australian air publication 7001.053(am1) · is tareg 3, while for amos, taregs 4 and 5 apply....

COPY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATION

7001.053(AM1)

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT MANUAL

Original Date of Issue: 21 Oct 10

M.D. BINSKIN Air Marshal ADF Airworthiness Authority Issuing Authority Date: 21 Oct 10

Sponsor: DGTA

File Reference: 2006/1163436/1

UNCONTROLLED IF PRINTED

elizabeth.low

Important Notice

RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTRIBUTEE AMENDMENTS TO PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT

1. This publication, although issued as an Australian Air Publication (AAP), is authenticated by the ADFAirworthiness Authority because the content has Tri-Service significance and authority. The single Service markingshave been replaced by their Tri-Service equivalents as part of the formation of a proper, structured, binding DefencePublication System for airworthiness, aircraft, aircraft related equipment and other ‘air’ matters under the authority ofDI(G) ADMIN 20-31.

2. Procedures for the management, control and amendment of AAPs are outlined in AAP 5030.001CD Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual.

Intellectual Property Protection

3. This publication is protected by Commonwealth of Australia Copyright. The contents of this publication mayalso be protected by other Intellectual Property Protection mechanisms, Government to Government Agreements and/or Third Party Transfer restrictions; such as Original Equipment Manufacturer’s Copyright and/or InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Notice to Contractors

4. This publication is issued to Contractors for information only and is to be returned intact on completion of contract to the relevant Commonwealth Contracting Authority.

Special Publication Instructions (SPI) Promulgated Publication Sponsor Changes

5. SPI promulgated publication sponsor changes are to be recorded in the table below:

DATE SPI NO NEW SPONSOR

COPYRIGHT COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA


AO 011 - Page 1 of 1

AO 011Revised Oct 2007

Publication ImprovementReport and Reply

Department of Defence Originator's file reference

Originator's action

Sponsor's details Publication no.

Date of issue AL status

Section no. Chapter or WP no. Page no. Para or Fig or Table no.

Brief summary of deficiency and suggested amendments

Originated byPrinted name Rank or title Section Phone no. Fax no.

Originator's unit and business address

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Refer to the relevant PSMA in the National Telephone Directoryfor guidance on form completion and submission

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To be returned to originator on completionSponsor's copy

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Effective Pages

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

NOTE

• When amended, the Defence written portion of the text affected by an AL is identified by amendment indicators detailed in AAP 5030.001CD, Section 4, Chapter 2.

Page No AL Page No AL

PRELIMINARY PAGES

List of Effective Pages i to iv 0

Notes to Readers i to iv 0

Amendment Certificate i to ii 0

Table of Contents i to ii 0

List of Figures i to ii 0

List of Tables i to ii 0

BODY MATTER PAGES

SECTION 1 (Interleaf)

CHAPTER 1

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CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 5

1 to 4 0 5A–1 to 5A–2 0 5B–1 to 5B–2 0 5C–1 to 5C–2 0

CHAPTER 6

1 to 6 0

CHAPTER 7

1 to 2 0 SECTION 2 (Interleaf)

CHAPTER 1 1 to 2 0

INDEX TO REGULATIONS 1 to 6 0

TAREG 1 1 to 4 0 1A–1 to 1A–2 0 1B–1 to 1B–2 0

TAREG 2 1 to 14 0 2A–1 to 2A–2 0 TAREG 3

1 to 28 0 3A–1 to 3A–2 0 3B–1 to 3B–2 0 3C–1 to 3C–2 0 3D–1 to 3D–2 0 3E–1 to 3E–2 0 3F–1 to 3F–2 0 3G–1 to 3G–2 0

TAREG 4 1 to 8 0

TAREG 5 1 to 8 0


CHAPTER 1

1 to 10 0 1A–1 to 1A–4 0 1A1–1 to 1A1–4 0 1B–1 to 1B–2 0 1C–1 to 1C–2 0 1D–1 to 1D–4 0

CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

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SECTION 3 (cont)

CHAPTER 5 1 to 4 0 5A–1 to 5A–2 0 5B–1 to 5B–2 0

CHAPTER 6

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CHAPTER 7

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CHAPTER 8

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CHAPTER 9

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CHAPTER 10 1 to 4 0

CHAPTER 11

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CHAPTER 12

1 to 10 0 12A–1 to 12A–2 0 12B–1 to 12B–4 0 12C–1 to 12C–6 0 12D–1 to 12D–8 0 12D1–1 to 12D1–4 0 12D2–1 to 12D2–2 0 12D3–1 to 12D3–2 0 12E–1 to 12E–4 0 12F–1 to 12F–4 0 12F1–1 to 12F1–6 0 12G–1 to 12G–4 0 12H–1 to 12H–2 0 12H1–1 to 12H1–2 0 CHAPTER 13

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CHAPTER 16 1 to 12 0 16A–1 to 16A–2 0 16B–1 to 16B–4 0 16C–1 to 16C–2 0 16D–1 to 16D–2 0 16E–1 to 16E–4 0 16F–1 to 16F–2 0

CHAPTER 17 1 to 12 0 17A–1 to 17A–2 0 17B–1 to 17B–2 0

CHAPTER 18 1 to 6 0

CHAPTER 19 1 to 2 0

CHAPTER 20 1 to 6 0 20A–1 to 20A–2 0


CHAPTER 1 1 to 24 0

CHAPTER 2 1 to 28 0

POST PAGES

Glossary 1 to 10 0

List of Abbreviations 1 to 2 0



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Notes to Readers

NOTES TO READERS

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This AAP is managed in accordance with AAP 5030.001CD—Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual. Reference is to be made to this publication for Unit management of AAPs and for procedures for requesting additional copies of AAPs and Amendments.

Alternate Media

This publication is available in an Alternate Media to paper; a CD-ROM version is available by contacting the sponsor.

HOW TO READ THIS MANUAL

Ideally, readers are encouraged to read all chapters of this manual. In the absence of sufficient time, the following is a quick reference to where essential information is located.

The Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREGs) themselves may be found in Section 2. The key AEO regulation is TAREG 3, while for AMOs, TAREGs 4 and 5 apply.

Background, philosophy, explanatory, high level information is generally contained in Section 1. This section is essential reading for SDEs and SMMs and highly desirable for DSDEs and other key staff.

Guidance, interpretation, explanation, and examples, are contained in Section 3 (for engineering issues) and Section 4 (for maintenance). Additionally, suggested methods of compliance specifically for AEOs are provided in Section 3.

A regulation to guidance cross-reference for TAREGs 1-3 is available within Section 3, Chapter 1.

This publication supersedes AAP 7001.053(AM1)—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual, Date of Issue 06 Jan 05.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES INTRODUCED IN THIS RE-ISSUE

DEFGRAM No 730/2008 of 18 December 2008 provided details of the overall DGTA-DGTA reorganisation that took effect on 01 January 2009. DGTA-ADF was reorganised into three Directorates; Directorate of Aviation Engineering (DAVENG-DGTA), Directorate of Aviation Compliance (DAVCOMP-DGTA), and Directorate of Aviation Regulation (DAVREG-DGTA). DEFGRAM No 443/2009 provided specific detail about the new DAVCOMP-ADF structure following the DGTA-ADF reorganisation. This re-issue (AL0) of the TAMM reflects the details of the DGTA-ADF reorganisation across the entire manual.

General

Due to the size of the change required to reflect the current DTGA-ADF organisational strucure this publication has been amended and released as a re-issue and as such, amendment bars have not been used in any section throughout this book and all references to the Amendment List have been reset to zero (0). All previous issues of AAP 7001.053(AM)1 are now superseded by this re-issue.

All instances of the term “Regulation”, when preceding a numbered regulation, have been replaced with the term “TAREG”.

All instances of the term “Shall” have been replaced with the term “Must”.

Significant changes resulting from this re-issue are reflected in the following paragraphs:

Section 1, Chapter 1—The Regulatory System for the Management of Technical Airworthiness

• Paragraph 20 has had the final sentence, including reference to AAP 7001.059(AM1) removed.



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Section 2, TAREG 1.2.4 a(1)

• This change increases DAR eligibility to include DSDE, noting the general requirement for no more than one DAR per weapons system.

• Replace the word “service” with the term “ADF”.

Section 2, TAREG 1, Annex A and B

• The Annexes detailing the Identity of COEs and the Qualifications for an ASR have been updated to reflect the identity the current ASR positions.

Section 2, TAREG 2.2.4 b

• Confirm DAR requirement for SOR in that it contains "documentary evidence, certified by the DAR, that the SOR meets the requirements of TAREG 2.2.4. a. and b.

Section 2, TAREG 2.2.6

• Statement of Operating Intent - This Regulation has been removed in toto and it contents included in TAREG 2.6.2.


• This Regulation has been amended to reflect the intent of NPRM 02-09. in that it establishes the TAR requirement that Informed RPA must be applied in a measured and informed way, with the guidance material providing advice to Project Offices and SPOs on meeting TAR expectations on Informed RPA in aircraft acquisition and modification projects.

Section 2, TAREG 2.2.11 b(1) and (3)

• Insertion of the word “Analysis” in two places as analysis is fundamental to many compliance findings and assessments against standards.


• Added a new line requiring the DAR to attest that the SOR meets all requirements of 2.2.4. into the clause dealing with Authorised Maintenance Data.


• Changes to SOI - This Regulations’ title and content have been replaced with detail from TAREG 2.2.6 Statement of Operating Intent (SOI).

Section 2, TAREG 3, Annex A

• Improvement to the guidance to this annex by removing all references to 'paragraph 1' from the bulleted paragraphs and replaced with the word 'Eligibility'.

Section 2, TAREG 3, Annex G

• Improvement of the heading and sub-headings to this annex.

Section 2, TAREG 4.1.4 and 4.1.1 b

• Change to Draft CAAPs 42W-1(3) Documents for the supply of Aeronautical Product. This change confirms that CASA Form 1 must not be used to release aircraft.



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Section 3, Chapter 1, Annex D

• This annex is provided as an example of the SDE/DSDE assessment form which is now available as a fully editable document from the DGTA-ADF internet and intranet webpages.

Section 3, Chapter 2

• This change allows, in specific circumstances, for a DSDE of a Service AEO to be considered for delegation as a Design Acceptance Representative.


• This Chapter has been amended to reflect the intent of the new regulation sub-paragraph at TAREG 2.2.4 b (6).

• Revision of title and paragraphs relating to DAR Responsibilities at paragraph 15 and 16.

• Replaced all instances of “Recognition of Prior Acceptance” with the terms “Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance” or “Informed RPA”.


• This change includes the development of guidance for electronic records to reflect the intent of TAREG 3.3.8.


• This Chapter has been amended to clarify the guidance of TAREG 2.6.2, Statement of Operating Intent.


• This Chapter has been rewritten with extra guidance and annexes included to provide updated detail on the Design Acceptance process.

• Replaced all instances of “Recognition of Prior Acceptance” with the terms “Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance” or “Informed RPA”.

• Annex D amended to reflect the intent of NPRM 02-09.

Section 4

• Removed all references to Technical Data and replacing it with the term Authorised Maintenance Data.


• Removed all references to several outdated Instructions and References.


• Removed all references to several outdated Instructions and References.

Glossary

• Changes to definition of the category ‘Technical Integrity’.

• Changes to clarify the differences in the terms ‘Safety Critical Item’ and ‘Safety Critical System’.



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Amendment Certificate

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AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned Amendment Lists have been incorporated in this copy of the Publication:

Amendment List Amended By

No Date of Issue Printed Name Signature Date

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2

3

4

5

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7

8

9

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11

12

13

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Amendment Certificate

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Amendment List Amended By

No Date of Issue Printed Name Signature Date

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26

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION AND POLICY

CHAPTER 1 THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF THE ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR DESIGN-RELATED ENGINEERING

CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW OF THE ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR MAINTENANCE

CHAPTER 4 THE POLICY BACKGROUND FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

CHAPTER 5 THE APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS TO DESIGNS NOT AFFECTING TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

CHAPTER 6 COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

CHAPTER 7 LEGAL LIABILITY OF COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYEES

SECTION 2 REGULATIONS

CHAPTER 1 ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS

SECTION 3 AEO GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND GUIDELINES TO BECOMING AN AEO

CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES TO MAINTAINING AN AEO

CHAPTER 3 CONDUCT OF COMMERCIAL AEO AUDITS

CHAPTER 4 GETTING HELP–DESIGN SUPPORT NETWORKS

CHAPTER 5 TECHNICAL INFORMATION (TI)

CHAPTER 6 HOW TO PRODUCE APPROVED DESIGNS

CHAPTER 7 DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

CHAPTER 8 INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS

CHAPTER 9 DATA, DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS

CHAPTER 10 INCORPORATION APPROVAL AND SERVICE RELEASE FOR MINOR CHANGES TO A TYPE DESIGN

CHAPTER 11 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

CHAPTER 12 DESIGN ACCEPTANCE FOR MAJOR PROJECTS

CHAPTER 13 TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

CHAPTER 14 ADF AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND ROLE CHANGES


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Table of Contents

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SECTION 3 (CONT)

CHAPTER 15 ASCENG’S, DOS’S AND GWEO’S ROLE IN DESIGN ACCEPTANCE AND SERVICE RELEASE OF AIRCRAFT/STORES CONFIGURATIONS

CHAPTER 16 GUIDANCE FOR TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER 17 ENGINE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER 18 OHS IN DESIGN

CHAPTER 19 WEIGHT AND BALANCE

CHAPTER 20 CENTRES OF EXPERTISE AND AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES

SECTION 4 AMO GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS GUIDANCE–REGULATION SPECIFIC

CHAPTER 2 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES


AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Figures

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No Title Page No

SECTION 1

2–1 Assignment of Organisational Engineering Authority 2

2–2 DAR Delegation and Award of Engineering Authority (ADF AEO and COE) 3

2–3 Assignment of Engineering Authority to Service and Commercial AEOs 5

6–1 Standard Compliance Assurance Model 3

6–2 Modified Compliance Assurance Model 3

SECTION 3

5–A–1 Technical Information Flow Diagram 5A–1

6–1 Example of both Simple and Complex Design Review Processes 3

6–A–1 Design Control Flowchart for Minor Changes to the Type Design 6A–1

9–1 Relationship between the Three Types of Design Data 2

11–1 ASIP Parts 2

11–2 Primary Information Flow in ASIP Part 5 4

12–F1–1 Example ADF Certification Basis Description (Suitable for Projects Acquiring and then Modifying an Aircraft) 12F1–4 to 12F1–5

12–F1–2 Example ADF Certification Basis Description (Suitable for Modifications to In-Service Aircraft) 12F1–6

12–G–1 Part of an Example Generic Aircraft Work Breakdown Structure 12G–3


AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Figures

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Tables

LIST OF TABLES

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Table No Title Page No

SECTION 1

5–1 Example of the Classification of Design Activities 2

5–2 Determining the Application of the Regulations to Design Activities 3

SECTION 3

1–1 Regulation to Guidance Cross-Reference 1 to 5

1–A1–1 Example Regulation Compliance Matrix - XXSPO 1A1–1 to 1A1–3

1–D–1 SDE / DSDE Assessment Form 1D–2

1–D–2 IEAUST CPEng Requirements 1D–3 to 1D–4

3–1 Evaluation of Auditor Competence 2

4–A–1 XXSPO Example DSN Table 4A–4 to 4A–5

12–A–1 Excerpts from FAA’s Compliance Checklist for the Lockheed 382J 12A–1

12–B–1 Airworthiness Elements 12B–1 to 12B–4

12–C–1 Operating Environment Considerations 12C–3 to 12C–5

15–A1–1 Example A/SC Plan Presentation Template 15A1–1

17–B–1 ENSIP and ESIP Activities 17B–1 to 17B–2

20–A–1 COE and ASR Roadmap 20A–1


AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Tables

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Sect 1 Chap 1

1

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 1

THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

INTRODUCTION

1. Chief Of Staff Committee (COSC) determination 2/98, appointed Chief of Air Force (CAF) as the ADF Airworthiness Authority (AA). The ADF AA is responsible for the authorisation, development, implementation and audit of a Joint airworthiness regulatory system for Type certification and the continuing airworthiness management of all State Aircraft. The COSC determination also agreed to the establishment of a joint Technical Airworthiness Agency with Directorate General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA)-ADF as head, to develop, implement, manage and audit the technical aspects of a regulatory system, determine airworthiness certification requirements, establish aircraft structural integrity programs and manage in-service technical standards for all State Aircraft. As a result of the review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (the Weston Review) conducted in 1999 and confirmed by subsequent COSC meetings (principally 8/99), DGTA’s title when regulating with respect to technical airworthiness is the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). It is important to note that DGTA is also the delegated Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA). Explanations of the TAR and TAA role are provided below.

2. ADF Technical Airworthiness Regulator (ADF TAR). The ADF TAR is responsible to the ADF AA for development of a regulatory system for technical airworthiness management. DGTA is the ADF TAR.

3. ADF Technical Airworthiness Authority (ADF TAA). The ADF TAA is responsible to the ADF AA and responsive to Service Chiefs for determinations regarding technical airworthiness of State Aircraft and ADF aviation systems. The TAA has authority to interpret technical airworthiness regulations in the context of specific aircraft designs and maintenance processes. DGTA is also the TAA.

NOTE

• The regulations define the functions of DGTA as both the TAA and TAR. However, to reduce confusion DGTA is normally referred to as the TAR throughout this manual.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the TAR’s regulatory system for the management of technical airworthiness by the ADF.

SCOPE

5. This chapter describes the elements of the TAR’s regulatory system and in particular the role and content of this publication.

DEFINITIONS

6. Definitions relevant to Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are contained in the Glossary. All definitions pertaining to the terms used in Section 2 are to be considered as regulatory in nature.

ELEMENTS OF THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

7. A workable and effective regulatory system must provide an environment for the effective and efficient creation, promulgation and implementation of essential regulations to meet the aims of the Regulator (in this case, the TAR acting on behalf of the ADF AA). Thus, the TAR’s regulatory system needs to include:

a. appropriate and consistent high level policy,

b. organisational structures which clearly define an independent regulatory body, and

c. mechanisms for:

(1) clearly enunciating regulations,

(2) ensuring compliance with those regulations, and



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(3) monitoring the implications of compliance to prevent over-regulation.

8. The TAR’s current regulatory system addresses the elements listed in Paragraph 7 in the following way:

a. Adequate policy has now been issued in various Defence Instructions as described in Section 1, Chapter 4 of this manual.

b. Organisational aspects have been addressed by the creation of the Directorate General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA-ADF).

c. In terms of the necessary mechanisms:

(1) Section 2 of this manual provides the regulatory requirements applying to the design, construction and maintenance of aircraft and aircraft equipment, these regulations are described more fully in Paragraphs 15 to 23;

(2) Section 1, Chapter 6 provides compliance assurance procedures; and

(3) to provide for adequate safety with minimum constraint, DGTA has instituted a number of measures including user consultation, regular user conferences and annual meetings with individual users.

STRUCTURE OF THE TAMM

9. The TAMM is the key document of the TAR’s regulatory system, and is divided into four sections:

a. Section 1 – Introduction;

b. Section 2 – Regulations;

c. Section 3 – Guidance for Regulations (Engineering); and

d. Section 4 – Guidance for Regulations (Maintenance).

10. Section 1 – Introduction. Section 1 explains the principles underpinning the regulations, the relationship between regulations and guidance, the policy background against which the regulations were developed and DGTA’s TAMM compliance assurance mechanisms.

11. Section 2 – Regulations. Section 2 contains all the regulations a person or organisation must satisfy within the ADF’s technical airworthiness system. These regulations address the procedures associated with the use and interpretation of regulations, the conduct and acceptance of design, construction and maintenance; and the interfaces between operational and technical airworthiness.

12. Section 3 – Guidance for Regulations (Engineering). Section 3 contains guidance to the engineering-related regulations. This guidance may provide information concerning the basis, scope, general application or precise implementation of the regulations.

13. Section 4 – Guidance for Regulations (Maintenance). Section 4 contains guidance to the maintenance-related regulations. This guidance may provide information concerning the basis, scope, general application or precise implementation of the regulations.

Related Manuals

14. Design Standard Management. There are two complementary aspects of the regulatory system: engineering management (focussed on the design, construction and maintenance processes) and design standard management (focussed on the product). Regulations governing engineering management are promulgated and explained by this manual. Design standard management is also the responsibility of DGTA, who sponsor AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual, which lists the TAR’s preferred design standards and provides extensive information on their application to ADF aircraft.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS BEHIND THE REGULATIONS

Why? – The Purpose of the Regulations

15. The authority of the TAR to regulate for the technical airworthiness of all State Aircraft is based upon recognition of the need to have a single technical regulatory system to preserve the safety of those aircraft. Any regulations issued by the TAR must therefore have but one purpose, the assurance of the safety of State Aircraft in all their intended roles.



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16. It is useful here to note that DGTA also has responsibility and authority with respect to the safety, capability and efficiency of all State Aircraft and related equipment and that whilst the regulations are not written to address this responsibility they have some applicability. The precise application of the regulations to these other areas of DGTA’s authority is contained at Section 1, Chapter 5.

What? – The Scope of the Regulations

17. CAF, acting as the AA for all State Aircraft operated by ADF, has determined (at DI(G) OPS 02-2) that to be considered airworthy, from a technical perspective, an aircraft must be designed, constructed and maintained:

a. to approved standards,

b. by competent and approved individuals,

c. who are acting as members of either an approved or authorised organisation, and

d. whose work is certified as correct, and accepted by the ADF.

18. DI(G) OPS 02-2 then defines Technical Airworthiness Management as a process involving the regulation, authorisation and review of technical activities necessary to ensure the continued airworthiness and flight safety of State Aircraft. The definition of airworthiness from DI(G) OPS 02-2 indicates that the engineering activities most relevant to Technical Airworthiness management relate to design, construction and maintenance, thus these three aspects of engineering are the subjects of these regulations.

Who? – The Audience of the Regulations

19. Many of the regulations in this manual will be met by persons and organisations that provide engineering services, be they related to design, construction or maintenance. However, the principal audience of the regulations is, in fact comprised of those persons responsible for accepting, on behalf of the Commonwealth, those services. Thus the regulations must do two things, first they have to clearly state the scope of the authority delegated to those persons accepting engineering services on behalf of the Commonwealth. Secondly, the regulations must clearly define how, and the conditions under which, that authority may be exercised. Thus the regulations will generally allow the delegate considerable freedom, however, the regulations must place boundaries on that discretion.

Where? – The Location of the Regulations

20. In any regulatory regime, the regulations must be separated from information that is advisory. It is also essential that those regulations be contained at a single place and be under the effective control of the Regulator. For these reasons, all the regulations pertaining to technical airworthiness management are contained in Section 2 of this manual. These regulations are entirely self-contained with no regulatory force being exported to other documents via cross-references.

When? – The Applicability of the Regulations in an Aircraft’s Life Cycle

21. Since the scope of the regulations covers design, construction and maintenance, they therefore apply to both the acquisition and in-service phases of an aircraft’s life cycle. In other words, the regulations apply to a Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) Project Office or Systems Program Office (SPO) when acquiring an aircraft type, a commercial organisation either constructing or upgrading aircraft, and the design and maintenance organisations (either Service or commercial) providing in-service engineering support to an aircraft type.

22. Not all regulations will apply to each of the classes of organisation identified above, since the scope of engineering and maintenance activities is different in each case. Applicability of each major regulation is explained briefly as follows:

a. TAREG 1. TAREG 1 pertains to general application of the regulations (applicable to all) as well as Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs) and Airworthiness Standards Representatives (ASRs). Since DAR and ASR delegations are made to only Commonwealth employees, these will generally only apply to Service organisations.

b. TAREG 2. TAREG 2 pertains to the TAR’s requirements for Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance. This regulation is written in terms of outcomes, rather than processes required by TAREG 3, as the majority of requirements are used to support evidence that an aircraft Type is airworthy, either at acquisition, after upgrade or during in-service review. This regulation is therefore particularly relevant to acquisition Project Offices as well as Service organisations performing Design Acceptance certification (and other organisations authorised to perform Assumption of Design Acceptance certification).



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c. TAREG 3. TAREG 3 pertains to certification as an Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) – see Section 1, Chapter 2. An AEO is an organisation performing Design Control and/or Configuration Item (CI) Management activities. It is therefore generally applicable (in whole or in part) to in-service organisations (both Service and commercial), as well as organisations conducting design during acquisition or upgrade (generally commercial organisations). In terms of design, the principles of Design Control apply equally to all designs irrespective of complexity.

d. TAREG 4. TAREG 4 pertains to certification as an Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) – see Section 1, Chapter 3. It is applicable to both Service and commercial organisations performing maintenance on State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product.

e. TAREG 5. TAREG 5 outlines the regulatory requirements for aircraft and Aeronautical Product maintenance and management procedures to be used by AMOs. It is also applicable to both Service and commercial AMOs.

How? – The Content of the Regulations

23. Bearing in mind the concepts described previously, the regulations principally regulate two basic points:

a. Entry Control. Entry Control - whereby engineering activities are limited only to persons and organisations authorised by the TAR, thus providing a measure of control over the manner in which such activities are performed and ensuring that the necessary rigour is applied.

b. Acceptance. Acceptance - the logical culmination of all the engineering activities performed for the Commonwealth is their acceptance by the Commonwealth. Therefore, the regulations must provide a practical application of the relevant policies defining the ADF’s means of establishing and maintaining the quality of aircraft design, construction and maintenance services.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

24. The regulations are the rules by which everyone who designs, constructs or maintains aircraft on behalf of the ADF will operate. However, just as it is impossible to determine the flow and tactics of a game of football from just reading the rules, so too it is very difficult to grasp how the regulations apply to engineering in the work place without additional material. The guidance in Sections 3 and 4 provide this additional material. They consist of a range of good practices, interpretations and precedents intended to assist the Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) users in applying the regulations. However, it must be stressed repeatedly that the regulations in Section 2 always have precedence over any direction in Section 1 or guidance in Sections 3 and 4.

CONTRACTOR TRANSITION FROM PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF THE TAMM

25. Engineering and Maintenance Organisations. The TAR recognises that a number of commercial organisations are still under contract against previous Amendment Lists (AL) or issues of the TAMM. These organisations will continue to be bound by, and audited against, that version of the TAMM until either:

a. the expiration of the contract;

b. the contractor seeks to extend the scope of its engineering or maintenance management system beyond that covered by the issue of the TAMM as contracted, but compliant with the latest TAMM regulations;

c. the contractor elects, via a nil-cost contract change proposal, to amend their engineering or maintenance management system to comply with the latest TAMM regulations; or

d. the contractor changes its engineering or maintenance management system to comply with the latest TAMM regulations following the conclusion of negotiations relating to a contract change proposal between the contractor and the Commonwealth.



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SECTION 1

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR DESIGN-RELATED ENGINEERING

INTRODUCTION

1. Upon first sight the regulations in Section 2 can appear intimidating and confusing. Since the individual regulations only define the necessary outcomes it is difficult to grasp the broader requirements. Whilst this difficulty is undesirable, it is also unavoidable if the regulations are to serve their primary purpose.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the regulatory system for design-related engineering. In particular, this chapter will identify the major classes of organisations and persons mentioned in the regulations and describe the relationships between them. This chapter also provides a brief philosophical overview of the principal regulations relevant to design engineering, noting that further detailed guidance concerning specific regulations is contained in Section 3.

DEFINITIONS

3. Definitions relevant to Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are contained in the glossary. All definitions pertaining to the terms used in Section 2 are to be considered as regulatory in nature.

ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONNEL IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

4. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) has three distinct roles within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) technical airworthiness regulatory system. These roles are to:

a. establish a regulatory system to control who may undertake engineering activities with respect to State Aircraft and related equipment, and to establish the requirements those organisations must satisfy;

b. define the standards to be applied to the design of aircraft and related equipment; and

c. assign authority to organisations or to delegate it to individuals to perform engineering activities on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to ensure those authorities and delegations are exercised in accordance with the relevant regulations.

5. The TAR does not personally conduct all these activities, rather he or she has an extensive staff to provide support where required. Further, to provide flexibility for any future organisational change, the regulations refer to the TAR, not the TAR’s appointment, and not to appointments within the TAR’s staff. Authorised members of the TAR’s staff may act on behalf of the TAR; of these, formal actions are classified as Authoritative Airworthiness Advice (AAA), refer TAREG 1.1.5 and Section 3, Chapter 5.

6. Most engineering work carried out on State Aircraft and related equipment is performed by organisations separate from the TAR and their staff. These organisations are awarded Engineering Authority (EA) to undertake work and are referred to as Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs). Their authority is generally recorded and promulgated via an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) issued from the TAR to the AEO. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2–1.

7. AEOs perform a wide variety of engineering tasks. Some AEOs e.g. Systems Program Offices (SPOs) and Weapon System Business Units (WSBUs) are responsible for the management of entire aircraft systems. Other AEOs may only be responsible for providing design and/or configuration item management services with respect to particular components or technologies. The regulations make no distinction between these organisations and refer to all as simply AEOs.



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Figure 2–1 Assignment of Organisational Engineering Authority

8. The Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) is largely silent on the kind of person to be found within an AEO, generally referring only to competent and authorised persons. Thus AEOs have considerable freedom to determine what organisational structure best suits their situation. The regulations refer to only two distinct positions, a Senior Executive and a Senior Design Engineer (SDE), and one general class of persons, Design Engineers (DEs). The Senior Executive is the individual in overall charge or command of the organisation, and therefore has control of resource and schedule issues which impact upon engineering processes. The SDE is the engineer who has overall responsibility for ensuring the quality of the engineering system and its outputs. DEs are engineers with sufficient qualifications and experience to exercise professional judgement in cases where the design requires such judgement, or where the implications of the design may not be readily apparent.

9. Some AEOs may establish Deputy Senior Design Engineers (DSDEs) should circumstances require them. For larger organisations, the intent is to allow for persons other than the SDE to be able to perform Design Approval of Significant designs without subsequent review of decisions by the SDE, as well as the ability to assign internal EA to subordinate personnel within the scope and level of the DSDE’s EA. Use of DSDEs is not mandatory, and overall responsibility for the Engineering Management System (EMS) remains the responsibility of the SDE. Further guidance concerning DSDEs can be found in Section 3, Chapter 1 and 6.

Design Acceptance Representatives and Airworthiness Standards Representatives

10. Under the system illustrated at Figure 2–1, all designs and design changes would need to be forwarded to the TAR for Design Acceptance certification prior to their incorporation. This situation is clearly unworkable and the TAR has therefore delegated authority to individuals to act as his representative to manage the Design Acceptance process on behalf of the Commonwealth. These individuals are referred to by the regulations as Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs). This structure is illustrated at Figure 2–2.

11. DARs are only appointed within those AEOs responsible for the Configuration Item (CI) management of whole aircraft or aircraft related equipment. In effect, this means that only the SPOs, Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) and selected aircraft Project Offices (for acquisition) have DARs. Where AEOs have a configuration management responsibility for aircraft subsystems e.g. Maritime Patrol Systems Project Office – Aircraft Life Support Equipment (MPSPO-ALSE) or where the SDE is not a Commonwealth employee, Design Acceptance certification must be either passed directly to the DAR of the parent aircraft or system, or an Assumption of Design Acceptance agreement must be established between the DAR and the AEO in accordance with TAREG 2.5.9. This agreement allows the AEO to assume Design Acceptance certification normally provided by the DAR for certain types of designs.

12. As stated at Paragraph 5, the TAR and his or her staff would normally be responsible for the definition of the standards to be applied to aircraft and related equipment designs and the interpretation of those standards. However, in a number of areas e.g. Aerial Delivery and Aircraft Stores Clearance, there are other organisations having sufficient expertise to identify and interpret these standards. These organisations have been identified in the regulations as Centres of Expertise (COE). The engineering element of these organisations is headed by an Airworthiness Standards Representatives (ASRs) who, like a DAR, exercises a personal delegation from the TAR to perform the design standard definition role of the Regulator, Figure 2–2.



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13. As both the DAR and ASR are performing roles of the TAR under a personal delegation, their positions can only be filled by Commonwealth employees. DAR and ASR delegations may not be further delegated without the explicit and written permission of the TAR.

Figure 2–2 DAR Delegation and Award of Engineering Authority (ADF AEO and COE)

Project Offices

14. Project Offices (POs) provide the management of major and minor changes to a Type Design or the acquisition of new aircraft. Many POs will form part of an existing aircraft SPO. Other POs, while still part of a Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) Division, will be established as a separate entity as they may be overseeing a new capability to be integrated into multiple weapon platforms or managing the acquisition of a new aircraft for which a SPO has not yet been formed. These POs invariably manage all, or part, of the Design Acceptance process but do not undertake either CI management or design service provision; consequently, they are not required to become AEOs.

15. For POs not forming part of an existing aircraft SPO, DMO’s Aerospace Systems Division AEO, has developed an Engineering Management System (EMS) which includes procedures for the management of technical airworthiness for major changes to Type Design and new aircraft projects. Via DMO Division Head agreement, all POs that could be subject to technical airworthiness regulation will comply with the requirements of the ASD Acquisition EMS. For POs within an existing aircraft SPO, the SPO’s EMS will provide the engineering management system for the project but should adopt, as near as practicable, ASD EMS procedures.

16. Design Acceptance Certification for major changes to a Type Design or for the acquisition of a new aircraft will be provided as follows:

a. the SPO DAR for POs within an existing aircraft SPO;

b. the parent aircraft DAR for POs not forming part of an existing aircraft SPO and managing changes to an existing Type Design; or

c. an acquisition project DAR for projects not forming part of an existing aircraft SPO.

Commercial Authorised Engineering Organisations

17. The ADF relies heavily upon commercial AEOs to provide engineering services in the initial design, construction and maintenance of aircraft and related equipment. Commercial AEOs also provide design support for in-service aircraft and related equipment. The ADF technical airworthiness system applies equally to these commercial AEOs as it does to any Australian Defence Organisation (ADO), refer Figure 2–3. The regulations require that all commercial AEOs:



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a. be required to comply with the regulations by an enforceable legal instrument,

b. comply with all applicable regulations, and

c. be sponsored by a ADF AEO.

18. The regulations differentiate between Service and commercial AEOs only when necessary; at all other times, they are treated as equally as possible. Where there are differences in treatment, these have arisen because:

a. Service and commercial AEOs are bound to follow the regulations via very different mechanisms. ADF AEOs are bound by Defence administrative and disciplinary procedures whereas commercial AEOs are bound only via a legal instrument; and

b. the vast majority of commercial AEOs will be contracted by ADF AEOs to perform design services on their behalf. Virtually all commercial AEOs will form part of a ADF AEO’s Design Support Network (DSN). ADF AEOs are therefore required to adopt a sponsorship role of the commercial AEOs forming part of their DSN.

HOW TO ENTER THIS ENVIRONMENT

19. Unlike the civil regulatory environment, entry into the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system is not discretionary. If a person or organisation is performing any of the activities covered by these regulations on any State Aircraft or related equipment, that person or organisation must apply for and receive the appropriate authority first. Also, no person or organisation will be awarded any authority unless they have a role in design-related engineering. Entry to the ADF’s regulatory system is strictly limited to those who are, or will be in the immediate future, performing design-related engineering with respect to State Aircraft or related equipment.

20. In contrast, the civil regulatory environment is open to anyone who would care to enter and who meets the relevant requirements. Therefore, a person or organisation planning (or hoping) to do work but with no actual tasking at that time can apply for and receive authority to undertake engineering activities at some point in the future.

21. Commonwealth employees seeking personal TAR delegations as a DAR or ASR are to apply via a Minute, providing suitable evidence of their compliance against the respective requirements of TAREG 1 and TAREG 3, Annex A.

22. Organisations seeking an EAC from the TAR are required to submit an application accompanied by an Engineering Management Plan (EMP) and a copy of all procedures, plans or instructions referenced in the EMP. Such application is to be made directly to the TAR for a Service organisation and via the identified sponsor AEO for a commercial organisation. EAC applications will be reviewed and the applicant organisation evaluated as described in Section 1, Chapter 6. Further details of EMP requirements are contained in Section 3, Chapter 1.



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Figure 2–3 Assignment of Engineering Authority to Service and Commercial AEOs

23. The regulations describe a number of processes, and it can be difficult to see how they all fit together. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of some of the concepts. Regulation areas such as Aircraft Stores Clearances A/SC and Special Flight Permits (SFPs) are not discussed, as they are applicable to only a relatively small number of organisations. Other areas of the regulations e.g. record keeping have been omitted as they are general requirements. The regulations can be considered in three broad conceptual areas: Design Acceptance, Design Control and Configuration Item (CI) management.

DESIGN

Design Acceptance

24. Design Acceptance is a determination of the technical acceptability of a design to the ADF and by extension, the Commonwealth. Design Acceptance is therefore the cornerstone of the ADF’s engineering regulatory system and the fundamental reason for the DAR’s existence. Design Acceptance is a quality management process, not an act. The Design Acceptance process comprises four phases:

a. Specification of Requirement. The ADF’s requirements must be articulated via a specification document providing a suitable basis for Design Acceptance in that the requirements are sufficiently complete, verifiable and attainable. The specification document is referred to within the regulations as forming part of the ADF Statement of Requirements (SOR), refer TAREGs 2.2.4 and 2.5.7.

b. Determination of Competency. The organisation performing the design must be assessed as having, and must be judged to have applied, the necessary quality systems and competence to complete the design and development with acceptable levels of technical risk. The TAR’s method of recognising organisational competence is through certification as an AEO to an appropriate level and scope.

c. Verification of Requirement Satisfaction. The Commonwealth must ensure that its requirements are satisfied prior to accepting a product. Therefore Design Acceptance requires verification that the test and evaluation results produced by, or presented to, the Commonwealth provide adequate evidence that the design complies with the specification.



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d. Certification of Requirement Satisfaction. Design certification is required from the design agency stating that the design meets the specification. The regulations refer to this as Design Approval certification, refer TAREG 3.4.3.

25. The Design Acceptance process is the responsibility of the DAR to manage, although certain activities within the process may be delegated to staff or commercial organisations. For example, DARs may delegate review of test reports or design certificates to their staff or to organisations forming part of their DSN.

26. The DAR may not delegate the final act of Design Acceptance certification. This certification is required prior to incorporation of the design in the case of changes to existing equipment and prior to issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for aircraft acquisitions. While the DAR may not delegate this authority without TAR approval, for designs classified as Minor, refer TAREG 2.5.3, the DAR may establish an Assumption of Design Acceptance arrangement, refer TAREG 2.5.9 and Section 3, Chapter 7. Such an arrangement allows specific individuals the ability to assume that the DAR would have provided Design Acceptance certification.

Design Control

27. The regulations require a relatively simple design control process be implemented to reduce the risk of errors. Given that Design Acceptance is the cornerstone of the regulations, the design control process has been regulated from the point of view of what must be done to achieve Design Acceptance certification. Thus it may appear to be presented in reverse order.

Design Approval and Design Review

28. The regulations require that only designs properly approved via the issue of Design Approval certification, may receive Design Acceptance certification. Requirements for Design Approval and Design Review are prescribed at TAREGs 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 and Section 3, Chapter 6.

29. The TAR considers that Design Review is a critical step in the design control process, essential to ensuring the airworthiness of all designs to be implemented on aircraft or aircraft-related equipment. Thus, the regulations require that:

a. all designs and design outputs are subject to Design Review (no matter how simple or limited in scope);

b. Design Review must be independent i.e. design reviewers must not have participated in the development of the design or design output; and

c. for designs judged as Significant, two professional engineers are to be involved in the development or review of the design.

30. When a person other than an authorised DE develops a design judged as Significant, the person providing the Design Approval certification i.e. SDE, DSDE or specifically authorised DE, must not have participated in either Design Development or Review and must provide a second level of review as part of the Design Approval process.

Judgement of Significance

31. All designs are required to be subject to a Judgement of Significance (JoS). This judgement is an assessment of the technical risk introduced by the implementation of the design and must consider both the probability and consequence of partial performance or failure of a design. Subsequent to a JoS, all designs must be classed as either Significant or Non-significant. Designs judged as Significant are subject to a more rigorous Design Review and Approval process. For further information refer to TAREG 3.4.5 and Section 3, Chapter 6.

Performance of Design and Design Planning

32. The TAR recognises that designs and design changes originate from many sources and differ markedly in scope and complexity. The regulations have not attempted to control who may perform design. The regulations require organisations to conduct design in accordance with a design plan. The design plan is intended to ensure that the design process is adequately guided in accordance with the specification, in terms of its development, review, and approval. For further information concerning design planning, refer Annex A to TAREG 2, TAREG 3.4.1 and Section 3, Chapter 6.

33. The regulations require that organisational and technical interfaces are well defined and documented, in recognition of common partnerships between SPOs, WSBUs and other AEOs during design development.



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CONFIGURATION ITEM MANAGEMENT

34. TAREG 3.5 refers to CI management, not simply configuration management. This regulation contains the requirements for AEOs, responsible for the management of CIs, as opposed to AEOs who simply perform design on CIs managed by others. Not all of TAREG 3.5 will apply to all CI managers, e.g. TAREGs 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 pertaining to aircraft/engine structural management are only applicable to organisations managing whole aircraft and engines.

Technical Information Review

35. Organisations managing CIs usually receive large quantities of Technical Information (TI) which may be of use in managing the equipment for which they are responsible. Often such TI will be received as part of an even broader selection of general correspondence, much of which may not be technical in nature. To remain fully informed and capable of discharging their responsibilities, organisations need a process of Technical Information Review (TIR) in accordance with TAREG 3.5.2 to collect, record and analyse TI, and decide on the appropriate action to take. Refer to Section 3, Chapter 5 for further guidance.

Aircraft and Engine Structural Integrity

36. The ADF’s experience with operating and maintaining aircraft has made it clear that airframe lives must be managed very carefully if the aircraft is to remain airworthy, without shortening its life through overly conservative usage and damage assumptions. Thus, TAREG 3.5.4 requires that airframes receive such management via an Aircraft Structural Integrity management system. The regulation calls for audits of maintenance requirements against the Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP) and other specialised processes. It also requires that ASIMPs be reviewed at least every year.

37. Recent trends in aircraft engine design and ADF experience in aircraft engines has shown that engine and engine component lives are best managed using specialised processes similar to those traditionally applied to aircraft structures. TAREG 3.5.5 requires organisations responsible for the CI management of engines to put an Engine Structural Integrity (ESI) management system in place in accordance with an ESIM Plan (ESIMP).

Modifications, Substitutions and Deviations

38. TAREG 3.5 allows three distinct ways of changing the configuration of a CI. These are: deviations, substitutions and modifications. The distinction between each is explained in the following paragraphs.

39. Deviation. A configuration change to a CI is to be managed as a deviation where:

a. one or a limited number of CIs within a population will depart from the current approved type design; or

b. where the entire population of a CI will depart from the current approved type design for a limited time.

40. Deviations will normally be raised to deal with accidental damage, production errors, deterioration or unavailability of material or parts, or any other occurrence generally limited in duration.

41. Substitution. A configuration change is to be managed as a substitution where:

a. a new part is to be authorised for use in a CI as an alternative to or replacement for, a currently approved part; and

b. the configuration change has no other effect on the functionality, interface characteristics or logistics support requirements of the affected CI or CIs.

42. Modification. All other changes are to be managed as a modification. In effect, a modification is a configuration change that effects the whole population of a CI permanently and also affects the ‘form, fit or function’ of either the CI being changed or other CIs in the relevant system. It must be noted that these classes of configuration change are not absolute and rely upon the judgement of the engineers and technical personnel involved in the process.

