevance. To maintain analytical integrity, intelligence analysts

need to insulate themselves from society’s prejudices and resist tendencies toward common

perceptions and toward parochialism. Doing so improves estimation in that it avoids

unnecessary, additional distortion.

Analysts can avoid these negative cultural and organizational influences through

independence of mind, nonconformity, and curiosity. Although, as Nesbitt and Ross point out,

there is a natural tendency to form images upon first impressions and on the basis of relatively

30

little information, analysts cognizant of such pressures can significantly reduce their effects

(1980, p.172). They can also make parallel efforts to combat pressures to conform to

organizational cultures by adopting common assumptions and to unnecessarily restrict

intelligence to protect their unit. Analysts ought not to submit to pressures to conform or rivalry

encouraged by specialization of intelligence units. As Bar-Joseph suggests, curiosity within

responsible, professional analysts will lead them to look for the bigger picture in order to fully

understand a research subject (2001). Analysts should strive for the courage to challenge

organizational and societal pressures in the name of truth. Efforts to do so are efforts that avoid

the pitfall of cognitive dissonance.

The ultimate assessment of quality information processing and maintenance of analytical

integrity should come from the intelligence consumer. The intelligence must justifiably motivate

a perception of accuracy and relevance in the policymaker that instills a level of confidence

sufficient to base political action. Communicating the intelligence appraisal appropriately,

including its underlying facts and assumptions, is critical to inspiring such confidence. A product

that withstands an intelligence-policy dialogue is much more likely to be employed. Ultimately,

to create confidence the intelligence ought to ease policymaker fears of ambiguity and deception,

thus reducing uncertainty.

While analysts have long strived for political objectiveness in their assessments,

analytical objectivity has only recently spawned great attention. Maintaining analytical

objectivity through quality information processing and maintenance of analytical integrity

requires as much careful attention and constant effort as required to maintain effective

intelligence-policy relations. The product of such efforts is the elimination of intelligence

31

analysts as a causal locus of intelligence irrelevance. Anything less than careful attention and

constant effort begs intelligence consumers to ignore intelligence products.

Policymakers as a Causal Locus

Intelligence consumers, however, have the ultimate say in the employment or rejection of

intelligence. As Amos Kovacs noted, it is in the mental steps of the decision-making process

where “the die is cast – to use or not to use” (1997, p.394). This decision may arise for various

reasons, some proper, some improper and rectifiable. The latter causes will be discussed here.

Policymakers may not employ intelligence due to inertia. Often, there is a distinct flow

within political organizations, militaries and governments. As Kovacs points out, “As a rule,

people and organizations prefer not to act rather than to act. And they prefer to act according to

previously decided plans rather than modify them” (1997, p.398). Intelligence can embody all

the prerequisites of usability and easily build confidence in decision-makers (if read) and still be

ignored. Andrew S. Grove (1999) notes that:

Senior managers got to where they are by having been good at what they do. And

over time they have learned to lead with their strengths. So it’s not surprising that

they will keep implementing the same strategic and tactical moves that work for

them during the course of their careers – especially [at critical moments]. I call

this phenomenon the inertia of success. It is extremely dangerous and can

reinforce denial. (p.127)

Kirkpatrick (1969) notes parallels in the military sphere. He asserts that military decision-

makers ignore intelligence for many reasons, including because “they simply do not care what

the enemy is doing or can do. They have decided on an objective and are determined to

accomplish it, regardless of what others might do” (1969, p.15). This phenomenon is

32

synonymous with incidents in which intelligence analysts cognitively block newly acquired

information in maintenance of initial perceptions. Both phenomena are the effects of perceptual

biases and both are potentially highly consequential. Deductively, therefore, a will to act, is a

prerequisite for intelligence use. Also deductively, though, the act of willing is also a prerequisite

for intelligence use. Policymakers must have already decided that action is necessary and that

inaction is unacceptable. Only then does intelligence have a decision to support — of which

action to take.

More personally, inertia within a policymaker’s mind may cause intelligence irrelevance.

Intelligence may be ignored simply because it is not congruent with a policymaker’s

preconceptions, dogmas or ideologies (Kovacs, 1999, p.400). Perceptions and appraisals of

reality that are incongruent with their ideology are naturally denied as “objective analysis [takes]

a second seat to personal and emotional reactions” (Grove, 1999, p.124). We have come to know

this phenomenon as cognitive or strategic dissonance. A clear example is Stalin’s ignorance of a

yearlong military buildup in Eastern Europe and eighty-seven separate, credible intelligence

warnings prior to Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June

1941. The fundamental reason those warnings were ignored was because of Stalin

preconceptions (Steury, 2006). Grove asserts that dissonance is an automatic reaction to strategic

inflection (1999). If so, policymakers fail both intelligence and national, or organizational,

security at the most pivotal moments - perceivably counterfactual strategic shifts. Indeed, as Bar-

Joseph and Kruglanski (2003) point out, regarding the lead up to the Yom Kippur war, key

figures with strong needs for cognitive closure:

(1) placed an unusually high premium on clarity and coherence of their

assessments (2) exhibited a high self-assured manner and an autocratic style of

33

decision-making, and (3) tended to suppress, ignore, and reinterpret information

inconsistent with their preconception until the very last hours before the outbreak

of the war… [which accounted] for…the general adherence… to the tragically

mistaken notion that war with Egypt and with Syria was unlikely. (p.92)

Thus analysts who develop the courage to speak truthfully to powerful decision-makers do so at

their own peril. As Johnson notes, “speaking truth to power is notoriously difficult, because

power often refuses to listen” (2003, p.12). These phenomena are synonymous with incidents in

which intelligence analysts allow the aggregation of evidence, memories and reasonable

scenarios correlated with their long-held, but mal-adjusted, mindsets drive their estimate of

probabilities, despite Betts’ warning. As discussed before, many decision-makers see themselves

as their best intelligence analysts; however, they must recognize that they too are susceptible to

the same cognitive and perceptual biases.

Cognitive dissonance, though, is but one form of a larger issue, filtering. There are

several forms of filtering sourced to the intelligence consumer. Intelligence that challenges

inertia, mentioned above, is often filtered precisely because it bears bad news. Policymakers

dislike hearing bad news as much or more than intelligence analysts dislike sharing it (Davis,

1995). Kovacs notes that narrowing one’s field of vision and concentrating on those events

perceived to be the most crucial is yet another self-imposed filter (1997). Yet the imperatives of

daily decision-making, which limit the time available to read and digest intelligence, requires a

consolidation of effort (Betts, 1978). Rationed vision, however, creates blind spots in policy,

and, therefore, in intelligence, which compounds uncertainty. Lastly, some scholars assert that

policymakers filter out intelligence analyses that are antithetical to their policy preferences.

These scholars assert policymakers purposely select intelligence analyses that provide support

34

for their preferences (Rovner, 2011; Lowenthal, 2008; Betts, 1978). In these cases,

policymaker’s do not use intelligence as a tool to serve policy, but as a weapon to defend their

standpoint and attack their political counterpart. Regardless, each form of filtering prematurely

limits policy options and responses on the table.

Of course, though, filters exist because of some inherent utility. They function similarly

to mindsets and relate to temporal concerns and constraints. Policymakers often assert that they

simply do not have sufficient time to read the volumes of intelligence reports that flood their

desks (Davis, 1995; Davis, 1996; Haass, 2007). As one policymaker bluntly stated:

I could not afford to read intelligence papers because this or that intelligence

agency was entitled to produce them. It did not matter to me how much work the

Agency had put into its products, or how polished they were in scholarly terms. In

fact, I could not afford the time to read intelligence papers written by personal

friends and colleagues. I could only read intelligence products tailored to help me

get through my substantive schedule. There was no other rational choice. (Davis,

1995, p.5)

Another recommended that analytical products not extend beyond two pages as he only had five

minutes each day to dedicate to intelligence (Johnson, 2002, p.193-194).For policymakers,

anything other than concise, tailored intelligence instinctively fails their needs. Intelligence

should suit policymakers’ preferred format, however, it would be tragic if the US needlessly

suffered a surprise attack because a policymaker simply could not make time to read a three-page

report. Arrogance and inflexibility can be just as dangerous and cognitive biases.

35

Moving Forward by Managing Intelligence Difficulties

The above literature demonstrates that effective intelligence-policy relations and, by

default, the relevance of intelligence are dependent upon an unnatural synergy between disparate

parties. Although the nature of intelligence work ensures and reinforces the natural tensions

inherent in intelligence-policy relations, often both analysts and policymakers needlessly

aggravate those tensions by failing to overcome cognitive intelligence difficulties. (See Table

2.2) Such failures are highly consequential not only for national or organizational security, but

also consequential for future intelligence-policy interaction. Thus the quality of intelligence

analysts and policymakers highly influences the development of such a synergy. Additionally,

calibrating relations early is likely to increase odds of efficacy for the long term, assuming

continued careful thought and constant effort.

Table 2.2: Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source

36

Although there are significant structural and functional disparities between the

intelligence and policy tribes, relations between the two do not need to be tense and intelligence

does not ever need to be irrelevant. The key to accomplishing these goals has already been

recognized by the scholarship, careful thought and constant effort. Within law enforcement, such

thought and effort may already be in place. Thus, we must understand the current state of the

relationship to be able to recommend any methods for improvement. Towards this aim, this study

will investigate the status of current intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement context.

The data collected will be used to deduce appropriate actions to improve relations and reduce

intelligence irrelevance. Given these goals, this exploratory and explanatory study investigates

the following research questions:

1. Are law enforcement intelligence-policy relations frustrated by tribal disparities?

2. Do law enforcement policymakers ignore law enforcement strategic intelligence?

3. How can law enforcement intelligence-policy relations be improved to reduce incidence

of intelligence irrelevance?

Assumption of frustrated relations and a higher-than-negligible incidence of intelligence

irrelevance, along with the concepts and assertions highlighted in this chapter, lead to the

following hypotheses:

1. The prevalence of cognitive biases or dissonance in analysts or policymakers, as well as

the level of security, filtering and inertia in the organization are all positively correlated

to intelligence irrelevance (as they increase, intelligence irrelevance increases).

2. The level of intelligence marketing by analysts, level of policymaker volition, level of

communication between analysts and policymakers, the amount of time available to

devote to strategic intelligence and the level of confidence in strategic intelligence by

37

analysts and policymakers are all negatively correlated to intelligence irrelevance (as they

increase, intelligence irrelevance decreases).

3. Incidence of intelligence irrelevance can be reduced and intelligence-policy relations

improved most effectively in the law enforcement context by focusing efforts on

measurably reducing the variables positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance and

measurably increasing those variables negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.

I anticipate support not only for the above hypotheses, but also for the data to support the

appropriateness of the independent variables summarized by the literature.

