authority and consensus in thomas more's doctrine of the church

AUTHORITY AND CONSENSUS IN THOMAS MORES DOCTRINE OF

THE CHURCH PHILIP SHELDRAKE

Wimbledon College. London

Recent authoritative scholarship on St Thomas More (centred largely around the gradual publication of his complete works in a critical edition by Yale University) has begun to have a profound effect on our understanding of the man and his thought. Most particularly are highlighted the complexity of More’s doctrine of the Church and its authority,and the consequent ambiguity of his frnal stand against Henry VIIL It has begun to emerge that to label More either as a papalist or a conciliarist is to oversimplify the issue. His three major polemical works against Protestants and several of his letters reveal a much richer basis for his doctrine of authority.’ This basis is the idea of consensus stemming from a fairly developed notion of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church as a whole, leading it into all truth. What this article proposes to do is to explore something of the origins, meaning and impli- cations of th is doctrine of consensux Firstly, however, we must fill in the background of some of the recent study of More’s doctrine of the Church in general and his precise views on the function of papacy and Council in the exercise of authority.

1

We can take as our starting point a recent controversy among scholars over whether More shifted his ground from being a conciliarist to being a papalist .2

There does, on the face of it, seem to be substantial evidence for such a

1 Responsio ad Luthemm, ed. J.M. Headley (Yale Edition, vo1.5, New Haven- London, 1969), hereafter Responsio; Confutorion of Tyndole’s Answer, ed. L. Schuster and Others (Yale Ed., vol. 8, New Haven-London, 1973), hereafter Confutofion; 771e Dialogue Concerning Tyndole, ed. W.E. Campbell (2nd ed.. London-New York, 1931), hereafter Dialogue; Selected Letters of St Thomos More, ed. E.1:. Rogers (New Haven- London, 1961).

2 For this controversy see R . Marius, ‘Thomas More’s View of the Church’ in the introduction to the Confutation, and the reply of J.M. Ikadley, ‘On More and the Papacy’,Moreono XI, no. 41 (1974). pp.1-10.

146

THOMAS MORE‘S DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 147

change. The published version of his Responsio has a clearer statement of the role of the papacy than an earlier unpublished version which is notably vague on the whole question. In Queen Mary’s reign, Cardinal Pole recorded that More, in a conversation with Bonvisi, admitted moving from seeing the papacy as of purely human foundation to seeing it as of divine origin. Pole is not always a reliable witness, but a significant letter of More himself to Thomas Cromwell in 1534 admits to the same development in his thinking. However, a closer look at this letter reveals that the change does not place More among the ultra-papalists. The nature of the divinely founded papacy is not defied. The basis for it seems ultimately pragmatic: ‘. . . for that primacy is at the leastwise instituted by the corps of Christendom and for the great urgent cause in avoiding of schisms . . .’ (Selected Letters, p.212). The centrality of consensus, which, as we shall see, is the key to all More’s thoughts on authority, is affimed: ‘And therefore sith all Christendom is one corps, I cannot perceive how any member thereof may without the common assent of the body depart from the common head . . .’ (Selected Letters, p.213). Finally, More still maintains that the pope is not above a General Council; ‘. . . for albeit that I have for mine own part an opinion of the pope’s primacy as I have showed you, yet never thought I the pope above a general council. . .’ (Selected Letters, p.2 14).

More remains cautious. The published version of the Responsio which contains the additions on the papal primacy also retains a statement of his reluctance to become embroiled in this controversy. It is also true that More never emphasizes the question in his later works. More seems to have felt a need (at least in the Responsio) to give the papacy a certain centrality in the Church. This is explicable, however, in the context of the attacks of Luther and his followers on the whole structure of authority in the Church which More could hardly ignore and against which his major polemical works are aimed. He undoubtedly feared a new sectarianism or fragmentation of the visible Church which would clash strongly with his own universalism and desire for order. Perhaps More felt that a theological notion of consensus was not enough in the new atmosphere of controversy.

What is also true, however, is that More, throughout his works, is reluctant to give any absolute authority to any human institution. It seems from the balance of the evidence that More is basically conciliar rather than papal in his conception of the administration of the Church. Nonetheless, both Council and papacy are seen as based on consensus. This latter notion, rather than an opposition or contrast of Council and pope, is the real centre of More’s doctrine. Both Council and pope are necessary but neither is the ultimate locus of authority.