Incorporation Approval and Service Release

43. Incorporation Approval (IA) of a design change is the formal process of permitting a design change to proceed from the design to the incorporation phase and has the effect of committing whatever resources are required for implementation. Service Release (SR) is the process of permitting the actual in-service use of the design change. Each of these processes need to address a wide range of engineering, support, contract, cost and schedule considerations, however, the regulations are limited to engineering issues. Refer to TAREGs 3.5.12 and 3.5.13 and Section 3, Chapter 10 for further details.



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44. The distinction between IA and SR regulations lies in the difference between the word ‘draft’ and ‘all’. The documentation set required to fully implement a design will probably still be incomplete for the grant of IA. For example, a design change to an item in the cockpit of an aircraft may receive IA prior to the completion or even drafting, of any amendments to the flight manual required by that change. SR may only be granted, in the above example, when those hypothetical flight manual amendments and any other documentation amendments are complete and issued.

Management of Type Design Data

45. This chapter and the associated regulations are generally concerned with CI management rather than the rather more restricted configuration management. TAREGs 2.2.8, 2.2.9 and 3.5.14, concerning the management of Type Design data; however, are intended to capture the essential outcomes required by the TAR of the discipline commonly known as ‘configuration management’.

46. The primary outcome required of an organisation managing Type Design data is that only relevant data is used for design activities. For further information refer to Section 3, Chapter 12, Annex E.



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SECTION 1

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF THE ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR MAINTENANCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The design-related regulations originally defined a new approach to ADF aircraft engineering, whereas maintenance related regulations in Section 2 as TAREGs 4 and 5, include existing ADF maintenance policy and practices in the technical airworthiness regulatory system. Additionally, the TAREGs 4 and 5 have been developed to harmonise with equivalent worldwide civilian airworthiness regulations.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the ADF aircraft maintenance regulatory system as defined by TAREGs 4 and 5. In particular, this chapter describes maintenance organisations regulated by TAREGs 4 and 5 and provides an overview of the relationship between those organisations and TAREGs 4 and 5.

DEFINITIONS

3. Definitions relevant to Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are contained in the Glossary. All definitions pertaining to the terms used in Section 2 are to be considered as regulatory in nature.

ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONNEL IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations

4. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) requires visibility of all Service and commercial organisations conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product, within and outside Australia. In order to achieve the required visibility, the TAR has defined organisations, that are approved by the TAR, and which can be used and managed by relevant ADF Sponsors, to conduct maintenance.

5. These organisations are defined as TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO) and include:

a. Certified maintenance organisations in accordance with TAREG 4.3;

b. Organisations that are part of a certified AMO’s Maintenance Support Network (MSN), and are conducting maintenance on behalf of, and within the certified AMO’s scope and level of maintenance in accordance with TAREG 4.4.3;

c. Organisations granted Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA) by the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) of an ADF Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) in accordance with TAREG 4.1.3;

d. Organisations holding certifications from TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities in accordance with TAREG 4.1.4, and which provide the applicable Authorised Release Certificate (ARC) for the maintenance performed;

e. Organisations that are AEOs undertaking maintenance confined to the installation of modifications, which have been developed by that AEO in accordance with TAREG 3.5.20.c.; and

f. Organisations that have been approved using the DGTA-ADF system of Other TAR Approvals.

6. General details of AMOs and the role of the Sponsor are provided in the following paragraphs. Section 4 Chapter 1 provides further explanation, amplification and guidance for each regulation.

7. Technical airworthiness assurance is maintained by reviewing, assessing and auditing prospective and established AMOs. In particular, technical airworthiness activities include, but are not limitied to:

a. the Sponsor ensuring that only AMOs are used to conduct maintenance;

b. Directorate General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA)-ADF assessment of new applicants for AMO certification for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5 against the proposed scope and level of maintenance;

c. DGTA-ADF surveillance of established AMOs; and



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d. the TAR managing compliance assessments or limiting, suspending or withdrawing AMO certifications or other TAR approvals from organisations that fail to conform with their maintenance management systems (MMS).

ROLE OF THE SPONSOR

8. The Sponsor is an ADF organisation, usually a Force Element Group (FEG) Headquarters or System Program Office (SPO), having corporate responsibility and authority to manage maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. When maintenance is required to be conducted to meet ADF aviation capability requirements, the Sponsor will allocate maintenance to organisations that have been approved by the TAR and are referred to as AMOs.

9. The roles and responsibilities of the Sponsor are to:

a. ensure that only AMOs are used to conduct maintenance;

b. identify and nominate to the TAR details of all organisations conducting, or proposed to conduct, maintenance under the Sponsor’s management;

c. for commercial organisations, ensure where applicable, AMO requirements are incorporated in a contract or other form of acceptable agreement to formalise the provision of maintenance services;

d. review and assess acceptability of Requests for Exemptions to the TAR from organisations or persons that can not comply with one or more applicable TAREGs 4 and 5;

e. support prospective AMOs with the development of their AMO submissions;

f. on receipt of an AMO submission; review it for:

(1) consistency with the Sponsor’s identified maintenance requirement;

(2) compliance with applicable contractual clauses regarding AMO requirements; and

(3) any significant concerns or issues that need to be addressed before the AMO submission is forwarded to the TAR.

NOTE

• Directorate of Aviation Compliance (DAVCOMP)-DGTA is responsible for assessing every AMO submission for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5

g. forward the AMO submission to DAVCOMP-DGTA with a covering letter or minute indicating support for the AMO submission and detailing any identified regulatory concerns;

h. if desired, and approved by DAVCOMP-DGTA staff, participate as an observer in any DGTA-ADF AMO audits or other surveillance activities. Note: where the Sponsor staff include appropriately trained and experienced auditors, broader participation in DGTA-ADF audits or other surveillance activities may be possible;

i. where applicable and appropriate, manage the contractual implications of any non-compliances;

j. provide ongoing feedback to DAVCOMP-DGTA when the Sponsor becomes aware of any regulatory non-compliances, performance issues or adverse maintenance issues of AMOs conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product; and

k. notify the TAR in every instance when the Sponsor’s requirement for an AMO to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product has lapsed.

CERTIFIED APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATION (AMO)

10. Unless the TAR provides other specific approvals, Service and commercial organisations seeking to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product are required to be certified AMOs. To qualify as a certified AMO, an organisation must hold a current Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC) issued by the TAR. Each MAC consists of a certificate signed by the TAR with an accompanying Schedule that details the scope and level of maintenance. Note that the Schedule will be a detailed disclosure of the AMO’s capability.

11. Scope and level of Maintenance. The statement of scope and level establishes the bounds of the maintenance services an AMO may provide.



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a. Scope. Scope is stated in terms of, or a combination of, aircraft type, aircraft systems/sub-systems or Aeronautical Product to be supported and will normally extend to a detailed listing, by Part Number or System as required, of the support capability provided to the Commonwealth.

b. Level. Level is usually defined by up to four distinct tiers: On-aircraft Operational Maintenance, Off-aircraft Operational Maintenance, On-aircraft Deeper Maintenance, and Off-aircraft Deeper Maintenance.

12. Assessment and certification of AMOs are required to establish and objectively control State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product maintenance airworthiness standards. These controls provide assurance to the TAR that organisations conducting maintenance do so to a consistent and acceptable standard. Further, they allow the TAR to determine individual and organisational maintenance responsibility.

How a Commercial Organisation Becomes a Certified AMO

13. A commercial organisation seeking AMO certification must be able to demonstrate to the TAR that the organisation is required to be certified as an AMO to provide maintenance services of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. This is usually achieved by entering into a contract with the Commonwealth to provide maintenance services. However, under the Technical Airworthiness Regulatory system, there is no requirement for a commercial organisation seeking AMO certification to be in contract with the Commonwealth. A commercial organisation seeking AMO certification must have its AMO submission endorsed by an eligible Sponsor. The Sponsor must define the maintenance activities required and continue to provide sponsorship of that organisation.

14. For commercial organisations that are participating in the contract negotiation process and have been identified as the preferred tenderer, the AMO certification process does not preclude assessment of that organisation for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5 during contract negotiations. Assessments at that stage will normally be to a system level; however, the successful tenderer will be required to submit an AMO submission for assessment by DAVCOMP-DGTA as soon as possible after contract signature. The precise date of submission will be dictated by the contract and must be advised to DAVCOMP-DGTA so that timely processing of the submission can be provided.

How a Service Organisation Becomes a Certified AMO

15. An AMO submission from a Service organisation will be treated in much the same way as in the preceding paragraphs that dealt with commercial organisations. That is, they will be subject to a system audit followed by a compliance audit. When a new Service organisation is formed, or a previously disbanded Service organisation is reformed, that Service organisation is to forward its AMO submission through its Sponsor as soon as possible. New or reformed Service organisations should expect the permissible timeframe to become an AMO will be advised by the sponsoring FEG at, or slightly before, the time when the Service organisation is initially formed or reformed.

AMO Certification Process

16. The steps to achieve AMO certification are outlined as follows:

a. A Service or commercial organisation (referred to hereafter as the applicant) prepares an AMO submission, which consists of a Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) and other referenced data, procedures or instructions. The applicant sends the AMO submission to their relevant Sponsor for review.

b. The Sponsor is required to review the applicant’s AMO submission for completeness prior to forwarding to DAVCOMP-DGTA with the Sponsor’s recommendation.

c. Upon receipt of an applicant’s AMO submission DAVCOMP-DGTA conducts a system audit to assess the entire submission against TAREGs 4 and 5. Once DAVCOMP-DGTA has completed a system audit of the applicant’s submission and is satisfied with the results, DAVCOMP-DGTA conducts a site assessment to confirm the adequacy of the applicant’s facilities (as required). Note that at this stage the applicant’s submission is not expected to be completely Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) compliant; however, it is expected to be sufficiently advanced as to assure a very high probability of reaching the required compliance within a short time.

d. When the applicant’s AMO submission is correct and site assessment is satisfactorily complete, the TAR awards AMO certification in the form of a MAC and accompanying Schedule, with any limitations and/or conditions as necessary. An initial compliance audit will generally be conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA within eight months after certification to confirm the AMO’s Maintenance Management System (MMS) complies, or continues to comply, with all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5. The composition of the DGTA-ADF audit team would depend on the applicant’s scope and level of maintenance and any particular conditions set by the TAR.



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17. AMOs conduct a variety of maintenance tasks. Some AMOs, particularly the flying squadrons with an organic maintenance capability, will be responsible for the complete aircraft as well as Aeronautical Product maintenance to the level and scope of their certification. Other AMOs may only be responsible for maintenance of a very limited range of Aeronautical Product. TAREGs 4 and 5 make no distinction between these organisations and simply refer to them as certified AMOs.

18. The Sponsor may choose to provide an instrument of authorisation to initiate the commencement of maintenance, with any other limitations or conditions additional to the TAR’s limitations or conditions. The instrument of authorisation may be the contract, standing offer, purchase order, or in the form of a minute, or other correspondence that details the commencement of maintenance in accordance with the certification from the TAR.

19. The AMO certification process involves close collaboration between DAVCOMP-DGTA and the Sponsor. The initial system audit, site assessment, certification and management of corrective actions are conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA. DGTA-ADF surveillance activities have been put in place to continually assess AMOs to ensure their Maintenance Management Systems remain compliant with the TAREGs 4 and 5.

20. Sponsors may choose to implement their own second party surveillance activities to monitor corporate governance aspects, which may include surveillance programs of maintenance activities such as HQ16 Avn Bde Annual Technical Review (ATRs), Fleet Air Arm audit checklists respectively. From time to time, the Sponsor’s second party surveillance activities may be conducted with the provision of DGTA-ADF auditors to assess potential non-compliances against the TAREGs 4 and 5.

AMO MAINTENANCE SUPPORT NETWORK

21. Sub-contractors to AMOs can only conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product when the services are provided as part of a certified AMO’s Maintenance Support Network (MSN) in accordance with TAREG 4.4.3. The fundamental basis regarding MSNs must be stressed. That is, MSNs are created only when a certified AMO intends to regularly outsource a part of its own scope and level of maintenance, and the prime AMO assumes responsibility for the maintenance provided by its MSN. Commercial AMOs have the corporate authority to enter into sub-contracting arrangements with MSN providers whereas it is not normally the case for an ADF AMO to do so. ADF AMOs rely on the FEG and/or SPO to make equivalent arrangements to outsource, or rebalance, maintenance services. In those cases, the contracted organisations are operating as approved organisations under the Sponsor’s control. The Senior Maintenance Manager of the certified AMO remains responsible for all maintenance outsourced from that AMO. Organisations that conduct maintenance of complete State Aircraft, complete engines and major engine sub-assemblies must not be included as part of an AMO’s MSN unless that organisation is a certified AMO with the corresponding scope and level for the maintenance to be conducted, or that organisation holds accreditation from TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities (civil or military) and provides an ARC, or equivalent, for the maintenance performed.

TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE AUTHORITY (TMA)

22. There will be occasions when maintenance activity is required on a short term or temporary basis, for example to meet a short term surge, incorporate one-off modifications, or provide ad-hoc maintenance services over a short period of time. In such cases it may not be cost-effective to require an organisation to become a certified AMO. Typically, the maintenance activity would be conducted before the certification process could be completed. TAREG 4.1.1 allows for the SDE of an ADF AEO to provide specific TMA to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance for a defined period of time not to exceed 12 months. Where the SDE of an ADF AEO grants TMA, that person will be responsible for the technical integrity of the work. No regulatory provision has been made for consecutive grants of TMA to the same organisation for the same scope of work as this situation is outside the spirit of the regulation. Should a requirement for maintenance services to be provided over a time greater than 12 months become apparent, the Sponsor is expected to develop an acceptable solution with DAVCOMP-DGTA staff in the first instance.

AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY ACCREDITATIONS RECOGNISED BY THE TAR

23. For many years there has been confusion within the civil aviation industry over the acceptance of documentation accompanying aeronautical products and attesting to their airworthiness. This was mainly due to the fact that different National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs) specified differing documentation requirements, often requiring clarification from the approving authority. To overcome this problem the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) formed a working group in July 1999. The purpose of the working group was to set a standard, develop a common form and harmonised instructions for use by the NAAs. The end result of the discussions by the working group was:

a. the development of a “common release certificate ” comprising a standardised format and text;



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b. requirements specifying that aeronautical products, other than standard parts, are to be supplied under cover of such a document;

c. the provision of guidelines for completion of the document; and

d. the FAA, JAA, TCCA and major international industry organisations have now agreed to a standard document entitled ARC.

24. Under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s (CASA) regulatory system, the purpose of the ARC (Form 917) is to identify airworthiness and eligibility status of an aeronautical product:

a. after manufacture;

b. after carrying out maintenance work under the approval of CASA;

c. to allow fitment of parts removed from one aircraft or aircraft component to be fitted to another aircraft or aircraft component after maintenance; and

d. to allow fitment of salvage parts after maintenance.

25. There may be occasions where maintenance could be outsourced to organisations that hold accreditation by TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities, which currently includes civil, but can be extended to selected military, airworthiness authorities. The TAR currently recognises organisations that hold accreditation from European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), FAA and CASA, and which provide the applicable ARC for the maintenance performed, as approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. Use of organisations that can release product under an ARC is restricted to those instances where the applicable NAA provides adequate oversight of the product being maintained and the AMO can prove the maintenance was conducted under the oversight of the applicable NAA.

26. There are many Airworthiness Authorities that use ARCs, or equivalent. Therefore, a Sponsor may apply to the TAR for approval to use organisations that hold accreditations from both civil and military Airworthiness Authorities other than those listed in TAREG 4.1.4.a. In such cases, the Sponsor is required to provide information in support of the application, and also provide any additional information when requested by DGTA-ADF.

AEO INCORPORATING MODIFICATIONS

27. Organisations may be contracted to design, develop, produce and install modifications. Where the scope of the maintenance activity to be conducted is confined to modification installation and does not involve any additional significant aircraft maintenance, the applicable AEO may install the modifications, which have been developed by that AEO in accordance with the requirements of TAREG 3.5.20.c. Under this situation, there is no requirement for the organisation to become a certified AMO. Any significant aircraft maintenance in addition to the installation of a modification, as defined at TAREG 3.5.20.a(2), and post installation maintenance of the modification is to be conducted by a TAR AMO, normally a certified AMO. Further guidance is provided in relation to TAREG 3.5.20, refer Section 3, Chapter 1.

OTHER TAR APPROVALS

28. Resource availability and risk considerations will inevitably limit the scope of application of TAREGs 4 and 5 to industry. This may particularly impinge on overseas repair item maintenance contracts, including US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support contracts. For such contracts, the full implementation of TAREGs 4 and 5 would require resource allocations out of proportion to the risk being addressed. Where the risk of compromised airworthiness can be assessed as acceptable, the TAR may approve an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. The TAR approval will be for a defined period and the organisation will be limited in scope and level to conduct maintenance, noting that the TAR approval is not intended to apply to maintenance of complete State Aircraft, complete engines, or major engine sub-assemblies. The TAR makes a distinction concerning maintenance of a complete aircraft and maintenance on a complete aircraft. For example, the former intends that the scope of maintenance is across the entire aircraft and may be an R3, or equivalent, servicing. The latter case relates to those instances where a specific maintenance task, for example a structural repair, can only be completed by the AMO by having access to the entire aircraft. In the above cases, the latter is allowable but the former is not.

29. Sponsors must apply to the TAR for approval to use an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product when the resources required for that organisation to become a certified AMO are considered excessive, and the organisation has a MMS commensurate with the level of risk associated with the maintenance being performed. The application would normally be in the form of a minute or letter with attached supporting information.



6

EXEMPTIONS

30. TAREG 4.2.—Exemptions requires any organisation, or person(s) involved in management or conduct of maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product to comply with all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 unless permitted by an Exemption granted by the TAR. Any organisation or person(s) that cannot comply with one or more applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 must submit a formal Request for Exemption. The Exemption Request must document the reasons for non-compliance and the alternative action to be taken to ensure that technical airworthiness is not compromised. Exemption Requests will be managed by Director Aviation Regulation (DAVREG) on behalf of the TAR, and the TAR will only consider approval of a Request for Exemption where the request has been endorsed by the relevant Sponsor. The disposition of all Exemption Requests will be advised to the applicant along with any terms or conditions relevant to the Exemption.

31. Not all TAREGs 4 and 5 may be applicable to an individual organisation. For example, TAREG 5.1.8— Maintenance Test Flights would not be applicable to a certified AMO conducting off-aircraft maintenance of avionics equipment. Exemptions are not required for non-applicable regulations. However, certified AMOs are to clearly identify in their MMPs any non-applicable TAREGs 4 and 5, together with a brief justification.

Leased Aircraft

32. Policy for the maintenance support of leased aircraft is outlined in TAREG 2.7 and Section 3, Chapter 16. Organisations maintaining leased State Aircraft will be required to become certified AMOs, however the aircraft may be maintained to civil airworthiness regulations. In this case, AMO certification may be based on the organisation’s continuing compliance with the relevant civil regulations.

Consultation

33. In all cases involving approval of non-TAR AMOs to conduct maintenance, the applicable Sponsor should consult DAVCOMP-DGTA for advice.



1

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 4

THE POLICY BACKGROUND FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

INTRODUCTION

1. The requirement for the regulation of technical airworthiness, and the way in which the ADF Technical Airworthiness Regulations are created, promulgated and enforced, stems from higher level ADF policy. This chapter is intended to provide an overview of the policy background and therefore provide some explanation as to why the regulations exist, as well as their means of implementation.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the policy background for the management of technical airworthiness.

SCOPE

3. This chapter provides overview of the relevant Defence Instructions, at a level higher than the technical airworthiness regulations themselves.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4. Prior to the formation of the Weapon System Logistics Management Squadrons (WSLMs) in the early 1990s, all engineering functions for Army and RAAF aircraft and aircraft-related equipment were conducted by RAAF Logistics Command, centrally located in Melbourne. Further, prior to the establishment of Navy Aviation Logistics Management Squadron, all engineering functions for RAN aircraft and aircraft related equipment were conducted by the Naval Aircraft Logistics Office (NALO), Sydney.

5. The Technical Airworthiness Regulations and AAP 7001.053 were initially responsible for providing guidance for the establishment of WSLMs, as well as a means to assure technical airworthiness of these functions since they were being performed geographically distant from RAAF Logistics Command (later reorganised as Support Command Australia – Air Force). Over time the regulations have evolved, due mostly to the recognition of the increasing role of commercial organisations in the conduct of engineering and maintenance activities, as well as the amalgamation of technical airworthiness management systems from the three services into a single ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system. The regulations are also undergoing transition due to the amalgamation of WSLMs and Project Offices into System Program Offices (SPOs) within the Defence Materiel Organisation.

POLICY

Introduction

6. Higher level policy mandating the ADF Technical Airworthiness Regulatory System may be found within the following documents:

a. Defence Instruction (General) OPS 02–2—Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management;

b. AAP 7001.048(AM1)—ADF Airworthiness Manual; and

c. Defence Instruction (General) LOG 4–5–012—Regulation of the Technical Integrity of ADF Materiel.

DI(G) OPS 02-2 - Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management

7. DI(G) OPS 02–2 outlines the requirements of CAF as ADF Airworthiness Authority (AA) for Type Certification and Service Release of State aircraft, and the management of ADF Airworthiness (comprising technical and operational airworthiness). It achieves this by outlining the ADF Airworthiness high level management structure.

8. The TAR is responsible to the ADF AA for Technical Airworthiness Regulation as previously described in Section 1 Chapter 1. The TAR is a member of the Operational Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (OAPRC), as are the Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAAs) or their representatives. The OAPRC is chaired by DCAF, who is appointed the ADF Operational Airworthiness Regulator (ADF OAR). This committee is the starting point for development of changes to ADF Airworthiness policy.



2

9. DI(G) OPS 02–2 describes the overall airworthiness system as comprising operators, regulators and reviewers. While the role of operators will not be further explained here, review of the overall airworthiness system is achieved by the Airworthiness Board (AwB) conducted for each aviation weapon system. Regulation of the airworthiness system is separated into operational and technical airworthiness regulations.

AAP 7001.048(AM1) ADF Airworthiness Manual

10. This publication expands on the policy information contained in DI(G) OPS 02–2. It contains frequent references to both this publication as well as AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual. Its primary purpose is to describe the overall airworthiness regulatory system.

11. A major theme within the publication is the management of aviation safety in the ADF through the separation of technical and operational airworthiness. This is necessary since the ADF is the owner, operator, maintainer and regulator of its aircraft, and the arrangement allows objective decision making for both operational and technical airworthiness issues. This, in turn, allows for the operation of ADF aircraft with a greater level of risk than would be acceptable under civil aviation regulations, particularly during conflict.

DI(G) LOG 4-5-12 Regulation of Technical Integrity of Australian Defence Force Materiel

12. Within DI(G) LOG 4–5–012, Service Chiefs are accountable to the Chief of the Defence Force for ensuring that Defence materiel is fit for service, and poses no hazard to personnel, public safety, or the environment. The instruction aims to standardise and integrate, at a high level, each Service’s responsibility to ensure that the equipment and systems may be operated without hazard to personnel or the general public, and also without negative effect on the environment, while at the same time providing the required operational capability.

13. The instruction is consistent with policy already in place within DI(G) OPS 02–2—Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management and extends the requirements to the land and maritime environments, as well as explosive ordnance. It requires Service Chiefs to appoint Technical Regulatory Authorities (TRAs) to establish a regulatory system to assure the technical integrity of materiel used in each environment. In order to meet this requirement, CAF has appointed the TAR as TRA for aviation materiel. The instruction outlines the requirements for agencies representing the TRA to audit units for compliance against the regulations, to recognise competent organisations through a certification process, as well as the promulgation of Defence Instructions, publications and standards to define requirements in further detail. The TAR meets the requirements of this instruction through the Technical Airworthiness Regulatory System described in this publication.



1

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 5

THE APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS TO DESIGNS NOT AFFECTING TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

INTRODUCTION

1. As part of the TAR’s responsibilities, DGTA is required to put in place a regulatory system for all engineering activities pertaining to aircraft related equipment. This related equipment includes such diverse elements as aircraft simulators, software development environments, air defence radars and air traffic control equipment.

2. Rather than develop a separate regulatory system for designs not affecting airworthiness, DGTA has directed that all such designs will comply with the intent of the regulations promulgated by this manual. It is recognised, however, that many of the regulations in Section 2 are aircraft and airworthiness-specific, and therefore need re-interpretation if they are to apply to other classes of design, and relaxation where they may be overly prescriptive.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide direction as to how the regulations are to be applied to designs and design changes of, or affecting, ADF equipment but not necessarily impacting upon technical airworthiness.

SCOPE

4. This Instruction applies to all organisations responsible for the conduct and/or management of engineering applied to State aircraft and aircraft related equipment.

DEFINITIONS

5. There are no unique definitions applicable to this chapter.

CLASSES OF DESIGN

6. For organisations managing the design of aircraft, compliance with the regulations is clear; however, the situation is less clear for organisations managing the design of other technical equipment. To resolve this difficulty, the regulatory system currently identifies the following two fundamental issues.

7. The Equipment To Be Designed/Modified. This has been defined as comprising three broad groups of equipment:

a. on-aircraft items,

b. off-aircraft items with an interface to the aircraft, and

c. off-aircraft items with no interface to the aircraft.

8. Note, the interface referred to can be either a physical interface (like support equipment) or a functional interface (such as CAMM2, simulators and ATC equipment).

9. The Effect of the Design/Modification. This has been defined as comprising three broad groups of design:

a. designs affecting airworthiness,

b. designs affecting air or personnel safety, and

c. designs affecting capability or efficiency.

10. Each organisation performing design activities on behalf of the ADF must consider the classes of design decision they will be making and create their Engineering Management System accordingly. A possible matrix of equipment and design effects is shown at Table 5–1.



2

NOTE

• This matrix is intended only to give a very rough overview of how some decisions on some equipment may be classified and that often the same equipment may appear in several classes. For example, some designs for role equipment could affect the airworthiness of an aircraft (such as internal fuel bladders carried in cargo areas). On the other hand, other designs will have no impact upon airworthiness, or even capability, and merely provide an efficiency gain for the ADF (redesign of a stretcher to ease its use inside aircraft).

Table 5–1 Example of the Classification of Design Activities

On-Aircraft items Off-aircraft – with interface

Off-aircraft – no interface

Technical Airworthiness

Engine, airframe, avionics, flight control, maximum lives, damage tolerances, some role equipment (fuel bladders etc), fuels/lubricants and most stores.

Some GSE, ATE and mission planners etc that effect the operation of the aircraft in flight. Some ground-based IT systems.

Not Applicable

Safety Most changes to life support equipment, ejection seats, some role equipment (parachutes), most stores, cargo, passengers.

Most GSE, ATC radars, ILS beacons etc. Flight training simulators.

Anything that goes fast, uses high powers or contains nasty chemicals etc.

Capability and efficiency

Most changes to radar, ESM, FLIR, EW, etc and some role equipment, stores, cargo, passengers.

Most air defence systems and data communications. Some ground-based IT systems.

Ground-based communications and IT systems, especially those for command and control purposes.

11. A complete description of each of the design classifications is contained at annex A.

Use of Professional Judgement in Classifying Designs

12. The classification of a design is not a straightforward application of a series of clearly defined steps in a flowchart. Ultimately, the classification of a design (or a collection of designs) is an exercise in professional judgement by an engineer. Given the virtually unlimited number of scenarios for design in the ADF, it is not possible for DGTA to make these judgements in advance. Thus, the initial classification in most cases will be made by engineers in the relevant design agencies. DGTA requires that design agencies document both the classification of their design activities and the rationale for that classification in their application for Engineering Authority.

APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS TO CLASSES OF DESIGNS

13. Having determined the classes of design likely to be made in an organisation it is then necessary to determine how the Section 2 regulations will apply to that organisation. In tailoring the regulations organisations performing design on behalf of the ADF are to conform to the application guide included in Table 5–2.



3

Table 5–2 Determining the Application of the Regulations to Design Activities

On-Aircraft Off-aircraft – with interface

Off-aircraft – no interface


Full Some Tailoring (Annex B)

N/A

Safety Full Some Tailoring (Annex B)

Management Guide (Annex C)

Capability Some Tailoring (Annex B)



Core Regulatory Concepts to Be Applied in All Design Classes

14. Irrespective of the guidance provided at the relevant annexes there are a limited number of concepts embodied by the regulations that apply to all classes of design. These are listed below.

15. The Classification of A Design is an Airworthiness Decision. To use Table 5–2 to determine the applicability of the regulations, an organisation must classify the design activities it performs. It must be recognised that this classification of a design is itself an airworthiness decision. In most cases this decision will only need to be made once, with the classification (and rationale for that classification) of routine design activities being recorded in the organisation’s EMP.

16. All Organisations Performing Design Activities Must Apply For and be Granted Authority. DGTA requires that all organisations apply for, and receive Engineering Authority (EA) prior to undertaking any engineering activities with respect to State aircraft or related equipment. The scope and level of EA, and the method by which it is provided, is based upon an assessment of the applicant's anticipated scope and level of engineering activities and the equipment upon which they will be conducted. Similarly, the level of compliance assurance for organisations will vary considerably depending on the classification of engineering decisions routinely made by the organisation. For example, organisations seeking to make airworthiness decisions on State aircraft would probably be certified as an AEO and be subject to a rigorous compliance assurance program, including external audits. Conversely, organisations performing design aimed at increasing the efficiency of logistics management software may be awarded EA via a minute from the TAR, based on a brief desktop audit of their documentation, and may not be subject to any compliance assurance program at all.

17. The Four Pillars of Design (Development, Review, Approval and Acceptance) Apply to All Designs. The four key pillars of design (development, review, approval and acceptance) apply to all designs, no matter how simple. It is self evident that all designs must be developed, however the latter steps are equally essential. All designs must be subject to independent review. All designs must be approved, ie. all designs must be certified by the relevant design agency as satisfying the specification. Finally, all designs must be subject to a Commonwealth Design Acceptance process to ensure that the design is applicable to the ADF’s requirements and suitable for use. The qualifications and experience of the people involved in these processes and the rigour applied to each will vary considerably, but each of these processes will exist, in some form, for all designs undertaken with respect to State aircraft and related equipment.

18. The Design Reviewer Must Always Be Independent From The Developer. No matter how simple (replacement of O-ring xyz with O-ring xyz-1) or complex (an AEW and C weapon system) a design may be, all design outputs comprising that design must be subject to independent review.

19. The Design Agency Must Hold a Third Party ISO 9001 Quality Certification or Equivalent. It is a general requirement that organisations seeking to contract with the Commonwealth are required to possess a third party certified quality system. DGTA has determined that this requirement will be included in the core requirements of any organisation (contractor or Service) seeking to undertake design for the ADF as this provides an assurance that the numerous administrative processes such as record keeping, documentation control etc will be adequately documented and properly functioning.

Organisations Making Decisions in Multiple Classes

20. Many (possibly most) organisations will be required to perform design activities in a number of the classes identified above. Organisations making decisions in multiple classes are only required to demonstrate the necessary compliance with the regulations as applicable to each decision class. However, in order to minimise the risk of more critical designs being treated inappropriately, and for the sake of efficiency and standardisation, DGTA expects that



4

such organisations will establish a single compliant management system for all activities and equipment types, rather than attempting to manage some designs by exception.

NOTE

• Whilst DGTA does not direct that organisations have a single EMS accommodating the most rigorous design activities undertaken by the organisation, DGTA must be certain that where an organisation seeks to establish parallel systems that there is very little risk of designs being handled inappropriately.

21. There will be cases where an organisation will deal with more critical designs very rarely or where the more (or less) critical designs are easily separated from the remainder. Under these circumstances, the organisation may seek to establish multiple systems for dealing with the exemptions. Examples of where this may be done include:

a. A unit managing EW software and performing a range of design tasks falling into a number of classes would normally have a single management system compliant for all of these designs. However, that organisation may elect to establish a second, less rigorous, system to deal with very minor design changes implemented on deployments away from the home base.

b. A unit managing support equipment may be able to separate those items with airworthiness implications from those without and restructure their organisation such that this division is clearly supported by the organisational structure. In such a case it may be viable for the organisation to impose different engineering management systems tailored to each type of design.

Annexes:

A. Classification of Designs B. Some Tailoring of Regulations C. Use of the Regulations as a Management Guide


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex A to Sect 1 Chap 5

5A–1

CLASSIFICATION OF DESIGNS

FURTHER DEFINITION OF DESIGN DESCRIPTORS

1. All designs can be classified in terms of the equipment effected by the design and the implications of that design. For the purposes of this publication all designs will be classified as being either:

a. On-Aircraft Items. This class of items consists of those forming part of the aircraft itself, ie structures, engines, radars, avionics etc and those items carried on the aircraft but not necessarily part of the aircraft. Thus this includes role equipment such as medivac equipment, stores, cargo and cargo handling equipment, additional fuel bladders, as well as items consumed during flight (fuels and lubricants, oxygen etc).

b. Off-Aircraft - With Interface. This class of items consists of all items that have any (physical or functional) interface with an aircraft.

(1) Physical Interfaces. Tools, test equipment, ground power units, fuel tankers etc all have obvious physical interfaces with the aircraft and thus it is important that none of these things include design flaws which might endanger the aircraft.

(2) Functional Interfaces. On the other hand a number of systems have functional interfaces which may represent as great (or greater) threat to the safety of the aircraft and personnel. These include such systems as simulators, Instrument Landing Systems, Air Traffic Control radars, some mission planning systems, and even some ground-based IT systems such as CAMM2. Similarly, there are some off-aircraft systems that have a functional interface with aircraft and provide significant capabilities to the ADF. These include systems such as air defence radars, some data communications networks etc.

c. Off-Aircraft – No Interface. DGTA is responsible for the oversight and regulation of a small number of systems that have no interface with aircraft at all. These systems are generally ground-based IT systems used for logistics management and command and control, some calibration equipment, and most facilities.

2. In addition, all designs will be classified as having the following implications:

a. Airworthiness. This class consists of any design that impacts upon the safety of flight of an aircraft.

b. Safety. Any design that impacts upon personnel safety in any way. For example, if one considers the issue of flight safety, this class would include designs affecting some of the operations of ILS and ATC equipment. Similarly, the design of a moveable gantry for painting aircraft could equally have safety implications and require the inclusion of safety rails and speed control etc.

c. Capability and Efficiency. This class consists of all designs intended to provide, or change, an operational capability. Software changes to an Electronic Warfare suite to improve its effectiveness, and the redesign of an antenna to improve an air defence radar’s performance, are both examples of this class of design. This class of design also consists of those designs intended to increase the logistics efficiency of the item, but which have no impact upon its airworthiness, safety or capability. Examples of these kinds of change include the repackaging of maintenance tasks within item individual lives to arrive at a more convenient servicing arrangement.

Combination of Design Descriptors to Classify Designs

3. Combining both of these classifications the design agency can arrive at the classification of their design and hence determine how the regulations are to be applied to that design. For example, a radar fitted to an aircraft is obviously an aircraft component. However, the nature of the radar and its role in the aircraft will determine the level of tailoring permitted to the regulations. A surveillance radar used for the detection and tracking of surface targets is a vital component of the capability of a maritime patrol aircraft but not essential to its airworthiness, thus any change to that would be fall into the Aircraft component/Capability class and a design agency working on this equipment could employ some tailoring of the regulations as permitted by annex C. Conversely, a weather radar may have no impact upon an aircraft’s mission performance but may be essential if the aircraft is to fly at night and to fly all-weather missions safely, hence it would normally be classed as Aircraft Component/Airworthiness and subject to the full rigour of the regulations.



5A–2

4. Using a ground-based system as an example, most IT systems used for logistics management have no direct interface with an aircraft (some such as spares assessing and life cycle costing tools may have an indirect interface with the fleet but not to individual aircraft). Usually, the operation of these tools is to help the ADF to put aircraft on-line at the lowest possible cost in logistic support. Thus these tools would generally be classified as Off-aircraft – no interface/Capability and Efficiency and could be managed in accordance with a system where the regulations were used simply as a management guide. On the other hand, some ground-based systems (such as CAMM2) have a direct interface with individual aircraft and aircraft components, and collect and manipulate data which may influence the ability of those aircraft to fly safely. In such an example, that IT system would normally be classified as Off-aircraft – with interface/Airworthiness and would be required to be managed in accordance with the regulations with only some tailoring.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex B to Sect 1 Chap 5

5B–1

SOME TAILORING OF REGULATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The regulations have been designed to ensure the airworthiness of aircraft in all the missions they are likely to undertake. Thus, the regulations are quite obviously based around getting and maintaining a type certificate and other aviation-related assurances of safety. Many of these regulations may not be relevant to some design agencies.

2. Also, given the inherent danger associated with flight and the unusual operational and logistic circumstances within Defence, the ADF regulations include a number of provisions that may be overly burdensome for some design organisations. Those organisations whose designs don’t (or are extremely unlikely to) affect the airworthiness of an aircraft may be able to tailor the regulations to moderate some of the stricter rules contained therein.

TAILORING THE REGULATIONS

Removing Unnecessary Regulations

3. For example, organisations working with ground-based equipment, even those with airworthiness implications would normally not need to consider any of the regulations associated with getting a type certificate, obtaining special flight permits and the like. Thus it would be reasonable to allow such organisations to tailor the regulations to remove those areas which obviously do not comply.

Reducing the Rigour of Rules

4. For example, organisations working with purely mission-related software, like many (but not all) EW applications, may seek to reduce the academic qualifications required of Design Engineers. Such a relaxation may allow personnel with Computer Science degrees (or equivalent) to exercise some of the authority normally reserved for personnel with full engineering degrees.

Use of Professional Judgement in Tailoring

5. It is impossible for DGTA to know in advance exactly which regulations don’t apply (or don’t apply fully) to all the organisations currently performing design in the ADF. Thus DGTA relies upon those organisations seeking to tailor the regulations for their use to employ their professional judgement in determining how they believe the regulations should be applied to their organisations. However, DGTA will assess and approve this proposed tailoring as described below.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

6. All organisations, no matter the class of engineering activities they undertake, are required to apply for engineering authority. The document forming the cornerstone of this application is the Engineering Management Plan (EMP). Organisations which have assessed their design activities as falling into one of the classes allowing ‘some tailoring’ of the regulations are required to submit an EMP exactly as required by the regulations which includes, in addition to the normal requirements:

a. the rationale for the classification of the organisation’s design activities;

b. the tailoring of the regulations proposed; and

c. the rationale for the tailoring of the regulations.

7. Organisations which have assessed their design activities as falling into one of the classes allowing ‘some tailoring’ of the regulations will be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA using the same considerations and methodologies as those organisations showing full compliance.

NOTE

• This does not automatically mean third party audits by DGTA-ADF staff.



5B–2

Blank Page


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex C to Sect 1 Chap 5

5C–1

USE OF THE REGULATIONS AS A MANAGEMENT GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

1. The regulations have been designed to ensure the airworthiness of aircraft in all the missions they are likely to undertake. Thus, the regulations are quite obviously based around getting and maintaining a Type Certificate and other aviation-related assurances of safety. Many of these regulations may not be relevant to some design agencies.

2. Also, given the inherent danger associated with flight and the unusual operational and logistic circumstances of Defence, the ADF regulations include a number of provisions that may be overly burdensome for some design organisations. Those organisations whose designs are extremely unlikely to have any direct impact upon the safety or operations of an aircraft may be able to use the regulations as a management guide rather than as strict direction.

USE OF THE REGULATIONS AS A MANAGEMENT GUIDE

What Does This Mean?

3. In this chapter DGTA has directed that no matter how an organisation’s design activities are classified, a small number of high-level requirements are held to be ‘core’ and are to be adhered to by all organisations. They are:

a. The classification of a design is an airworthiness decision.

b. All organisations (excluding OEMs under certain circumstances, refer TAREG 2.5.6.c) performing design activities must apply for and be granted authority.

c. The four pillars of design (development, review, approval and acceptance) apply to all designs.

d. The design reviewer must always be independent from the developer.

e. The design agency must hold a third party quality certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent.

4. These are the only ‘regulations’ applicable to organisations permitted to use the regulations in this publication as a management guide. All the other requirements in Section 2 of this publication should be used to guide the development of the organisation’s EMS and in particular should be used to tailor the rather generic requirements of the ISO 9001 quality standard.

5. Use of Professional Judgement in Use of the Regulations as a Management Guide. It is impossible for DGTA to know in advance exactly how the regulations can be used to guide all the organisations currently performing design in the ADF. Thus DGTA relies upon those organisations seeking to use the regulations as guidance to employ their professional judgement in determining how they believe the regulations should be applied to their organisations. However, DGTA will assess and approve this proposed tailoring as described below.


6. All organisations, no matter the class of engineering activities they undertake, are required to apply for engineering authority. The document forming the cornerstone of this application is the Engineering Management Plan (EMP). Organisations which have assessed their design activities as falling into one of the classes allowing the regulations to be used as a management guide are still required to submit an EMP. However, this EMP may not necessarily be exactly as required by the regulations. For example, given that there is no strict requirement to comply with all the regulations an organisation of this type may chose to omit the regulation compliance matrix normally required. However, the EMP will be required to satisfy the requirement for such a document (or equivalent) contained in ISO 9001 and must also contain:

a. the rationale for the classification of the organisation’s design activities;

b. a description of how the regulations have been applied to the organisation; and

c. the rationale for that application of the regulations.

7. Organisations that have assessed their design activities as being in one of the classes that allow the use of the regulations as a management guide will be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA using similar considerations and methodologies as those organisations showing full compliance. However, it is unlikely that DGTA will require on-site audits as part of this compliance assurance activity. Also, it is likely that DGTA will allow those organisations to self assess their continuing competency.



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SECTION 1

CHAPTER 6


INTRODUCTION

1. Organisations responsible for performing or managing engineering and/or maintenance applied to State Aircraft and aircraft related equipment are to comply with the regulations contained in Section 2. In order to regulate compliance, the TAR requires that compliance assurance activities be conducted, including both initial and ongoing evaluations. Compliance assurance covers a range of activities, of which the auditing function is just one tool.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the TAR’s compliance assurance requirements for the management of technical airworthiness and how these activities are to be applied to all engineering and maintenance conducted by, or on behalf of the ADF.

SCOPE

3. This chapter applies to all organisations responsible for performing or managing engineering and/or maintenance applied to State Aircraft and aircraft related equipment.

DEFINITIONS

4. Definitions relevant to Sections 1, 3 and 4 are in the Glossary contained at Section 4. All definitions pertaining to the regulations in Section 2 are contained in that section and as such are to be considered as regulatory in nature.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE CONCEPTS

5. Compliance assurance is the system by which the TAR assures himself or herself that:

a. an organisation seeking authority or an increased level of authority, demonstrates the potential to comply with the regulatory requirements, and

b. organisations with existing authority are maintaining compliance with the regulatory requirements.

6. There is no one method for undertaking compliance assurance; rather there are a number of tools available. The method of compliance assurance for a particular organisation must be tailored to meet the specific circumstances that apply to that organisation.

Tailoring of Evaluations

7. Compliance assurance activities range from desktop reviews of documentation through to formal on-site auditing. Clearly the type and frequency of compliance assurance activities needs to be tailored by the agency responsible for the planning and conduct of the evaluation, to reduce the impact on the organisation being evaluated while at the same time providing full confidence that the TAR’s regulatory requirements will be met. The intent is to balance the risk to the ADF versus the resources required to ensure compliance. Factors to be considered in tailoring compliance assurance activities are provided in Paragraphs 8 through 13.

8. Level and Scope of Activity. The level and scope of the activity to be performed by the organisation will largely dictate the types of compliance assurance activities. For example, an organisation performing maintenance on a simple component within well-prescribed guidelines may only require limited compliance assurance evaluation. Conversely, an organisation assigned authority to perform complex and critical engineering design development, review and approval will require a rigorous Compliance Assurance Program.

