I. Definition and Description of Technology

Computerized voting is a superior form of casting ballots. It allows for fairer and faster voting. It

takes many forms with different processes but how it is implemented depends on the

technological facilities allocated for the elections procedure. Automated election system

(AES) is a system that uses appropriate technology to accomplish and aid such tasks as voting,

counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral

process. Republic Act No. 9369, which is the Amended Elections Automation Law provides for the

use of two forms of AES. The first is a paper-based election system defined as “a type of

automated election system that uses paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,

consolidates, canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count.” It uses the

Optical Mark Reader (OMR) Technology. Here, the voters have to shade the oval which

corresponds to their candidate of choice using pencil in a specially scanned paper ballot. It is

composed of 2 Laptops, 2 Digital Scanners, 2 card readers, 1 hub and 1 printer. The votes in the

shaded ballots will then be scanned and counted using an Automated Counting Machine (ACM).

This kind of technology is pretty much familiar in the Philippines. It is used in the National

Secondary Aptitude Test (NSAT), formerly the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE),

given by the Department of Education (DepEd), and in the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Licensure Examinations and other examinations given by the Professional Regulatory

Commission (PRC), wherein the answer sheet is composed of ovals and the oval corresponding to

the chosen answer would be shaded by the examinee. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office

(PCSO) for its Lotto system, wherein the ovals, corresponding to the numbers being bet upon, are

also shaded, employs a similar system. In all these, the answer sheets and the lotto cards are

read, or counted, by the OMR. Because of its familiarity, and because it makes use of ballots

which is what most Filipinos are familiar to, this system was recommended as the most suitable for

the Philippine setting.

The second form is the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). It is defined as “a type of automated

election system that uses electronic ballots, records votes by means of a ballot display provided

with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data

by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting

results electronically.” voters are provided with a Voting Pad where the photos of candidates can

be selected by pressing on the desired picture. Once the vote is final, a receipt is generated after

pressing ‘BOTO‘. The Board of Election Inspectors keeps the receipt just in case there are

complaints raised. However, DRE Technology can only be deployed in areas where

communications is available and reliable.

The first automated election was held in ARMM last August 11, 2008. There were a lot of “firsts”

during this historical event: First fraud-free election in more than half a century; first time the

winning candidates were proclaimed in less than two days after election day; first to use electronic

voting and transmission machines in a Philippine electoral exercise; first time election results have

been uncontested; first elections with practically no reports of voter disenfranchisement; and first

elections where the rate of failure of elections is less than 1 percent. Voters’ turnout was greater

than expected, reaching 90% of the expected voting population.

On February 25, UP Diliman(UPD) held its first campus-wide computerized University Student

Council (USC) elections. The open source voting system, called “Halalan”, was created by the UP

Linux Users Group (UnPLUG), a student organization at the College of Engineering (CoE). The

colleges provided the computers for the elections. The voting process started with students

presenting their IDs or Form-5s to attending poll clerks, who checked the list of valid voters.

Students on the list then received their passwords from the poll clerks and proceeded to

unoccupied voting stations. Using their student numbers and the passwords provided as login

information, they opened their electronic ballots and marked the boxes of their chosen candidates.

Once they clicked the confirm button, their votes were final and they were automatically logged

out. The system allows voters to log in again but only to check their votes, not change them. The

first working prototype of Halalan was created in January 2005 and presented to UPD student

councils and student publications later that month at the Palma Hall Lobby. Its first application in

the USC elections was at the CoE and the School of Statistics in 2007. A year later, the College of

Business Administration, the College of Mass Communication, and the School of Library and

Information Science also adopted the system.

 II. Providers of the Technology

Computerized elections would not be possible without Republic Act No. 9369 and the lawmakers

behind it. But, ultimately, this new system of voting cannot be implemented without the

technology need to run the whole system. As far as the government is concerned, making such

provisions is the extent of their ability to provide computerized elections. A third party is needed

to fully implement the Act by providing the government and the Philippines with the

technology needed to run the elections. Here is where the technology providers come in.

Different firms have showed interest in providing the machinery and computers for the Philippines’

automated elections. 11 of which are foreign companies, though only one of them will be chosen

and be given the contract through a series of bidding. These are US firms Sequioa, Avante, ES/S,

Hart and Scantron; Venezuela’s Smartmatic; United Kingdom’s DRS; India’s Bharat; South

Korea’s DVS Korea; Gilat Solution of Israel and Spain’s Indra System. Whoever gets the contract

will be renting out about 80,000 machines that will be used for the 2010 elections. Two of these

providers have already serviced the elections here in the Philippines, specifically the ARMM

elections. Venezuela’s Smartmatic provided the DRE – Direct Recording Electronic technology

which uses an Automated Voting Machine (AVM) and allows voters to choose their candidates on

an electronic voting pad and confirm their choices using a simple touch screen system. The

Smartmatic SAES4000 system is a combination of hardware with secure software and manned by

highly qualified human resources that enables it to ensure fault less elections. Smartmatic joined

forces with Strategic Alliance Holdings, Inc. (SAHI), a fully Filipino owned technology provider

specializing in the provision of IT solutions to both the public and private sectors, to form

SMARTMATIC-SAHI Technology, Inc. Together; they provided the necessary technology and IT

solutions for the automation ARMM elections and if given the contract again, they may as well

provide the technology and technical expertise for the 2010 national elections. Another provider in

the ARMM elections and a bidder for the contract for the 2010 elections is Avante International

Technology, Inc. They provided the OMR – Optical Mark Reader technology. Their very own,

AVANTE's PATENTED OPTICAL-VOTE-TRAKKER® is an optical scan system that enables

scanning of paper ballots that are captured as digital ballot images for faster, easier and error free

tallying. Avante also provided Automated Counting Machine (ACM) to be used in tallying the

votes. “The AVANTE ACM system also has a patented and proven capability to detect and reject

counterfeit or fake ballots”

 III. Users of the Technology

Being the little brother of the United States of America in Asia, the Philippines and we, Filipinos,

always had the notion of what a country should be. It should be for the people, by the people and

of the people in other words, democratic. We have toppled administrations that we did not approve

of and by peaceful means at that. The users of the technology, Online Elections, would be the

Filipino people in general and also, in a way it can be a step by step process in which, it can be

first implemented in school elections then, the local elections, and the national elections is the last

step. As Filipinos, we hate knowing that we are being taken advantage of whether be it in terms

elections or anything in general. We hate that we are being governed by unworthy people and

people who are not deserving of the position. How then are they able to achieve such feats? We

can’t be possibly sure but a rational explanation would be that we are being cheated in the

elections. And thus, by applying this technology we are able to prevent this from happening. The

users will benefit from it and the country as a whole because the integrity of the elections would be

objectified and strengthened. The public will also be satisfied because faster results are

guaranteed by the usage of automated and online elections. The government will also be

benefited because lesser costs will have to be allocated for the elections in the long run. The initial

costs might be high because of the need for technology and infrastructure upgrades and

manpower training, but the succeeding costs in the next elections will be lower. However, there is

also one thing that is hindering us from achieving this goal of ours, which is the digital divide,

mainly because of poverty. The problem with online voting systems is that those who do not

have any experience or knowledge on using or manipulating computers would find it hard

and tedious to vote through computers and as such will have a harder time to cast their

ballots. This might lead to lesser voter turnouts, hence, lesser participation from the

general public that might affect the usefulness of the elections. This might be a hindrance

to our being democratic and liberal as a people because we might accidentally shut down

those who are illiterate in computers by implementing an online platform for the elections.

The voters should be well informed and prepared for such adaptation of technology. As

Information Technology advances here in the Philippines, the group believes that, we will be able

to lessen the digital divide as an effect of online voting, as a consequence of the implementation of

online voting. This will be a simultaneous effect because the government and the people are now

more pressured to learn and be well versed in ICT because it is now a prerequisite to exercise

their voting rights. In short, it is a two-pronged spear that would have exponential benefits when

implemented rightfully.

 IV. Technology Assessment

A. Readiness of the Philippines to Adapt to an Online Platform of Elections

Is the Philippines ready for automated election? Are we ready for something new? First, let us

discuss the advantages and disadvantages that will emerge if our country engages with an

automated election. Smartmatic (also referred as Smartmatic Corp. or Smartmatic International) is

a multinational corporation founded in 2000 that specializes in the design and deployment of

complex purpose-specific technology solutions. It is organized around three business areas:

Electronic voting systems, integrated security systems, and biometric systems for people

registration and authentication for government applications. Smartmatic offers the Smartmatic

Automated Election System (SAES), a unified voting, scrutiny, tabulation, allocation and result

broadcast solution -suitable for any type of election- which was officially released in 2003. In

addition to the many benefits of the SAES system, its most outstanding advantage lies in the

guarantee of total transparency in any given electoral or referendum process. SAES offers the

possibility to verify and audit results through different means, guaranteeing zero numerical

inconsistencies between all stages covered by every single vote, from actual casting to final

scrutiny. Smartmatic provides us other benefits and advantages if we will deal with automation of

election.

 1. Financial Savings

Though automated elections deals with acquiring computer, hence will cost a large amount of

money, it can still cut cost in other expenses, i.e. labor cost. Since the computer would do the

counting. That means fewer laborers are needed. Normally, automation requires a large up-front

investment in hardware and software, as well as expensive training of electoral workers and

running educational campaigns for voters. Automated elections guarantees short- and long-term

returns that can greatly compensate for the initial investment.

 2. Increased speed and efficiency of electoral task and faster electoral results

The computer to be used has internal tools that can increase speed and efficiency for some

important works during the election. Also, using computers would make the election itself faster.

Voting manually would consume time for the voters to write name of the candidates, etc. Also, with

vast advancement of technology, the machine/ computer has a tool that can count the votes faster

and more accurate. Using computers/machines, they would be the one to tally and transmit the

votes to the electoral board without human intervention. The automated electoral system

mechanisms significantly reduce the chances of errors, because vote counting is based on an

internal machine count rather than on individual ballots, which can be tampered with.

 3. Improved capacity to identify and prevent frauds

With the system using ultra-safe encryption algorithms to store and transmit each vote from the

SAES voting machine to the tabulation centers, tampering of votes will be prevented and the

integrity of the elections would be higher.

On the other hand, one of the disadvantages of using computers/ machine in election is the

broad knowledge of man in terms of technology. Though computers may have high

securities, there are many computer “geeks” that can bombard the computers and the

system as a whole. They have many ways to hack those computers to be used in the

elections. Hackers are the number one enemy of this system. Hackers are known to

infiltrate and manipulate even the most sophisticated computer programs in the world.

Also, technology, though seems to be perfect, may still have errors in its components. We

all know that no computer system is 100% tamper-proof, or foolproof. We are not sure that

it, the automated election, may give us the best results of the elections. Also, can this

system eliminate other election-related problems like vote buying?

Presented with the advantages and disadvantages, another question may arise, will the

people of the Philippines be able to adapt to the new system?

In the present generation, people became more literate, especially with the use of computer.

Having had computer lessons during elementary and secondary education, even in public schools,

people know the basics on the use of computer. One survey conducted was that about 25 million

Filipinos are using computers and the internet, mostly in developed cities. Though some are

underprivileged, they still have access on computers through internet cafés. However, that is in

the urban area. How about in the rural and the isolated area? We all know that the

Philippines is a developing country, and many areas here do not permit people to have a

technology-integrated lives. ****Especially in the province, many indigenous ethnic groups

do not know how to use computer, nor, do they know how to read and write. So, how can

these people adapt to the new system? They need time to learn. Also, some areas here in

the Philippines do not have electricity. In those areas, for sure, they would conduct manual

voting.**** It is not consistent that some areas will have automated election, while some

have manual elections. Actually, last August 2008, the ARMM conducted their elections. They

used a new system of automation. Hence, the COMELEC said that the election was a success.

COMELEC Jose Melo said he was “very, very satisfied” with the conduct of the elections in the

ARMM, dubbed the “cheating capital” of the Philippines. And less than 24 hours, more than half of

the poll results were in with the COMELEC. As what we discussed earlier, automated election

would increase speed and efficiency, like what the ARMM election has experienced. Actually, this

automated election in ARMM is an experiment for the 2010 National election. If the ARMM election

is a success, would be the National Election on 2010 be a success with the use of computer?

We’ll find out since the President signed the law that passed Republic Act No. 9525 appropriating

11.3-billion supplemental budget for the full automation of the elections, a first in Philippine

history. Hence, that is next year, we will see if the Philippines will be capable of having an

automated election.

 B. General Feasibility of Online Elections in the Philippines

 Is it Feasible?

If one out of ten Filipinos have no ability to read and write at the same time, is it possible for the

Philippines to have automated elections? Let us remember that for the past decades, Filipinos

have successfully voted even though some do not know how to read and write. Clearly, the

Philippines will be pushing through with the automated elections by the year 2010. An automated

election will be feasible in the Philippines with the right and proper technology or system to be

used. There are certain problems that it might encounter. Electricity in the rural areas of the

Philippines is not always available; if it is available it is not that reliable. If the Commission on

Elections will use Direct Recording Equipment Process there would be a problem in deploying the

hundreds of thousands of units to different locations all through out the Philippines. A number of

technical personnel are needed to install the system. The government already provided a budget

for the transmission of the machines as well as payments needed for the technical personnel. All

the voters must be trained to use the DRE system. According to Senator Gordon, Filipinos are

smart enough to participate in an automated election. He also suggested that an automated

election is going to be more feasible if there would be a national ID system based on

 Is it Feasible to be able to come up with a check and balance so that cheating would not be

prevalent?

It is feasible. An automated election, for a fact, cannot fully prevent cheating but only certain forms

of it could be prevented through check and balance. It is also a fact that there is no system that is

tamper proof. The following are plausible forms of check and balance: paper audit trail of ballots,

protection of software source code, no switching of ballot boxes, the testing of the technologies,

and the addition of some amendments on the Senate Bill No. 2231. The Automated Election Bill in

the Philippines requires that there should be a voter verifiable paper audit trail. This feature of the

bill will reduce the incidents of vote buying and increase the security and credibility of the people’s

votes. The voter verifiable audit trail enables the voters to review and edit their votes. On the same

note the right amount of protection on the automated elections' software source code would

prevent hackers on hacking on to the computers for counting and thus prevents the tampering on

the number of votes. On the old system, manual transmissions of ballot boxes allow the possibility

of ballot switching but with the new system, it would be prevented. Another way to check if it is

feasible to have an automated election without cheating to be prevalent is to test the technology

itself. The technology should be checked if it is efficient and if it works the way it should be to

further eliminate certain problems with it. By testing the technology, COMELEC will know

beforehand if the system can be tampered as well as its errors. The Senate approved Senate Bill

No. 2231, the Amendment to the Election Automation Law states additional security for the

random auditing of the system and system for recount. Other kinds of check and balance are

instead of writing the name, voters marks the candidate of their choice, the voter should physically

feed the ballot into the machine where the ballot has its picture taken, the election returns are

proposed to be automatically transmitted, the OMR machines should not be equip with any kind of

communication devices, there should be seven copies of the ER to be sent to different computers,

COMELEC would provide PC’s for the different parties so that they can follow the tabulation, and

the statement of vote would be projected in each canvassing center so that the watchers can

compare the totals.

 V. Conclusion

The paper discussed the advent of online elections that would probably dawn on us, Filipinos, next

elections. It provided a background on the basics of online/automated elections, the components

needed to make it possible, the methods that would be employed to guarantee the integrity safety

of the votes, a discussion on the general feasibility as grounded to the advantages and

disadvantages of the technology, and everything was then contextualized to fit the circumstances

of the Philippines. It can then be concluded that online/automated/computerized elections can be

possible in the Philippines if sufficient training and preparations are employed in spearheading it.