148 PHILIP SHELDRAKE

2

Clearly, any remarks that More may have wished to make about authority must have been based on a particular understanding of the Church as such. This is abundantly clear from the basic disagreements with his two main protagonists, Luther and Tyndale. There is, of course, a danger of over- simplification, but briefly, More saw the Lutheran understanding of the Church as being what has been called ‘de-incarnational’. That is, that the Church was not a perceptible community of good and bad men apparent to all. In contrast, More’s analysis of authority is based on the firm conviction that the Church is visible and known. He refused to drive a wedge between the invisible Church of faith (the reality of which he did not deny) and the only visible evidence we have - the ,community of those who profess the name of Christ on earth. For More, ecclesiology had not simply a theological but also a sociological dimension. Thus the Church as the ‘body of Christ’ has a visible and known element - the ‘Church militant’ qn earth. It seems clear that More took a middle road between the idea of the survival of faith in an invisible form only, and what might be called the ultra-papalist view that a particular person (the pope) always incarnates the faithfulness of the Church. There is a conti- nuity of faith in a visible community - but precisely in the community as a whole. Against Luther’s idea that the Word of God alone authenticates the truths of faith, More replies, in effect, that without the authentification of a Spirit-filled community it is impossible to be sure precisely where the Word of God is spoken.

The second basic supposition is that the Church is all the faithful, or as More himself says many times: ‘the number and congregation of right believing

The Spirit is not present simply in papacy, hierarchy or General Council. More also believed that ‘by this church know we the scripture’ (Dialogue, pp.144,182). That is, both that we derive OUT knowledge of what is canonical Scripture from it, and that through it we have the possibility of being able to interpret Scripture as.the need arises. Once again it must be emphasized that this kind of inspiration is given to the Church as a whole. Consensus in More’s mind is not only opposed to the idea of limiting authority to particular groups within the Church, but also to the idea of ‘primacy’ of each individual believer standing alone.

Thus, for More the Church has authority and this authority is not simply a legal thing but is based on the abiding presence of the Spirit of Christ in his ‘body’. He continually quotes two key gospel texts: When the Spirit of truth comes he will guide you into all truth (Jn 16: 13) and ‘1 am with you always, to the close of the age’ (Mt 28:20). Certainly, too, More has a lawyer’s prede-

3 Responsio, pp.363-5; Dialome, p.181; Confutation, p.517.

THOMAS MORE’S DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 149

liction for order and thus there is a certain utilitarian basis for some of his ideas. As he hints several times in his Responsio: charity is not enough given the fickleness of human n a t ~ r e . ~

Finally, for More, the Church as the ‘body of Christ’ is a living organism. As such, change is part of its nature. God must be free to reveal new directions and initiatives. A doctrine of authority which was purely legal and which placed it solely in certain human structures would tend to inhibit this process of growth. The point is of course that structures themselves are liable to change. Belief cannot change, but it seems to be true that he did not ke the papacy nor the whole hierarchical structure of the Church as of theological necessity. In his Confutation he defends himself fi+y against any charge of making the papacy part of the definition of the Church (Confutation, p.576).

3

More sees the papacy essentially as a necessary point of unity and of continuous practical authority in maintaining the reality of the universal community and the effective functioning of consensus. Luther may have had a point in his reaction against what he saw as an ‘ecclesiasticization’ of grace, but More feared that an over-assertion of the spiritual and personal aspects would be to the detriment of any objective body of law in the Church. Indeed his fears go further than that. Those who attack the idea of papacy are in danger of undermining the whole structure of authority, secular as well as ecclesiastical. Freedom to attack office-holders (including popes) as unworthy does not lead logically in More’s mind to a rejection of the authority of the office as such. That kind of notion had dangerous and universal ramifications. Men may begin to say

. . . that all the hole world must leue of all maner of offyces, and neyther haue pope, emperour, kynge, counsallour, mayre, shyryffe, nor alderman to gouerne or rule the comons . . . For among all these offyces there can be founden none, that hath not had ere thys many an yll man in the rome (Confutation, pp. 579-80).

Thus More felt it necessary to emphasize that not only was the Church a ‘known’ and visible community, but also that asit had had (in Christ) a known head on earth, so it continues to have one in the person of the pope. If there is a known body there must be a known head. Those who follow Luther are known too and their leaders are known. However More is a long way from accepting a strictly papalist interpretation of the Petrine claims. He is notably vague about the precise role of the papacy. As we have already seen More sees

4 See, for example, Responsio, p.197.


a need for a visible centre of unity ‘for the great urgent cause in avoiding of schisms’. This seems to imply some sort of disciplinary role. He explicitly refers to the correction of evil bishops in the Confitation and to determining forms of worship in the Responsio and also to banning superstitions such as ‘silly ditties’ to saints.5 However, even this legal role is not seen by More as exclusively that of the pope. The canon law used by the Church stems from many sources - popes, Councils and ‘dyuers good holy men’ (Confutation, p.593). More’s pope is in no way possessed of autocratic or exclusive powers.

