authentication in mobile internet protocol version 6 liu ping
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Authentication In Mobile Internet Protocol version 6 Liu Ping. Supervisor: professor Jorma Jormakka. 1. Introduction 2. Mobility support 3. Security mechanisms and threats analysis 4.Address ownership problem 5. Present solution 6. Conclusion. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Authentication In Mobile Internet Protocol version 6
Liu Ping
Supervisor: professor Jorma Jormakka
1.1. IntroductionIntroduction2. Mobility support3. Security mechanisms and threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. Present solution6. Conclusion
1.1. IntroductionIntroduction2. Mobility support3. Security mechanisms
and threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. Solution6. Conclusion
• MotivationMotivation1. Mobile device and Ebusiness 2. Current solutions are fairly completed to be
implemented
• Related workRelated work1. Strong authentication: PKI 2. Weak authentication: CGA, CAM and RR
• Our solutionOur solution Based on asymmetric and symmetric
encryption algorithm to distribute an ID and a session key
• CGA: Cryptographically Generated Address
• CAM: Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6
• RR: Return Routability
1. Introduction2. 2. Mobility supportMobility support3. Security mechanisms
and threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. Solution6. Conclusion
• MN: Mobile Node, it is MIPv6Mobile Node, it is MIPv6• CN: Correspondent Node is Correspondent Node is
communicating node with a MN, it is communicating node with a MN, it is either stationary node or mobile nodeeither stationary node or mobile node
• HA: Home Agent, a router is on a MN’s Home Agent, a router is on a MN’s home link. It registers all necessary home link. It registers all necessary information for a MN, i.g. CoA, HoAinformation for a MN, i.g. CoA, HoA
• CoA: A MN’s Care-of Address, which is A MN’s Care-of Address, which is temporary and a foreign link assigns to temporary and a foreign link assigns to the MN on the foreign linkthe MN on the foreign link
• HoA: A MN’s permanent IPv6 address A MN’s permanent IPv6 address on its home linkon its home link
Bidirectional tunneling
HA
MN
CN
Route Optimization
MN CN
• Need a binding process: MN sends CoA to its HA and CNs when it’s out of its home link
• CN saves the MN’s CoA into its BUC-binding update cache
• CN can deliver a packet to the MN directly by setting the packet’s source address to be the MN’s CoA
• Route optimization can reduce congestions of the MN’s home link and HA, but introduces new vulnerabilities
BU processBU process
1.1. HoA: a MN’s HoA cannot be abusedHoA: a MN’s HoA cannot be abused2.2. CoA: CN’s BUC must save correct CoA: CN’s BUC must save correct
MN’s CoAMN’s CoA
Source IPDestination IP
HoA optionHoA option……(CoA)
HoAHoACoA
……
BU message’s headerBU message’s header CN’s BU entryCN’s BU entry
1. Introduction2. Mobility support3. 3. Security mechanisms Security mechanisms
and threats analysisand threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. Solution6. Conclusion
Security Mechanisms• Authorization and trust• Authentication• Integrity• Confidentiality• Anti-replay
• Authorization and trust:Authorization and trust: A CN verifies whether a MN has right to create or update its BUC
• Authentication:Authentication: MN and CN can verify their identifies
• Integrity:Integrity: BU message cannot be modified by an unauthorized node
• Confidentiality:Confidentiality: CoA and HoA cannot be disclosed to malicious nodes
• Anti-replay:Anti-replay: An attacker delivers old, out-of date packet to CN by pretending to be a MN
MN CN
MN attacker
::20:10:10:10 BUBU
False BUFalse BU::30:10:10:10
BUCHoACoA
::40:10:10:10
Source address: ::30:10:10:10
Destination address: ::CN’s IP address
Home address option: MN’s home address
Threats analysis
•Man-In-the-Middle attack
•Denial of Service attack
Man-In-the-Middle attack
A B
Attacker
Denial Of Service Attack
MN CN
Attacker
1. Introduction2. Mobility support3. Security mechanisms
and threats analysis4.4. Address ownership Address ownership
problemproblem5. Solution6. Conclusion
1. A MN’s HoA works as a searching key during BU process
2. A MN’s HoA must be secret enough, otherwise, attacker can launch a passive or an active attack easily by sending a false BU message to a CN
1. Introduction2. Mobility support3. Security mechanisms
and threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. 5. SolutionSolution6. Conclusion
Solution Overview• Using an ID shared only with a pair
MN and CN as a searching key• Apply RSA asymmetric to
distribute an ID and a session key• Apply Twofish symmetric
algorithm to encrypt/decrypt CoA during BU process
Authentication in MIPv6
Apply in MIPv6
Preparation Binding Update Verifying
Preparation Procedure
MN-----------------------------------CNPublic key
MN<---------------------------------CN[ID, session key] public
MN saves the ID and session key
MN generates public/private key
Binding update procedureMN---------------------------------CN
CN decrypts CoA by session
CN verifies CoA and saves
[CoA] session & ID
IDIDSession keySession keyCoACoAPublic keyPublic key……
CN’s BU entryCN’s BU entry
Verify procedure• An attackerAn attacker
It is failed because of IPsec protection (without a SA shared with CN before). An attacker cannot do any more harmful thing.
Verify procedure• An cheater: has a SA beforeAn cheater: has a SA before
ID ID ID or session keyID or session key is not correct,is not correct, Session key Session key CNCN drops packet.drops packet.
Compares CoA andCompares CoA and
CoA CoA source addresssource address
1. Introduction2. Mobility support3. Security mechanisms
and threats analysis4. Address ownership
problem5. Present solution6. 6. ConclusionConclusion
Summary• Solve address ownership Solve address ownership
problemproblem• Prevent possible attacks Prevent possible attacks • Implementation simpleImplementation simple• Suitable any kinds of computer Suitable any kinds of computer
and memory and memory • It is difficult to recognize a It is difficult to recognize a
cheatercheater
Future work1. Combine software and 1. Combine software and
hardwarehardware2. Ciphertext error2. Ciphertext error• Transmission processTransmission process• Storage mediumStorage medium• Recover plaintext from errorsRecover plaintext from errors
Thank youThank you