The long-term benefits of the said platform for voting greatly exceed the initial technological and

training costs that it would entail making it a feasible investment in the future for our country. But

even if this new voting platform is grounded on technology and is streamlined by modernity, it is

still not foolproof. Many problems were discussed regarding the possibility of hacking and the

crashing of the system but it can still be considered safer than the manual voting system that we

have been implementing for so long now. The problem of digital divide was also alluded to the

discussion. The Philippines, as a developing country, has regions and groups of people that are

deprived of technology and proper training and education. This might lead to an accidental and

virtual exclusion of these people and towns from the up and coming online elections, which might

possibly make lessen the voters’ turnout and the whole democracy of our elections. It can also be

deduced that the implementation of the online elections will not only strengthen the integrity of our

votes but in the process close the digital divide that we are experiencing right now. By training our

people to use ICT, we are making them ready to use it for more things to come-not just for mere

electoral usage. To end, our country might be a long way to go from being industrialized and fully

prepared to reap the benefits of ICT in every major part of our everyday lives, but the conduct of

the 2010 online/automated elections is a still a big step forward towards the achievement of a truly

democratic and honest elections and the closure of the digital divide as a whole. Our

infrastructures might not be at par to other countries and our people might not be fully informed

and trained yet, but these shortcomings can be greatly remedied if we are equipped with the

willingness to learn and adapt to our ever-changing world.

Election Automation -- Motivations

This section we will discuss a variety of reasons for automating various parts of the electoral

process. In order to make the best use of technology in a given jurisdiction, it is important to

understand the motivations that are driving automation initiatives. It is also important to remember

that automation cannot solve all electoral problems. Indeed there are many situations in which

automation is not necessary or even useful.

One aspect that too often is neglected when discussing the pros and cons of election automation

is the EMBs importance as educator of the representative democratic system. It is true that under

certain conditions automation of the electoral process and the work of the EMB are valid. But we

should not ignore the short-and long-term affect that having ordinary people involved in the

electoral process has on the elections. By employing vast number of people as registrants and

verifiers of signatures for candidates and parties; registration clerks of the voters' roll, and

members of local election committees all over the country the EMB is reaching into a very large

number of households in a country. What they learn during their training and experience in their

work is shared and discussed with families and friends at dinner tables and social events for

months leading up to election day. We sometimes tend to forget that in many countries, the EMBs

are indirectly conveying a bulk of the voter education and voter information messages via their

temporary employees. Hence, when introducing new technologies in an electoral process in

emerging democracies resulting in a reduction of the workforce, we must be aware that the voter

education and voter information budget have to be adjusted too.

Some common motivations for election automation include:

saving money

increasing the speed and efficiency   of   election-related tasks

increasing the speed   of   obtaining election results

improving the accuracy   of   election results

improving the ability to identify and prevent fraud

improving public confidence in the electoral process

demonstrating 'high-tech' capabilities 32

Saving Money

Election automation can potentially save money by reducing labor costs associated with an

election. Cost savings can be realized through   automated   vote counting as well as automating

other election-related tasks. In the future systems that let voters vote from home, business, or

public-access computers may reduce costs associated with setting up and staffing polling

locations.

However, it is important for election administrators to do a comprehensive cost analysis

before assuming that automation will save them money. Automation requires a significant

initial investment in computer hardware and software as well as expenses to train election

personnel and educate voters. Computer equipment requires ongoing maintenance and will

need to be periodically upgraded or replaced. Computers that are used only on election day

will need to be safely stored between elections. And equipment may need to be transported

from storage to voting and tallying sites on election day.

Increasing the Speed and Efficiency of Electoral Tasks

At various stages of the electoral process, election administrators are required to handle large

quantities of data, and under tight deadlines. Therefore they should constantly be on the lookout

for potential improvements. There are a variety of tools that can increase the speed and

efficiency ofelection-related tasks. Vendors offer technology solutions that can:

automate election planning, managing, budgeting, and record keeping

draw precinct boundaries and assign voters to precincts

verify and count signatures on petitions

provide information to candidates, parties, and voters

monitor and prepare reports on campaign contributions and spending

register voters and create voter identification cards

authenticate voters at voting sites

manage absentee voting, including verifying signatures on absentee ballot envelopes

record votes, count ballots, and transmit local tallies to central tallying facilities

disseminate election results33

Increasing the Speed of Obtaining Election Results

Election automation can greatly reduce the time it takes to count ballots and obtain election

results. If voters enter their votes directly into a computer or ballots are tallied at precinct locations,

precinct tallies may be automatically transferred to tallying centers and results obtained almost

immediately after the polls close. Even if ballots are not tallied locally, automated methods of ballot

counting provide great time savings over hand counting.

Improving the Accuracy of Election Results

One of the core issues resulting in heated discussions in the courtrooms and TV studios in the US

in the end of 2000 was the accuracy of the various counting techniques employed in the different

counties. President George W. Bush's Director of Communication argued that hand counting votes

was not a reliable method, and should be discouraged. Too much subjectivity was involved in that

process, and therefore machine counts should be used, it was alleged. In order for technical

machines to live up to our high expectation they however must be thoroughly tested and

maintained, and the administrators and voters using them must be adequately trained in order to

operate them correctly. If this is the case, then machines could potentially be able to provide more

accurate results than can be provided by hand-counted ballots. Furthermore, when voters enter

their votes directly into a computer, inaccuracies introduced as a result of voters' unclear ballot

marks can be eliminated. It is important to remember, however, that problems with computer

hardware or software may also introduce extensive errors.

Improving the Ability to Identify and Prevent Fraud

Automated systems can reduce opportunities for some kinds of election fraud. Fraud may be

reduced if voted ballots need not be physically transported, if computerised voter registration logs

make it easier to identify people who should not be registered or who attempt to vote using

someone else's registration, or if all computer system accesses are thoroughly logged. Of course,

computerised voting opens up opportunities for new types of voting fraud. Computer files can be

destroyed due to viruses or erased by hackers. In addition, it is much more difficult for local and

international observers to verify and control that data has not been manipulated. Thus, it is

essential that extensive precautions be taken.

Improving Public Confidence in the Electoral Process

If members of the public trust technology and believe that its use will prevent fraud, they may have

more confidence in the electoral process. If people distrust technology, however, or if technology

used in an election proves difficult to use or fails, people are likely to lose confidence in the

electoral process.

Demonstrating 'High-Tech' Capabilities

Many elected officials are enthusiastic about computerised voting simply because they want to

project a 'high-tech' image for their administration or for their state or country. This is not a good

reason for automation if it is the only one for automation. When accompanied by other reasons,

however, this motivation may help drive financial allocations and legislation that might be

necessary to realise election automation.

I. Introduction

It is a proven fact that during Philippine elections a lot of comments occur. The kind of

election here in the Philippines is very different from the others. We were astonished to the

US presidential election last year which Barack Obama won. It was an astonishing event

that the world has ever seen. But, what made us astonished is that it took only few hours to

proclaim the next president of the most powerful nation in the world. Polls were

computerized, everything was so organized. Now it made us think that if computerized

voting system is being forwarded for approval in the Philippines for the 2010 election. To us,

it will be a nice move by the government to gain back the trust of the nation.

Every election in the Philippines was seemed to be dirty and bloody. And with that

computerized voting scheme, the upcoming election won’t repeat what happened to the

previous years. Votes back them were counted manually by underpaid public school

teachers. And when evening comes, the next day, people would hear in news that a

precinct staff was murdered and the ballot box stolen. This is actually so common here. And

even before the election a candidate would be in the news, ambushed, murdered and

forced to step down. That is how dirty politics here.

Now back to the computerized election, it is a very great idea to keep the election clean.

We are now living in a high technology world and it is about time that the country makes

use of high-tech equipment to significantly reduce the many problems that Philippine’s

suffered during election.

Statement of the problem

1. What is a computerized election system?

2. When was the first computerized election used in the Philippines?

3. What is the difference between a manual and computerized election?

4. What are the three methods of voting?

5. How does a computerized election work?

6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a computerized election?

Objective of the study

1. To inform the students on what is a computerized election system.

2. To know what is the difference and which is better between manual and

computerized election.

3. To know how it would lessen the burden during Philippine election.

4. To know the advantages and disadvantages of computerized election.

5. To know how computerized election work.

Importance of the study

Every election in the Philippine was seemed to be dirty and bloody. The kind of election we

don’t want to, for it is now the time to change the level of voting here in the Philippines.

Computerized election could be a turning point for the country to be successful in many

elections to come.

This study will prove on how computerized election could help the kind of election, that

Philippine has. In addition, this study can show the different reasons why computerized

election is important to the country. However, this study could also show the disadvantages

of using computerized election.

The main purpose of this study is to inform every voter on how computerized election helps

the kind of election that Philippine has.

Review of Related Literature

A. Definition of computerized election

Computerized election system is defined as vote counting process using electronic devices

such as computers. According to an act authorizing the Commission on Elections, they

should conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-

test it in March 1996 election in the ARMM and for other purposes

(http://www.COMELEC.com).

A. Difference between manual and computerized election

To differentiate manual from computerized election, let us first define manual election.

Manual election is defined as a system that count votes using paper audits stored by a

ballot box. In addition, manual election usually takes a long time before proclaiming the

winning candidate. It is a time consuming system, for it takes more than a month before the

results are transmitted to the COMELEC. Lastly, manual election is counted by underpaid

public school teachers, while computerized election is a system that counting and voting

process is done by using a sufficient installed program into the computers. Unlike manual

election, computerized election is easy and fast for the transmission of results is done by

computers. In addition, computerized election usually takes a short period of time before

proclaiming the winning candidate.

B. History of Computerized Election

1. The first computerized election happened during the presidential election of George W.

Bush last November 02, 2004. Computerized voting machines were used to count the

majority of the votes which the machines were built for and programmed by the companies

such as DIEBOLD and ES&S tabulated the results in record time, showing, just minutes

after the polls closed. “This is an extraordinary achievement in grass-roots politics”, said by

some political analyst (http://www.confusionroad.com/article.php?).

2. Despite threats of postponement and intermittent skirmishers between rebel and

government troops, the country’s first computerized election has been conducted smoothly-

though only in some parts of the troubled Mindanao region. The automated polls proceeded

with minor problems on August 11, 20008, with about 85 percent of 10.5 million registered

voters casting their vote, according to election officials. The landmark election was confined

within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an aggregation of areas n the

southern island populated mostly by Muslim inhabitants. The Philippine government spent

some 600 million pesos in the computerized election which served as a test-pilot for the

country’s general election in 2010. The COMELEC said, a few voting machines

malfunctioned during the election but these were fixed promptly by the local contractors and

it is declared a successful election. The COMELEC used two electronic voting systems for

the polls: DRE (Direct Recording Electronics) system for the province of Maguindanao, and

OMR (Optical Mark Reader) technology for the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,

Shariff Kabunsuan and Lanao del Sur. COMELEC spokesperson James Jimenez said in a

blog post that ARMM poll was a significant milestone in the country’s election reform, noting

that voters showed enthusiasm in using automated voting machines amid security

problems. In general, the first computerized election in the Philippines was successful and

declared a milestone (http://www.completefirst.com)

II. Three methods to vote

A. Paper ballots are still used as the primary way f voting in a number of countries. Voters

mark their ballot by hand with an indelible marker (a marker that cannot be erased) or pen

and place their finished ballot in a ballot box. Local election officials then count the votes by

hand.

B. Optical Scan Voting Systems enable votes to mark their choices on pre-printed ballots by

either connecting “arrows”, or filling in “bubbles” next to the candidates’ names. The paper

ballot is then counts the married “bubbles” or “arrows” on each ballot and automatically

computes the total of each candidate and/or issue. 

C. DRE’s (Direct Record Electronic System) enable voters to record their choices

electronically directly into the machine. There are several types of DRE’s (some have a dial

while others use a touch screen) but, essentially they all enable voters to move back and

forth between screens (ballot pages) to select the candidates and/or issues to whom they

wish to vote. Once a voter has made his or her choices, the DRE provides a summary

screen that presents those choices and gives the voter the ability to go back and make any

changes before the pressing the “vote” or “cast ballot” button. One of the benefits of a DRE

System is that prevents “over voting” that is, it stops the voter from selecting two candidates

or options in a race were only one is allowed. As well a DRE gives the voter an opportunity

to correct “under voting” or when he/she fails to select any candidate or option in race.

III. Process of computerized election

A. The validation system process

The commission shall take such steps as many are necessary for the security and

implementation of system promulgate for of computerized election. The commission shall

take the security of the voters and the votes. Votes shall take the validation system to

ensure the requirement in voting in a computer machine.

There are two factors to consider being valid for voting:

1. ID System

It is the process that allow voters to have its ID card to make sure that

the voter is valid. It could also be a proof that the voter is registered and legal to vote.

2. Scanning

It is the process that computers check the identification of the voter to ensure the validation

of the registered voter. Scanning can be considered as a double checker process, for it

double the information of the voter.

A. The tabulation process

Tabulation process deals with the counting of the votes and the process of the transmission

of the results. These include the consultation/canvassing and transmission of results.

Two steps to consider in tabulating process:

1. The first step

On election night at the central tabulation center, the memory card from each precinct as

ballot box is entered into a computer. This computer takes the records of each ballot from

the memory card and sorts them by precinct into separate files, one each for city, council,

school committee and ballot question. The complete ballot files for each race or question

are then copied unto a computer disk. Each ballot record consists of the candidates

selected by the voter and the order in which they were ranked.

2. The second step

The computer disk with the ballot files is installed in a second computer. This computer

contains the software which contains the ballots. The software has been programmed to

follow the “Cambridge rules”. By computer, the same process formerly carried out manually

by more than a hundred counters over the course of a week is conducted in a matter of

seconds by the electronic sorting, counting and transfer of votes.

A. Election result process

An “unofficial first count of number one votes of each candidate for city council and school

committee will be available on election night within minutes of receipt of the memory card

from the last reporting precinct. This count is referred to as “unofficial” because it does not

contain all ballots. The complete ballots records are then copied and read into the

tabulation software were they are tallied. The software produces an “unofficial first count”

and then proceeds to distribute surplus and eliminate candidates with the least number of

votes until all seats have been filled, the election commissioners declare the results.

IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of computerized election

A. Advantages of computerized election

1. Initial recording of voter information

Initial records of voter are stored to the program that is use for the voting process. With the

help of computers, information of the voters can be easily traced by the Comelec official.

2. Secure storage of votes

Through computers, the security of votes has been keep and protected for votes were

safety saved by a memory card. This memory card can’t be deleted easily by anyone. With

the help of the machine the votes are secured and the retrieval process can be done easy

and fast.

3. Maintaining the continuous list

The continuous list of the voter’s information was maintained, for the secure list of voters

information was saved by the computers.

4. Printing copies of preliminary voter’s list

The printing copies of preliminary voter’s list can be given directly to the area where voter’s

can vote. There would be an easy access for the voter’s and without any delays the list can

be shown to the voters.

5. Data entry to revise the preliminary voter’s list 

The preliminary voter’s list can be revise easily if ever there is a need for revision of the

voter’s list.

6. Maintaining record of the materials inventory 

The records of the materials inventory can be save and edited, with the help of the

programs installed to the computers.

7. Printing copies of the final voters list

The final copy of the voters list can be printed easily and fast to be given right away to the

area it is assign.

8. General record keeping and maintenance

The computer can keep records and maintenance safety by using the right program that

protects the general records of the voters and the votes.

9. Identifying duplicate registrations

The computer can detect duplicate registration for the voters information is saved by the

computers.

10. Producing statistics on voter registration

The computer helps producing statistics on voter by geographic area, as well as by gender,

age, etc.

11. Low cost and without wasting paper

The computer helps in not wasting too much of paper, for the format of voting is done by

computer. In addition, the cost of the election can be minimize for the computers counts

votes easy and fast.

