authoritarian deliberation on chinese internet

47
Running Head: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet Please Cite This Paper as Follows (Online Publication, Without Page #): Jiang, M. (2010). Authoritarian deliberation on Chinese Internet. Electronic Journal of Communication, 20 (3&4). Min Jiang (Ph.D. Purdue) Assistant Professor of Communication Studies Colvard North 5011, UNC-Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223 E-mail: [email protected] Telephone: 1-704-687-2826

Upload: min-jiang

Post on 13-Nov-2014

205 views

Category:

Documents


5 download

DESCRIPTION

Modern authoritarianism relies on a combination of patriotism and performance-based legitimacy rather than ideology. As such, a modern authoritarian government has to allow for some forms of political discussion and participation from which popular consent to authoritarian rule is derived. With 420 million Internet users, 200 million bloggers, and 277 million netizens able to access the Internet through their mobile phones (CNNIC, 2010), China presents an interesting case to examine public deliberation online. Adapting the concept of authoritarian deliberation (He, 2006a) from an offline environment to an online one, the article proposes four types of online spaces of authoritarian deliberation extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces. The paper discusses their characteristics and implications for political participation in China and argues that democracy need not be a precursor to public deliberation. Instead, public deliberation may present a viable alternative to the radical electoral democracy in authoritarian countries like China.

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

Running Head: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

Please Cite This Paper as Follows (Online Publication, Without Page #):

Jiang, M. (2010). Authoritarian deliberation on Chinese Internet. Electronic Journal of

Communication, 20 (3&4).

Min Jiang (Ph.D. Purdue)

Assistant Professor of Communication Studies

Colvard North 5011, UNC-Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223

E-mail: [email protected]

Telephone: 1-704-687-2826

Page 2: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

ii

Abstract

Modern authoritarianism relies on a combination of patriotism and performance-based

legitimacy rather than ideology. As such, a modern authoritarian government has to allow

for some forms of political discussion and participation from which popular consent to

authoritarian rule is derived. With 420 million Internet users, 200 million bloggers, and

277 million netizens able to access the Internet through their mobile phones (CNNIC,

2010), China presents an interesting case to examine public deliberation online. Adapting

the concept of authoritarian deliberation (He, 2006a) from an offline environment to an

online one, the article proposes four types of online spaces of authoritarian deliberation

extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda

spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and

international deliberative spaces. The paper discusses their characteristics and

implications for political participation in China and argues that democracy need not be a

precursor to public deliberation. Instead, public deliberation may present a viable

alternative to the radical electoral democracy in authoritarian countries like China.

Key words: authoritarian, deliberation, China, government, democracy, Internet, public

opinion, propaganda, legitimacy

Page 3: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

1

“Without legitimacy, words are invalid; invalid words lead man to nowhere”

(Mingbuzheng ze yanbushun; yanbushun ze shibucheng). – Confucius

In 1994, China connected to the World Wide Web. By mid-1998, Chinese

Internet users reached one million. Ten years later, China surpassed the United States as

the world’s largest Internet market. By July 2010, China had 420 million Internet users,

31.8% of its population. Among them, 200 million have blogs1 (China Internet Network

Information Center [CNNIC], 2010).

The exponential growth of the information sector helped China leapfrog into the

digital age and galvanized its economy. However, it also amplified voices of the masses,

much to the horror of the one-party state as the Editor-in-Chief of People’s Net said:

“What would it look like if everybody went into politics? … China has more than 100

million Internet users. If they were all free to speak their minds, we would have a very

serious situation” (quoted from Lagerkvist, 2006, p.9). It almost seems President Reagan

foresaw fear of this sort when he remarked in 1989 that “[t]he Goliath of totalitarianism

will be brought down by the David of the microchip,” (quoted from Kalathil & Boas,

2003, p.1). Yet despite the doom and gloom about the regime’s fate upon the arrival of

information technology, Chinese government has so far managed to weave and guard a

sophisticated authoritarian web through various means of censorship (Boas, 2006). So,

the state’s extensive Internet regulation runs against an impressive degree of Internet

activism (Yang, 2006) that has led the famed Hong Kong blogger Roland Song to believe

that “the dam is leaking all over the place” (2008).

Contrary to Western mainstream media’s sketch of China’s cyberspace as nothing

but highly policed and censored, there is actually considerable online public discussion of

Page 4: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

2

social, political, and policy issues, albeit largely within the expanding boundaries

consented to by the state. Those who view the Chinese citizenry as an obedient and

undifferentiated populace waiting to be enlightened and freed grossly miss the

heterogeneity and cacophony of public opinion in Chinese cyberspace today. If public

deliberation promises to expand the public sphere and even elevate democratic practice in

the West (Gastil & Black, 2008), do they hold any potential for China, a society under the

watchful eye of a powerful government? What emergent spaces for public deliberation,

however limited, can help unlock China’s online public sphere (Lagerkvist, 2006)? In

what ways has public deliberation among Chinese Internet users challenged or supported

the state? And what implications does it have for social and political pluralism and

liberalization in China, if not democratization?

This article explores the spaces, dynamics, and implications of online public

deliberation in a rapidly changing Chinese society. First, I draw upon Western theories of

public sphere and public deliberation and discuss their relevance to Chinese online public

discourses. In particular, to account for permeating government control of Internet access

and content and increasing commercial influence in China’s online spaces, the paper

extends the concept of authoritarian deliberation developed by Baogang He (2006a &

2006b) for China’s offline deliberative experiences to Chinese cyberspace. Second, I

examine how China’s peculiar sociopolitical contexts shape its online deliberative spaces.

I propose four major types of spaces of authoritarian deliberation extending from the core

to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central propaganda spaces, government-regulated

commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces. I

Page 5: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

3

examine the dynamics of deliberation and state control in each and discuss, finally, the

implications of online authoritarian deliberation in China.

Democratic Deliberation and Authoritarian Deliberation

Theories of public deliberation and discursive participation, built upon a

framework of representative democracy or deliberative democracy (Chambers, 2003;

Dryzek, 2006; Gastil & Black, 2008), have until recently excluded the experience of

deliberation in China (He, 2006a; Leib & He, 2006). I argue, however, the implicit

assumption that democracy needs to be a precursor to public deliberation not only

overlooks emerging empirical evidence of public deliberation in less democratic societies

(He, 2006a & 2006b; Leib & He, 2006; Yang, 2003, 2006, 2008), but also inhibits

consideration of alternative routes to liberalization and democratization in these societies.

Here, I distinguish democratic deliberation from authoritarian deliberation. The latter is

no substitute for deliberative democracy but acknowledges limited public deliberation in

countries like China, especially in online settings. The very development of public

deliberative experiences and institutions, particularly at the grassroots levels, may help

cultivate a critical citizenry and build a broader passage to increased political

participation, civil liberties, and better governance in such transitional societies.

Democratic Deliberation

Rooted in theories of democracy, various definitions of public deliberation tend to

agree on increasing the legitimacy and quality of decision making through informed and

popular discussions. “Public” indicates open scrutiny as opposed to private chat (Sennett,

1977). “Deliberation” suggests rational debate between participants. Public deliberation

advocates a “talk-centric” approach to democracy instead of a “voting-centric” one that is

Page 6: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

4

the cornerstone of liberal representative democracy (Chambers, 2003; Fung & Wright,

2003). It is hoped that the very practice of public deliberation can approximate the public

sphere as a social space where private individuals are able to engage in rational debate to

reach a consensus free from coercion (Habermas, 1989, 1996).

So far, much of the literature on public deliberation has rested upon a rather

idealized notion of the public sphere and a normative view of collective discursive

deliberation. For instance, most recently, Gastil and Black (2008) define public

deliberation as the following: “When people deliberate, they carefully examine a problem

and arrive at a well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration

of diverse points of view” (p.2). Combining both analytical and social aspects, this

definition resonates with both Dewey’s (1910) conceptualization of problem solving and

Habermas’s writing on the public sphere. The Deweyan perspective on problem solving

is rational and analytical: creating a solid information base, prioritizing the key values,

identifying a broad range of solutions, weighing the pros, cons, and tradeoffs among the

solutions, and lastly choosing the best solution possible. The consideration of the social

aspects of public deliberation also bears the imprint of Habermasian notions of the public

sphere and communicative action: adequate opportunity to speak, rights to comprehend,

obligation to consider others’ opinions, and respect for all.