On the question of doctrine the contexts in which some reference to the pope appear are rare and ambiguous. For example in the Responsio (p.619) More certainly talks of yielding to the pope in matters of doctrine, but the context is an argument about the papacy as centre of unity and as guarantee- ing the faith of the Church and does not necessarily refer to the definition of doctrine. In fact the wider context of More’s remarks on doctrine makes it clear that it is a General Council - or even the Church in general - which has t h s particular role:

‘but eyiher by the comen faste fayth of the whole catholyke chyrch growen as it ever doth by the soyryte of god, that maketh men of one mynde in his chyrche or by the determynacyon of the chyrche assembled for such causes in the generall counsayles’ (Confutation, p.714).

None of this is surprising, as in More’s mind popes may err as individuals, and may be judged and deposed. He clearly states that the promise of Christ that ‘the gates of hell shall not prevail‘ refers to the whole Church and not to the primacy alone (Confiration, p.693). Indeed Peter’s faith did fail while that of the Church as a whole was preserved (in More’s mind) by the Virgin Mary (Wogue. pp.68-9).

4

We have already noted that More, in his important letter to Cromwell in 1534, states categorically that he never puts the pope above a Council. Later in the same letter he seems to give to a General Council the power both to depose a pope and to act as a court of appeal frdm his decisions (Selected Lerrers, pp.213-14). Councils may, like popes, decide on ‘things to be done’ and may in the course of time change such things. It is to the General Council that More gives the power to discern and declare the faith of the Church. Once done this commands the acceptance of all:

Many things every man learned wotteth well there are, in which every man is at liberty without peril of damnation to think which way him

5 On correction ofbishops, see Confurarion, p.586; on forms of worship, Respmsio, p.219; on banning,superstitions, Selected Letters. p.120.


list till the one part be determined for necessary to be believed by a general council . . . (Selected Letters, p.232, to Dr Wilson).

The General Council has two bases for its authority. Firstly, Christ promised to be present where two or three gather in his name. A fortiori, More claims, his presence must be guaranteed where several hundred of the most learned men in Ckstendom are gathered in the same name. Secondly, on a h u m k level, the authority is based on a legal notion of representation.6 It may well be that here More is influenced by English theories of parliament: ‘. . . the dew assemble of certayne partes representynge the whole body sholde haue the full authoryte of the whole body’ (Confutation, pp.94041).

However there is an important corollary of this,notion of representation and that is that authority fundamentally resides in the whole body of the Church. On several occasions More suggests that the general belief and consent of the whole Church over a period of time may be as effective and as binding as a Council:

For when all chrysten people be by the same spyryte of god brought into a full agreement and consent, that the vow of chastyte may not‘be by hys pleasure that made it broken and set at nought. . . than is that bylyfe as sure a trouth as though they had all the whole company to a counsayle to gyther to determyne it. . . (Confutation, pp.941-2).

Thus a Council functions by expressing the authority which belongs to the Church as a whole. It is ‘authenticated‘ by the consensus of the whole and confirms the consensus already existing in the Church.

In the relation of Council to pope, one further area remains doubtful. Several times, More refers to Councils being ‘lawfully assembled’ but at no time is it clear who is responsible for calling one. Whether he saw t h i s as the function of the papacy exclusively or whether he accepted conciliar theory that princes may call Councils can never be known for certain. What can be said is that in certain respects More seems to be in line with Conciliar theory on other matters. In his 1534 letter to Cromwell, already quoted, he is in line with the important conciliar canon Sucromctu (1415) of the Council of Constance which proclaimed conciliar supremacy. In the Confutation (p.937) he is in agreement with the decree Frequens in calling for regular Councils. Perhaps it is also significant that he seems to avoid deliberately Bishop Fisher’s papalist specificness on the calling of Councils in the latter’s Asserfionis Lutherunue Confutufio (1 523).

To conclude these remarks on Thomas More’s attitude to the papacy and General Councils we can assert firmly that he was no papalist in the strict sense. There is a common pattern in his polemical works of reluctance to get involved in disputes over the pope’s powers. While using Bishop Fisher and his

6 Confirtation, pp.714-15,937,941;Responsio, p.363.


writings quite extensively in the Responsio, More chooses to differ quite significantly on the interpretation of Lk 22:31-32. Fisher takes it to refer to the Petrine office, More to the Church in general. Further, More is clear that only Christ has praesidenriu (sovereignty) in the Church. This differs consider- ably from a typical contemporary papalist writer such as Catharin~s.~ More’s reverence for the papacy seems to be practical rather than on the level of ‘this is the best of all possible worlds’. All the time we hear the implied question: ‘what other human authority is more likely to be adequate?’ It appears that More is prepared to link the activity of the Holy Spirit within the visible Church to a General Council more than to the papacy. However he is tantalizingly vague -

It has been pointed out that at the time when More was writing the Confutation (1532-33), Henry VIII’s conciliarism was at its strongest and therefore it is not surprising that his interest comes across in More’s work. It has even been suggested that in parts (most notably in the truncated IXth book) there is a deliberate suppression of treatment of the papacy.8 However, in his final trial speech when he had nothing to lose, More affirmed his allegiance to the ‘common corps of Christendom’, citing a realm larger than England. In so far as this is specified it is an appeal to the Councils and consensus and not to the papacy. It is to this theological notion of consensus, which is the key to More’s doctrine and which underpins the authority of Council and pope, that we shall now turn our attention in more detail.