9. Existing Contracts and Agreements. Existing contracts and agreements between the ADF and the organisation, particularly for like services and activities, may modify the level of compliance assurance required. The agency responsible for the planning and conduct of any evaluation may link compliance assurance activities with those conducted by other ADF organisations.

10. Existing Certifications. Existing certifications by other recognised airworthiness authorities (as defined in Section 2), quality system certifying bodies, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and major fleet operators may influence the level of compliance assurance required. For example, little value may be achieved by the ADF



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performing an on-site audit of a major OEM which designs and produces aircraft for the US military, and is subject to frequent review by the US Department of Defence and/or the Federal Aviation Administration.

11. Previous ADF Experience. ADF experience in past dealings with the organisation, particularly for similar activities, will also assist in the determination of the types of compliance assurance required. Clearly, an organisation that has established a reputation with the ADF for reliable and competent performance will be subject to differing degrees of compliance assurance to an organisation with which the ADF has had no prior dealings.

12. Organisational Stability. The inherent stability of an organisation, both with respect to its structure and management, and the personnel employed, will impact the type and frequency of compliance assurance required. Any significant restructure of an organisation or changeover of key personnel will generally require the implementation of a revised compliance assurance evaluation.

13. Volume. The volume of work performed by the organisation (not to be confused with monetary value) must be considered in tailoring compliance assurance activities. An organisation performing a large, stable volume of simple tasks will require different compliance assurance methods to an organisation performing intermittent, complex functions.

Compliance Assurance Tools

14. There are many tools available for undertaking compliance assurance. In general, a combination of some or all of these tools is required to evaluate compliance. The method of compliance assurance to be undertaken and the tools to be used, will be determined by the agency responsible for the planning and conduct of the evaluation or as mandated by the TAR. Some of the more common tools for compliance assurance are briefly described in Paragraphs 15 through 19.

15. System Level Review. The system level review is an off-site review of an organisation’s structure, personnel, management plans and procedures to determine the potential for compliance with regulatory requirements. A system level review and initial audit are normally conducted prior to assignment of authority to an organisation. Continuous review of an organisation’s management plans and procedures is also an important component of ongoing compliance assurance.

16. Quality Assurance/Product Review. Quality assurance involves the inspection or review of an organisation’s products and services, usually undertaken on an ongoing, sampling basis. The purpose of reviewing individual ‘products’ is to monitor quality, and adherence to regulations. Incremental sampling of an organisation’s management systems and procedures can also be undertaken as an alternative to discrete audits. Ongoing quality assurance and product review requirements are included within the regulations in Section 2.

17. Performance Measurement. Performance measurement activities can prove a useful tool in compliance assurance. If appropriate indicators are chosen and monitored, they can provide an early indication of quality or procedural problems, allowing prompt intervention to ensure continued compliance.

18. Second Party Reviews. In conjunction with other tools, reviews of other party’s inspection and audit results can be a useful tool in compliance assurance. Other parties include recognised airworthiness authorities (both civil and military as defined in Section 2), major OEMs and quality system certifying bodies.

19. Audits. Formal audits are one of the most structured and visible methods of compliance assurance. Audits can be carried out off-site, however usually involve an on-site audit conducted by a team of trained auditors. Audits generally fall into two categories, Initial and Ongoing. They are covered in more detail in Paragraphs 28 through 36.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE MODELS

20. The tailoring of evaluations must not, for reasons of expediency, compromise the rigour required for adequate compliance assurance. Therefore, the method of compliance assurance selected for a particular organisation will be tailored from one of two baseline models. The onus is on the evaluation agency to justify departures from the model based on the circumstances of the relevant organisation. The two baseline models are for a developing organisation (the ‘standard’ model given most organisations’ state of development) and for a mature arrangement.

Standard Compliance Assurance Model

21. Many organisations responsible for the conduct and/or management of engineering and maintenance applied to ADF aircraft and aircraft equipment will fall into the standard model for compliance assurance as outlined in Figure 6–1. Tailoring of the methods and tools used is allowed, however the intent of the approach outlined below must be met and will be monitored by the TAR.



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Figure 6–1 Standard Compliance Assurance Model

22. The frequency of system level reviews and compliance audits will be tailored according to the factors listed at Paragraphs 8 through 13. A ‘trigger event’ is an occurrence such as an organisational change, change of key appointment, change of level and scope of activity, or unsatisfactory findings of regular product reviews requiring the implementation of specific compliance assurance techniques.

Mature Compliance Assurance Model

23. In some circumstances the organisational stability and maturity may allow highly modified compliance assurance methods. This arrangement will only occur when the organisation has been stable for a significant period and has demonstrated long-term reliability in dealings with the ADF. Under these circumstances the TAR may approve the use of the following compliance assurance model Figure 6–2.

Figure 6–2 Modified Compliance Assurance Model



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24. In the above model, regular on-site audits are replaced by ongoing reviews. The TAR would only approve this approach if the ongoing review program were comprehensive, structured and proven.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE RESPONSIBILITIES

25. DGTA-ADF. DAVCOMP-DGTA staff, on behalf of the TAR, will be responsible for providing guidance for the conduct of compliance assurance activities including the tailoring of these activities. Compliance assurance of all Service organisations involved in the conduct and/or management of engineering and maintenance applied to State Aircraft and aircraft equipment will be carried out by DAVCOMP-DGTA staff.

26. Responsible Agency. ADF agencies that propose to purchase engineering services from a commercial organisation will be responsible for compliance assurance of that organisation, using a method approved by the TAR. This will include the development and promulgation of a compliance assurance program. Commercial providers of maintenance services will normally be subject to compliance assurance by DAVCOMP-DGTA staff.

27. Authorised or Approved Organisations. Organisations involved in the conduct and/or management of engineering and maintenance applied to State Aircraft and aircraft equipment are responsible for maintaining systems fully compliant with the TAR’s regulatory requirements in Section 2. Any significant changes to organisational structure, management plans, procedures or key personnel are to be notified to the TAR through the ADF sponsoring agency.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE AUDITS

28. Audits are an important tool of compliance assurance, which will usually be applied to developing organisations. They will be conducted within DAVCOMP-DGTA guidelines, to an approved schedule, in order to confirm an organisation’s compliance with the TAR’s regulatory requirements. Service organisations and commercial maintenance organisations will usually be subject to regular audits by DAVCOMP-DGTA staff. Commercial engineering organisations may be subject to audits by the sponsoring ADF agency depending on the level of compliance assurance required by the TAR. The two main types of audit, Initial and Ongoing are described more fully below.

Initial Audits

29. During the initial evaluation of organisations, the emphasis is on gaining assurance that the organisation has the necessary expertise, data and management procedures to meet the TAR’s regulatory requirements. The complexity and scope of the initial audit will be determined after consideration of the factors detailed at Paragraphs 8 through 13. Irrespective, new AEOs must show compliance against all applicable regulations, with the initial audit covering the full range of activities as per the formal instrument, as well as all areas of the organisation. The structure of an initial audit generally follows three phases, as described in Paragraphs 30 through 32.

30. Initial System Level Review. The initial system level review is an evaluation of the organisation’s structure, personnel, capabilities and management plans in order to determine the potential to meet the TAR’s regulatory requirements. Major components of the initial system level review include:

a. off-site evaluation of management plans and relevant procedures;

b. familiarisation visit to evaluate equipment and facilities (if required);

c. documenting any inadequacies found, and setting requirements for rectification; and

d. upon satisfactory resolution of all issues, seek formal acceptance of management plans from the TAR.

31. Initial Audit. The initial audit is an evaluation of the organisation’s practices and procedures against the specific requirements of the authority to be assigned, in order to ensure compliance with the TAR’s regulatory requirements and to enable assignment of authority. Initial audits are normally conducted on-site, and include:

a. preparation of an audit plan, nomination of the audit team and notification to the auditee;

b. conduct of the initial audit and reporting on areas of non-compliance; and

c. upon satisfactory resolution of non-compliances, a recommendation to the TAR regarding the suitability of the organisation for assignment of authority.

32. Post–Audit Action. Assuming that all issues arising from the initial audit have been resolved and the TAR has agreed to the assignment of authority, the following actions are taken:

a. arrange promulgation for assignment of organisational authority;



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b. formulate and document compliance assurance methods including details on performance measures, product reviews and any audit program; and

c. monitor changes to management plans and procedures and implement the compliance assurance program.

Ongoing Audits

33. During the ongoing evaluation of organisations the emphasis shifts to gaining assurance of continued compliance with approved plans and procedures, as well as achieving satisfactory levels of performance. Objective and documented evidence of compliance can be sought. Once again, the complexity and scope of the audit will be determined after consideration of the factors detailed at Paragraphs 8 through 13. The structure of a compliance audit generally follows three phases, as described in Paragraphs 34 through 36.

34. System Level Review. The system level review is an evaluation of the organisation’s structure, personnel, capabilities and management plans to ensure they remain relevant and suitable for the level and scope of authority assigned to the organisation. Major components of the system audit include:

a. off-site evaluation of management plans and relevant procedures; and

b. documenting any inadequacies found and setting requirements for rectification.

35. On–Site Compliance Audit. The on-site compliance audit is an evaluation of the organisation’s practices and procedures against the specific requirements of the authority assigned, in order to seek objective evidence of compliance with the TAR’s regulatory requirements. Compliance audits are conducted on-site, and include:

a. preparation of the audit plan, nomination of the audit team and notification to auditee;

b. conducting the audit, seeking objective evidence of compliance and reporting on areas of non-compliance; and

c. upon satisfactory resolution of non-compliances, provide a recommendation to the TAR regarding the suitability of the organisation for retention of assigned authority.

36. Post Audit Assessment. Assuming that all issues arising from the compliance audit have been resolved, and the TAR has agreed on the retention of assigned authority, then the ongoing evaluation continues using previously defined and documented compliance assurance methods.



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1

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 7

LEGAL LIABILITY OF COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION

1. Commonwealth employees who are performing engineering and maintenance functions in accordance with the regulations presented at Section 2, are accountable for the decisions they make. This situation has raised the question of the legal liability of these employees.

2. This chapter provides an overview of liability issues for Commonwealth employees. This includes both members of the ADF and civilian employees of the Department of Defence. Specifically, it does not address:

a. actions that may be taken under the relevant Crimes Act for ‘criminal negligence;’

b. charges that may be preferred under section 35 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 for ‘negligent performance of duty’; or

c. the liability (civil or criminal) of staff employed by contractors, conducting engineering and maintenance activities for the Commonwealth.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of legal liability issues as they apply to Commonwealth employees. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between this guidance and the regulations, the regulations take precedence.

LEGAL LIABILITY OF COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYEES

Negligence

4. Negligence is the failure to exercise the degree of care that is required by law in the particular circumstances. The purpose of the law of negligence is to enable a person who has suffered damage (personal injury, property damage or economic loss) through another person’s negligence to receive compensation to recoup that loss.

5. Negligence can occur by either an act or an omission. Whether particular conduct amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. In summary, a person will only be liable for negligence if the following conditions are met:

a. the law requires a degree of care to be exercised in the particular circumstance;

b. the person fails to exercise this degree of care; and

c. their failure to exercise the degree of care results in damage (loss) to another person.

Vicarious Liability

6. In general, a person is legally responsible for damage that results from their acts or omissions. However, it is an established principle of law that where an employee is negligent and causes damage giving rise to an action, the employer will be held liable for that damage, at least where the conduct of the employee that gave rise to the loss occurred in the course of or arose out of the employment and was not serious or wilful misconduct. This is called the vicarious liability of the employer and has been developed by the courts based on the principle that the employer exercises control over the duties performed by the employee and is thereby responsible for the actions of the employee. Furthermore, an employer has an implied obligation to indemnify employees against liabilities arising out of or in the course of their employment.

7. However, the fact that the employer (i.e. the Commonwealth) is vicariously liable does not of itself absolve the employee from liability. The plaintiff, namely the party suffering the loss or damage, may sue either the Commonwealth or the employee, or both parties. Generally the plaintiff will at least include the employer as a party to the action on the basis that the employer will generally be in a better financial position than the employee to meet their claim, whether by having insurance to cover the contingency or otherwise.



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Legal Services Directions 2005

8. The Legal Services Direction 2005 (the Directions) issued in accordance with the Judiciary Act 1903, outline the circumstances in which Defence, as a Commonwealth agency, is permitted to provide legal assistance at Commonwealth expense to Commonwealth employees.

9. The general policy underlying the provision of assistance to Commonwealth employees for legal proceedings is that such support provides a benefit to the Commonwealth, because it is of benefit to the Commonwealth to act properly as an employer in supporting employees who have acted reasonably and responsibly in performing their duties.

10. Expenditure is normally approved to assist an employee who is a defendant in civil or criminal proceedings if the proceedings arose out of an incident that relates to their employment with the employing agency and the employee acted reasonably and responsibly.

11. Assistance may be provided under the Directions to an employee who has acted, or is alleged to have acted, negligently (i.e. failed to exercise the legal standard of ‘reasonable care’ owed in the circumstances) but not where the employee’s conduct involved serious or wilful misconduct or culpable negligence.

12. Therefore, Commonwealth employees who provide engineering/maintenance advice as part of their duties with Defence are likely to be able to claim legal assistance at Commonwealth expense unless they have acted wilfully (e.g. have deliberately set out to harm a person) or have been culpably negligent (e.g. they were drunk while performing their duties and therefore caused harm).

Summary

13. Where Commonwealth employees act reasonably and responsibly and within the scope of the duties expected of them it is likely that they will be entitled to legal assistance at Commonwealth expense. In addition, Defence maintains professional indemnity insurance policies that may respond should a relevant claim arise.

14. Although this guidance has been reviewed by Defence Legal this information is only intended to provide a general overview of the civil liability of Commonwealth employees in relation to legal claims arising from the exercise of their duties. Questions of a specific nature should be directed to local legal staff at ADF establishments for further advice.



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SECTION 2

CHAPTER 1

ADF TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This section contains all of the regulations a person or organisation must satisfy within the ADF’s technical airworthiness system. The regulations identify the procedures associated with the use and interpretation of regulations, the conduct and acceptance of design, construction and maintenance and the interfaces between operational and technical airworthiness.

Attachments:

A. Index to Regulations B. TAREG 1 – Application of Regulations and Procedural Rules C. TAREG 2 – Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance D. TAREG 3 – Authorised Engineering Organisations E. TAREG 4 – TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations F. TAREG 5 – Aircraft Maintenance and Management Procedures



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Index to Regulations

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INDEX TO REGULATIONS

TAREG 1 – APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURAL RULES

1.1 GENERAL

1.1.1 Applicability

1.1.2 Rule Making

1.1.3 Application of These Regulations

1.1.4 Exemptions

1.1.5 Authoritative Airworthiness Advice

1.1.6 Rules of Interpretation

1.2 DESIGN ACCEPTANCE REPRESENTATIVES

1.2.1 Applicability

1.2.2 Application for Delegation as a DAR

1.2.3 Scope of Delegation

1.2.4 Eligibility

1.2.5 Certificates of Authority

1.2.6 Duration of Certificates

1.2.7 Delegation of DAR Responsibilities

1.3 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES

1.3.1 Applicability

1.3.2 Application for Delegation as an ASR

1.3.3 Eligibility

1.3.4 Certificates of Authority

1.3.5 Duration of Certificates

1.3.6 Delegation of ASR Responsibilities

TAREG 2 – TYPE CERTIFICATION, SERVICE RELEASE and DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

2.1 GENERAL

2.1.1 Applicability

2.2 TYPE CERTIFICATION

2.2.1 Applicability

2.2.2 Issue of a Type Certification Recommendation

2.2.3 Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for New Aircraft or Major Changes

2.2.4 ADF Statement of Requirements (SOR) for New Aircraft or Major Changes

2.2.5 Airworthiness Standards for New Aircraft and Major Changes

2.2.6 Statement of Operating Intent

2.2.7 Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance

2.2.8 Type Design

2.2.9 Type Records



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2.2.10 Reserved

2.2.11 Compliance Findings

2.2.12 Software Compliance Findings

2.3 SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS

2.3.1 SFP Submission and Recommendation

2.4 SERVICE RELEASE FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

2.4.1 SR Submission and Recommendation

2.5 CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

2.5.1 Applicability

2.5.2 Design Acceptance System for Changes to a Type Design

2.5.3 Classification of Changes in Type Design

2.5.4 Changes Requiring a New AMTC

2.5.5 Supplemental Type Certification

2.5.6 Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to Type Design

2.5.7 ADF Statement of Requirements for Minor Changes

2.5.8 Airworthiness Standards for Minor Design Changes

2.5.9 Assumption of Design Acceptance Certification

2.6 OTHER CERTIFICATION ISSUES

2.6.1 Changes to Planned Withdrawal Date

2.6.2 Changes to SOI

2.6.3 Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness

2.6.4 Reserved

2.6.5 Notification of Unairworthy Conditions

2.7 CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

2.7.1 Definition

2.7.2 Applicability

2.7.3 Recognition of Civil Aviation Regulatory Systems

2.7.4 Continued Compliance

TAREG 3 – AUTHORISED ENGINEERING ORGANISATIONS

3.1 GENERAL

3.1.1 Applicability

3.2 ENGINEERING AUTHORITY CERTIFICATES

3.2.1 Applicability

3.2.2 Certificate Required

3.2.3 Sponsor AEO Requirements

3.2.4 Application

3.2.5 Audits



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3.2.6 Issue of a Certificate

3.2.7 Duration

3.2.8 Engineering Management Plan

3.3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ISSUE

3.3.1 Definitions

3.3.2 Personnel

3.3.3 Design Support Networks

3.3.4 Design Control System

3.3.5 CI Management System

3.3.6 Data

3.3.7 Equipment, Tools and Facility Requirements

3.3.8 Records

3.3.9 EMS Internal Evaluation System

3.3.10 Documentation Control

3.3.11 Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards

3.4 DESIGN CONTROL

3.4.1 Design Control System

3.4.2 Data Control

3.4.3 Issue of a Design Approval Certificate

3.4.4 Design Review

3.4.5 Judgement of Significance

3.4.6 Design Acceptance

3.5 CI MANAGEMENT

3.5.1 Applicability

3.5.2 Technical Information Review

3.5.3 Software Integrity Management

3.5.4 Aircraft Structural Integrity Management

3.5.5 Engine Structural Integrity Management

3.5.6 Modifications

3.5.7 Substitutions

3.5.8 Deviations

3.5.9 Aircraft/Stores Configurations

3.5.10 Aerial Delivery Clearances

3.5.11 Special Technical Instructions (STI)

3.5.12 Incorporation Approval

3.5.13 Service Release for Minor Changes to Type Design

3.5.14 Management of Type Design Data

3.5.15 Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness

3.5.16 Flight Manuals and Aircraft Operating Instructions



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3.5.17 Weight and Balance

3.5.18 Non Destructive Testing

3.5.19 Production

3.5.20 Modification Installation

3.6 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

3.6.1 Continued Compliance

3.6.2 Changes to an AEO’s Organisation

3.6.3 Inspections and Audits

TAREG 4 – TAR APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS

4.1 GENERAL

4.1.1 Applicability – Who May Maintain State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product

4.1.2 Sponsor

4.1.3 Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA)

4.1.4 Airworthiness Authorities Accreditations Accepted by the TAR

4.1.5 Other TAR Approvals

4.2 EXEMPTIONS

4.2.1 Exemption Requirements

4.3 AMO CERTIFICATION

4.3.1 Application for AMO Certification

4.3.2 Award and Retention of AMO Certification

4.3.3 Changes to AMO Certification

4.3.4 Duration of AMO Certification

4.4 MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

4.4.1 Maintenance Management Plan

4.4.2 Quality Management System

4.4.3 Maintenance Support Networks

4.5 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1 Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM)

4.5.2 Quality Manager (QM)

4.5.3 Maintenance Personnel

4.5.4 Human Factors and Maintenance Error Management (HF and MEM)

4.6 FACILITIES

4.6.1 AMO Facilities



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TAREG 5 – AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

5.1 CONDUCT OF MAINTENANCE

5.1.1 Authorised Maintenance Data

5.1.2 Maintenance Certification

5.1.3 Independent Maintenance Inspection (IMI)

5.1.4 Maintenance Release of Aircraft

5.1.5 Safety

5.1.6 Deferment of Required Maintenance

5.1.7 Maintenance Ground Runs

5.1.8 Maintenance Test Flights (MTF)

5.1.9 Aircraft Ground Handling

5.1.10 Structural Repairs

5.1.11 Weight and Balance

5.1.12 Contingency Maintenance and Battle Damage Repair

5.2 MAINTENANCE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION

5.2.1 Maintenance Records and Documentation Requirements

5.2.2 Falsification, Reproduction or Alteration of Maintenance Records

5.3 REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS

5.3.1 Reporting of Unserviceable Conditions

5.3.2 Reporting of Unairworthy Conditions

5.3.3 AMO Investigation of Reported Unserviceable and Unairworthy Conditions

5.3.4 Other Reporting Requirements

5.4 TOOLS, EQUIPMENT AND AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT

5.4.1 Tools and Support Equipment

5.4.2 Local Manufacture or Modification of Standard Tools

5.4.3 Aeronautical Product

5.4.4 Transfer of Aeronautical Product (Cannibalisation)

5.5 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

5.5.1 Initiial Requirements

5.5.2 Recovery of Aircraft

5.5.3 Salvage



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) TAREG 1

1

TAREG 1

APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURAL RULES

1.1. GENERAL

1.1.1. Applicability

a. This regulation prescribes the procedural requirements for:

(1) applying, interpreting and amending these regulations;

(2) applying for authority to act as a Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) or Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR) on behalf of the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR); and

(3) the exercise and further delegation of the authority to act as a DAR or ASR.

1.1.2. Rule Making

a. The TAR will initiate rule making procedures upon his own motion; however, in doing so he may consider the recommendations of other agencies and the petitions of other interested persons.

b. Except as provided under Paragraph g, the TAR must issue a proposed regulation or amendment to allow interested persons to participate in regulation drafting proceedings.

c. A proposed regulation or amendment will include:

(1) a reference to the authority under which it is issued,

(2) a description of the subjects and issues involved and the substance and terms of the proposed regulation,

(3) a statement of the time in which written comments must be submitted, and

(4) a statement of how and to what extent interested persons may participate in the proceedings.

d. Any interested person may petition the TAR to issue, amend, or repeal a regulation irrespective of whether it is a substantive regulation or a proposed regulation or amendment.

e. Each petition submitted under Paragraph d must:

(1) set forth the text or substance of the regulation or amendment proposed or the regulation that the petitioner seeks to have repealed as appropriate;

(2) explain the interests of the petitioner in the action requested; and

(3) contain any information, views or arguments available to the petitioner to support the action sought and the reasons why granting the request would be in the interests of the airworthiness of State Aircraft.

f. Following review of all petitions received under Paragraph d to repeal or amend a proposed regulation or amendment, the TAR may issue a substantive regulation or amendment.

g. Where the TAR anticipates that a proposed regulation or amendment is unlikely to result in adverse comment the TAR may issue a substantive regulation or amendment.

h. A substantive regulation or amendment must be issued as an amendment to this publication and must be accompanied by implementation and transition instructions as appropriate.

1.1.3. Application of These Regulations

a. All Service personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever they are engaged in, or are seeking to engage in, any design or maintenance activity within the scope of these regulations.

b. All commercial personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever they are engaged in, or are seeking to engage in, any design or maintenance activity within the scope of these regulations, to the extent required by a legally binding formal instrument.

c. These regulations are applicable to all State Aircraft and aircraft-related equipment.



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1.1.4. Exemptions

a. All regulations in this section, or referenced by this section, are issued under the authority of the TAR.

b. No person or organisation must operate in a manner contrary to these regulations unless expressly permitted by an exemption granted by the TAR.

c. Any person or organisation seeking an exemption from these regulations must submit a written request to the TAR:

(1) for ADF organisations or personnel, directly from the organisation or person; or

(2) for commercial organisations, through the sponsor Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO).

1.1.5. Authoritative Airworthiness Advice

a. Authoritative Airworthiness Advice (AAA) must mean advice issued on behalf of the TAR by either an ASR or authorised members of the TAR’s staff.

b. A Technical Airworthiness Directive (TAD) must mean a specific type of AAA issued by the TAR or authorised representative to correct an unsafe or unsatisfactory technical condition.

c. AAA and TADs carry the authority of the TAR and as such, any action required is mandatory.

1.1.6. Rules of Interpretation

a. In these regulations, unless the context requires otherwise:

(1) words importing the singular include the plural,

(2) words importing the plural include the singular, and

(3) words importing the masculine gender include the feminine.

b. In these regulations the word:

(1) ‘must’ is used in the imperative sense;

(2) ‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act described and the words ‘no person may ...’ or ‘a person may not ...’ mean that no person is required, authorised, or permitted to do the act described; and

(3) ‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’.

1.2. DESIGN ACCEPTANCE REPRESENTATIVES


a. This regulation prescribes the procedural requirements for delegating to Defence personnel the authority to act as representatives of the TAR for Design Acceptance functions in accordance with TAREG 2. Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) means a person so delegated.

b. For the purposes of this regulation, Design Acceptance means a determination of the technical acceptability of aircraft and aircraft-related equipment design for Service use.

1.2.2. Application for Delegation as a DAR

a. All persons appointed to designated DAR positions must apply to the TAR for a delegation appropriate to the responsibilities of that appointment. The application for a delegation as a DAR must include:

(1) the name, rank (or level) and PMKeys number of the person;

(2) the position and responsibilities of the person;

(3) the scope of the delegation sought;

(4) the relevant experience and qualifications of the person; and

(5) the certifications held and current status of the ADF AEO in which the DAR is to work.



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1.2.3. Scope of Delegation

a. A DAR delegation must be for one or more aircraft types and applies to the aircraft and aircraft-related equipment as defined in this regulation.

b. Where items of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment are assigned to another ADF AEO for engineering management, the DAR must retain design acceptance responsibility for those items with respect to their use with or on the assigned aircraft type.

1.2.4. Eligibility

a. Except as otherwise allowed by the TAR, to be eligible for a delegation as a DAR a person must:

(1) be appointed to an SDE or DSDE position in an ADF AEO with scope for one or more aircraft types as provided in TAREG 3;

(2) be a Commonwealth employee (either ADF or APS); and

(3) possess tertiary qualifications and professional development sufficient for appointment as an SDE as provided in TAREG 3, Annex A.

1.2.5. Certificates of Authority

a. A Certificate of Authority is issued to a person delegated authority to act as a DAR. The certificate must specify the designated DAR position to which the delegation applies.

1.2.6. Duration of Certificates

a. Except when withdrawn earlier by the TAR, a person holding a delegation as a DAR must retain that delegation for the period of their appointment to a designated DAR position and for no longer.

1.2.7. Delegation of DAR Responsibilities.

a. Except as provided in Paragraph b, a DAR must not further delegate his authority.

b. A person may act on behalf of a DAR in his absence if:

(1) the person is authorised as a DSDE or DE as provided in TAREG 3.3.2 and the DAR is satisfied that the person is competent to act in his absence within specified limits;

(2) the DAR has provided a written authorisation to the person to act on his behalf in his absence within specified limits;

(3) the person is satisfied that sufficient justification exists for acting on behalf of the DAR in his absence, and that he will be acting within the limits specified by the DAR; and

(4) any decisions made by the person on behalf of the DAR are reviewed and endorsed by the DAR as soon as practicable upon his return.

1.3. AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES


a. This regulation prescribes the procedural requirements for delegating to Defence personnel, authority to act as representatives of the TAR in prescribing, revising and interpreting airworthiness standards in accordance with TAREG 2 and TAREG 3.3.11.

b. The TAR is the sole authority for prescribing, revising and interpreting airworthiness standards in all matters where no ASR authorisation has been made.

1.3.2. Application for Delegation as an ASR

a. All persons appointed to designated ASR positions must apply to the TAR for a delegation appropriate to the responsibilities of that appointment. The application for delegation as an ASR must include:

(1) the name, rank (or level) and PMKeys number of the SDE;

(2) the position and responsibilities of the person;

(3) the relevent experience and qualifications of the person; and



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(4) the certifications held and current status of the ADF AEO in which the ASR is to work.

1.3.3. Eligibility

a. Except as otherwise allowed by the TAR, to be eligible for delegation as an ASR a person must:

(1) be appointed to an SDE or DSDE position in a ADF AEO which is also a COE;

(2) be a Commonwealth employee (either ADF or APS);

(3) possess tertiary qualifications and professional development necessary for appointement as an SDE as provided in TAREG 3, Annex A; and

(4) possess additional qualifications, specific to particular ASR positions, as specified in Annex B.

1.3.4. Certificates of Authority

a. A Certificate of Authority is issued to a person delegated authority to act as an ASR. The certificate must specify the designated ASR position to which the delegation applies.

1.3.5. Duration of Certificates

a. Except when withdrawn earlier by the TAR, a person holding a delegation as an ASR must retain that delegation for the period of their appointment to a designated ASR position and for no longer.

1.3.6. Delegation of ASR Responsibilities

a. Except as provided in Paragraph b, an ASR must not further delegate their authority.

b. A person may act on behalf of an ASR in his absence if:

(1) the person is authorised as a DE as provided in TAREG 3.3.2 and the ASR is satisfied that the person is competent to act in his absence within specified limits,

(2) the ASR has provided a written authorisation to the person to act on his behalf in his absence within specified limits,

(3) the person is satisfied that sufficient justification exists for acting on behalf of the ASR in his absence, and that he will be acting within the limits specified by the ASR, and

(4) any standards advice approved by the person on behalf of the ASR is reviewed and endorsed by the ASR as soon as practicable upon his return.

Annexes:

A. Identity and Authority of COEs B. Special Qualifications Required of ASRs


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex A to TAREG 1

1A–1

IDENTITY AND AUTHORITY OF COEs

COE Title Scope of Authority

Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU)

Cargo aerial deliver equipment and loads with respect to all ADF transport aircraft

Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG)

Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Squadron (ASCENG SQN)

Stores Clearance with respect to all ADF aircraft

Maritime Patrol Systems Program Office – Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (MPSPO-ALSE)

Life support equipment with respect to all ADF aircraft

Director of Ordnance Safety (DOS) All Defence explosive ordnance and associated materiel intended for use as Aviation materiel.

Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency (JFLA) Liquid fuels, lubricants and allied products with respect to all ADF aircraft.

Ground Telecommunications Equipment System Program Office (GTESPO)

ADF airspace surveillance, control and communications systems.



1A–2

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex B to TAREG 1

1B–1

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED OF ASRs

NOTE

• Requirements are in addition to those specified for an SDE in TAREG 3, Annex A.

ASR Special Qualifications

COE Title Special Qualifications

Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU)

Previous experience as a Design Engineer and previous experience in an Aeriel Delivery Engineering position.

Aircraft Stores Compatibility Squadron (ASCENG SQN)

Explosives Ordnance Engineering MSc/PgDip; or

Guided Weapon Systems MSc.

Maritime Patrol Systems Program Office- Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (MPSPO-ALSE)

Nil

Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS) Masters of Science in Explosive Ordnance Engineering or Masters of Science in Guided Weapons Systems.

Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency (JFLA) Bachelor of Engineering (Chemical, Mechanical, Aeronautical or Materials) and postgraduate qualifications (at a minimum of Masters degree level) in Chemistry/Applied Chemistry

or

Bachelor of Science/Applied Science (Chemistry or Applied Chemistry) and postgraduate qualifications (at a minimum of Masters degree level) in Engineering (Chemical, Mechanical, Aeronautical or Materials)

Ground Telecommunications Equipment System Program Office (GTESPO)

Nil



1B–2

Blank Page



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TAREG 2

TYPE CERTIFICATION, SERVICE RELEASE AND DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

2.1. GENERAL


a. This regulation prescribes procedural requirements for:

(1) the issue of TAR recommendations for issue and amendment of Australian Military Type Certificates (AMTCs), Supplementary Type Certificates (STCs), Special Flight Permits (SFPs) and Service Releases;

(2) the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness; and

(3) the Design Acceptance of aircraft and aircraft-related equipment designs and changes to those designs.

2.2. TYPE CERTIFICATION


a. This regulation prescribes procedural requirements for the issue of a recommendation by the TAR for issue of an AMTC for aircraft being acquired for ADF operations, or for which a new AMTC or STC is required following a major design change or a substantial change in the aircraft’s role.

b. For the purposes of this regulation, ‘aircraft being acquired for ADF operations’ must mean aircraft being purchased or leased for use in ADF operations as State Aircraft and includes fleet addition aircraft intended to be included under an amendment to an existing AMTC.

2.2.2. Issue of a Type Certification Recommendation

a. The DAR must submit to the TAR copies of:

(1) the relevant Design Acceptance certificate;

(2) an assessment of the adequacy of the Type Record, submitted by the design agency in accordance with TAREG 2.2.9;

(3) the current version of the applicable Design Acceptance strategy, compiled in accordance with TAREG 2.2.3; and

(4) a document which summarises the achievements made against the Design Acceptance strategy.

b. The DAR is entitled to a Type Certification recommendation from the TAR if the TAR is satisfied that Design Acceptance has been completed in accordance with these regulations and all airworthiness issues raised during that process have been satisfactorily resolved or are being managed through TAR-approved issue papers.

2.2.3. Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for New Aircraft or Major Changes

a. Except as otherwise authorised by the TAR, the DAR must only issue a Design Acceptance certificate for an aircraft type being acquired for ADF operations or one which has undergone a major design change, if he has ensured that:

(1) the Design Acceptance strategy has been documented in accordance with Annex A;

(2) TAR endorsement has been obtained for ADF Statements of Requirements (SORs) before inclusion as part of a formal instrument for the acquisition and related engineering services referenced in the Design Acceptance strategy, as provided in TAREG 2.2.4;

(3) any amendments to the TAR endorsed ADF SOR:

(i) have been approved by the DAR where there was no reduction in the level of safety established by the airworthiness standards of the ADF SOR, or



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(ii) have been endorsed by the TAR or a relevant ASR where there was a reduction in the level of safety established by the airworthiness standards of the ADF SOR.

(4) the design agency or agencies providing aircraft engineering services to the Commonwealth for the acquisition have achieved and maintained AEO status relevant to the services provided for the duration of the engineering activity;

(5) the design agency or agencies have submitted:

(i) a list of all identified OHS risks, together with an associated risk management plan;

(ii) a Type Record in accordance with TAREG 2.2.9;

(iii) a Design Approval certificate in accordance with TAREG 3.4.3;

(iv) test reports, calculations and other Type Design data necessary to show compliance with the ADF SOR;

(v) Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness as required by the applicable airworthiness standards;

(vi) flight manual documents as required by the Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR) and applicable airworthiness standards;

(vii) an Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP) and Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP) as required by the applicable airworthiness standards and;

(viii) a software Management Plan covering in-service management of software as required by TAREG 3.5.3.

(6) an examination of the Type Design has been conducted and all compliance findings completed in accordance with TAREG 2.2.11 and that:

(i) the Type Design and the product are found to meet the prescribed airworthiness standards of the ADF SOR or provide an equivalent level of safety;

(ii) any airworthiness issues identified through the course of Design Acceptance activities have been processed in accordance with TAREG 2.2.11; and

(iii) no feature or characteristic of the aircraft makes it unsafe for its intended operations.

2.2.4. ADF SOR for New Aircraft or Major Changes

a. The DAR must ensure that the ADF SOR for an aircraft being acquired for ADF operations or subject to a major design change:

(1) requires the design agency to make all calculations, inspections and tests necessary to show that the Type Design meets all requirements of the ADF SOR and the aircraft remains safe for its intended operations;

(2) requires the design agency to audit the Type Design to ensure that calculations, inspections and tests conducted at Paragraph a.(1) are relevant to the state of the Type Design being offered for Design Acceptance;

(3) provides the Commonwealth with access to the results of the audit required by Paragraph a.(2);

(4) requires the design agency to provide the Commonwealth with the relevant Type Design data;

(5) provides the Commonwealth with the opportunity to perform additional inspections, flight and ground tests in order to satisfy the TAR that the Type Design meets all requirements of the ADF SOR; and

(6) specifically precludes the interpretation of compliance findings in support of Design Acceptance by the Commonwealth as indicating the Commonwealth has granted Design Approval of any design, inspection or test result required under Paragraph a. of this regulation.

b. In order to obtain the TAR’s endorsement of the ADF SOR, the DAR must submit to the TAR:

(1) those documents forming the ADF SOR;

(2) a copy of the current Statement of Operating Intent (SOI);



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(3) a copy of the current Design Acceptance strategy for the acquisition compiled in accordance with Annex A to this regulation, along with a statement confirming that the ADF SOR documents have been developed in accordance with that strategy;

(4) if the Design Acceptance strategy relies on prior acceptance, evidence related to prior acceptance as required by TAREG 2.2.7;

(5) if TAR or ASR advice was rejected in the development of the ADF SOR and the matter remains unresolved, documentation fully disclosing the advice and the reasons for rejection; and

(6) documentory evidence, verified by the DAR, that the SOR meets the requirements of TAREG 2.2.4. a. and b.

c. The TAR may endorse those documents forming an ADF SOR if the TAR is satisfied that:

(1) the SOI has been issued by the relevant Operational Airworthiness Authority and meets the requirements of TAREG 2.2.6;

(2) the proposed Design Acceptance strategy meets the requirements of Annex A;

(3) the DAR has ensured proper consultation with the TAR and the relevant ASR in the compilation of those documents, to ensure that prescribed airworthiness standards are adequate as defined in TAREG 2.2.5 for the intended operations as defined in the SOI; and

(4) if the Design Acceptance strategy relies on prior acceptance of a type substantially the same as that being offered for acceptance, the ADF SOR prescribes airworthiness standards relevant to the variation in Type Design as provided in TAREG 2.2.5.

2.2.5. Airworthiness Standards for New Aircraft and Major Changes

a. The airworthiness standards in AAP 7001.054(AM1) are to be considered as the TAR’s preferred design standards.

b. If the TAR or a relevant ASR finds that the nominated airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of a novel or unusual design feature, ‘special conditions' may be prescribed to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established for a comparable aircraft type.

c. Except as otherwise allowed under TAREG 2.2.4, the airworthiness standards to be specified in a SOR for an aircraft acquisition or major design change are:

(1) the TAR’s preferred standards in AAP 7001.054(AM1), effective on the date of TAR endorsement of the SOR and any later amendments subsequently prescribed by the TAR;

(2) alternative airworthiness standards that have been shown, to the satisfaction of the TAR or relevant ASR, to establish an equivalent level of safety; and

(3) any special conditions prescribed by the TAR or relevant ASR in accordance with Paragraph b.

2.2.6. Reserved

2.2.7. Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance

a. The DAR must only include Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA) of an aircraft, as part of the Design Acceptance strategy for acquisition of an aircraft, of substantially the same Type Design where:

(1) for that type of aircraft:

(i) an AMTC is in force;

(ii) a civil Type Certificate, issued by a civilian National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) of a recognised country as listed at TAREG 2.2.7.e, is in force; or

(iii) a recognised military force as listed at TAREG 2.2.7.f. has accepted the aircraft into service (and it remains in service).

(2) the role and operating environment for which the aircraft was designed is comprehensively disclosed;

(3) the airworthiness standards, including the details of any tailoring of those standards, to which the aircraft was designed, are disclosed;



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(4) the extent of aircraft systems and functions covered by the certification is disclosed; and

(5) any risk treatments, including risk retentions, agreed to by the Airworthiness Authority are comprehensively disclosed.

b. The DAR must only include RPA of an extant aircraft system as part of the Design Acceptance strategy for a change to an ADF aircraft Type Design, where:

(1) the design has been accepted by an Airworthiness Authority that is recognised at TAREG 2.2.7.e or TAREG 2.2.7.f;

(2) the aircraft system is fitted to an aircraft type that is substantially the same configuration as the ADF aircraft type, and differences in configuration between the two aircraft types are comprehensively disclosed;

(3) the role and operating environment for which the aircraft system was designed is comprehensively disclosed;

(4) the airworthiness standards, including the details of any tailoring of those standards, to which the aircraft system was designed, are disclosed;

(5) evidence exists that the civilian or military Airworthiness Authority applied a level of oversight to the design commensurate with the consequences of system failure; and

(6) any risk treatments, including risk retentions, agreed to by the Airworthiness Authority are comprehensively disclosed.

c. Where civilian or military Airworthiness Authority oversight of a design change to an ADF aircraft is proposed, the DAR must submit a proposal to the TAR for approval, confirming that the Airworthiness Authority:

(1) is recognised at TAREG 2.2.7.e or TAREG 2.2.7.f.;

(2) has agreed that adequate formal instruments with the design agency are in place for the Airworthiness Authority to execute its oversight functions of the design agency;

(3) has previous certification experience relevant to the scope of the design change;

(4) has documented a formal agreement with the ADF that:

(i) confirms the same level of oversight for the ADF design change will be provided as for similar design changes to indigenous aircraft;

(ii) comprehensively discloses the limits of the Airworthiness Authority’s proposed oversight;

(iii) discloses the extent to which the ADF specific role and operating environment will be accounted for in the Airworthiness Authority’s oversight; and

(iv) confirms that the ADF will be consulted prior to the Airworthiness Authority approving designs that do not meet the contracted airworthiness standards; and

(5) will provide a formal Type Certification recommendation to the ADF, including operational limitations or conditions as required to achieve an acceptable level of safety.

d. Where RPA of an extant aircraft type or aircraft system design is included in the Design Acceptance strategy for new aircraft or major design changes, the DAR must submit to the TAR, in addition to the documentation required under TAREG 2.2.4.b:

(1) a Type Certificate, or other certificates or documents showing acceptance into service for the extant aircraft or aircraft system, issued by:

(i) the NAA of a recognised country as listed at TAREG 2.2.7.e, or

(ii) a recognised military force as listed at TAREG 2.2.7.f.

(2) evidence that the prior acceptance is applicable to the configuration being acquired by the ADF and the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment as defined in the SOI;

(3) data necessary for the compilation of a Type Record as required by TAREG 2.2.9;

(4) evidence of an undertaking to provide access to the Type Design data required to show compliance to the prescribed airworthiness standards;



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(5) a Design Acceptance strategy for the new design that treats all limitations in the certifications provided by Airworthiness Authorities for the extant design, and

(6) for Airworthiness Authority oversight of new ADF system designs, evidence of a formal agreement encompassing each of the requirements at TAREG 2.2.7.c.

e. Each of the following is a recognised country for the purposes of these regulations:

(1) Australia;

(2) Canada;

(3) New Zealand;

(4) the French Republic;

(5) the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

(6) the United Kingdom;

(7) the United States of America;

(8) Switzerland; and

(9) any other country for which the TAR is satisfied that the design standards and practices, quality control standards, and certification procedures used by the NAA of the country provide an adequate level of safety, normally equivalent to that required by these regulations for comparable aircraft.

f. Military forces of each of the following countries are recognised for the purpose of these regulations:

(1) Canada;

(2) the French Republic;

(3) the United Kingdom;

(4) the Kingdom of Spain;

(5) the United States of America; and

(6) any other military force for which an aircraft of that type has been accepted into service (and remains in service), and for which the TAR is satisfied that the design standards and practices, quality control standards, and acceptance into service procedures used by the military force provide an adequate level of safety, normally equivalent to that required by regulations for a comparable aircraft.

2.2.8. Type Design

a. The Type Design of all aircraft must consist of:

(1) the drawings, specifications, manuals and bulletins, including a listing of those documents necessary to define the configuration and design features of the aircraft shown to comply with the airworthiness standards applicable under this regulation;

(2) reports of tests and computations made during the course of the design, including those necessary to show that the product meets the airworthiness standards applicable to it under this regulation;

(3) information on dimensions, material and processes necessary to define the structural strength of the aircraft;

(4) Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness as required by the applicable airworthiness standards, including those required for maintenance, transport and storage of the aircraft and its equipment, and for the transport and storage of parts and materials required to be used in maintenance;

(5) the flight manual including operating procedures, operating limitations and other information necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft type as required by the applicable airworthiness standards; and

(6) any other data necessary to allow, by comparison, the determination of the airworthiness of later aircraft of the same type.