This normative approach, however, is often criticized for its idealism and

instrumentalism. For instance, Fraser (1990), Mouffe (1996), and Young (1996) have on

various occasions critiqued the concept of the public sphere for its lack of attention to

coercive forms of power in public discourse, the exclusion of affective modes of

communication in favor of rational discourse, and its tendency to promote consensus as

Page 7: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

5

the purpose of deliberation. As the Internet is increasingly viewed as a public sphere

(Papacharissi, 2002), the Web’s potential of decentralization, egalitarian access, and

interactivity is often juxtaposed to the danger of centralization, digital divide, and loss of

privacy (Harrison & Falvey, 2001). These dichotomies reflect the tension between

modern, normative, and idealized discourses and postmodern, locally grounded,

imperfect accounts of human experiences. But this rift can be understood in productive

ways. Dahlberg (2005) argues that the pursuit of the Habermasian ideal of the public

sphere does not mean reduction of coercion is not desirable or cannot possibly be

achieved. Instead, the very process of argumentation, justification, even when flawed, has

the promise to identify power imbalances and eventually achieve equality.

A number of approaches have been proposed to bridge the gap between reality

and idealized norms. For instance, Fishkin (1995) introduces the concept of

“incompleteness” to account for the less than optimal processes of public deliberation.

Dahlberg (2007) contends at a more fundamental level that in order to fully account for

power that supports existing social and political systems, a radicalized public sphere

where “counter-publics” struggle over the limits of legitimate deliberation is essential to

Internet-supported democracy. Other approaches advocate differentiation between variant

forms of public deliberation. Among Habermas’s various critics, Fraser (1990) argued

that strong publics, those whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and

decision-making should be differentiated from weak publics, whose deliberative practice

consists exclusively of opinion-formation and does not encompass decision-making.

Recently, Habermas (2005) also speaks of two types of political deliberation: “(a) among

citizens within the informal public sphere and (b) among politicians or representatives

Page 8: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

6

within formal settings” (p. 388). The differentiation between strong and weak publics is

particularly useful for understanding online public deliberation in China. While rarely

amounting to strong publics, Chinese online opinion formation based on informal

conversations between netizens can approach weak publics that often challenge the status

quo power arrangement.

I do not discount the importance of normative deliberation or strong publics for

collective decision making in more democratic societies, but this paper focuses on

dialogic deliberation and everyday political talk (Kim & Kim, 2008) among Chinese

netizens. Whether individuals are drawn to the like-minded, more likely to result in a

polarization effect (Sunstein, 2001) or are willing to be exposed to diverse opinions

(Stromer-Galley, 2003), dialogic deliberation helps construct the concept of the self and

other, produce a sense of community, and render public reason possible (Kim & Kim,

2008). Indeed, these are prerequisites to deliberation involving decision-making. Thus,

the emphasis here is not the production of consensus through rational debate, but the very

act of informal and spontaneous discussions on various social, political, and policy issues

that could ultimately support deeper exercises of deliberative democracy down the road.

The author does not assume a fully capable Chinese citizenry for public deliberation or a

liberal democratic framework that guarantees such institutions as the rule of law, civil

liberties, and national elections, none of which is firmly established in China.

Authoritarian Deliberation

Baogang He (2006a) coined the term “authoritarian deliberation” to recognize the

unique contours of public discourse in China. For He, Chinese public deliberation is

authoritarian because decision making is dominated by leaders who are not competitively

Page 9: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

7

elected. As a result, the party-state sanctions and prescribes the boundaries of political

discourses. However, the discourse is deliberative in the sense that local people employ

argumentation and reasoning to discuss collective problems. In these discussions,

evidence is presented, solutions proposed and justified. This type of local participation is

naturally problematic given that authoritarian regimes, by definition, can never be fully

democratic (Pei 2006). Nevertheless, the concept of “authoritarian deliberation”

acknowledges the greater civic and political speech freedoms extant in an authoritarian

state that relaxes its grip over political discourse in exchange for its own legitimacy and

survival.

Whereas He employed the idea of “authoritarian deliberation” to analyze public

opinion formation and procedural decision making in face-to-face settings at the local

level, I adapt the concept to study public discussion and opinion formation on Chinese

Internet (2006a). This adaptation does not discount the importance of offline public

deliberation. Rather it acknowledges the Internet’s potential to facilitate information

sharing, discussion, and even collective action on a wide range of public issues. In the

Chinese contexts, online public deliberation is authoritarian because the state actively

shapes the boundaries of political discourse in Chinese cyberspace, as it does in offline

practices.

Despite the apparent paradox, the juxtaposition of deliberation and

authoritarianism is conceptually useful because modern authoritarianism increasingly

relies on a combination of patriotism and performance-based legitimacy rather than

ideology. Three decades of Chinese reform and opening up have witnessed the erosion of

planned economy, rise of an impressive middle class, and demise of the communist

Page 10: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

8

ideology (Zhou, 2008). In order to engender popular belief that existing political

institutions are the most appropriate for the society, in other words to maintain the

legitimacy of a political system (Lipset, 1959), a modern authoritarian government like

China has to allow for some forms of discussion, debate, and participation from which

popular consent of the authoritarian rule is derived.

Authoritarian deliberation is consistent with Nathan’s observation of

institutionalization in China (2003). To maintain political legitimacy, the Chinese

government has implemented various input institutions “that people can use to apprise the

state of their concerns” (Nathan 2003, 14). Such institutions include: the Administrative

Litigation Act of 1989 that allows citizens to sue government agencies for alleged

violations of government policies; Letters-and-Visits departments (Xinfangju) for citizen

complaints; people’s congresses; people’s consultative conferences (where citizen

grievances are addressed); and use of mass media as the people’s tribunes (Nathan 2003).

I argue that the advent of the Internet in China has extended and in some ways

transformed such practices by adding an online dimension to many of rights- and justice-

seeking activities.

Offline, for instance, Time Magazine reported the first deliberative poll conducted

in China in 2005. It took place in Zeguo township, Wenling City of Zhejiang Province.

257 residents, who were randomly selected to represent the town’s 240,000 population,

voted on the desirability of 30 government-proposed infrastructure projects. After grilling

local officials and learning about these budgetary proposals, they chose environmental

projects over the flashier proposals of parks and bridges. The poll’s architect, James

Page 11: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

9

Fishkin was gleeful with hope, “The public is smart. Under the right conditions, it’s smart

in China just like it’s smart in Britain or smart in Bulgaria” (Jakes, 2005).

The Zeguo poll was not entirely unprecedented. Over the years, a variety of

indigenous deliberative practices for collective decision-making had been adopted at both

the local and national levels (He, 2006b): democratic discussion meetings (minzhu

kentanhui, kentan literarily means “sincere discussion,” or “have a heart-to-heart.”); fast

track for people’s voices (minqing zhitongche); democratic political discussion day

(minzhu yizhengri); democratic budgetary meetings (minzhu licaihui); democratic public

hearings (minzhu tingzhenghui); residents’ forums (jumin luntan), and etc. Some

grassroots meetings also experiment with citizen evaluation of local leaders’ performance

(Kennedy, Rozelle, & Shi, 2004). At the national level, village elections and public

hearings have been approved by the central government (He, 2006b; Pei, 2006; Shi,

1997).

Sure, one can reasonably argue that such deliberative practices are often times

dominated by the state and marked by lack of equality and representation of different

interests. Whether online or offline, they are approved by the state to pacify the public

and maintain government legitimacy. Calling a few of China’s local deliberative

experiments acts of deliberative democracy will “let the Chinese government off too

easily” (Leib, 2005).

However, it may be counter-productive to quickly dismiss such instances of

deliberation as entirely meaningless. Both democratic and transitional societies need to

aggregate public opinions. Deliberation in China may not but fully democratic, but it is

likely to force government, especially local governments, to be more efficient and

Page 12: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

10

accountable for their actions. If the cultivation of public reason and consideration of

public opinion in policy making can foster what some scholars call governance-driven

democratization (He, 2006a; Warren, 2008), authoritarian deliberation may be a

worthwhile route to political reforms in China.