38

METHODOLOGY

In order to address the research questions and test the stated hypotheses, I conducted

survey research that examines intelligence-policy relations at HIDTA programs both from the

perspective of HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts as well as from HIDTA policymakers. This

survey research will determine if, in fact, intelligence and policy are disconnected in law

enforcement and if that disconnection causes frustration for either party. Data was also collected

to determine the relevance of strategic intelligence within HIDTA. The survey research will also

determine the level of synergy that currently exists between HIDTA intelligence analysts and

their policymakers. This will be accomplished by evaluating the quantitative and qualitative

survey data that directly reflect the level of intelligence marketing present, the level of analyst

and policymaker submission to intelligence difficulties including cognitive biases, cognitive

dissonance, security, filtering, time constraints, and the level of organizational inertia present in

HIDTA programs. We can then deduce from the details of the present synergy, or lack thereof,

appropriate measures that can reduce incidents of strategic intelligence irrelevance in law

enforcement. The following methodology section will provide the details of this research.

Survey Setting

As stated above, the survey research conducted for this study was completed at HIDTA

programs, programs key to counter-narcotic efforts. These programs are ideal for measuring law

enforcement intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance as the national HIDTA

program provides thirty-two individually managed HIDTA offices that assist federal, state, local

and tribal law enforcement partners. Each HIDTA is responsible for producing its own strategy

and its policymakers and analysts are employed by and representative of federal, state, local and

tribal law enforcement levels. No other single population source is likely to be as generalizable

39

as the HIDTA population. The generalizability of the study to the larger law enforcement

community is also supported by the fact that the study’s approach is not dependent upon the

HIDTA mission or strategy. Rather, sampling the HIDTA program provides thirty-two potential

case studies to verify whether intelligence irrelevance has translated over from the national

security sector. The verification, then, highlights the high likelihood that law enforcement

agencies and organizations other than the HIDTA program are afflicted by unnatural

intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance.

The HIDTA program functions to consolidate drug enforcement personnel and resources to

more effectively combat drug trafficking in areas of the country considered to be major drug

distribution channels. The first offices were opened in 1990, when the Office of National Drug

Control Policy (ONDCP) established five HIDTA’s in New York City, Los Angeles, South

Florida, Houston, and the Southwest Border. Today, thirty-two HIDTAs with representation

from fifteen percent of US counties, covering fifty-eight percent of the US population, as well as

all major federal, state, local and tribal drug enforcement organizations continue this mission in

thirty-two targeted areas. (See Figure 3 for a map of HIDTA counties nation-wide) They fulfill

this mission through 670 current initiatives throughout the country including:

• Enforcement initiatives comprising multi-agency investigative, interdiction, and

prosecution activities;

• Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives;

• Support for programs that provide assistance beyond the core enforcement and

intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; and

40

• Drug use prevention and drug treatment initiatives (“High intensity drug,” 2010)

The HIDTA intelligence initiatives specifically assist participating agencies develop a

coordinated HIDTA strategy, identify new target and trends, develop threat assessments and drug

market analyses, de-conflict targets and events, and manage cases.

As described above, one of the four core missions of the national program is to enhance

“law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement

agencies” (“High intensity drug,” 2010). Towards this end, HIDTAs develop intelligence-driven

initiatives to combat local drug threats (“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). Common initiatives

include those directed towards identified drug trafficking corridors or areas, drug trafficking

conveyances, drug finance methodologies, and drug-related crime (generally violent) threats.

Figure 3.1: HIDTA Program Counties 2010

41

Tactical HIDTA intelligence analysts support multi-agency criminal investigators and task force

officers within these initiatives with intelligence that directly supports areas of uncertainty within

their investigations, particular attention given to investigative direction and focus (“HIDTA

program policy,” 2009). Strategic HIDTA intelligence analysts work drug threats that are not

investigation-specific, including intelligence “related to the structure and movement of organized

criminal elements, pattern of criminal activity, activity of criminal elements, projection of

criminal trends, or projective planning” (“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). Within many

HIDTAs there is a large degree of cross-over between the roles of tactical and strategic analysts.

It is not clear from the program policy, however, if the intelligence functions within the HIDTA

program address the basic assumptions of counter-narcotic and HIDTA strategies, a role

traditionally and commonly associated with strategic intelligence analysis. Rather, HIDTA

program policy suggests intelligence analysts do not produce intelligence or strategic intelligence

(“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). According to program policy, the drug threat assessment is

the strategic intelligence product of each HIDTA; HIDTAs develop their strategy annually based

on their annual drug threat assessment. Developing a strategy that “can respond quickly” to the

current drug threat, though, is not an intelligence function. Intelligence functions to permit

policymakers to preempt what will be, not to respond to what is. Thus, HIDTA threat

assessments are overwhelmingly retrospective and operationally-focused.

Nonetheless, HIDTA initiatives reside at the nexus of HIDTA strategic intelligence and

HIDTA policymaking. (See Figure 4 for the intelligence-policy process) Each HIDTA possesses

an executive board comprised of representatives from all federal, state, and local law

enforcement participants. Initiatives are created and proposed for ONDCP approval through each

HIDTA’s executive board, their policymaking component. The Director of the ONDCP also

receives advice directly from the participating f

the executive decision to fund a new HIDTA initiative

specific or HIDTA-wide initiative

of strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking, is the setting for thi

be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both

intelligence analysts and HIDTA executive board members.

The sampling procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling

research questions further dictate a sampling focus on HIDTA

their policymakers. Thus sampling will be restricted to professionals with those

HIDTA programs. Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;

however, participation will be limited to those HIDTA analysts

production of strategic intelligence

Policymaking functions are execute

generally include representation from

•HIDTA Strategic

Intelligence

Identify strategic

threats and

intelligence gaps

•HIDTA Executive

Board

Propose

initatives for

funding to

address threats

and gaps

Figure 3.2

irectly from the participating federal law enforcement agencies before making

ecutive decision to fund a new HIDTA initiative (strategic element), whether a HIDTA

wide initiative. Activity between the first two links in this process, the nexus

of strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking, is the setting for this study. The survey will

be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both

intelligence analysts and HIDTA executive board members.

Survey Sample

procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling

research questions further dictate a sampling focus on HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and

Thus sampling will be restricted to professionals with those roles

Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;

however, participation will be limited to those HIDTA analysts that are involved in the

production of strategic intelligence. HIDTA policymakers, by contrast, hold numerous titles

Policymaking functions are executed within HIDTA executive boards. HIDTA executive boards

generally include representation from all federal, state, local and tribal participants of that

HIDTA Executive

Board

Propose

initatives for

funding to

address threats

and gaps

•Federal Law

Enforcement

Agency

Representatives

Advise on which

initiatives to

fund

•Director of the

Office of

National Drug

Control Policy

Grants funding

for HIDTA

initiatives

3.2: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process

42

ederal law enforcement agencies before making

whether a HIDTA-

Activity between the first two links in this process, the nexus

The survey will

be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both HIDTA strategic

procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling. The

intelligence analysts and

roles within

Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;

are involved in the

, hold numerous titles.

d within HIDTA executive boards. HIDTA executive boards

all federal, state, local and tribal participants of that

New HIDTA

Initiative

43

HIDTA. Members of HIDTA executive boards, therefore, will be invited to participate in the

policymaking sample. All members of both survey samples can potentially be sampled.

Demographics

The data collection phase of this study yielded 72 total responses, 40 policymaker

responses and 32 strategic intelligence analyst responses. Of the 72 respondents who started the

survey, 46 completed it, yielding a 63.9% completion rate. The 40 policymaker responses are

estimated to represent 6.25% of the HIDTA policymaker population. The 32 strategic

intelligence analyst responses are significantly more representative of the HIDTA strategic

intelligence analyst population at an estimated 50%. Although the rate of questionnaire

participation is not a variable of this study, it nonetheless is the first indicator of intelligence-

policy relations at HIDTA.

The initial questions posed by the study questionnaires aimed to confirm respondents’

role at their HIDTA as well as collect demographic data reflecting the respondent’s HIDTA and

level of law enforcement representation. Aggregate study data represents 21 of the 32 HIDTAs

— 5 HIDTAs fall under the Southwest Border HIDTA but are individually managed (See

Appendix D for Study Demographics Figures). Of the twenty-one HIDTAs represented, ten

include representation in both the policymaker and strategic intelligence analyst population. As

expected, both the policymaker and analyst study participants represent several levels of law

enforcement including federal, state, and local law enforcement. Such inclusion, coupled with

the response rates, permit study findings to be suggestive of intelligence-policy relations at

HIDTA as well as in law enforcement in general, but not generalizable.

44

Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials

Given the large geographic disparity between HIDTA locations, this study relied on

electronic surveys. A set of questionnaires were developed and distributed online utilizing the

services of web-based survey site surveymonkey.com. The HIDTA email domain served as the

primary distribution channel for data collection. Thus respondents were able to participate from

natural, non-manipulative settings of their choice — within the limits of locations in which they

had access to the Internet.

Two distinct surveys were developed and distributed separately to their corresponding

sample. The two distinct samples represent the two nodes in the relationship: strategic

intelligence analysts and intelligence customers/policymakers. The data collection process took

place over the period of four weeks. Reminder invitations for the survey were distributed to

increase respondent participation. Survey protocol was as follows:

• Day 1 – Invitation to online survey instrument sent by e-mail, data collection began

• Day 14 – Thank you/Reminder letter sent by e-mail

• Day 27 – Additional thank you/reminder letter sent by e-mail

• Day 28 – Data collection concluded

Measures

To determine if intelligence irrelevance is or is likely to become an obstacle for HIDTA

strategic intelligence the questionnaire sought responses to questions relating to the existence of

a relational disconnect and any resulting frustration, the relevance of intelligence to their

organization, and specific measures of the causes of intelligence irrelevance asserted by the

scholarship in the literature review. These variables were operationalized as follows:

45


To discern whether or not law enforcement intelligence-policy relations were plagued by

tribal tensions and gaps the questionnaires asked respondents whether or not they believed they

are connected to their intelligence-policy counterpart. If not, respondents were asked to report

whether that disconnect causes them frustration. Follow-up questions aimed to measure whether

or not law enforcement policymakers ignored strategic intelligence. Questions asked respondents

to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production with the frequency of policymaker

discussion of strategic intelligence products. Respondents were also asked directly to assess the

relevance of strategic intelligence to HIDTA success and how to improve the utilization of

strategic intelligence. The last question highlights the level to which participants are aware of the

causes of reported intelligence-policy disconnection. Any recommendations outside of the ten

independent variables included in this study provide opportunities for further research. These

questions aimed to determine the level of intelligence-policy disconnection, the level of strategic

intelligence irrelevance, and to validate the latter measure by asking indirect questions about

strategic intelligence production and consumption.

Cognitive Bias

Cognitive bias has been asserted to be a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as bias reduces

the policymaking value of intelligence products. Biased policymaking can undermine

intelligence just the same. Respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the

steps they take to remain objective in their strategic intelligence production or policymaking,

respectively, as a measure of their susceptibility to cognitive bias in their given tasks. Thirteen

potential steps were offered as well as an opportunity to list any other steps taken by the

46

respondent. This question aimed to measure HIDTA susceptibility to bias and to determine the

correlation between cognitive bias and intelligence irrelevance.

Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as it leads

policymakers to deny appraisals of reality (strategic intelligence assessments) that are

inconsistent with their ideology or schema in favor of preserving that ideology or schema. Both

study populations were asked to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production that is

inconsistent or conflicts with policymaker beliefs or attitudes, the frequency of policymaker

rejection or disbelief of those assessments, and the frequency of policymaker rationalization of

those assessments. These questions aimed to measure the presence of cognitive dissonance in

HIDTA policymakers and determine how they alleviate the resulting tension. Additionally, these

questions aimed to determine the correlation between cognitive dissonance and irrelevance.

Security. Security is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as security

considerations limit the availability and accessibility of strategic intelligence to potential users,

thus undermining the intelligence-policy process. Security measures can also limit the

availability and accessibility of critical sources necessary for the production of valuable strategic

intelligence. This undermines the intelligence process directly and the intelligence-policy process

indirectly. To determine the level to which security impacts intelligence-policy relations and is

correlated with intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA, analysts were asked to report the availability

of critical sources of strategic intelligence/information as well as the frequency that security

policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence sources, impede the production of

useful intelligence, and delay the production of useful intelligence. Policymakers were asked to

report the availability of strategic intelligence products as well as the frequency that security

47

policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence, impede their use of strategic

intelligence, and delay their use of strategic intelligence.

Filtering

Filtering is asserted as a cause for intelligence irrelevance, as filters color the information

that reaches a policymaker and often adversely impact its timeliness. In effort to determine the

level to which filters impact intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence

irrelevance, respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the number of

personnel/parties that must approve strategic intelligence products before they reach the

policymakers, report the frequency that these approvals/revisions delay the production of useful

strategic intelligence, and report how these measures affect the utility of the product.

Organizational Inertia

Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when

policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions

rather than alter them. The logic follows, policymakers simply may not care about what is going

on, but have decided on an objective and/or strategy and intend to achieve or implement it. To

determine the level to which organizational inertia impacts intelligence-policy relations and is

correlated with intelligence irrelevance the questionnaire asked respondents to describe their

strategy, to report the length of time their strategy has largely remained the same, the level of

success of their strategy, and to judge whether or not strategic intelligence can improve their

strategy.

Marketing

Insufficient marketing of intelligence is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as

policymakers are consumed by their substantive schedules and cannot innately know which

48

information and assessments are most deserving of their limited time. Policymakers often devote

their time to the people, issues, and information that most press for it. To measure the level to

which HIDTA marketing impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence

irrelevance respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the amount of

time spent marketing strategic intelligence products to policymakers.

Volition

Volition is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as policymakers must be

willing and have decided to act for intelligence to be relevant to its organization. If policymakers

have not decided to act then they are not likely to value intelligence assessments. To measure the

level to which volition impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with irrelevance

respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to judge the likelihood that their

Executive Board would be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans.

Respondents should have been asked whether or not they have decided policy or strategy change

(action) is necessary, however, the researcher misinterpreted the concept of volition.

Communication

Insufficient frequency or low quality communication between intelligence analysts and

policymakers is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance as low professional cooperation

intensifies natural gaps and tensions within intelligence-policy relations. To measure the level to

which communication impacts intelligence-policy and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance,

respondents were asked to report the frequency in which intelligence produced is easily

digestible (a measure of quality), the frequency in which intelligence produced includes

assessments of source reliability and analytical confidence, their general satisfaction with the

timeliness, format, content, communication, and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence, the

49

frequency in which policymakers and strategic intelligence analysts directly communicate, and

whether or not analysts normally attend their Executive Board meetings.

Time

Producing valuable strategic intelligence requires a significant investment of time, both in

terms of production and marketing. Employing strategic intelligence also generally requires a

significant temporal investment. Strategic intelligence is apt to become irrelevant if either side,

intelligence or policymakers, devote insufficient amounts of time to these efforts. To measure the

level to which temporal attributes impact HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and correlate with

intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the frequency in which they

produce/utilize strategic intelligence, the percentage of their time they devote to strategic

intelligence, to qualify their temporal investment, and to report their overall satisfaction with the

timeliness of strategic intelligence.

Confidence

For policymakers to base political action on intelligence, intelligence products must

overcome ambiguity, avert deception, and motivate a perception of accuracy and relevance in

policymakers that is sufficient to justify action. To this end, confidence must be achieved by both

analysts and policymakers in intelligence products as well as intelligence processes. To measure

the level to which confidence impacts HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with

intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the relevance of strategic intelligence to

their HIDTA, their level of belief that their strategy can be improved through strategic

intelligence, to general confidence in their strategic intelligence processes and products, and

whether or not analytical confidence was normally included in strategic products.

50

Data Analysis

As mentioned previously, the study collected quantitative and qualitative data to address

the research questions. Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted on collected quantitative

data. Quantitative and qualitative data representative of the dependent and ten independent

variables were analyzed for statistical significance in terms of central tendency and variance for

both aggregate data as well as data representative of intelligence irrelevance. Surveymonkey.com

automatically extracted quantitative data from the questionnaires for construction of that data

into a Microsoft Excel sheet for manipulation and analysis. Furthermore, a set of matrices were

constructed by the researcher to assist in data analysis. The matrices categorized responses

offered by each question into one of three options: low, moderate, or high (See Tables 3& 4).

Response options were assigned to matrix categories logically according to the researcher. The

subjective nature of the development of these tools need not undermine the study findings since

the statistical correlation between aggregate results and those representative of intelligence

irrelevance are the primary sources for this study’s findings and conclusions. The matrices only

serve to assist in data analysis and to graphically display summarized data results. Analyzing the

results in this manner permits the production of a prescriptive methodology for HIDTA’s to

mitigate, or more favorably, eliminate strategic intelligence irrelevance. All survey questions

were also analyzed thematically in context of the three research questions and hypotheses.

51

Marketing Volition Communication Time Confidence

← L

owe

r

Hig

her →

- % of time devoted is ≥ 20%

- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy

- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s normally attend Executive Board meetings

- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IA’s and PM’s -IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI

- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PM’s judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products

-% of time devoted is 10-20%

- PM’s judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)

- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Every 6 months or yearly -- IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart

- Analyst – 30-50% of time devoted - PM – 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI

- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI

- % of time devoted is <10%

- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy

- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s &PM’s: Less than Yearly - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PM’s reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IA’s normally do not attend Executive Board meetings

- Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst – 0-30% of time devoted - PM – 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI

- SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products

Table 3.1: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations IA – Intelligence Analyst, PM – Policymaker, SI – Strategic Intelligence

52

Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia ←

Low

er

H

ighe

r →

-Average of 0-4 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias

- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IA’s - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PM’s - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility

- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years - Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias

- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- Critical SI sources occasionally available to IA’s - SI occasionally available to PM’s - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility

- Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias

- No incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IA’s - SI generally or readily available to PM’s - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough

- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

Table 3.2: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations IA – Intelligence Analyst, PM – Policymaker, SI – Strategic Intelligence

53

RESULTS

The study questionnaire posed a total of 36 questions. Demographic inquiries aside, each

question will be discussed as it relates to the 11 total variables measured in this thesis: 1

dependent variable (intelligence irrelevance) and 10 independent variables (causes of intelligence

irrelevance).


Study results suggest that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are moderately

plagued by tribal disparities and that law enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic

intelligence. The number of respondents reporting to believe they are disconnected from their

intelligence-policy counterpart was lower than expected, but still notable. Eleven of thirty

analysts, or 36.7%, report disconnection while seven of thirty-two policymakers, or 21.9%,

report the same in their intelligence-policy relations. Interestingly, ten of the twenty-one

HIDTAs represented, or 47.6%, report a disconnection by an analyst, policymaker or both. Out

of the ten HIDTA’s represented by the data on both the analyst and policymaker side only the

North Texas HIDTA had a respondent from both populations report disconnection. This result

demonstrates the level of inconsistency in intelligence-policy relations and thus emphasizes the

level of relational disconnection in HIDTA. Most respondents are not even aware that their

counterpart believes they are disconnected.

While these results confirm that natural gaps and tensions plague intelligence-policy

relations, the level of frustration caused by intelligence-policy disconnection was also less than

anticipated, but still notable. One of six policymakers, or 16.7%, and three of ten analysts, or

30%, reporting disconnection also reported frustration caused by that disconnection (See

Appendix E for Intelligence-Policy Disconnection Figures). Although the reasons for this result

54

are unclear, the greater level of frustration among analysts appears to support the assertion that

policymakers can succeed without intelligence analysts, but the opposite is not true. This result

suggests that even though analysts and policymakers are active participants in the relationship,

the weight of ensuring effective intelligence-policy relations rests nearly exclusively on the

HIDTA analysts’ shoulders. This can easily lead to ineffective relations as HIDTA analysts are

not in a position to compel their policymakers to pay attention to their estimates.

Study responses reflecting the frequencies of strategic intelligence production and

executive discussion of those products confirm this relational weakness. Over four-fifths of

analysts, or 82.2%, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly,

however, less than half report that it these products are discussed by executives as frequently.

Most are not sure how frequently their products are discussed by policymakers. Less than half of

policymakers, however, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or

quarterly. Most report it is produce yearly, however, discussed at board meetings quarterly.

Nearly one-fourth of policymakers, however, or 23.3%, do not know how often strategic

intelligence is produced at their HIDTA. The substantial level of relational opacity and

inconsistency demonstrated by these results not only confirms HIDTA intelligence-policy

disconnection, but suggests it was under-reported.

Ironically, when asked directly, an encouraging number of analysts and policymakers

report that strategic intelligence is relevant to their success. Specifically, 82.1% of HIDTA

analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report that strategic intelligence is relevant (See

Appendix F for Intelligence Irrelevance Figures). This result confirms that HIDTA analysts see

their work as more relevant to HIDTA success than their policymakers. Again, the disconnection

in these results supports the assertion that policymakers can succeed without intelligence

55

analysts. A third of policymakers (N=10) believe they can successfully fulfill their mission

without strategic intelligence. Half as many analysts feel the same way. Although no

respondent, analyst or policymaker, reported strategic intelligence as “irrelevant” to HIDTA

success, the number reporting the function as somewhat relevant or irrelevant suggests law

enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic intelligence. If it was never ignored, strategic

intelligence would be reported as relevant by all analysts and policymakers.

Furthermore, intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance are positively

correlated. HIDTA’s with at least one respondent reporting strategic intelligence as somewhat

relevant/irrelevant account for 83.3% of reports of intelligence-policy disconnection. Thus, less

than one-fifth of reported disconnection is associated with relevant intelligence. This high

correlation demonstrated between intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance

supports scholarly assertions that intelligence-policy relations are riddled with natural tensions

and gaps, and that they often lead to intelligence-irrelevance. This correlation also raises the

question as to whether HIDTA policymakers are managing intelligence professionals with an

intuitive sagacity, as Sun Tzu recommended so many years ago. The notable levels of

intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance would suggest that HIDTA

policymakers are doing so only if they sincerely view intelligence as more of a threat than an

asset to HIDTA strategy and policy. Regardless, it appears clear that the reciprocative skepticism

that has largely and historically characterized intelligence-policy relations has translated to the

law enforcement environment.