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2.2.9. Type Records

a. The Type Record must define the Type Design at the time of issue of a Design Acceptance certificate by providing a complete index to all Type Design data.

b. Type Design data must be included in the Type Record when it is not adequately controlled and stored.

c. Type Records must be compiled in accordance with Section 3 Chapter 12, Annex G.

2.2.10. Reserved

2.2.11. Compliance Findings

a. The DAR must ensure that:

(1) compliance findings are made only by competent and authorised individuals and agencies, and

(2) authorisations are recorded within the Design Acceptance strategy.

b. Compliance findings for an ADF SOR requirement must be made on the basis of:

(1) data obtained through inspection, test or analysis of the aircraft, its systems, materials, or parts where such tests are conducted subsequent to the relevant design agency tests;

(2) data obtained through involvement in design agency inspection or test activity; and

(3) Type Design data provided by the design agency, including data related to inspections, tests or analysis conducted without ADF involvement; and/or

(4) evidence of prior acceptance, as required by TAREG 2.2.7.

c. An authorised person or agency must only make a compliance finding if:

(1) the evidence provided indicates that the design satisfies the ADF SOR requirement, and

(2) the method used to show compliance is suitable for its intended purpose.

d. The DAR must ensure that all data assessed in the making of a compliance finding is the applicable version of such data.

e. The DAR must ensure that any issue identified as a result of compliance finding activities is only closed after:

(1) the design is subsequently found to meet the relevant ADF SOR requirement,

(2) the TAR or a relevant ASR has determined that the design provides an equivalent level of safety to that specified in the ADF SOR, or

(3) the TAR or a relevant ASR has accepted the reduction in the level of safety where the design has not met all airworthiness standards specified in the ADF SOR.

2.2.12. Software Compliance Findings

a. The DAR must ensure that a Software Compliance Finding Plan is documented to support the Design Acceptance of new or modified aviation software, where aviation software is defined in accordance with TAREG 3.5.3.a.

b. The DAR must ensure that the software compliance finding is conducted in accordance with the Software Compliance Finding Plan.

c. The DAR must obtain TAR approval of the Software Compliance Finding Plan if the worst credible failure condition of the new or modified aviation software is more severe than Minor (as defined in FAA AC25.1309) or Marginal (as defined in MIL-STD-882C).

d. Where TAR approval of the Software Compliance Finding Plan is required in accordance with TAREG 2.2.12.c, that TAR approval must be in the form of either:

(1) approval of the Software Compliance Finding Plan for a specific acquisition or modification, or

(2) a standing approval of the Software Compliance Finding Plan for on-going software compliance findings for in-service changes to previously design accepted aviation software.

e. In order to obtain TAR approval of the Software Compliance Finding Plan, the DAR must submit to the TAR, a Software Compliance Finding Plan that:



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(1) was prepared in accordance with AAP7001.054(AM1) Section 2 Chapter 7 Annex A;

(2) defines software safety and assurance benchmarks commensurate with the worst credible failure condition of the new or modified software through either the application of TAR recognised software safety and assurance standards in AAP7001.054(AM1) Section 2 Chapter 7, or alternative standards approved by the TAR;

(3) nominates a competent compliance finding agency to undertake the software compliance finding, or includes details of arrangements to resolve the limitations to compliance finding agency competency using technical specialists approved by the TAR;

(4) to the extent that the compliance finding uses Commonwealth oversight:

(i) identifies software lifecycle data to satisfy the TAR approved software safety and assurance standards;

(ii) identifies arrangements for software compliance finding agency access to software lifecycle data for evaluation against the TAR approved software safety and assurance standards; and

(iii) identifies the method of evaluation of the software lifecycle data against the TAR approved software safety and assurance standards; and

(5) to the extent that the compliance finding relies on prior acceptance by a recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority, includes evidence relating to prior acceptance of the software and any additional supporting information required by TAREG 2.2.7—Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance.

2.3. SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS

2.3.1. SFP Submission and Recommendation

a. The DAR seeking a TAR recommendation for a Special Flight Permit (SFP) must submit copies of the following documents:

(1) the draft SFP including operating limits and conditions;

(2) a certification by the DAR that all required Design Acceptance activities have been completed given the state of development of the acquisition or major design change and scope of operations required by the SFP;

(3) an assessment of the adequacy of the Type Record at the time of issue of the SFP;

(4) the current version of the applicable Design Acceptance strategy compiled in accordance with Annex A to this regulation;

(5) a document which summarises the achievements made against the Design Acceptance strategy;

(6) certification that appropriate maintenance and logistics arrangements are in place to provide for the scope of aircraft operations to be conducted under the SFP;

(7) certification that all aircraft to be operated under the SFP conform to the Type Design as submitted at paragraph a.(2); and

(8) a description of the Engineering Management System (EMS) to be used for engineering support during the SFP, including the delegation of responsibilities for on-going airworthiness and safety of flight evaluation.

b. The DAR is entitled to a SFP recommendation from the TAR if:

(1) the TAR is satisfied that Design Acceptance has been substantially completed in accordance with these regulations for the state of development of the acquisition or major design change and scope of operations required by the SFP; and

(2) all airworthiness issues raised during that process have been satisfactorily resolved or are being managed through TAR-approved issue papers.



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2.4. SERVICE RELEASE FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

2.4.1. Service Release Submission and Recommendation

a. The DAR seeking a TAR recommendation for Service Release must submit evidence that:

(1) a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or AMTC has been or will be issued;

(2) a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the Design Acceptance of the aircraft following Service Release;

(3) an AEO is in place to provide CI management of the aircraft in accordance with TAREG 3 following Service Release, including the establishment of a suitable Design Support Network;

(4) appropriate Aircraft and Engine Structural Integrity Management systems are in place for the aircraft in accordance with TAREGs 3.5.4 and 3.5.5;

(5) a Maintenance Support Network (MSN) including Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs) has been established;

(6) all identified OHS risks have been documented, together with an associated risk management plan;

(7) all OHS risks have been assessed, where appropriate making reference to OHS information from a competent authority and appropriate treatments have been implemented and;

(8) a Software Integrity Management System covering in-service management of software is established as required by TAREG 3.5.3.

b. The DAR is entitled to a Service Release recommendation from the TAR if the TAR is satisfied that the evidence submitted in accordance with Paragraph a. supports such a recommendation.

2.5. CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN


a. This regulation prescribes the requirements for a DAR seeking:

(1) to perform Design Acceptance of changes to Type Design, or

(2) issue of a TAR recommendation for the issue of an AMTC or STC.

2.5.2. Design Acceptance System for Changes to a Type Design

a. The DAR must establish a Design Acceptance system to ensure the requirements of this regulation are satisfied. The system must include procedures to ensure:

(1) the change to the Type Design is classified in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3,

(2) changes to the Type Design classified as major are treated in accordance with either TAREG 2.5.4 or 2.5.5 as applicable, and

(3) changes to the Type Design classified as minor are treated in accordance with TAREG 2.5.6.

2.5.3. Classification of Changes in Type Design

a. Except as provided in Paragraph b, the DAR may assume all changes to Type Design as minor.

b. The DAR must seek a classification of a change to the Type Design by the TAR if:

(1) the change to the Type Design would introduce a new capability, or significantly vary an existing capability; or

(2) the change to the Type Design may have an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product.

2.5.4. Changes Requiring a New AMTC

a. The DAR must apply to the TAR for a Type Certification recommendation as provided in TAREG 2.2 where a new AMTC is required in accordance with Paragraph b.



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b. A new AMTC is required when the design changes to an aircraft type are so extensive that the aircraft requires a substantially complete investigation of compliance with the applicable airworthiness standards.

2.5.5. Supplemental Type Certification

a. For major changes to an aircraft Type Design not great enough to require a new AMTC, the DAR must provide Design Acceptance certification in accordance with TAREG 2.2.3 and apply to the TAR for an STC recommendation.

b. The DAR must submit copies of documentation as required by TAREG 2.2.2.a, with the exception that a Type Record supplement is to be submitted in lieu of the aircraft Type Record.

c. The DAR is entitled to an STC recommendation from the TAR if:

(1) the TAR is satisfied that the Design Acceptance process has been completed in accordance with these regulations, and

(2) all airworthiness issues raised during that process have either been satisfactorily resolved or are being managed through TAR approved issue papers.

2.5.6. Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to Type Design

a. Except as provided under TAREG 2.5.9, the DAR must provide a Design Acceptance certificate to record the Design Acceptance of minor changes to an aircraft or aircraft equipment Type Design prior to the grant of Incorporation Approval in accordance with TAREG 3.5.12.

b. The DAR must only provide a Design Acceptance certificate for a minor change to Type Design for a design change originating from an AEO if:

(1) the DAR is satisfied that the AEO certification is relevant to the services provided for the duration of the design activity;

(2) the AEO has verified to the satisfaction of the DAR that the design change complies with:

(i) the relevant ADF SOR prescribed in accordance with TAREG 2.5.7, and

(ii) airworthiness standards prescribed in accordance with TAREG 2.5.8.

(3) the AEO has:

(i) provided a Design Approval certificate for the design change as required by TAREG 3.4.3;

(ii) provided copies of such design data as the DAR may require in determining the acceptability of a design;

(iii) documented all identified OHS risks, together with an associated risk management plan; and

(iv) assessed all OHS risks, where appropriate making reference to OHS information from a competent authority and implemented appropriate treatments.

c. The DAR must only provide a Design Acceptance certificate for a minor change to Type Design for a design change originating from a non-AEO if:

(1) the DAR is satisfied that the design is applicable to the ADF’s configuration, intended roles and environment for the aircraft or aircraft-related equipment, and either:

(i) the design has been previously approved by the NAA of a recognised country or by a recognised military force as defined in TAREG 2.2.7, or

(ii) the DAR is satisfied that:

(a) the design complies with airworthiness standards prescribed in accordance with TAREG 2.5.8;

(b) the source of the design change data is reliable and of acceptable quality;

(c) the original customer for the design services and intended application for the design change is known; and



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(d) the design was approved by the aircraft or aircraft-related equipment Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or other established supplier of engineering services of acceptable quality.

d. If a design change, assessed in accordance with Paragraph b. and c., requires additional design effort to adapt the design for ADF purposes, or substantial additional verification activity to demonstrate the airworthiness or applicability of the design change for ADF purposes, then the required design activity must be conducted by a suitable AEO and a Design Approval certificate provided in accordance with TAREG 3.4.3 prior to Design Acceptance certification.

2.5.7. ADF Statement of Requirements for Minor Changes

a. Except as provided under Paragraph b. the DAR must only approve an ADF SOR for minor changes to an aircraft if that document:

(1) references and conforms to specifications referenced in the Type Record of the applicable aircraft;

(2) contains all the ADF’s requirements relevant to the item being altered;

(3) requires the design agency to make all calculations, inspections and tests necessary to show that the design meets all the requirements of the ADF SOR and that the aircraft remains safe for its intended operations;

(4) requires the design agency to provide the Commonwealth with the relevant data and the opportunity to make such inspections, flight and ground tests as are necessary to satisfy the DAR that the design meets all the requirements of the ADF SOR and that the aircraft remains safe for its intended operations; and

(5) specifically precludes the interpretation of compliance findings in support of Design Acceptance by the Commonwealth as indicating the Commonwealth has granted Design Approval of any design, inspection or test result required under Paragraph a.(3).

b. The DAR may authorise approval of an ADF SOR, in accordance with this regulation, for a scope of minor design changes not exceeding that for which Assumption of Design Acceptance has been allowed in accordance with TAREG 2.5.9, by:

(1) a DSDE within the AEO, or

(2) the SDE of another AEO.

c. Where the ADF SOR for a minor design change to an aircraft results in a change or addition to the specifications referenced in the Type Record, the DAR must submit the following to the TAR for endorsement:

(1) the documents forming the ADF SOR;

(2) a copy of the current Statement of Operating Intent (SOI);

(3) if the strategy for Design Acceptance relies on prior acceptance, evidence related to prior acceptance as required by TAREG 2.2.7; and

(4) if TAR or ASR advice was rejected in the development of the ADF SOR and the matter remains unresolved, documentation fully disclosing the advice and the reasons for rejection.

2.5.8. Airworthiness Standards for Minor Design Changes

a. Except under the provisions of Paragraph b. the airworthiness standards applicable to a minor design change must be either:

(1) those standards incorporated by reference in the AMTC or STC, or

(2) alternative airworthiness standards, prescribed by the TAR or relevant ASR.

b. If a proposed design change consists of a new design or substantially complete redesign of a component, equipment or system installation, and the DAR determines that the standards incorporated by reference in the Type Certificate for the aircraft may not be adequate, then the design change must be shown to comply with:

(1) standards prescribed by the TAR or relevant ASR that establish an equivalent level of safety, and



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(2) any special conditions as defined in TAREG 2.2.5.

2.5.9. Assumption of Design Acceptance Certification

a. The DAR must only allow Design Acceptance certification to be assumed by an AEO for specified design changes or classes of design change, prior to progression of the design to Incorporation Approval, in accordance with TAREG 3.5.12 under the following conditions:

(1) internal to the AEO, in accordance with the AEO’s approved procedures; or

(2) from an external AEO, under the terms of a formal agreement between the DAR and the external AEO.

b. Any procedures or agreements applicable under Paragraph a. must:

(1) identify the interface, airworthiness and other performance requirements to be maintained for the relevant CIs;

(2) define the design changes or classes of design changes to which the agreement or procedures applies;

(3) identify the procedure by which the assumption of Design Acceptance Certification must be recorded for each design change, ensuring that:

(i) the conditions for Design Acceptance Certification as provided in TAREG 2.5.6 have been satisfied; and

(ii) the record of the assumption of Design Acceptance Certification:

(a) is completed and endorsed by a person with at least the necessary authorisation for Design Approval certification for the design change; and

(b) references the agreement or procedures.

(4) for a commercial AEO:

(i) specify the method by which the Design Approval and Design Acceptance records and all related design and implementation records must be made available for review by the DAR or representative, assure ready access to these records for the DAR or his representative; and

(ii) specify the method for reviewing contractor performance and, if necessary, revoking authorisations.

c. The design changes or classes of design changes specified in the formal agreement or procedures must not include major changes or those which:

(1) add a new capability to the aircraft or markedly enhance an existing capability;

(2) result in a reduction in safety, or mission performance for the aircraft;

(3) affect technical or human interfaces between the affected CI and other CIs or higher assemblies outside the scope of work performed by the AEO;

(4) involve the rejection in full or part of mandatory or safety related OEM advice;

(5) result in the introduction of new OHS risks without appropriate treatment, including communication of that risk in accordance with a defined OHS procedure; and

(6) result in an increase to a pre-existing OHS risk without appropriate treatment, including communication of that risk in accordance with a defined OHS procedure.

d. An authorisation provided in accordance with Paragraph a. is only valid while the organisation continues to hold a valid EAC and until the DAR suspends, terminates or otherwise revokes it.

e. The DAR must be responsible for monitoring the performance of commercial AEOs authorised in accordance with this regulation and revoking authorisations where deemed necessary to assure aircraft airworthiness and technical acceptability for service use:

(1) The monitoring program must include audits of documentation for at least 10% of design changes accepted under the authorisation at an interval not to exceed one year to ensure, at a minimum, that:



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(i) design changes accepted under the authorisation are within the bounds of the design changes or classes of design changes identified in the formal agreement; and

(ii) the conditions for Design Acceptance certification as provided in TAREG 2.5.6 have been satisfied.

(2) All audit results arising from the monitoring program must be treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8.

2.6. OTHER CERTIFICATION ISSUES

2.6.1. Change to Planned Withdrawal Date

a. The DAR must notify the TAR of any plans to alter the Planned Withdrawal Date (PWD) for an aircraft type.

2.6.2. Statement of Operating Intent (SOI)

a. The TAR must endorse all initial Statements of Operating Intent.

b. The TAR must endorse all changes to Statements of Operating Intent prior to approval by the OAA. The following exception applies:

(1) The DAR may endorse changes to an SOI that are editorial in nature.

c. The DAR must inform DGTA of any changes to the Statement of Operating Intent.

d. The DAR must inform the OAAR of any change to Type Design that requires a change to the SOI.

e. The DAR must manage any changes to the Type Design resulting from a change to the SOI in accordance with TAREG 2.5.2.

2.6.3. Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness

a. Certificates of Airworthiness must mean a certificate attesting that:

(1) an individual aircraft has been examined and conforms to the Type Design,

(2) any deviations to that aircraft have been approved as provided under TAREG 3.5.8, and

(3) the aircraft is considered airworthy as at the date of the certificate.

b. The DAR must issue a Certificate of Airworthiness for each aircraft acquired for ADF operations, following issue of an AMTC for the aircraft type and before operation of each aircraft.

c. The Certificate of Airworthiness must include the following:

(1) certificate number,

(2) aircraft type,

(3) aircraft model,

(4) aircraft serial number,

(5) applicable AMTC, and

(6) applicable STCs.

d. The DAR must update the Certificate of Airworthiness for affected aircraft to reflect conformance to the Type Design following a major change to the Type Design.

e. The DAR must cancel a Certificate of Airworthiness for an affected aircraft if:

(1) the AMTC for the affected type is withdrawn,

(2) the aircraft is no longer regulated by the ADF Airworthiness Authority, or

(3) the aircraft is no longer deemed to demonstrate satisfactory conformance to the Type Design.

f. The DAR must reissue a Certificate of Airworthiness cancelled under Paragraph e. when an affected aircraft is eligible for reissue of a certificate.



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2.6.4. Reserved

2.6.5. Notification of Unairworthy Conditions

a. The DAR must immediately notify the TAR whenever an aircraft has, or is likely to be operated in an unairworthy condition. The DAR's notification must include the:

(1) details of the source of information,

(2) potential risk to safety,

(3) number of aircraft affected,

(4) proposed action to rectify the unairworthy condition, and

(5) potential impact on operations.

b. The TAR must consider the notification before making a recommendation to the Operational Airworthiness Authority. The TAR's recommendation may include advice regarding the restriction or suspension of flying operations.

2.7. CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

2.7.1. Definition

a. For the purposes of this regulation, ‘civil leased aircraft’ must mean aircraft:

(1) leased from a commercial organisation,

(2) for use in ADF operations as State Aircraft,

(3) to be listed on the State register for the term of the lease period, and

(4) originally designed to a civil airworthiness standard.


a. The TAR will determine the specific aircraft types to which this regulation is to apply.

b. This regulation allows for recognition of civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals for eligible civil leased aircraft types.

c. Civil owned civil registered aircraft that may be temporarily classified as State Aircraft for the purposes of specific tasks of a limited duration are excluded from this regulation.

2.7.3. Recognition of Civil Aviation Regulatory Systems

a. The TAR may allow the use of civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals to form the basis of technical airworthiness management for civil leased aircraft if an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated.

b. Except as otherwise authorised by the TAR, only the civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals from the countries listed in TAREG 2.2.7.c. will be recognised.

c. The DAR seeking a TAR authorisation for the use of civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals for a civil leased aircraft type must submit evidence that:

(1) a Type Certificate or equivalent document issued by an NAA remains in force for the Type Design being leased for ADF use;

(2) the airworthiness standards applied by the NAA to issue the Type Certificate or equivalent document are relevant and suitable for the ADF configuration, role and environment as specified in the SOI in accordance with TAREG 2.2.6;

(3) an AMTC has been or will be issued;

(4) individual aircraft have or will be subject to an independent third party inspection prior to the issue of ADF Certificates of Airworthiness;

(5) appropriate systems are in place to undertake technical airworthiness management for the term of the lease period including;

(i) Design Acceptance processes,



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(ii) design and CI management processes, and

(iii) aircraft maintenance and management processes.

(6) a ADF AEO has been identified to sponsor all commercial organisations engaged in design or maintenance activity;

(7) all organisations engaged in design or maintenance activity hold relevant NAA approvals, have been authorised by the TAR, and will be subject to independent audit for the term of the lease period;

(8) arrangements are in place for ongoing support from the OEM of the aircraft type for the provision of Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness; and

(9) arrangements are in place to ensure the receipt of all airworthiness directives issued by the NAA that issued the Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate or equivalent documents for aircraft and engines and for the exchange of defect and alert information relevant to the aircraft and engine types.

2.7.4. Continued Compliance

a. The DAR must notify the TAR, and require prior approval from the TAR for continued management of a civil leased aircraft type under this regulation, should there be a change to any of the following:

(1) a substantive change to the ADF configuration, role or environment to that originally specified in the SOI in accordance with TAREG 2.2.6;

(2) a Type Certificate or equivalent document issued by an NAA for the Type Design is cancelled, suspended or revoked by the NAA;

(3) any organisation engaged in design or maintenance activity supporting the civil leased aircraft type cease to hold relevant NAA approvals; or

(4) the OEM advises that it will no longer provide Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness.

Annex:

A. TAR Requirements for Design Acceptance Strategies



2A–1

TAR REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN ACCEPTANCE STRATEGIES 1. Approval. The appropriate DAR must approve the documented design acceptance strategy prior to submission to the TAR for receipt of a:

a. TAR endorsement of the ADF SOR as required by TAREG 2.2.4,

b. TAR recommendation for the issue of a Special Flight Permit as required by TAREG 2.3, and

c. TAR recommendation for an AMTC or STC as required by TAREGs 2.2.2 and 2.5.5 respectively.

2. The documented Design Acceptance strategy must include:

a. Introduction. A brief description of the project must be included in order to confirm that there is a requirement to document the strategy. A Design Acceptance strategy is only required to be documented when either:

(1) an AMTC is required for the ADF acquisition of a new aircraft type not previously certified for ADF operations; or

(2) a new AMTC (TAREG 2.5.4) or STC (TAREG 2.5.5) is required due to a design change to an existing ADF aircraft being classified as major.

b. Airworthiness Design Standards. A brief description of the compilation of the technical aspects of the ADF Statement of Requirements (SOR) must be documented in order to receive a TAR endorsement of the ADF SOR in accordance with TAREG 2.2.4. The description must confirm that:

(1) the airworthiness standards which form the Certification Basis are prescribed within the ADF SOR and were established in accordance with TAREG 2.2.5;

(2) the TAR and relevant ASR were involved in the compilation of all documents which form the ADF SOR in accordance with TAREG 2.2.4.c.(3); and

(3) adequate evidence exists for the DAR to receive informed RPA in accordance with TAREG 2.2.7. This evidence must include:

(a) a copy of an appropriate aircraft Type Certificate or Type Acceptance Certificate which meets the requirement of TAREG 2.2.7; and

(b) the ADF SOR prescribing airworthiness standards relevant to the variation in Type Design as required by TAREG 2.2.4.c(4).

c. Design Agency Details. A brief description of any design agency or agencies performing design review and approval activities in accordance with TAREG 3 is required, including the:

(1) name and address of each design agency,

(2) current AEO status of each design agency, and

(3) current Quality Assurance status of each design agency.

d. Design Acceptance System Description. A brief description of the Design Acceptance system, established in accordance with TAREG 2.5.2, is required to confirm that:

(1) personnel are to be assigned appropriate Engineering Authority to perform Design Acceptance activities relating to the Type Design as defined by TAREG 2.2.8;

(2) personnel and agencies who are to make compliance findings are identified and authorised as required by TAREG 2.2.11;

(3) compliance findings are to be made and any issue papers are to be finalised in accordance with the requirements of TAREG 2.2.11 and Section 3, Chapter 12;

(4) the Certification Basis is to be established and completed in accordance with Section 3, Chapter 12;

(5) the proposed Commonwealth evaluation and ongoing compliance assurance activities for each design agency are to be conducted in accordance with TAREG 3.6.3;

(6) the TAR or relevant ASR is to be consulted prior to approval of amendments to the TAR endorsed SOR, as required by TAREG 2.2.3.a(3);



2A–2

(7) the DAR is to review all SOI amendments as required by TAREG 2.6.2;

(8) the process for the receipt of a Special Flight Permit (SFP), if required, includes the requirements of TAREG 2.3 to ensure the receipt of a TAR recommendation for SFP; and

(9) the process for the issue of a Design Acceptance certificate includes the requirements of TAREG 2.2.3.



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TAREG 3

AUTHORISED ENGINEERING ORGANISATIONS

3.1. GENERAL


a. This regulation prescribes:

(1) the procedural requirements for the issue of an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC);

(2) rules governing Service organisations holding EACs; and

(3) requirements to be mandated through formal instrument by Sponsor AEOs for those commercial organisations required to hold an EAC for the provision of design or engineering management services to the ADF.

3.2. ENGINEERING AUTHORITY CERTIFICATES


a. This regulation defines the privileges of a holder of an EAC and prescribes the procedural requirements for the issue of an EAC.

3.2.2. Certificate Required

a. All organisations must only operate as an AEO with, and in accordance with, a valid EAC issued by the TAR.

b. A commercial organisation must not operate as an AEO unless the terms of the EAC are enforceable by a formal instrument whose requirements are acceptable to the TAR for any service they provide as an AEO.

c. The Letter of Engineering Authority issued with each EAC must be considered part of the Certificate.

d. The Letter of Engineering Authority must define the scope and level of activity for which the certificate is issued.

3.2.3. Sponsor AEO Requirements

a. Sponsor AEO must mean an ADF AEO responsible for the management of a formal instrument between the Commonwealth and a commercial organisation which requires that commercial organisation to operate as an AEO.

b. Sponsor AEOs must ensure that any formal instruments requiring a commercial organisation to operate as a commercial AEO are developed and administered to satisfy the requirements of these regulations.

c. Sponsor AEOs must develop, promulgate and adhere to a structured compliance assurance program when a commercial organisation is required to operate as a commercial AEO, to ensure that the commercial AEO is monitored for compliance with the TAR’s regulatory requirements.

d. Sponsor AEOs must notify the TAR in writing:

(1) upon cessation of the formal instrument between the Sponsor AEO and commercial AEO, or

(2) when recommending that a commercial AEO certification be suspended or revoked.

3.2.4. Application

a. The applicant must submit an application for an EAC to the TAR:

(1) by the applicant directly when it is an ADF organisation, or

(2) through the Sponsor AEO when the applicant is a commercial organisation.

b. Each application must be submitted with:



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(1) details of the applicant, including organisation name and address, and the reason for the application;

(2) details of the applicant’s Engineering Management System (EMS) documented in an Engineering Management Plan (EMP) compiled by the applicant as provided in TAREG 3.2.8; and

(3) a copy of all procedures, plans or instructions referenced in the EMP.

c. For an application from a commercial organisation, the Sponsor AEO must include a copy of the clauses of the formal instrument proposed to enforce the regulations in this regulation.

d. For an application from a commercial organisation relying substantially upon subcontractors to perform the engineering activities listed in the applicant’s EMP, the application must detail those subcontractors and the respective scopes of work to be subcontracted.

3.2.5. Audits

a. The applicant must allow the TAR or his representative to make such investigations of the applicant’s facilities, products, personnel and records as are needed to satisfy the TAR that:

(1) the applicant meets the criteria listed at TAREGs 3.3 to 3.6 as relevant to the scope of EA being sought,

(2) the EMP submitted as provided in TAREG 3.2.4 provides a satisfactory basis for the issue of an EAC, and

(3) the applicant is capable of satisfying the EMP requirements when providing services to the ADF as an AEO.

b. Where the applicant is a commercial organisation, relying substantially upon subcontractors to perform the engineering activities listed in the applicant’s EMP, the applicant must:

(1) allow the TAR or his representative to audit those subcontractors as provided under Paragraph a; and

(2) prior to the conduct of any such audit, inform the TAR or his representative of those engineering activities being performed by subcontractors.

3.2.6. Issue of a Certificate

a. The applicant is entitled to the issue of an EAC if the TAR is satisfied that:

(1) the applicant has established and will maintain a third party quality certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent relevant to the scope of activity to be performed as an AEO;

(2) the EMS as documented in the EMP meets the requirements of these regulations and satisfactorily defines the engineering organisation and methods for ensuring compliance with this regulation;

(3) the applicant meets the criteria listed at TAREGs 3.3 to 3.6 as relevant to the scope of EA being sought; and

(4) for a commercial AEO, the sponsor AEO has developed and promulgated a compliance assurance program as required by TAREG 3.2.3.

3.2.7. Duration

a. An EAC issued to a ADF AEO is valid until it is surrendered or until the TAR suspends or revokes it.

b. An EAC issued to a commercial AEO is valid for the period of the formal instrument(s) or until the TAR suspends or revokes it.

3.2.8. Engineering Management Plan

a. The EMP must contain at least:

(1) a statement signed by the Senior Executive required by TAREG 3.3.2, confirming that:

(i) the EMP and any referenced plans, procedures and instructions describe the organisation and its methods for ensuring ongoing compliance with these regulations; and



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(ii) all activities undertaken by the organisation as an AEO can be carried out in accordance with these regulations.

(2) a tabulated cross-reference to the specific plans, procedures and instructions used by the applicant to comply with each regulation;

(3) a description of the scope of engineering activities to be undertaken by the applicant, including identification of:

(i) CIs being managed or supported (if scope includes specific CIs);

(ii) technologies being supported (if scope includes specific technologies);

(iii) design control and CI management activities to be conducted; and

(iv) the airworthiness standards that the ASR is authorised to prescribe, revise and interpret in accordance with TAREG 3.3.11.

(4) a statement of the level of engineering activity to be exercised by the applicant:

(i) for the overall scope identified at Paragraph a.(3) or, where level varies, for each activity within the scope identified at Paragraph a.(3); and

(ii) where the level may be one or both of the following:

(a) Design Acceptance certification, as prescribed in TAREGs 2.2.3 and 2.5.6; and

(b) Design Approval certification, as prescribed in TAREG 3.4.3.

(5) details of relevant organisational certifications held by the applicant, including:

(i) quality system certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent as required by TAREG 3.2.6, and

(ii) current or previous engineering or design certifications issued by the TAR and other airworthiness authorities.

(6) an organisation chart showing the titles of, and lines of responsibility for, the Senior Executive, ASR, SDE, DSDEs (if applicable), DEs and any other persons required by TAREG 3.3.2;

(7) the qualifications, training and experience of the SDE and any DSDEs required by TAREG 3.3.2;

(8) a description of the applicant’s Design Support Network (DSN) including:

(i) details of DSN members and services as required by TAREG 3.3.3;

(ii) a list of all Technical Information (TI) sources to be collected and registered by the applicant as required by TAREG 3.5.2;

(iii) an explanation of any data access agreements managed by the applicant as required by TAREG 3.3.6; and

(iv) interface arrangements with DSN members to ensure proper identification and control of all Type Design data as required by TAREG 3.5.14.

(9) details of all locations where the applicant intends to conduct engineering activities within the scope defined at Paragraph a.(3);

(10) a description of the equipment, tools and facilities necessary to conduct all engineering activities within the scope defined at Paragraph a.(3), as required by TAREG 3.3.7; and

(11) a description of the EMP amendment process, including conditions for prior TAR acceptance, as required by TAREG 3.6.2.

b. The EMP must be approved by the incumbent SDE.

3.3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ISSUE

3.3.1. Definitions

a. In this regulation access to a resource must mean that it is both physically and legally available for use by the members of an organisation in performing all relevant activities as an AEO.



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3.3.2. Personnel

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must employ:

(1) a Senior Executive who has the authority within the applicant organisation to ensure that all activities undertaken by the organisation can be carried out in accordance with the requirements prescribed by this regulation;

(2) a Senior Design Engineer (SDE) meeting all the criteria of Annex A to this regulation and for ASR appointments, requirements of TAREG 1, Annex B. The SDE is responsible for ensuring that the applicant’s organisation complies with the requirements of this regulation. The SDE must be accepted by the TAR and must be ultimately responsible to the Senior Executive for the following functions:

(i) assignment of authority to competent personnel to plan, perform, supervise, review and certify all engineering activity listed in the applicant’s EMP;

(ii) design control;

(iii) CI management;

(iv) maintaining the EMS internal evaluation system in accordance with TAREG 3.3.9;

(v) ensuring that the EMS is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels of the organisation;

(vi) ensuring there are sufficient Design Engineers (DEs), meeting all the criteria of Annex B to this regulation, to perform DE functions listed in the applicants EMP and required by this regulation, and with the competencies required:

(a) for the scope of engineering activity listed in the applicant’s EMP; and

(b) for a commercial organisation, to ensure that subcontractor engineering activity complies with both the systems and procedures in the applicants EMP and the technical requirements specified for that activity.

(vii) for ASRs only, prescribing, revising and interpreting airworthiness standards in accordance with TAREG 3.3.11;

(3) for a Sponsor AEO, sufficient auditor and Lead Auditor qualified personnel, meeting all the criteria of Annex G to this regulation, to conduct compliance assurance activities required by TAREG 3.2.3; and

(4) sufficient personnel to undertake all engineering activities listed in the applicant’s EMP and required under this regulation.

b. The applicant for an EAC may employ Deputy Senior Design Engineers (DSDEs) meeting all the criteria of Annex A to this regulation. Such nominated persons must be accepted by the TAR as DSDEs and may perform the following functions:

(1) assignment of authority to competent personnel to undertake engineering activities listed in the applicant’s EMP; and

(2) design control functions as defined by TAREG 3.4.

c. The applicant must establish organisational arrangements to ensure the SDE has direct access to the Senior Executive required by Subparagraph a(1) on any matter concerning the adequacy of the EMS or its compliance with these regulations.

d. The applicant must establish a procedure to authorise competent personnel to perform the engineering functions listed in the applicant’s EMP and required under this regulation.

e. The personnel authorisation procedure must ensure that:

(1) the competence of personnel is initially assessed against the scope of engineering activities to be performed;

(2) the SDE or a DSDE authorises DEs and other personnel undertaking engineering activities listed in the applicant’s EMP;

(3) authorised personnel are provided with written evidence of the scope and level of their authorisation where:



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(i) scope means the limitations on their authorisation in terms of technology, equipment, airworthiness standards or type of design; and

(ii) level means the type or degree of authority being exercised and must include at least the levels of SDE, DSDE (if applicable) and DE.

(4) for a Sponsor AEO, the SDE authorises all auditor and Lead Auditor personnel;

(5) the competence of authorised personnel is maintained;

(6) the SDE authorises one or more DSDEs or DEs to perform SDE functions as limited to paragraphs a.(2)(ii) to a.(2)(iv) when the SDE is absent; and

(7) a DE acting in the capacity of SDE must not perform personnel authorisations.

3.3.3. Design Support Networks

a. Design Support Network (DSN) must mean those organisations or persons not a part of the applicant’s organisation that will perform, or assist in the performance of services the applicant intends to provide as an AEO.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must:

(1) identify each member of their DSN in their EMP and for each member:

(i) identify the services to be provided,

(ii) define in what instances those services are to be sought, and

(iii) define how those services will be used, including any caveats or limitations on their use.

c. Except as otherwise authorised by the TAR, each applicant for an EAC must include as part of its DSN:

(1) all OEMs for aircraft and engines managed by the AEO;

(2) all AEOs with design control or CI management responsibility for items or parts which form part of, or interface with, CIs to be within the scope of the applicant;

(3) all COEs who provide relevant support;

(4) DSTO and other research bodies who provide support through formal or informal agreements;

(5) statutory or regulatory bodies applicable to the engineering activities identified in the EMP;

(6) where the applicant is a Service organisation, all commercial AEOs which provide them with support as provided in this regulation;

(7) where the applicant is a commercial organisation:

(i) the sponsor AEO and all other ADF AEOs which they intend to support as an AEO; and

(ii) all sub-contractors who are to supply engineering services in support of the applicant’s services as an AEO.

(8) any other organisations providing information or advice relevant to the applicant’s services as an AEO under either formal or informal agreement with the applicant.

d. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to:

(1) evaluate and select persons or organisations to act as part of their DSN on the basis of:

(i) that person’s or organisation’s ability to perform the engineering activities they are to undertake, and

(ii) that person’s or organisation’s ability to satisfy the requirements of these regulations.

(2) audit commercial AEOs and their subcontractors as applicable, against the requirements of these regulations at intervals of not more than two years in accordance with TAREG 3.6.3; and

(3) review the appropriateness of the DSN at intervals of not more than two years.



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3.3.4. Design Control System

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC which includes in its scope design control responsibilities must establish a design control system that satisfies the requirements of TAREG 3.4.

3.3.5. CI Management System

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC which includes in its scope CI management responsibilities must establish a CI management system that satisfies the requirements of TAREG 3.5.

3.3.6. Data

a. For the purposes of these regulations:

(1) Type Design data means data that has been defined at TAREG 2.2.8;

(2) Design reference data means Type Design data and any other data, including design manuals and handbooks, airworthiness design standards, specifications, technical standards and technological practices, engineering reports and reference material, and drawings, used as an input to a design activity as provided by TAREG 3.4; and

(3) Design output data means all data produced in developing the design as provided by TAREG 3.4. Following Incorporation Approval of the design, design output data is used to update the Type Design data.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must:

(1) describe the intellectual property rights associated with all data accessed via agreements with organisations external to the ADF including:

(i) the scope and period of all such agreements; and

(ii) the rights and responsibilities of all parties in relation to ownership, access and maintenance of the data.

c. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC that includes in its scope design control responsibilities must establish procedures to control design reference data, drawings and reports as required by TAREG 3.4.2.

d. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC that includes in its scope CI management responsibilities must establish a procedure for managing Type Design data as required by TAREG 3.5.14.

3.3.7. Equipment, Tools and Facility Requirements

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must:

(1) identify the equipment, tools and facilities necessary to conduct all activities proposed to be undertaken as an AEO and required under these regulations in the EMP;

(2) have access to that equipment, tools and facilities;

(3) establish a procedure to:

(i) control the equipment, tools and facilities;

(ii) ensure the calibration of tools, test equipment and facilities; and

(iii) confirm the suitability, currency and availability of all tools, test equipment and facilities.

3.3.8. Records

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to identify, collect, index, store, maintain and dispose of the engineering records required by this regulation; and must:

(1) while a holder of an EAC, make such records available to the TAR or his representative upon request; and

(2) for commercial organisations, agree to transfer copies of such records to the Commonwealth upon cessation of the commercial AEO formal instrument in accordance with terms to be included in the formal instrument and endorsed by the TAR.



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b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to:

(1) record details of the qualification, training, experience and authorisation of each person who is assigned authority under TAREG 3.3.2;

(2) where the applicant is to perform design control as provided in TAREG 3.4:

(i) record all designs and design changes developed by the applicant; and

(ii) retain all drawings, tests, analyses and reports that show the designs and design changes comply with applicable requirements, including airworthiness design standards, as provided in TAREG 3.4.

(3) where the applicant is to perform CI management as provided in TAREG 3.5, record CI management information as required by that regulation;

(4) record the date of and person certifying the assessment of design reference data for suitability and applicability as provided in TAREG 3.4.2;

(5) record all calibrations on tools and test equipment and the standards used as required by TAREG 3.3.7;

(6) record the results of audits of commercial AEOs or subcontractors as appropriate as required by TAREG 3.3.3;

(7) record the results of audits arising from the monitoring program for commercial AEOs as required by TAREG 2.5.9;

(8) record the results of reviews of DSN appropriateness and effectiveness as required by TAREG 3.3.3;

(9) record quality indicators and the results arising from procedures for corrective and preventive actions, internal audits and management reviews as provided in TAREG 3.3.9; and

(10) ensure that:

(i) all records are legible and of a permanent nature; and

(ii) for ADF AEOs, except as otherwise authorised by the TAR, all records are retained for a minimum of two years from the date that the last example of the CI is permanently withdrawn from ADF service.

c. Each applicant must establish procedures to ensure where records are to be stored electronically, for the period that such records are required to be retained:

(1) all hardware or software tools required to extract, manipulate and read the records are also retained; and

(2) a recoverable electronic copy of the record is made and stored at another secure site.

3.3.9. EMS Internal Evaluation System

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish an internal evaluation system to ensure compliance with, and the adequacy of, the EMS procedures required by these regulations.

b. The EMS internal evaluation system must include:

(1) a definition of the tools and performance indicators to be used to measure adequacy of the EMS, such as audit reports, publication reviews, defect reports, incident reports and customer feedback;

(2) a procedure to describe how performance indicators are monitored to identify existing deficiencies or potential causes of problems in the applicant’s EMS;

(3) a procedure for corrective action to ensure that existing deficiencies in the system are corrected;

(4) a procedure for preventive action to ensure that potential causes of deficiencies that have been identified within the system are remedied;

(5) an internal audit program to audit the applicant’s organisation for conformity with its EMS; and

(6) management review procedures to ensure the continuing suitability and effectiveness of the EMS in satisfying the requirements of this regulation.



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c. The EMS internal evaluation system must ensure that the EMS is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels of the organisation.

d. The procedure for corrective action must specify how:

(1) existing deficiencies are to be corrected,

(2) corrective action is to be followed up to ensure the action is effective, and

(3) management will review the effectiveness of any corrective action taken.

e. The procedure for preventive action must specify how:

(1) potential deficiencies are to be remedied,

(2) preventive action is to be followed up to ensure the action is effective, and

(3) management will review the effectiveness of any preventive action taken.

f. The EMS internal audit program must:

(1) specify the frequency and location of the audits taking into account the nature of the activity to be audited,

(2) ensure audits are performed by trained auditing personnel who are independent of those having direct responsibility for the activity being audited,

(3) ensure the results of audits are reported to the personnel responsible for the activity being audited and the manager responsible for internal audits,

(4) require preventive or corrective action to be taken by the personnel responsible for the activity being audited if problems are found by the audit, and

(5) ensure follow up audits to review the effectiveness of any preventive or corrective action taken.

g. The procedure for management review must:

(1) specify the frequency of management reviews of the EMS taking into account the need for the continuing effectiveness of the system, and

(2) ensure the results of the review are evaluated and recorded.

3.3.10. Documentation Control

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to maintain adequate control of all documentation that has any bearing on activities detailed in the applicant’s EMP, ensuring that:

(1) documentation is reviewed and approved by competent and authorised personnel before issue,

(2) current issues of relevant documentation are available to personnel who require access to such documentation for the provision of the engineering activities in the applicant’s EMP,

(3) obsolete documentation is promptly removed from all points of issue, and

(4) changes to documentation are reviewed and approved by competent and authorised personnel prior to issue.

3.3.11. Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards

a. Each applicant seeking authority to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards, hereinafter referred to as an Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR), must have EMP procedures to ensure that:

(1) the airworthiness standards that the ASR has responsibility for are identified in the EMP and are managed in accordance with TAREG 3.3.10;

(2) there is a pro-active approach to monitoring of amendments to airworthiness standards;

(3) Authoritative Airworthiness Advice (AAA) issued by the COE is:

(i) authorised by the ASR;

(ii) clearly identified as AAA; and

(iii) communicated to the TAR.



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(4) the competency and ongoing professional development requirements for the ASR and those positions within the AEO deemed to be essential to an AEO maintaining its COE status, are described in the EMP and endorsed by the Senior Executive.

3.4. DESIGN CONTROL

3.4.1. Design Control System

a. For the purposes of this regulation, design must mean the design of a product (component or item), a design change or design service performed for another AEO.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish a design control system to:

(1) control and verify designs to ensure that specified requirements are met, and

(2) ensure that all design decisions are documented and recorded.

c. The design control system must include procedures to ensure that:

(1) data is controlled as provided in TAREG 3.4.2;

(2) appropriate development plans are prepared for each design project and those plans:

(i) include a requirement to conduct an OHS risk analysis;

(ii) describe or reference all design activities, including Judgement of Significance, design development, Design Review and Design Approval;

(iii) assign responsibility for their implementation to competent, authorised individuals equipped with adequate resources;

(iv) are approved by the person who is to approve the design, prior to commencement of the design project; and

(v) are updated as necessary as the design evolves.