12. Keeping an audit trail of the changes made to each voter record.

The audit trail of the changes made to each voter record can be quickly. For example, by

whom a change was made, on the basis of what source information, what data were

changed, which record attributes were affected.

13. Easy and Fast voting

With computerized voting you would have several ways to vote. If you don’t have a

computer you would go to the place where you vote how and vote on the computers

provided you to vote on. Voting at the polls will be as easy as it ever was, even easier. The

computers at the polls will be set up easy to use. Within minutes after the polls close the

computer totals the votes and the winner is displayed. Information is instantly available

about what the totals were to each area. No waiting into the night for the results to be

counted. The computers count it all up instantly.

B. Disadvantages of computerized election

1. Fraud

If wrong results can occur accidentally, they can also happen intentionally. Rigging has

been suspected in various elections, but law suits have been unsuccessful. In many other

cases, fraud could easily have taken place. For many years in Philippines, manual system

overrides were necessary to compute the processing of no computerized precincts. With

the adoption of computerized election the more tampering can occur. Computerized

elections are being run or considered but it does not answer the problem of cheating during

election.

2. Erroneous results

Computer-related error occurs with alarming frequency in elections. Computerized elections

can cause erroneous results for there is a possibility to attribute “human error” and not

“computer error”, and were presumably due to operators and hot programmers; however in

the absence of dependable accountability, who can tell? Existing Standards for designing,

testing, certifying, and operating computerized vote-counting system are inadequate and

voluntary, and provide few hard constraints, almost no accountability and no independent

expert evaluations.

3. Privacy and confidentiality

The transparency of voting can cause detection by those who want to cheat. The

confidentiality of the votes won’t be confidential anymore, for the results are done publicity.

4. Risk of theft

Computerized elections can be a risk of theft, especially to those desperate candidates who

can hire an expert. Hacking can be a problem in computerized election for there is a

possibility in manipulating the votes.

5. Cost

The cost of computerized election is expensive, that is why it is difficult for the country.

V. Conclusion

Providing sufficient measures for computerized election we therefore conclude that:

1. Computerized election is a great idea to keep the election clean.

2. Computerized election is an opportunity to promote good, quality and clean voting

process.

3. Computerized election will promote easy and fast voting unlike manual system.

4. Computerized election is a sufficient system to use in voting and counting process.

5. Computerized election helps eliminating manipulation of votes.

6. Computerized election will help in processing votes easy and fast.

7. Computerized election has more advantages than disadvantages.

8. Computerized election has disadvantages in conducting election.

9. Computerized election won’t be sufficient if it will mis handled.

10. Computerized election in the Philippines will change the way of votinng process to a

great way.

There are advantages gained last time. But did it outweigh the disadvantages?

Automated Election: Are we ready?

The Malacañang's Department of Budget and Management produce the P11.9 billion

supplemental budget for this coming election which will be automated. Christian Monsod

has been explaining how the Open Election System method of automation works.

“Monsod stressed that the proposed OES-based automated election system, combined with an

optical mark recognition (OMR) technology, could cost government about P8 billion for the

equipment and operations. If Comelec prefers getting the OES automated election system alone, it

will cost around P4 billion."

And he added that "The choice of automation technology and its successful implementation is key

to the credibility of the elections."

What was really the "Automated Election"?

Based on the Senate Bill No. 2231: (13th Congress) which entitled:

AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY

11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL

ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS

AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.

881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTIONS LAWS,

PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

On section 2 on the said article defines the automated election system as:

A system using appropriate technology for voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing,

transmission of election results and other processes in the conduct of electoral exercises.

Equipments or components that are being used for Automated Election:

1. Counting machine - a machine that uses an optical scanning mark-sense reading

2. Data storage device - a device used to electronically store counting and device of any similar

advanced technology to count ballots; canvassing results, such as, memory pack or diskette;

3. Computer set - a set of equipment containing regular components, i.e., monitor, central

processing unit or CPU, keyboard and printer;

4. National Ballot - refers to the ballot to be used in the automated election system for the

purpose of the May 1998 elections. This shall contain the names of the candidates for

president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or coalitions participating under

the party-list system;

This ballot shall be counted by the counting machine:

5. Local Ballot - refers to the ballot on which the voter will manually write the names of the

candidates of his/her choice for member of the House of Representatives, governor,vice-

governor, members of the provincial board, mayor, vice-mayor, and members of the city

municipal council.

6. Board of Election inspector - there shall be a Board of Election Inspectors in every precinct

composed of three (3) regular members who shall conduct the voting, counting and recording

of votes in the polling place.

Many questions and complains arise from this issue such as:

How reliable can be the automated election system be?

Some people said that anything that is being done through computerized would be

easier to falsify.

In the side of indigenous people it would be hard for them to vote if the election will be

done automatically because some of them are illiterate.

Advantages of the system to this coming 2010 election:

There will be no ballot box snatching as the ERs are transmitted electronically for canvassing

There is less work for the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)

If all precincts are connected, national results can be produced within one hour after the close

of voting

There is automated tally of votes at the city/municipal level

The DRE can include an automated voter validation system

Canvassing at the city/municipal and provincial levels is almost instantaneous

There is an instantaneous tally of votes at the precinct level

Ballots are pre-printed and voters simply mark choices

Incoming Philippine Elections Pros and Cons of Automation

The whole system itself will be more gullible to sabotage and nationwide fraud, in which

the country is not proud to have a colorful background of. Certain methodology of

nationwide cheating in the elections will be a lot easier compared when it is manual. In a

simple click or push of a button it is possible to completely alter the results in favor of a

specific party. The sacred votes will be treated as data flowing through the air, which in this

states becomes gullible and easy to manipulate especially in today's advancement in

technology.

Smartmatic--the official company responsible for automation--did a great job in designing

the machines but it is not full proof. I may say it is a little disappointing. I applaud their

design of incorporating back up plan in case of sabotage, nationwide blackout and other

events but the ballot itself worries me. Their campaign ion educating the voters about the

proper way of voting may be effective yet it is not enough. I hate to say it, but there will

always be a small percentage of voters who will be intimidated about the system that they

may not vote anymore because frankly the ballot is very complicated and sensitive. And

there is another part of the system which may never both because of their inability to do

so.

****It will make the elections faster because machines are a lot faster than human, but

humans are more efficient than machines.**** The point here is we should watch for the

balance of speed and efficiency to determine the election's transparency.

POINTS:

1.The automation will be our milestone towards technological advancement and probably political

transparency.

OPINION:

The whole system of automation maybe a breakthrough in our society but it is not a full proof plan.

We should keep our eyes open for sabotage because of our history. We should protect the

election and keep its sacredness.

SUPER KADUPER!!!!! XD

A SECOND LOOK ON

THE 2010 PHILIPPINE

AUTOMATED ELECTIONS

By Romeo Cayabyab

“Such success (of the 2010) elections is a credit to the hard work of Comelec and Smartmatic

as well as the commitment of the people of the Philippines toward increasingly transparent

elections. . . The creation of a comprehensive election law encompassing the amendments

regarding electoral technology would improve the transparency and efficiency of future election

processes.†�

In short and reading between the lines of the Carter report, the 2010 automated elections were not

transparent enough, nor efficient. On these conclusions and on other recommendations presented

by the Carter Center, GFN fully agrees.

The Carter Center recommended the following steps which according to it were aimed to

improve transparency and efficiency of the automated election system (AES):

That the Commission of Elections (Comelec) and its board of election inspectors (BEIs)

increase their technical capacity in administering polls using automated election system;

1. That the election calendar provides adequate time for implementation of all stages of

automation;

2. That pre-election testing in a real-world setting is conducted at an earlier date to ensure

adequate time to correct any issues identified;

3. That there is a third-party certification authority to generate the public and private keys

used in result transmission;

4. That procedures are amended to ensure secrecy of the ballot;

5. That measures to increase security meet their ends;

6. That the number of polling stations are expanded and larger clustered precincts are

divided to minimize delays in the voting process;

7. That the process and quality of random manual audit is improved; and

8. That the participation of candidates and political parties in pre-election testing of the

AES is increased.

For the Carter Center to make these recommendations, it must have found the AES

wanting, if not defective.

The Carter Center and GFN Observations: Side by Side

Going over my notes, here are some points where the Carter Center and GFN reports and

observations meet:

1. Technical capacity of Comelec and BEIs in administering the AES

On national televisions, in media conferences, in a foreign observers’ briefing on May 6, 2010,

and even during the first day of national canvassing of votes at the PICC on May 11, 2010,

Smartmatic and Comelec officials were like inseparable twins, so to speak, with a Smartmatic

officer mostly taking the lead as a spokesperson.

It is no wonder that in its report, the Carter Center observed, “While the unfamiliarity of the

AES required significant input and oversight from Smartmatic in 2010, in future elections

COMELEC, as the legally mandated election management body of the Philippines, should seek to

increase its capacity to oversee the technical aspects of the process. Smartmatic officials often

conducted press interviews and voter education efforts, responsibilities more clearly mandated as

Comelec’s…†�

2. No pre-election testing of AES

The Carter Center report recommends that “adequate time†be allowed to conduct “pre-�election testing in a real-world setting†in order to rectify any issues like that which required all�

76,000 compact flash cards to be reconfigured due to an error detected one week before election

day.

We agree that Comelec ran out of time to test the AES, however the issue of pre-election testing is

more related to non-compliance with the legal requirements.

In our GFN report, we wrote that the AES was implemented live without the appropriate field

testing, and law-specified testing in actual elections.

The field tests are specified by Sec 6 of RA 9369, “for the regular national and local election,

which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act (in 2007), the AES shall be used in at

least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao …†� and “In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented

nationwide.†�

We also highlighted in our report that there are specifications set out in the Bid Specifications,

Annex E which required that as many field tests shall be conducted until the requirements for the

tests have been satisfied provided that the tests shall not go beyond December 5, 2009. The Bid

Specifications also required tests of live transmission of precinct results.

“No such tests were conducted by December 5, 2009. In fact, a precinct test using 10 sample

ballots were conducted in selected precincts starting in February 2010,†we wrote in the GFN�

report.

“No field tests in an entire municipality, city and even province were conducted. This is further

aggravated by the fact that 4,690 polling centers have no cell phone signal from

telecommunication firms affecting about 5 million registered voters.

“Worse, on May 3, seven days before elections, Comelec and Smartmatic discovered

malfunctioning of Compact Flash cards with erroneous votes for local elections. They hurriedly

imported new ones and reconfigured all 76,340 CF cards for use on May 10.†�

3. Digital signatures in transmitting election returns removed

The absence of a third party who should be charged with generating the public and private keys in

the digital signatures to be used in transmitting results was highlighted by the Carter Center.

We agree on that point. The lack of an independent third party in generating encryption keys was

a basic and fundamental system flaw.

What made that worst was that the requirement for digital signatures in transmitting results was

actually abandoned. No one can doubt that with no digital signatures, the risk of falsifying election

returns was very high.

The importance of digital signatures in maintaining data integrity and security had been

recognized, in fact, by enabling RA 9369 (Sec 19A) when it prescribed thus:

“Within one hour after the printing of the election returns, the chairman of the board of election

inspectors or any official authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and

representatives of the accredited citizens’ arm, political parties/candidates, if any, electronically

transmit the precinct results…†and “The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally�

signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the

canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate.”

The importance of digital signatures cannot be overemphasized.

As highlighted in our report, digital signatures serve two purposes, namely, to identify the BEI

personnel and the precinct number from which the election returns came, and to ensure that the

precinct election returns are not modified in any way by dagdag-bawas.

4. System security measures to protect the integrity of AES were abandoned

In addition to the legally required digital signatures in transmitting election returns being set aside,

critical AES security features were abandoned or disabled.

Ultra violet reading function disabled: The UV-reading functionality of the PCOS machine to

authenticate a ballot was disabled, and replaced with a hand-held UV lamp. We also noted during

our observation of election proceedings in selected Pampanga precincts the BEIs were not

provided with UV lamps.

Voter paper audit trail removed: The requirement for voter verified paper audit trail to ensure that

the machine registered the voter’s choice correctly was not complied with. Voter was only

notified in the PCOS screen that his/her vote is read. Only the

word â€œCONGRATULATIONS†�was shown in the PCOS LCD.

The Carter Center also raised these security deficiencies in its report.

5. Possible disenfranchisement of voters due to delays in the voting process

The Carter Center noted in its report, “In 2010, the number of polling stations was reduced to

76,347 in an effort to reduce costs so that each precinct could have its own PCOS machine. The

reduction of polling stations by approximately 75 percent produced a corresponding increase in

the number of voters per station… a sizable increase from the approximately 200 voters per

precinct in previous elections… As a result, Carter Center observers noted significant congestion

in polling centers… This congestion caused long waits for voters throughout the country, often

longer than three hours. “

GFN observers agree with the Carter Center observation that the clustering of more than 320,000

polling stations into 76,000+ clustered precincts contributed to delays in the voting process.

In addition to the Carter group’s observation, we also noted that (a) the actual process of

notifying the voters where their new precinct is located caused not only delays but also confusion

among the voters, and (b) the delays and long wait could have impacted on the result of the

elections.

Here is an extract of the GFN report:

“Voters Lists were posted on the walls outside the clustered precincts (with a maximum of

1000 registered voters) only on voting day.

“Although precinct assignments were mailed to individual voters by barangay captains, most

received theirs late in the voting day or not at all. Voters have great difficulty in locating and

identifying their clustered precincts. Long queues developed with voters waiting several (from one

to six) hours before voting. As a result, many, especially women and the elderly, decided to forego

voting.

“Comelec’s consultant on queue management estimates the number of disenfranchised voters

to range from 2 million to 8 million.

“This number can easily affect the results in the presidential, vice presidential and senatorial

race especially the close one.†�

6. Non-Compliant Random Manual Audits

On the following assessment of RMAs from the Carter Center, we totally agree:

“A lack of transparency and a general inefficiency in how officials actually administered and

conducted audits plagued the postelection audit process, however. While random manual audits

were to occur on election night, in practice, results of such audits were in some cases still

unknown weeks after the election.†�

The legislative basis for random manual audits is found in Sec 24 of RA 9369, “Where the

AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one precinct per congressional district

randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference between the

automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual

count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error.†�

The difference referred to in RA 9369 is defined in the Bid Bulletin Specifications thus,

“Component 1B-PCOS Machine – 10. The system shall count the voter’s vote as

marked on the ballot with an accuracy of at least 99.995%â€.�

Clearly, only a maximum 0.005% is considered by law as an acceptable error rate.

At 12 noon of election day, Comelec raffled the RMA precincts from the 76,340 precincts

nationwide but the choice of the RMA precincts was made public only after the close of voting.

As it happened, the RMAs and the rigid specifications for tolerable error contained in RA 9369

were good only on paper.

In our interim report, we wrote “As observed in Pampanga, the RMA (Random Manual Audit)

in one precinct in Telabastagan was started at 8pm election day and the results were not

disclosed to the observers. The results of 30 RMA precincts were released and announced as of

15 May 2010. Last 20 May, Comelec announced results of about 300 RMA precincts were

completed with few discrepancies. PPCRV and Comelec announced some 0.07% discrepancies in

about 400 ERs audited as of 21 May. No target completion was announced.†�

GFN observers asked: If the 400 ERs audited disclosed a 0.07% discrepancy, how much more

discrepancy could be expected for the rest of the 76,340 ERs? And in precincts where

discrepancies were found to be outside the tolerable error rate, were manual counts carried out to

comply with the legal requirements of a manual count?

Additionally, why did Comelec municipal, provincial and regional officers refuse to show the results

of the random manual audits even to election observers claiming that they could not provide

copies of the audits because they were in sealed envelopes and they had no copies?