The last question posed to respondents regarding the relevance of intelligence asked how

to improve the use of strategic intelligence at HIDTA. Content Analysis (or text analysis) of the

responses suggests analysts and policymakers are most concerned with communication,

56

organizational inertia, time, and marketing. Of the responses collected, 45.5% related to issues in

communications, 18.2% related to organizational inertia, 15.2% related to time, 12.1% related to

marketing, 6.1% related to policymaker volition and security, 3.0% related to confidence.

Respondents did not answer that cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance or filtering were problems.

Recommendations outside of this study’s variables included the following: improving the

general quality of strategic intelligence products, increasing resources and analysts, expanding

the role of strategic intelligence analysts, increasing training, and prioritizing intelligence

projects. While policymaker recommendations focused heavily on improving communication

and the need for more analysts and marketing, analyst recommendations focused on

communication and organizational inertia. These responses demonstrate that both HIDTA

analysts and policymakers see significant opportunities to improve the relevance of strategic

intelligence. Analysis of responses measuring the independent variables of this study will

highlight if these recommendations are on target.

Cognitive Bias

As stated above, cognitive bias causes intelligence irrelevance by undermining its

objectivity, a central pillar of intelligence function. The aggregate results measuring the level of

cognitive bias indicate that there are significant opportunities for HIDTA analysts and

policymakers to decrease bias in their assignments. While analysts report a mean number of 7.2

steps taken to remain objective in their assessments, policymakers report a mean number of 4.9

steps taken to remain objective (See Appendix G for Cognitive Bias Figures). Analysts are most

likely to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (95.2%, N=20), and they frequently critically

assess the reliability of sources (81%, N=17). They are least likely to modify perceptions in the

face of incongruent evidence (28.6%, N=6), or employ efforts to detect deception (33.3%, N=7).

57

Policymaker responses suggest they are more biased than analysts. Policymakers are most likely

to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (87%, N=20), and resist tendencies toward

common perceptions (60.9%, N=14). They are least likely to consciously avoid cognitive

anchors (13%, N=3), or seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses (17.4%, N=4). These

results demonstrate that HIDTA policymakers are likely more biased in their decision-making

that HIDTA analysts are in producing strategic intelligence.

Cognitive bias increases, though, when filtering out those responses representative of

intelligence irrelevance. Analysts who report strategic intelligence as somewhat

relevant/irrelevant (A-SR/I’s) and policymakers who reported strategic intelligence as somewhat

relevant/irrelevant (P-SR/I’s) report they take fewer steps to avoid cognitive bias than the mean

analyst and policymaker respondent. A-SR/I’s report a mean number of 5.7 steps taken to remain

objective in producing intelligence. However, no A-SR/I’s report they consciously prohibit their

expectations from influencing their analyses, consciously avoid cognitive anchors, or insulate

themselves from societal prejudices. Furthermore, only a third (N=1) report they seek to

disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses; equally consider causality, randomness, accident

and error; employ efforts to detect deception; or modify perceptions in face of incongruent

evidence. P-SR/I’s report a mean number of 3.75 steps taken to remain objective in

policymaking, suggesting they are the most biased population sampled. No P-SR/I’s report they

seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses or employ efforts to detect deception.

Furthermore, only 12.5% (N=1) report they consciously avoid cognitive anchors; equally

consider causality, randomness, accident and error; modify perceptions in the face of incongruent

evidence; use words of estimative probability; or insulate themselves from societal prejudices.

These results demonstrate an unnerving level of bias in HIDTA intelligence and policymaking

58

processes and products. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that cognitive bias is positively

correlated with intelligence, as hypothesized.

Indicator

Aggregate Central

Tendency

Aggregate Variability

SR/I Central Tendency

SR/I Variability

Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure

# Steps Mean 6.00 Std Dev 4.65 Mean 4.20 Std Dev 1.61

Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance causes intelligence irrelevance when policymakers relieve the

tension caused by incongruence or confliction between objective reality and their cognitive

schema by rejecting analyses reflective of objective reality, or in other words, they ignore

intelligence. Measures of cognitive dissonance were overwhelmingly unfamiliar to both analyst

and policymaker respondents, however, both populations reported these phenomena occur (See

Appendix H for Cognitive Dissonance Figures). Most analysts (73%) report they do not know

the frequency of: strategic intelligence being inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker

beliefs or attitudes, policymakers rejecting or disbelieving inconsistent strategic intelligence, or

policymakers rationalizing inconsistent strategic intelligence as agreeable with their beliefs or

attitudes. Additionally, most policymakers (58.7%) report they do not know the frequency of

these phenomena. Analysts reporting otherwise, however, report that policymakers rationalize

strategic intelligence findings as agreeable with their beliefs or attitudes more frequently than

they report them to be inconsistent with their beliefs and attitudes. Policymaker responses report

the same results. Policymakers also report they reject or disbelieve strategic intelligence findings

when they are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs or attitudes nearly as frequently as they

are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs and attitudes. These results suggest cognitive

Table 4.1: Cognitive Bias Results

59

dissonance is likely an issue in HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and that it likely causes

some level of intelligence irrelevance. However, more data is necessary to confirm these

assertions.

Reporting from P-SR/I’s and A-SR/I’s closely parallels these results, thus preventing a

confident deduction of correlation between cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. A-

SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s report that rejection, disbelief and rationalization occur, but occur slightly

less frequently than incidence of intelligence inconsistency with policy schemas. A “none” or

“never” answer was not offered. Respondents wishing to communicate that answer may explain

the large number of “I don’t know” responses. These results demonstrate that further research is

needed to confirm the level of cognitive dissonance present in law enforcement and its

correlation to intelligence irrelevance. Nonetheless, the data available suggests that cognitive

dissonance occurs within HIDTA, both when intelligence is relevant and when it is less than

relevant.

Indicator

Aggregate Central

Tendency



SR/I Variability


Incidence of Inconsistency v.

Incidence of Rejection/Disbe

lief

Mode I Don't Know

Range

Quarterly-Less than

Yearly

Mode I Don't Know

Range

Quarterly-Less than

Yearly

Incidence of Inconsistency v.

Incidence of Rejection/Disbe

lief

Mode I Don't Know

Range

Quarterly-Less than

Yearly

Mode I Don't Know

Range

Quarterly-Less than

Yearly

Table 4.2: Cognitive Dissonance Results

60

Security

Security is an aspect central to understanding intelligence irrelevance. Security can

undermine intelligence-policy relations and processes by limiting the availability and

accessibility of intelligence and its sources. The aggregate results collected measuring security

demonstrates that HIDTA security measures do not substantially impact intelligence-policy

relations. Policymakers and analysts report that strategic intelligence and its critical sources are

generally available (See Appendix I for Security Figures). Most policymakers (72%, N=18)

report security measures never or rarely restrict their access to strategic intelligence. Most

policymakers also report security measures never or rarely impede or delay their use of strategic

intelligence, 84% (N=21) and 80% (N=20) respectively. Analysts, however, report security

measures impacting intelligence-policy relations to a greater degree. Many analysts (42.9%,

N=9) report security measures occasionally restrict their access to critical sources of strategic

intelligence. Two thirds of analysts (N=14), however, report security measures never or rarely

impede or delay their production of strategic intelligence. Thus, security measures in HIDTA are

unlikely to significantly and adversely impact intelligence-policy relations as they do not

substantially impact the availability or accessibility of strategic intelligence or its critical sources.

A-SR/I and P-SR/I results suggest that security measures may be related to intelligence

irrelevance, though further exploration is needed. A-SR/I reporting, particularly, demonstrates a

notable association between security measures and intelligence irrelevance. Two of three A-

SR/I’s report that critical sources of strategic information/intelligence are generally unavailable.

Additionally, one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely restrict access to critical

strategic intelligence sources and one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely

delaying the production of useful intelligence. Furthermore, two of three A-SR/I’s report that

61

security policies occasionally impede the production of useful strategic intelligence. Of P-SR/I

responses, one of eight reports security measures routinely impacting intelligence-policy

relations. One P-SR/I also reports security measures routinely impeding the use of strategic

intelligence. Most P-SR/I’s (75%, N=6) report security measures rarely or never restrict their

access to strategic intelligence. Additionally, most P-SR/I’s (87.5%, N=7) report security

measures rarely or never impede or delay their use of strategic intelligence. Nonetheless, SR/I

responses demonstrate an increase in adverse impacts of security measures. Cumulatively, these

results demonstrate that security, particularly measuring adversely impacting the availability and

accessibility of resources analysts need, is likely positively correlated with intelligence

irrelevance, as hypothesized.

62

Indicator

Aggregate Central Tendency



SR/I Variability


Availability of SI

Sources Mode

Generally

Available

Range

Generally

Unavailable-

Readily Available; I Don't

Know

Mode

Generally

Unavailable

Range

Generally

Unavailable-

Occasionally

Available

Availability of SI

Mode

Multimodal:

Occasionally,

Generally,

Readily Availabl

e

Range

Generally

Unavailable-

Readily Available; I Don't

Know

Mode

Occasionally

Available

Range

Generally

Unavailable-

Readily Availabl

e; I Don't Know

Frequency of

Restricting Access

Mode Rarely Range

Never-Routinely; I Don't

Know

Mode Never Range Never-

Routinely

Frequency of

Impeding Production/

Use

Mode Rarely Range


Know

Mode Rarely Range Never-

Routinely

Frequency of Delaying Production/

Use

Mode Rarely Range


Know

Mode Rarely Range Never-

Routinely

Filtering

Filters impact the relevance of intelligence by coloring the information that reaches

intelligence producers and consumers, thus undermining the comprehensive objectivity of

intelligence. The results of aggregate data collected relating to the impact of filtering

demonstrates that filters have little impact on HIDTA intelligence-policy relations. Twenty-one

analyst responses report a total of sixty-four revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 3.05, mode

of 3, and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA

Table 4.3: Security Results

63

policymakers (See Appendix J for Filtering Figures). The analyst-reported numbers possess a

standard deviation of 1.69. Additionally, most analysts report these measures rarely delay the

production of useful strategic intelligence and are about right to make the product useful.

Policymaker responses generally parallel those of provided by HIDTA analysts. Twenty-two

policymaker responses report a total of forty-six revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.09,

mode of 3, and median of 2 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach

HIDTA policymakers. The policymaker-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 1.54.

Additionally, policymakers report these measures rarely delay the production of useful strategic

intelligence and are about right to make the product useful. These results demonstrate that

HIDTA filters do not substantially impact intelligence-policy relations.