(3) organisational and technical interfaces between different groups are defined and the necessary information is documented, transmitted and regularly reviewed;

(4) a Judgement of Significance is performed for every design activity, including substitutions, modifications and deviations in accordance with TAREG 3.4.5;

(5) design specifications, including applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, are reviewed to ensure:

(i) all requirements and methods of verification are adequately defined and documented;

(ii) airworthiness standards as defined in TAREG 2 are adequately specified; and

(iii) incomplete, ambiguous or conflicting requirements are resolved with the sponsor AEO or DAR as appropriate;

(6) design output:

(i) is documented and expressed in terms that can be verified against specified requirements;

(ii) meets the design input requirements;

(iii) contains or makes reference to Design Acceptance criteria;

(iv) identifies those characteristics of the design crucial to the safe and proper functioning of the product including requirements for operation, storage, handling, maintenance and disposal; and

(v) is subject to review by authorised persons as provided in TAREG 3.4.4 prior to release.

(7) design verification:

(i) measures meet specified requirements, and

(ii) measures and results are recorded.

(8) Design Approvals are issued as provided in TAREG 3.4.3;



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(9) design activities are performed only by authorised personnel as provided in TAREG 3.3.2;

(10) for commercial applicants, each design activity to be performed on behalf of the applicant’s organisation by a subcontractor:

(i) is identified in the applicant’s EMP as provided in TAREG 3.2.8; and

(ii) complies with the systems and procedures in the applicant’s EMP and with the specified requirements for the design activity.

3.4.2. Data Control

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must have access to design reference data, as defined by TAREG 3.3.6.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to control design reference data, as defined in TAREG 3.3.6, to ensure that:

(1) current issues of relevant design reference data are available to all personnel involved in design activities;

(2) design reference data is assessed for suitability and applicability by a competent and authorised person prior to use;

(3) obsolete design reference data is promptly removed from all points of issue or use; and

(4) changes to design reference data are reviewed and approved by competent and authorised personnel prior to issue.

c. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish procedures to:

(1) produce, check and control drawings; and

(2) produce, check and control reports showing compliance with specified design requirements.

3.4.3. Issue of Design Approval Certificates

a. The procedure for issue of a Design Approval certificate required by TAREG 3.4.1 must ensure:

(1) Design Approval certificates are granted by an authorised person only if satisfied that:

(i) the design was developed in accordance with the systems and procedures detailed in the applicant’s EMP and as required by this regulation;

(ii) the design complies with specified requirements;

(iii) compliance of the design with specified requirements has been adequately verified;

(iv) the design output documentation provides a true and accurate record of the design and is properly indexed, traceable, and protected in accordance with TAREG 3.3.8;

(v) adequate Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness have been provided; and

(vi) that the design outputs comprising the design have been reviewed in accordance with TAREG 3.4.4.

(2) each design certificate lists or references:

(i) the specifications, standards and other requirements to which the design was developed;

(ii) a comprehensive index of design documentation; and

(iii) where relevant, a complete index of Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness for the design.

(3) except as provided in Paragraph (4), only the SDE or a DSDE must approve any design judged as Significant under TAREG 3.4.5;

(4) a DE must only approve designs judged as Significant when the SDE or a DSDE has specifically authorised that DE to approve designs of that class. The SDE or a DSDE must review the Design Approval decision as soon as practicable.



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3.4.4. Design Review

a. The procedure for Design Review required by TAREG 3.4.1 must ensure:

(1) certification of design output as a reviewer is granted by an authorised person only if satisfied that:

(i) the design assumptions, design reference data, design conditions and the method and tools employed in developing the design output are assessed as appropriate and valid;

(ii) any calculations or analyses conducted in developing the design output are assessed as having been properly conducted and correct; and

(iii) the design stage output meets any design stage input requirements.

(2) for designs judged as Significant, design output review must be conducted by authorised DEs;

(3) for design judged as Non-Significant, design output is reviewed by competent authorised persons;

(4) where more than one engineering discipline is involved in a design stage, the design stage output is reviewed by properly authorised persons from each discipline represented;

(5) persons reviewing a design output have not participated in the development of that design output; and

(6) for designs judged as Significant where design stage outputs were developed by persons authorised at a level below DE, a second level of review is conducted by the SDE or a DSDE who must be satisfied that:

(i) the persons performing the design and Design Review were competent for the task; and

(ii) the design assumptions, design reference data, design conditions and the method and tools employed in developing the design output were appropriate and valid.

3.4.5. Judgement of Significance

a. The procedure for judging Significance required by TAREG 3.4.1 must ensure:

(1) except as provided under Subparagraph a(2), the Judgement of Significance of a design activity is only made by an authorised DE;

(2) where the decision process is well defined and the exercise of professional engineering judgement is not required, the Judgement of Significance is made only by a properly authorised person;

(3) designs are judged as either Significant or Non-significant depending on the risk to aircraft airworthiness of partial performance or failure of the design;

(4) designs are judged as Non-significant only when an authorised person is satisfied that the risk to aircraft airworthiness of partial performance or failure of the design is low enough not to justify the additional engineering rigour and expertise that is mandated for designs judged as Significant;

(5) the risk to airworthiness of partial performance or failure of a design is assessed as a function of both:

(i) the consequence of partial performance or failure of the design; and

(ii) the probability of partial performance or failure occurring.

(6) the consequence of partial performance or failure is assessed as high if:

(i) the design requires a structural repair to primary or secondary structure beyond approved limits;

(ii) the design impacts upon structural integrity, flight handling, performance or operating limitations; or

(iii) failure or partial performance of the design would directly result in the loss of a vital system for which there is either no redundancy or would adversely impact upon personnel safety.



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(7) the probability of the partial performance or failure of a design is assessed as high if the design requires comprehensive engineering justification, assessment and verification.

3.4.6. Design Acceptance

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC which is to include provision of support to a DAR for Design Acceptance responsibilities must establish Design Acceptance procedures satisfying the requirements for Design Acceptance as provided in TAREG 2.

3.5. CI MANAGEMENT


a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC which includes in its scope CI management responsibilities as defined in this regulation must establish a CI management system to control and verify configurations to ensure that specified requirements are met.

(1) For the purposes of this regulation, all communication and interaction between a commercial AEO and operational authorities is to be conducted through the Sponsor AEO, except for those instances where the Sponsor AEO directs otherwise.

3.5.2. Technical Information Review

a. For the purposes of this regulation:

(1) Technical Information (TI) means all information relevant to the continuing airworthiness and technical integrity of a CI;

(2) Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI) means any TI relating to unsafe conditions in an aircraft type, or changes to Type Design which will affect the safety of an aircraft type; and

(3) TI and TAAI originates from:

(i) the ADF Airworthiness Authority (including authorised delegates);

(ii) the TAR;

(iii) Technical Airworthiness Directives (TADs) issued under TAREG 1.1.5;

(iv) other AEOs;

(v) maintenance and operational units;

(vi) NAAs (including CASA and foreign NAAs);

(vii) Aircraft and aircraft-related equipment OEMs;

(viii) other military or civilian operators; or

(ix) any other source identified in the applicant’s EMP;

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC applicable to this regulation must establish a Technical Information Review (TIR) system to monitor technical issues affecting the CI and initiate action needed to ensure that adequate levels of performance and safety are maintained.

c. All sources of TI to be collected and registered must be identified in the applicant's EMP.

d. Any formal agreements covering provision of TI must be identified in the EMP as part of the applicant's DSN.

e. The TIR system must include:

(1) arrangements for the collection of TI;

(2) a procedure to assign authority to personnel to undertake TIR activities as required by TAREG 3.3.2;

(3) a procedure to ensure that:

(i) all TI is registered;

(ii) all issues of serially-issued TI are received;



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(iii) all TI is evaluated for applicability and action required in a timely manner by a competent and authorised person;

(iv) all TI applicability and action required decisions are recorded in, and traceable to, the TI registration;

(v) in determining action required at Paragraph (3) (iv), TI identified as TAAI is actioned in accordance with Paragraph (x);

(vi) TI relating to aircraft operating procedures and limitations is re-transmitted to appropriate operational authorities in a timely manner;

(vii) any required follow up design change action is initiated and any required performance or safety improvement is incorporated in the specification for the change;

(viii) new and potential sources of TI are evaluated for future collection and inclusion in the list of TI identified in the EMP;

(ix) all TI and records of evaluation decisions are treated as engineering records as required by TAREG 3.3.8;

(x) for TAAI:

(a) the DAR and appropriate operational authority are notified of the issue at the earliest opportunity,

(b) relevant TAAI is exchanged in a timely manner,

(c) necessary instructions are issued to assure adequate safety of operations:

(i) in a timely manner,

(ii) subject to Design Acceptance requirements, and

(iii) in consultation with the appropriate maintenance and operational authorities to minimise operational impact of the action taken.

(d) where a decision is taken not to comply with TAAI found to be fully or partially applicable to the CI being managed, the TIR process is not finalised until:

(i) receipt of a Design Acceptance certificate, as provided in TAREG 2, from the relevant DAR; and

(ii) the DAR has notified the TAR of the decision.

f. Procedures developed by the applicant as required by Paragraphs e.(3) (vi) and e.(3) (x) must be endorsed by the relevant Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA).

3.5.3. Software Integrity Management

a. Each applicant responsible for the Configuration Item management of aviation software or aviation systems containing software must establish and maintain a Software Integrity Management System, where aviation software is inclusive of:

(1) on-aircraft software, off-aircraft software with aircraft interface, and off-aircraft software with no interface but which has airworthiness or safety implications: and

(2) technologies that resemble software development such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and firmware.

b. The Software Integrity Management System must include:

(1) a Software Management Plan (SMP);

(2) procedures to assure software integrity of new or modified software; and

(3) procedures to provide continuing assurance of the software integrity of accepted software.

c. The Software Integrity Management System must ensure that:

(1) the SMP is issued by the SDE and approved by the TAR;

(2) any amendment to the SMP:

(i) has been approved by the DAR; and



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(ii) where there are additions to the Configuration Items listed in the SMP, or a reduction to the assurance of software integrity, has been approved by the TAR.

(3) all aviation software Configuration Items being managed by the applicant, including the associated software assurance level, and worst credible failure condition are identified in the SMP;

(4) all software tools being used by the applicant, including the tool categorisation and qualification, are identified in the SMP;

(5) the SMP is reviewed at an interval not exceeding two years.

d. The procedures to assure software integrity of new or modified software must:

(1) ensure software development of safety-related software is conducted to satisfy the objectives of either a TAR recognised software assurance standard, or a Software Assurance Matrix approved by the TAR;

(2) require a software safety program be established for the development of all software that is safety-related;

(3) to the extent that Commonwealth oversight applies:

(i) ensure a Plan for Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC), or equivalent document, is submitted to and approved by the TAR prior to the commencement of development if the worst credible failure condition of the new or modified aviation software is more severe than Minor (as defined in FAA AC25.1309) or Marginal (as defined in MIL-STD-882C);

(ii) provide for Commonwealth oversight of software for safety-related systems to permit the Commonwealth to make software compliance findings;

(4) to the extent that recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority oversight applies:

(i) ensure that certification requirements are agreed by the recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority prior to commencement of development if the worst credible failure condition of the new or modified aviation software is more severe than Minor (as defined in FAA AC25.1309) or Marginal (as defined in MIL-STD-882C);

(ii) provide for oversight by the recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority of safety-related systems to permit the recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority to issue their certification to the Commonwealth:

(5) implement acceptable software load control as required by TAREG 3.5.

e. The procedures to provide continuing assurance of the software integrity of accepted software must:

(1) implement a framework for software problem reporting, problem assessment, tracking of problem reports and corrective actions to ensure that safety-related errors, faults and failures are identified and resolved within a timely manner as per TAREG 3.5.2;

(2) ensure the DAR and TAR are notified of any errors, faults or failures of aviation software which potentially result in a large reduction in safety margins; and

(3) describe configuration management processes of all aircraft software as required by TAREG 3.5.

3.5.4. Aircraft Structural Integrity Management

a. Each applicant responsible for the CI management of an aircraft must establish and maintain an Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) management system to assist the TAR in assuring continued airworthiness of the aircraft structure.

b. The ASI management system must include:

(1) an Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP);

(2) procedures to maintain ASI; and

(3) procedures to support continuing assessment of ASI.

c. The ASI management system must ensure that:



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(1) for a new aircraft type or major design change, the ASIMP is issued by the TAR prior to the Design Acceptance of the aircraft type or design change in accordance with TAREG 2.2.3;

(2) all updates to the ASIMP are approved by the TAR prior to their incorporation and implementation;

(3) the TAR is notified of any deficiencies identified in the ASIMP;

(4) the ASIMP is reviewed at least on an annual basis;

(5) the ASIMP specifies the authoritative source or sources for structural inspection programs, structural life limits, and component retirement times;

(6) ASI projects are managed as directed by the TAR; and

(7) structural components from crashed or retired aircraft and cracked primary structural components are made available for tear down.

d. The procedures to maintain ASI must:

(1) ensure all structural repairs and modifications conform to the relevant Certification Structural Design Standard (CSDSTD);

(2) implement Fatigue Management in accordance with the ASIMP, including authorised structural inspection programs and structural life limits;

(3) ensure the authorised structural inspection program intervals, structural life limits, and component retirement times are not exceeded without TAR approval;

(4) ensure that any amendments to the authorised structural inspection program intervals, structural life limits, and component retirement times are notified to the TAR; and

(5) implement Environmental Degradation Management in accordance with the ASIMP.

e. The procedures to support continuing assessment of ASI must:

(1) implement usage monitoring in accordance with the ASIMP;

(2) ensure collection of condition data records in accordance with the ASIMP;

(3) maintain records of defects, inspections, repairs and modifications to primary structure;

(4) maintain the integrity of usage monitoring and Operational Loads Monitoring systems installed on the applicant’s aircraft, as documented in the ASIMP; and

(5) ensure ageing aircraft structural audits are carried out, under the guidance of the TAR, when the aircraft reaches its mid life point or after 15 years in service whichever is sooner, unless otherwise authorised by the TAR.

3.5.5. Engine Structural Integrity Management

a. Each applicant responsible for the CI management of an aircraft gas turbine engine must establish and maintain an Engine Structural Integrity (ESI) management system to assure the continued airworthiness of that engine.

b. The ESI management system must ensure that:

(1) an ESI manager is appointed;

(2) critical parts are identified for each engine;

(3) life limits, inspection and Usage Monitoring (UM) requirements are identified for each critical part based upon the advice of:

(i) the OEM or in the absence of such advice;

(ii) a recognised NAA or foreign military force in accordance with TAREG 2.2.7; or

(iii) the TAR.

(4) a system for engine UM is in place to ensure that engine operating data is recorded to enable management of usage against the limits identified at Subparagraph (3);

(5) a system for engine Conditioning Monitoring (CM) is in place; and



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(6) the requirements identified at Subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5) are assessed for applicability to the ADF configuration, role and environment and undergo periodic review to assure continued effectiveness.

c. The ESI management system must be documented by an Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP).

d. The ESIMP must be reviewed at an interval of not exceeding two years.

e. The ESI management system must be implemented by procedures that are sponsored by the applicant.

f. TAR approval is to be sought prior to the applicant making any:

(1) deviation or modification to the life limits or requirements established at Subparagraph b.(3) above; or

(2) issue or amendment to the ESIMP.

3.5.6. Modifications

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation must establish procedures to ensure:

(1) except for those configuration changes to be managed as substitutions or deviations, all configuration changes to a CI are managed as modifications;

(2) where modifications to a subordinate CI requires a complementary change to the configuration of a higher CI; or introduces an appreciable change to the characteristics, interchangeability, performance or interfaces (human or technical) of the higher CI; the complementary changes to higher CIs are managed as modifications;

(3) instructions for the incorporation of modifications are issued to user organisations in the form of a modification order prepared in accordance with the requirements at Annex F;

(4) the following implementing instructions are issued to user organisations;

(i) modification order,

(ii) related amendments to continuing airworthiness instructions, and

(iii) related amendments to flight manual and other operating instructions.

(5) approval of the implementing instructions is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that the implementing documents;

(i) accurately reflect the approved design, and

(ii) provide adequately validated instructions for incorporation and serviceability testing, maintenance and operation of the modified CI or CIs.

(6) implementing instructions are not issued to user organisations before the granting of Incorporation Approval;

(7) there is no change to the substance of the implementing instructions following Incorporation Approval;

(8) arrangements are established with user organisations to ensure aircraft are not released for flight before granting of Service Release in accordance with TAREG 3.5.13;

(9) arrangements are established with user organisations to ensure modified products of items are not inducted for maintenance before the issue of related amendments to continuing airworthiness instructions;

(10) no amendments to modification orders are issued which would:

(i) change the substance of the modification, and

(ii) change any aspect of the modification that will result in a difference in configuration between items modified under the different versions of the modification order; and

(11) modification orders are issued in a sequential series established for each CI for inclusion in a separate controlled technical manual for each CI issued to users as part of continuing airworthiness instructions.



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b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation must establish trial modification procedures to ensure:

(1) approval for a trial modification is granted by the Incorporation Approval authority for the CI;

(2) arrangements are established with user units to quarantine CIs subject to trial modification activity for the purposes of the trial;

(3) design output data as defined at TAREG 3.3.6, including test procedures and reporting requirements:

(i) is subject to limited Service Release for the purposes of the trial as provided by TAREG 3.5.13; and

(ii) is issued under cover of implementation instructions which ensure implementation is properly controlled, sequenced and coordinated.

(4) configuration items are returned to an approved configuration before being released from the trial;

(5) trial modifications are subject to Incorporation Approval and Service Release before being released for flight trials; and

(6) the following implementing documents are prepared and reviewed by competent and authorised persons for issue by STI or other authoritative instruction:

(i) draft modification orders,

(ii) additional ICA of the modified aircraft and its modified CIs,

(iii) additional operating limitations and operating instructions to be imposed for the purposes of the flight trial, and

(iv) demodification plans and instructions.

c. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation must establish procedures to ensure:

(1) modification implementation instructions and associated approvals, and records of trial modification approval, Incorporation Approval and Service Release are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(2) modification records are traceable to the related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREG 3.4 and TAREG 2; and

(3) modification installation, excepting trial modifications under Paragraph b, are undertaken by either an AEO or AMO as required by TAREG 3.5.20.

3.5.7. Substitutions


(1) configuration changes are managed as substitutions where:

(i) a new part is to be authorised for use in a CI as an alternative to, or replacement for, a currently approved part; and

(ii) the configuration change has no other effect on the functionality, interface characteristics or logistics support requirements of the affected CI or CIs.

(2) implementing instructions to be issued for the substitution provide authoritative direction for amendment of those continuing airworthiness instructions which provide authority-to-fit for the affected CI or CIs;

(3) approval of the implementing instructions is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that they accurately reflect the approved design;


(5) there is no change to the substance of draft implementing instructions following Incorporation Approval;



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(6) substitution implementation instructions and associated approvals, and records of Incorporation Approvals are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(7) substitution records are traceable to the related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREGs 3.4 and 2.

3.5.8. Deviations


(1) configuration changes to CIs are managed as deviations where; by reason of accidental damage, production error, deterioration or unavailability of material or parts, or any other occurrence; authority to deviate from the current approved type design is required for a limited number of products of a CI;

(2) implementing instructions provide authoritative direction for recording of continuing airworthiness requirements or other logistics management requirement introduced by the deviation;

(3) approval of implementing documents is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that they:

(i) accurately reflect the approved design; and

(ii) provide adequately validated instructions for repair or rework if required, serviceability testing, maintenance and operation of the affected CI or CIs.


(5) there is no change to the substance of implementing instructions following Incorporation Approval;

(6) deviation implementation instructions and associated approvals, and records of Incorporation Approvals are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(7) deviation records are traceable to the related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREGs 3.4 and 2.

3.5.9. Aircraft/Stores Configurations

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish a procedure that prior to Design Acceptance certification of a new or modified aircraft/stores configuration that:

(1) either:

(i) AOSG ASCENG has issued a aircraft/stores compatibility clearance for the configuration; or

(ii) AOSG ASCENG has made compliance findings as per TAREG 2.2.11 for the aircraft/stores configuration aspects of the SOR.

(2) a Design Approval certification has been issued for the aircraft/stores integration; and

(3) for a store containing EO:

(i) GWEO has issued a EO Design Certificate for the store; and

(ii) a Safety and Suitability for Service for the store has been issued; or

(4) for a store not containing EO, a Design Approval certificate has been issued for the store.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish a procedure to ensure that Service Release for a new or modified aircraft/stores configuration must include attestations by:

(1) the DAR certifying that technical airworthiness requirements for the aircraft/stores configuration have been satisfied;

(2) the OAAR or OAAR representative attesting that all operational airworthiness requirements for the aircraft/stores configuration have been satisfied; and



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(3) relevant logistics and maintenance authorities attesting that all required logistics and maintenance arrangements for the aircraft/stores configuration have been established.

c. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish arrangements with user organisations to ensure that a new or modified aircraft/stores configuration is not released for flight before the granting of Service Release in accordance with Paragraph b and TAREG 3.5.13.

d. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish a procedure to ensure that ASCENG SQN is notified of any significant aircraft/stores configuration change as listed at Annex C.

e. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish an aircraft/stores trial procedure to ensure:

(1) approval for a trial is granted by the Incorporation Approval authority and the operational authority for the aircraft type;

(2) design output data as defined at TAREG 3.3.6, including test procedures and reporting requirements:

(i) is subject to limited release for the purposes of the trial as provided by TAREG 3.5.13; and



(i) validated instructions for handling and loading of the aircraft;

(ii) additional ICA of the aircraft involved in the trials (including post-trial inspection or servicing); and

(iii) additional operating limitations and operating instructions to be imposed for the purposes of the flight trial.

(4) trial aircraft/stores configurations are subject to Incorporation Approval and Service Release before being released for flight trials; and

(5) aircraft are returned to an approved configuration before being released from the trial.

3.5.10. Aerial Delivery Clearances

a. Except as provided in Paragraph b, for the purposes of these regulations Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE) means equipment employed on transport or rotary wing aircraft in the aerial delivery of material; including slings, platforms, containers, parachutes, rigging materials, cloths, cords, tapes, threads and webbing.

b. For the purposes of this regulation ADE does not include equipment employed in the aerial delivery of personnel.

c. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation which is to have management responsibility for an aircraft type must establish procedures to ensure:

(1) all new air transport, air drop or external lift loads, changes to those loads or change to operating limitations for those loads are managed as aerial delivery clearances;

(2) the aerial delivery COE as provided in TAREG 1 is notified of any change to the following to determine whether the change affects extant aerial delivery clearances:

(i) ADE, or

(ii) the aircraft or role equipment stated in Annex D.

(3) the following implementing instructions for an aerial delivery clearance are issued to user organisations as required to implement the approved design:

(i) flight manual amendments as required to authorise aerial delivery loads, carriage and employment procedures, jettison requirements and other operating limitations;

(ii) other operating instructions as required by the operational authority;

(iii) amendments to aircraft continuing airworthiness instructions; and



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(iv) instructions for handling and rigging of loads.

(4) approval of the implementing instructions is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that the implementing instructions accurately reflect the approved design for the aerial delivery load;

(5) implementing instructions for an aerial delivery clearance are not issued unless Incorporation Approval has been granted as provided in TAREG 3.5.12 and on the basis that Design Acceptance of the aerial delivery clearance has ensured:

(i) the ADE or role equipment design to be employed in the aerial delivery activity has been certified as suitable for its intended use by the COE as provided in TAREG 1 and design accepted by the ADF as provided in TAREG 2; and

(ii) the COE has certified the aerial delivery load design as suitable for its intended use as provided in TAREG 1, and the aerial delivery load has been design accepted by the ADF as provided in TAREG 2.

(6) arrangements are established with user organisations to ensure that aerial delivery loads are not released for flight before the granting of a Service Release in respect of the aerial delivery clearance as provided in TAREG 3.5.13;

(7) there is no change to the implementing instructions following Incorporation Approval;

(8) aerial delivery clearance implementing instructions and associated approvals, Incorporation Approval and Service Release are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8; and

(9) aerial delivery clearance records are traceable to the related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREG 3.4 and TAREG 2.

d. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this Subregulation must establish aerial delivery trial procedures to ensure:

(1) approval for an aerial delivery trial is granted by the Incorporation Approval authority for the aircraft type or delegate and the relevant operational authority;

(2) arrangements are established with user units to provide the necessary aircraft and other resources needed for the trial;

(3) design output data, including test procedures and reporting requirements:

(i) is subject to limited release for the purposes of the trial as provided by TAREG 3.5.15; and



(i) draft instructions for handling and rigging of loads,

(ii) additional ICA of the aircraft involved in the trials, and

(iii) additional operating limitations and operating instructions to be imposed for the purposes of the flight trial.

(5) trial loads are subject to Incorporation Approval and Service Release before being released for flight trials; and

(6) aircraft are returned to an approved configuration before being released from the trial.

3.5.11. Special Technical Instructions (STIs)

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC, with applicability under this regulation, must establish a Special Technical Instruction (STI) management system for issue of those design change and continuing airworthiness instructions whose urgency cannot be satisfied by other types of implementing instructions.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC, with applicability under this regulation must establish procedures to ensure:



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(1) every STI undergoes STI release before issue to user organisations;

(2) STI release is granted only by an authorised person if satisfied that:

(i) the content of the STI meets the requirements of Annex E,

(ii) the STI accurately reflects the approved design, and

(iii) every design change implemented by the STI has been given Incorporation Approval.

(3) STIs are sequentially numbered within their Series, and released in numerical order;

(4) no amendments to an STI are released which would:

(i) decrease the applicability of an STI, or

(ii) change any engineering aspect of the STI which will result in a difference in configuration or engineering standard between CIs having different versions of the STI incorporated.

(5) amended STIs must be clearly identified with an amendment number;

(6) the method of dispatch ensures that information in the STI remains legible and unambiguous;

(7) arrangements are established with user units to ensure user organisations acknowledge receipt of the STI;

(8) the STI sponsor is advised when an STI can be cancelled due to all actions being complete;

(9) all design changes implemented by STI, except for those with no enduring effect once the STI is cancelled, are to be recorded in either modification orders, deviations, substitutions or other publication amendments;

(10) STIs, acknowledgments and STI responses are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(11) STIs are traceable to any related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREG 3.4;

(12) at least the first page of every hardcopy STI is bordered by red and white ‘Warning Page’ hatching;

(13) STI registers are maintained to record the title, number and status of each STI released in their Series;

(14) STIs are actively monitored for incorporation status including:

(i) STIs are cancelled at the earliest possible opportunity;

(ii) STIs found not to be fully incorporated past their incorporation timeframe are subject to appropriate action as determined by the SDE; and

(iii) the status of released STIs is promulgated at six monthly intervals for each STI Series status of either ‘active’ or ‘cancelled’.

(15) STI distribution lists are maintained and annually reviewed.

3.5.12. Incorporation Approval


(1) Incorporation Approvals are granted only by the Senior Executive required by TAREG 3.3.2 of the AEO as applicable, or a nominated representative of the Senior Executive within the limits and in accordance with the requirements of a written delegation;

(2) a record is maintained of the current and past nominated representatives within the AEO with authority to grant Incorporation Approvals;

(3) Incorporation Approvals are granted only if the Senior Executive or a nominated representative has determined that:

(i) A Design Acceptance certificate has been issued for the design;



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(ii) draft implementing instructions for the change have been approved by an authorised person as provided in TAREG 3.3.2;

(iii) operational endorsement of implementing instructions has been granted for any design change which affects functional performance or other operational characteristics of an aircraft; and

(iv) where a proposed design change will have an affect on functionality, interface or logistics support requirements of higher level items, or requires a complementary change to higher level items, Incorporation Approval has been endorsed by persons with authority for Incorporation Approvals for the higher level items.

(4) for safety related changes, where the condition at Subparagraph (3) (i) has been met, any decisions not to provide Incorporation Approval, or to not comply with recommended incorporation timeframes, is endorsed by:

(i) the SDE; and

(ii) for design changes, the applicable DAR.

3.5.13. Service Release for Minor Changes to Type Design

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation who is to exercise CI management responsibility for an aircraft type must establish procedures to ensure:

(1) Service Release of modified aircraft, aircraft/stores configurations and aerial delivery clearances is granted only by the AEO’s Senior Executive required by TAREG 3.3.2, or a nominated representative of the Senior Executive within the limits and in accordance with the requirements of a written delegation;

(2) a record is maintained of the current and past nominated representatives with authority to grant Service Release;

(3) Service Release is only granted if the Senior Executive or nominated representative has determined that:

(i) the modification, aircraft/stores configuration or aerial delivery clearance has previously been granted Incorporation Approval as required by TAREG 3.5.12;

(ii) all implementing instructions for the modification, aircraft/stores configuration or aerial delivery clearance have been issued to user organizations;

(iii) OHS risks have been assessed, where appropriate making reference to OHS information from a competent authority; and

(iv) OHS risks have been treated through implementation of appropriate mitigation actions.

3.5.14. Management of Type Design Data

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC must establish a system for management of Type Design data as defined at TAREG 3.3.6. for each CI managed by the AEO, to ensure only current and relevant data is used for design activities.

b. The system for management of Type Design data must include:

(1) interface arrangements, agreed with members of the DSN and documented in the applicant’s EMP, to ensure proper identification and control of all Type Design data;

(2) a procedure to ensure design output data produced in support of a design change to the CI is identified as Type Design data following the granting of Incorporation Approval for the change;

(3) a procedure for identification of Type Design data to ensure that superseded data is cross referenced to superseding data to ensure that only current data is used in design activities; and

(4) a procedure for update of the relevant Type Record as provided in TAREG 2 following issue of an STC for a major design change.

3.5.15. Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA)

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation must establish procedures to:



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(1) authorise and control the issue, distribution, use and amendment status of ICA;

(2) ensure at least one set of ICA, and any changes to those instructions, is provided to any organisation required by any regulation to comply with those instructions;

(3) ensure ICA or amendments to those instructions are not issued:

(i) before granting of Incorporation Approval for any related design changes as provided in TAREG 3.5.12, and

(ii) before granting of technical approval for other changes.

(4) ensure technical approval of ICA or amendments to those instructions is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that:

(i) the instructions are suitable for their intended purpose, are technically sound and have been adequately validated;

(ii) any design change being implemented has been properly approved and accepted as provided in TAREG 3.4;

(iii) the instructions or amendment accurately reflects the design change being implemented;

(iv) the instructions identify all Safety Critical Items and Systems (SCIS); and

(v) the instructions identify Independent Maintenance Inspection (IMI) requirements for SCIS.

(5) ensure records of technical approvals for ICA are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(6) ensure changes to ICA are traceable to related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREG 3.4 and TAREG 2;

(7) validate ICA that identify those maintenance requirements essential to the airworthiness of aircraft and associated CIs;

(8) collect and analyse data used to validate the ICA that identify maintenance requirements essential to the airworthiness of aircraft and CIs; and

(9) ensure that all maintenance requirements essential to the airworthiness of aircraft and associated CIs are reviewed as a result of TIR or other change initiator.

3.5.16. Flight Manuals and Aircraft Operating Instructions

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation who is to exercise CI management responsibility for an aircraft type must establish a flight manual control system that includes:

(1) documented arrangements established with relevant operational authorities to ensure that amendments to flight manuals and aircraft operating instructions that affect operating instructions or limitations are not issued before technical endorsement from the AEO; and

(2) procedures to ensure:

(i) technical endorsement of amendments to flight manuals or other operating instructions is granted only if an authorised person is satisfied that:

(a) any design change being implemented has been properly approved and accepted as provided in TAREG 3.4 and TAREG 2; and

(b) the amendment accurately reflects the design change being implemented.

(ii) records of technical endorsements for amendments to flight manuals and aircraft operating instructions are treated as engineering records as provided in TAREG 3.3.8;

(iii) amendments to flight manuals and aircraft operating instructions are traceable to any related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records as provided in TAREG 3.4 and TAREG 2.



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3.5.17. Weight and Balance

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC which includes the CI management of an aircraft must establish a documented weight and balance tracking system.

b. The weight and balance tracking system must ensure that aircraft under management remain within authorised weight and balance design limits.

3.5.18. Non Destructive Testing

a. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC with applicability under this regulation which is to have management responsibility for an aircraft type must establish procedures to ensure:

(1) all proposed Non Destructive Testing (NDT) procedures are subject to Design Approval by the TAR prior to their incorporation in a Modification, Deviation or STI unless:

(i) the NDT procedure has originated from an AEO explicitly assigned EA to approve such designs, or

(ii) the NDT procedure has originated from an OEM forming part of the applicant’s DSN.

3.5.19. Production


(1) Production means the manufacture and assembly of new CIs and related Aeronautical Product, or complete aircraft.

(2) Materials and parts are sub-elements of Aeronautical Product.

b. Each applicant for the issue of an EAC responsible for production must establish and maintain a production control and management system.

c. The production control and management system must include:

(1) a procedure for assessing and authorising all production personnel, together with clear criteria for workmanship;

(2) procedures for the control of all production equipment including periodic inspection, maintenance and calibration;

(3) procedures defining the manner of production, including control over design changes, data, and material substitutions in accordance with TAREGs 3.3.6, 3.4, 3.5.7, and 3.5.8 as applicable;

(4) the use of a suitable facility, production environment, tools and equipment to the extent that they affect product quality;

(5) a procedure controlling the prevention, detection and removal of foreign objects;

(6) a documented production inspection system that provides for:

(i) appropriate identification and inspection of incoming materials and parts;

(ii) appropriate storage and protection of materials;

(iii) inspection of Aeronautical Product at points during the production process to determine conformance with design data requirements;

(iv) segregation and identification of rejected materials and parts in a manner that precludes incorporation in production items; and

(v) accountability for all product during manufacture and assembly activities.

(7) the establishment and maintenance of a Materials Review Board (MRB) and materials review procedures which ensure that:

(i) any materials and parts that are rejected because of departures from design data or specifications are considered by the MRB prior to use on production items;

(ii) materials and parts determined by the MRB to be serviceable after rework or repair are identified and re-inspected; and

(iii) records of MRB action are maintained for a minimum of two years after the action was taken.



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(8) provision of a certificate at the end of the production process certifying that the CI or aircraft conforms with all specified requirements, except as noted thereon.

3.5.20. Modification Installation


(1) Modification installation means the incorporation of changes to an existing Type Design following Incorporation Approval, with the exception of trial modifications.

(2) Significant aircraft maintenance activity means modification installation activity:

(i) performed concurrently with aircraft deeper maintenance,

(ii) requiring substantial dismantling of primary structure or systems to incorporate, or

(iii) involving an extended period of maintenance by the organisation to support an SFP or limited aircraft operations.

b. Modification installation for an existing Type Design is only to be carried out by an organisation holding a valid Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC) for the applicable scope and level of work where any significant aircraft maintenance activities are expected to occur.

c. Modification installation for an existing Type Design that does not require significant aircraft maintenance activity may be carried out either by an organisation holding a valid MAC for the applicable scope and level of work, or the EAC holder that developed the modification, providing the scope of engineering activities addresses the following TAREGs 4 and 5:

(1) A nominated individual is responsible for the conduct of all work conducted on ADF aircraft or equipment, to the equivalent of TAREG 4.5.1 (Senior Maintenance Manager).

(2) Documented processes are in place for assessing and authorising personnel as competent to carry out the modification installation in accordance with TAREG 4.5.3 (Maintenance Personnel).

(3) Suitable systems are in place for the management of human factors affecting modification installation in accordance with TAREG 4.5.4 (Human Factors and Maintenance Error Management).

(4) A suitable facility and working environment have been provided for the modification installation in accordance with TAREG 4.6.1 (AMO Facilities).

(5) Modification installation procedures meet the requirements of TAREG 5.1.1 (Authorised Maintenance Data).

(6) Procedures are in place to ensure that all applicable safety precautions for the aircraft type are identified and observed in accordance with TAREG 5.1.1 (Authorised Maintenance Data).

(7) Procedures ensure that all work undertaken on ADF aircraft is certified in accordance with TAREG 5.1.2 (Maintenance Certification).

(8) Procedures are in place for the control of foreign objects during the conduct of modification installation in accordance with TAREG 5.1.2.d.(4) (Maintenance Certification).

(9) Appropriate Independent Inspections are undertaken as required by TAREG 5.1.3 (Independent Maintenance Inspections).

(10) Procedures ensure that all work undertaken on ADF aircraft is properly documented in accordance with the applicable requirements of TAREG 5.2 (Maintenance Records and Documentation).

(11) Accurate weight and balance information is maintained for each aircraft subject to modification, in accordance with TAREG 5.1.11 (Weight and Balance).

(12) Reporting and investigation of defects, unairworthy condition, and maintenance incidents occurring during the conduct of the modification installation are managed as required by TAREG 5.3 (Reporting and Investigation Requirements).

(13) Procedures are in place to ensure that any deviations as defined by TAREG 3.5.8 to document proposed changes to the modification installation are raised and recorded in accordance with TAREG 5.1.1.f. (Authorised Maintenance Data).



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(14) All tools and support equipment required to undertake modification installation are managed to the applicable requirements of TAREG 5.4.1 (Tools and Support Equipment).

(15) All Aeronautical Product required for the conduct of the modification installation is managed to the applicable requirements of TAREG 5.4.3 (Aeronautical Product).

(16) A certificate is provided at the end of the modification installation process certifying that the modified CI or aircraft conforms to all specified requirements, except as noted thereon.

3.6. OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

3.6.1. Continued Compliance

a. The AEO must:

(1) ensure that the EMP:

(i) reflects the current Engineering Management System and associated procedures, and

(ii) remains a current description of the organisation.

(2) comply with all procedures and systems referenced in its EMP;

(3) make applicable procedures available to personnel who require those procedures to carry out their duties;

(4) continue to meet the standards and comply with the requirements prescribed in TAREGs 3.4 to 3.6 for certification under this regulation; and

(5) notify the TAR within 48 hours of any circumstance that could affect the ability of the ADF AEO to meet those requirements.

3.6.2. Changes to an AEO’s Organisation

a. The AEO must ensure any amendment to its EMP:

(1) meets the applicable requirements of this regulation; and

(2) complies with the amendment procedures contained in its EMP.

b. The AEO must provide a copy of each amendment to its EMP:

(1) for a ADF AEO, to the TAR; or

(2) for a commercial AEO, to the Sponsor AEO.

c. Where the AEO proposes to make a change to any of the following, prior written notification to, and acceptance by the TAR is required:

(1) the SDE and any DSDEs; or

(2) the design or CI management activities the holder undertakes.

d. The TAR is to be advised in writing immediately after:

(1) any change to the Senior Executive, or

(2) the cancellation, suspension, or completion of the formal instrument as required by TAREG 3.2.7.b.

e. The TAR may prescribe conditions under which an AEO may operate during or following any of the changes specified in Paragraph c and d.

f. An AEO must comply with the conditions prescribed under Paragraph e.

g. Where any change referred to in this regulation requires a change to the certificate (including the LEA), the AEO must apply to the TAR for issue of a replacement certificate.

h. When the TAR issues a replacement certificate, the certificate it replaces is revoked.

i. The AEO must make such amendments to its EMP as the TAR may consider necessary in the interests of safety.



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3.6.3. Inspections and Audits

a. The AEO must allow the TAR to carry out such inspections and audits of the organisation’s design offices, facilities, documents, and records as the TAR considers necessary in the interests of aviation safety.

b. The AEO must conduct any internal inspections and audits of the organisation’s design offices, facilities documents, and records as directed by the TAR that the TAR considers necessary in the interests of aviation safety.

c. The AEO must provide the TAR all information that the TAR considers relevant to the inspection or audit conducted in accordance with Paragraph a. to this regulation.

d. Except as otherwise authorised by the TAR, each AEO must be required to undergo an external audit at an interval not to exceed two years and as specified by the applicable compliance assurance program as required by TAREG 3.2.3.c.

(1) The audit team must include a quantity of qualified auditors led by a qualified Lead Auditor, each meeting the criteria in Annex G (as applicable) to this regulation.

(2) The audit team must be approved by:

(i) for a ADF AEO audit, the TAR; and

(ii) for a commercial AEO audit, the SDE of the Sponsor AEO.

(3) The Sponsor AEO must provide to the TAR a copy of the audit report arising from an external audit of a commercial AEO.

Annexes:

A. Senior Design Engineer and Deputy Senior Design Engineer B. Design Engineer C. Significant Changes to Aircraft/Stores Configurations D. Changes Affecting Aerial Delivery Clearances E. Content of an STI F. Content of a Modification Order G. Auditors



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3A–1

SENIOR DESIGN ENGINEER AND DEPUTY SENIOR DESIGN ENGINEER

ELIGIBILITY

1. To be eligible for acceptance as a SDE or DSDE a person must possess:

a. tertiary qualifications and demonstrated professional engineering competencies sufficient to satisfy the requirements for Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng) membership in the institution of Engineers, Australia (IEAUST);

b. relevant experience in the management of a design and CI management system within a quality framework;

c. broad exposure to maintenance of the applicable weapon system or equipment;

d. demonstrably high level of professional knowledge on the applicable weapon system, equipment or technology, acquired either through relevant prior experience, and/or formal training courses;

e. confidence to undertake independent design review and approval; and

f. maturity and integrity to identify situations that are beyond his/her competency and capability.

NOTES

• In circumstances where the applicant is non-compliant with any of the eligibilty requirements, the AEO is to apply for an exemption in accordance with TAREG 1.1.4. The TAR may approve an exemption request and in doing so, impose limitations or conditions on the level and scope of work performed by the SDE or DSDE.

• ADF AEO applicants must demonstrate their compliance with each of the eligibility requirements. The SDE is to assess the applicant’s claims and supporting evidence and make a recommendation on their suitability for acceptance as an SDE or DSDE. If recommended, the applicant’s claims, supporting evidence and a request for assignment of Engineering Authority (EA), for a defined scope, is to be forwarded to DAVCOMP-DGTA. Section 3, Chapter 1 includes guidance for managing applications.

• Commercial AEO applicants must demonstrate their compliance with each of the eligibility requirements. The commercial SDE is to assess the applicant’s claims and supporting evidence and make a recommendation on their suitability for acceptance as an SDE or DSDE. If recommended, the applicant’s claims and supporting evidence must be forwarded to the Sponsor AEO with details of the scope of EA sought. The Sponsor AEO SDE must review the application and if the recommendation is supported, forward the applicant’s claims, supporting evidence and a request for assignment of EA, for a defined scope, to DAVCOMP-DGTA. Section 3, Chapter 1 includes guidance for managing applications.



3A–2

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3B–1

DESIGN ENGINEER 1. To be eligible for appointment as a Design Engineer a person must possess:

a. either:

(i) Tertiary qualifications and demonstrated professional engineering competencies sufficient to satisfy the entry requirements for membership in the Institution of Engineers, Australia (IEAust) as a professional engineer at the membership grade of Member (MIEAust); or

(ii) Tertiary qualifications and professional competencies sufficient to satisfy the entry requirements for membership in the Institution of Engineers, Australia (IEAust) as an engineering officer at the membership grade of Officer Member (OMIEAust). Tertiary qualifications must be obtained through a formal curriculum from a recognised tertiary institution.

b. Relevant experience in design development and review activities.

c. A demonstrably high level of professional knowledge on the applicable weapon system, equipment or technology.

d. Sufficient confidence in themselves to undertake independent design review.

e. Sufficient maturity and integrity to identify situations that are beyond their competency, capability and assigned scope of Engineering Authority.