5

If we say that the authority of Council or papacy is based on consensus in the mind of More we are ultimately talkingnot simply about a constitutional issue but a theological notion. For although More does use the language of law, consensus is fundamentally the accord produced by the working of the Spirit poured out throughout the whole Church. To understand adequately the contrast and similarities of the views of More and others (conciliarists, Henry WII and Fisher for example) who use the word consensus, we need to sketch briefly some of the background to the use of the word.

The notion of consensus comes to prominence as a legal or constitutional

7 A Florentine Dominican friar who published in 1520 his Apologia pro ventate catholicae e t apostolicae f d e i ac doctrinoe adversus irnpia ac valde pestifera Martini Lutheii dogmata.

8 See Confutation, Part 3 ; Introductions, p.1425.

THOMAS MORE‘S DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 153

question in later medieval canon law and in conciliar t h e ~ r y . ~ On the whole the question arose naturally from practical litigation which reached a peak in the 12th and 13th centuries. Such a flood of lawsuits demanded some sort of answer to the question of the precise relationships between chapters and their bishops, abbots, and the monasteries. Where does authority in a local (or indeed universal) church reside - in the head or in all members? Who are the members? Some or all? Was it for example the maior et sanior pun? These practical problems helped the canonists to develop their concept of corporation. The earlier canonists were largely concerned with local churches and it is in this context that the Decrefuls of Pope Alexander 111 (1 159-81) tackled the rights of canons and chapters. These Decrefuls formed the basis for much future discussion. However, there was a great deal of confusion in the use of the terms de concilio and de consensu (counsel and consent) which were inadequately de f i ed . Hostiensis, perhaps the greatest medieval canonist, suggested that counsel did not necessarily include actual consent to decisions. However, consent properly so called was necessary in any vital issue of the whole corporation.

The question of the validity of decisions made with or without consent was of considerable importance. Joannes Teutonicus argued that it was sufficient that consent be sought even if it were not obtained. In the papal context the Decretist Huguccio observed that papal laws ought to be discussed in consistory before they were promulgated without saying whether laws promulgated without actual consent were invalid. The Glossa Palatina, however, appears to have been clearer on this point: the pope, alone, is actually incompetent to establish law for the whole Church. Such is valid only when actually approved by the cardinals.

Conciliar development consisted largely of work along the same lines but now with particular reference to the universal Church and the rights of the papacy vis4-vis cardinals and Councils. The real basis of conciliar theory was not so much that the f i a l authority in the Church lies in a Council but that it lies with the whole body of the faithful (congregatiofidelium). In this there is a close resemblance to More. This is, however, primarily a legal-constitutional position. Certainly in general, by the 15th century, the idea that the whole community was the source of political authority was fairly common among both lawyers, secular and religious, and political thinkers. The notion of corporation and representation and thus of consent (though not, obviously,

9 For the general background to the notion of consensus in later medieval canon law and in conciliar theory, see especially: 0. Engels, ‘Councils’, in Encyclopediu of Theology, ed. Karl Rahner (Eng. tr., London, 1975); B. Tierney, Fourrdnfions of Conciliar Theory (Cambridge, 1955); E.F. Jacob, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch (ed. 2, Manchester. 1953); on the thought of Pierre d’Ailly in particular, see F. Oakley, The Poliiical Thought of Pierre d jlilly (New Haven-London, 1964).

1 54 PHILIP SHELDRAKE

of modem democratic theory!) was common language. There are hints of this in More, as when he defends the authority of Councils on the grounds that governmental structures representing and thus carrying the authority of the whole cqmmunity were widely accepted (Confutation, p.940).

The question as to whether conciliar theory was solel,, a legal-constitutional one is too complex to treat in detail. Certainly the argument was carried out largely in the camp of the lawyers and the issues were mainly immediate and practical. I t is not surprising therefore that the language appears to be that of political theory rather than of theology. It would be fair to say, then, that More, for all his being also a lawyer, takes a more purely theological approach. This emphasis too is not surprising in the context of what was, after all, theological polemic. However, in general terms, we should remember that the world within which the canon lawyers and conciliarists worked was one with an assumed theological dimension. Of the later conciliar thinkers of the mid-15th century, perhaps the greatest was Nicolas of Cusa. Certainly in his Concordanria Chfholicu (1433) there are theological principles involved. The Church is conceived as a divine world whose head is Christ - and so while parallel to secular society, it is not entirely the same. His basis for consensus as the background to the authority of bishop, pope and Council, is the notion of man as essentially free. In the context of the time this is based on theological as well as philosophical suppositions.1°