SR/I reporting demonstrates, however, that filters are positively correlated with

intelligence irrelevance. A-SR/I’s report a total of thirteen revisions/approvals yielding a mean of

4.33 and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA

policymakers. A-SR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 3.21. Two of three A-

SR/I’s report these measures take away from the utility of their product. A-SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s

both report that these measures occasionally delay the use of strategic intelligence. P-SR/I’s

report a total of twenty revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.86, mode of 2 and median of 3

revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA policymakers. The P-

SR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 0.90. P-SR/I reporting concurs with

aggregate policymaker and aggregate analyst reporting that these measures are about right to

make the products useful. Cumulatively, though, these results demonstrate that filters are

positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

64

Indicator

Aggregate Central

Tendency



SR/I Variability


# Revisions/ Approvals

Mean 2.56 Std Dev 1.67 Mean 3.3 Std Dev 1.83

Delay of Production/Us

e Caused Mode Rarely Range

Never-Routinel

y; I Don't Know;

NA

Mode Occasio

nally Range

Never-Routinel

y

Judgment of Revisions/ Approvals

Mode About Right

Range

Takes Away-

Not Enough

Mode About Right

Range

Takes Away-

Not Enough

Organizational Inertia

Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when

policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions

rather than alter them. Study responses suggest HIDTAs likely suffer from substantial

organizational inertia. The key elements of the HIDTA strategy include: enforcement,

prosecution, intelligence, information technology (IT), training, de-confliction, information

sharing, administration (management and coordination), and prevention. Analysts and

policymakers nearly across the board confuse their strategy with their mission, and their

descriptions of their strategy largely ignore all the elements listed above aside from enforcement

(See Appendix K for Organizational Inertia Figures and Tables). Content analysis of study

responses demonstrates analysts conveyed an average (mean) knowledge of 16% of their

strategy. Policymakers conveyed a mean knowledge of 18.3% of their strategy. These results

suggest analysts and policymakers are either overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their HIDTA

strategy or that the stated strategy, although conceptually appropriate, is institutionally an

Table 4.4: Filtering Results

65

illusion. If analysts and policymakers are overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their strategy this is a

strong indicator that HIDTAs prefer to act in accordance with the current inertia of their

enforcement activity, regardless of the stated strategy or current objective reality. An illusory

HIDTA strategy would result from the same cognitive process. The following results measuring

organizational inertia must then be taken with a grain of salt. Both analysts and policymakers

report their strategy has been largely the same for more than 5 years. Both analysts and

policymakers also judge their strategy as successful in achieving the HIDTA mission. Ironically,

though, both analysts and policymakers believe their strategy can be improved through strategic

intelligence. Thus, although analysts and policymakers are substantially unfamiliar with their

largely unchanged and reportedly successful strategy, they think it can be improved through

strategic intelligence. It is unclear how much they believe the strategy can be improved;

however, the results suggest they do not believe it can be improved substantially.

Nonetheless, even discounting the inherent difference in views of the relevance of

strategic intelligence, SR/I reporting still demonstrates that organizational inertia is positively

correlated with intelligence irrelevance. Most SR/I responses match aggregate reporting that their

strategy has remained largely the same for more than five years, but responses are less variable.

SR/I respondents are even less familiar with their strategy, though, demonstrating a mean

knowledge of 12.95%. Obviously, SR/I respondents view strategic intelligence as less than

relevant — somewhat relevant/irrelevant. Most SR/I respondents see their strategy as somewhat

successful; however, they believe it can be improved through strategic intelligence.

Cumulatively, these results demonstrate that organizational inertia is positively correlated with

intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

66

Indicator Aggregate

Central Tendency Aggregate Variability


SR/I Variability

Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Years

Strategy Largely

Unchanged

Mode More than 5 Years

Range < 1 Year

- > 5 Years

Mode More than 5 Years

Range 1-2

Years - > 5 Years

Familiarity with

Strategy Mean 17.10% Std Dev 26.60% Mean 12.95% Std Dev 7.97%

Level of Belief SI

Can Improve Strategy

Mode Yes Range No-Yes Mode Yes Range Yes

Relevance of SI

Mode Relevant Range

Somewhat

Irrelevant-

Relevant

Mode Somewh

at Relevant

Range

Somewhat

Irrelevant-

Somewhat

Relevant

Judgment of Strategy

Success Mode

Successful

Range

Somewhat

Unsuccessful-

Successful; I Don't Know

Mode

Somewhat

Successful

Range

Somewhat

Unsuccessful-

Successful

Marketing

Not all politically useful intelligence is naturally employed. Intelligence often requires

marketing effort to achieve relevance. The aggregate results demonstrate sparse marketing by

HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts. Twenty-four analyst responses yielded a mean of 4.8,

mode of 0, and median 4 percent of their time devoted to marketing their products. Analyst

responses demonstrated a standard deviation of 5.36. Twenty-two policymaker responses yielded

a mean of 5.8%, mode of 0, and median of 3 percent of their strategic intelligence analyst’s time

is devoted to marketing to them. Policymaker responses demonstrated a standard deviation of

Table 4.5: Organizational Inertia Results

67

8.15. These results demonstrate that HIDTA analysts spend nowhere near a third of their time

marketing their products, as recommended by policymakers in Chapter 2. Those policymakers

would consider the level of HIDTA strategic intelligence marketing foolish and a disservice to

HIDTA policymakers. Undoubtedly, these results suggest marketing is a significant opportunity

to improve intelligence-policy relations.

The marketing results are worse when filtering for responses representative of

irrelevance. While analysts that report their products are less than relevant to their HIDTA also

report they spend more time marketing their products, policymakers reporting that strategic

intelligence is less than relevant to their HIDTA report their analysts spend nearly no time

marketing their products. The five A-SR/I responses yielded a mean of 8.20, mode of 5, and

median 5 percent of their time devoted marketing their products. A-SR/I reported yielded a

standard deviation of 7.3 percent. A-SR/I results were skewed by one analysts reporting they

spend 20% of their time marketing their products, the most reported by any analyst participating

in the study. Conversely, the seven P-SR/I responses yielded a mean 2.14, mode of 0, and

median 0 percent of their strategic intelligence analyst’s time devoted to marketing analytical

products to them. P-SR/I reporting yielded a standard deviation of 3.9 percent. Five of the seven

P-SR/I respondents reported their analysts devote 0 percent of their time marketing their

products. Combined, aggregate analyst and policymaker reporting, however, yields a mean of

5.26 percent of time devote to marketing while combined SR/I reporting yields a mean 4.67

percent of time devote to marketing. Intelligence marketing, thus, is demonstrably negatively

correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

68

Indicator

Aggregate Central

Tendency



SR/I Variability


% of Time Spent

Mean 5.26% Std Dev 6.77% Mean 4.67% Std Dev 6.14%

Volition

For intelligence to be relevant to any policymaker he or she must be willing and have

decided to act where the subsequent decision on which action to take requires intelligence

support. The collected data do not directly measure HIDTA policymaker volition due to a

misinterpretation by the researcher. The collected data do, however, form a foundation for

significant HIDTA policymaker volition (See Appendix L for Volition Figures). Analyst

responses demonstrate that 80% (N=20) of HIDTA analysts believe their Executive Board is

likely or highly likely to be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans.

Policymaker responses demonstrate that 92% (N=23) of HIDTA policymakers feel the same

way. These results are encouraging as a policymaker will to act is a prerequisite of a decision to

act, and therefore of intelligence relevance. Only one policymaker communicated an overt

action to support strategic policymaking – the hiring of a strategic intelligence analyst. This

highlights the difference between the willingness to act and the act of willing action, of deciding

action is necessary. Further data is needed to assess policymaker volition in HIDTA and the law

enforcement context.

Nonetheless, reporting representative of intelligence irrelevance demonstrate a decrease

in policymaker willingness to act. Most A-SR/I’s, 60% (N=3), report they believe their executive

board is less than likely to modify its strategy and plans — 40% reporting chances are even and

Table 4.6: Marketing Results

69

20% reporting such change is highly unlikely. While most P-SR/I’s, 75% (N=6) report their

boards are likely or highly likely to be willing to modify its strategy or plans, 25% (N=2), report

those chances are even, more than reported in aggregate policymakers report. These results

suggest volition may be negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.

Indicator

Aggregate Central

Tendency



SR/I Variability

Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure PM

Proclamation of

Willingness to Modify Strategy

Mode Likely Range

Chances are

Even-Highly Likely

Mode

Multimodal: Likely, Highly Likely

Range

Chances are

Even-Highly Likely

IA Judgment of PM

Willingness to Modify Strategy

Mode Likely Range

Highly Unlikely-Highly Likely

Mode

Multimodal: Chances are

Even, Likely

Range Highly

Unlikely-Likely

Disparity Between the

Two None Minimal Moderate Moderate

Communication

As stated above, suboptimal communication, in terms of frequency or quality, intensifies

the natural gaps and tension in intelligence-policy relations, thereby causing intelligence

irrelevance. Aggregate results demonstrate that the frequency of intelligence-policy

communication is a significant area to improve relations. Most analysts and policymakers, or

44.9%, report that many strategic intelligence products are easily digestible (See Appendix M for

Communication Figures). Most analysts and policymakers, or 58.4%, also confirm that source

reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence products.

Most analysts, however, 54.2% (N=13), report they directly communicate with their executive

Table 4.7: Volition Results

70

board less than yearly. Policymaker responses are multimodal with 32% reporting they directly

communicate with their strategic intelligence analysts weekly and 32% claiming to do so less

than yearly. Additionally, only 25% of analysts and 24% of policymakers report they/their

strategic intelligence analysts normally attend Executive Board meetings. Analyst and

policymakers report they are satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the timeliness, format, content,

communication and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence analysts, though. These results

demonstrate that the quality of HIDTA intelligence-policy communication is generally good;

however, the quantity of direct communication can be substantially improved.

Both the quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication decrease, though,

when evaluating SR/I reporting. Most SR/I respondents, or 55%, report few strategic intelligence

products are easily digestible. Most SR/I respondents, or 42.5%, also report that direct

intelligence-policy communication occurs less than yearly (P-SR/I results are multimodal). SR/I

satisfaction ratings skewed right (towards dissatisfaction). Most A-SR/I’s report they are

somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence products.

Aggregate SR/I reporting, however, demonstrates that these respondents are somewhat satisfied

with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence. A mean 66.7% of A-SR/I’s do

not know how often strategic intelligence products are inconsistent with policymaker beliefs or

attitudes, or how often policymakers reject/disbelieve or rationalize strategic intelligence. A

slightly larger percentage of SR/I respondents, or 76.9%, report strategic intelligence analysts do

not normally attend their HIDTA Executive Board meetings. A lower percentage of SR/I

responses, or 53.8%, confirm the inclusion of analytical confidence and source reliability in

strategic intelligence. Cumulatively, SR/I reporting demonstrates a notable decrease in the

71

quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication. These results confirm that

communication is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

Indicator

Aggregate Central Tendency



SR/I Variability

Method Measure Method Measure Metho

d Measure Method Measure

Digestibility of SI

Products Mode Many Range None-All Mode Few Range None-All

Inclusion of Analytical Confidence and Source Reliability

Mode Yes Range No-Yes; I

Don't Know Mode Yes Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know

Frequency of Direct PM-IA

Com-munication

Mode Less than Yearly

Range Weekly-Less than Yearly

Mode Less than Yearly

Range Weekly-Less than Yearly

PM-IA Satisfaction

with Timeliness, Format and

Content of SI

Mode

Multi-modal: Very

Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied

Range

Very Dissatisfied-

Very Satisfied

Mode

Multi-modal:

Somewhat Satisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied

Range

Very Dissatisfie

d -Very Satisfied

Normal IA Executive

Board Attendance

Mode No Range No-Yes Mode No Range No-Yes

Time

Effectively producing and consuming strategic intelligence requires significant

investments of time by analysts and policymakers. If either party devote insufficient time to

these projects then intelligence is liable to become irrelevant. Aggregate results relating to

temporal attributes raise serious questions about what the study responses are measuring.