3B–2

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex C to TAREG 3

3C–1

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/STORES CONFIGURATIONS 1. A significant change to either an aircraft or store form, fit, function and qualification limits, requiring reassessment of aircraft/stores compatibility is caused by the following criteria:

a. Any change to the external aerodynamic shape of the aircraft or store that may affect physical fit, performance, flying qualities and/or separation characteristics.

b. Any change in basic aircraft or store structural characteristics, including the addition/deletion of any antennae, vents, drains, probes or ducts that may affect the store in any way.

c. Any change to the aeroelastic or wing mass distribution characteristics of the aircraft.

d. Any change in the aircraft Basic Weight Configuration that affects the carriage and employment of a store or stores combination.

e. A 12.7mm (0.5") or greater change in store C of G (excluding any allowable tolerances).

f. A 5% or greater change in store weight.

g. A 10% or greater change in store pitch, roll or yaw moments.

h. Any change in functional concept, including weapon delivery mode changes.

i. Any degradation in the Electromagnetic Radiation environment affecting the electromagnetic compatibility of the aircraft/store configurations.

j. Any degradation in the HERO characteristics of the aircraft or store.

k. Any change in electrical/electronic connector characteristics or their location.

l. Any change in store suspension lug location.

m. Any change in arming wire or lanyard routing.

n. Any change in aircraft or stores fuze safing, arming design or Hazard Classification Code.

o. Any change in aircraft or stores environmental qualification or tolerance.

p. Any change in aircraft thrust or stores ballistic and/or propulsion characteristics.

q. Any change in stores explosive fill or casing affecting blast performance or store fragmentation patterns.

r. Any change in aircraft or store OFP software or SMS changes that affects the operation, employment or accuracy of the store.

s. Any change to the aircraft, store or Safe Escape Manoeuvres that causes an increase in the Minimum Safe Release Height or Safety Template during employment of the store.

t. New nomenclature for either aircraft or store.

u. Individual changes that do not necessarily make a significant change which, when considered cumulatively, result in a significant deviation from the design specification of the presently certified aircraft and/or store are considered to constitute a significant change. The term ‘aircraft’ also includes the aircraft Stores Suspension Equipment.

2. The use of the term ‘significant change’ is used to assess the impact on the extent of the aircraft/stores compatibility and is distinct from the term ‘Judgement of Significance’ as detailed at TAREG 3.4.5.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex C to TAREG 3

3C–2

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex D to TAREG 3

3D–1

CHANGES AFFECTING AERIAL DELIVERY CLEARANCES 1. Changes to the following may affect extant aerial delivery clearances:

a. Aerodynamic changes to the aircraft performance, flying qualities and/or separation characteristics.

b. Aircraft internal configuration.

c. Aircraft internal loading structural limitations.

d. Aircraft weight and balance causing a shift in aircraft C of G limits.

e. Operating Intent, including aerial delivery mode changes.

f. Aircraft operating environment or conditions.

g. Aircraft thrust and/or propulsion characteristics.

h. The configuration of aerial delivery loads previously certified for carriage by State aircraft.

i. Aircraft loading equipment; and

j. Aerial delivery role equipment.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex D to TAREG 3

3D–2

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex E to TAREG 3

3E–1

CONTENT OF AN STI 1. STIs must include the following:

a. Security Classification. The originator must classify STIs according to their content. When classifying an STI the originator must consider:

(1) effect on operational capability of aircraft and equipment,

(2) numbers of aircraft involved,

(3) location of aircraft, and

(4) criticism of products.

b. Addressees. Addressees must be those of the standard distribution list for the STI Series plus any additional addressees as appropriate. The STI originator must check the standard distribution list and ensure that any additional agencies with action responsibilities are included as addressees, particularly those listed as having maintenance responsibility in the TMP.

c. Title. The title line of an STI must always begin with the STI Series name and STI number. The title following the STI number must commence with wording which clearly indicates the item or subject involved.

d. Confirmation/Amendment/Cancellation Information. Where applicable, the line immediately following the title must detail the STI being confirmed, amended or cancelled.

e. CAMM Key. The STI is to include the appropriate CAMM Key data.

f. References. When an STI includes TMP amendments, the appropriate TMP must be included under the title as Reference A and referred to in the Instructions Section.

g. Types Affected. To avoid ambiguity in identification and application, catalogue identification details where appropriate and clear reference to applicability are to be included in the Types Affected Section.

h. Urgency Section. Express urgency in the following terms:

(1) ‘Before Next Flight’;

(2) ‘On receipt of this Instruction’;

(3) ‘Within xx days of receipt of this Instruction’;

(4) ‘At the next R Servicing’; or

(5) ‘At the next and subsequent R Servicings’.

i. Origin. This section must include information concerning background, related incidents, and subsequent corrective action both commissioned and planned.

(1) Reference is to be made, where appropriate, to publications, drawings, special tools or equipment or processes required to out the instructions.

(2) If the STI will affect aircrew operations, then a paragraph is to be included to specifically address the impact of the STI will have in that area.

(3) Where the urgency permits, detail is to be included on action taken to arrange issue of necessary spares, components, GSE and technical data (including estimates of delivery dates of equipment).

(4) Reference is to be made to other STIs which relate to the same problem or issue.

j. Instructions. The first instructional element must include a requirement to make the equipment safe for maintenance action. The instructions must be written in a step by step sequence and cover all the actions required to bring both the installed and uninstalled equipment (noting the trades responsible) back to a fully serviceable state. For STIs covering service bulletins or the like, the instructions are to refer to the relevant portions of the attached document.

k. Reports Required. Each STI must address reporting requirements in cases where the STI can not be incorporated for some reason.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex E to TAREG 3

3E–2

l. Recording Action. For STIs that require recording action, this section should detail the recording actions required.

m. Modification Action. State the relevant implementing instruction identifier.

n. Cancellation. This section must provide a synopsis of proposed long term corrective action and the means by which the STI will be cancelled.

o. STI Releasing Authority. The STI Releasing Authority or delegate must sign the signature block of the STI.

p. Attachments. Any attachments must be listed including both title and originating reference.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex F to TAREG 3

3F–1

CONTENT OF A MODIFICATION ORDER 1. A Modification Order must contain sufficient information to fully explain and enable implementation of the associated design change. This annex details the minimum information that must be contained in a Modification Order, but does not specify the format of a Modification Order.

2. A Modification Order must include, as a minimum, the following information:

a. An introductory section that includes the following information:

(1) Reason for the modification;

(2) Priority;

(3) Description of features by which the modification may be recognised;

(4) Relationship with other modifications;

(5) Effect on servicing or ground handling; and

(6) Number of parts comprising the order.

b. A section that lists the affected equipment types and/or the affected serial/tail numbers.

c. A section that lists the trade groupings and minimum skill levels required by those personnel implementing the modification.

d. When the modification is to be incorporated.

e. A section that details which organisations are responsible for incorporating the modification.

f. A unique reference to the document or instrument granting Incorporation Approval for the modification.

g. Orders or Instructions that are superseded, cancelled or amended.

h. A list of any special tools required for incorporation.

i. A section that lists all drawings, specifications or other special documents required for implementation of the modification.

j. A modification parts list section which includes the following information for each part to be fitted as part of the modification:

(1) An internal reference number;

(2) A stock number;

(3) A part number;

(4) Item name; and

(5) Quantity required.

k. The method and sequence of incorporation.

l. A section which lists the following information for each of the items removed as part of the modification:

(1) An internal reference number;

(2) A stock number;

(3) A part number;

(4) Item name; and

(5) Quantity required.

m. Action on items removed.

n. Action on Stock Holdings.

o. Modification or Re-operation of Stock holdings.

p. Testing requirements.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex F to TAREG 3

3F–2

q. Recording requirements.

r. A summary of the effect on aircraft or CI weight and balance.

s. A statement on the results of the electrical load analysis.

t. A statement on the impact to EMI/EMC integrity.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex G to TAREG 3

3G–1

AUDITORS

AUDITOR

1. To be eligible for authorisation as an Auditor, a person must meet all of the following requirements:

a. Either:

(1) successful completion of an External (Lead) Auditor training course conducted by a JAS-ANZ recognised organisation.

or

(2) successful completion of a period of informal audit training as deemed appropriate by the SDE for the auditing task to be performed by the Sponsor AEO.

b. Either:

(3) a minimum of three years’ experience in aerospace engineering relevant to the auditing task to be performed by the Sponsor AEO.

or

(4) completion of a period of Continuation Training (CT) and On-The-Job training (OJT) as deemed appropriate by the SDE.

c. Satisfactory knowledge of regulations applicable to the auditing task to be performed as determined by the SDE.

d. Satisfactory performance of at least five days auditing experience (including preparation) as an auditor under training.

LEAD AUDITOR

2. To be eligible for authorisation as a Lead Auditor, a person must already be appointed as an auditor in accordance with paragraph 1 above, and meet the following additional requirements:

a. Successful completion of an External (Lead) Auditor training course conducted by a JAS-ANZ recognised organisation.

b. A demonstrated high level of knowledge in ADF aviation operations and associated airworthiness regulation requirements.

c. Satisfactory performance of at least five days auditing experience (including preparation) as a lead auditor under training.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex G to TAREG 3

3G–2

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TAREG 4

TAR APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS

4.1. GENERAL

4.1.1. Applicability - Who May Maintain State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product

a. Maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product must only be conducted by an organisation that has been sponsored in accordance with TAREG 4.1.2, and approved by the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR).

b. A maintenance organisation is approved by the TAR when:

(1) the organisation has been certified as an Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) by the TAR in accordance with TAREG 4.3; or

(2) the organisation is part of an AMO’s Maintenance Support Network and is conducting maintenance on behalf of, and within the certified scope and level of, that AMO in accordance with TAREG 4.4.3; or

(3) the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) of an ADF Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) provides Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA) in accordance with TAREG 4.1.3 for an organisation to conduct maintenance, in which case the SDE will be responsible for the technical integrity of the work; or

(4) the organisation holds certification by a recognised Airworthiness Authority and provides an Authorised Release Certificate for the maintenance conducted in accordance with TAREG 4.1.4; or

(5) the organisation is an AEO conducting maintenance confined to the installation of modifications, which have been developed by that AEO, in accordance with TAREG 3.5.20.c; or

(6) the TAR provides an approval based on the TAR’s assessment of the organisation’s Maintenance Management System (MMS) in accordance with TAREG 4.1.5.

4.1.2. Sponsor

a. For the purposes of this regulation, Sponsor means any ADF Force Element Group Headquarters, ADF AEO or ADF organisation responsible for the maintenance management support of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

b. A Sponsor must:

(1) ensure that only organisations approved by the TAR under TAREG 4.1.1.b are used to conduct maintenance;

(2) identify and nominate to the TAR details of all organisations conducting, or proposed to conduct, maintenance under the Sponsor’s management;

(3) notify the TAR when the Sponsor becomes aware of adverse maintenance issues that could affect technical airworthiness; and

(4) notify the TAR when the Sponsor no longer requires an organisation to conduct maintenance.

4.1.3. Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA)

a. TMA may be granted by the SDE of an ADF AEO to an organisation to conduct maintenance for a period of time not exceeding 12 months.

b. TMA must not be granted to allow an organisation to conduct maintenance of complete State Aircraft, complete engines or major sub-assemblies of engines.

c. When granting TMA to an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product, the SDE must assess the organisation’s Maintenance Management System and ensure that:

(1) a nominated individual, meeting the intent of TAREG 4.5.1 is responsible for all maintenance conducted;



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(2) documented processes, meeting the intent of TAREGs 4.5.3 are in place for assessing and authorising personnel as competent to perform maintenance;

(3) suitable facilities meeting the intent of TAREG 4.6.1 are available;

(4) suitable systems are in place to ensure that only Authorised Maintenance Data meeting the intent of TAREG 5.1.1 is used to conduct maintenance;

(5) all maintenance performed is certified in a manner that meets the intent of TAREG 5.1.2;

(6) procedures are in place for the control of foreign objects during the conduct of maintenance;

(7) maintenance performed is documented, in a manner that meets the intent of TAREG 5.2;

(8) unserviceable and unairworthy conditions, and maintenance incidents that occur during maintenance are investigated and reported in accordance with TAREG 5.3;

(9) all tools and support equipment required to conduct maintenance are managed, meeting the intent of TAREG 5.4.1; and

(10) all Aeronautical Product is managed, meeting the intent of TAREG 5.4.3.

d. The SDE of an ADF AEO must specify product acceptance checks to be carried out by a nominated representative for items maintained under TMA.

e. The SDE of an ADF AEO must notify the TAR when TMA has been granted, suspended, removed or expired.

f. The TAR may direct an organisation that has been granted TMA to become a certified AMO.

4.1.4. Airworthiness Authority Accreditations Recognised by the TAR

a. An organisation that holds accreditation from the listed Airworthiness Authorities in this regulation, and which provide the applicable Authorised Release Certificate (ARC) for the maintenance performed is approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of Aeronautical Product:

(1) EASA, Form 1; or

(2) FAA, 8130 series, and Form 337; or

(3) CASA, Form 1, or Form 917.

b. A Sponsor may apply to the TAR for approval to use organisations accredited by other Airworthiness Authorities not listed in this regulation.

4.1.5. Other TAR Approvals

a. The TAR may approve an organisation to conduct maintenance on State Aircraft and/or of Aeronautical Product for a defined period of time as set by the TAR, when:

(1) the resources required for that organisation to become a certified AMO are considered excessive to the level of risk associated with the maintenance being conducted, and

(2) the organisation has a Maintenance Management System commensurate with the level of risk associated with the maintenance being conducted, and

(3) the Sponsor applies for TAR approval of that organisation.

b. The Sponsor’s application to the TAR must include:

(1) the name and address of the organisation proposed to conduct the maintenance,

(2) details of the organisation’s Maintenance Management System,

(3) details of the maintenance activity to be conducted,

(4) a risk assessment in support of the application, and

(5) any relevant certifications or approvals held by the organisation.

c. The Sponsor must provide additional information in support of the application when requested by the TAR.



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4.2. EXEMPTIONS

4.2.1. Exemption Requirements

a. Any organisation, or person(s) involved in management or conduct of maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product must comply with all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 unless permitted by an Exemption granted by the TAR.

b. An organisation or person(s) that cannot comply with one or more of the applicable TAREGs 4 and 5, must submit a Request for Exemption to the TAR, with a CC to the Sponsor.

c. The TAR will only consider approval of an organisation’s Request for Exemption when it has been endorsed by the relevant Sponsor.

d. An organisation or person(s) granted an Exemption by the TAR must:

(1) comply with all terms and conditions stated by the TAR;

(2) maintain a permanent record of details relating to all Exemptions; and

(3) advise the TAR, through the relevant Sponsor, when the grounds for Exemption no longer apply.

4.3. AMO CERTIFICATION

4.3.1. Application for AMO Certification

a. An organisation identified as requiring AMO certification, (hereafter referred to as the ‘applicant’), must submit an application for a Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC) to TAR, through its Sponsor.

b. Each application must include:

(1) details of the applicant, including the organisation’s name and address, and the reason for the application;

(2) details of the applicant’s Maintenance Management System (MMS), documented in a Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) which provides a description of the scope and level of work to be undertaken and which satisfies the requirements of TAREG 4.4.1;

(3) any requests for exemptions; and

(4) any relevant certifications held by the organisation.

c. Notwithstanding TAREG 4.3.1.a and b, the applicant must supply additional documentation in support of its application when requested to do so by the Sponsor or DGTA-ADF.

4.3.2. Award and Retention of AMO Certification

a. Each AMO application must be assessed by DGTA-ADF to ensure that:

(1) the Maintenance Management System (MMS) complies with all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5;

(2) the Maintenance Management Plan contains processes to ensure that maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product conducted by the applicant is performed:

(i) to ADF-approved standards,

(ii) by competent and authorised personnel,

(iii) by personnel acting as members of an approved organisation, and

(iv) by personnel whose work is certified as correct.

(3) the applicant has sufficient competent personnel available to plan, perform, supervise, inspect and certify all maintenance to be conducted;

(4) the applicant provides appropriate and adequate facilities for all maintenance to be conducted; and

(5) the applicant has all necessary tools, Authorised Maintenance Data, equipment and materiel to conduct maintenance.



4

b. Applications failing to satisfy the requirements of TAREGs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.a (1) will be rejected and must have the basis for the rejection fully documented and disclosed to the applicant.

c. The applicant must allow the TAR (or representative thereof) to make such investigation of its facilities, personnel and records as are needed to satisfy the TAR that the AMO complies, and continues to comply, with applicable TAREGs 4 and 5.

d. Applications that satisfy the requirements of TAREGs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2a, and a satisfactory site assessment, will entitle the applicant to be formally certified as an AMO by issue of a Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC).

e. Each MAC consists of a Certificate signed by the TAR with an accompanying Schedule that details the maintenance the AMO is approved to conduct.

f. A certified AMO must not conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product unless that scope and level of maintenance has been identified in the MAC.

g. The continued validity of an AMO’s certification must be re-assessed by a process and at a frequency determined by the TAR.

4.3.3. Changes to AMO Certification

a. Each AMO must:

(1) continue to comply with all the requirements of applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 and conditions of Exemptions that have been granted;

(2) advise any change to the basis of its AMO certification to the TAR within two working days of the change and seek approval for that change; and

(3) ensure that, where the TAR has approved changes to the basis of an AMO’s certification in accordance with TAREG 4.3.3.a (2), the AMO’s documentation (including the MMP) is updated to reflect all changes approved by the TAR.

4.3.4. Duration of AMO Certification

a. The MAC will remain in force until it expires, is terminated, surrendered, suspended, or superseded.

4.4. MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

4.4.1. Maintenance Management Plan

a. Each AMO must have, and continue to maintain, a Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) that documents:

(1) a certification by the Senior Executive that:

(i) approves the issue of the MMP;

(ii) attests the MMP and any referenced plans, procedures and instructions accurately reflect the Maintenance Management System (MMS); and

(iii) confirms all maintenance activities undertaken by the AMO can be carried out in accordance with applicable TAREGs 4 and 5.

(2) a system to manage Exemptions in accordance with TAREG 4.2.1;

(3) the organisational structure that includes:

(i) the title(s) of management positions;

(ii) the titles of supervisory positions; and

(iii) an organisational chart or equivalent document showing associated chains of management and maintenance responsibility of the key appointments and groups within the AMO.

(4) the system used by the AMO to outsource maintenance or maintenance support functions which includes:

(i) the organisation/s used to supplement the AMO’s maintenance or maintenance support functions,



5

(ii) the maintenance conducted by the external organisation/s on behalf of the AMO, and

(iii) the management processes associated with assessing and authorising an external organisation for inclusion in the AMO’s Maintenance Support Network.

(5) a Quality Management System that complies with TAREG 4.4.2;

(6) specific responsibilities and selection criteria, detailing required qualifications, training and experience for the Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM);

(7) selection criteria for appointment of the Quality Manager, detailing required qualifications, training and experience;

(8) selection criteria for all personnel planning, performing, supervising, inspecting and certifying maintenance;

(9) procedures to prevent the ingress of foreign objects into, and the detection and removal of those objects from, State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product;

(10) the system used for authorising personnel in accordance with TAREG 4.5.3;

(11) the system for management of human factors and maintenance error in accordance with TAREG 4.5.4;

(12) a general description of facilities, including their location, used to conduct maintenance;

(13) where relevant, procedures to assess the adequacy and availability of facilities required to conduct maintenance away from the main maintenance facility; and

(14) the systems and procedures used by the AMO to comply with all applicable TAREG 5 clauses.

b. Where an AMO believes that any TAREG 4 clause is not applicable to their AMO, the MMP must contain a statement which explains why the clause should not be considered applicable.

4.4.2. Quality Management System

a. The AMO must establish and maintain a documented Quality Management System (QMS) acceptable to the TAR that includes:

(1) management reviews of processes, procedures and audit findings, and

(2) a system of internal quality indicators.

b. The QMS must include an internal audit program that:

(1) ensures the documented MMS continues to comply with applicable TAREGs 4 and 5;

(2) evaluates compliance with procedures and processes that are stated or referenced in the MMP;

(3) includes corrective and preventive actions, any necessary follow-up, and corrective action close-out; and

(4) includes review and reporting of the effectiveness of preventive actions.

4.4.3. Maintenance Support Networks (MSN)

a. The Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM) remains responsible to the TAR for all maintenance outsourced by the AMO.

b. An organisation that conducts maintenance of complete State Aircraft, complete engines, or major engine sub-assemblies must not be included as part of an AMO’s MSN unless:

(1) the organisation has been certified by the TAR for the maintenance being conducted; or

(2) the organisation is operating under accreditation by a TAR recognised Airworthiness Authority in accordance with TAREG 4.1.4 and provides an Authorised Release Certificate for the maintenance performed.



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4.5. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1. Senior Maintenance Manager

a. The AMO must have an appointed Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM) who is responsible for all maintenance conducted within the AMO.

b. The AMO must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the TAR that the SMM is competent to comply with all applicable technical airworthiness requirements embodied in this manual to the level commensurate with their position.

c. The SMM must ensure that all maintenance is adequately resourced and conducted to approved standards, methods and practices.

d. The SMM must demonstrate a thorough understanding of the TAREGs 4 and 5.

e. Where a SMM delegates authority within the bounds of the TAREGs 4 and 5, the SMM remains responsible for the decisions resulting from the exercise of the delegated authority.

4.5.2. Quality Manager

a. The AMO must have an appointed Quality Manager who is responsible for the Quality Management System defined in TAREG 4.4.2.

b. The person appointed as the Quality Manager must have qualifications, training and experience appropriate to the management of quality systems.

4.5.3. Maintenance Personnel

a. An AMO must have sufficient personnel for the planning, performing, supervising, inspecting and certifying of maintenance.

b. The SMM, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, must authorise personnel involved in planning, performing, supervising, inspecting and certifying maintenance as necessary to meet the maintenance requirements within the AMO.

c. Personnel authorised to perform or certify maintenance must meet the qualification, training and experience requirements of a standard acceptable to the TAR.

d. The SMM, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, must ensure all personnel planning, performing, supervising, inspecting and certifying maintenance are competent to comply with the technical airworthiness requirements embodied in this manual to a level commensurate with their position.

e. On a periodic basis not exceeding 12 months, authorised personnel must be formally reassessed and re-authorised by the SMM, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, to ensure:

(1) the basis for the person’s authorisation remains valid,

(2) all required training has been carried out, and

(3) the assigned authority accurately reflects the intended employment of the person.

f. The AMO must maintain and use a system to record all assessments and authorisations.

4.5.4. Human Factors and Maintenance Error Management

a. The AMO must establish, maintain and use a system for the identification, investigation, notification, reporting and management of human factors and maintenance errors within the AMO.

b. The system for the management of human factors must ensure:

(1) that personnel do not perform maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product when an acceptable level of performance would, or might, be impaired; and

(2) That personnel notify their responsible manager, when they are subject to psychological or physiological factors that would, or might, impair their ability to safely perform maintenance.

c. The AMO must establish a program of continuation training on human factors and maintenance error management awareness for all personnel and retain a record of that training.

d. When incorrect or inappropriate maintenance has occurred, the AMO must conduct an investigation and formally report the incident to the Sponsor and the TAR, as a minimum.



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e. Only competent and authorised personnel, who have received human factors and maintenance error management training, may conduct investigations of maintenance related incidents.

4.6. FACILITIES

4.6.1. AMO Facilities

a. The AMO must have, or have access to, the necessary facilities for all management, planning, certification and maintenance conducted on State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

b. Facilities must be provided and used for the storage of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product and maintenance documentation for which the AMO is responsible. The facilities must:

(1) provide security;

(2) where appropriate, provide adequate segregation; and

(3) minimise deterioration, contamination, corrosion and damage.



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TAREG 5

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

5.1. CONDUCT OF MAINTENANCE

5.1.1. Authorised Maintenance Data

a. For the purposes of this regulation Authorised Maintenance Data is any technical publication, instruction, order, directive, or data approved for use by DGTA-ADF or the relevant AEO for the conduct of maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

b. The AMO must hold, and use, applicable current Authorised Maintenance Data.

c. The AMO must notify the maintenance data sponsor of any inaccurate, incomplete, or ambiguous procedure, practice, information, or instruction contained in Authorised Maintenance Data.

d. The AMO must maintain a system for management and review of Authorised Maintenance Data.

e. Authorised Maintenance Data must:

(1) be complete and up to date,

(2) be maintained in good order,

(3) be accessible to personnel,

(4) be applicable to the scope and level of maintenance being conducted,

(5) be supported by a master document or record allowing the amendment status and completeness to be ascertained, and

(6) contain or display:

(a) their authority for use,

(b) document name,

(c) date of issue, and

(d) document Sponsor details.

f. The AMO must notify the Sponsor of the Authorised Maintenance Data when the AMO is unable to comply with any Authorised Maintenance Data.

g. Reference material not classified as Authorised Maintenance Data must be clearly identified as such and must not be used to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

h. The SMM may authorise a local maintenance procedure to amplify or clarify AEO or DGTA-ADF authorised maintenance procedures.

5.1.2. Maintenance Certification

a. For the purposes of this regulation, certification means the act of an authorised person signing that they have discharged their responsibilities for a specifc task.

b. All maintenance must be accurately and progressively documented and certified by an authorised person.

c. An authorised person must certify only for maintenance that they have performed or supervised.

d. An authorised person must only certify maintenance, or maintenance tasks, as complete when:

(1) the maintenance was performed by authorised persons,

(2) the maintenance performed was appropriate to the required maintenance,

(3) maintenance was performed in accordance with the AMO’s Maintenance Management System,

(4) all foreign objects have been removed, and

(5) any follow on tasks have been identified and documented.



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e. The authorised person who certifies maintenance, or maintenance tasks, as complete accepts responsibility for that maintenance.

5.1.3. Independent Maintenance Inspections (IMI)

a. Only authorised personnel who have not been involved in the maintenance being inspected can perform IMIs.

b. IMIs must be performed whenever any safety critical item on the following systems is replaced, adjusted, repaired, modified or reconnected:

(1) flight control;

(2) engine control;

(3) undercarriage, brake and steering control;

(4) installed airborne oxygen;

(5) aircrew escape;

(6) explosive ordnance; and

(7) any other system identified by the relevant AEO.

c. IMIs required by TAREG 5.1.3.b must be performed at the completion of maintenance to ensure that all items:

(1) are correctly assembled, adjusted and/or locked, and

(2) operate with full range and freedom of movement, and in the correct sense.

d. IMIs that have been separately specified by the relevant AEO must be performed in accordance with the AEO’s directions.

e. The AMO may specify additional IMI requirements.

f. IMIs must be certified in accordance with TAREG 5.1.2.d

5.1.4. Maintenance Release of Aircraft

a. At the completion of all required maintenance and prior to aircrew acceptance of an aircraft, a certification that releases an aircraft from maintenance must be made in the applicable aircraft maintenance record.

b. A person certifying the release of an aircraft from maintenance must ensure:

(1) all required maintenance has been completed and certified, or a determination has been made in accordance with TAREG 5.1.6 to defer any required maintenance;

(2) the aircraft is in the approved configuration;

(3) all tooling used during maintenance has been removed from the aircraft, and is accounted for; and

(4) no scheduled maintenance will fall due during the time the aircraft is released to aircrew.

c. Unscheduled maintenance is permissible after the aircraft has been released from maintenance providing:

(1) the aircraft captain has authorised the performance of the proposed maintenance, and

(2) the maintenance to be performed has been authorised by the SMM.

5.1.5. Safety

a. The AMO must observe all safety precautions detailed in State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product technical publications and documents.

5.1.6. Deferment of Required Maintenance

a. The SMM or delegate may defer required maintenance, provided an acceptable level of flight safety can be maintained with the affected items of equipment inoperative or defective.



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b. The SMM or delegate must not defer required maintenance when:

(1) the available information needed to make an informed decision is either inadequate or in doubt; or

(2) they are not confident that adequate competence or expertise can be applied to making an informed decision; or

(3) environmental, local or human factors would unacceptably impair the making of an informed decision.

c. Before approving any deferment of maintenance which affects the handling or operational characteristics of an aircraft, the SMM or delegate must obtain an operational endorsement from an authorised aircrew member.

d. Maintenance which has been deferred must:

(1) have a specific period of deferment clearly documented,

(2) have a documented justification of the decision,

(3) be documented and be presented in a format that is visible to aircrew on acceptance of the aircraft, and

(4) have records that are retained as part of the aircraft record.

e. The SMM must regularly review all decisions applicable to authorising the deferment of maintenance to ensure:

(1) documented and authorised procedures have been followed;

(2) applicable data was used by the person authorising the deferment of the maintenance;

(3) the decision was within the authorising person’s level of qualification, training and experience; and

(4) the decision and related requirements were correct and appropriate.

f. The AMO must have procedures for approving deferment of required maintenance that state the minimum competency standards for personnel authorised to approve the deferment of maintenance.

5.1.7. Maintenance Ground Runs

a. Maintenance ground runs must be performed when the safe, full or partial correct operation of an aircraft needs to be proven before the aircraft is returned to service, or cleared for a maintenance test flight.

b. Maintenance ground runs must be performed in accordance with AEO-approved procedures.

c. Maintenance ground runs must only be performed by authorised personnel.

d. Engine ground runs of rotary wing aircraft with engaged rotors must only be performed by authorised aircrew.

5.1.8. Maintenance Test Flights

a. Maintenance test flights must be carried out whenever a safety critical item is changed, adjusted or maintained, and safe and correct operation of a system cannot be proven by means of workshop or ground testing, or a maintenance ground run.

b. Applicable workshop and ground tests and maintenance ground runs that can be performed to prove partial, safe, and correct operation must be successfully performed before a maintenance test flight is conducted.

c. AMOs must provide aircrew with AEO-approved maintenance test flight schedule documentation covering the range of applicable functional tests and checks to be performed.

d. Maintenance test flights must return measureable or quantifiable results regarding the operation of any affected systems or handling characterisitics of the aircraft, so that a determination regarding the serviceability of the aircraft or affected systems can be made by the responsible maintenance crew.



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5.1.9. Aircraft Ground Handling

a. Only approved equipment and procedures must be used when ground handling aircraft.

b. Only authorised personnel can perform aircraft ground handling.

c. The AMO must only use marshalling signals approved and specified by DGTA-ADF.

d. The AMO may approve locally developed marshalling signals, which do not conflict with those approved by DGTA-ADF.

e. The AMO must document marshalling signals used by the AMO.

5.1.10. Structural Repairs

a. Details of all structural repairs to primary and secondary aircraft structure, including repair by replacement, must be forwarded to the relevant AEO.

b. Where the structural repair is outside the scope of Authorised Maintenance Data, the AMO must request a repair scheme from the AEO. The request must contain the following information:

(1) State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product identification/serial number;

(2) details of the damage, including location;

(3) relevant maintenance publication that makes reference to the damaged area; and

(4) where applicable, details of a proposed non-standard repair.

5.1.11. Weight and Balance

a. Accurate and current weight and balance information must be maintained by the AMO.

b. State Aircraft and AEO nominated Aeronautical Product must be weighed by trained and authorised personnel:

(1) after any maintenance activity which is likely to markedly alter the weight or Centre of Gravity; and

(2) as otherwise nominated by the relevant AEO.

c. The AMO must forward details of all weighs to the relevant AEO.

5.1.12. Contingency Maintenance and Battle Damage Repair

a. Where a Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT) and Battle Damage Repair (BDR) capability is required the AMO must:

(1) have documented CMAINT and BDR procedures which are approved by the relevant AEO;

(2) ensure that the use of CMAINT and BDR techniques are documented in accordance with the approved maintenance recording system; and

(3) ensure that only authorised personnel perform BDR.

b. CMAINT procedures must only be invoked for declared contingencies.

c. Training in the application of BDR techniques must only be performed on training aids.

d. The AMO must provide details of all CMAINT and BDR repairs to the relevant AEO at the earliest possible opportunity.

e. The AMO must ensure that State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product subject to CMAINT and BDR action are surveyed, as soon as contingency circumstances cease, to determine action required to recover technical integrity.

f. The AMO must ensure that State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product subject to CMAINT are returned to peacetime maintenance immediately contingency circumstances cease.

g. The SMM may approve the use of salvaged Aeronautical Product without AEO approval when CMAINT has been invoked.



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5.2. MAINTENANCE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION

5.2.1. Maintenance Records and Documentation Requirements

a. The AMO must establish and maintain a system to document all maintenance on State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product for which they are responsible.

b. All personnel making entries pertaining to the completion of maintenance in the State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product maintenance records must be authorised to do so in accordance with TAREG 4.5, and perform the tasks in accordance with TAREG 5.1 and TAREG 5.4

c. All entries in maintenance records describing unserviceable conditions must contain:

(1) the name of the person making the entry,

(2) an accurate and concise description of the unserviceable condition or the required maintenance, and

(3) the date and time the unserviceable condition was entered.

d. Entries pertaining to the completion of maintenance must:

(1) accurately describe the maintenance performed;

(2) where appropriate, make reference(s) to the relevant Authorised Maintenance Data used in the performance of that maintenance; and

(3) contain certifications that comply with TAREG 5.1.2 and:

(a) identify the person who made the certification,

(b) stipulate the capacity in which the certification was provided, and

(c) document the date and time of certification.

e. Maintenance Records must contain sufficient detail to show the make, model, identification number and/or serial number of the State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product being maintained.

f. Maintenance Records must be:

(1) controlled (serially, where appropriate);

(2) legible and comprehensible;

(3) unable to be changed, either deliberately or inadvertently without leaving evidence that a change did take place and maintaining legibility of the original data;

(4) stored and supported in such a manner as to retain readability (visual or electronic) for the required retention period;

(5) protected against loss, damage and unauthorised alteration; and

(6) able to be secured.

5.2.2. Falsification, Reproduction or Alteration of Maintenance Records

a. Personnel must not make fraudulent or false entries in any maintenance record, document or report.

b. Personnel must not be caused to make fraudulent or false entries in any maintenance record, document or report.

c. Personnel who perform an alteration or reproduction of a maintenance record in accordance with TAREG 5.2.1.f (3) must be authorised.

5.3. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS

5.3.1. Reporting of Unserviceable Conditions

a. Details of all unserviceable conditions discovered, experienced or reported during operation or maintenance must be recorded at the first opportunity after identifying the condition, and at least before release of an aircraft from maintenance.



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b. Unserviceable conditions must be documented in a relevant and approved State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product maintenance record and completed in accordance with the requirements defined in TAREG 5.2.1 d.

c. When an unserviceable condition is the result of other than fair wear and tear, the AMO must prepare a documented report meeting the content and reporting time-limits defined by the relevant AEO and forward it to the AEO.

d. The AMO must ensure that State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product that are subject to reporting of an unairworthy condition in accordance with TAREG 5.3.1.c are quarantined from other State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product, and appropriately identified to show the item is subject to reporting action.

5.3.2. Reporting of Unairworthy Conditions

a. An AMO must report to the relevant AEO within 24 hours any unairworthy condition which:

(1) could cause the loss of an aircraft, or

(2) could cause a failure of an emergency system or life support system, or

(3) could adversely affect wider fleet operations.

5.3.3. AMO Investigation of Reported Unserviceable and Unairworthy Conditions

a. Unless otherwise specified by the relevant AEO, all unserviceable and unairworthy conditions reported in accordance with TAREG 5.3.1.c and 5.3.2 must be investigated by the AMO, and a report forwarded to the applicable AEO within 15 working days.

b. The AMO must report to the relevant AEO within 24 hours when, during an investigation the AMO becomes aware of a condition which could:

(1) cause the loss of an aircraft, or

(2) cause a failure of an emergency system or life support system, or

(3) adversely affect wider fleet operations.

5.3.4. Other Reporting Requirements

a. Unless covered as part of a report submitted in accordance with TAREG 5.3.1.c or 5.3.2., the AMO must submit a report to the applicable AEO where:

(1) unapproved Aeronautical Product has been received,

(2) an installed aircraft system component has been identified as an unapproved Aeronautical Product,

(3) a system or component is believed to make the State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product substandard for the required system performance, or

(4) the packaging of State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product compromises technical integrity.

b. The AMO must comply with any other failure or unairworthy condition reporting requirements defined by the AEO for State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product.

c. Unless otherwise stated by the TAR or responsible AEO, the AMO must comply with all reporting requirements defined in applicable Authorised Maintenance Data.

5.4. TOOLS, EQUIPMENT AND AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT

5.4.1. Tools and Support Equipment

a. An AMO must have, or have access to, the necessary tools and support equipment to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

b. AMOs must have a documented system which ensures all tools and support equipment used in the maintenance and servicing of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product are:

(1) serviceable;

(2) appropriate and approved for the maintenance for which they are employed;



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(3) calibrated (where applicable); and

(4) individually identified.

c. In addition to TAREG 5.4.1b, an AMO conducting maintenance of complete aircraft or aircraft engines must:

(1) individually trace the tool to the job, and

(2) account for tooling at shift changes and at the completion of maintenance.

d. Where the Authorised Maintenance Data specifies a particular tool or support equipment, the AMO must use that tool or support equipment unless the use of alternate tooling or support equipment is approved by DGTA-ADF or the relevant AEO.

e. Where a tool or item used in maintenance cannot be accounted for, all State Aircraft, Aeronautical Product or equipment in the vicinity in which the tool may have been used or stored must not be released from maintenance until the tool or item is found, or the SMM, or delegate, is satisfied that the tool or item has not been left in any of the State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product in question.

5.4.2. Local Manufacture or Modification of Standard Tools

a. The SMM may authorise the local manufacture, modification and use of standard tools.

b. Where a standard tool is to be locally manufactured or modified, the SMM must ensure that:

(1) the tool is fit for the intended purpose;

(2) the tool is appropriately identified;

(3) documentation detailing the tool’s purpose, maintenance policy, and correct use is detailed in a local procedure; and

(4) the relevant AEO is provided a copy of the documentation required by TAREG 5.4.2.b(3).

5.4.3. Aeronautical Product

a. The AMO must document maintenance and logistics procedures for management of Aeronautical Product within the AMO’s control.

b. Prior to the installation of Aeronautical Product to higher assemblies, maintenance personnel must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to qualify that product.

c. AMOs must ensure that:

(1) all Aeronautical Product has been identified from the relevant AEO-approved parts list;

(2) all Aeronautical Product is sourced from the relevant AEO-approved manufacturer, nominated agent or accredited vendor;

(3) initial receipt inspection requirements defined by the procurement / ordering authority, where applicable to the AMO, are conducted;

(4) an identification and tracking system records and tracks each item of Aeronautical Product that is received, stored, issued and used within the AMO;

(5) only approved Aeronautical Product is installed or used on State Aircraft or other Aeronautical Product;

(6) except when fitted to State Aircraft or other Aeronautical Product, all Aeronautical Product is to be labelled, to provide the following information:

(a) item name;

(b) manufacturers part number(s);

(c) stock number (where applicable);

(d) serial number or batch / lot number (where applicable);

(e) status and the date of status change (where applicable); and

(f) name(s) and signature(s) of person(s) certifying the equipment as serviceable or unserviceable (as applicable).



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(7) handling and storage of Aeronautical Product is carried out in a manner that prevents damage or deterioration and retains technical integrity;

(8) all Aeronautical Product is packaged and labelled to the extent necessary to ensure conformance to all required standards stipulated by the relevant AEO;

(9) where applicable all Certificates of Conformity (C of C) or AEO-approved equivalent documents are retained;

(10) suspect unapproved Aeronautical Product is investigated and reported to the AEO in accordance with the TAREG 5.3.4.a(1) and (2);

(11) any Aeronautical Product which is subject to investigation is segregated and quarantined from other Aeronautical Product, reported and labelled with investigation and full identification details;

(12) unserviceable Aeronautical Product is separated from serviceable Aeronautical Product;

(13) Aeronautical Product that is to be transported is packaged, labelled and transported with all applicable documentation in accordance with AEO requirements; and

(14) Aeronautical Product identified for disposal is segregated and disposed of in a manner approved by the relevant AEO.

5.4.4. Transfer of Aeronautical Product (Cannibalisation)

a. Where an AMO elects to transfer Aeronautical Product from an aircraft or higher assembly, the AMO must validate the serviceability of the cannibalised Aeronautical Product prior to, or on installation of, the product.

5.5. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

5.5.1. Initial Requirements

a. The AMO must comply with all accident reporting requirements defined by the Sponsor and the relevant AEO.

b. On notification of an aircraft accident, the SMM must ensure that, for the affected aircraft, all actions are taken to preserve evidence both at the accident site and within the AMO.

5.5.2. Recovery of Aircraft

a. Where an AMO is responsible for the recovery of accident damaged aircraft the AMO must:

(1) have procedures for the recovery of aircraft;

(2) have, or have timely access to, any required recovery equipment;

(3) have competent and authorised personnel to perform the recovery procedures; and

(4) advise the AEO of the details of damage to the aircraft.

b. Where the risk can be justified in the opinion of the SMM, the SMM may, with approval from the operational commander, approve the use of documented ABDR techniques to enable the recovery of a damaged aircraft to an appropriate maintenance location.

5.5.3. Salvage

a. Aeronautical Product that has been the subject of an aircraft accident must only be reused following authorisation by the relevant AEO, or in accordance with TAREG 5.1.12.g.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND GUIDELINES TO BECOMING AN AEO

Applicable Regulations:

TAREG 1 Application of Regulations and Procedural Rules

TAREG 2 Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance

TAREG 3 Authorised Engineering Organisations

INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter serves as an introduction to guidance chapters within this section by providing a cross reference between regulations and guidance. It also provides amplification of the regulatory system under which an organisation is certified as an Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO).

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to organisations on the requirements to obtain an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) to operate as an AEO.

SCOPE

3. This chapter is applicable to ADF and commercial organisations seeking to operate as an AEO, to conduct design or engineering management activities for State Aircraft and aircraft-related equipment. Where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

REGULATION TO GUIDANCE CROSS REFERENCE

4. The regulation to guidance cross-reference detailed in Table 1-1 provides the location of further background information for particular regulations. It must be noted, however, that the guidance should be read within the context of the applicable regulation to which it refers. This is because the guidance is based upon engineering concepts rather than individual regulatory requirements; therefore, some regulations are covered by multiple guidance references. Where guidance is considered ‘Not Applicable’, this generally reflects that the regulations are either self explanatory, provide a statement of fact or are referenced in another publication.