The unprecedented adoption of the Internet, along with other recent adjustment of

state-society relationship in China, has made online authoritarian deliberation particularly

relevant. First of all, three decades of economic and related social reforms have

transformed China in such a way that the state can no longer dictate or monopolize the

distribution of resources (Yang, 2004). Nor can it fully control public discourses. Not

only is there a swelling Chinese middle class with their faith in free enterprise and respect

for private property, there is an equally impressive civil rights movement aimed at

defending individual rights and free personal choices, including occupational, sexual,

religious and other freedoms (Zhou, 2008).

Second, in such an increasingly pluralized and mobile society, public deliberation

appeals to Chinese government in a number of ways. It may: a) serve as a safety valve

allowing people to let off steam to avoid and contain social confrontation; b) channel

public discourses in ways to support the government’s policies and agendas; and c)

increase government legitimacy by building a more open, responsive, and democratic

administrative image among the public.

Furthermore, Internet diffusion accelerates the expansion of public discourses.

Paradoxically, while the digital revolution has enhanced the Party’s ability to control,

bolstered the permeation of commercial interests in the society, and in many ways

widened the digital divide (Zhao, 2007), it also has empowered individual voices and

Page 13: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

11

group formation (Yang, 2007). Many Chinese are now able to: a) access greater

alternative sources of information besides what was provided by official newspapers,

radio, and TV programs previously; b) “talk back” to official media on issues of their

concern; and c) engage with other societal members and overseas media through public

discourse. In this context, study of online authoritarian deliberation can provide insight

into the unique nature and potential of everyday political discourse among Chinese

netizens.

Spaces of Online Authoritarian Deliberation in China

By the end of 2008, there were 2.878 million Chinese websites (CNNIC, 2009a).

Like elsewhere in the world, Chinese Internet teems with various applications ranging

from emails, news feeds, blogs, bulletin boards (BBSs), podcasts, videocasts, social

networking sites and so on. What sets China apart from others is the state’s insistence on

asserting its authority over a massive network of users and public discourses within its

jurisdiction with extensive means of surveillance and manipulation: configuration of

Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas, 2004), filtering (Zittrain & Edelman, 2003),

Internet policing (Brady, 2006), regulation of Internet service providers (MacKinnon,

2009), suppression of dissident use and discipline of cyber cafes (Chase & Mulvenon,

2002; Qiu, 2000), and most recently employment of web commentators to shape and alter

public debate (Bandurski, 2008). However, these tactics of control are not deployed

invariably across the board2, thus producing different types of constraints and

opportunities for public discourses.

Instead of treating the Chinese cyberspace as a monolithic entity filtered, censored,

and patrolled by the government, severed from the rest of the world by the “Great

Page 14: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

12

Firewall of China”3 (Qiu, 2000), I see it as a sphere composed of diverse yet connected

spaces where the influence of the state varies, thus creating disparate conditions for

public deliberation. I recognize in this paper four types of online spaces of authoritarian

deliberation extending from the core to the peripheries of authoritarian rule: central

propaganda spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, emergent civic spaces, and

international deliberative spaces. The state maintains a distinctive relationship to the

Chinese society and/or international communities in each space. Moreover, these spaces

are not disjointed islands. Rather, they overlap, converge, and clash. In the following

section, I discuss the features of these spaces that are not only home to mundane public

conversations between Chinese netizens but are also groundswells of radical jingoism as

well as rational discourse of public issues and policies.

Central Propaganda Spaces

Central propaganda spaces are online spaces where the Chinese government

asserts its presence through government websites and other official online media. The

state’s control over these spaces is firm, if not complete. Examples of central propaganda

spaces include Chinese e-government websites as well as state media such as People’s

Net (http://www.people.com.cn/), Xinhuanet (http://www.xinhuanet.com), CCTV Online

(http://www.cctv.cn), and CNR Online (http://www.cnr.cn). In addition to enhanced

office automation, e-commerce, the state’s 1 trillion yuan investment (US$121 billion) in

government IT projects since early 1990s also built an extensive government network

(Yong, 2003, p.83). Provincial, city, and county governments feature government portals

at rates of 100%, 93%, and 69% respectively (CCID, 2006). Offline government

operations such as People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency also have a significant

Page 15: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

13

online presence through People’s Net and Xinhuanet respectively. State broadcast

heavyweights like China Central Television (CCTV) and China National Radio (CNR)

quickly adopted digital platforms. Similar to the government’s manipulation of print and

broadcast media for propaganda and mobilization of its citizens, the recent development

and management of the state’s online presence helps solidify the government’s technical,

symbolic, and political power in the digital age.

Not surprisingly, control of public deliberation in central propaganda spaces is

easier to achieve given the state’s direct control over the infrastructure and dependent

institutions. Not only is online content in such spaces dominated by state “guidance of

public opinion” (Yulun Daoxiang), filtered by state employed “Internet police,”

compliance with official agenda in these central propaganda institutions is also buttressed

through state sanctioned leadership.

It is worth noting, however, that despite these constraints, a considerable amount

of public deliberation occurs. Jiang’s study of 31 Chinese provincial government portals

(2009) reveals a complicated picture of government networks that have grown adept at

setting public agenda, regulating public discourse, managing social order to maintain its

legitimacy. Aside from making more information available online, government networks

opened up spaces for public discourse: e-consultation functions such as Q&A with

government officials and e-petition; e-discussion features such as real-time “gov. chat”

between citizens and policy makers and policy discussion forums. Granted the state

intends these limited spaces to deflate social tension and re-establish Party legitimacy,

but when compared to the past, local citizens have more access to government

Page 16: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

14

information, services, and means to articulate their rights and seek social justice. As a

result citizens are gaining access to local politics, and with it, political knowledge.

Government online media have also resorted to softer societal control, relying on

more sophisticated methods of containing public dissent and setting agenda. Similar to

the use of investigative journalism in traditional broadcast media (Zhao, 2000), official

online media have both strategic and commercial imperatives to provide some spaces for

public deliberation. For instance, People’s Net has maintained a highly popular online

forum, “Strengthening the Nation Forum” (Qingguao Luntan). It rose out of a

nationalistic “protest forum” against NATO’s 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in

former Yugoslavia (Yang, 2003). Riding the wave of zealous sentiments, the forum was

an important locus of rising nationalism. Later, it became a highly popular place for

debating policy issues: tackling China’s economic problems, fighting corruption,

revisiting China’s one child policy, improving food safety, increasing social equality and

so on. Many of the forum’s users consider the forum and the Internet in general a freer

space for public discussion of national affairs, expression of their opinions, concerns and

complaints (Yang, 2003). In a symbolic gesture of top Chinese leaders’ recognition of the

Internet’s power in shaping public opinion, Chinese President Hu Jingtao recently held a

dialogue with netizens on the forum. Some interpreted his appearance as proof that the

forum can influence government decision-making (People’s Net, 2008). Notably, with

the state’s strong financial backing, websites like People’s Net lead the way in adopting

the latest interactive features such as blog, podcast, videocast, social bookmarking, and

mobile delivery of news and information. So the government’s capacity to influence

public deliberation in the digital age has strengthened, not withered.

Page 17: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

15

Government-regulated Commercial Spaces

Another type of space for public deliberation is online commercial spaces.

Commercial websites have been inconsistently regulated by Internet companies following

government directives. By the end of 2008, there were 552,898 .com Chinese websites,

19.2% of all websites in China (CNNIC, 2009a). By comparison, 77% of sites bear .cn

domain names, 3% use .net, and 0.7% register as .org (see Table 1). However, many

websites with .cn and .net domain names are commercial as well, such as Tianya

Community (http://www.tianya.cn), the largest Chinese online forum with over 20

million users (Tianya, 2009).

