avian flu pandemic preparedness
DESCRIPTION
Avian Flu Pandemic Preparedness. David A. Denneno APRN,BC, MSN, MEd, CEN Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Sturdy Memorial Hospital Attleboro, MA. The only thing harder to do than get your organization to plan for a disaster is to explain to the public why you didn’t. Avian Flu Key Facts. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Avian Flu Pandemic Avian Flu Pandemic PreparednessPreparedness
David A. Denneno APRN,BC, MSN, MEd, CENDavid A. Denneno APRN,BC, MSN, MEd, CEN
Emergency Preparedness CoordinatorEmergency Preparedness Coordinator
Sturdy Memorial HospitalSturdy Memorial Hospital
Attleboro, MAAttleboro, MA
The only thing harder to The only thing harder to do than get your do than get your
organization to plan for a organization to plan for a disaster is to explain to the disaster is to explain to the
public why you didn’t.public why you didn’t.
Avian Flu Key FactsAvian Flu Key Facts Influenza A (H5N1) virus is an influenza A virus subtype Influenza A (H5N1) virus is an influenza A virus subtype
occurring mainly in birds, is highly contagious among occurring mainly in birds, is highly contagious among birds, and can be deadly to thembirds, and can be deadly to them
H5N1 virus does not usually infect people, but infections H5N1 virus does not usually infect people, but infections with these viruses have occurred in humans. Most of with these viruses have occurred in humans. Most of these cases have resulted from people having direct or these cases have resulted from people having direct or close contact with H5N1-infected poultry or H5N1-close contact with H5N1-infected poultry or H5N1-contaminated surfacescontaminated surfaces
Influenza viruses have the ability to change. Scientists Influenza viruses have the ability to change. Scientists concerned that H5N1 virus could be able to infect concerned that H5N1 virus could be able to infect humans and spread easily from one person to another humans and spread easily from one person to another
Pandemic occurrence cannot be predicted Pandemic occurrence cannot be predicted
If H5N1 virus were to gain the capacity to spread easily If H5N1 virus were to gain the capacity to spread easily from person to person, an influenza pandemic could from person to person, an influenza pandemic could beginbegin
Pandemic Outbreak Pandemic Outbreak PossibilitiesPossibilities
At least 2-7 million people worldwide will At least 2-7 million people worldwide will die (possibly many more) die (possibly many more)
Tens of millions of people will require Tens of millions of people will require medical attention medical attention
Healthcare systems may Healthcare systems may become overwhelmedbecome overwhelmed
Essential services may break down as key Essential services may break down as key personnel are infectedpersonnel are infected
Businesses and schools may close Businesses and schools may close International travel may be limited as International travel may be limited as
governments restrict entrygovernments restrict entry
Pandemic PhasesPandemic PhasesInterpandemic Period Interpandemic Period
PhasePhase 1 1
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infections or disease in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infections or disease is considered to be low. is considered to be low.
PhasePhase 2 2
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. risk of human disease.
Pandemic Alert Period Pandemic Alert Period
PhasePhase 3 3
Human infection(s) with a new subtype. No human-to-human spread, or Human infection(s) with a new subtype. No human-to-human spread, or
at most rare instances of spread to a close contact. at most rare instances of spread to a close contact. Currently at this phase
Phase Phase 4 4
Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission. Spread is Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission. Spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.
Phase Phase 5 5
Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk). may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).
Pandemic Period Pandemic Period
Phase Phase 6 6
Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population. Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population.
How many vents do you How many vents do you have?have?
Traditional vs Disaster Traditional vs Disaster MedicineMedicine
Traditional MedicineTraditional Medicine Do everything possible for the Do everything possible for the
patient.patient.
Disaster MedicineDisaster Medicine Do the most for the most.Do the most for the most.