In summary,

There is no doubt that there had been a noticeable improvement in the peace and order aspects of

the elections compared to past national elections.

But actions on the part of Comelec ~ which to a large extent had also been highlighted by other

observers group like the Carter Center ~ had put to question the authenticity, integrity,

confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the vote counts in the ERs.

The dark cloud rose from disabling critical, legally-specified security features, particularly the

digital signatures in transmitting election returns, the UV scanners in authenticating ballots, and

the voter verification audit trail in ensuring that the voter’s choice had been correctly registered

by the machine.

These pre-election system modifications and inadequate system testing, coupled with the last

minute rush to reconfigure and redistribute nationwide more than 76,000 compact flash cards due

to an error detected one week before election day plus the unnecessary delays and long wait on

election day for voters to cast their ballot which could have translated to at least 2 million voters

being disenfranchised, had practically reduced next to zero whatever confidence was left in us in

the integrity of AES.

Even the post-election proceedings which could have given the elections a semblance of integrity

were rendered questionable. The data that Comelec showed the public were the percentages of

precincts reporting – which were meaningless – and not the actual votes tallies. The

consolidation of the RMA reports took almost two weeks to complete – prompting the impression

that they were “Random Manual Edits†and, even then, the consolidated results fell short of�

the minimum threshold mandated by law.

To date after two years, the legitimacy of the 2010 elections remains a contest and a big question

mark.

(All rights reserved.)

Will Automated Elections in the Philippines Increase Public Confidence?

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May 5, 2010

By Tim Meisburger

In the past, Philippine elections have frequently been marred by allegations of widespread

cheating and other electoral malpractice. The most famous (or perhaps infamous) method of

cheating is called dagdag/bawas (add-subtract), when votes are subtracted from the opposition

candidate and added to a favored candidate, and vice versa.

Concerns over election credibility have been exacerbated by the typically long period between

voting and the official announcement of results. Delays were caused in part by an antiquated

polling procedure that required voters to remember candidate names and write them on a ballot

paper, leaving polling officials to decipher the handwriting of all voters, including some less than

fully literate, all the while dealing with complaints from watchful party officials who were “certain”

that the illegible scrawl was a vote for their candidate.

A local woman examines a mock ballot during a voter education seminar on the new automated

technology.

Increasing public frustration prompted the Philippine government to propose in the mid-1990s that

the polling process be automated to decrease cheating and simplify polling and vote-counting.

Some supported this because they believed automation would serve as an effective check on

cheating, while others saw modernization as a means to finally do away with the infamous write-in

ballot process.

After several false starts, automated elections were finally tested in the 2008 Autonomous Region

in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections. The tests were generally viewed as successful (although

some disputed that conclusion), and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) went ahead with

plans for an automated May 10, 2010 National Elections. But as the Philippines finally seems

poised to complete its 15-year automation odyssey, doubts are being raised.

Automation, which was once seen as a panacea for election-related problems, is increasingly

being viewed as potentially a source, rather than the solution, for the problems weakening the

integrity and credibility in the election process.

Recently, a widely-respected international risk assessment firm published a highly critical report,

which builds on concerns previously expressed by local and international election watchdogs and

local IT associations, predicts a high probability of “failure of elections” due to “automation

uncertainties.” The paper, distributed to top embassy officials, watchdogs, and political parties,

further concludes that “the bid to automate the 2010 elections increases the pressure significantly

and adds strain to a country that has historically experienced elections mismanagement,

corruption and fraud.”

So what does “automation” actually mean in the Philippine elections context? Voters will receive a

pre-printed ballot and will shade an oval next to each candidate they choose. The voter will then

feed the ballot into a Precinct Count Optical Scanner (PCOS) located above the ballot box. As the

ballot passes through the scanner into the box, the PCOS will save the marks in its internal

memory.

This is not actually new technology; the shading and scanning process has been used by

educators for standardized tests since the 1960s. And it is not truly automated voting, since voters

still mark their choices by hand on a paper ballot, rather than pushing a button or tapping a

computer screen. So, where exactly then, is the automation? The clue is in the name of the

machine that scans the ballots: Precinct Count. During the polling process the PCOS stores the

votes, and at the end of election day, automatically adds the votes, then prints out a paper form

listing the totals for each candidate, and automatically transmits those totals through an internal

cell phone to servers at the municipal and national COMELEC headquarters and political party

offices.

There are many advantages to this system. It is simple and understandable by the average

person. The technology involved, at least in the scanning process, is tested and proven, and

consequently unlikely to result in counting error. If there are doubts about the accuracy of the

machine count, the paper ballots can be manually recounted to confirm results. And, because

ballots are pre-printed with the candidate names, this system does away with the myriad of

problems with handwritten ballots.

However, despite the proven technology, some say they are unclear how well it will work and say

they worry that the machines will not accurately record the votes, either because they are

unreliable or because they have been rigged. A series of problems with the machines have helped

fuel this uncertainty. For example, to prevent the use of fake ballots, the PCOS contain an

ultraviolet scanner that can read a special code printed in ultraviolet ink on authentic ballots

(similar to the watermarks used on some currency to help prevent counterfeiting). In pilot testing,

however, the ultraviolet scanner was rejecting too many authentic ballots, and that feature had to

be disabled. The problem is likely to do with the printing of the mark rather than with the machine

itself, and glitches like this are to be expected with new technology. However, small, unrelated

problems can easily undermine confidence in the system. Unfortunately, during one of the final

rounds of testing on May 3, widespread glitches appeared again, requiring reprogramming of the

machines and postponement of further tests to May 7, just three days before the election. Despite

fears that the problems might be part of a plot to induce a failure of elections, COMELEC

staunchly maintains that the election can go ahead on Monday, May 10, across the

nation. (UPDATE: On May 6, the military announced that at least 80 percent of the vote-counting

machines in Metro Manila have been delivered to their respective precincts, but the reconfigured

memory cards may not be able to reach 5 percent of the country, mostly in Mindanao, until

election day.)

Locals feed ballots into the scanning machines during a mock election in Cotabato City.

Many people also say they worry that the results will be manipulated, either inside the PCOS or

after transmission. Although no one has yet demonstrated how this might be done, a lack of

transparency related to the proprietary software of the PCOS and the processes surrounding vote

aggregation fuel unease. The history of electoral cheating has made some citizens less likely to

trust this process, or any process.

Apart from technological concerns (which I feel are probably overblown), there are legitimate

concerns with the potential failure of associated election logistics. Because the new polling system

is expected to handle significantly more voters per hour than the old manual system, the number

of precincts (polling stations) has been reduced from 250,000 to under 80,000. Even if this works

technically, poll locations can have a considerable effect on turnout. Two out of three voters will go

to a new station location, and for some of the 50 million registered voters in the Philippines, this

could lower turnout or cause confusion on election day.

Filipino polling officials do have a reputation for effective improvisation, and run mostly credible

elections when faced with confusing instructions, lack of materials, and a stressful political

environment. But even this may not be enough to overcome our last concern: public perception.

Even if voters and officials understand the process, the machines are accurate, and the

transmission of results precise, doubts will persist. The new process is just that: new; and it is less

transparent than the old, while the intensity of political rivalries has not decreased. Every time a

race is close, or the outcome goes against conventional wisdom, the losing candidate is likely to

cry foul and blame the new system.

Whether or not these allegations have traction will depend on public perception of the process. If

they find their polling station easily, have no problems marking the ballot, and see that local results

more or less reflect their expectation, then Filipinos are likely to have confidence in the process,

and the first national automated elections will be viewed as a historic advance. If, on the other

hand, chaos reigns on election day, allegations of malpractice (whether or not it occurs) will

spread, and the elections may be seen as a historic failure. Personally, I expect a result

somewhere in the middle. There will be problems and solutions, positives and negatives, and the

Filipino people will muddle through somehow, as they have so often in the past.

Filipinos witnessed a new page in the Philippines' history following the successful completion of

the country's first automated election on Monday amid technical problems and reported cases of

violence nationwide.

Even before polling stations officially opened at 7 a.m., some of the 50 million registered voters

have already started forming queues at the 76,000 precincts nationwide, ignoring the scorching

heat caused by the El Nino dry spell.

The Commission on Election (Comelec) had hoped to entice at least 85 percent of the registered

voters to participate in this year's election.

As of press time, the Comelec is already counting the ballots as the 90 million Filipinos eagerly

await the results.

While things went generally well in most parts of the country, the same problems that hounded

Philippines' past elections were still present on Monday. Birth pains caused by the vote-counting

machines were also experienced delays, prompting the Comelec to extend voting hours by

another hour to 7 p.m.

"So far, the election has been peaceful and successful. We have already expected violence to

erupt in certain parts of the country especially in provinces that are traditionally torn by (these

disturbances)," Earl Parreno, a political analyst at the Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms,

said in an interview.

Vote buying remains to be a persistent problem despite the country's switch to optical scanning

machines from the manual method meant to reduce the risk of cheating. Envelopes containing

money were seen in some of the polling stations as candidates attempt to make a last-minute

influence in voters' decision.

Cases of election-related violence were also reported, especially in the war-torn provinces of

Mindanao in Southern Philippines where leftists have been harassing both the military and the

civilians.

Grenades exploding, unidentified armed men opening fire at a poll station and government troops

exchanging fire with gunmen were just among the cases reported in the hot spot southern

Maguindanao, the same province where 57 people were brutally murdered in infamous political

massacre on Nov. 23 of last year.

Herbert Yambing, chief of the armed forces and national police Joint Security Coordinating Center,

said the attacks were seemingly initiated to scare away voters from Monday's polling as they were

done at secluded sections of the towns.

According to police sources, at least nine people died and 12 others were injured in about 37

election-related violent incidents throughout the country as the Filipino people cast their votes for

the presidential and local elections.

"So far, this has been the most peaceful (election) if we will compare it to the previous

elections...We hope this would hold until tonight and throughout until the counting (of the votes) is

over," Armed Forces of Philippine Task Force spokesman Ricardo Nepomuceno said.

Around mid-Monday afternoon, Comelec has already recommended a failure of election to be

declared in nine towns -- situated in Lanao del Sur and Basilan -- in Mindanao while election has

been declared to have failed in two towns in Central Philippines.

Disenfranchisement among voters were also heavy, according to the Center for People

Empowerment in Governance, which puts the blame on the malfunctioning of the precinct count

optical scan ( PCOS) machines that had caused severe delays in some polling precincts.

Other problems, like mix-up in the delivery of ballots, long queues due to slow voting, ballot

feeding jams and generally, ill- trained members of the Board of Election Inspectors, have also

irritated some voters who abandoned voting altogether.

Despite the setbacks, Filipinos can no longer do anything but wait the results of Philippines' first

automated election which will seal the country's fate in the next six years.

Preliminary results are expected to be released Monday night, significantly faster than the manual

vote counting done in the past and which usually takes weeks and sometimes months before

results come out.

Survey results have shown Liberal Party standard-bearer Senator Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III to

be Filipinos' favorite, followed by actor-turned-politician Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada and

Nacionalista Party standard-bearer Manuel "Manny" Villar.

"I ran a good campaign and is prepared whether I win or lose," Gilbert "Gibo" Teodoro,

administration candidate, said.

Teodoro and his first cousin Aquino voted in their home province in Northern Philippines while

Villar and Estrada voted in their bailiwick in Metro Manila.

While things went smoothly for Teodoro, Villar and Estrada who finished the entire process in less

than 15 minutes, Aquino meanwhile had to wait for more than four hours before he was able to

cast his vote following technical glitches.

"This election is crucial because Filipinos are hoping that ( the Philippines) will (finally) have

credible, acceptable election results now that (it) has switched to the PCOS machines. Although

technical problems were reported, the theory is that if we lessen human intervention, chances of

manipulating the results will be ( slimmer)," Parreno said.

Election Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal had reported more than 300 defective machines

nationwide, which Parreno said remains "manageable" since there are 76,000 PCOS machines

deployed nationwide and 6,000 machines are on standby.

Whoever will win this year's election will face myriad of issues from insurgency problems that have

hindered economic growth in southern Philippines and certain areas in Luzon to addressing

deeply-entrenched corruption and red tapes in various government bodies that have caused

massive distrust among Filipinos. 

Comelec spokesperson James Jimenez says that a lot of the discrepancies that cropped up

was not due to inconsistencies in the automated elections system, but human error.

"Automation was never really autonomous from human participation... That’s [human

participation] where the errors are cropping up... The system itself worked perfectly, which

is the reason why there are significantly fewer errors and significantly more results

available from the precinct transmission." (BASAGIN!)

The election results may have been “fast” to cite Comelec and Smartmatic but this claim should

not gloss over the fact that over and above the poll outcome is the need to establish the integrity of

such results and to determine whether automation did promote democracy and address the

systemic problem of fraud. Seven days after May 10, reports of incidents on the automated

elections are now coming in.

1. The Pagbabago! People's Movement for Change  disputed Melo's assessment, citing the

Comelec's own admission that there are discrepancies between the electronic election

returns and their printed versions. The discrepancies affect some 150,000 voters from 196

precincts in different provinces.

2. Ernesto Maceda present documents, furnished to him by former Manila Mayor Lito Atienza,

showingelection returns in Manila dated not May 10 but April 28, May 4 and May 9, to support

allegations of poll pre-programming.

3. Joseph Estrada’s lawyer George Garcia questioned the hasty delivery of reconfigured flash

cards   the week prior to the elections as logistically improbable.

“Were the 76,000 flash cards really returned and reconfigured or were the so-called substitutes

already prepared and ready for delivery in the short period of three days. And if there was really

nothing irregular going on, why is it that the Comelec did not allow the presence of media and

party watchers during the reconfiguration?”

4. There are 51,317,073 registered voters in the country and the total number of voters who

voted is 35,276,524. Everybody was stunned when the original copy of the national canvass

report by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) showed that the number of registered

voters was pegged at 153 million. Comelec  immediately “acknowledged the error and

blamed a script bug in the report generating programme for the wrong statistic. The agency

explained further that its computer added the number of registered voters coming from three

servers which multiplied the number of voters by three.”

5. Ernesto Maceda  received reports of “agents” approaching candidates before the elections

offering electoral victories in pre-programmed compact flash cards and memory cards in

exchange for stiff fees of as much as P30 million. Comelec dared the camp of former

President Joseph Estrada to show evidence to back its allegation of massive selling of

compact flash (CF) cards used by precinct-count machines to read votes during the May 10

automated polls.

6. Three sacks of election material—including ballots, election returns and memory

cards.dumped in a junk shop in Cagayan de Oro.

7. The number of disenfranchised voters in last Monday’s election may range from 2 million to 8

million, a figure that could have changed the picture of the vice presidential and senatorial

races, according to Marvin Beduya, Commission on Elections’ consultant on queue

management.

8. The Eighty six foreign observers who constituted the Peoples’ International Observers’

Mission says that contrary to rosy reports coming out in the dominant press about the

“successful” conduct of May 10 elections, it was “neither fair nor honest.” They added that

“Despite the government’s rhetoric, actual practice showed that it is not committed to free

and honest elections.”

Marvin Beduya  thinks that “ we should celebrate the success of the automated voting soberly and

with the thought that it may not have delivered the true will of the people, the key purpose of

elections, in a manner that is very difficult to prove.”

Cenpeg’s monitoring through reports from field researches and reliable sources reveal more

incidents which Blog Watch confirms with their reports from the team of bloggers in various

precints.

Malfunctioning , shutting down and even destruction of PCOS machines, CF cards unable to

function,paper jams and power outages in many areas

Failure of transmission from the clustered precints forcing Bureau of Election Inspectors (BEI) to

bring the CF cards or even PCOS machines to the municipal canvassing centers (manual

transmission).  They have received reports from May 10-15 of failures of transmission from many

municipalities and provinces; a number of clustered precints resorted to manual count due to

PCOS and CF card failures.