Table 1. Number of Websites under Various Domain Names in China

Domain Name Quantity Proportion

.CN 2,216,437 77%

.COM 552,898 19.2%

.NET 87,713 3%

.ORG 21,005 0.7%

Total 2,878,053 100.0% Source: 23

rd CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2009)

Users flock to commercial websites for a wide variety of activities. The six most

popular uses are music (83.7% Chinese Internet users), news (78.5%), instant messaging

(75%), search engine (68%), online video (67.7%), and gaming (62.8%), according to a

national survey conducted by CNNIC (2009a). It is noteworthy that, in addition to online

news, discursive and socializing spaces such as blogs, online forum/BBS, and social

networking sites (SNSs), are also very popular: 54.3% netizens reported having a blog,

35.2% updating their blogs, 30.7% publishing on forum/BBS, and 19.3% actively using

SNSs.

Such a pattern of use is partially driven by China’s dominant younger Internet

demographic: 35.6% are under the age of 20, 31.5% between ages 20 and 29, i.e. two-

Page 18: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

16

thirds of Chinese Internet users, or 200 million, are under age 30 (CNNIC, 2009a). This

wired young generation, born digital or growing up digital like their Western counterparts,

defies tradition and embraces fads (Wang, 2008). They crave social bonding, information,

and entertainment (Bu, 2006). The famed Chinese Back Dorm Boys who rose to stardom

by lip syncing Back Street Boys songs and making them available on video sharing sites

such as YouTube are symbolic of a youth culture that yearns for self expression and

recognition. Undoubtedly, Chinese youth today have more self-publishing and

networking tools at their disposal. Blogs, online videos, BBS, and instant messaging

platforms can help bypass traditional media gatekeepers. It is not clear whether this

generation will take the initiative to improve social justice and create social change as

“digital renegades” or simply turning into happy “digital captives” of consumerism and

hedonism (Morozov, 2008). Nevertheless, there is plenty of economic incentive for

Chinese Internet companies to provide a relative open environment to attract users.

These commercial spaces are “open” in relative terms because the state still

defines and redefines the boundaries of political discourses. First, the government filters

“harmful” foreign web content through the Great Firewall by controlling key

international Internet gateways (Qiu, 2000). Second, both domestic and foreign Internet

companies have been asked to comply with state regulations. Notably, Baidu, Google,

Yahoo!, and Microsoft have agreed to censor their search engines in exchange for their

access to China’s swelling Internet market (MacKinnon, 2009). The recent dramatic spat

between Beijing and Google brought issues of censorship and cyber attacks to the

international forefront.

Page 19: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

17

In addition, Internet content providers are ordered to follow state directives such

as the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services Provisions and

Administration of Internet Information Services Provisions (both issued in 2000) and the

Administration of Internet News and Information Services Provisions (effective in 2005)

(CNNIC 2009b). Moreover, the state can easily reach out to commercial websites to

assert its presence. For example, in 2005, Beijing People’s Political Consultative

Conference invited public input on policy topics such as energy conservation, healthcare,

and pension systems on Sina.com, one of the top three Chinese commercial portals (Sina,

2005).

Nevertheless, regulating hundreds of thousands of commercial websites remains

quite difficult. Although commercial Internet firms have taken a “voluntary pledge” to

keep a watchful eye over users (Wired, 2002), the finer details of how to interpret and

implement government filtering directives are left to the companies themselves.

MacKinnon’s (2009) study of censorship patterns in Chinese blogosphere reveals great

variations among blog hosting companies operating in China. Much of the variation is

caused by differences in resources, values, and the Internet companies’ perceived

relationships with the government and users.

Adding to the difficulty of regulation is the fact that Chinese netizens have grown

adept at critiquing the regime while avoiding harsh repression (Esarey, 2008). It is one

thing to ban patently sensitive topics such as Tibet and Falun Gong, but quite another to

detect and delete farce, coded criticism, and political satire (Esarey & Xiao, 2008). For

instance, when websites are shut down by authorities, netizens openly refer to it as being

“harmonized,” a sardonic reference to the government’s ubiquitous promotion of

Page 20: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

18

“harmony” in Chinese society. After that phrase became blocked, Chinese netizens

started to post pictures of river crabs wearing three watches: river crabs sound like

“harmonize” in Chinese and three watches are a pun on “the three represents.”4

To shape and sway public opinion in these spaces, the “50 cent party” approach

became popular. Started in 2005 in Nanjing University, web commentators are reputedly

paid 50 cents (or $0.07) for each positive comment made on popular Chinese websites

and message boards (Bandurski, 2008). Backed by State Council Information Office and

funded by commercial websites, these web commentators focus on current affairs forums

and major national and provincial portals, both official and commercial. Thus, “larger

Web sites must find a happy medium between pleasing the authorities and going about

their business” (Bandurski, 2008) in the face of increasing civic desire for free expression

and accountable governance.

Emergent Civic Spaces

Despite censorship and commercialization of Chinese Internet, public discourse

thrives. Emergent civic spaces here refer to online spaces where NGOs, civic groups and

organizations deliberate and coordinate collective actions around shared interests and

values, relatively independent of the state and the market. The latest CCNIC survey

(2009a) indicates civic spaces are a weak sector of Chinese Internet, with 21,005

websites registering with .ORG domain names, constituting only 0.7% of all Chinese

websites. Many officially sanctioned national civic organizations use the Internet to

coordinate their efforts: China Red Cross, China International Almsdeed Institute, and

China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF). CYDF manages the widely popular

Project Hope, building elementary schools in rural areas and improving poor students’

Page 21: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

19

access to education. Recently, a few celebrity charities such as One Foundation (started

by Chinese Kong Fu movie star Jet Li), and Yumi Love Fund (pioneered by Chinese pop

star Li Yuchun) garnered a lot of media attention and a large online following.

The types of civic spaces are as varied as the types of civic organizations. Yang

(2007) identifies five types of civic organizations in China: business, environment,

women’s issues, social services, health and community development. Others

organizations, such as religious and cultural ones, also maintain an online presence.

According to the National Bureau of Civil Affairs (2007), there were 212,000 voluntary

social organizations in 2007, compared to 131,000 in 2000.

While neither outwardly ideological nor political, Chinese civic organizations do

not exist entirely separate from the state. Civic organizations are expected to complement

government organizations by providing necessary social services, alleviate social malaise,

convey social concerns, and maintain social order (Wang & Zhang, 2007). The growth of

Chinese civil organizations is positive in the sense that they improve people’s experience

and abilities of self-organization as well as helping define the administrative power.

However, in a society teemed with governmental “mommies and nannies” (Zhai, 2009),

Chinese civic organizations are not only required to register but also to be affiliated with

related government “supervisory bodies” (Wang & Zhang, 2007).

Much like their offline counterparts, non-commercial websites have been asked to

register online. Under Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s (MIIT) 2005

Non-Commercial Web Site Registration Regulation (2009), all non-commercial websites

must register with the MIIT and provide contact information or will face a significant

financial penalty. This regulation applies to all personal websites and blogs hosted in

Page 22: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

20

China that are accessible through an independent domain name. Blogs hosted through an

Internet service provider like Sina Blogs, for instance, need not register. This regulation

extends similar rules intended for commercial websites to their non-commercial

counterparts, creating a chilling effect on China’s growing numbers of website owners

and bloggers.

Yet despite interference from the government, civic spaces are expanding.

Through a process of what Yang (2003) calls “the co-evolution of the Internet and civil

society in China,” the Web offers new avenues for citizen participation. China’s incipient

civil society, in turn, expands the Internet by providing the social basis for

communication.

When Beijing initially embraced the Internet for economic development, the Web

was not seen as inherently liberating but rather something that can be configured and

controlled (Jiang, 2009). As China’s information sector boomed, the state ability to police

it has also grown broader and more sophisticated. Meanwhile Internet adoption has

significantly increased the opportunities for Chinese people to access information, assert

their voices, and connect with fellow netizens. If civil society is “the arena of uncoerced

collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (Center for Civil Society,

2004), the spaces of spontaneous civic actions have expanded in absolute terms.

Much of this development occurs within specific groups of shared cultural

identities and interests. Yang’s study of Huaxia Zhiqing Net (2003), for instance,

demonstrates how the educated youth generation uses online forums to build a virtual

community based on their shared experience during the Cultural Revolution. Independent

bloggers and podcasters may also create communities of readers and fellow writers.

Page 23: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

21

Don’t Think, a blog created in May 2006 by Beijing Sanlian Lifeweek journalist Wang

Xiaofeng saw more than 30 million visits as of April 2008 and is now available offline

through China’s online bookstores. The blog, connected with dozens of other

intelligentsia bloggers, forms an alternative community of voices to mainstream media.