It seems fair to suggest, then, that conciliar thought was not simply the application of constitutional terms from the secular world to the society of the Church. Such secular constitutionalism is perhaps particularly strong in such as Pierre d' Ailly, where the pope is seen as principalis inter maghos on whom the ecclesiastical order depends, but who is himself elected by the community through their representatives the cardinals. However even d' Ailly has a theological underlay. Although he did not frequently use the notion of 'Mystical Body of Christ' as a way of describing the Church, it is present in his thought and so his view of the Church is not simply that of a political theoretician. Yet it is still fair t o say that compared to More, d'Ailly does not have the same theological richness or explicitness. In his letter to the Council Fathers at Pisa in 1405 he certainly refers to the authority of Christ as the means for preserving the unity of the Church, but there is no concept of the interior working of the Holy Spirit (Oakley, p.159). In contrast, d'Ailly's pupil Gerson has perhaps the clearest theological perpsective to his thought. His ideas on the Church used the concept of the Mystical Body much more than d'Adly. Although the context for much of his thought is the apparently legal problem of how a Council can be called only by a pope if there is no one

10 See H. Jedin, Hisrory of rhe C'ouncil of l i ent Wng. tr. , London, 1961). vol. 1, pp.22ff.

THOMAS MORES DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 155

agreed candidate for the See of Peter, a deeper question is raised of where authority ultimately lies. Gerson has certainly read and used Conrad of Gelnhausen, the Provost of Worms, who argued strongly that the Church was not the College of pope with cardinals but the ‘congregation of the faithful in the unity of the sacraments’ (Jacob, p.9). Conrad based his theological considerations on the First Epistle to the Corinthians and on Ephesians in which the ‘indwelling’ of the Holy Spirit is emphasized. Following this idea Gerson, in a sermon to the University of Paris in March 1415, refers to Christian society as essentially Spirit-guided. Although he goes on to talk of such society in legal terms, he clearly viewed it as not simply a political but also a Mystical Body and not to be regarded in altogether the same way as constitutional theorists regarded the secular state.

6

Thus, while it would be unfair to suggest that conciliar theory contained no theological basis for consensus, it is also clear that the practical context of most of the canonists’ activity directed them more into a legal and political direction. It would not seem very likely then, that More drew his real inspiration for his theological notion of consensus or discernment, which are treated as gifts of the Spirit, from this source. There is a further question of how aware More was of canon law and conciliar theory. Without a good deal more research this is not an easy question to answer. In the early 1530s Henry VIII’s government produced a history of conciliar appeals. In general it is fair to say that conciliar ideas were in the air in England during the period concerned, and that there was considerable interest in such questions in court circles. However, this in itself is no evidence that More had taken the trouble to read the sources. Of the leading conciliar theorists only Jean Gerson gets a mention in the polemical works, but this is only once and as a writer of a spiritual work on the following of Christ (Confutation, p.37). There is also evidence that the ideas of equity and epieikeia used by Marsiglio of Padua, Occam and Gerson were present in England in the 1520s and 153Os, but al l this is general and somewhat circumstantial evidence. On canon law Professor Schoeck, who has written on the subject, has been able to produce only a sketchy picture.” It is unlikely that canon law was taught at the Inns of

I I On the question of the presence of the ideas of Marsiglio etc. in England and on the knowledge of canon law by secular lawyers, see: R.J. Schoeck, ‘Canon Law in England on the Eve of the Reformation’, Medieval Studies XXV (1 963), pp. 125-47. The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio was in fact only translated into English at the behest of Cromwell in 1533 and published in 1535. As the fust Latin edition was only available as late as the mid-1520s it seems probable that More did not have fist-hand knowledge of the work.


Court. Some of those with whom More entered into controversy appear to have known some canon law. Barnes for example, produced a collection of sententiae from patristic and canonical writings at Wittenburg in 1531. In general too, Reformers seem to have derived many of their patristic texts from canon law decretals. Edward Lee and Reginald Pole, friends of More, are known to have been trained in canon law. However, none of this is proof of a wide or profound knowledge on More’s part. Rather more evidence is needed to be convincing on that point. The fact that More refers to and occasionally quotes from Decretals in his works and appears to show some knowledge of Gratian in particular does not prove that he knew them at fmt hand.12 Useful polemic quotations seem to have been available to both sides of the argument without t h i s implying profound study. Quotations used in such general teims, in such small quantities and as polemic brickbats could just as well have been borrowed from other sources, or have simply been current in the general atmosphere of the time.