Delayed canvassing and random manual audits (RMAs) in many areas with the results of

completed RMAs remaining undisclosed.

CenPEG in a press conference on Monday added that even before the May 10 election, the AES

was already stripped of the legal processes, safeguards and minimum industry standards as

mandated by the election law and Comelec’s Terms of Reference.  Urgent proposals and

recommendations raised by CenPEG , the AES watchdogs for a source code review, the enabling

of voters verifiability feature, digital signature, and private keys to be generated solely by Board of

Election Inspectors (BEI) adequate and timely voters education and BEI training, the holding of

real mock elections, and accuraten field tests remained unheeded up until the final stretch of

election preparations. As mandated by law, all these were absolutely necessary in order to

establish the integrity of the AES and the election results.

 

The Compact Flash Cards

James Jimenez, Comelec spokesman  was quoted in   the Philippine Star article , “Comelec to

Erap: Prove allegations” on May 16 about the CF Cards. Jimenez said the Comelec will act on

these accusations—“which he dismissed only as speculations—only if the Estrada camp shows

proof of the alleged offer by unidentified persons before the elections to sell pre-programmed CF

cards that would be deployed to favor certain candidates.”

Jimenez futher explains that the “compact flash cards have nothing to do with the count, all it does

is say that “you machine, you are for this precint”.  Basically, what a compact flash card does is to

customize a machine so that it is specific to a particular locality and that’s all that it does. It has

nothing to do with the counting logic”

Dr. Pablo Manalastas, fellow and IT consultant for the CenPEG says “that the CF card has nothing

to do with the counting logic is the biggest lie ever to come from Comelec”.  The CF card

contains data that are the very heart and soul of the counting logic, such that use of the wrong CF

card produces wrong counts and puts to question the entire results of the May 10, 2010

automated election.

 

I asked him if it is possible to have pre-programmed CF cards and he said that only Comelec and

Smartmatic has access to them.

Dr. Manalastas can only surmise an educated guess (because Comelec has never been

transparent according to him) on the mismatch between ballots and CF cards on May 3.

Smartmatic-Comelec must have gone through several iterations of ballot design and CF card

production, considering that it changed the ballot design from vertical enumeration for a position ,

to horizontal enumeration and considering that new names had to be added to the ballot from time

to time, to accommodate new decisions about candidates made by the Supreme Court and

Comelec itself. Smartmatic-Comelec produced the final version of the ballot, but forgot to produce

the CF cards for the new ballot design.  Instead, Smartmatic-Comelec shipped the latest ballot

design with the old CF cards. So during, the May 3, 2010 final testing and sealing (FTS) step,

almost all PCOS machines failed in NCR, and Comelec had to stop the FTS, and Smartmatic

promised that a new batch of 76,000 + CF cards will be produced and delivered to the precints in

time for election on May 10.

To date, Comelc has not reported to the Filipino people how many of the 76,000 + new CF cards

reached the correct destination precints AND successfully passed FTS before 7:00 AM on election

day because only in these precints will the count be correct. (read the technical analysis of CF

cards)

Comelec just doesn't have the right to destroy valuable items (CFCs) needed for auditing and

examination of the poll automation conduct by their representatives, independent poll watch dogs,

and other advocacy groups,” said Bobby Tuazon.  Sec. 27 of Republic Act 9369 (Amended AES

Law) provides for a review and assessment of the AES technology used after the elections.

This clip is a portion of the Documentary called "Hacking Democracy." The video represents a

similar situation during the May 10, 2010 Philippine Elections. This video does not intend to

accuse any Candidate of election fraud but to shed light on how election results can be

manipulated to favor those who can afford. Perhaps this can help open the minds of the Filipino

people to the vulnerabilities of Automated Elections in an unfortunately corrupt country.

Should we believe the Comelec Tabulation/canvass?

Comelec must prove beyond reasonable doubt that it only used election returns from consolidated

precints that used only CF cards that passed FTS, because only such precints will produce correct

counts. It dos not matter whether the paper ballots were fed to the PCOS machine by the voters

themselves on election day, or batch-fed by the BEI to the PCOS machine after election day

because the CF card arrived late and was tested later, as long as there are voters, watchers, and

party representatives to witness the process and authorized people to sign the printed election

return.

 

Poll Issues and concerns

There are issues and concerns  that Comelec should answer to test its claim of “success” and

“celebration of democracy” of the May 10 election.  Data is very much needed in the

documentation of the automated elections in the spirit of fully disclosing the following:

Failure to fully cleanse the voters’ registration lists, with many legitimate voters de-listed from their

polling precints and many others unable to vote.

The actual number of PCOS machines that successfully transmitted and how “transmissions” were

done from polliung centers with many machines unable to transmit or failed to transmit altogether

The magnitude of PCOS breakdowns, malfunctioning CF cards, and other technical problems

The real reasons for the malfunctioning CF cards in the May 3 final testing and sealing (FTS) and

whether the new CF cards were correctly reconfigured. How many of the reconfigured CF cards

reached their destinations before election and how many did not? The problem  arising from

incorrectly configured CF cards that Comelec discovered on May 3 and the haste and limited

material time for the Smartmatic to re-do the process would contribute to the erroneous counting

of votes.

Whether a final FTS was done prior to the election and if so, how many of the 76,340 clustered

precints were able to conduct the FTS and what is the percentage of success or accuracy. In

relation to this, was the FTS in the clustered precints witnessed by poll watchers and election

watchdogs?

Why the use of the 30 million worth of UV scanners was not fully complied with and why the

Comelec website reveals only summarized election returns (ERs). The accuracy of the ERs

cannot be verified unless the digitally-signed, consolidated returns from the clustered precints are

transparent on the website.

Why did Comelec chairman Jose Melo start reading before the media the “first transmitted results”

at 6:30 p.m. May 10 even if the polls were to be closed at 7:00 p.m.? Comelec should explain the

discrepancy in the “first transmitted results” from Western Samar and Zamboanga Sibugay when

the first transmissions were officially registered from a different province at 7:30 p.m.? Western

Samar was able to transmit results only on May 14.

Was it simple oversight or just a case of incompetence or was there an evil scheme to rig election

results in the case of the highly-irregular storage of 67 PCOS machines in Antipolo and the

reported Cagayan de Oro elections returns (ER) junk shop discovery?

 

Call to action

We lose nothing by investigating Smartmatic and the way that the election and the count went. An

investigation would not undermine the idea that the automated election was a success. If anything,

it will prove that automation is a technology that we should adopt and that the old manual voting

should be left in our past, never again to be used. Dr. Pablo Manalastas’ tentative findings are that

national positions may have been accurate and that local positions are easier to cause fraud. 

Bobby Tuazon added that the Hocus PCOS is possible because the AES  is vulnerable to fraud.

Many questions need to be answered.

In the tight race for the vice presidency , the anxious 10th to the 12th spot for the senate, the party-

list contest, the fiercely disputed local posts, one cannot ascertain that the electoral problems and

issues are over and done with.

1. Comelec and Smartmatic should provide or make available to every interested voter,

candidate or entity engaged in electoral advocacy, all documents- electronic and hardcopy ,

by which assessment could be accomplished with reasonable accuracy and transparency.

2. CenPEG calls for the formation of an independent, non-partisan, and impartial citizens’ body

to review and assess the conduct of the May 10 automated elections, including the

processes and procedures taken and the budget use in preparing for the elections and

thereafter.

3. The Joint Congressional oversight committee must also act now to exercise its statutory

mandate to require Comelec and Smartmatic to reveal all information or data in whatever

form so that the citizens’ body could very well perform its intended duties.

While the call to action is in progress, concerned citizens group are already doing their share.

1. The Integridad sa Halalan initiated an online central clearinghouse where the Filipino people

can report anomalies in the recently conluded 2010 automated elections. The site

encourages all freedom-loving Filipinos to submit  with as much detail and accuracy as

possible actual, confirmed incidents.

2. The Halalang Marangal encourages every candidate who lost – and won – in the machine-

counted 2010 elections should demand thorough post-election testing and audit for accuracy

of every counting machine and its results.

3. The Peoples’ International Observers’ Mission encouraged the Filipino people to call for an

investigation and to make the Comelec, Smartmatic, the military and the Arroyo

administration accountable for the bungled preparations for the elections, the numerous

rights violations perpetrated in relation to the elections, and numerous “glitches” that had

made voting and countin g difficult, dangerous and doubtful for many Filipinos.

4. Kontra Daya  listed down seven suggestions for Comelec to consider, including a review of

the clustering of precincts which resulted in long lines at the polling areas, more intensive

training for those manning the polls, conducting additional mock elections, probing the faulty

CF cards and the reason why ultraviolet lamps were not used in some precincts (to check the

seal of the ballots), surveying the number of disenfranchised voters, and examining reports of

malfunctioning Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines.

5. Atty. Lorna Kapunan  at the CenPEG press conference stated that there is a judicial remedy

through the Writ of Habeas Data . Comelec can't just deny the irregularities just because

PCOS machines were  running. Kapunan said Comelc would have to produce the documents

and other materials that would show that there was no fraud.

The general rule handed down to  the#juanvote netizen’s guide is that “each eligibile voter should

be allowed to vote freely and that those votes be counted quickly and accurately”. ”. We note the a

big disconnect between what we all witnessed during the May 10 elections and all the claims of

success. The results from the random manual audit must be awaited, and “the issues that may

arise from it resolved. Questions that were unsatisfactorily addressed before election day and

especially about the CF memory card fiasco must be answered."

The Filipino people want a successful election so badly, that it is easy to get carried away by a

flood of incoming election returns. The supporters of the winning candidate may not be inclined to

pursue the transparency of the Comelec.  Many want to believe that a clean and speedy election

actually took place. The public euphoria at the speed of counting should not erase the persistent

concerns about the process

 

Watchdog fears pirated technology in 2013 automated elections

By MARC JAYSON CAYABYAB, GMA NewsOctober 25, 2012 2:13pm

 

A pirated technology for Philippine elections.

 

Election watchdog Automated Elections System Watch (AES) raised this possibility as it expressed

fears that poll machine supplier Smartmatic-Total Information Management would resort to

“pirated” technology following its legal fight with Dominion Voting Systems, the software owner for

the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines.

“The big question is not if the Commission on Elections pushes through with the PCOS system

despite the termination of the licensing agreement. In light of the legal complaint, Smartmatic

would be using a system that can be described as pirated,” AES co-convenor Bobby Tuazon told

GMA News Online in a phone interview.

 

Smartmatic Asia president Cesar Flores refused to grant GMA News Online an interview, but sent

a statement saying they would continue with the automation despite the business rift with

Dominion.

“Smartmatic is fully capable of providing all support to Comelec and all customers, regardless of

any rifts with any of its providers,” the statement said.

Smartmatic has an ongoing legal battle with Dominion after the latter cancelled a 2009 license

agreement with it last May. The agreement enabled Smartmatic to be Dominion’s legitimate

representative in the country.

According to AES, “the termination denies Smartmatic access to technical support and

assistance;” thus, Smartmatic might not get Dominion’s proprietary source code and other

“escrowed materials” that the Comelec could use to enhance the PCOS system.

 

Dominion owns the technology used by Smartmatic.

“[Smartmatic] had already been denied to use the system. If Comelec still decides to use the

system then the Philippine elections will be using a pirated computer technology,” Tuazon said.

All systems go

Smartmatic said it will enhance the PCOS machines — the same technology used in the 2010

elections — in time for the 2013 polls.

 

“For the Philippines, we draw on our extensive experience, and we will incorporate the

modifications and enhancements to the election system purchased by COMELEC that were

requested and completed in 2011,” it said in the statement.

The company went on to say that “it’s all systems go for the 2013 automated elections.”

“As in 2010, Filipinos can depend on the PCOS machine for transparent elections next year and in

the years to come. Business as usual,” Smartmatic said.

Even Comelec chair Sixto Brillantes Jr. is confident that automation will push through next year.

“Whatever happens, we’re going automations in 2013… We’re very confident that the issue of

Smartmatic and Dominion would be settled,” he said.

Brillantes had earlier said that only minor enhancements on the PCOS machines would be

affected by the business rift, but he refused to elaborate.

Asked about the possibility of having pirated technology, Brillantes only smirked and said: “Bayaan

niyo na silang gumawa ng ingay.”

“Hindi kami nag-aalala. May ginagawa naman kami. Hindi muna naming sasabihin sa inyo,” he

said.

No contingency measures

But Tuazon was not assured, saying Comelec doesn’t seem to have contingency measures in

case Smartmatic fails to improve the glitches of their PCOS machines.

 “[The elections] is six months away. And we’re hoping that Comelec already adopt remedial or

contingency measures. Kasi ‘yung kaso makes the 2013 elections in limbo,” said Tuazon, who

was also the director for policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance.

Instead of settling with Smartmatic as supplier, Comelec should review the purchasing agreement

with Smartmatic to find alternative options, Tuazon said.

“It looks like Smartmatic can no longer comply with the provisions of the purchase agreement –

the modifications and enhancements that needed to be made,” he said.

Comelec has earlier said it will not pay for the 82,000 PCOS machines, worth P1.8 billion, if

Smartmatic fails to make the enhancements.

What Comelec could do, Tuazon said, is design an alternative voting system in the country to

replace Smartmatic.

 

“We have a very competent IT community who can help. The question is, is there still time?

According to our IT consultants, there is still time,” he said.

Transparency issue?

More than being an issue of credible and accurate elections, the Smartmatic business fight could

also reflect Comelec’s transparency.

For elections reform advocate Atty. Luie Guia, the Comelec should strive for transparency in the

Smartmatic legal dispute to avoid speculations about the 2013 midterm polls.

“Sometimes, Comelec brush aside all these issues being raised especially sa issue ng Dominion

at Smartmatic. I think it’s important for Comelec to improve the transparency of the process to

show that they’re asking Smartmatic what this is and how it can affect the process,” said Guia, the

executive director of the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (Lente), in a separate phone

interview with GMA News Online.

“Tapos sila (Comelec) na mismo ang magpapaliwang sa publiko in detail kung ano ba ang

implications nito,” the lawyer added.

Guia said groups tend to speculate on the impact of the business fight of Smartmatic precisely

because of the lack of information issued by Comelec on the issue.

“What we can do right now is to speculate. Precisely because there’s no explanation coming from

those who are privy to the case,” Guia said.

“Kung legal ito, ano ba ‘yung legal? It’s a matter of public concern that the public would know kung

ano ‘yung issue ng Dominion at Smartmatic. That’s transparency,” the lawyer added.

Comelec could thus share the responsibility of handling the elections with the public if they are

transparent in their operations, Guia said.

“When you are transparent, binibigyan mo ng datos at information ang publiko, you spread the

responsibility of running the elections. Alam ng publiko na ganito ang nangyayare, ganito ang

kakulangan. You give the public a responsibility to do their share,” Guia said.

Brillantes previously said the fight between Smartmatic and Dominion are “legal issues” and

should not affect the technical aspect of the elections, adding that Dominion should still enforce

Smartmatic ‘s contract with Comelec in the past “at the time Smartmatic was still their legitimate

agent.”

“We don’t care if there was a cancellation. Dominion cannot get out of their commitments signed

before May just by canceling (Smartmatic’s) license. Kailangan sundan pa rin ng Dominion ‘yun

legally,” Brillantes had said.

Smartmatic has earlier claimed that the 82,000 PCOS machines purchased by Comelec for P1.8

billion could last even until the 2016 elections.

"These machines are for a particular purpose. They are still good even for the next elections. They

are not like laptops that are very powerful, but are prone to wear-and-tear,” Smartmatic product

development specialist Marlon Garcia had said in a hearing with the House committee on suffrage

and electoral reforms late July.