In 2005, Antiwave won the Deutsche Welle’s Best Podcasting Site for its sarcastic

parodies of the establishment. The site’s name, Antiwave, communicates its creators’

rejection of tradition, mainstream radio programming, indoctrination by the official

educational system, and government-controlled public discourse (Danwei, 2007). Its

podcasting emphasizes critical thinking and public discussion where the Great Talk of the

People (Renmin Dahuitan) replaces the Great Hall of the People5 (Renmin Dahuitang).

Controversial issues such as Chinese-Japanese history and freedom of expression in

China are not excluded from their podcasting. These sites are examples of an alternative

social space outside the Chinese mainstream media.

Besides facilitating identity formation, information sharing and public discussion,

online deliberation also supports collective action on civic and policy issues. 1kg.org, for

instance, utilizes its website to coordinate a volunteer network of travelers to deliver

donated books and other school supplies for children in remote areas. Moreover, the

boundaries between civic, government, and commercial spaces are increasingly

collapsing as citizens move between them online. Collective Internet incidents (Wangluo

Qunti Shijian), also known as massive online incidents, cyber activism, or cyber

contentions are emblematic of this trend (Cai 2008; Yang 2008). Massive online

petitions, protests, and Internet vigilantism (or the “human flesh search”) constitute

Page 24: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

22

“radical, claims-making communicative action[s]” (Yang 2008, p.126) that often involve

questions of corruption, social injustice, and nationalism (Yang, 2008).

A particularly powerful example was the death of Sun Zhigang. Sun was a

college graduate who worked for a graphic design company in Guangzhou. He was

detained for not having proper identification papers and died three days later in police

custody. Sun’s death triggered a public outcry online. The online protests eventually

resulted in the abolishment of the “Custody and Repatriation” system (China Net, 2003).

As momentous as the response to Sun’s death was, it was not an isolated incident. In

2007, a Chongqin homeowner stared down powerful developers to defend her property

rights. In 2008, Weng’an police building and vehicles were torched during a riot over the

cover-up over a girl’s death. Also in 2008, Chinese college students created a website to

counter perceived distortions in the Western media’s coverage of the 2008 Tibetan unrest

(CNN was a favorite target).

An increasingly popular online collective action is the “human flesh search.” In

these actions, large numbers of individuals use the Internet, as well as offline sources, to

identify a specific person or facts. “Human flesh searches” have targeted both major and

minor issues, from exposing corrupt officials to publicly shaming individuals for

undesirable, yet admittedly minor, activity (Yu & Shan 2009; Zuckerman 2009). In their

often factional, nationalistic, and incoherent manner, these examples of Internet-based

public deliberation and action reflect the development of a more pluralized, stratified, and

liberal society.

International Deliberative Spaces

Page 25: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

23

Chinese public deliberation does not focus exclusively on domestic issues.

International deliberative spaces bridge China and the outside world and mediate public

opinion between them. Individuals, organizations, and government bodies concerned

about China’s role in an increasingly interdependent global environment inhabit

numerous such deliberative spaces. Chinese public opinion is closely observed and

monitored by various actors with backgrounds in culture, politics, business, academia and

etc.

The Chinese government adopts different measures of response to the various

actors. Foreign content deemed undesirable is blocked by the Great Firewall of China

(Zittrain & Edelman, 2003). Although such filtering may not be perfect, it is effective

enough to maintain societal stability (Boas, 2004). Beijing has also been aggressively

building its international PR operations to counter foreign influences such as BBC and

Voice of America. Among the government’s international efforts are English versions of

government websites and image-shaping official media outlets such as CCTV

International and China Radio International.

“Bridge bloggers” (Zuckerman, 2008) are among those often subject to

government filtering. These bloggers are bilingual or multi-lingual individuals who

“cross” borders and traverse otherwise disconnected online communities. Websites and

blogs openly critical of the Chinese government and its practices are selectively censored.

Websites like MITBBS, highly popular among overseas students and immigrant

communities, are blocked. Roland Song’s blog EastSouthWestNorth, based in Hong

Kong, is blocked on and off within mainland China.

Page 26: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

24

General publishing and social networking sites such as Blogger, YouTube, and

Twitter are inaccessible from China. The blocking of general information sources like

Wikipedia, BBC, and New York Times often depends upon the sociopolitical situation of

the moment. During a March 31, 2009 press conference, a reporter questioned the

spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the government’s blocking

YouTube. The spokesperson responded, “The Internet in China is fully open and the

Chinese Government manages the Internet according to the law. As for what you can and

cannot watch, watch what you can watch, and don’t watch what you cannot watch”

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

Other bridge bloggers operate from within China without being blocked. Many

choose some degree of self-censorship. The Chinese Economist Translating Team does

exactly that to balance its existence and compliance with the government (Baio, 2009). A

group of dedicated fans of the Economist newsmagazine have been translating each issue

of the magazine cover-to-cover. Volunteers collaborate out of pure interest in spreading

knowledge and improving their own English skills. On touchy topics, the team puts the

articles in a protected forum that blocks access to search engines and non-members.

“There’s one general rule: If the article involves any sensitive topics, if you’re not sure

whether it’s permitted or not, please don’t risk any chance by publishing it” (Baio, 2009).

A similar project is run by a group of volunteers from Tianya community to translate

Times magazine (Tianya Bloggers, 2009).

Complete and organized international political deliberative discussions may not

be accessible to Chinese netizens. The official view tends to support projects like anti-

CNN that collects and distributes biased Western media coverage of China among

Page 27: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

25

netizens to cultivate a sense of nationalism. Although the intent to expose Western media

bias is completely legitimate and the founders of anti-CNN vow to seek truth, it is quite

ironic that the website largely fails to do the same with Chinese mainstream media.

However, despite online censorship, Chinese people do have more freedoms than before

and there is a growing interest in the access and understanding of foreign media content.

The Internet may have a positive impact on assisting Chinese knowledge seekers to

experiment and discover after all.

Discussion

Managing everything Chinese netizens have to say is impossible. China is home

to 420 million Internet users and 200 million bloggers (CNNIC, 2010). Modern

authoritarianism, resorting less to sheer military might and downright oppression, instead

relies on both patriotism and performance-based legitimacy to gain the favorable

compliance. More refined and strategic use of economic resources and state apparatuses

helps the Party maintain social order and stability. Realizing that economic growth is the

regime’s ultimate raison d’être, the Chinese government tries to leverage information

technology to maintain growth while limiting people’s use of the Internet for political

activities. The combination of marketization and political closure translates into the

Party’s continued monopoly of political power while granting a measure of economic and

cultural freedoms to individuals, groups, and regions (Yang, 2003). This opens up spaces

for public deliberation in China’s cyberspace.

Public deliberation holds potential for an authoritarian society like China. The

pursuit of better policy and governance is not limited to Western societies. Although

authoritarianism can never be democratic, and China has yet to develop democratic

Page 28: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

26

institutions such as rule of law and protection for civil rights, it is both possible and

desirable to nourish public deliberation alongside other democratic institutions in such

transitional countries. Societies need not choose between radical and incremental change

to facilitate citizens’ participation in local, regional, and national affairs. The concept of

authoritarian deliberation (He, 2005) is a useful theoretical construct that recognizes both

the reality of deliberative experiences in China and the troubling limitations of such

practices. Indeed, a variety of deliberative spaces, confined as they are, exist on the

Chinese Internet with different dynamics of state regulation and citizen participation.

It seems that both mechanisms of deliberation and control are expanding.

Announcing the demise of the propaganda state (Lynch, 1999) is perhaps a bit too early.

The Chinese state has successfully utilized information technology for political control.

Central propaganda spaces enhance government surveillance, maintenance of social order,

and government legitimacy through both e-government networks and official government

online media. At the same time, however, central propaganda spaces are also infused by

political discussions and general debate. Many government websites now provide citizens

with more access to national and local politics. Citizens, on the other hand, are

increasingly demanding government accountability. However, the lack of authenticity in

such state-controlled deliberation begs the question of how effective the government’s

strategic concessions will be if no substantial political reforms materialize.