The notion of consentlconsensus also appears in Henry VIII’s Defence of the Seven Sacraments and in Bishop Fisher’s works against Luther. While the question of government is dealt with, the notion of consensus is widened in two ways in the face of the Reformers’ attacks on doctrine and the whole question of spiritual authority in the Church. Consensus then becomes not merely an existential question of how practical authority is exercised but also the question of what precisely is the authority of the Church for decisions of doctrine or praxis (particularly in the sacramental sphere). For Henry, Scripture is important and is much quoted. However the unifying role of the Holy Spirit producing discernment and consensus is not made clear. For t h i s reason he lacks the theological depth of More. ‘Overwhelming tradition’ is his key idea - the agreement of Fathers, Councils and,to some degree, consensus fideriurn is adduced to support the belief and practices (particularly liturgical ones) of the Church. Thus time, usage and numbers are more significant than for More.13 Bishop Fisher used More’s favourite texts (John 16: 13; Matthew 28:20) in a sermon against Luther in 1521 to point to the Holy Spirit acting in the Church as a guarantee of truth. In his Assertionis Lutheranae Confutatio (1 523), Fisher uses consensus in the rather legal sense of human agreement giving approval to church practice. However, he uses another word, concolulia, to describe the unifyin9 work of the Spirit in a similar way to More. This, it is suggested, he got from Erasmus.14

12 For quotations from the Decretals see, for example, Didogue, p.264 and Confu-

13 Examples of Henry’s approach can be found in the Responsio, where they are

14 J.M. Headley, Introduction, in Responsio, Part 2, p.144.

tution, pp.592 and 918.

directly quoted, for example, pp.113 and 345.

THOMAS MORE’S D W R I N E OF THE CHURCH 157

7

More in his own account of consensus draws these two concepts of Fisher together - whether consciously or not is hard to determine. Consent thus becomes not merely a legal or administrative idea but something with a theological dimension. It remains true that More uses the term in the more legal sense at times. Thus he talks of the representative basis of a Council within a corporative notion of the Church as we have noted earlier. Consent too is the basis in his mind for the authority of both Council and papacy. Thus the opinion about the power of the pope held by the ‘corps of Christendom’ carries more weight than an individual or national value (Selected Letters, p.212). A Council’s decisions are in some way authenticated by a preceding or subsequent consensus on the decisions taken or the doctrine taught.15 Following Henry’s line of argument, the ‘agreement of all times and places’ - that is time, usage, and numbers also appears in More’s thought. Perhaps the classic expression is in the fmal trial speech as recorded by Roper:

If the number of Bishops and Universities be so material as your Lord- ship seemeth to take it, then I see little cause my Lord why that thing in my conscience should make any change. For I nothing doubt but that, though not in this realm, yet in Christendom about, of these well- learned bishops and virtuous men that are yet alive, they be not the fewer part that be of my mind therein. But if I should speak of those which already be dead, of whom many be now Holy Saints in heaven, I am very sure it is the far greater part of them that, all the while they lived, thought in this case that way that I think now. l6

Such a view is expressed in several places in More’s polemical works and in his letters. If one accepts that the individual may err, then such a collective witness is important. Numbers alone muy count in this sense:

. . . you present no-one on your side as either the patron or witness of your opinion whereas the church brings forward against you the public agreement of all Christians and proves by the sayings of the ancient fathers that all the faithful have also judged the same thing throughout so many ages, who judges it ridiculous, except you who are the most ridiculous of men, if all men prefer to trust all themselves alone rather than only you, a single infidel (Responsio, p.571).

However, More is aware that simply to argue from the consensus of numbers is not enough on its own. Men may err singly or collectively. The basis of the value even of this sort of consensus is in the belief that the Holy Spirit inspires believers. True, he inspires the individual - but discernment of what the Spirit is saying must, to prevent pure subjectivism, be subject to some sort of verification or better, authentification. The agreement of one or two, or

15 See Dialogue, p.261; Confutation, p.812; Responsio, pp.363-5. i6 William Roper, nhe Life o f Sir Thomas More. Knight (Everyman Edition, London,

1969, p.46).


better a Council of wise and educated men then carries weight because unity of mind is one of the signs of the working of the Spirit, The consensus of the Church then is far more than simply the agreement of men, however many and however learned. Luther made this point when he argued that the Turks and Jews too had a longstanding public agreement on their beliefs and practices (Responsio, pp.221-3). It is precisely because More believes that the Church is not simply a human assembly but the Mystical Body of Christ, with the living presence of Christ in its midst and the inspiration of the Spirit that he can confidently assert that its consensus is of a different order:

. . . what is spoken by the church of Christ who speaks on the authority of the Holy Spirit is another thing. Christ said: ‘It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you’ (Responsio, p.225).