The Comelec has said some 50,000 PCOS units passed the technical tests, 1,000 were rejected,

and about 30,000 were set aside for having "dirty” adaptors. — KBK/HS, GMA News

III. Presentation of Data

A P7.2 billion deal was made between the COMELEC and Smartmatic and Total Information

Management (TIM). The contract is posted online because according to Rene Sarmiento, "Making

the poll automation contract available to everyone online shows our policy of transparency, even in

the operationalization of the contract." Sarmiento also stated that, "At any rate, Comelec has been

transparent from the very start and Comelec is ready to defend the poll automation

contract." Being people of a third-world country, the Filipinos along with the Philippine government

want to catch up with the quick expansion and creation of technology and the future. One of our

attempts to catch up with the other countries who experience new types of technology is the

automation of elections. The machines being used for the election are very essential to the

success or failure of the elections since the voters will use them to directly vote who our country's

next president shall be. With the machines, the voting and countine proccess which used to take

weeks and even months will now take only days. The brand of PCOS (Precinct Count Optical

Scan) machine will be the SAES (Smartmatic Auditable Elections System) 1800, which is a type of

optical mark reader machine. This type of technology is like the ones used to count the results of

computerized examinations, such as the NCEE,  where the examinee shades a circle to mark his

or her answer in a multiple choice test. The counting, tally, transmission and consolidation of votes

will be done by the computers. When the poll closes, a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) will

perform a "close function" by touching the appropriate button on the machine's LCD screen. Doing

so will prevent the insertion of additional ballots after voting has ended. After the machine closes

the poll at a particualr precinct, it automatically counts all the votes cast and thereafter, an Election

Returen (ER) will be printed, which is a report on the result of voting in each precinct wherein the

total votes cast for each candidate are tallied. After the ERs are printed, the transmission cable is

connected to the PCOS machine for the electronic transmission of results from a particular

precinct to the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) via canvassing/consolidation machines

(CCMs), which will consolidate the results from all precincts within the city or municipality. Results

will also be transmitted electronically to the Comelec central office. The same process will take

place from the city or municipality to the province, then from the province to Congress and

Comelec. The 82,200 machines will be stored and secured away from anyone in their respective

precincts until the day of the elections and they will not be connected to any transmission lines to

prevent any hackers from having any access to them. But there are many problems concerning

the upcoming automated elections this May in 2010. There are suspicions that cell phone

jammers, which are not illegal in the Philippines, could affect the processes and results of the

election by disrupting the signal of the machines being used for the elections. There was a

shipment of 5,000 jamming devices a few weeks ago. This roused the suspicion of the COMELEC.

There is also the fear of delay. The machines will arrive on Feb. 28. That leaves only 2 months to

prepare for the upcoming elections. This election will also be a nightmare for the logistics part of it.

There are 1630 municipalities. That's 1630 sets of names of local officials printed on 1630 different

ballots that are going to be read by 1630 machines. Each of those 1630 machines will have to be

customized to compensate for each of the local changes. And remember, the COMELEC has only

TWO MONTHS to do all this. There is also the problem and doubt with the machines themselves.

According to a survey from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 47% of respondents say that the

machines might be sabotaged while only 44% trust the COMELEC to secure their votes being

cast. There is also a 30% chance that the machines will fail. According to another survey, 49% of

Filipinos say that if the elections do not work out, there will be another people power while only

22% disagreed with this statement. 

 

IV. Interpretation of Data

In our opinion, the Philippines isn't ready for an automated election. There is a huge delay in the

schedule because we only have 2 months after the delivery of the machines to program them and

check them. It is only 3 months to the elections and still there are so many problems that the

COMELEC is encountering and there are still more popping up. The threat of jammers, sabotage

etc. cannot be dealt with in that time span. There is also the threat of a 30% chance failure

rate. Our government is paying 7.2 billion taxpayer's Pesos on a 30% chance of failure. It is

not only the machines with the problems. Cheating is very rampant in our society. There are so

many threats to this election and a failure might lead to a revolution. Though we think that an

automated election is the future of this country, we do not see it now as the right future in 2010.

 

V. Conclusions

     1. The Philippines is not ready for the automation of elections since we do not have much

experience with this type of technology in the past.

     2. The automation of elections is not worth the time and money of the Republic of the

Philippines because we still have to go through many expensive security options to make the

election a success and we have just months before the elections.

     3. The COMELEC is doing what it can to make sure that the elections will be fair.

     4. Even if the public has been assured many times that the elections will succeed and people

with the intention to manipulate the election process will be able to do so little does not make the

people sure about its success.

     5. There is a time for everything and now is not the right time for this type of technological

advancement. We will have to automate the elections eventually but as of now, it does not look

like the government's plans will push through until before the deadline.

     6. The whole processes involved in the elections including the voting, tallying and presentation

of results will be shortened with the automation of elections.

     7. Being Filipinos, we know that somewhere, somehow, we will make a big mistake while we try

to push automated elections. As the saying

         goes, new technology plus old habits equals unknown consequences.

     8. If and when the elections fail and it is discovered that cheating and tampering with the

machines that are part of the election are discovered, chaos and civil unrest will fall over the

nation.

 

Massive cheating feared as Comelec summarily dismisses unresolved automated election

problems

PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 20, 2013 

 

“Clearly, automation does not magically solve the issues perpetually hounding the conduct of the

elections in the country. Instead, the AES even gives more room for doubt and electoral fraud.” –

Kabataan Party-list

MANILA – The election campaign is already heating up but many groups expressed fears that the

votes may not be accurately counted. Openings for massive cheating seem to still abound and the

people remain to have little recourse in guarding their votes once their ballots are fed into the

multi-million peso PCOS machines.

“Unlike what Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes wants the public to believe, there is indeed cause for

alarm with regard to the upcoming automated polls,” said Kabataan Partylist President Terry Ridon

in a statement. His group is urging the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to directly confront

problems besetting PCOS machines and other AES-related issues, instead of “sidestepping

issues hounding the automated election system (AES).”

Yesterday, Brillantes, chairman of Comelec, posted in his Twitter account: “The continued

assertion of falsehood by AES Watch, CENPEG et al aims nothing but to sow public mistrust and

sabotage the upcoming elections.”

Days before that, Brillantes had been all over the media claiming he is already tired of critics’

repeated charges against the Comelec’s preparations and that the Comelec had supposedly

addressed much of these. But according to these critics, the most crucial problems besetting the

automated election system (AES) are still there, and these have even gotten worse compared to

when it was first used in the country in 2010 elections.

Last 2010 election, watchdog AES Watch gave the system a grade of 1.40, or in danger; for 2013

elections, it graded it 0.29— a failure.

“They had three years since May 2010 to do some fixing and reforming but they just repeated the

same mistakes that we saw in 2010,” said Bobby M. Tuazon, co-convener of AES Watch and

director for policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG).

Comelec’s call of faith in election prep ‘baseless’

Sixto Brillantes said the Comelec has adopted improvements and corrected deficiencies in the

system for the 2013 elections. But these are empty placatory statements to election watchdogs

who have raised the following significant issues which, until now, they say, the Comelec has not

adequately addressed:

- ‘Pirated’ software for PCOS machines

- Unfixed bugs in PCOS machines

- Ballot design-CF cards data mismatch

- The disabling of voter verification system in PCOS machines

- The lack of digital precautions against election return tampering (e.g. digital signing)

- Errors in transmission programs

- The issue of signal jammers or the remote manipulation of election result transmission

- Lack of clear mechanisms for election protests

- Hardware problems including faulty and damaged machines

For these, the AES Watch has given the COMELEC’s preparations for the 2013 elections a failing

mark. Instead of responding by way of addressing the problems, Comelec chairman used “gutter

language” against the election watchdog. (See: Use facts not gutter language, Brillantes told)

The automated election system has been touted to bar cheating because of the speed of its

counting. But the way the machines expected to count it are being prepared by the Comelec, it

appears it could only speed up cheating and disenfranchisement, and just as easily hide the

hocus-pocus on votes.

“Clearly, automation does not magically solve the issues perpetually hounding the conduct of the

elections in the country. Instead, the AES even gives more room for doubt and electoral fraud,”

Ridon said.

“Instead of answering pertinent issues raised by AES Watch, CENPEG and Kontradaya, all

Brillantes have to offer are baseless accusations of sabotage. These election watchdogs are only

raising valid issues against the AES with the aim of improving the integrity of the upcoming polls,”

Ridon said. He dared Comelec to “stop beating around the bush and act immediately to resolve

these issues.”

Lack of source code review, single biggest cause of doubt on AES

Recently, Comelec has also announced that it would push through with the automated elections

even without the source code review. The source code is the readable program that details how

the PCOS machines will run on election day. RA 9369 (the law enabling automated elections

system) stipulates that the source code should be opened for review 90 days before the elections.

It is considered an essential step for safeguarding the PCOS machines from digital manipulation.

Due to an ongoing standoff between Smartmatic and rival Dominion Voting Systems, the source

code for the PCOS machines has yet to be released.

“Brillantes is saying that there is no need for us to wait for the source code or conduct another

mock election because the AES’ Technical Evaluation Committee has forwarded a ‘favorable

review’ of the system. This is despite the fact that the past mock election was marred with PCOS

errors and problems,” Ridon said.

In a statement released to the media, former Comelec Commissioner Gus Lagman pointed out

that without the source code review, the public cannot verify if the PCOS machines are counting

votes correctly.

Earlier, Lagman had also questioned the Comelec’s decision to purchase the said used PCOS

machines, when there were cheaper, more reliable or trustworthy alternatives. Brillantes just

laughed it off when asked about it in an AM radio interview.

With regard to Comelec’s refusal to review the source code, Brillantes told DZRH late last week

that as a safeguard or a way of determining if there had been cheating, we have the “random

manual audit.” But for critics checking to see if the Comelec is following the prescribed safeguards

for AES – and meeting disappointments at nearly every turn – this is like being asked to have blind

faith in the Comelec.

“Giving a go-signal to the AES without the source code review casts a heavy cloud of doubt on the

accuracy and integrity of the results of the upcoming polls. This issue alone is already a cause for

alarm,” Ridon said. Echoing the warnings of election watchdogs, Ridon said that “If this issue is

not resolved immediately, it can open the floodgates for massive electoral cheating.”

 

Use facts not gutter language, Comelec told

PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 20, 2013 

 

By MARYA SALAMAT

Bulatlat.com

MANILA — The Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch) refused “to go down to the level

of arguments with the prominent use of gutter language by the head of a Constitutional body –

Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes.”

In a strongly worded statement, Bobby M. Tuazon, co-convener of AES Watch and director for

policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), condemned the

Comelec chair’s “offensive remarks” against election critics. Comelec has accused AES Watch,

whose chair emeritus is former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and CenPEG, headed by

National Artist Bienvenido Lumbera, of “election sabotage.”

Tuazon also scored Brillantes’ “sexist remarks” and macho order to women leaders of AES Watch,

who include AES Watch women co-conveners, Ms Maricor Akol, a reputable IT expert involved in

IT professionals certification, and Ms Evita Jimenez, executive director of CenPEG and project

research head of the popular Corruptionary publication.

Tuazon fired back that in fact, it is the Comelec, under Brillantes, that has failed to build public

trust and confidence in the election system by its “repeated failure to comply with the election law

and its fixation to a technology proven to be defective, unlicensed, and with a dismally-low

accuracy.”

Worse, the Comelec is only repeating the mistakes already pointed out in 2010 elections, Tuazon

said.

Comelec disdain of problem solvers scored

Tuazon said they are not just problem-oriented, as Comelec’s Brillantes has repeatedly insinuated.

AES Watch has, in fact, been offering the Comelec solutions to its problems. “Since the last

elections, we have sought dialogs with the Comelec, gone to congressional hearings with

proposed legislative enhancements for poll automation, studied meticulously the automation with

reports copy furnished all major election stakeholders, and gone to the high court several times as

well.”

“Non-disclosure of the source code to political parties and interested groups for independent

review as provided for in the Poll Automation law for reasons only Chairman Brillantes knows is a

major concern that should alarm stakeholders in the coming election,” Tuazon said.

Political parties like PDP-Laban for example had gone to the Comelec last January 2013 to

exercise this right, only to be told that the source code is not available for review.

Brillantes, quoted by the media, argued, “There is no review if there is no source code,” adding

that “the law does not provide for source code review in order for elections to proceed.”

The Comelec chairman’s inconsistent statements are themselves adding to confusion and

uncertainties in the coming automated elections, Tuazon said. As far as AES Watch is concerned,

Brillantes’ actions and statements fit more accurately his own accusations of election sabotage.

Comelec and Brillantes apparently just wanted to hold the 2013 elections using their flawed

system – anybody who pointed at these flaws are “saboteurs.”

As Lito Averia, IT security expert, Congress resource person on IT matters, and election observer

for more than 20 years, asked, “How does the Comelec chair define ‘election sabotage?’”

He reiterated that they are “merely asking questions and raising issues which the Comelec

continues to ignore.”

Questionable software to be used in 2013 elections

The Comelec chairman today insisted that the Philippine government owns the PCOS machines

per the option to purchase signed with Smartmatic in March 2012.

This does not mean though that the Philippine government is also the owner of the software the

machine will use. “Brillantes is the one who is ignorant, especially in software licensing,” Averia

said.

Even non-lawyers in the IT industry, said Averia, understand that proprietary software like

MSOffice, for instance, is not sold with the machine, though one has paid for it. “What one buys is

a license to use. Comelec cannot claim to have bought the software that came with the PCOS in

March 2012. It is only a user of the software AND only for the 2010 national and local elections at

that.”

“The basic civil law principle is you cannot sell what you do not own. If the owner gives you

authority to sell, there is still a limit to what you can sell, depending on what is written in the

authorization,” AES Watch also clarified.

With the 2009 agreement – where the license to use the poll technology was given to Smartmatic

only for 2010 – having been terminated in May 2012 by the real owner of the technology,

Dominion Voting Systems, the Venezuelan sales company (Smartmatic) has lost its right to the

software, AES Watch said.

Smartmatic has also lost its access to the program system that is critically needed to correct the

program errors and bugs that both Comelec and Smartmatic reluctantly admitted only in 2012,

Tuazon said.

Because of these circumstances, Brillantes announced last week that Comelec will use instead

the program system designed for the aborted 2011 ARMM election reportedly supplied by

Smartmatic. But the use of the 2011 program is not covered by the 2009 licensing agreement

precisely because the latter only spoke of the 2010 elections, Tuazon explained.

In a forum held Monday at UP Alumni center, AES Watch distributed information materials like

Primers, Alerts and Poll watch guides on the automated elections for May 13, 2013.

“Rather than go down to the level of gutter language, AES Watch and its members have agreed to

help provide information materials to help guide voters and poll watchers,” Tuazon added. 

Election failure

Meanwhile, AES Watch yesterday said that the Comelec might commit a “potentially impeachable

offense” if the PCOS machines do not work.

“Is the repeated failure to comply with the automation law and the fixation to use the defective

Smartmatic-provided system setting the stage for a possible election failure? If this is so, the

Comelec has nobody to blame but itself for what are potentially impeachable offenses. It should

stop pointing the finger at the usual suspected culprits like the teachers, poll watchdogs, and the

voters themselves,” the AES Watch said in a statement.

The election watchdog raised concern on how the poll body is preparing for the upcoming midterm

election and if it is complying with provisions under Republic Act 9369 or the Automated Election

Law.

The group mentioned the problems that surfaced during the May 2010 national and local elections

such as ballot rejections, transmission failure, inaccuracy of the vote count, election returns and

certificates of canvass not digitally signed as required by law.

The problems reportedly came out during the mock elections conducted by the Committee on

Suffrage and Electoral Reforms at the House of Representatives on July 24 and 25, 2012 and in

10 cities and municipalities last Feb. 2.