Whereas mass media used to be part of the state structure, the commercialization

of the Chinese Internet has undoubtedly helped establish a platform for public discourse.

This is not to evoke technological determinism or overstate the participatory nature of the

Web, but rather to acknowledge that citizens have used the available self-publishing tools

Page 29: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

27

and social media for business, entertainment, social and civic purposes. Bulletin boards,

online forums, blogs, and social networking sites aid adventures of all kinds. Although

individuals are not allowed to publish newspapers in China, personal blogs have become

private papers for many Chinese bloggers. Citizens have grown accustomed to using both

emotionality (qing) and rationality (li) in public spaces to defend their rights and seek

social justice. As a result, those spaces heavily influenced by state and commercial

interests are also the very spaces where private lives and the larger political world are

bridged and where public opinion is formed.

Limited as they are, emergent civic spaces on Chinese Internet reflect the slow

evolution of values and beliefs during three decades of industrialization, urbanization,

liberalization. Zhou (2008) dubs the grassroots movements for increased civil liberties

“China’s long march towards freedom.” Growing pluralism has led to diverse group

formations both offline and online. Social groups, often from the margins of the society,

can gain access to public discourse, articulate their problems and opinions and, in some

cases, even drive public debates. Although the state apparatus reacts to monitor and

control these groups, the nearly unlimited possibilities of group formation afforded by

network technologies and driven by diverse social interests are not likely to wither away.

Instead, widening social inequalities are likely to instigate civic discourses and collective

actions to challenge the regime’s legitimacy. Exposure of corruption and violations of the

rights of vulnerable individuals are likely to be intertwined with bursts of state-

orchestrated nationalism as various social groups press their own agendas.

International deliberative spaces may also expand. More border-crossing groups

discover means to exchange information, become more adept at using circumventing

Page 30: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

28

technologies, and acquire experience in negotiating the balance between self-expression

and self-censorship. As economic, cultural, and political ties continue to strengthen

between China and the outside world and as the population of sophisticated Chinese

Internet users continues to grow, censorship becomes harder for the state, not easier.

In these various spaces, the state is both repressive and adaptive at the same time.

The state’s methods of monitoring and controlling discourse vary depending on the

relationship between the civic space and Beijing. The regime must adapt as the civic

space shifts further from center of authoritarian control (the central propaganda spaces) to

the periphery (international forums). While technical infrastructures such as the Great

Firewall and censored domestic search engines help the state filter Internet content,

different kinds of legal and personnel resources are also devoted to regulating online

spaces. State employed Internet police delete content directly. Commercial websites self

censor. Both civic and commercial sites are required to register with the government.

Yet the effect of the government’s presence on deliberation is not always

predictable. Debate in spaces such as the Strengthening the Nation Forum (Qiangguo

Luntan) is sometimes more lively and robust than other commercial and civic spaces

where government presence is less palpable. While some online activities on Qiangguo

Luntan are rigged by state-employed web commentators, a lot of citizen participation is

active and genuine (Yang 2003). Known for policy debate, Qiangguo Luntan regularly

attracts citizens who share strong nationalistic sentiments or deep concerns for social

issues, encouraging them to petition the government. It is a space where participants feel

they have an audience and what they say matters. Some even feel top Chinese leaders

take notice of people’s plight and perhaps, in some cases, can even take action.

Page 31: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

29

Such online dynamics speak to a number of constraints for civic and political

participation in Chinese society: a) the dominance of a strong state over a weak civil

sector; b) a paternalistic political culture; and c) the lack of institutional and legal means

to resolve social injustices, forcing citizens to appeal to higher authorities outside the

justice system (Minzner 2006). It is, thus, not surprising that these online instances of

demand- and complaint-making are often brought by individuals rather than groups.

Groups are more threatening to the regime. Many complaints often target lower-level

officials rather than the party-state in general (Nathan 2003). This kind of resistance

against men, not principles, argued O’Brien and Li, is paradoxically more system-

supportive than system-subversive (2006).

The unique pressures on public online discourse in China forces Chinese Internet

users to structure their discourse in other ways. Many civic-minded Chinese users employ

sarcasm, parody, and humor when criticizing the government. A fine balance between

self-expression and self-censorship is critical. Many strategically choose to criticize local

government officials and isolated incidents rather than directing their criticisms at the

central government or national policies beyond the state’s tolerance (Esarey 2008). This

tendency has grown more common as people realized that edgier commercial and

emergent civic websites like Bullog and Fatianxia (Legal World) were ordered to close

their business operations or move their servers overseas (Liu 2008; Ramzy 2009). To

continue their operations, many websites and individual bloggers have toned down their

criticism. However, they persistently test and push back against restrictions, motivated by

the optimistic conviction that “history is on their side” (MacKinnon 2007, 46).

Conclusion

Page 32: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

30

In order to harmonize social frictions and channel online public discourse to

support government policies and agendas, the Chinese government has consciously

allowed for a limited sphere of public discussion and deliberation on economic, social,

and political affairs. At the same time, with expanding economic and cultural freedoms,

Chinese citizens are actively seeking greater political freedom in order to secure other

forms of liberty. Such demands have increasingly made their way into Chinese

cyberspace. Although many citizens may not demand democracy or elections, more and

more are willing to use every means possible to defend their personal rights and property

against institutional abuse (Benney 2007). These defenses serve as the foundation of

citizens’ quests for civic and political participation online. Individual citizens and civic

groups have increasingly learned to effectively garner social attention and mobilize

public opinion.

To study the Internet’s role in fostering democratization in China, a dichotomy

between “democratic” and “non democratic” or “free” and “not free” is too simplistic. In

fact, many countries occupy a place on a continuum between the two. I believe it is more

pragmatic and productive to consider China as a case of authoritarian governance where

there are degrees of economic, cultural, and even political freedoms within the system

while, at the same time, the state expects and ensures the consent of its citizenry. The

citizens’ consent is increasingly negotiated online in the context of growing personal

freedoms and liberties. The government’s legitimacy is never complete or unchallenged.

Online discourses are important for precisely this reason; it is where the state’s claim to

power is contested.

Page 33: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

31

It is also useful to differentiate the various spaces of online public deliberation in

China for both theoretical and practical reasons. While some studies tend to view the

Chinese Internet from the standpoint of censorship and control (Boas 2006; Chase &

Mulvenon 2002; Qiu 2000), others emphasize the Internet’s potential to foster civil

society (Yang 2003, 2006, 2007). And in certain cases, a somewhat uncritical use of

concepts like public sphere and deliberative democracy renders China’s unique political

and social contexts almost irrelevant (Zhou, Chan & Peng 2008). These different foci and

assumptions about the Chinese Internet tend to assert certain characteristics or potentials

of the Web at the sacrifice of others. As a result, different programs, agendas, and

policies are proposed or implemented without enough attention to how they may affect or

be affected by an opposite or complementary set of dynamics.

The contexts of public discourse and opinion formation online are critical to

gaining a better understanding of the Internet’s potential role in public deliberation. I

reject a one-dimensional view of the Chinese Internet. It is not a uniform environment but

rather a varied collection of interrelated spaces embodying multiple dialectics of

government control and citizen participation.

In the case of China, the spaces for public deliberation are often factional,

nationalistic, and incoherent. There are several factors that likely encouraged these

characteristics and point to some implications for future research in online public

deliberation.

First, while there are clearer distinctions between the government, business, and

civil society in more mature democratic societies, those lines are less distinct in China

due to the government’s permeating influence on the fabric of political, economic, and

Page 34: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

32

social life. Engaging the government to change its institutional behavior, policy, and

practices is therefore crucial to promoting public deliberation in China. Baogang He

believes “it is impossible to develop any form of deliberation without backing from

governmental officials” (2006a, 138). Significant changes to public deliberation

mechanisms may require identification and engagement of reform-minded Chinese

bureaucrats and elites in order to push social justice agendas forward. Perhaps, as Leib

remarked after a deliberative democracy in Hangzhou of Zhejiang Province, that “those

governing simply were more in touch with the reality that the democratization project

needs to be as top-down as it will invariably be bottom up, as local grassroots activism

finds ways to engage Chinese citizens” (2005).