Nonetheless, these results demonstrate that analysts and policymakers do not devote a sufficient

amount of time to producing or employing non-investigation-specific intelligence. Most analyst

and policymaker responses report intelligence production and policymaker discussion at least

Table 4.8: Communication Results

72

yearly (See Appendix N for Time Figures). Most analyst respondents, or 96.4%, report at least

yearly strategic intelligence production. Most policymaker respondents, or 76.7%, report at least

yearly strategic intelligence production. Additionally, most policymaker respondents, or 93.3%,

report yearly or more frequent executive discussion of strategic intelligence. So far the results

seem promising. Discouragingly, however, most analyst respondents, or 62.5%, report thirty

percent or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Only 25% of analysts

report over fifty percent of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Additionally,

most analysts, or 50%, report their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough. These

results raise serious doubts about quality of strategic intelligence that is produced. These doubts

increase exponentially when we relate this time investment to the analyst and policymaker

reports that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or quarterly — 82.2% of analysts

and 46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence product with this frequency. It is all but

certain that the products they are referring to do not qualify as strategic intelligence. Moving on,

though, policymaker responses yield a mode 2-5% of their time is available to devote to strategic

intelligence. Most, or 52%, reporting their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough

time. Policymaker assessment of the timeliness of strategic intelligence is multimodal, 44% of

policymaker respondents are very satisfied and 44% are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness.

Most analysts, or 50%, are somewhat satisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. These

results suggest that many of the study respondents are not referring to strategic intelligence if

most believe it is being produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly by analysts spending thirty

percent or less of their time producing it. Strategic intelligence production, as stated in Chapter

2, is infrequently produced, resource and time intensive, multi-disciplinary, and far-reaching in

nature. Thus, these results confirm that HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts are highly

73

unlikely addressing the basic assumptions of their HIDTA’s strategy. Nonetheless, analysts and

policymakers still believe they do not invest enough time into these non-investigation-specific

tasks. Thus the quality of this intelligence production, likely general or estimative intelligence,

and resulting policymaking are substantial opportunities to improve relations and decrease

intelligence irrelevance. Simply stated, HIDTA analysts and policymakers spend less than a

sufficient amount of time producing and employing non-investigation-specific intelligence.

The amount of time devoted by HIDTA analysts and policymakers decreases, though,

when evaluating SR/I reporting. A lower percentage of SR/I responses, or 85%, report at least

yearly strategic intelligence production, the other 3 P-SR/I respondents do not know. Also fewer

SR/I responses, or 65%, report strategic intelligence discussion by policymakers at least yearly.

A larger percentage of A-SR/I’s, or 80%, reports that less than 30% of their time is available to

devote to strategic intelligence. A larger percentage of P-SR/I’s, or 75% (compared to 64% total

policymakers), reports that 5% or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence.

All SR/I respondents report their time available to strategic intelligence is not enough or not

nearly enough. Most A-SR/I’s (66.7% N=2) and more P-SR/I’s (25% N=2) than policymakers

are somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. Most P-SR/I’s, though, or

50%, are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness. These results suggest that analysts and

policymakers in HIDTAs where non-investigation-specific intelligence is irrelevant spend less

than an insufficient amount of time producing and employing those products. Furthermore, these

results confirm that time is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

74

Indicator Aggregate Central

Tendency Aggregate Variability


SR/I Variability


Frequency of

Intelligence Production/

Use

Mode Quarterly Range

Weekly-Less than Yearly; I

Don't Know

Mode Quarterly Range

Weekly-Less than Yearly; I

Don't Know

IA % Time Investment

Mode 1-10% Range 0% - More than 50%

Mode 1-10% Range 0% - More than 50%

PM % Time Investment

Mode 2-5% Range 0-1% -

More than 20%

Mode 2-5% Range 2-5% - 10-

20%

IA-PM Judgment of

Time Investment

Mode About the

Right Amount

Range

Not Nearly Enough -

Much More than Enough

Mode Not

Enough Range

Not Nearly Enough -

Not Enough

IA-PM Satisfaction

with SI Timeliness

Mode Somewhat Satisfied

Range

Very Dissatisfied

-Very Satisfied

Mode Somewhat Satisfied

Range

Very Dissatisfied

-Very Satisfied

Confidence

Confidence in intelligence processes and products must be achieved by both analysts and

policymakers to justify intelligence influencing political action. Aggregate results relating to the

confidence HIDTA analysts and policymakers have in strategic intelligence demonstrates

substantial confidence by both populations. As reported above, analysts and policymakers agree

that source reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence

products. Inclusion of these measures only serves to increase policymaker confidence in the

product. Furthermore, most analysts, or 82.1%, report strategic intelligence is relevant to their

HIDTA (See Appendix O for Confidence Figures). Most policymakers, or 66.7%, report the

same. Nearly all respondents, or 98% of analysts and policymakers, believe their strategy can be

improved through strategic intelligence. One disconnected policymaker does not. Interestingly,

Table 4.9: Time Results

75

though, only 40% of analyst respondents claim to be confident in their HIDTAs intelligence

processes and products, while 56% claim to be somewhat confident/unconfident. Most

policymakers, or 52%, are confident in their strategic intelligence processes and products, while

48% are somewhat confident/unconfident. These results suggest there may be some disparity

between what intelligence processes and products should be and what they are. Almost all

respondents believe their strategy can be improved, far fewer are confident it will be.

Furthermore, these results demonstrate that strategic intelligence products likely only

occasionally motivate a sense of accuracy and relevance in HIDTA policymakers sufficient to

base political action.

Confidence in intelligence processes and products decreases, though, when evaluating

SR/I results. Inherently, all respondents report strategic intelligence is less than relevant,

somewhat relevant/irrelevant. No A-SR/I’s report they are confident in their strategic intelligence

processes and products. Rather, most, or 80%, report they are somewhat confident/unconfident.

Twenty percent report they are unconfident. Only 25% (N=2) of P-SR/I’s report they are

confident in their strategic intelligence processes or products. The other 75% report they are

somewhat confident/unconfident. A-SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s do, however, agree with aggregate

reporting that analytical confidence and source reliability are normally included in strategic

intelligence products and that their strategy/policy can be improved through strategic

intelligence. Nonetheless, these results demonstrate a marked decrease in confidence affirming

that confidence is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.

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Indicator Aggregate Central

Tendency Aggregate Variability


SR/I Variability


Relevance of SI

Mode Relevant Range Somewhat Irrelevant-Relevant

Mode Somewhat Relevant

Range

Somewhat Irrelevant-Somewhat Relevant

Level of Belief SI

Can Improve Strategy

Mode Yes Range No-Yes Mode Yes Range Yes

IA Confidence

in SI Mode

Multi-modal:

Somewhat Confident, Confident

Range Unconfident-Confident

Mode

Multimodal: Somewhat

Unconfident, Somewhat Confident

Range Unconfident-Somewhat Confident

PM Confidence

in SI Mode Confident Range

Somewhat Unconfident-Confident

Mode Somewhat Confident

Range Somewhat

Unconfident-Confident

Inclusion of Analytical Confidence

in SI

Mode Yes Range No-Yes; I

Don't Know Mode Yes Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know

Summary

Analysis of the data yielded from the strategic intelligence analyst and executive board

(policymaker) questionnaires has revealed findings within the areas of the research questions.

Analyst and policymaker responses to the questionnaires were grouped to correspond to the

research questions and then categorized within the study’s independent variables to validate the

hypotheses. Here they will be discussed in summary.

The findings discussed in this chapter highlight the relevance of the study’s research

questions. The data reveal that HIDTA intelligence-policy relations are notably disconnected and

some frustrations arise as a result, as expected, primarily among analysts. The data further

Table 4.10: Confidence Results

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confirm that intelligence irrelevance is an obstacle in law enforcement, that it is likely

underreported, and that there are a significant number of policy opportunities to increase the

relevance of law enforcement strategic intelligence. Two matrices below categorically

summarize study data pertaining to the third research question. The matrices graphically

illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypotheses one and two. Cognitive dissonance, security

and volition are exceptions to the previous statement as the data collected was not sufficient to

confidently correlate these variables with intelligence irrelevance. The matrices also graphically

illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypothesis three. Cognitive bias, filtering, organizational

inertia, marketing, communication, and time elements of HIDTA intelligence-policy relations

present significant opportunities for improvement in context of reducing intelligence irrelevance.

Confidence, not addressed in hypothesis three, is also highly relevant to any HIDTA effort to

decrease intelligence irrelevance. Among the proposed causes of intelligence irrelevance for

which this study collected data, only security measures presented distinctly fewer policy

opportunities for reducing intelligence irrelevance. The data, nonetheless, suggest a correlation

between security and volition and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized. The data also confirm

a correlation between all independent variables and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized,

apart from the two listed above and cognitive dissonance. Thus, these data and findings offer a

foundation for the development of a prescriptive policy to reduce intelligence irrelevance in law

enforcement.

Research questions and hypotheses aside, analysis of the study data suggests a strong

possibility strategic intelligence is politically irrelevant within HIDTA simply because it is not

produced. As stated in Chapter 1, strategic intelligence is distinct from other forms of

intelligence in that it must inherently be multi-disciplinary, comprehensive, and contextually

78

adapted to a grand (organizational or national) strategy. Thus, strategic intelligence is immensely

time and resource intensive. The number of study respondents reporting the production of

strategic intelligence on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis (82.2% of analysts and 46.7% of

policymakers) suggests a high likelihood that the products they refer to do not meet the

qualifications of strategic intelligence. Additionally, the number of respondents overwhelmingly

associating their day-to-day enforcement and intelligence efforts with their HIDTA strategy

solidifies this assertion as it demonstrates an analytical inability to address that which is

comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist beyond paper. Discussion in Chapter

1 reveals this would not be the first study to come to this conclusion. Rather, study data likely

more accurately measures general or estimative intelligence, and its irrelevance.

79


← L

owe

r

Hig

her →


- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition)














Central Tendency →

Table 4.11: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance

80

Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia

← L

owe

r

Hig

her →







- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes










Table 4.12: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance

81


← L

owe

r

Hig

her →


- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition)















Table 4.13: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance

82

Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia ←

Low

er

H

ighe

r →







- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes










Table 4.14: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance

83

CONCLUSION

As previously stated, the purpose of this study was to determine the level to which

intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law

enforcement. Furthermore, determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permits the

development of prescriptive policy to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished

through contextually-focused survey analysis of the HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker

populations. The surveys directly and indirectly addressed intelligence-policy relations,

intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of intelligence irrelevance.