“The same problems and issues, regarded by Comelec as minor glitches, are highly likely to

resurface during the midterm election which could result in inaccurate vote counts and tallies and

disenfranchisement of voters,” it said.– With Evelyn Macairan                       

                               

Comelec failed again – election watchdog

Written by Jing Villamente And Johanna M. Sampan Reporters

 

Poll watchdog Automated Election System (AES) Watch on Monday gave the Commission on

Elections (Comelec) a failing mark in its preparation for the upcoming May polls, as it issued the

second release of its comprehensive assessment of the commission.

In a forum held at the University of the Philippines, the poll watchdogs said that they used the

system trustworthiness, accountability and readiness, or STAR Card, to comprehensively assess

and rate the implementation of the second automated election by the commission, Smartmatic-

TIM and other providers.

Prof. Bobby Tuazon, director for Policy Study of the Center for People Empowerment in

Governance (CenPEG), said that they will hold Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr. to his

promise in September 2011 that he will resign within a year if no reforms will happen to his

commission.

“He’s been there for two years and still, there are no reforms,” Tuazon said.

Poll watchdog also said that poll officials may be committing “potentially impeachable offenses,”

especially if the precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machines will fail on election day.

“Is the repeated failure to comply with the automation law and the fixation to use the defective

Smartmatic-provided system setting the stage for a possible election failure? If this is so, the

Comelec has nobody to blame but itself for what are potentially impeachable offenses,” the poll

watchdog said in a statement.

“It should stop pointing the fingers at the usual suspected culprits like the teachers, poll watchdogs

and the voters themselves,” it added.

Same problems

They said that proof of the commission’s failure is the continued presence of the “same problems”

observed in the May 2010 national and local elections.

These problems include ballot rejection, transmission failures, inaccuracies of the vote counting

and election returns and certificates of canvass not digitally signed as required by law.

The group lamented that these problems continue to be regarded by the poll body as “minor

glitches.”

“The right to suffrage is the people’s sovereign right to elect officials upon whom they confer the

authority to serve the public responsibly, transparently, with accountability and on a full-time basis.

For this reason, it is imperative that the electoral process is credible, trustworthy, reliable and

accurate in serving as the instrument of the people’s will. We have to demand from Comelec, our

election manager, full accountability and transparency,” the AES Watch said.

Tuazon cited the report made by a team they sent to the United States to observe its automated

election in 2012. While the US automated poll system also had some technical glitches, the

difference is that Americans were quick to address these problems.

Evita Jimenez, AES executive director, who led the observer team, said that they came up with

“10 Alerts” for the coming election to guard against “modern day cheating.”

“This is our guide for everyone to guard diligently the elections this year. It will be one of the most

fraudulent elections, kung di tayo magbabantay,” she added.

 They urged voters to watch all precincts, which will be “the center stage” on election day.

“It’s better for the media and other watchdog organizations if precincts are covered by CCTVs

[closed-circuit televisions],” Jimenez said.

Watchdogs and poll observers should also watch out for “pre-shaded ballots,” discrepancies in the

voters’ list. Jimenez said that poll watchers and voters have the right to ask the board of election

inspectors to exhibit every ballot to the public before giving it to the voter. 

“Distinguish the official precinct-assigned PCOS from the fake ones, or ‘contingent’ PCOS.

Because certification and testing are anything but arbitrary, there is no way to know if the PCOS

machine at the precinct is authorized precinct-assigned PCOS machine,” the group said.

It warned that PCOS buying, or PCOS control, are the new forms of cheating that everybody must

be wary of.

The group also warned against the switching of compact flash cards prior to, or in the course of

voting.

Jimenez said that cheating could also occur during the transmission of votes, since any problem

during transmission can change the number of votes.

Brillantes lashed out at his critics, saying that they are out to sow public mistrust and sabotage the

upcoming polls.

In his Twitter account—@ChairBrillantes, the commission chief said that poll watchdogs and

CenPEG intend to disrupt the holding of successful election.

COMELEC spokesman JAMES JIMENEZ--a prolific writer, blogger and speaker in his own right--

has been having a running debate with the Center for People Empowerment in Governance over

the ongoing 2010 election automation project. Personally, I think that James Jimenez's intelligent

sense of humor is the perfect antidote to the Y2K-bug-like tendentiousness and fearmongering to

which the worst of CenPeg's "analyses" descend.  

In its May, 2009 "Policy Critique," the Center for People Empowerment in

Governance(CenPeg) questioned the TRANSPARENCY of the proposed 2010 automated

election system:

The Precinct Count Optical Scan-Optical Mark Reader (PCOS-OMR) technology chosen by the

Comelec goes against the basic democratic principle of “secret voting and public

counting.” This is because the OMR system makes the counting, canvassing and consolidation

of election results hidden from public eye and, hence, lacks any transparency as the Constitution

and RA 9369 require. The proclamation of winners will be done in 2-3 days making it extremely

impossible to file any election protest which is expected to be widespread – and poll watching

almost futile.

Here is what JAMES JIMENEZ wrote in a recent Facebook Note    in response to many of the

points raised by CenPeg and lawyer Harry Roque in a suit to TRO the automated election contract

with Smartmatic/TIM.  I am happy to share it with readers and writers of Philippine Commentary

because of its uhmm, transcendental importance.

I would have said everybody a watch-dog, but that term has always carried - for me at least - the

unfortunate connotation that someone, somewhere is gonna turn rabid. So, "everyone a quick-

counter" it is; because that's how it's going to be.

But before we get to that, this is how the canvassing flows - bottom up. Start from the precinct

where a paper report is generated in the form of election returns. The ERs are then delivered

physically to the first canvassing level which is at the city or municipality. The city or municipality

canvassing board then produces its own reports: the certificate of canvass and a statement of

votes by precinct. Each city or municipal canvassing board then sends its report to the next

canvassing level: the provincial. Provincial produces its own COC and SOV then reports to the

National Board of Canvassers. The National Board canvasses the results for Senators and Party-

List, while Congress canvasses results for President and Vice-President. 

The problem with this process is that it takes too long. Delivering the reports can take days,

sometimes even a week or more. In the meantime, people get antsy and worried that the reports

are being manipulated or altered in some way. Especially worrisome is when the outcome of the

elections is made to hinge on reports that haven't been canvassed yet; the fear being that the

manipulators are waiting to see just how much padding or shaving they need to do. So time,

essentially, can be a tool for manipulators and a very destabilizing factor in the mandate of

whoever emerges the winner.

Obviously, the solution is electronic transmission. 

Electronic transmission drastically cuts down the time necessary to transmit election results from

level to level. But, naturally, in order for electronic transmission to be possible, the data -

essentially the written reports generated by each level in the process - has to be in electronic form.

How to do that?

One solution is to manually count the votes, manually prepare the election returns, and then

encode the election returns into a computer with electronic transmission capabilities.

Sounds simple enough. But let's examine that a little closer.

Manual Counting

A manual count has its benefits, foremost would be that there would be no need to teach voters

how to vote. The ballot will be the usual thing - a long sheet of paper with the names of the

positions being voted on (what I call the "races") followed by blank lines where the voter can write

the names of the candidate he's voting for. So that's good, right?

Well, yes. In the sense that inertia is your friend. But that kind of voting runs into all sorts of

problems all the time. First, there's the problem of illegible handwriting. Then there's the issue of

voters who don't write the full name of the candidate. And of course, there are instances when

some candidates have the same name, and the voter isn't specific enough with his choice. All

these problems add up to questions of voter appreciation. The teachers engage in adhoc

interpretations of what the ballot is actually trying to say about the intent of the voter. It's a

guessing game, really, where the main players are the lawyers of the candidates. Not the voter -

his part is done. It's the lawyers trying to outdo each other in convincing the BEI to see things their

way.

Another result of this is that it draws out the time needed to complete the count; hence the

counting proceeds in fits and starts until dawn the following day. And again, time can become a

tool for subverting the vote. During the wee hours, when non-partisan people are mostly no longer

around to watch the proceedings, all sorts of attempts are made to subvert the vote count: power

outages, intimidation, thuggery, bribery .. you name it. Teacher's lives are put at risk, the integrity

of the ballot is challenged mightily, and the outcome of the elections becomes suspect. 

IS THE PRECINCT VOTE COUNT EASY TO SECURE?

Over the past few weeks, you've probably heard a lot of people saying that the vote count is the

easiest thing in the world to secure; that the vote count is the cleanest part of the process; that a

manual count is the best because it is witnessed by the public. HAH!

The vote count is the most difficult part of the process to secure for the following reasons: first, the

sheer scale of it. You're talking about counting going on more-or-less simultaneously in more than

250 thousand locations throughout the country. Second, it takes too long. Counts run up to 12

hours during which time any number of attacks on the integrity of the elections can ensue. And

third, the majority of the counts all over the country, as well as a significant chunk of the counting

process itself, are NOT watched by the public: there are simply too many counts going on at the

same time, and too many non-partisan observers simply cannot stay all night. In the end, many

watchers simply come back the following day to claim copies of ERs that they can nitpick about.

ER Preparation

Manual ER preparation has its share of problems, naturally. The most significant being the mis-

recording of the data. Let's forget about fraud for awhile and just focus on fatigue induced error. 

On election day, the members of the BEI are up and about by 4 am, getting their election supplies.

Elections run from 7am to 4pm. Counting usually starts at 6 pm and runs till 6 am the following

day. Which means that by the time the ERs are being prepared, the teachers doing the job will

have been up nearly 24 hours. Fatigue is inevitable, and when people get tired, people make

mistakes.

How inevitable is error? It is so inevitable that when an ER is presented and shows no erasures or

errors of any kind, it's perfection is considered a good indicator of fraud. Chew on that for awhile.

Our system is so prone to error that if no errors are evident, we suspect that something fishy is

going on. How twisted is that? Nevertheless, it is a sound observation. Because of the strain

placed on teachers, fatigue is one of the most significant causes of error through inadvertence.

Add to that, deliberate error brought about by coercion or corruption and you realize that ERs

prepared manually are probably not as pristine as some people might want you to believe. And

that's where the lawyers come in.

A lawyer's job is to make sure that his candidate wins. This means, if you're being brutally frank

about it, that a lawyer will try everything he can to influence the way the results are reported. He

can influence it during preparation of the ER, or he can influence it by challenging the number of

votes reported for his candidate. Either way, under a regime of manual preparation of ERs,

lawyers will exert an inordinate amount of influence in the way the vote is reported, and they will

also contribute mightily to the delay in the reporting.

ER Encoding

So, the ER - whose faithfulness in reflecting the will of the people will, by now, have been diluted -

now has to be encoded to produce an electronically transmittable document.

The most straightforward solution is to have someone reading from the ERs while someone sits

and encodes everything he hears. Now it's obvious that neither can check what the other is doing.

The encoder can't verify everything the reader tells him, just as the reader cannot check whether

his words are being tapped into the computer accurately.

This sets up two points of vulnerability: the reader (who can be coerced or bribed into dishonesty)

and the encoder (who, by the way, can be coerced or bribed into dishonesty). 

Ironically however, despite these vulnerabilities - from counting to ER preparaton to ER encoding -

there are some quarters who would rather see us stuck rather than try out the other way for getting

the ERs ready for electronic transmission.

The other way

The other way is automated counting. If you automate the counting, then the counting machine

presents the count in two ways: a paper election return report, and an electronic version of the

same report. Kinda like having a print-out of that word document you typed. You have a hard and

a soft copy. 

With the electronic version generated at the same instant the count is completed, the transmission

can then proceed seamlessly, with no need for anyone to interpret any ballots or to encode

anything. 

You save time and you ensure that there will be no discrepancies mediated by human error or

human malice.

Now there are those who would belittle the importance of saving time with the electronic count.

With all due respect but very little fondness, let them tell that to the teachers who have to stay up

more than 24 hours just to complete the counting and preparation of ERs; let them tell that to the

teachers who have to spend the night wondering whether the next hour will bring goons with guns;

let them tell that to the teachers who have to turn away bribes, knowing full well that there may be

adverse repercussions arising from their nobility.

And of course, there are those who will belittle the trustworthiness of the COMELEC in conducting

the automated counting. Fair enough, I would say. Don't trust the COMELEC, but don't let that

distrust consign the rest of the country to repeating the same old processes with the same old

vulnerabilities; don't let that distrust get in the way of getting the teachers out of harm's way; and

don't let that distrust become a stumbling block to the improvement of the electoral system.

On another level, don't use that mistrust to mislead the people.

People with avowed distrust for the COMELEC like saying that the machines can be programmed

to count wrongly; to favor this or that candidate; to ensure a pre-determined outcome. People who

distrust the COMELEC slam the system for a supposed lack of transparency.

A hand-count is not the only route to transparency. 

First, all a hand-count really does is show that ballots are actually being read. It does not

guarantee any individual voter that "his vote is being counted accurately." All it does is give people

- the BEI, the lawyers - the opportunity to argue about what the voter intended. And since no one

can actually say for certain that the ballots are being read according to each voter's intent, how

can a hand count guarantee anything? If you think about it, the ability of lawyers to question the

accuracy of the vote ultimately rests on the uncertainty of how to interpret the source document -

the ballot. Remove that uncertainty and the ability to question the accuracy of the count

evaporates.

Now consider an automated election system where the ballots unequivocally show voter intent and

where the resulting machine count can be verified against the actual ballots? Sure, you don't see

ballots actually being read, but that doesn't put you in a worse position vis-a-vis a hand count.

Besides, any re-count will still go through the same process of lawyers trying to outdo each other

in convincing the authorities that the voter voted this way and not that. With the automated system,

however, the hand re-count is much easier and much more definitive precisely because there is no

mistaking voter intent. If the oval is shaded, it's a vote. If not, then not.

There are those who argue saying that by the time a hand recount of the modern ballot is

undertaken, the winners will have been proclaimed. I may have missed something, but isn't that

how it is with a hand count? 

Second, the automated system has the advantage of being tamper-evident.

Tamper evident

Tamper-evident only means that if someone monkeys around with something, the monkeying is

obvious. Like meds. No one seriously believes that those flimsy foil things prevent tampering with

the pill inside. The main strength of the foil is that if someone does try to get to the pill inside, the

damage to the foil will be so obvious that no one in his right mind is gonna think that everything's

okay. Once you know that the pill has been tampered with, you know right away to chuck it in the

trash.

It's kinda the same with the automated election system. Unlike a foil pack, the design is such that

the speed of counting and consolidation make it very difficult to tamper with the results; but just

like a foil pack, the design also ensures that any unauthorized tampering is immediately obvious.

The results, you see, are transmitted directly out of the precinct and sent to several recipients all at

once: to the municipal canvassing center, to the COMELEC central server, to the servers of the

dominant majority, the dominant minority, the accredited citizen's arm, and the KBP. And yes, it

will also be sent to a publicly accessible website.

That's seven different recipients of the same data, all in one go. And that's not even counting the

30 hard copies of election returns that will be made available to practically everyone.

Now if someone were to tamper with one of those results, for whatever reason, the discrepancy

with all the other copies available makes the tampering immediately discoverable. So, if your

shenanigans are immediately obvious, why bother doing it at all? You won't make a difference in

the final result and you're likely to be found quickly. Bottom line, the widespread availability of

precinct results makes fraud more trouble than it's worth. 

Even better, having the results published on the web essentially democratizes quick-counting.

Literally anyone with internet access and a calculator can do exactly what Namfrel used to do, can

do exactly what the COMELEC is doing. Everyone becomes a quick-counter!

Irony

And this is why I can't help but shake my head at the irony of people trying to derail automation. In

one breath, they thump their chests and proclaim themselves concerned only with the cleanliness

of elections, and yet in the next, they do everything they can to scupper this excellent opportunity

we have to actually improve the cleanliness of elections.