Second, state monitoring and control over expansion of an emergent civil society

stymies the potential growth of the civil sector. Under the government’s restrictions,

public deliberation has not been able to organize or institutionalize itself in order to

broaden its audience and be more effective. Instead, current online public deliberation

tends to be restricted to informal, dispersive, and sporadic exchanges. As the state

carefully guards against the formation of large groups based on political and ideological

agendas, it is perhaps worthwhile, for the short term, to nurture the development of

humanitarian, environment, health, and community services in China where citizens

acquire the experience and skills of civic action. The social morale and social capital

generated in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake, for instance, is a great resource to be

tapped into. Exchanges with nonprofit institutions across borders may provide more

energy to China’s emergent civil society.

Page 35: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

33

Third, as public deliberation often occurs online nowadays, it is paramount to

understand the mechanisms of information sharing, civic discussions, and collective

actions. Of particular interest is the explication of how massive sharing of news and

information and everyday online political talk coalesce into Internet collective incidents

that press demands for reforms at the institutional level. Furthermore, one may ask in

what ways the availability of networking tools has helped or deterred citizens to share,

connect, and act together, and similarly what specific social, cultural, and political factors

may have mediated the ways Chinese citizens utilize such technologies.

Fourth, the fact that two thirds of Chinese Internet users are people under the age

of 30 invites researchers and policy makers to gain a better understanding of China’s

digital generations. It is feared that as Chinese media increasingly gravitate towards

commercialization and entertainment (Zhao 1998), a large proportion of China’s digital

population may choose to ride along the “entertainment superhighway” for entertainment

and consumerism rather than engaging in public affairs and social justice issues (CNNIC

2007; Morozov 2008). Finding ways to engage Chinese youths to nurture the growth of

Chinese civil society may be crucial to China’s political future in the long term.

Finally, online public deliberation’s broader and long-term implications for

authoritarian China need to be considered. Granted government networks and popular

online protests reduced rampant corruption, but can an authoritarian state learn to

discipline itself? What mechanisms can be built (online or offline) to discipline the abuse

of political power and restore a degree of social justice? How long can the central

government keep faulting local, low-level officials for corruption while maintaining

public confidence in the top leadership? And as the regime uses the Internet to win

Page 36: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

34

popular support, fend off criticism and social antagonism, and give the people a way to

let off steam, to what extent will the government’s political PR and theatrical

performance of “openness” appease forces of significant social and political change? Are

the Chinese people gradually losing their fear of the state as its reliance on patriotism and

legitimacy appears quite fragile at times of mounting economic and social problems?

It may be that the Chinese government prefers to remain in the authoritarian

twilight zone forever, somewhere between totalitarianism and democracy. In order to

maintain power, the regime has implemented various measures to include citizens in local

and national politics. Online authoritarian deliberation instills much-needed legitimacy in

this process. At the same time, however, online public deliberation may improve civil

liberties and political participation as participants acquire knowledge, skill, and

experience sharing information, building connections, and engaging in collective actions.

If there are different routes to improve governance, solve social problems, and promote

civic and political participation in a complex society like China, democracy may not be a

precursor to public deliberation. Instead, public deliberation, even in an authoritarian

society, may flourish as a viable route to better governance and democracy in China.

Page 37: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

35

Notes:

1 The latest Chinese Internet national survey reports 35.3% of blog owners update their blogs every six

months.

2 For instance, Rebecca Mackinnon (2009) examined how censorship is decentralized among Chinese blog

service providers with great variation from company to company.

3 The Great Firewall of China refers to a technological filtering system built by the Chinese government to

monitor and block foreign Internet content deemed harmful to the Chinese society.

4 The Three Represents is a set of ideological principles introduced by former Chinese president Jiang

Zemin in 2001 which then became the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party at the 16th

Party

Congress in 2002. It stipulates that the CCP must represent the most advanced social productive forces and

culture in China as well as the interest of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.

5 The Great Hall of the People is used for legislative and ceremonial activities by the Chinese government.

It is the site of National People’s Congress.

Page 38: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

1

References

Baio, A. (2009). Translating “the Economist” behind China’s Great Firewall. Retrieved

on April 3, 2009 from http://waxy.org/2009/02/translating_the_economist/

Bandurski, D. (2008). China’s guerrilla war for the web. Far Eastern Economic Review,

July. Retrieved on December 20, 2008 from

http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web

Benney, J. (2007). Rights defense and the virtual China. Asian Studies Review, 31, 435-

446.

Boas, T. (2006). Weaving the authoritarian web: The control of Internet use in

nondemocratic regimes. In J. Zysman & A. Newman (Eds.), How revolutionary

was the Digital Revolution: National responses, market transitions, and global

technology (pp. 373-390). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bu, W. (2006). Internet user among Chinese youth. In J. Xi, Y. Sun, and J. Xiao (Eds.),

Chinese youth in transition (pp.215-232). Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing,

Ltd.

Cai, Y. (2008). Disruptive collective action in the reform era. In K. O’Brien (Ed.),

Popular protest in China (pp. 163-178). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

CCID Consulting. (2006). 2005 Chinese government websites performance evaluation.

http://www.ccidconsulting.com/2005govtop/default.shtml.

Center for Civil Society. (2004). Definition of civil society. Center for Civil Society,

London School of Economics. Retrieved on March 16, 2008 from

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/introduction.htm

Page 39: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

2

Chase, M. S., & Mulvenon, J. C. (2002). You’ve got dissent! Chinese dissident use of the

Internet and Beijing’s counter-strategies. Santa Monica: RAND.

China Net. (2003). 84 days and nights in Guangzhou. China Net. Retrieved on September

16, 2008 from http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Jul/69295.htm

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). (2003). The CASS Internet report 2003:

Approaching the Internet in small Chinese cities. Retrieved March 24, 2004 from

www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/chinainternet_casestudies.pdf

China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). (2007). The 19th China Internet

Network Development Survey Report. Retrieved December 10, 2007 from

http://www.cnnic.cn/download/2007/cnnic19threport.pdf

China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). (2009a). 23rd

Statistical Survey

Report on the Internet Development in China. Retrieved April 15, 2009

http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/153540.pdf

China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). (2009b). Regulations and

Provisions of Chinese Computer and Information Network. Retrieved on March

16, 2009 from http://www.cnnic.cn/index/0F/index.htm

China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). (2010). 26th Statistical Survey

Report on the Internet Development in China. Retrieved July 15, 2010 from

http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2010/7/15/100708.pdf

Chinese National Bureau of Civil Organizations. (2007). 2007 Statistical Report of the

Development of Civil Affairs. Retrieved on March 1, 2009 from

http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=30672&dictionid=2201&c

atid=

Page 40: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

3

Dahlberg. L. (2005). The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?

Theory and Society, 34, 111-136.

Danwei (2007, January 22). Antiwave: podcast pioneers – Danwei hard hat show. Online

video clip. YouTube. Accessed on March 22, 2008.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=en9sy3agHEw

Deliberative Democracy Consortium. (2008). http://www.deliberative-democracy.net/

Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. New York: Heath & Co.

Esarey, A. (2008). Political discourse in the Chinese blogosphere: A quantitative analysis.

Paper presented at the 6th Annual Chinese Internet Research Conference. Hong

Kong, PRC: University of Hong Kong.

Esarey, A. & Xiao, Q. (2008). Below the radar: Political expression in the Chinese

blogosphere. Asian Survey, 48, 752–772.

Fishkin, J. (1995). The voice of the people. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually

existing democracy. Social Text, 25/26, p. 56-80.

Fung, A., & Wright, E. (2003). Deepening democracy: Institutional innovations in

empowered participatory governance. New York: Verso Books.

Gastil, J. & Black, L. (2008). Public deliberation as the organizing principle of political

communication research. Journal of Public Deliberation, 4. Retrieved on March

22, 2008 from http://services.bepress.com/jpd/vol4/iss1/art3/

Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (1996). Democracy and disagreement. Cambridge, MA:

Belknap Harvard.

Page 41: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

4

Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of

law and democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (2005). Concluding comments on empirical approaches to deliberative

politics. Acta Politica, 40, 384–392.

He, B. (1997). The democratic implications of civil society in China. London: Macmillan

Press Ltd.