While aggregate respondent results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence

irrelevance, respondents reporting less than relevant intelligence demonstrate that seven of the

ten scholarly identified causes of irrelevance are correlated with intelligence irrelevance as

previously asserted — data collected was not sufficient to confidently draw a correlation

between cognitive dissonance, security, and volition; and intelligence irrelevance. Furthermore,

these ten irrelevance-correlated topics all present HIDTA with policy opportunities to improve

intelligence-policy relations and reduce incidents of intelligence irrelevance.

Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement

As stated above, study results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence irrelevance.

An encouraging 82.1% of HIDTA analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report strategic

intelligence is “relevant” to the success in the HIDTA mission. Conversely, however, 17.9% of

analysts and 33.3% of policymakers consider strategic intelligence less than relevant to the

success of their HIDTA, somewhat relevant/ irrelevant. These results demonstrate that

intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law

enforcement and that intelligence has failed to successfully integrate into the enforcement and

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investigative culture. These conclusions are also supported by results demonstrating 36.7% of

analysts and 21.9% of policymakers feel disconnected from their intelligence-policy counterpart.

Additional results, however, likely more accurately demonstrate the level of strategic intelligence

irrelevance in law enforcement.

Study results emerging from measurement of the independent variables (causes of

irrelevance) provide valuable insight into HIDTA intelligence irrelevance. 82.2% of analysts and

46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence production on a weekly, monthly or quarterly

basis. Any products produced at these rates are all but certain not to qualify as strategic

intelligence given the depth of analysis, number of variables, time, and resource prerequisites of

strategic intelligence production. An additional 3.6% of analyst responses and 10% of

policymaker responses reporting strategic intelligence production every 6 months also unlikely

qualify. Furthermore, the results demonstrating a mean 16% analyst familiarity and 18.3%

policymaker familiarity with the HIDTA strategy suggests an analytical and policymaking

inability to address that which is comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist

beyond paper. These results permit two logical conclusions about law enforcement intelligence

irrelevance: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is unknown

because of disparity between this study’s concept of strategic intelligence and the law

enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the former in law enforcement,

or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers because of a

demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not strategic (by the definition

accepted for this study). Accepting the latter conclusion seems more reasonable than the

accepting the former. This conclusion, however, need not undermine study research and analysis

pertaining to research question three or any of the three study hypotheses. Rather, given these

85

conclusions regarding strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance, findings regarding the

causes of law enforcement intelligence irrelevance are all but certainly more accurately

interpreted as reflective of general or estimative intelligence-policy relations and causes of

general or estimative intelligence irrelevance. This interpretation is consistent with the role of

strategic analysts outlined in Chapter 3 as focusing on non-investigation-specific and projective

analyses.

Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement

Scholarship outlined in Chapter 2 presents ten elements of intelligence-policy relations

that are asserted to account for incidence of intelligence irrelevance. With the exception of

cognitive dissonance, security, and volition, this study finds a correlation between each element

and intelligence irrelevance consistent with scholarly-asserted correlations, positive and

negative. Specifically, this study confirm that marketing, communication, time and confidence

are all negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance — a decrease in any of these elements

correlates to, if not causes, an increase in intelligence irrelevance. Conversely, cognitive bias,

filtering, and organizational inertia are all positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance —

an increase in any of these elements corresponds to, if not causes, intelligence irrelevance. This

study affirms that volition is likely negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however,

the data collected was not sufficient to confirm this. Similarly, this study affirms that security is

likely positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however, the data collected was not

sufficient to confirm this. Nonetheless, increasing those variables negatively correlated (or likely

negatively correlated) with irrelevance as well as decreasing those variables positively correlated

(or likely positively correlated) with irrelevance should serve to improve HIDTA intelligence-

policy relations and decrease incidence of intelligence irrelevance.

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Considering the HIDTA program, the study results offer the most likely causes of general

or estimative intelligence irrelevance (see the Results summary in Chapter 4). Analyst and

policymaker recommendations for improving communication, marketing, time, and

organizational inertia were on point. Lower levels of intelligence marketing, lower quality and

quantity of intelligence-policy communication, increases in cognitive bias, and higher

organizational inertia are the intelligence-policy attributes most likely causing intelligence

irrelevance in HIDTA. Additionally, lower levels of confidence in intelligence, lower levels of

time invested in intelligence, and higher levels of filtering and security likely moderately cause

intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA. Of all ten attributes, the levels of intelligence marketing,

cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, and organizational inertia were the most concerning. These

deficiencies in intelligence-policy relations, however, provide opportunities for improvement,

both for intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence. Before outlining a

prescriptive policy to improve intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence,

however, it is critical to address one additional likely cause of law enforcement intelligence

irrelevance.

Chapter 1 demonstrates that intelligence is an ancient craft and one that is rooted in the

instinct for survival. This logic keeps with that which likely provoked early intelligence users to

do so within the realm of military campaigns. What does not seem apparent, though, is that law

enforcement policymakers are at all concerned with their survival within their executive

positions or with the survival of their organizations. It is also unclear that the performance of

rigorous strategy or policy analysis is a prerequisite of executive or institutional stability within

certain law enforcement missions. Rather, despite political and public frustration with counter-

narcotic enforcement efforts, funding for them represents the stable majority of the national drug

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control budget (Executive Office of, 2010). It also seems to be that some law enforcement goals,

such as those to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, are

unlikely to require a strategy, rather than tactical and operational planning. Logic would seem to

dictate that a strategy only becomes relevant when paralleled by requirements for achieving

ambitious levels of efficiency and effectiveness, arguably peripheral law enforcement goals.

Thus, at least some law enforcement strategy is more likely abstract theory than sound logic.

This is highly likely the case in the HIDTA programs. Nonetheless, for the purposes of

improving the relevance of non-strategic law enforcement intelligence, a prescriptive framework

aimed at improving intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law

enforcement intelligence is offered. A framework aimed at making strategic intelligence relevant

is also offered.

Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence Irrelevance

Assessment of the ten independent variables of this study illuminates numerous

opportunities to stabilize or improve the relevance of HIDTA intelligence. First, there are several

indicators of positive intelligence-policy relations that ought to be reinforced and stabilized.

Security policies within HIDTA appear to successfully balance the competing interests of

enforcement operational integrity and efficiency. Security considerations also demonstrate a

lower level of access restriction, production delay or impediment, and consumption delay or

impediment. With regard to filters, most HIDTA members judge the level of intelligence

revision and approval about right to make to maximize the value of their products. Reinforcing

the substantial level of intelligence relevance and substantial level of analyst and policymaker

belief in intelligence is also beneficial to the stated aims. And lastly, analysts should be

encouraged to continue to include their analytical confidence and source reliability in

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assessments. Such inclusion can only improve policymaker confidence in the product. These

efforts, in sum, ought to stabilize the elements of intelligence-policy relations already closely

calibrated for optimal intelligence-policy relations and intelligence relevance.

Conversely, however, there are several elements of intelligence-policy relations that can

be improved upon to increase the relevance of intelligence. Study results demonstrate a

substantial level of bias among SR/I reporting, worse than the already substantially biased

aggregate HIDTA intelligence and policy. HIDTA members can exploit advanced analytical

techniques to increase the rigor in their analysis and policymaking as well as decrease analytical

bias. HIDTAs ought also seek means to increase the availability of critical sources of estimative

intelligence to analysts and estimative intelligence to policymakers. Members would also benefit

from familiarizing themselves HIDTAs comprehensive strategy and ensuring its relevance to

current and developing drug threats. HIDTA analysts ought to significantly increase their efforts

to market their products, spending as much as a third of their time or enough to feel guilty about

avoiding other tasks, as policymakers recommend. Essentially, if they have something worth

saying they should ensure those who need to hear it actually do. Analysts ought to also consider

reformatting their products to increase their digestibility. If policymakers cannot easily withdraw

their conclusions and their logic then they are not likely to see value in their product.

Additionally, analysts and policymakers would both benefit from more frequent direct

communication. Intelligence ought to function at the direction of policymakers. Regular

attendance by analysts to executive board meetings is one method to improve intelligence-policy

communication. Increased direction from policymakers will also likely increase the time analysts

invest in general and estimative products as well as increase the timeliness of those products.

Increasing direction communication would also reinforce some of the variables mention here

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including increasing marketing and ensuring the digestibility and relevance of intelligence

products and processes. And lastly, cognitive dissonance, from the little data that was provided

was substantial. Policymakers who accept that their conceptions of their operating environment

may need to be calibrated from time to time are likely to produce better policy and possess better

relations with their intelligence analysts. In sum, decreasing cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance,

and organizational inertia as well as increasing the availability of critical sources of intelligence

and policymaking, intelligence marketing, and the frequency and quality of intelligence-policy

communication are the primary elements of the framework to improve law enforcement

intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law enforcement

intelligence. Additional opportunistic recommendations at the institutional level are a significant

resource provided elsewhere (See: “The national criminal,” 2003; and Peterson, 2005).

In addition to the recommendations arising from measurement of the ten causes of

irrelevance, HIDTA analysts and policymakers recommend expanding the role of intelligence

analysts, providing training opportunities, and prioritizing intelligence projects. Analysts also

recommend HIDTAs perform tactical analysis (rather than research and information processing)

and extract strategic value which can be exploited. It is unclear whether these recommendations

are aimed at reducing strategic or estimative intelligence irrelevance. To improve either,

however, HIDTAs must shift away from intelligence research initiatives towards intelligence

analysis initiatives. HIDTAs are unlikely to achieve sound strategic logic by collecting data

exclusively in the context of individual investigations.

Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence Irrelevance

First, for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymakers it must be

requested and produced; or, in other words, it must be valued. This requires that both

90

policymakers and analysts understand what strategic intelligence is and how it can add value to

their program. Contrary to what ONDCP suggests, strategic intelligence is not “intelligence

related to the structure and movement of organized criminal elements, patterns of criminal

activity, activities of criminal elements, projections of criminal trends, or projective planning”

(“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). The association of strategic intelligence strictly with analysis

that is “big picture” and “long-term” is a legacy of Cold War-era thinking and highly inaccurate

(Heidenrich, 2007). Rather, it is all that ONDCP suggests and more combined and analyzed for

the strict purpose of impacting a HIDTA strategy. Strategic intelligence products, therefore,

must either: 1) analyze all variables necessary to reasonably optimize the soundness of the logic

employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal, or 2) analyze one or more

variables in relation to previous strategic intelligence analysis of all reasonable variables and

demonstrate how previous logic fails to reflect the current reality (or will likely fail to reflect

reality in the future) — as a means of calibrating the logic employed to achieve a grand (national

or organizational) goal, or 3) analyze all relevant information necessary to reasonably validate an

assumption within the logic employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal

(turning an assumption into a truth). Simply stated, strategic intelligence must comprehensively

support a strategy; a strategy is not a plan, and certainly not an operational plan, but the logic

driving a plan to achieve a grand goal. Additionally, strategic intelligence requires that analysts

not attempt to identify independent variables in the dynamic environment, but rather accept that

the environment is made up of innumerable dependent variables. In the case of HIDTA, this

means that drug trafficking simply cannot be managed strictly through enforcement activity.