PH elections become pawn in Smartmatic-Dominion dispute

by RG Cruz, ABS-CBN News

Posted at 02/13/2013 9:22 PM | Updated as of 02/13/2013 9:23 PM

MANILA - The 2013 Philippine mid-term elections have become the latest casualty in an ongoing

exchange of legal cases and bitter rivalry between 2 foreign companies.

Commission on Elections (Comelec) Chairman Sixto Brillantes noted that the impasse over the

source code of the Precint Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines bought by the Comelec for the

2013 election came after earlier battles between Smartmatic and Dominion Voting Systems Inc.

overseas.

“That's in fact the case in Delaware, the fight in Puerto Rico and Mongolia. Nasabit ang Pilipinas.

'Di ko naman minamasama masyado. I'm still talking to them," he said.

The source code is the human readable instruction software for the PCOS machines, as well as

the consolidation and canvassing systems that will be used in the election.

The Automated Election Law requires that the source code be open to review 90 days before the

polls.

However, third-party reviewer Systest Labs Inc. has not released the source code and its

certification because of the legal battle between Smartmatic and Dominion, which owns the

original software.

Asked if he thought the legal battle was a portent of Dominion's possible entry into the Philippines

as provider of election systems in the 2016 elections, Brillantes said, "they're only interested in

one thing -- money."

Lawsuits

Based on documents sent to ABS-CBN News by election watchdogs, 2 cases are pending in

Delaware -- a collection suit filed by Smartmatic against Dominion for what it believes was the

illegal termination of its software license agreement for the PCOS machines in the Philippines with

Smartmatic, and a counterclaim filed by Dominion against Smartmatic for alleged breach of

contract.

In both cases, both companies also traded accusations of unfair competition in securing election

supplier contracts in Mongolia and Puerto Rico.

"Dominion International's conduct in Mongolia and Puerto Rico appear to be consistent with a

pattern of activity designed to interfere with Smartmatic's prospective business relationships and

prejudice Smartmatic International’s ability to compete," according to one of the documents.

Smartmatic's collection suit, which was filed in September 11, 2012, accused Dominion of, among

others:

(1) improperly purporting to terminate the License Agreement based upon an incorrect and

pretextual interpretation of the geographic scope of the Agreement’s non-compete clause;

(2) failing to deliver fully functional technology for use in the 2010 Philippines national election;

(3) failing to provide timely technical support during and after the Philippines election;

(5) failing to provide Smartmatic with information relating to the Licensed Technology, including

new developments to the licensed technology;

(6) intentionally frustrating Smartmatic's right to market, lease, and sell the licensed technology;

and

(7) failing to place in escrow the required source code, hardware design, and manufacturing

information.

Smartmatic questioned Dominion's basis for terminating the license agreement because of an

alleged breach by Smartmatic of a non-compete clause with Dominion in the US.

Defective technology

The complaint further held Dominion liable for a defect in the technology, with the latter's software

allegedly failing to correctly read and record the paper ballot during a test of the automated voting

system conducted shortly before the election.

"This relates to the problems encountered one week before the Elections in May 2010, where the

software provided by Dominion was producing inaccurate results of the testing and sealing

ballots," Smartmatic's Cesar Flores said.

This prompted Smartmatic to redeploy a new set of CF cards with the corrected configuration.

"Smartmatic spent millions of dollars to save the automated elections in the Philippines, and we

have been requesting Dominion to reimburse the costs that we incurred due to the defect in their

technology," Flores added.

"Even though Smartmatic is entitled by the licensing agreement to make adjustments and

modifications to the licensed software, we did prefer in the interest of time to commission

Dominion for said improvements," he said.

"Dominion tried to keep Smartmatic hostage and force us to waive our claims from the CF card

rescue operation. Smartmatic could not allow this attempt by Dominion to hijack the elections in

the Philippines."

Smartmatic argued this was the case in Mongolia, where Dominion ended up supplying the needs

of the Mongolian election administration despite competition from Smartmatic.

"Dominion has acknowledged that it demonstrated certain critical functionality relating to the

Cyrillic language before the Mongolian election authorities, but refuses to provide Smartmatic

International with sufficient information regarding such functionalities," the complaint filed by

Smartmatic said.

It also accused Dominion of misrepresenting itself in securing the election supply contract for

Puerto Rico.

"Smartmatic recently learned that Dominion informed the (Puerto Rico) Commission that

Smartmatic does not have access to the latest Certificated PCOS technology developed by

Dominion," it added.

In its reply to the complaint, Dominion flatly denied Smartmatic’s allegations.

It also argued that while the license agreement was in effect through May 23, 2012, Smartmatic

was only entitled to market licensed products and technology, and not all voting systems

developed by various Dominion entities.

"This is an inaccurate statement from Dominion," Flores said. "Dominion did include the Cyrillic

language into the licensed technology and denied access to that upgrade to Smartmatic with the

intention to sabotage our commercial efforts in Mongolia."

Flores said Dominion does not deny a flaw in their system that prompted the redeployment of CF

cards in 2010. "They are basically saying that Smartmatic should have tested the licensed

technology even more, which is a clear confession of their lack of confidence in their own

technology."

In October 2012, Dominion filed its own counterclaim for damages, arguing that "because

Smartmatic and Dominion were competitors, Dominion made clear that any license for its PCOS

technology would be limited in nature and, in particular, would not include Canada and the United

States."

License fees

Dominion maintained that its contract was limited so that Smartmatic "would not modify, enhance

or otherwise make any changes to Dominion International's PCOS voting systems without prior

written agreement; and would pay Dominion International a license fee for each voting machine

delivered by Smartmatic to a third party."

In addition, Dominion alleged that despite numerous requests by Dominion International,

Smartmatic International refused to provide information to Dominion International about payments

by the Comelec.

"Smartmatic International was not forthcoming with accurate information about the Comelec

payments, and only upon a notice of default from Dominion International did Smartmatic

International eventually pay the fees it owed to Dominion International," the company said.

Flores, however, said "Smartmatic has never denied payment to Dominion International."

"However, in May 2013, two months after the option to purchase was exercised, Dominion

attempted to terminate the license agreement," he added. "We expect the Delaware court to

decide now if that termination is actually legal, as Dominion did not follow the clauses stipulated in

the licensing agreement for terminations."

Dominion in its complaint also said that "on June 14, 2012, Dominion International, through

counsel, wrote to Smartmatic International to advise it that, due to the termination of the license

agreement, Smartmatic International was no longer licensed to provide those 81,000 machines to

Comelec, and that Dominion had no obligation to undertake the upgrades."

Flores argued, "that is also inaccurate, even if the termination of the licensing agreement was legal

-- which Smartmatic maintains is not -- Dominion has to honour their obligations as defined by said

agreement."

"Dominion knew that Comelec was entitled to the full access and support to the technology, and

now they are legally bound to provide all support to this perpetual license that Comelec finally

purchased two months before the alleged termination of the licensing agreement," he added.

ABS-CBN News has sent an email to Dominion for its comments but no response has so far been

received.

Smartmatic suit may doom 2013 elections – AES Watch

The election watchdog Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch) today urged anew Sen.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago to convene the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) and

look into reports that the Smartmatic company will not be able to correct its voting system’s

deficiencies. Failure to correct the PCOS system’s program errors and bugs may doom the

coming 2013 mid-term elections.

Prof. Bobby Tuazon, AES Watch co-convener and CenPEG’s director for policy studies, issued

the urgent appeal to the JCOC, which oversees the automated election system, after receiving a

damning evidence showing the Venezuelan marketing company’s failure to correct the defects of

the PCOS machines which were used in the 2010 national elections.

Tuazon said that the U.S.-based Dominion Voting Systems, which supplied the election

technology to Smartmatic for the Philippine elections, terminated its 2009 license agreement with

the latter on May 23, 2012. As a result, the termination denies Smartmatic access to technical

support and assistance as well as to Dominion’s proprietary source code and other “escrowed

materials” which are vital to correcting and “enhancing” the PCOS system upon request of

Comelec in March this year.

Dominion is the real owner of the election technology – a fact which Smartmatic refused to divulge

during the 2010 elections.

The contract termination, Tuazon said, explains why Smartmatic can no longer correct the PCOS

errors and defects that are causing erratic counting, among other problems.

Comelec, headed by Chairman Sixto Brillantes, Jr., said it will not pay Smartmatic for the purchase

of its 60,000 PCOS voting machines unless the system is corrected – or “enhanced,” as the poll

body would put it. Comelec bought the machines last March 30 subject to the said condition and

other terms.

Dominion did not release the vital materials because Smartmatic refused to accede to the higher

fees demanded by the U.S. election technology manufacturer.

In a subsequent suit it filed against Dominion last Sept. 11 before the Delaware court of chancery

in the U.S., Smartmatic International accused the former with unilaterally repudiating the 2009

license agreement and undermining its election projects in Mongolia and Puerto Rico.

In the complaint – a copy of which was obtained by CenPEG – Smartmatic said Dominion’s

alleged “breach of contract and tortious interference in Smartmatic’s business” has caused the

Venezuelan company immediate and irreparable harm” and imperils its “standing in the

marketplace.”

Smartmatic also admitted system errors of its technology in the compact flash card (CFC) fiasco

during the May 3, 2010 final testing and sealing (FTS) or a week before the May 2010 elections in

the Philippines. It blamed Dominion’s software for failing to correctly read and record the paper

ballots. The FTS failure nearly stopped the May 10, 2010 elections with a Comelec contingency

plan to revert to manual system. Smartmatic is also demanding damages from Dominion for

incurring huge financial losses and for suffering “reputational harm” with many voters casting

doubt on the credibility of the elections.

“It nearly affected the 2010 Philippine elections,” Smartmatic said in a statement last Sept. 18.

Likewise, the Venezuelan company revealed that Dominion breached the 2009 license agreement

by failing to deliver “fully functional technology” for the 2010 Philippine elections, and failing to

place in escrow the required source code, hardware design, and manufacturing data.

Dr. Pablo Manalastas, AES Watch co-convener and CenPEG Fellow for IT, said this constitutes

an explicit admission by Smartmatic of the “failure of its system to function fully, resulting in glaring

errors, most of which were documented” by CenPEG and AES Watch in 2010.

“Does Dominion’s failure automatically imply Smartmatic’s failure to do the escrow required by the

election law (RA 9369),” Manalastas added. “Do these actions by Smartmatic constitute a criminal

intent to cheat, a criminal intent to avoid its contractual obligations with Comelec and with the

Filipino people?” the IT programmer guru asked.

Tuazon said the JCOC has been asked several times from as early as June 2010 by AES Watch

to convene immediately in order to assess the May 2010 elections and propose an alternative

automation technology for the next election.

The JCOC members, he said, should probe into why Smartmatic had been saying persistently that

its system was 100% perfect contrary to the scientific studies of Filipino IT experts and scholars. In

a July 2012 mock elections administered by the House suffrage and electoral committee,

Smartmatic claimed a perfect counting accuracy (the law mandates 99.9995% accuracy). But

subsequent reviews by AES Watch’s IT resource persons revealed an average of 97% accuracy

rating thus exposing the system’s erratic counting, with millions of votes being missed out from

counting in an actual election.

Smartmatic is now vulnerable to being charged with perjury for lying through its teeth, Tuazon

said. “What other truths is Smartmatic hiding from Filipino voters?” he said.

The Philippines is hemmed in by a financial war between Smartmatic and Dominion, Tuazon. But

in the end, the Philippines’ electoral process in 2013 will be put in jeopardy, he added. 

Comprising 40 groups and NGOs, the citizens election watch group AES Watch monitored the

May 2010 elections and is continuing its documentation in preparation for the May 2013 elections.

Last April, individual AES Watch members led by its President Emeritus, former Vice President

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. filed a TRO case against Comelec and Smartmatic before the Supreme

Court for the illegal purchase of PCOS machines for use in the next elections.

Automated Election for 2010???

Is automated election the answer for a clean and honest election? Is it credible? Is Philippines

ready for it?… These are some of the queries whirling inside my mind when automated election

brought into topic. Elections in the Philippines have always been a manual process with the results

for national positions often being announced more than a month after election day, but this coming

May 2010 it will shift into automated election. An attempt to rectify this was done by the

Commission on Elections by automating the process of counting the votes.

What is Automated Election System?

Automated election system (AES) is a system that uses appropriate technology to accomplish and

aid such tasks as voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result,

and other electoral process. Republic Act No. 9369, which is the Amended Elections Automation

Law provides for the use of two forms of AES. The first is a paper-based election system defined

as “a type of automated election system that uses paper ballots, records and counts votes,

tabulates, consolidates, canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count.” It

uses the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) Technology. Here, the voters have to shade the oval which

corresponds to their candidate of choice using pencil in a specially scanned paper ballot. It is

composed of 2 Laptops, 2 Digital Scanners, 2 card readers, 1 hub and 1 printer. The votes in the

shaded ballots will then be scanned and counted using an Automated Counting Machine (ACM).

This kind of technology is pretty much familiar in the Philippines.

The second form is the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). It is defined as “a type of automated

election system that uses electronic ballots, records votes by means of a ballot display provided

with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data

by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting

results electronically.” voters are provided with a Voting Pad where the photos of candidates can

be selected by pressing on the desired picture. Once the vote is final, a receipt is generated after

pressing ‘BOTO‘. However, DRE Technology can only be deployed in areas where

communications is available and reliable. These technologies proved that IT in the Philippines is

fastly growing and developing.

Who will provide?…

This new system of voting will not be implemented without the technology need to run the whole

system. The Smartmatic, a world-class leading supplier of electoral solutions and services, won

the bid to carry out the 2010 Election project in the Philippines. The contract was worth

approximately $150 million, that Smartmatic is to deploy 82,200 SAES1800 voting machines

across a sizable proportion of the 7,107 thousand islands comprising the territory of the

Philippines, and transmit all results electronically to over 1,700 canvassing and consolidation

centers. Smartmatic has successfully deployed its electronic voting technology in multiple electoral

processes in the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, accurately counting over

150 million votes, always with the provision of an auditable paper trail, and open source-code

reviews. Last year, the Smartmatic electoral technology was used in the election in the ARMM

region in the Philippines, an event the COMELEC regarded as very satisfactory, and first of its

kind in South East Asia. Smartmatic is a multinational company that designs and deploys

technological solutions aimed at helping governments fulfill, in the most efficient way, their

commitments with their citizens. It is one of the largest cutting-edge technology suppliers, with a

wide and proven experience in the United States, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Automated election has several advantages, some of these are: Financial Savings, though

automated elections deal with computers and will cost large amount of money, it will still cut the

cost, like labor cost. Since computer will do the counting, it means fewer laborer needed. Another

advantage is, increased speed and effiency of electoral task and results. Using computers would

make the voting and the counting faster and acccurate than manual process of election. It has also

improved capacity to identify and prevent frauds., tampering of votes will prevented and the

integrity of the election would be higher. There are so many advantages but the question is, Are

Filipinos ready for this?

Even automated election provide high security, there are still computer geeks that can bombard

the whole system or hack the computers and manipulate the results. There is also a possibility that

cheaters would come from the people who developed the system. And wee can’t deny the fact that

some Filipinos doesn’t know how to use computers especially in the rural area, will they be able to

adapt this new process? In my own opinion, the main problem with automated election is

“transparency”. People won’t able to see the actual process of counting the votes and several will

doubt if the results are really correct.

Our country might be a long way to go from being industrialized and fully prepared to reap the

benefits of Information Techbology in every major part of our everyday lives, but the conduct of the

2010 automated elections is a still a big step forward towards the achievement of a truly

democratic and honest elections and the closure of the digital divide as a whole. Our

infrastructures might not be at par to other countries and our people might not be fully informed

and trained yet, but these shortcomings can be greatly remedied if we are equipped with the

willingness to learn and adapt to our ever-changing world.