Whether such a consensus, even granted the notion of divine inspiration, leads to a crude doctrine of oportet sic esse - that whatever the Church teaches or does must necessarily be so - is difficult to judge. More appears to imply t h i s when he says:

The whole church of Christ for more than a thousand years past tells you this. Whatever her spouse has inspired in her for so long a time surely must be so, however much a new heretic may now deny and contemn it (Responsio, p.413).

However this should be balanced against the teaching of More on the relativism of structures, the freedom of God, and the fact of change being part of the nature of the Church. Certainly More would hold that in questions of belief change is not possible - that what is accepted by consensus is inspired and therefore correct. The more sophisticated notion of development of doctrine is, not surprisingly, absent - the distinction, that is, that would now be made between fundamental beliefs and their linguistic formulation in any particular age (or for that matter, new insights into these beliefs which ‘develop’ but do not change them). The context of the passage quoted is in fact a question of liturgical practice rather than doctrine. ‘Surely must be so’ cannot mean ‘must always be so’ if More is consistent with his doctrine of change. The ‘sin’, if it be such, which comes from attacking such a practice, would thus seem to be not in doing that which is absolutely wrong, that is what necessarily must be wrong, but rather in doing the contrary to what the Church discerns and agrees by consensus to do at any one time. To set up private judgement against the consistent teaching and practice of consensus in the Church (which More sees as inspired) is what he objects to. This says nothing at all about whether the Church could be inspired to change a practice as a result of a new inspiration, discernment and consensus. In this sense, oportet sic esse is not what More holds.

As we have seen, such a view of consensus and its validity depends on the belief that this is not simply the result of arguments and agreements of any


group of men. It is something brought about by the inspiration of the Spirit. The Church in More’s vision is once more a community built around the presence of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit which instructs the Church and produces unity. Without this, consensus on its own has no special signifi- cance:

. . . and by that mean . . . that these words of Christ’s promise made unto his disciples that the Holy Ghost should instruct them of all things were meant for themself in their own persons and not that ever he should instruct his church after their days. And when he said: ‘Where- soever be two or three gathered together in my name, there 1 am myself among them’ we shall say by this means that he meant but of his own disciples in his own time while he was here with them, and not that he would be likewise present with such other congregations in his church after. . . And finally then, were these words frustrate when he said: ‘Lo I am with you all the days to the world’s end’? (Dialogue, p.69).

The effect of this presence of the Spirit must necessarily be unity of belief. For the Spirit cannot be divided against itself. Thus if we wish to find out where this divinely inspired community is, it is that which manifests a consis- tency of belief - a consensus of all times and places. In this sense, consensus becomes a sign of the Spirit’s presence.“

The key, then, to More’s doctrine of consensus is not in a legal or constitutional theory but in a theology of the ‘indwelling Spirit’, as he states clearly in the third Postulate of the four that he offers to Luther in the Responsio (p.301). Because it is a theological notion, it is not something which can be argued from logical or other philosophical premises as a legal notion might. It depends ultimately on faith:

For, even if the identity of that church which agrees on matters of faith is evident to sense, yet it is not evident to sense that this agreement does not come about by human conspiring but that it is divinely born and inspired, for this no one grasps except by faith (Responsio, p.200).

It is at this point that More argues that such a consensus carries more weight than a simply legal notion and where he states clearly that his doctrine of consensus is not derived solely from such issues in canon law and conciliar theory :

. . . we will answer you that the custom of the Christian people in matters of the sacraments and of faith has the force of a more powerful law than has the custom of any people whatever in civil matters, since the latter relies only on human agreement, the former is procured and prospers by divine inspiration (Responsio, p.4 15).

Because of the authority carried by this consensus produced by the Holy Spirit, there can be no contradiction in what the Church teaches, even if there is change :

i7 Dialogue. p.132; Responsio, pp.l01,231,623.


But the church of Christ did not doubt that whatever the Holy Spirit inspired in the church was undoubtedly true, whether it was contained in scripture or not. Indeed if any apparently contradictory scriptural text was alleged, the faith written in her heart taught that this text was insufficiently understood by those to whom it seemed so contradictory, since it was a matter of absolute certainty that Christ does not fail his church on articles of faith, nor does the truthful Spirit of God contradict himself (Responsio, p. 103).

The crucial point is not so much More’s argument against the possibility of contradiction but rather that the Scripture is not the only repository of truth. Revelation is not a static thing but is a continuous process of ‘being led into all truth‘ by the Spirit. The Church does not simply pass on a complete and unchanging deposit of faith. God is not confined to working within particular human instruments (in this case, the Bible). Thus change is possible and necessary, and consensus is the guarantee that what is done or said is in fact inspired.

For how would the whole Christian people throughout such scattered nations have agreed to the same practice in that matter, since the words of the gospel seem rather to incline towards the other side, except by the action of Him who makes those who dwell in a house to be of one mind, who leads His church into all truth, who is ever with her even to the consummation of the world? (Responsio, p.365).