Table 1–1 Regulation to Guidance Cross-Reference

TAREG Title Section 3 Guidance Chapter

1 Application of Regulations and Procedural Rules

1.1 General Not Applicable

1.1.1 Applicability Not Applicable

1.1.2 Rule Making Not Applicable

1.1.3 Application of These Regulations Chapter 1

1.1.4 Exemptions Chapters 1 and 2

1.1.5 Authoritative Airworthiness Advice Chapter 5

1.1.6 Rules of Interpretation Not Applicable

1.2 Design Acceptance Representatives

Not Applicable


1.2.2 Application for Delegation as a DAR

Not Applicable



2


1.2.3 Scope of Delegation Chapter 2

1.2.4 Eligibility Chapter 2

1.2.5 Certificates of Authority Not Applicable

1.2.6 Duration of Certificates Not Applicable

1.2.7 Delegation of DAR Responsibilities Not Applicable

1.3 Airworthiness Standards Representatives

Chapter 20

1.3.1 Applicability Chapter 20

1.3.2 Application for Delegation as an ASR

Chapter 20

1.3.3 Eligibility Chapter 20

1.3.4 Certificates of Authority Chapter 20

1.3.5 Duration of Certificates Chapter 20

1.3.6 Delegation of ASR Responsibilities Chapter 20

2 Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance



2.2 Type Certification Not Applicable



Chapter 14


Chapter 7

Chapter 18

2.2.4 ADF Statement of Requirements (SOR) for new Aircraft or Major Changes

Chapter 7

2.2.5 Airworthiness Standards For New Aircraft Or Major Changes

Chapter 7

2.2.6 Reserved

2.2.7 Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance

Chapter 7 and 12

2.2.8 Type Design Chapter 7

2.2.9 Type Records Chapter 7

2.2.10 Reserved Not Applicable

2.2.11 Compliance Findings Chapter 7

2.2.12 Software Compliance Findings AAP 7001.054(AM1) Sect 2 Chap 7

2.3 Special Flight Permits Chapters 7 and 14

2.4 Service Release for Major Changes to Type Design

Chapter 14

Chapter 18

2.5 Changes to the Type Design Not Applicable



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2.5.2 Design Acceptance System for Changes to a Type Design

Chapter 7

2.5.3 Classification of Changes in Type Design

Chapter 7

2.5.4 Changes Requiring a New AMTC Not Applicable

2.5.5 Supplemental Type Certification Not Applicable

2.5.6 Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to Type Design

Chapter 7 and Chapter 18


Chapter 7


Not Applicable


Chapters 2, 7 and 18

2.6 Other Certification Issues Not Applicable

2.6.1 Changes to Planned Withdrawal Date

Not Applicable

2.6.2 Statement of Operating Intent Chapter 11

2.6.3 Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness Chapters 2 and 14


2.6.5 Notification of Unairworthy Conditions

Chapter 2

2.7 Civil Leased Aircraft Not Applicable

2.7.1 Definition Not Applicable

2.7.2 Applicability Chapter 16

2.7.3 Recognition of Civil Aviation Regulatory Systems

Chapter 16

2.7.4 Continued Compliance Chapter 16

3 Authorised Engineering Organisations



3.2 Engineering Authority Certificates

Not Applicable


3.2.2 Certificate Required Not Applicable

3.2.3 Sponsor AEO Requirements Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4

3.2.4 Application Chapter 1

3.2.5 Audits Chapters 2 and 3

3.2.6 Issue of a Certificate Chapter 1

3.2.7 Duration Chapter 2



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3.2.8 Engineering Management Plan Chapter 1

3.3 General Requirements of Issue Not Applicable

3.3.1 Definitions Not Applicable

3.3.2 Personnel Chapters 1 and 2

3.3.3 Design Support Networks Chapter 1, Annex A

Chapters 2 and 4

3.3.4 Design Control System Chapters 2 and 6

3.3.5 CI Management System Not Applicable

3.3.6 Data Chapters 1 and 9

3.3.7 Equipment, Tools and Facility Requirements

Chapter 1, Annex A

3.3.8 Records Chapter 9

3.3.9 EMS Internal Evaluation System Chapter 2

3.3.10 Documentation Control Chapter 9


Chapter 20

3.4 Design Control Not Applicable

3.4.1 Design Control System Chapter 6 and 18

3.4.2 Data Management Chapter 9

3.4.3 Issue of Design Approval Certification

Chapter 6

3.4.4 Design Review Chapter 6

3.4.5 Judgement of Significance Chapter 6

3.4.6 Design Acceptance Chapters 2 and 7

3.5 CI Management Not Applicable


3.5.2 Technical Information Review Chapter 5

3.5.3 Software Integrity Management AAP 7001.054(AM1) Sect 2 Chap 7

3.5.4 Aircraft Structural Integrity Management

Chapter 11

3.5.5 Engine Structural Integrity Management

Chapter 17

3.5.6 Modifications Not Applicable

3.5.7 Substitutions Not Applicable

3.5.8 Deviations Not Applicable

3.5.9 Aircraft/Stores Configurations Chapter 15

3.5.10 Aerial Delivery Clearances Not Applicable

3.5.11 Special Technical Instructions (STIs)

Chapter 8



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3.5.12 Incorporation Approval Chapter 10

3.5.13 Service Release for Minor Changes to Type Design

Chapter 10 and 18

3.5.14 Management of Type Design Data Chapter 9

3.5.15 Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness

Chapter 8


Chapter 8

Chapter 10

3.5.17 Weight And Balance Chapter 19

3.5.18 Non Destructive Testing Not Applicable

3.5.19 Production Chapter 1

3.5.20 Modification Installation Chapter 1

3.6 Operating Requirements Not Applicable

3.6.1 Continued Compliance Chapter 2

3.6.2 Changes to an AEO’s Organisation Chapter 1, Annex A

Chapter 2

3.6.3 Inspections and Audit Chapter 3

TYPES OF AEO

5. How the regulations are applied and therefore how an organisation is certified as an AEO is not the same in every case. The process will vary depending on the nature of the work to be performed and the organisation performing that work. As a general rule there are three broad categories and they are explained below along with an explanation of the general process to be followed for certification.

6. For off-aircraft applications, note that Section 1, Chapter 5 provides guidance on tailoring of the regulations. Depending on the application, tailoring of the regulations may include relaxation of the requirement for the organisation to be an AEO. Note also that for design changes classified as Minor in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3, TAREG 2.5.6 provides some scope for these designs from a non-AEO to receive Design Acceptance certification by the DAR.

ADF AEO

7. ADF AEOs are generally established from scratch and are therefore free to establish an Engineering Management System (EMS) based on literal compliance with the regulations. ADF AEOs will find that the bulk of this chapter, including much of the guidance contained in other chapters within this section, will be directly relevant. Refer to Paragraph 16 below for a top-level amplification of the regulations.

8. Service organisations requiring an EAC are to submit a formal request to the TAR in accordance with TAREG 3.2.4. The submission is to include an Engineering Management Plan (EMP) and copies of all referenced plans and procedures. Note that DAVCOMP-DGTA staff will normally provide guidance on development of the submission through preliminary review of draft documentation.

Commercial AEO for Initial Design and Production (OEM)

9. An aircraft or major system Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is in almost all cases an established manufacturer of aircraft and/or related equipment. Without such a standing it is unlikely to have been awarded a contract with the ADF. The basis for AEO certification of OEMs relies on the determination as to whether its existing systems and processes meet the intent of the regulations.

10. The OEM’s existing design control system may already be certified by other recognised military forces or National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs) as listed in TAREG 2.2.7. Existing certifications provide greater confidence in the organisation and may assist to reduce both the requirements as well as the amount of effort necessary for AEO certification. Despite this it is important to ascertain the relevance of the existing certification(s) to the ADF



6

scope of work, whether the team assigned to the ADF contract is covered under that certification and whether the certification is maintained by an adequate surveillance program.

11. An OEM is recommended for AEO certification by the sponsor AEO or Project Office (PO) responsible for the contract. The format of documentation submitted by the OEM is an EMP. The EMP is to contain:

a. a cross-reference matrix between the regulations and where the OEM’s existing system of procedures meets the regulation’s intent;

b. a description of the OEM’s organisational structure, particularly those elements and locations that are to be assigned to the ADF contract; and

c. a statement by the Senior Executive declaring that the management system documented in the EMP will be applied to the ADF contract.

12. The OEM may not always be willing to make fundamental changes to their management system to demonstrate literal compliance with the regulations. Therefore, an initial evaluation of an OEM for AEO certification is frequently an ‘EMP improvement’ exercise. This provides the opportunity to gain further insight into the OEM’s existing system to ensure that it is adequately described and referenced in the EMP. Further, it is expected that the OEM’s EMP will be quite a small document, likely less than 10 pages.

13. Sponsor AEO responsibilities are described in more detail in Section 3, Chapter 4. Note that this chapter mandates DGTA-ADF staff involvement in initial AEO evaluations for new aircraft types and substantial upgrades to existing types. Sponsor organisations are encouraged to contact DAVCOMP-DGTA staff for advice.

Alternative Means of Compliance

14. Alternate means of compliance with the regulations in Section 2 are available when certification against alternate regulatory systems or standards can be demonstrated. For these alternative systems, providing certification is maintained via an ongoing surveillance program, compliance with the intent of some regulations may be assumed. The TAR has assessed alternate regulatory systems against the regulations in Section 2; an alternative means of compliance strategy can be found for these alternate systems beginning at annex C.

Commercial AEO for In-Service Support

15. For commercial organisations providing in-service support, many of the principles of AEO certification for an OEM apply. The key difference, however, is greater variation in how the organisation has been established to service the contract. Even in the event that the OEM is involved via its Australian subsidiary, the contracted organisation may share little in common with the OEM itself. Therefore, the existing quality, stability and certifications of the OEM cannot necessarily be applied to the in-service contractor. Initial evaluations (in particular) are generally more involved as a result. For further guidance, refer to Section 3, Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) may mandate DAVCOMP-DGTA staff involvement for initial and on going compliance activities for selected commercial AEOs. DAVCOMP-DGTA staff are available for further advice.

TOP-LEVEL AMPLIFICATION OF REGULATIONS

Organisational Requirements

16. The TAR assigns Engineering Authority (EA) to organisations based on an evaluation of their competence and capability. This evaluation conforms to the ‘OPPD’ model, that is, an Organisation is authorised by the TAR if it has competent Personnel, documented Processes and access to authoritative Data. Further amplification of these requirements is provided in the following paragraphs.

Organisational Systems

17. Organisations must implement a system within which engineering activity will be conducted. While an ISO 9001 quality system forms the basic standard, the TAR prescribes additional requirements to assure technical airworthiness.

Quality Management System (QMS)

18. An organisation-wide QMS is fundamental to any assignment of EA as it establishes a level of control and consistency over an organisation’s activities. Certification to AS/NZS ISO 9001 or equivalent is the minimum standard of QMS required. However, since ISO 9001 does not meet all of the TAR’s technical airworthiness requirements by itself, TAREG 3.2.6 requires organisations to have both a certified QMS and an Engineering Management System (EMS) acceptable to the TAR. The EMS can be considered an extension of the base QMS for engineering activities within the ADF aviation environment.



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Engineering Management System (EMS)

19. An organisation’s EMS comprises the organisational structure, responsibilities, processes, procedures and resources that it applies to the conduct and management of engineering. The TAR requires that an AEO must have an EMS with the following key elements:

a. Engineering Management Plan (EMP). All AEOs must maintain an EMP that encompasses the entire engineering organisation forming the AEO. An EMP provides a reference to the engineering plans, processes and procedures with which the organisation must comply and thus provides a baseline for initial assessment of the organisation as an AEO. EMPs are approved by the applicant’s Senior Design Engineer (SDE) and accepted by the TAR as part of the evaluation process leading to provision of an EAC. Annex A contains guidance on preparing an EMP in accordance with TAREG 3.2.8.

b. Design Support Network (DSN). AEOs are unlikely to have all of the internal resources necessary to conduct engineering activities autonomously. As a result, AEOs must establish a formal network of external organisations to fill the gaps in their engineering capability. Such a network referred to as a DSN, is an essential element of an AEO’s EMS and must be described in the AEO’s EMP. DSN requirements are more fully described in Section 3, Chapter 4.

c. Senior Design Engineer. Each AEO must identify one person, the SDE, responsible to the Senior Executive for ensuring compliance of the organisation with the TAR’s regulations. SDEs are responsible for assigning EA to individuals within the AEO to perform design and Configuration Item (CI) management activities. SDEs are also responsible for Design Approval certification of designs generated within their AEO, either personally or by monitoring compliance by staff with approved procedures. The role of an SDE is prescribed in TAREG 3.3.2 and described further in Section 3, Chapter 2. AEOs may further choose to nominate Deputy Senior Design Engineers (DSDEs) to perform a range of SDE-level functions as a means to improve organisational efficiency; however, the use of DSDEs is not mandatory. Further, the appointment of DSDEs does not remove the singular responsibility of the SDE for overall management of the AEO’s EMS and its compliance with the regulations.

Personnel

20. The TAR requires that EA is only assigned to personnel with appropriate qualifications, training and experience for the scope and level of authority to be assigned. To assign ‘internal’ EA in accordance with TAREG 3.3.2, SDEs must firstly define an engineering organisational structure as a subset of the overall structure of the parent organisation. This structure needs to identify the scope and level of EA required by each position and the assessment criteria applied in assigning that EA, and should include not only Design Engineers (DEs) but all personnel performing engineering activities. This requirement assures the TAR that the AEO is employing sufficient competent and authorised personnel to carry out the full scope of engineering activities to be undertaken by the AEO.

NOTE

• The engineering organisational structure may include individuals external to the immediate AEO where required. For example, limited EA may be assigned from the SDE of an AEO to an external organisation’s Senior Maintenance Manager.

21. The minimum qualifications, experience and attributes required of SDEs, DSDEs, and DEs are prescribed in TAREG 3, Annexes A and B. SDE and DSDE applicants are to be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA staff against the requirements of TAREG 3 Annex A. The recommended format that applicants are to use in documenting their claims for compliance with TAREG 3 Annex A and providing the means for SDE recommendations for assignment of EA is provided at Annex D to this chapter. All applicants are directed to the DGTA-ADF websites, both intranet and internet, for an editable copy of the aforementioned recommended format document. Should a SDE or DSDE applicant fail to meet any of the criteria, then an Exemption must be sought from the TAR.

22. The SDE may choose to add to the requirements of TAREG 3, Annex A or B in accordance with the role and nature of the AEO’s activities (eg. specific weapon system or technology experience). These additional requirements should be documented within the EMP. Should an SDE or DSDE not meet these additional requirements, the TAR is to be notified. Should a DE not meet the additional requirements prescribed within the EMP, then the SDE is able to issue a local exemption. For further information regarding exemptions see Paragraph 29.

23. The minimum required DE qualifications at TAREG 3, Annex B are presented as two options. The option at Paragraph 1.a.(ii) requires sufficient qualifications for membership to the Institution of Engineers, Australia (IEAust) as an Officer Member (OMIEAust). While IEAust accepts applications for OMIEAust based solely on experiential-based qualifications (such as a Certificate in Frontline Management), the TAR requires that DE applicants have academic-based qualifications. These are qualifications gained through attendance at a formal course conducted by a



8

recognised tertiary institution. This requirement of the TAR, while additional to the general IEAust minimum, is flexible in application. That is the TAR does not specify any minimum standard for the qualification (e.g. Diploma), the requirement simply being that the qualification is suitable and relevant to the scope and level of EA to be assigned to the DE. If there is any doubt, SDEs are encouraged to refer to DAVCOMP-DGTA for advice.

Processes

24. TAREG 3.2.4 requires AEOs to maintain and follow documented, controlled and approved procedures for all their engineering activities. AEOs should already have a rigorous documentation control procedure, as this is a prerequisite for QMS certification. The TAR further specifies a number of essential processes, such as internal assignment of authority, DSNs and the Design Control system. Additional requirements are specified for those AEOs that undertake CI management activities.

25. The need for the TAR to mandate processes and procedures above those required by ISO 9001 is sometimes questioned. The reality is that ISO 9001 is a generic standard which is to be adapted to meet specific industry requirements (a point which is often overlooked). In TAREG 3 the TAR has defined the level of adaptation required to meet the specific needs of the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system. This approach is in fact very similar to that taken by all recognised NAAs, such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which prescribe specific requirements for design and management of aircraft and aircraft-related equipment.

26. AEOs, depending on the scope and level of EA assigned to them, are also expected to maintain a number of plans subordinate to their EMP, some of which are prescribed by regulations. Such plans include the Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP) and the Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP). A listing of plans and key procedures required by AEOs is provided at Annex B.

Data

27. As a quality certified organisation, every AEO will already have identified a set of quality records for retention. TAREG 3.3.6 complements and reinforces this requirement of the quality standard by requiring AEOs to maintain access to data that relates specifically to the engineering being performed, particularly for design control activities and related decisions. For AEOs that manage whole aircraft types, TAREG 3.3.6 also covers the most important data set of all; that is, the aircraft Type Design data. The regulations aim to ensure that all data used by the AEO to make engineering decisions is available, relevant, authoritative and approved for use. For further information concerning data refer to Section 3, Chapter 9.

APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS

Compliance Assurance

28. Initial and ongoing compliance with TAR regulations by ADF AEOs will be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA through compliance assurance activities, as prescribed by TAREGs 3.2.5 and 3.6.3. ADF AEOs will, in turn, perform compliance assurance monitoring of commercial AEOs they sponsor within their DSNs (with the assistance of DAVCOMP-DGTA as required). Section 1, Chapter 6 describes the process used by the TAR to evaluate AEO applicants and to monitor ongoing compliance through audit activities. Section 3, Chapter 4 provides additional guidance on Service sponsor AEO responsibilities, while Section 3, Chapter 3 provides specific guidance on the conduct of commercial AEO audits.

Exemptions to Regulations

29. As provided by TAREG 1.1.4, in exceptional circumstances an AEO (or AEO applicant) may seek exemption from one or more TAREGs that ordinarily apply to an applicant organisation, but for some reason cannot be complied with. TAREGs that are clearly not applicable to the scope of work to be performed by the AEO should be indicated as 'Not Applicable' within the EMP compliance matrix, and do not require exemption. Exemption requests, with one exception, are to be raised as formal and specific written correspondence to DGTA-ADF. That is, exemption requests cannot be either an element of, or implied in, any other documentation that the TAR or DGTA Staff may deliberate. The exception relates to applications for a TAR delegation, such as DAR, SDE or ASR. If an application for a TAR delegation requires an exemption to qualifications, training, or experience requirements, the exemption request may be part of the application. Exemption requests should initially be discussed between SDEs and DGTA Staff before the request, which should be fully justified, is staffed to DGTA-ADF. The DGTA-ADF response for all exemptions requests will always be in writing and stipulate the timeframe for which the exemption is valid.



9

Application to Designs not Affecting Airworthiness

30. Section 1, Chapter 5 describes how the regulations apply to ADF aircraft, aircraft-related equipment, and other aviation system engineering activities in the ADF.

NOTE

• The regulations promulgated in AAP 7001.053(AM1) are primarily focussed on ensuring technical airworthiness. They are not intended to address broader OHS implications.

PRODUCTION

Scope

31. TAREG 3.5.19 covers new aircraft, CIs and any Aeronautical Product produced specifically for that CI, such as cabling harnesses, mounting brackets, etc. It is not intended to apply to production of lower-level Aeronautical Product, such as wiring, connectors and fasteners. It is also not to be applied to existing non-AEO OEM suppliers of CIs for in-service use where the OEM is not involved in any integration or installation design activity for an existing Type Design. In other words, TAREG 3.5.19 applies where a requirement exists to establish a commercial AEO to produce (as well as design) a new aircraft, or design a change (requiring some degree of production) to an existing Type Design.

32. Rather than regulating ‘Authorised Production Organisations’, Production (as defined) may be authorised under an organisation’s AEO certification, providing the EAC applicant can demonstrate appropriate production control and management systems as specified in TAREG 3.5.19. In particular, please note the following:

a. TAREG 3.5.19.c(3). Procedures defining the manner of production address the interface issues between the production and design organisations. Such interfaces are essential to ensure that in the event of problems with production, adequate documented procedures are in place to cover part or material substitutions as well as deviations from the approved design, as required. Further, appropriate engineering staff must be involved in the decision making process, and appropriate records are generated from such actions.

b. TAREG 3.5.19.c(8). An essential aspect of production is the certification by the production organisation that the product conforms to all specified requirements. Note that this may be in the form of a Certificate of Conformance.

MODIFICATION INSTALLATION

Significant Aircraft Maintenance Activity

33. A significant aircraft maintenance activity is the determinant as to whether an organisation performing modification installation to an existing Type Design aircraft requires certification as an Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) in accordance with TAREG 4. Significant aircraft maintenance activities are defined at TAREG 3.5.20.a(2). The AEO applicant should make a determination as to whether significant aircraft maintenance activity is likely to occur during the modification installation and therefore either submit an application for AMO certification, or adjust the level and scope of proposed AEO certification to suit. The following paragraphs amplify arrangements once this determination has been made.

Fleet-Wide Modification Installation With Significant Aircraft Maintenance Activity

34. For any modification installation to an existing Type Design that is conducted concurrently with or requires substantial maintenance activity, the organisation conducting the fleet-wide installation must be approved as an AMO. The must hold a valid Maintenance Authority Certificate (MAC) for the applicable scope and level of work required. TAREG 3.5.19 refers.

Fleet-Wide Modification Installation Without Significant Aircraft Maintenance Activity

35. The TAR acknowledges that there may be instances where a commercial organisation is contracted to design, develop, produce and install modifications to an existing Type Design and the organisation will be required to achieve and maintain AEO certification. For those instances when fleet-wide installation will not involve substantial maintenance activity, the TAR does not require the organisation conducting the installation to become an AMO. Rather, the organisation will have to demonstrate that the applicable clauses of TAREGs 4 and 5 have been adequately addressed and processes documented. TAREG 3.5.20 refers.



10

36. Certification as an AEO, including modification installation, can be achieved by including the additional TAREG 4 and 5 requirements within the AEO submission. The EA scope will be assessed and assigned to reflect the modification installation requirements. Note that this option is made available by the TAR to recognise that the management overheads associated with obtaining full AMO certification, in addition to AEO certification, may be excessive if the modification installation activity is relatively simple. This option does not preclude the commercial organisation from obtaining AMO certification. Further, for organisations with existing procedures compliant with other regulatory systems, compliance of these procedures with the intent of TAREG 3.5.20 will need to be demonstrated (as an alternative to the development of new procedures).

Trial Modifications

37. The installation of a modification for the purposes of design development, prototyping and trial may be undertaken by the AEO that is developing the modification. The AEO must be able to demonstrate adequate controls over the installation process, to ensure that the technical airworthiness of the trial aircraft is not compromised. TAREG 3.5.6.b details the minimum requirements for trial modifications.

Annexes:

A. Guidelines on the Content of an EMP B. Examples of Plans and Procedures Required by AEOs C. Alternative Means of Compliance – SAE AS9100 Revision A D. SDE / DSDE Assessment Form



1A–1

GUIDELINES ON THE CONTENT OF AN EMP 1. These guidelines are intended to assist Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) applicants to prepare an Engineering Management Plan (EMP). The purpose of an EMP is to provide a roadmap to an organisation's Engineering Management System (EMS), that is, the organisational structure, responsibilities, procedures, processes and resources that an organisation applies to its conduct and management of engineering. Accordingly, an EMP builds upon an organisation's Quality System and focuses the principles of quality management upon engineering. An EMP may be considered as a Quality Manual for engineering in the aerospace environment. The EMP may be focussed on engineering applied by the organisation to manage an existing aircraft weapon system eg a Systems Program Office (SPO), a project or specialist engineering services provided eg Non Destructive Testing.

2. The EMP provides a documented baseline for evaluation and audit of the engineering system to verify its effectiveness. As such, the EMP is the key document supporting the assignment of EA to an organisation. Note that many organisations have established a system that supports design activity on aircraft and aircraft-related equipment, that has been developed over time to comply with other regulatory environments (e.g. CASA, JAA, FAA, US DoD, UK MoD). The EMP is the document that discloses how these established processes and procedures meet the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory requirements, as the TAR does not necessarily expect that organisations will develop a unique range of processes and procedures in support of the ADF. In such cases, the EMP could simply be an interface document pointing to existing established processes to meet ADF regulatory requirements. The guidance below covers the minimum content requirements of an EMP prescribed by TAREG 3.2.8.

GUIDANCE ON TAREG 3.2.8

Introduction

3. The EMP should begin with an introduction describing the role of the organisation in broad terms along the lines of a mission statement. Following on from this statement of purpose should be a description of the strategy being adopted for overall management of the supported aircraft weapon system/s. This description should indicate the balance between the AEO and external agencies (including contractors) in the long-term management of the weapon system/s. By identifying the existence of relationships between these organisations, the introduction prepares the reader for explanation of the details of those relationships in the body of the EMP.

Statement by Senior Executive

4. The Senior Executive is the person in overall charge or command of the organisation, thus this position has control of resource and schedule issues which impact upon engineering processes. The statement by the Senior Executive provides the top-level commitment by the organisation to meet its regulatory requirements as an AEO. The Senior Executive is required to confirm that the EMP and all referenced plans, procedures and instructions accurately reflect the engineering organisation. The Senior Executive is also required to give an undertaking that the necessary resources are available for the AEO to carry out its engineering activities.

Regulation Compliance Table

5. The EMP is to include a table, or matrix, cross-referencing each regulation requirement to the specific plans, procedures and instructions used to demonstrate compliance with the requirement. The compliance matrix serves multiple purposes, as follows:

a. It provides the AEO applicant with a systematic approach to developing the EMS to satisfy all the relevant regulatory requirements. The process will highlight areas where an organisation’s existing management system requires further definition to address all of the TAR’s procedural requirements.

b. It allows the organisation to identify which regulations are relevant to the scope of work sought as an AEO and also those that should be highlighted as not applicable. For those regulations deemed to be not-applicable, a brief justification should be included in the compliance matrix. Regulations that are applicable but require no direct action or documented process should be annotated as ‘noted’.

c. A properly completed compliance matrix greatly assists the TAR’s review of the overall applicability and compliance of the applicant’s EMS in the evaluation phase leading to AEO certification. The compliance matrix allows the TAR’s staff to verify by desktop review that the applicant’s documented system meets the regulatory requirements. This gives confidence that the organisation understands the regulatory requirements and generally results in a smoother compliance (on-site) evaluation.



1A–2

6. The compliance matrix should be structured to show compliance of the applicant’s EMS against all regulations, down to sub-numbered level, from TAREG 1 through TAREG 3. An example compliance matrix for the fictitious XXSPO organisation is shown at Appendix 1.

Scope of Engineering Activities

7. The ‘scope’ statement, together with the ‘level’ statement described below, puts the remainder of the EMP into context by establishing the bounds of the activities to be performed by the organisation and its need for authority from the TAR to perform those activities.

8. The scope of engineering activities is to be described by some combination of ‘systems’ and ‘design services’. System scope is to be defined in terms of aircraft type-specific systems, sub-systems or major assemblies, further refined as necessary by system classification (for example primary, secondary or tertiary structure) or system criticality. There is no need to include in the EMP an exhaustive list of all CIs to be managed by the AEO; this information should be visible through other configuration management documents. Design service scope is to include provision of one or more processes, technologies or disciplines. Where necessary, the design services being provided may be further defined in terms of design change significance.

9. The scope of engineering authority sought by an applicant must be consistent with organisational structure, competence and extent of external support networks. For commercial AEOs the scope of EA awarded by the TAR cannot exceed that defined in the formal instrument with the Service sponsor AEO. Commercial AEOs should therefore carefully review the engineering requirements of their contract or other formal instrument to ensure that all relevant activities which require EA are included in the EMP. Equally, the EMP should not seek EA for activities outside the scope of work of the formal instrument.

Level of Engineering Activities

10. Level relates to the highest level of engineering authority exercised for the scope of activity. The highest level exercisable by a commercial AEO is Design Approval certification, as defined by TAREG 3.4.3. Design Acceptance certification is a Commonwealth corporate governance function, therefore only a ADF AEO with a resident Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) can be awarded organisational EA for Design Acceptance certification. In this case the EA awarded to the organisation complements the personal delegation given to the DAR.

11. Where the highest level of EA varies for different activities within the scope, the level of EA for each activity or group of activities should be identified. Similarly, if the highest level of EA does not incorporate lower levels of EA then this should also be highlighted. For example, a ADF AEO may require authority for Design Acceptance certification for all aspects of the aircraft weapon system design, but may only be able to perform Design Approval certification for a limited scope commensurate with the internal competence and capability of the organisation.

12. The description of scope and level, or levels, of activity in the applicant’s EMP combine to define the statement of organisational EA being sought from the TAR. This determines the bounds for assessing the organisation against all elements of the OPPD model described earlier. The rest of the EMP should explain how the organisation is structured to perform the full scope and level of engineering activities.

Organisational Certifications

13. TAREG 3.2.6 requires the applicant to hold ISO 9001 or equivalent quality certification relevant to the scope of work to be performed as an AEO. The importance of quality certification is discussed in the main body of this chapter. The EMP is required to provide evidence of quality certification and should fully define the scope of activities covered by the certification, which must include the complete scope of work to be performed as an AEO. The EMP should also specify any other relevant engineering or airworthiness certifications (such as those awarded by CASA, JAA, FAA, UK MoD, US DoD etc) that would aid the TAR’s overall assessment of the competence and capability of the organisation. This includes any previous or current EACs awarded by the TAR. If the applicant has an existing EAC the EMP should clearly identify the new scope and level of EA being sought and demonstrate how the organisation has extended its EMS to cover the new or expanded scope of work.

Organisation Chart

14. The purpose of the organisation chart is to identify all those appointments within the AEO that will exercise EA, in accordance with TAREG 3.3.2. This allows the TAR to determine whether the staffing structure is appropriate to support the whole scope of engineering activities. It also highlights the lines of responsibility and access requirements between key personnel, for example, between the Senior Executive and SDE as required by TAREG 3.3.2. The organisation chart should list position titles rather than individual names.



1A–3

15. The organisation chart should identify the positions of:

a. the Senior Executive;

b. the Senior Design Engineer (SDE);

c. any Deputy SDEs (DSDEs);

d. Design Engineers (DEs); and

e. other positions requiring EA (including positions external to the organisation).

16. Accompanying the organisation chart should be a brief narrative of the scope and level of engineering responsibilities associated with each position or type of position. Note that positions requiring EA at a level lower than DE may be disclosed in general terms, that is not every individual position is required to be shown.

SDE and DSDE details

17. Having identified in the organisation chart all positions requiring EA, the EMP must then either include details of the qualifications, training and experience of the actual persons nominated for the SDE position and any DSDE positions, or a reference to where this information is located. The qualifications, training and experience of the SDE and DSDEs (if nominated) are required because the TAR personally assesses the suitability of these individuals against the criteria in TAREG 3, Annex A. The TAR accepts the SDE and any DSDE appointments as part of acceptance of the EMP as the basis for the AEO. Unless otherwise specified the TAR allows the SDE appointment to exercise EA for the whole scope of organisational engineering activity. Additionally, DSDEs may be granted EA for the full scope of engineering activity (equal to that of the SDE) if the person demonstrates the necessary competence. However, the SDE remains the sole person responsible for management of the AEO’s EMS.

Design Support Network (DSN)

18. The DSN description collates a number of regulatory requirements on the AEO to establish relationships with external support agencies. There are certain types of organisations that must be included in the applicant’s DSN, as listed in TAREG 3.3.3. Applicants should first read TAREG 3.3.3 and Section 3, Chapter 4, Getting Help – Design Support Networks, for a thorough understanding of DSN requirements before completing this section.

19. The EMP should provide, through its description of DSN members and services, a rationale of how the DSN is structured to enable the AEO to achieve its full scope of engineering responsibilities. Applicants who intend to rely substantially on subcontractors to provide engineering activities will need to clearly demonstrate how the subcontractors will be evaluated, selected and monitored (which includes audit) to ensure that the subcontractors meet both the TAR’s regulatory requirements and the technical requirements of the AEO.

20. A crucial element of support provided by external agencies is the provision or management of data related to CIs managed by the AEO. For this reason, the DSN section in the EMP must also include:

a. a list of all sources of technical information (TI). This listing allows cross-reference to the DSN to ensure that the AEO has established links with all external sources of technical information that could affect the AEO’s airworthiness management of a CI or CIs (for those AEOs that manage CIs);

b. an explanation of any data access agreements and associated intellectual property rights, as prescribed by TAREG 3.3.6. Such agreements with the data provider (an original equipment manufacturer for instance) should address not only the direct access needs of the AEO, but also the possibility of third party access requirements for subcontractors assisting the AEO; and

c. interface arrangements with DSN members for management of Type Design data, to ensure that only relevant and authoritative data is used. These arrangements may cover, for example, the provision of Type Design data held by the AEO (as CI manager) to DSN members to assist in a specific task, or the provision of Type Design data from an OEM to the AEO on an as-needed basis. As previously mentioned these arrangements along with the other data-related requirements complement the overall description of DSN relationships in the EMP.

21. The TAR acknowledges that it can take some time to establish mature relationships with all DSN members. Hence, the emphasis during an initial AEO evaluation is to ensure that the AEO applicant has identified all the relevant external organisations and has evaluated those organisations for their suitability to provide competent engineering services. The EMP, at the time of submission to the TAR, should clearly reflect the current status of each DSN member, as well as the proposed mature relationship and the plan for achieving the mature arrangement (for example, subcontract, Memorandum of Understanding or other formal agreement).



1A–4

Locations of Engineering Activities

22. This section helps to define the overall organisation that comprises the AEO, especially where the organisation performs work under its AEO scope at multiple sites. The EMP should also identify those elements of engineering activity that are carried out at DSN member locations, particularly for major subcontractors. This is cross-referenced against the preceding information on DSN relationships and organisational interface requirements.

23. The EMP should provide sufficient information to demonstrate that each of the Organisation, People, Processes and Data (OPPD) elements are in place at each location where work will be undertaken by the AEO. The TAR will determine which locations of the applicant’s organisation, and subcontractors where applicable, require on-site audit as part of the initial AEO evaluation process. TAREG 3.2.5 refers.

Equipment, Tools and Facilities

24. Once the locations of all engineering activities within the scope of the AEO are identified, the EMP should then describe the necessary equipment, tools and facilities (ETF) at these locations to support these engineering activities. For example, the AEO may need access to specialist ETF in order to develop and test a design before Design Approval certification can be made. The ETF could be both software (for example, a finite element modelling package) and hardware (e.g. an ultimate tensile strength testing machine). Arrangements for access to ETF not possessed by the applicant are also to be described.

EMP Amendment Process

25. The SDE approves all changes to the EMP, however prior acceptance from the TAR is required before issuing an amendment that would alter the basis of AEO certification. These specific instances are prescribed in TAREG 3.6.2 and cover changes to the key personnel, scope or location of engineering work. The EMP should acknowledge the requirement for such proposed changes to be sent to the TAR, either directly, in the case of a ADF AEO, or through the sponsor AEO in the case of a commercial AEO. The TAR will determine if any additional compliance assurance activity is required prior to accepting an organisational change. A change to the engineering scope will trigger, at a minimum, reissue of the Letter of Engineering Authority. In general minor changes to an EMP eg correction of typographical errors, references to updated procedures etc, do not require prior acceptance by the TAR.

Contacting TAR Staff

26. Directorate of Aviation Compliance (DAVCOMP-DGTA) is responsible for managing the evaluation of new AEO applicants on behalf of the TAR. Service organisations seeking further advice on the preparation of an EMP should contact DAVCOMP-DGTA staff directly. Commercial AEO applicants should contact their Service sponsor AEO in the first instance, although DAVCOMP-DGTA may provide further guidance if required. The AEO compliance assurance activities conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA are detailed in AAP 7001.068(AM1)—Design and Technology Services Support Manual, Section 2, Chapter 1. The manual is available on the DGTA-ADF web site http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dgta/.

Appendix:

1. Example Regulation Compliance Matrix – XXSPO


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex A to Sect 3 Chap 1

1A1–1

EXAMPLE REGULATION COMPLIANCE MATRIX – XXSPO Table 1–A1–1 Example Regulation Compliance Matrix – XXSPO

TAREG Title Compliance

1.1 General Noted

1.1.5 Authoritative Airworthiness Advice XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-26 Technical Information

1.2 Design Acceptance Representatives WGCDR Barnes Wallace appointed XXSPO DAR vide certificate no. DGTA666

1.2.7 Delegation of DAR Responsibilities XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-18 Assignment of internal EA

1.3 Airworthiness Standards Representatives XXSPO SI(ADMIN) 2-40 Airworthiness Standards Representative

2.1 General Noted


Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1 Type Certification Plan Development


Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-2-1-10 Design Acceptance

2.2.4, 2.2.5 ADF SOR, Airworthiness Standards for New Aircraft or Major Changes

Refer ASD QMS procedures 3-3-3-1 (Specification Development) and 3-3-3-2 (Statement of Work Development)

2.2.6 Statement of Operating Intent Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-3-1-1

2.2.7 Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1

2.2.8, 2.2.9 Type Design, Type Record Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1

2.2.10 Reserved

2.2.11 Compliance Findings Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-2-1-6 PDAS Development

2.3 Special Flight Permits Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1

2.4 Service Release Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1

2.5.1, 2.5.2 Applicability, Design Acceptance System for Changes to a Type Design

(Minor) XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-28 Design Acceptance Process

(Major) Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-2-1-10

2.5.3 Classification of Changes in Type Design Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-2-1-6 PDAS Development

2.5.4, 2.5.5 Changes Requiring a New AMTC, Supplemental Type Certification

Refer ASD QMS procedure 3-5-1-1

2.5.6 Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to the Type Design

XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-28 Design Acceptance Process









1A1–2

Table 1–A1–1 Example Regulation Compliance Matrix – XXSPO (cont)


2.6.1-2.6.2 Changes to PWD/SOI Noted

2.6.3 Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-35 Certificates of Airworthiness

2.6.4 Reserved

2.6.5 Notification of Unairworthy Conditions Noted

2.7 Civil Leased Aircraft Not Applicable

3.1 General Noted

3.2.1-3.2.7 Engineering Authority Certificates Noted, Sponsor AEO / Commercial AEO aspects refer to XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-4 DSN

3.2.8 Engineering Management Plan XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-1 to 2-8 EMP

3.3.1 Definitions Noted

3.3.2 Personnel XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-2 Organisation

XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-18 Assignment of Internal EA

XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-17 Professional Development and Training

3.3.3 Design Support Networks XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-4 Design Support Network

3.3.4, 3.3.5 Design Control, CI Management Noted

3.3.6 Data XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-32 Management of Data

3.3.7 Equipment, tools and facilities XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-6 Equipment, tools and facilities

3.3.8 Records XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-19 Engineering Records

3.3.9 EMS Internal Evaluation System XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-21 Internal Engineering audits

XXSPO Quality Manual

3.3.10 Documentation Control XXSPO SI(ADMIN) 1-3 Control of Documentation


XXSPO SI(ADMIN) 2-40 Airworthiness Standards Representative

3.4.1 Design Control System XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-28 Design Acceptance Process

3.4.2 Data Management XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-11 Data Management

3.4.3, 3.4.4 Issue of Design Approval Certification XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-28 Design Acceptance Process

3.4.5 Judgement of Significance XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-27 Judgement of Significance

3.4.6 Design Acceptance XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-28 Design Acceptance Process

3.5.1 Applicability Noted

3.5.2 Technical Information Review XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-26 Technical Information


3.5.4 Aircraft Structural Integrity Management F-XX ASIMP

XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-36 Management of Aircraft Structural Integrity



1A1–3

Table 1–A1–1 Example Regulation Compliance Matrix – XXSPO (cont)


3.5.5 Engine Structural Integrity Management F-XX ESIMP

XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-37 Management of Engine Structural Integrity

3.5.6 Modifications XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-29 Modification Orders

3.5.7 Substitutions XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-30 Technical Substitutions

3.5.8 Deviations XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-31 Deviations

3.5.9 Aircraft Stores Clearance and Certification XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-38 Aircraft stores clearances

3.5.10 Aerial Delivery Clearances Not Applicable to fighter aircraft

3.5.11 Special Technical Instructions (STIs) XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-39 Special Technical Instructions

3.5.12 Incorporation Approval XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-40 Configuration Control Boards

3.5.13 Service Release XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-40 Configuration Control Boards

3.5.14 Management of Type Design Data XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-11 Data Management

3.5.15 Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-12 Technical Publications


XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-12 Technical Publications

3.5.17 Weight and Balance XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-41 Management of aircraft weight and balance

3.5.18 Non Destructive Testing XXSPO SI(LOG) 2-42 Non Destructive Testing

3.5.19 Production Not Applicable

3.5.20 Modification Installation Not Applicable

3.6 Operating Requirements Noted

4 Approved Maintenance Organisations Not Applicable

5 Aircraft Maintenance and Management Procedures

Not Applicable



1A1–4

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AAP 7001.053 (AM1) Annex B to Sect 3 Chap 1

1B–1

EXAMPLES OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY AEOs 1. The following list is representative of the plans that are normally required by an AEO. These plans are usually contained or referred to within the Engineering Management Plan with a cross reference to the regulations they aim to satisfy:

Type of Plan Regulatory or Publication Reference

Quality Plan TAREG 3.2.6

Configuration Management Plan (CMP) Not a TAR requirement

Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) Not a TAR requirement

Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP) TAREG 3.5.4

Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP) TAREG 3.5.5

2. The following list of required procedures is not exhaustive, but indicates some of the key processes that AEOs are normally required to document:

Process Regulatory or Publication Reference

Assignment of internal EA procedures including those for:

assessment of engineering staff for assignment of EA,

method of documenting authorisations,

ongoing competency development, and

appointment of staff to hold EA on a temporary basis.

TAREG 3.3.2

Design Support Network procedures (Sect 3, Chap 4) including:

identification of DSN members and services provided,

definining how the services provided are to be treated,

ongoing evaluation of DSN effectiveness,

assessment of new organisations for DSN, and

compliance assurance procedures (where applicable).

TAREG 3.3.3

Data management and record control procedures:

clearly identify all design reference data,

full disclosure of all Intellectual Property rights,

control of design reference data, and

retention and control of all engineering records.

TAREG 3.3.6

TAREG 3.3.6

TAREG 3.3.6

TAREG 3.4.2 TAREG 3.3.8

Internal Evaluation procedures:

describe relationship with Quality System internal review,

SDE review of engineering outputs,

internal audit program of engineering staff and procedures, and

method for undertaking corrective action.

TAREG 3.3.9


AAP 7001.053 (AM1) Annex B to Sect 3 Chap 1

1B–2

Process Regulatory or Publication Reference

Procedures relating to the design control system:

specification development and approval;

design development plans and drawing control;

Judgement of Significance;

Design Review and Design Approval (including certification);

Design Acceptance certification (where applicable);

Assumption of Design Acceptance certification (where applicable);

Test, Evaluation, Verification; and

Configuration Management.

TAREG 3.4

TAREG 3.4.5

TAREG 3.4.3 and 3.4.4

TAREG 2 and 3.4.6

TAREG 2.5.9

TAREG 3.4

TAREG 3.5

Technical Information Review procedures (Sect 3 Chap 5):

clear identification of TI to be collected,

method for registering and sequence checking TI,

priority exchange of TAAI,

recording TI applicability and action taken, and

authorisation of personnel to undertake TIR activity.

TAREG 3.5.2

CI Management procedures (where applicable):

Software Integrity Management

ASIM,

ESIM,

Modifications,

Substitutions,

Deviations,

Aircraft/Stores Configurations,

Aerial Delivery Clearances,

STIs,

Incorporation Approval,

Service Release for Minor changes to Type Design,

Management of Type Design Data,

Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness,

Flight Manuals and Aircraft Operating Instructions,

Weight and Balance,

Non Destructive Testing,

Production, and

Modification Installation.

TAREG 3.5

TAREG 3.5.3

TAREG 3.5.4

TAREG 3.5.5

TAREG 3.5.6

TAREG 3.5.7

TAREG 3.5.8

TAREG 3.5.9

TAREG 3.5.10

TAREG 3.5.11

TAREG 3.5.12

TAREG 3.5.13

TAREG 3.5.14

TAREG 3.5.15

TAREG 3.5.16

TAREG 3.5.17

TAREG 3.5.18

TAREG 3.5.19

TAREG 3.5.20



1C–1

ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE – SAE AS9100 REVISION A 1. AS9100 - Quality Systems Aerospace Model for Quality Assurance in Design, Development, Production, Installation and Servicing is a standard published by the Society of Automotive Engineers. It is based on ISO 9001 and adds aerospace-specific requirements to provide a harmonised standard for aerospace companies worldwide. The standard is gaining wide acceptance.

2. For acquisition of new aircraft types, due to the inherent confidence that may be placed in the design capabilities of an OEM certified to AS9100, the process of such an organisation becoming an AEO can be considerably abbreviated, as:

a. it would be anticipated that many of the procedures required to be in place to achieve AS9100 certification would satisfy the design-related regulations of the TAMM; and

b. there is no need for the organisation to satisfy many of the CI management-related regulations.