HHS PlanHHS Plan
Pandemic Influenza PlansPandemic Influenza Plans
HHS PlanHHS Plan National StockpilesNational Stockpiles
Massachusetts DPH Massachusetts DPH PlanPlan National Hospital National Hospital
Bio-terrorism Bio-terrorism Preparedness Preparedness ProgramProgram
HHS PlanHHS Plan
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recommends that The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recommends that hospitals consider stockpiling enough consumable resources, such as hospitals consider stockpiling enough consumable resources, such as masks and gloves, to last the duration of a pandemic wave, approximately masks and gloves, to last the duration of a pandemic wave, approximately six to eight weeks. It also recommends that hospitals do the following:six to eight weeks. It also recommends that hospitals do the following:
Anticipate the need for supplies and determine trigger points for ordering Anticipate the need for supplies and determine trigger points for ordering extra resources extra resources
Estimate the need for respiratory care equipment (including mechanical Estimate the need for respiratory care equipment (including mechanical ventilators), and develop a strategy for acquiring additional equipment, if ventilators), and develop a strategy for acquiring additional equipment, if needed needed
Anticipate their need for antibiotics and determine how supplies can be Anticipate their need for antibiotics and determine how supplies can be maintained during a pandemic.maintained during a pandemic.
VHA Inc. SurveyVHA Inc. Survey
Depletion of critical Depletion of critical supplies within 2 supplies within 2 weeksweeks
Interruptions in Asian Interruptions in Asian manufacturing could manufacturing could impact replenishment impact replenishment optionsoptions
60/62% with plans: Not 60/62% with plans: Not preparedprepared
90% inventory last 16 90% inventory last 16 days or <days or <
What do we need?What do we need?
Larry Dooley, Vice President at NovationLarry Dooley, Vice President at Novation
Hospitals need to take a critical look at their inventory Hospitals need to take a critical look at their inventory levels.levels. Determine whether they need to slowly begin making Determine whether they need to slowly begin making
changes to prepare for the impact of avian flu or some other changes to prepare for the impact of avian flu or some other pandemic pandemic
Communicate their needs to their supply distribution partners Communicate their needs to their supply distribution partners
Network with other hospitals in their community or regionNetwork with other hospitals in their community or region
Develop a contingency plan for how they might share Develop a contingency plan for how they might share supplies or move supplies within a region on a rolling basis supplies or move supplies within a region on a rolling basis
Sturdy Memorial Hospital Sturdy Memorial Hospital Seven Days on HandSeven Days on Hand
7 DAYS ON HAND
updated 3/09/06 Item Daily Qty Days Each Add Total Bio T
Description # use/ea OH/ea OH Cost qty Cost Inv.
Hand soap 4152 8.33 250 30
Central line Kit AK15703A 1.5 19 16 *
Cadaver Bag MI-XD-CBB01 3 0 0 21
Facial Tissue 820 93 613 8 *
Suct Cath dynd41904 0.285 119 185
Suct Cath dydn41902 4 238 135
Suct Cath dydn41900 4 128 43
Suct Tube K87 9 250 30
Suct Coll v71-1105 39 244 8
D5W 1000ml 2B0064 1 62 33 *
D5W 500ml 2B0063Q 2 76 31 *
Lact Ringer 2B2324 71 255 7 *
Saline 2B1324 55 253 5 110 *
TOTAL
Sturdy Memorial Hospital Sturdy Memorial Hospital Seven Days on Hand Seven Days on Hand
7 DAY ON HAND SURGE ITEMS
Total Current Current Total
Item usage for qty days Each qty Total Bio T
Description # 1 week on hand OH Cost needed Cost Inv.
Mask Resp N95 6300 620 80 5680 $
Gown Isolation 202 6300 500 30 5800 $
Glove Small 23-93s 4600 7800 13 0 $ -
Glove Med 23-95s 20760 17300 5 3460 $
Glove Lg 23-97s 2500 5000 16 0 $ -
TOTAL $
Sturdy Memorial HospitalSturdy Memorial Hospital
Mask usage predicated on 9 masks/patient/day @ 100 patients or 900 masks/day x 7 days or 6300 masks.
Gown usage also predicated on 9 disposable isolation gowns/patient/day @ 100 patients or 900 gowns/day x 7 day or 6300 gowns.
Glove usage predicated on current average daily usage plus 20%.