auteur, strategic economist, unido director, afrology think tank group
DESCRIPTION
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora CREATING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REMITTANCES. Presented by Dr. Yves Ekoué Amaïzo. Auteur, Strategic Economist, UNIDO Director, Afrology Think Tank Group Tel. et Fax: 0043 2247 3552 – 0043 1 26026 5102 Email : [email protected] – [email protected] - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
1
Auteur, Strategic Economist, UNIDODirector, Afrology Think Tank Group
Tel. et Fax: 0043 2247 3552 – 0043 1 26026 5102Email : [email protected] – [email protected]
www.menaibuc.com – www.afrology.com
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora
CREATING EFFECTIVENESSOF THE REMITTANCES
Presented by Dr. Yves Ekoué Amaïzo
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
2
Contents
Introduction: From migration to Diaspora
1. Increasing Workers remittances: a sign of increased Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa?
2. Creating effectiveness of the remittances in Africa
Conclusion: Towards collective efficiency
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
3
Introduction: From migration to Diaspora
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
75
175
0 50 100 150 200
Number ofimmigrants
1965 2002Source: Gildas Simon, “International migration trends, Population & Sociétés, n. 382, INED, September 2002; Géodynamique des migrations internationales
dans le monde, PUF, Paris, 1995; OECD, International Migration Trends, SOPEMI, 2001,
Migration in the World : 1965 - 2002, in millions
Immigrants = People living outside • their country of origin, or• their country of primarily citizenship
Diaspora = People living outside • their country of origin, or• their country of primarily citizenshipSince many years or centuries
1965
2002
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
5
1. Increasing Workers remittances: a sign of increased Poverty in sub-Saharan
Africa?
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
North Africa 3.9 3.7 3.8 2.8 4.7
Central Africa 0 0.2 3.6 4.6 4.4
Western Africa 2.5 2.8 3.7 1.9 4
Eastern Africa 4.4 4.2 5.3 2.1 2.6
Southern Africa 2.1 2.8 2.6 3.6 2.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Data from ADfB, African Development Report 2004
1. Real GDP Growth rates in African Sub-regions, 1999-2003 ( in Percentage)
• None of the African sub-regions reached 7 % of GDP as suggested in the MDG
5. Southern Africa
2. Central Africa
1. Northern Africa
4. Eastern Africa
3. Western Africa
Unworkable Millennium Development Goals in 2015 ?
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
Industry 2.4 4.3 3.6 2.6 4.1
Services 3.7 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.6
Agriculture 2.1 1.4 4.7 2.8 3.1
Manufacturing 3.3 4.3 4.1 3.5 2.3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Data from ADfB, African Development Report 2004
2. Sectoral Growth rates in Africa, 1999-2003 ( in Percentage changes from preceding year)
Lower Commitment to Manufacturing ?From 3.3 % in 1999 to 2.3 % in 2003
Better performance of Africa in Services
4. Manufacturing
2. Services
1. Industry
3. Agriculture
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
8
Debt generating resources
Non Debt generating resources
(net resource flows)1. Long-term debt
2. Short-term debt
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private non guaranteed
1. Foreign Direct investment (net)
2. Portfolio Equity flows
3. Grants (excluding tech. coop.)
4. Technical Cooperation grants
5. Balance of Exports minus Imports of goods and services
6. Workers Remittances
Source: G. Johnson and K. Sholès, Stratégique, Publi-union, Paris, 2000, see Chapter 11.
3. Main financial resources transferred to Africa
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
Sub-Saharan Africa
5%
All Developing Countries
95%
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2004, pp. 2 and 26.
Share of Africa from the net resource flows and transfersall Developing Countries (in Billion dollars and percentage)
$ US 4,000 millions
$ US 80 millions
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
1970 1980 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Global Development Finance 2003
Net resource flows and transfers (selected regions), 1970-2002 (in US $ million)
Europe and Central Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
500000
550000
1970 1980 1990 2000 2002
Source: Data from Global Development Finance 2004.