He, B. (2003). The theory and practice of Chinese grassroots governance: Five models.

Japanese Journal of Political Science, 4, 293-314.

He, B. (2006a). Western theories of deliberative democracy and the Chinese practice of

complex deliberative governance. In E. Leib & B. He (Eds.), The search for

deliberation democracy in China (pp.133-148). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

He, B. (2006b). Participatory and deliberative institutions in China. In E. Leib & B. He

(Eds.), The search for deliberation democracy in China (pp. 175-196). New York:

Palgrave MacMillan.

Jiang, M. (2009). Exploring online structures on Chinese government portals: Citizen

political participation and government legitimation. Social Science Computer

Review, 27.

Kalathil, S., & Boas, T. (2003). Open networks, closed regimes: The impact of the

Internet on authoritarian rule. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace.

Page 42: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

5

Kim, J. & Kim, E. J. (2008). Theorizing dialogic deliberation: Everyday political talk as

communicative action and dialogue. Journal of Communication, 18, 51-70.

Lagerkvist, J. (2006). The Internet in China: Unlocking and containing the public sphere.

Lund University, Sweden: Lund University, Department of East Asian Languages.

Leib, E. (2004). Deliberative democracy in America: A proposal for a popular branch of

government. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University.

Leib, E. (2005). The Chinese Communist Party and deliberative democracy. Journal of

Public Deliberation. Retrieved October 5, 2006 from

http://www.auburn.edu/academic/liberal_arts/poli_sci/journal_public_deliberation

/printerview/china.htm

Leib, E. & He, B. (Eds.). (2006). In search for deliberative democracy in China. New

York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lipset, S. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and

political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105.

Liu, X. (December 29, 2008). Fatianxia is dead! Retrieved on March 15, 2009 from

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49daf0ea0100bwcx.html

MacKinnon, R. (2007). Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship, and civic

discourse in China. Public Choice, 134, 31-46.

MacKinnon, R. (2009). China’s censorship 2.0: How companies censor bloggers. First

Monday, 14. Retrieved February 3, 2009 from

http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089

Page 43: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

6

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang’s regular

press conference on March 31, 2009. Retrieved on April 3, 2009 from

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/new_404.htm

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China

(MIIT). (2009). Laws and regulations. Retrieved on March 29, 2009 from

http://www.miibeian.gov.cn/FG/flfg.jsp

Minzner, C. (in press). Xinfang: An alternative to the formal Chinese legal system.

Stanford Journal of International Law, 42.

Morozov, E. (2008, December, 11). Digital renegades, or captives? International Herald

Tribune. Retrieved on December 20, 2008 from

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/11/opinion/edmorozov.php

Nathan, A. 2003. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 14, 6-17.

O’Brien, K. (1994). Villagers’ committees: Implementing political reform in China’s

villages. Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 32, 33-59.

O’Brien, K., & Li, L. (2006). Rightful resistance in rural China. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Oksenberg, M. (1998). Confronting a classic dilemma. Journal of Democracy, 9, 27-34.

Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The virtual sphere: the Internet as a public sphere. New Media &

Society, 4, 9-27.

Pei, M. (2006). China’s trapped transition: The limits of developmental autocracy.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Page 44: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

7

People’s Net. (2008). President Hu Jingtao Greets and Communicates with Netizens

through Strengthening the Nation Forum on People’s Net. Retrieved on August 2,

2008 from http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/50459/114410/7411702.html

Qiangguo Luntan (2008). Retrieved on June 25, 2009 from http://bbs.people.com.cn/

Qiu, J. L. (2000). Virtual censorship in China: Keeping the gate between the cyberspaces.

International Journal of Communications Laws and Policy, 4, 1-25.

Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sennett, R. (1977). The fall of public man. New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc.

Shi, T. (1997). Political participation in Beijing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

Sina. (2005). Beijing People’s Political Consultative Conference seeks legislative bills.

Sina.com. Retrieved March 15, 2008 from http://news.sina.com.cn/pc/2005-09-

30/27/1711.html

Sina. (2008). Blogs and podcasts from 2008 National People’s Congress (NPC) and the

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Retrieved on

March 22, 2008 from http://news.sina.com.cn/z/2008qglh/blog.html

Song, R. (2008). Reflections of a bridge blogger. Retrieved on Jan 6, 2009 from

http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20081116_1.htm

Stromer-Galley, J. (2003). Diversity of political conversation on the Internet: Users’

perspective. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 8. Retrieved on May

10, 2006 from http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol8/issue3/stromergalley.html

Tianya (2009). Tianya: About Us. Retrieved on July 1, 2009 from

http://help.tianya.cn/about/about.html

Page 45: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

8

Tianya Bloggers. (2009). American Times magazine in Chinese (bloggers translation).

Retrieved on March 18, 2009 from

http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/view_blog.asp?BlogName=timeweekly

Wang, F. & Zhang, Y. (2007). On regulating non-profit organization (Feiyinglixing

Zuzhi Guizhi Tantao). Commercial Times, 35. Retrieved on March 5, 2009 from

http://qkzz.net/magazine/1002-5863/2007/35/2251365.htm

Wang, J. (2005). Youth culture, music, and cell phone branding in China. Global Media

and Communication, 1, 185-201.

Wang, X. (2008). Don’t Think (Buxu Lianxiang). http://www.wangxiaofeng.net/

Warren, M. (2008). Governance-driven democratization: Opportunities and challenges.

Paper presented at Interpretation in Policy Conference. Colchester, UK:

University of Essex. Retrieved on December 2, 2008 from

http://www.ruc.dk/upload/application/pdf/e0974d31/Governance-

Driven%20Democratization.pdf

Yang, D. (2004). Civil society as an analytical lens for contemporary China. China: an

International Journal, 21, 1-27.

Yang, G. (2003). The Internet and civil society in China: A preliminary assessment.

Journal of Contemporary China, 12, 453–475.

Yang, G. (2006). Activists beyond virtual borders: Internet-mediated networks and

informational politics in China. First Monday, 7. Retrieved October 6, 2006 from

http://firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/yang

Yang, G. (2007). How do Chinese civic associations respond to the Internet? Findings

from a survey. The China Quarterly, 189, pp. 122-143.

Page 46: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

9

Yang, G. (2008). Contentions in cyberspace. In K. O’Brien (Ed.), Popular protest in

China (pp. 126-143). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Yong, J. S. (2003). Enter the dragon: Informatization in China. In J. S. Yong (Ed.), E-

government in Asia: Enabling public service innovation in the 21st century, (pp.

65-96). Hong Kong: Times Media.

Yu, J. & Shan, G. (2009). Response to collective incidents and social harmony. People’s

Net Public Opinion Channel. Retrieved on March 12, 2009 from

http://yq.people.com.cn/Forum/postDetail.aspx?ID=000007277

Zhai, M. (2009). Common knowledge of civil society you may not know: The

characteristics, virtues, and limitations of civil society (Ni keneng buzhidao de

gongmin shehui changshi: Gongmin shehui de tezheng, meide yu juxian). Yibao:

One person’s newspaper. Retrieved on March 28, 2009 from

http://www.1bao.org/?p=701&cpage=1

Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, market and democracy in China: Between the party line and the

bottom line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Zhou, K. (2008). China’s long march to freedom: Grassroots liberalization through

individual action. Washington DC: Center for International Private Enterprise.

Retrieved on October 1, 2008 from www.cipe.org/publications/fs/pdf/082808.pdf

Zhou, X., Chan, Y., & Peng, Z. 2008. “Deliberativeness of Online Political Discussion.”

Journalism Studies 9, 759-70.

Zittrain, J. & Edelman, B. (2003). Empirical analysis of Internet Filtering in China.

Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School.

Retrieved on August 6, 2008 from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/

Page 47: Authoritarian Deliberation on Chinese Internet

10

Zuckerman, E. (2008). Bridgeblogger and xenophile, a tale of two bloggers. Retrieved on

May 28, 2009 from

http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/12/05/bridgeblogger-and-xenophile-

a-tale-of-two-bloggers/

Zuckerman, E. (2009). China’s complicated internet culture. My heart is in accra.

Retrieved on March 12, 2009 from

http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2009/03/03/chinas-complicated-internet-

culture/