Drug trafficking is a product of many other forces including social, economic, political, and

philosophical variables, among others. A strategy that ignores these is all but certain to fail. And

91

lastly, it is crucial that HIDTAs distinguish this process and these products from operational

intelligence and operational planning. Both operational and strategic intelligence are non-case-

specific.

Secondly, HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and policymakers must optimize their

relations for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymaking. This requires that they

calibrate the ten independent variables of this study within strategic processes. They need to

ensure high levels of strategic intelligence marketing, policymaker volition, strategic

intelligence-policy communication, time invested and confidence in strategic intelligence

products and processes. Additionally, they need to ensure low levels of cognitive bias, cognitive

dissonance, security, filtering, and organizational inertia. This is no different from the process

required for the relevance of intelligence at any level. And as asserted, it takes careful thought

and constant effort.

Limitations and Future Research

As with any research, there were inherent limitations within this study. Limited resources

forcing this study to employ survey research rather than interviews resulted in insufficient data to

correlate cognitive dissonance with intelligence irrelevance. This study was also limited by a

misinterpretation of the concept of volition. The data collected for the purposes of measuring this

variable did not in fact measure it. Additionally, data collected from HIDTA policymakers was

minimal, estimated to represent 6.25% of the population. Interviewing HIDTA members would

have possibly resulted in more collected data and more depth of data collection regarding analyst

and policymaker familiarity with their strategy. Although careful thought was employed in the

development of study questionnaires, face-to-face interviews permit the researcher to clarify the

questions posed to participants, thus increasing the accuracy of data collected. Additionally, in

92

order to improve the accuracy of data analysis, future researchers utilizing questionnaires ought

to benchmark the categorical assignment of measures (low, moderate, high) of the independent

variables. Categorical assignment of the independent variables, as provided in Chapter 4, is

vulnerable to contest. Future research can also draw more distinct correlations between

intelligence irrelevance and its asserted causes by comparing and contrasting data representative

of relevant intelligence with that of irrelevant intelligence – rather than aggregate with irrelevant.

Nonetheless, this study illuminates a couple opportunities for future research. First, this

study highlights the possibility that strategic objectivity is decreasingly or simply not valued. As

stated above, collected data was insufficient for statistically significant correlation between

cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. Study responses, nonetheless, reflect the

relevance of this attribute to understanding intelligence-policy relations and intelligence

irrelevance.

Truly strategic intelligence represents somewhat of a departure from traditionally

externally-focused intelligence towards an externally and internally-focused effort. While in the

former, the product focuses on the weaknesses of a them for the purposes of highlighting

opportunities to gain competitive advantage for us, in the latter the product focuses on

weaknesses of them and the potential weaknesses of us to calibrate our logic of achieving or

maintaining a competitive advantage. Simply stated, intelligence normally highlights

advantageous opportunity to leverage our current strengths whereas strategic intelligence

normally recommends a calibration of our logic; the result potentially causes internal reform or

change. Thus, strategic intelligence seems to inherently possess the potential for internal conflict

as it inherently opposes those within the organization who have a vested interest in the status

quo. This presents a unique opportunity for future research to isolate the roles of objectivity and

93

cognitive or organizational dissonance in strategic intelligence-policy relations. It would be

interesting to read analytical conclusions arising from research that leverages interviews with law

enforcement or national security policymakers aimed to address this topic in appropriate depth.

Secondly, this study posits that law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is likely caused

by the absences of any threat to executive and institutional survival — that causes of intelligence

irrelevance can lie outside the realm of information processing, quality analysis and assessment,

and maintenance of professional norms. Future research that investigates and clarifies the

presence or absence of measurable levels of accountability present in law enforcement, their

relation to intelligence irrelevance, and their implications for the necessity of strategy would be

particularly intellectually profitable in understanding law enforcement strategic intelligence-

policy relations. It can confirm that the adoption of the framework posed here will actually

permit law enforcement intelligence to be relevant. The hypothesis here is: intelligence is

doomed to irrelevance when it aims to support organizations/nations and policymakers whose

survival is not threatened. Secondly, this research would hypothesize that in these cases the ten

independent variables of this study no longer represent the causal factors of intelligence

irrelevance. Research confirming these hypotheses would have significant implications for

intelligence processes in many environments and of many organizations.

Lastly, the data collected highlight the strong possibility that irrelevance is not the only

pathology of intelligence-policy relations present in the law enforcement arena. The data

demonstrate notable support for the possibility that excessive harmony is the most prominent

pathology present in the HIDTA program. Again, excessive harmony occurs when intelligence

and policy officials share the same complacent tunnel vision – neither party seriously addresses

or challenges the assumptions inherent in the policy or strategy currently driving organizational

94

action. In these cases, it is the lack of tension between intelligence and policy parties that creates

ineffective relations. ONDCP’s definition of strategic intelligence sets the stage for

organizational logic to be ignored. The data collected on cognitive dissonance suggest that

HIDTA intelligence may rarely be inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker beliefs and

attitudes. Data collected on organizational inertia demonstrate that HIDTA analysts and

policymakers are generally unaware of their strategy and that intelligence products are highly

unlikely applicable to HIDTA strategy. And some of the most crucial efforts to avoid cognitive

biases that would permit excessive harmony, such as consciously avoiding cognitive anchors and

modifying perceptions in the face of incongruent evidence, were rarely taken. These findings

present a highly valuable opportunity for future research to explore and substantiate the level to

which law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are plagued by excessive harmony. The

likely absence of any risk to law enforcement organizational or executive survival would

logically seem to reinforce the high likelihood that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations

are plagued by substantial excessive harmony.

95

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Blank Copy of IRB Proposal Form

106

Appendix B: HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analyst Measurement Instrument

115

Appendix C: HIDTA Policymaker Measurement Instrument

Appendix D: Study Demographics Figures

: Study Demographics Figures

124

Appendix E: Intelligence-Policy Disconnection

Policy Disconnection Data Figures

127

Appendix F: Intelligence Irrelevance

Intelligence Irrelevance Figures

129

Appendix G: Cognitive Bias Figures

Figures

130

Appendix H: Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive Dissonance Figures

134

Appendix I: Security Figures

135

Appendix J: Filtering Figures

143

Appendix K: Organizational Inertia

Organizational Inertia Figures, Tables, and Lists

147

149

Enforcement Prosecution Intelligence IT Training Deconfliction Information Sharing Administration (Management and Coordination)

Prevention None

Number of Responses Eluding to

Topic

18 0 11 0 1 0 6 0 0 3

Percentage of Responses Eluding to

Topic

72.0% 0.0% 44.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 24.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.0%

Mean

Number of Responses Eluding to

Topic

17 2 8 1 1 1 0 0 3 3

Percentage of Responses Eluding to

Topic

85.0% 100.0% 40.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.0% 15.0%

Mean

16.0%

18.30%

Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analysts

Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Executive Board Members

150

Please describe your current strategy at HIDTA.

Analyst Responses:

- Quarterly trends in trafficking - Our strategy uses a number of task forces to address the threats identified throughout the

year. Their focus is intelligence driven investigations. The task force concept allows agencies to leverage resources and be more effective.

- Proactive - It’s unclear - Monthly newsletters - Participating agencies incorporate intelligence with enforcement activities to address the

threat. - Intelligence led policing is key. - We have a HIDTA Intelligence Support System (ISS) made up of 3 intel centers - Dismantle DTOs - Dismantle DTOs through investigative means - TO DEVELOP NEW INTELLIGENCE PROTOCOLS THAT WILL IDENTIFY DRUG

IMPORTATION-TRANSPORTATION-DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND MONEY LAUNDERING INFRASTRUCTURES RESULTING IN ARRESTS OF HIGH-LEVEL TRAFFICKERS AND SEIZURES OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS AND MONEY AND DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO BORDER DRUG TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES

- More tactical. Assisting law enforcement agencies - To provide/share information and intelligence among all the agencies in this area and

beyond as necessary. - Identifying threats and addressing in efforts of mitigating it - To disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations. As far as Intel, we are here to

support HIDTA Initiatives and other State/Local Police agencies on ongoing criminal investigations. Should we see a developing trend, we produce strategic documents and disseminate them in our AOR.

- To pursue the drug traffickers and organizations - Participation by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies; the collocation and

commingling, at one central facility, of most investigative initiatives; targeting the most significant drug trafficking, money laundering, and drug-related violent crime organizations

- Identify drug threats as documented in the annual Threat Assessment then provide specific direction on threat elements to be addressed and deployment of resources thru the funding of initiatives.

- To combat the DTO’s and provide training to LE members to help in the fight against drugs

- Improving public safety, assist law enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies

151

- To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies

- Provide officer safety and analytical support to initiatives through intel gathering and dissemination

- To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies

- To assist Law Enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies

- Give money to task forces and let them incorporate that money into their existing programs however they see fit

Policymaker Responses:

- Identify Threat and develop enforcement strategies to deal with threat through unity of

effort - Interdiction, Investigation, and Prosecution of drug shipments smuggled and/or

transshipped into and through the State of NM - Evaluate past performance, determine the threat, align resources into task forces and

initiatives to counter the threat , evaluate success. - Detect, investigate and disrupt/dismantle DTO and MLO - Our current strategy is based on the Drug Market Analysis produced by NDIC. The

Strategy has not changed significantly over the past few years, but changes have been made to reflect the Executive Board and Directors view of the drug market and threat.

- A MIX OF INVESTIGATIVE/INTELLIGENCE/TRAINING/SUPPORT AND PREVENTION INITIATIVES

- To target large DTOs and MLOs. Disrupt flow of drugs to community. - Reduce availability of illicit drugs, effectively use Intel, detect-disrupt-dismantle DTOs

& MLOs - Reduce availability of illicit drugs; effectively use intelligence; detect, disrupt, dismantle

DTOs; reduce drug-related violence; support demand reduction efforts - I don’t think we have one for executives - Intelligence and enforcement - Based on our strategic intelligence we design our task forces to attack our specific threats - DTOs that traffic in Meth and Marijuana are our priorities along with cross border

trafficking - Task Force approach based on specialties - Develop operational objectives that reflect strategic threats as identified by the Threat

Assessment - The Lake County HIDTA will aggressively pursue drug and firearms trafficking

gangs/organizations in order to disrupt, dismantle, and reduce the supply of drugs and firearms to help meet the National Drug Control Strategy goals.

- Narcotics from the DR and the Caribbean, Money Laundering, parcel interdiction - See our Strategy and Threat Assessment Published annually

152

- The Northwest HIDTA Executive Board has implemented and administered programs that meet the National Drug Control Strategy by forming partnerships and dedicating HIDTA resources to law enforcement, intelligence, prosecution, prevention, treatment, and education efforts. The Northwest HIDTA Executive Board’s strategy is to develop programs and initiatives that meet the ONDCP program requirements and that reduce the drug threat in this region.

- Through the successful investigation of violent drug trafficking organizations, reduce the trafficking of drugs and the occurrence of drug-related violent crime within the HIDTA region

Appendix L: Volition Figures

157

Appendix M: Communication Figures

Figures

159

Appendix N: Time Figures

173

Appendix O: Confidence Figures

Figures

177

avoiding intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement

Documents