Debt generating resources versus Non debt generating resources, in Sub-Saharan Africa 1970-2002 (in US $ million)
Debt generating resources
Non Debt generating resources
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1970 1980 1990 2000 2002
Source: Global Development Finance 2003
Benchmarking Workers remittances in selected regions1970-2002 (in US $ million)
East Asia and Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
0
5
10
15
20
25
1970 1980 1990 2000 2002
Source: Data from Global Development Finance 2004.
Benchmarking NDGR/DGR in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-2002 (in %)The Poverty Paradox: something wrong with the present African governance on producing value
added and sharing wealth
Share of Non debt generating resources in Debt generating resources
Share of Workers Remittances in Non debt generating resources
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
14
2. Creating effectiveness ofthe remittances in Africa
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
15
Management of projects and
funds
Gradual Changes
Major Changes
Proactive Decision making
1. Adjustment through direct
influence on the context
2. Planning and implementing changes while making use of
present conditions
Reactive Decision making
3. Non-linear introduction of
changes due to pressures from the
environment
4. Conversion due to external pressures
Source: G. Johnson and K. Sholès, Stratégique, Publi-union, Paris, 2000, see Chapter 11.
Dynamic strategic changes required
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
16
Despite hostile business environment in Africa:
Strengthening States and improving its performance as a regulatory and enabling body
Building on private sector development including public-private partnerships
Investing Workers Remittances into:1. Securing land ownership especially for women2. “Proximity” credit facility institutions3. Promoting cross-border free trade4. Linkages with regional and global production
networks5. Identifying “appropriate technology and know-how
and structuring its diffusion locally6. Building on performance, quality and timely delivery7. Self employment activities8. Promotion of value added products and services
based on systemic up-grading and innovation approaches (at all stages)
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
17
The way forward: Focusing on technology upgrading
1. Moving from Transfer of People to Transfer and diffusion of knowledge, skills and technology (using video conference facilities and wireless technologies)
2. Transforming selected Universities into Social Responsibility knowledge centres
3. Promoting national and sub-regional reverse Brain Drain through incentives for countries pursuing a predictable and conducive environment
4. Tax free regimes for equipment and technology imports within Diaspora’s new geographical borders (intra-pan-African countries)
5. Database for Diaspora’s competencies including Business and subcontracting matchmaking partnership with local private sector and knowledge centres
6. Creation of a post of Commissioner for African Diaspora’s at the level of the African Union and/or NEPAD and a Ministry for Diaspora at national and regional levels
7. Building Cross-border networks at the sectoral and financial levels
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
18
Conclusion: towards collective efficiency
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
19
1. Do not work in isolation2. Build interdependence among the
Diaspora as well as with Africa and3. Build on
Collective efficiencyin Africa
Leveraging the Africa Diaspora, London Business School, Africa Club, Friday 22nd April 2005
Y.E. Amaïzo
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU
MAROC
ALGERIESAHARA OCCIDENTAL
SENEGAL
MAURITANIE
MALIILES DU CAP VERT
NIGER
NIGERIA
GHANATOGO
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIACOTE D'IVOIRE
BURKINA FASO
BENIN
TUNISIE
LYBIE
TCHAD
CAMEROUNREP. CENTRAFRICAINE
EGYPTE
SOUDAN
ERYTHREE
ETHIOPIE
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIE
KENYAGUINEE EQUATORIALE
GABONCONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIE BOSTWANA
ZAMBIE
COMORES
SEYCHELLES
MAURICEMADAGASCAR
TANZANIEREP. DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
ZIMBABWE
AFRIQUE DU SUD
LESOTHO
SWAZILAND
MOZAMBIQUE
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
MALAWI
SAO TOME ET PRINCIPE
GUINEE
GAMBIE
GUINEE BISSAU