Of course again this depends on a belief that there i s a Spirit guiding the Church and that unity is his gift.

Because ‘inspired’, agreement, particularly in belief, is not simply the result of rational discussion, the weighing of arguments or the sifting of evidence. This may well be what happens on the surface, but for More the reality is that the gift of discernment is given to see what is right doctrine or what is correct interpretation. Just as there is a visible human community with a deeper level of spiritual reality open only to the eye of faith, so there is the process of decision-making in a human way and a deeper level of spiritual reality which is the process of discernment:

We beg that he believe that the church has been given the power from God to distinguish (discernere) the words of God from the words of men and the traditions of God from the traditions of men, with Christ clearly governing the church constantly and the Holy Spirit always directing the agreement of the church in matters of faith (Responsio, p.301).

Because the origin of consensus is in this spiritual gift of discernment, the process whereby such consensus is achieved does not function like a simple vote or by a simple process of argumentation. Needless to say, discernment may take place through the medium of such things, but the reality goes deeper than this:

Sometyme he (God) sheweth yt leysourly, suffryng his flokke to comen


& dyspute therupponl and in theyr treatynge of the mater, suffreth them wyth good mynde & scrypture and naturall wisedome, with inuocacyon of his spiritual1 helpe, to serche and seke for the treuth, and to vary for the whyle in theyr opynyons, tyll that he rewarde theyr vertuouse dylygence wyth ledyng them secretely in to the consent and concorde and bylyef of the trouth by his holy Spirite qui facit unanimes in domo (Confutation, p.248).

Thus the key is not so much in the discussion as in the openness to the working of the Spirit. Virtue rather than human learning is in some ways more significant. This is further underlined by More when he suggests that the process of discernment leading to consent may well start from a single man’s opinion against the majority of the Council, which nonetheless eventually is discerned to be the best against the previous opinion of the majority:

For though some one man myght in some one mater be of better mynd at the fyrste then the multytude, yet in a counsayle of wyse men when it were purposed, yt were lykely to be perceyued and alowed. And in a counsayle of crysten men the spyryt of God inclyneth euery good man to declare hys mynde, and inclyneth the congregation to consente and agree vppon that that shall be the beste (Confutation, p.922).

8 At least two problems are raised by this richer view of consensus and the

consequent interplay of a theological (and in some ways ‘idealistic’) notion with what might be called practical politics in the exercise of authority in the Church. How far is either papal or conciliar authority exercisable without a real, prior consensus? Clearly neither institution within the church is seen as the unique ‘locus’ of the inspirational authority which is at the base of belief. Can doctrinal pronouncements have validity if they are not adequately expressions of consensus? On this level ‘validity’ is not simply a question of legality but ultimately of truthfulness. For, to be sure of truth, the inspiration of the Spirit is the only guarantee. What happens if such pronouncements are based on inadequately formulated consensus? At the back of these questions is another - what does consensus mean, or how is it manifested? The Spirit is that which ‘makes of one mind those who dwell in the house’. Does this imply unanimity? Clearly if the question of consensus were to be treated merely on the level of law then this is not so vital. However, the ideal, theological dimension seems to imply that unanimity - ‘union of minds and hearts’ - is what consensus ultimately means. For unity is what comes from the Spirit.

It is not possible with absolute certainty to answer these questions from More’s writings. The problem of polemic style is the lack of systematization. More is not a systematic theologian in the technical sense and so leaves many threads untied and questions unanswered. Often we have to rely on implication,


and the implication of what he says seems to be that firstly a real consensus is what ultimately validates the actions of pope and Council. This consensus may, it appears, be prior (more usually), or consequent. On unanimity there is undoubtedly some ambiguity. At some points More seems to imply that it may not be practically possible, or indeed necessary. If there is not unanimity over a question of praxis, More sees the necessity of making some decision and therefore introduces an element of provisionality (Responsio, p.922). On the other hand he lays great stress as we have seen on thefact of unanimity as a sign of the Spirit’s presence in the Church - in the past, and in the Church now.18 Certainly on questions of belief, to put oneself outside the consensus position was to put oneself effectively outside the Church. In this sense, therefore, More saw unanimity as in fact being maintained within the Church. Ultimately therefore, while More carefully avoids an over-institutional model of the Church and its authority, he certainly settles for a model of a closely knit community, in which the virtue of unanimity is present against what he felt was the excessive subjectivism of the Reformers. A community, united and unanimous in belief, is how More would ultimately defme the Church. This unity is primarily achieved not so much through the activities of structures (although these may be effective media) but through the action of the Spirit producing consensus.

18 On unanimity in the past, see e.g. Responsio, p.625; in the Church now, see Responsio. ~ p . 6 1 1 ~ 6 2 3 .

authority and consensus in thomas more's doctrine of the church

Documents