AEO Application

3. A submission for such an AEO applicant certified to AS9100 is to consist of:

a. evidence of the organisation's AS9100 certification, with scope applicable to the design activity to be undertaken for the ADF;

b. evidence of ongoing surveillance of the OEM by the AS9100-certifying agency that is relevant to the ADF scope of work and of satisfactory quality;

c. a compliance matrix showing how the OEM's procedures meet the intent of relevant TAMM regulations; and

d. a Senior Executive statement declaring that the organisation will comply with their suite of procedures referred by the cross-reference matrix.

Sponsor AEO assessment

4. The sponsor AEO's assessment of the candidate OEM for certification as a commercial AEO is to consist of the following minimum requirements:

a. a desktop assessment of the procedures (with the aid of the cross-reference matrix); and

b. assessment of the organisation's AS9100 certification and ongoing surveillance for adequacy and relevance to the ADF scope of work.

5. On-site initial compliance or ongoing compliance / surveillance audit activities are not mandatory, but may be included at the discretion of the sponsor AEO SDE.

6. Potential sponsor AEOs intending to follow this alternative means of compliance to certify an OEM as an AEO for a new aircraft type acquisition must document this intention within an initial evaluation plan for DGTA endorsement in accordance with Section 3 Chapter 4. Please contact DAVCOMP-DGTA as early as possible for advice.



1C–2

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex D to Sect 3 Chap 1

1D–1

SDE / DSDE ASSESSMENT FORM 1. Completion of this assessment form, or an equivalent, and provision of relevant supporting evidence will assist DAVCOMP-DGTA in providing a timely response to SDE/DSDE requests for Engineering Authority (EA). The assessment form contains three parts which are described in the following paragraphs.

Part 1

2. Part 1 outlines the requirements for SDE and DSDE applicants as promulgated in TAREG 3, Annex A. This part is to be completed by all SDE/DSDE applicants. The applicant is to complete the assessment form ensuring that their comments (claims) clearly demonstrate how they meet each of the criteria. This can be achieved by stating details of relevant qualifications, training, experience and attributes. Each of the applicant’s assessment comments should be supported with evidence such as formal certificates, records of training and curriculum vitae etc. Example statements against selected criteria are provided in Table 1–D–1, Paragraph 1a and b.

Part 2

3. Part 2 outlines the IEAUST requirements for acceptance as a CPEng. This part is only required for SDE/DSDE applicants who are not currently registered with IEAUST at the CPEng level. The requirements in Table 1–D–2 are subject to change without consultation. Therefore, it is important to validate the currency of the information presented in the Table prior to submitting the assessment form. This can be done by visiting http://www.engineersaustralia.org.au/ and viewing the Chartered Status and Professional Development Handbooks and the Continuing Professional Development information.

Part 3

4. Part 3 is to be completed by the applicants and SDE(s). Individuals certifying in Part 3 are attesting that:

a. Applicant. The claims made are a true representation that are or can be supported with evidence.

b. Commercial AEO SDE. The applicant is suitable for acceptance at the SDE or DSDE level. The SDE is providing a recommendation to the Sponsor SDE that is based on an assessment of the applicant’s claims and associated supporting evidence.

c. ADF AEO SDE. The applicant is suitable for acceptance at the SDE or DSDE level and that he:

(1) meets the requirements of TAREG 3, Annex A; or

(2) where the applicant does not meet the requirements of Annex A, an exemption is sought from the TAR and the EA application contains evidence of appropriate mitigation strategies that ensure the ongoing health of the AEOs EMS with the exemption in place.

APPLICATION FOR EA

5. Applications for acceptance at the SDE or DSDE level are forwarded to directly to DAVCOMP-DGTA by the ADF AEO SDE for Service applicants and through the Sponsor AEO for commercial AEO applicants. The ADF AEO SDE is to formally request EA from the TAR via a Minute which identifies the applicant’s details and the scope of EA sought. An assessment form and all relevant supporting evidence are to be attached to the Minute. DAVCOMP-DGTA will manage the application and the TAR acceptance process.



1D–2

PART 1

Table 1–D–1 SDE / DSDE Assessment Form

Regulatory requirements Assessment comments and supporting evidence Compliant (Yes/No)

1. TAREG 3, Annex A. To be eligible for acceptance as an SDE or DSDE a person must possess:

a. Tertiary qualifications and demonstrated professional engineering competencies sufficient to satisfy the requirements for Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng) membership in the Institute of Engineers, Australia (IEAust).

Example text I am a registered CPEng (Cert No XXXX) or I satisfy the requirements for acceptance as a CPEng, refer to comments in Table 1–D–2. Supporting evidence to support this claim i.e. Curriculum Vitae, copy of formal qualifications and work break down history are provided as enclosures.

b. Relevant experience in the management of a design and CI management system within a quality framework.

Example text I have: • held Engineering Authority at DE level for

A400M, A400N and F22; Avionics, Software, Oxygen, Systems Safety, Armaments and Life Support Systems.

• have XX years of relevant experience in the management of design and CI systems, within a quality framework. This experience was acquired as the A400M Avionics Design Engineer, A400N Integrated Logistics Manager and A400M Block Upgrade Engineering Manager.

(evidence of EA and posting history attached)

c. Broad exposure to maintenance of the applicable weapons system or equipment.

d. Demonstrably high level of professional knowledge on the applicable weapons system, equipment or technology, acquired either through relevant prior experience, and/or formal training courses.

e. Confidence to undertake independent design review and approval.

f. Maturity and integrity to identify situations that are beyond his/her competency and capability.



1D–3

PART 2

Table 1–D–2 IEAUST CPEng Requirements

Requirement Assessment comments and supporting evidence Compliant

(Yes/No) 2. To be eligible for acceptance as a Professional Engineer a person must satisfy the following:

a. Completion of an IEAust accredited four year engineering qualification in Australia or equivalent.

b. Minimum of three years acceptable work experience at the level of Professional Engineer.

3. To be eligible for acceptance as a CPEng a person must:

a. possess demonstrated engineering competencies to satisfy the requirements of the IEAust Stage 2 Competency-Based Assessment; and

b. achieve all three core (C) and two of the ten elective (E) competency units. The units are as follows:

IEAUST Competency Units C1 – Engineering Practice C2 – Engineering Planning and Design

C3 – Self Management in the Engineering Workforce

E1A – Engineering Business Management; or

E1B – Engineering Project Management

E2 – Engineering Operations E3 – Materials/Components/Systems E4A – Environmental Management; or E4B – Investigation and Reporting.

E5 – Research, Development and Commercialisation

E6 – Sourcing and Estimating Materials

E7 – Change and Technical Development

E8 – Technical Sales and Promotion



1D–4

PART 2

Table 1–D–2 IEAUST CPEng Requirements (cont)

Continuing Professional Development (CPD)

Assessment comments and supporting evidence Compliant (Yes/No)

Evidence of compliance with CPD requirements: as follows: Within a three year period, 150 hrs of structured CPD comprising: • at least 50 hrs relating to the

practitioner’s area of practice; • at least 10 hrs covering risk

management; • at least 15 hrs covering business

and management skills; and • the remainder must cover a range of

activities relevant to the practitioner’s career and interests.

PART 3

Applicant Statement:

Supporting Evidence

Rank/Name:

Appointment: Signature: Date:

Commercial AEO SDE– Recommendation Statement:

Recommended Not Recommended

Rank/Name:


ADF AEO SDE – Recommendation Statement:

Recommended Not Recommended

Rank/Name:




1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 2

GUIDELINES TO MAINTAINING AN AEO

Applicable Regulation:

TAREG 3 Authorised Engineering Organisations

INTRODUCTION

1. To ensure that an Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) remains compliant with the Regulations, each AEO is required to carry out its duties in accordance with the current approved EMP and referenced procedures. While Section 3 Chapter 1—Introduction and Guidelines to Becoming an AEO provides guidelines on how to establish an AEO, this chapter addresses how organisations are to maintain AEO status.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the ongoing maintenance and improvement of an organisation once it has been granted AEO status.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this chapter is the provision of guidance material that will assist organisations in understanding the regulations. This chapter focuses on both the Safety Design Engineer (SDE) and Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) (where applicable) responsibilities and their role in maintaining AEO status. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, the regulations take precedence.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

4. Senior Design Engineer. Every applicant for an AEO must nominate a Senior Design Engineer (SDE) who is accepted by the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). The SDE is primarily responsible for maintaining certification as an AEO. While an AEO may appoint a number of Deputy SDEs (DSDEs) to undertake SDE functions, it is the SDE that retains the responsibility for the AEOs Engineering Management System (EMS).

5. Design Acceptance Representative. For service AEOs, the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) is delegated authority from the TAR to be responsible for the Design Acceptance function. Design Acceptance is the process whereby a design change (i.e. an output of the design process) involving aircraft or aircraft-related equipment is determined to be technically acceptable for ADF use. This is based on a determination that the specified requirements and design standards are sufficient and applicable (to the ADF authorised configuration, maintenance policy and procedures, and operations) and that the quality of the design has been proven to the satisfaction of the responsible DAR. Generally, design quality is assured through approval of the design by an AEO against the approved design requirements and standards plus an acceptable basis of design verification.

6. In most circumstances, the DAR will be the SDE of the service AEO responsible for the design management of the weapon system for which DAR responsibility is delegated. This ensures a high degree of awareness of the Engineering Management System (EMS) under which the AEOs engineering authorities operate, and supports the ongoing assessment of the competency element of the Design Acceptance process. However, for AEOs supporting multiple weapon systems, the TAR will consider proposals for delegation of DAR responsibility to DSDEs, to alleviate SDE workload and reduce design management complexity associated with multiple weapon systems under a single EMS. Such consideration by the TAR will be based on the fundamental principle that each weapon system that is described by a EMS will not have more than one DAR. Where multiple DARs are delegated authority within an EMS, the SDE retains overall responsibility for maintaining the EMS and providing the engineering system to allow technically acceptable designs to be developed, reviewed and approved.

7. Level and Scope of EA. The TAR awards AEO to an organisation with a specific level and scope of organisational Engineering Authority (EA). Level means the degree of approval that may be given for a design, e.g. Design Approval certification (for Service and commercial AEOs) or Design Acceptance certification (for Service AEOs only). Scope is generally expressed in terms of system scope and design services scope. System scope concerns the equipment covered, and may be limited to particular aircraft components or aircraft-related equipment, or encompasses an entire aircraft type. Design services scope concerns the particular processes, technologies or disciplines that may be applied to the system scope, for instance aircraft stores clearances (a process), composite repairs (a technology), and repair schemes to secondary structure (a discipline).



2

KEY AREAS FOR MAINTAINING AEO STATUS

8. The focus of Section 3 Chapter 1 ‘Becoming an AEO’ is on meeting the Organisation, Personnel, Procedure, and Data requirements of the regulations. While the focus of maintaining AEO status is essentially on maintaining these requirements, they can be further broken down into specific groups or activities, which are described in the following paragraphs.

9. Quality System. The SDE is responsible for ensuring that the organisation continues to hold a valid Quality System certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent, which covers the range of services provided as an AEO.

10. Workforce. The SDE is responsible for assigning internal EA to sufficient staff, particularly Design Engineers (DEs), to enable the AEO to conduct the full scope and level of engineering activity. However, it is understood that in some instances internal EA cannot be assigned due to staff vacancies, or insufficient competencies of individuals. In the event that staff numbers fall below acceptable levels, for ADF AEOs, the TAR is to be advised, while for a commercial AEO, the DAR of the sponsor AEO should be advised. Should there be a risk to maintaining technical airworthiness caused by insufficient staff, the TAR may decide to temporarily restrict or remove organisational EA from the AEO until the situation improves (refer to paragraph 28 for further information). Although the SDE does not normally have control over an organisation’s resources (this being the responsibility of the Senior Executive), it is the SDEs responsibility to monitor engineering staffing levels and competencies, and advising the TAR (for commercial AEOs through the sponsor AEO) when substantial shortfalls exist.

11. Supervision. The SDE is primarily responsible for ensuring that engineering staff adhere to the EMS, which subordinate personnel are adequately supervised, and that adequate oversight is provided of the design outputs. This does not mean that the SDE should personally review all design outputs. To the contrary, the development and review activity should be assigned to competent personnel and DEs throughout the organisation. Ideally, the SDE will only provide Design Approval certification for those designs judged as significant. The SDE is also responsible for bringing to the attention of the TAR (for a service AEO) or the DAR (for a commercial AEO) any issue that affects the AEOs ability to comply with the regulations, or any other matter that has the potential to affect technical airworthiness.

12. Internal EA. The SDE is responsible for keeping track of the internal EA awarded to staff within the AEO. This includes removing EA from staff that resign or are posted, evaluating the competency of new staff for award of EA, and conducting reviews of existing staff for continuation, extension, or reduction of existing EA. The SDE may also decide to review the quality and accuracy of engineering decisions made by his staff as an indicator of their performance and competence. In addition, the SDE is responsible for nominating either DSDEs or DEs to perform SDE duties when the SDE is absent.

13. Internal EMS Evaluation System. The SDE is responsible for conducting a series of internal evaluations or audits of the AEOs EMS. Note that while the program for these evaluations may be managed by the Quality Manager (QM) of the organisation, the activities themselves concern compliance of the EMS against the Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM), and are quite distinct from compliance of the organisation’s Quality Management System (QMS) against ISO 9001 or an equivalent standard. They are to be conducted by qualified internal auditors, ideally the SDEs own technical staff. The results of these internal evaluations should be documented as observations and Corrective Action Requests (CARs), the same as for an external audit by Directorate general Technical Airworthiness–Directorate of Aviation Compliance (DAVCOMP–DGTA) or the sponsor AEO. They should be reported at management review meetings and have corrective and preventative actions undertaken as for internal quality audits. The internal evaluation system is an important tool for the SDE to ascertain how the EMS is performing, as well as being the best indication of how an AEO will fare at the next surveillance audit. The internal evaluation system is also a useful method for encouraging continual improvement to the EMS and associated procedures.

14. Training Program. A program of continuation training or professional development is required in order to satisfy the regulatory requirement to maintain the competence of personnel undertaking engineering activities. The training program should be conducted regularly, and records of attendance for each individual kept in order to tailor the training program, as well as for evidence at internal and external audits. Care should be taken in forming the schedule of training, to ensure that the topics covered are directly relevant to the AEOs activities. As an example, should the AEO experience an influx of new personnel, the training program should be tailored to cover the more basic principles of the EMS and the AEOs procedures, these being the highest priority for training of new staff. Further, there is little point conducting lessons on a specific industry or engineering technology if the staff have a generally poor understanding of the design control system and TIR processes.

15. Design Control System. The SDE is responsible for ensuring that the overall design control system is compliant with the Design Control TAREG 3.4. Further details can be found in Section 3 Chapter 6—How to produce Approved Designs. Importantly, within the design control system the SDE should primarily conduct Design Approval certification for significant designs, whilst providing oversight of other design control processes (such as Design Review) conducted by competent subordinate staff.



3

16. Management of the Design Support Network. The SDE is responsible for the periodic review of the Design Support Network (DSN) as a whole, in order to ensure that it is suitable for the AEOs activities. This may require the addition of new organisations to the DSN or removal of organisations no longer required in the DSN. New DSN members must not only be evaluated, but it must also be determined what services they are able to provide, when they must be sought for advice or services, and how their services are to be treated by the AEO.

17. Compliance Assurance. As a subset to DSN management, should a ADF AEO sponsor any commercial AEOs, these organisations must be subject to a compliance assurance program. Similarly, any commercial AEO that has subcontractors performing engineering services on their behalf must also be subject to an audit program. Sponsor AEO responsibilities and compliance assurance programs are covered in Section 3 Chapter 4—Getting Help–Design Support Networks.

18. Exemptions. TAREG 1.1.4 requires that AEOs who seek to depart from an applicable regulation must submit a formal exemption request to the TAR. The AEOs SDE should document in the exemption request the reasons for non-compliance, and what action is proposed to compensate for the lack of compliance with the applicable regulation. The SDE should demonstrate that while operating with the exemption, the AEO can still adequately constrain any risk to technical airworthiness. Exemptions may also be applied for candidate DEs, DSDEs or SDE who do not meet the minimum criteria stipulated in annexes A and B to TAREG 3, as described in Section 3 Chapter 1. Further guidance on exemptions can be found in AAP 7001.068(AM1)—Design and Technology Services Support Manual.

19. EMP and Procedures. The SDE is responsible for coordinating a periodic review of the Engineering Management Plan (EMP) and procedures to ensure that they continue to describe the activities of the AEO and that they remain compliant with the regulations.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF DESIGN ACCEPTANCE REPRESENTATIVES

20. The individual delegation from the TAR to a DAR is a key component of the technical airworthiness regulatory system. As the Design Acceptance function represents corporate governance, a DAR must be a Commonwealth employee (either ADF or APS). Eligibility requirements are similar to those for an SDE (Annex A to TAREG 3). However, the TAR provides a formal written delegation to DARs. As DARs will normally reside within an AEO; the AEO must have suitable processes and procedures to support the DAR as required by TAREG 3.4.6.

21. Design Acceptance System. The DAR is a representative of the TAR for Design Acceptance functions. Design Acceptance means a determination of the technical acceptability of aircraft and aircraft-related equipment for Service use. As such, the DAR is the “custodian” of the Design Acceptance process for the systems nominated by the TAR, in a similar manner to which the SDE is responsible for the EMS. The majority of Design Acceptance activities should actually be carried out by competent personnel (other than the DAR), under the system defined, monitored and controlled by the SDE. Within TAREG 2, the DAR is the only person authorised by the TAR to issue a Design Acceptance certificate. The issue of a Design Acceptance certificate (for new aircraft types, major changes to a Type Design, or minor changes to a Type Design) does not require the DAR to personally review all design decisions, calculations, and design outputs. Rather, the Design Acceptance certificate is the method by which the DAR certifies that Design Acceptance functions have been conducted within a compliant Design Acceptance system, that addresses the requirements of TAREG 2 depending on the classification (i.e. new aircraft, major change, or minor change).

22. Assumption of Design Acceptance. TAREG 2.5.9 requires that, for commercial AEOs exercising an Assumption of Design Acceptance certification agreement, a monitoring program be established. The DAR is required to review at least 10% of design changes at least once per year, and document the results of the monitoring program. The purpose of the monitoring program is to confirm that the commercial AEO continues to comply with the regulations, and is exercising the Assumption of Design Acceptance certification within the bounds of the agreement between the DAR and the AEO.

23. Applications to the TAR. The DAR is responsible for applying to the TAR for endorsement of Statement of Requirements (SOR) or SOR changes, Type Certification Recommendations, SFP Recommendations, and Service Release Recommendations for new aircraft or major changes to Type Design. The DAR is required to comply with a number of specific requirements and provide certain documentary evidence to the TAR in each instance, and these are fully described in TAREG 2.

24. Classification of Type Design Changes. The DAR is responsible for classifying any changes to Type Design. In general, the DAR may assume a change to Type Design is minor unless the change will introduce a new or substantially varied capability, or will have an appreciable affect on weight, balance, structural strength or operational characteristics. If there is any doubt on the classification of a change to Type Design, the matter is referred to the TAR.

25. Exemptions. TAREG 2 prescribes a number of requirements that must be met in order for a DAR to issue a Design Acceptance certificate. The requirements vary depending on the level of Design Acceptance activity (new



4

aircraft, major change, or minor change). If a specific requirement cannot be met, or sufficient justification for waiving the requirement exists, the DAR is required to submit a formal exemption request to the TAR in accordance with TAREG 1.1.4. The DAR should document in the exemption request any alternative methods or mitigating factors that demonstrate an equivalent level of technical acceptability exists.

26. Issuing Certificates of Airworthiness. The DAR issues Certificates of Airworthiness for individual aircraft, confirming compliance to the Type Design. The DAR is also required to suspend or cancel Certificates of Airworthiness in certain circumstances, refer to TAREG 2.6.3.

27. Notification of Unairworthy Conditions. The DAR is responsible for notifying both the TAR and the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) whenever an aircraft type has a condition or defect which is unairworthy in accordance with the regulations. This includes conditions that although they may not be directly unairworthy, may involve a substantial restriction in operations or operational capability.

WITHDRAWAL OF AEO STATUS

28. The TAR is entitled to suspend or revoke AEO certification, under the provisions of TAREG 3.2.7, if an AEO fails to meet the conditions for continued compliance (TAREG 3.6.1 refers). Sponsor AEOs are required to notify the TAR in writing with any recommendation to suspend or revoke a commercial AEO certification.

29. For commercial AEOs, the Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) that represents AEO certification remains valid only whilst a formal instrument remains in force. Immediately the formal instrument is cancelled or expires (e.g. at completion of a contract), the engineering authority provided by the EAC ceases. Note that multiple formal instruments, which are detailed in the Letter of Engineering Authority, may relate to one EAC. The EAC remains valid whilst there is at least one formal instrument in force.



1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 3

CONDUCT OF COMMERCIAL AEO AUDITS

Applicable TAREGs:

TAREG 3.2.5 Audits

TAREG 3.3.2 Personnel

TAREG 3.6.3 Inspections and Audits

INTRODUCTION

1. All Service AEOs (including Project Offices) employing commercial AEOs as part of their DSN are required to undertake compliance assurance activities for those commercial AEOs that they sponsor. The composition of the compliance assurance program is dependent on a number of factors, such as the scope of engineering activities performed by the commercial AEO, and the confidence the sponsor AEO has in the technical competency of the commercial AEO. For Service AEOs with a heavy reliance on commercial AEOs for provision of engineering services, a program of formal AEO audits against the TAREGs will be a major feature of the AEO compliance assurance program.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance as to how commercial AEO audits are to be conducted.

SCOPE

3. This guidance chapter has been developed primarily for the benefit of Service organisations (as sponsor AEOs) to facilitate thorough, fair and consistent audits of commercial AEOs and AEO applicants. DGTA-ADF staff are required to comply with somewhat more stringent requirements, which are nevertheless based upon the same principles.

AUDITOR COMPETENCIES

4. TAREGs 3.3.2 and 3.6.3 require that auditors and lead auditors conducting audits of commercial AEOs meet certain competency criteria, specified in annex G to TAREG 3. Selection, evaluation and authorisation of auditors is the responsibility of the SDE. As the conduct of commercial AEO audits supports management of the AEO’s DSN, this responsibility cannot be further delegated (eg. to DSDEs or DEs).

5. Guidance on the appropriate education, work experience, auditor training and experience required to meet the minimum requirements at TAREG 3 annex G is provided in the following paragraphs.

Auditor

6. Qualifications. Unlike SDE and DE criteria, there are no formal qualification requirements for an auditor or lead auditor.

7. Training. The preferred level of formal training for an auditor is satisfactory completion of an external (lead) auditors course conducted by a JAS-ANZ recognised organisation (note that this course is mandatory for a lead auditor). In the event that it is not possible for auditors to have completed this course, an acceptable alternative is informal auditor training. The degree and nature of informal training is determined by the SDE, and should be appropriate to the audit requirements of the Sponsor AEO. Similarly, all auditors should possess an appropriate level of knowledge of applicable Section 2 TAREGs for the auditing task; again this is to be determined by the SDE.

8. Experience. In the absence of any aviation related qualification or experience, additional continuation training (CT) and on the job training (OJT) will be required to gain sufficient familiarity with aviation sector concepts, terminology and organisations. The degree and nature of OJT and CT is determined by the SDE, and should be appropriate to the audit requirements of the Sponsor AEO. For example, an audit of a commercial AEO producing EW self protection equipment for multiple aircraft types requires different knowledge than that of an organisation providing in-service support to an entire aircraft Type.

9. The applicant should participate as an auditor-under-training until evaluated as competent to perform audits without supervision. One complete audit of a commercial AEO should satisfy the five days experience requirement,



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which includes desktop audit preparation, as well as the on-site audit. For smaller or less complex AEO audits, additional audits are to be completed to ensure exposure to all TAREGs, and to meet the five days experience requirement. A guide on how to evaluate the competence of auditors is at Table 3–1. DGTA-ADF staff may provide additional guidance and assistance as required.

Lead Auditor

10. Training. Lead auditors are to have successfully completed an external (lead) auditor course conducted by a JAS-ANZ recognised organisation.

11. Experience. A high level of knowledge of ADF aviation operations and airworthiness TAREGs will be gained from OJT, CT, and several AEO audits. One complete audit of an AEO as Lead Auditor-under-training should normally satisfy the five days experience requirement, which includes audit planning, and conduct of the on-site audit.

Audit Records

12. All AEO auditors should maintain a record of audits conducted. This record may be in the format of a Record of Training and Employment (RTE), an IEAust CPD form, or another format as appropriate. As a minimum, the following information should be recorded:

a. Audit date;

b. Organisation and description (including approximate size and function);

c. Type of audit (initial or surveillance);

d. Name of the Lead Auditor; and

e. Role undertaken (under-training, auditor or lead auditor).

Specialist Auditors

13. Many audits of commercial AEOs and commercial AEO applicants will require the assistance of ‘technical experts’ from other areas of the sponsor organisation (e.g. ASI or MRD personnel). Whilst it is desirable, specialist auditors are not required to meet all the competency requirements of Annex G to TAREG 3, and are under the control of the Lead Auditor for the purposes of audit. Similarly trained auditors from other areas of Defence, and occasionally commercial organisations, may also be used as members of the audit team as needed. In the event that auditors from ‘third party’ commercial organisations participate in an audit of another commercial AEO or AEO applicant, it is strongly suggested that the auditee is consulted and agrees with their participation prior to the audit commencing.

Table 3–1 Evaluation of Auditor Competence

Evaluation Method Objective Example

Records review To verify the background of the auditor Analysis of records of education, training, employment history, audit experience

Interview auditee To evaluate personnel attributes, communication skills, verify information,

acquire additional information

Face to face interviews

Observation To evaluate personnel attributes and the application of skills and knowledge

Role playing, witnessed audits, on job performance

Post audit review To provide information where direct observation may not be possible or

appropriate

Review of report and discussion with colleagues, clients, auditees and the

auditor

Audit feedback To provide information about how the performance of the auditor is perceived

Surveys, questionnaires, follow up calls, complaints



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Continuation Training and Professional Development

14. To increase familiarity with the regulatory system, and to continually improve the quality of compliance assurance activities, all AEO auditing staff should participate in a regular Continuation Training (CT) program. The CT program should address all aspects of the TAREGs as well as:

a. feedback on audit findings;

b. feedback on problems or deficiencies with the application or understanding of specific TAREGs;

c. guidance by the SDE or DGTA-ADF staff on how to audit specific TAREGs (including analysis of Section 3 chapters); and

d. continuous feedback on the conduct of the compliance assurance program, and the suitability of instructions, tools and techniques.

15. All authorised AEO auditors are encouraged to continually develop auditor competencies. To maintain formal Auditor or Lead Auditor Authorisation, all auditors are to undertake the following over a twelve month period:

a. Participation in Continuing Professional Development programs;

b. Participation in the CT program; and

c. Undertake sufficient AEO audits, equivalent to at least 10 days experience, annually. (For Lead Auditors, an audit must be completed as the lead auditor).

16. Failure to comply with the above requirements, unless specifically exempted in writing by the SDE, should cause any AEO Auditor or Lead Auditor authorisation to lapse after a 12 month period.

AUDIT PREPARATION

Types of Audits

17. There are two main types of audit as follows:

a. Initial AEO audit. An initial AEO audit is conducted as part of the initial evaluation of an organisation, prior to the assignment of Engineering authority (EA) by the TAR. The purpose of an initial AEO audit is to gain assurance that the organisation has the necessary expertise, data and management procedures to meet the TAR’s regulatory requirements.

b. Surveillance AEO audit. A surveillance AEO audit is conducted after the assignment of EA as part of the compliance assurance program established to ensure the continued compliance of the AEO with the TAREGs in Section 2 of this publication.

Phases of Audit

18. For both types of audit, there are four phases of the audit process, as follows:

a. Preparation and Planning. This phase consists of establishing the audit purpose, scope, and timing, selecting and briefing the audit team and lead auditor, and developing the audit plan. Sponsor AEOs must note that the TAR has mandated DAVCOMP–DGTA staff involvement with the evaluations and audits of some commercial organisations. These are listed in Section 3 Chapter 4.

b. Desktop review. This phase is the formal evaluation of the organisations EMP or AEO Submission (AEOS), together with all referenced procedures, in order to confirm compliance with the TAREGs. It is generally conducted off-site wherever possible.

c. On-site audit. This phase is the formal on-site, physical evaluation of the organisation, in order to confirm compliance with the EMP/AEOS and procedures, as well as to clarify any findings in relation to regulatory compliance noted during the desktop review. This is achieved primarily through interview of the SDE and key engineering personnel, as well as examination of records.

d. Report and follow-up. This phase consists of compiling and releasing the audit report, as well as liaising with the organisation for the closure of any Corrective Action Requests (CARs) raised as a result of the audit.

19. There are considerable resources available concerning each of the four phases described above, both from the DGTA-ADF intranet website (http://sorweb.sor.defence.gov.au/dgta/) as well as websites of the Service AEOs. While the intent of this chapter is not to reproduce this procedural material, several key aspects are highlighted to assist sponsor AEOs in providing a competent and thorough auditing capability.



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Setting the Audit Scope

20. TAREG 3.3.3.d(2) requires that commercial AEOs and their subcontractors are audited against the requirements of the formal instrument at intervals of not more than two years. When setting the audit scope, first refer to the formal instrument (contract, standing offer etc). This will help to determine which TAREGs are required to be audited against. This first step is often the key to a successful audit, as a common fault is for sponsor AEOs to attempt to audit against the entire range of TAREGs, many of which may not be applicable. For example, a commercial AEO that only provides certified designs (but no CI management functions) does not need to be audited against TAREG 3.5.

21. The applicable TAREGs shown in the EMP (or AEOS) compliance matrix may be checked to ensure consistency against the scope of activities covered in the formal instrument. This is a good starting point to establish clearly the applicable TAREGs for the audit activity.

22. Initial AEO audit. For an initial AEO audit, the organisation must show compliance against all applicable TAREGs. The audit scope is therefore the TAREGs that cover the full range of activities as per the formal instrument, as well as all areas of the organisation. For an initial AEO audit there has often been very little design activity conducted under the terms of the formal instrument. Hence, the emphasis of an initial AEO evaluation is to ensure that the organisation’s structure, personnel, capabilities and management systems demonstrate the potential to meet the TAR’s requirements.

23. Surveillance AEO audit. For a surveillance AEO audit, the audit scope may be less than all applicable TAREGs and/or all areas of the organisation. This will depend on the number of audits scheduled as part of the commercial AEO’s compliance assurance program, as well as other indicators of the commercial AEO’s performance. Providing the biennial requirement of TAREG 3.3.3.d(2) has been met, it is preferable to schedule more frequent, limited scope audits than a single, full scope audit every two years, as it provides greater exposure of the commercial AEO to the sponsor AEO. This should be balanced against the commercial AEO’s compliance responsibilities to other organisations and standards, such as ISO9001 certification and other contracts, to avoid continual interruptions to the commercial AEO caused by frequent audit activity. The audit frequency should be determined by the SDE and documented in the AEO’s compliance assurance plan. Further, it should be agreed to by the commercial AEO and may also form part of the formal instrument.

Selecting the Audit Team

24. The Lead Auditor and all Auditors (with the exception of auditors-under-training) should be competent as per Table 3-1. The audit team size should be determined based on the size and structure of the organisation being audited and the number of TAREGs to be covered. For example, with reference to the fictitious BBSPO organisation described in Section 3 Chapter 4 annex A:

a. AustPac Aviation Services. An audit (initial or surveillance) of AustPac Aviation Services would not necessarily require a large audit team. This is because the AEO certification for AustPac covers only the CariBus aircraft type, and is associated with engineering activity resulting from Deeper Maintenance (DM) work (generally repairs to structure with no CI management responsibilities). Hence, the scope of work and scope of TAREGs is relatively narrow.

b. Upgrades R Us. Conversely, the audit of Upgrades R Us involves both the Dodo and F-XX AUS aircraft. BBSPO as sponsoring AEO should therefore ensure that XXSPO is represented on the audit team. Upgrades R Us are an established AEO with a proven track record, and the audit team size would depend on the scope of TAREGs to be covered. Depending on the audit scope, a team may be required to audit each aircraft type. A third team may be required to cover the supporting aspects likely to be common to both aircraft within the Upgrades R Us organisation, such as data and records, and EMS internal evaluation.

25. Essentially, the audit team size should be whatever the Lead Auditor and SDE feel is appropriate. This is dependent on the level of perceived risk with the organisation, which is the likelihood and consequence of a poor design or CI management activity being released by the AEO. In practice, risk is easier assessed as a function of:

a. an AEO’s most recent performance (performance measures/indicators and audit reports/corrective actions);

b. the accuracy (ie currency) of that performance assessment; and

c. the overall scope and ‘significance’ of the engineering activities being performed.



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DESKTOP REVIEW

26. The desktop review is one of the most important aspects of an AEO audit. It is also most often the area that produces the most frustration, on both the part of the sponsor, and on the AEO or AEO applicant.

Purpose of the Desktop Review

27. The purpose of the desktop review is to evaluate the organisations EMP and key referenced procedures against the key TAMM requirements. This review serves two main purposes. Firstly, it provides the audit team members with an oversight of how the AEO or AEO applicant is structured, and how the organisation intends to conduct activities under the formal agreement. Secondly, it provides an early indication of whether the EMP and key referenced procedures will meet the intent of TAMM requirements. The desktop review will often provide a very good indication of those aspects of the management systems that will require specific attention during the on-site audit.

28. The purpose of the desktop review is not to exhaustively compare an AEO’s or AEO applicant’s EMP and key referenced procedures against every detailed element (and sub-element) of the TAREGs. Sponsor AEO staff are sometimes tempted to follow this approach during the desktop review, and this is especially common if the reviewers are not experienced with the TAREGs. The problem with this approach is that (particularly for initial AEO evaluations) it can lead to frequent rejection of AEO or AEO applicant documentation, causing multiple rewrites. This can consume substantial resources at both AEOs (sponsor and commercial AEO), leading to frustration and friction between the two. Just as importantly, this approach will often cause the commercial AEO to provide documentation to satisfy the reviewers, rather than meet organisational and design requirements, effectively documenting a ‘false EMS’.

Terminology and Equivalency

29. Service AEOs are established primarily to provide engineering services compliant with the TAREGs at Section 2. It is therefore common for processes to directly quote the TAREGs, and for terminology to be the same as that used within TAREGs. In contrast, many commercial AEOs are certified after assessment that their existing management systems and processes are compliant with the TAREGs, or that they meet the intent of the TAREGs. Most commercial AEOs or AEO applicants have existing processes and management systems developed over time, often to support multiple customers. Sometimes the core management procedures are dictated by corporate or ‘Head Office’ policy. Commercial organisation terminology rarely aligns completely with TAMM terminology, and it is up to the sponsor to conduct the ‘translation’.

30. Furthermore, commercial organisations frequently adopt substantially different management practices than is commonly seen within Service AEOs. This is due in part to completely different imperatives – commercial organisations generally exist for the purposes of making a profit. In some instances the management practices have been adopted and adapted over time to meet the primary function of the organisation – complex cross-matrix organisations, utilising a tailored Systems Engineering methodology, is common for large commercial organisations developing complex weapons systems. The TAR does not mandate any particular organisational structure or management practice, as long as the systems meet the core regulatory requirements.

31. Consider, for example, the fictitious example AustPac Aviation Services. Section 3 Chapter 4 annex A states that AustPac performs repairs and modifications to a range of aircraft types throughout Australasia, including several ADF types. This suggests, therefore, that AustPac deals with many civil aircraft types. In order to perform repairs and modifications to Australian registered aircraft, AustPac would require certification as a CASA CAR 30 or CASR Part 145/146 organisation. It is likely that AustPac would use a number of key procedures and processes on all repair and modification activity, whether civil or military. An initial assessment of AustPac would therefore need to consider whether aspects of its existing systems and procedures are compliant with the TAREGs, despite not using the same terminology as the Section 2 TAREGs.

32. In summary, it is important to be open minded when auditing commercial AEOs. Care should be taken to avoid mandating that a particular procedure or system be established, using particular terminology, in order to comply with a Section 2 TAREG, when an existing procedure or system may be compliant (or at least meet the intent of the TAREG). This not only avoids commercial AEO frustration with the ‘unique requirements of the ADF regulatory system’, but ultimately avoids the additional cost for the contractor to develop a unique procedure or system that is already satisfied in another form.

How Much ‘Desktop’ is Enough?

33. As a guide, a desktop review should be completed once the commercial AEO or AEO applicant has provided sufficient evidence that the EMP and key referenced procedures address the core TAMM requirements. Minor deficiencies that may be apparent during the desktop review should be noted for investigation during the on-site audit, as often these are found to be a misinterpretation of the management systems described, rather than an actual deficiency. If during a desktop review it appears that an important element is missing, the Lead Auditor should seek



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clarification from the commercial AEO SDE in the first instance, as often required processes are in fact addressed in documentation which has not been provided as part of the AEO submission.

DURING THE AUDIT

Conduct of the Audit

34. The on-site audit should be conducted in a thorough and fair manner. The purpose of an AEO audit is not to raise Corrective Action Requests (CARs), but to ensure the AEO or AEO applicant complies with the intent of the required TAREGs. Care should be taken to minimise, as much as possible, disruption to the auditee’s workplace during the on-site audit. Audit Team members should take a pragmatic approach when assessing compliance of an AEO’s or AEO applicant’s management system with the TAMM regulatory requirements.

Access

35. A commercial AEO understandably wishes to protect the value of its engineering investment. Intellectual Property (IP) rights are a common feature of commercial AEO auditing. While an audit team is required to be mindful and considerate of the organisation’s IP rights, the team is entitled access (both physical and legal) to all data, records, and documentation required during the audit. Such access is generally upheld by:

a. contract clauses either requiring access to existing data, or requiring that any data produced under the contract is the property of the Commonwealth; or

b. TAREGs 3.2.5.a and 3.6.3 requiring the TAR or his representatives be allowed access to offices, facilities, documents, and records as the TAR considers necessary and in the interests of aviation safety.

36. Conversely, recognition of the organisation’s IP rights requires the auditing team to only access data, records and documentation necessary for the audit, and also seek the organisation’s permission before duplicating (photocopying) any of the data, records or documentation.

Raising of CARs

37. The Lead Auditor should decide which non-conformances identified by audit team members are to be raised as CARs. Care should be taken to locate the root cause of any non-conformance found, rather than just identifying the symptom. Any CARs raised should reflect a specific requirement to rectify a management system deficiency, and hence must be raised against a clearly identified requirement. This may be a TAREG, or it may be against the organisation’s own documentation.

38. The correct and accurate wording of CARs is a skill, as well as an activity that should be allocated sufficient time during the audit. The aim is to economise word use while providing sufficient information clearly and accurately. Further, it is often good practice to quote or paraphrase sections of the TAREGs within the CAR wording. In the event that the CAR wording becomes too long, consider moving some of the content to the audit report. Examples of acceptable CAR wording are as follows:

a. Assumption of Design Acceptance is not being exercised under the terms of a formal agreement as required by TAREG 2.5.9.

b. The ‘organisation’ EMP contains a number of non-conformances against TAREG 3.2.8. Refer audit report for further details.

c. The ‘organisation’ does not have a documented Design Support Network for the (type) aircraft, as required by TAREG 3.3.3.

d. The ‘organisation’ does not have a recoverable electronic copy of (system) data stored at another secure site as required by TAREG 3.3.8.

e. The ‘organisation’ is not complying with the EMS Internal Evaluation Process, refer to procedure QM 004. The internal quality audit program has 47 audits overdue, 22 of which are EMS related.

f. The ‘organisation’ does not have a procedure for Aerial Delivery Clearances as required by TAREG 3.5.10.



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AFTER THE AUDIT

Responsibilities of the Sponsor AEO

39. The sponsor AEO is responsible for compiling and releasing the audit report, within a reasonable period following completion of the audit (10 working days as a guide). In accordance with TAREG 3.6.3, the sponsor AEO should also forward a copy of the audit report to the respective desk officer within DAVCOMP-DGTA. Further, the sponsor AEO is also responsible for ensuring that the commercial AEO or AEO applicant undertakes action to close any CARs raised. This may require the sponsor AEO to provide advice and assistance to the commercial organisation, in order to clarify requirements or provide TAREG interpretations. Sponsor AEO staff should ensure that corrective action required of commercial AEOs is limited to the intent of the CARs raised, and that additional ‘nice to haves’ are not placed upon the organisation after the audit.

TAR Recommendation for AEO Certification

40. The sponsor AEO SDE should recommend the commercial organisation to the TAR for certification as an AEO in the event that either:

a. compliance has been demonstrated against all applicable TAREGs; or

b. the degree of non-compliance is sufficiently minor that the quality of design and/or CI management functions being performed is not affected.

41. In the event that non-compliances are assessed to potentially affect the quality of functions being performed, the Lead Auditor should consult the SDE, and the AEO recommendation should be either:

a. deferred until the organisation is re-audited (or CAR closure activities are completed); or

b. recommended for a reduced scope of engineering activities to that intended, in order to allow the organisation to commence some engineering activities while containing the level of risk, until such time as non-compliances are addressed.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM

42. Sponsor AEOs are required by TAREG 3.2.3 to develop, promulgate and implement a compliance assurance program for commercial AEO members of the DSN. Following a successful initial AEO evaluation, DGTA will not normally provide formal EA until such time as the sponsor has documented the compliance assurance program. Guidance on how to develop and document a compliance assurance program is provided in Section 3 Chapter 4.

43. For commercial AEOs that have been awarded EA by the TAR for a new or substantially expanded scope of activities, DGTA strongly suggests that the first surveillance AEO audit be conducted approximately six months following award of EA. This is to ensure that the commercial AEO is actually applying the EMS as documented.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 4

GETTING HELP - DESIGN SUPPORT NETWORKS


TAREG 2.2.3 Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for new aircraft or major changes

TAREG 2.5.6 Design Acceptance for minor changes to Type Design

TAREG 3.2.3 Sponsor AEO requirements

TAREG 3.3.3 Design Support Networks

INTRODUCTION

1. No organisation is able to conduct all design activities itself. Even the largest and most competent design agencies will rely upon a network of external organisations to provide data, advice or additional resources. This network is called a Design Support Network (DSN).

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance that will assist organisations seeking EA to establish and maintain their DSNs. It also is intended to assist organisations already having EA to better manage their DSNs.

SCOPE

3. This chapter covers all DSNs required by all organisations seeking (or exercising) EA with respect to State Aircraft or related equipment. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

WHY HAVE A DSN?

4. Apart from regulatory requirements there are many practical reasons why an organisation would have a DSN. For example, a Service organisation may have limited knowledge of structural repairs and so might outsource the development of structural designs to a contractor who would become part of the DSN.

5. Other reasons for having a DSN are more subtle. For example, a structural repair contractor may already be an AEO with many people, all of whom are extremely qualified and experienced. The contractor may even hold all the data for the aircraft in question. However, the contractor needs to remain informed with respect to the ADF’s configuration and usage, and may well require specialist advice and design services (eg NDT techniques) from time to time. Hence the contractor will have its own DSN, which would include (as a minimum) the contracting Service organisation, and may also include a number of subcontractors. Thus DSNs don’t just provide designs; rather they provide a range of engineering services that support the design process.

6. Below are some of the more common uses of a DSN member:

a. provision of design services,

b. managing items of other weapon systems,

c. provision of technology advice,

d. provision of Technical Information, and

e. provision of standards and advice.

WHO SHOULD BE IN A DSN?

Original Equipment Manufacturers

7. The TAR recognises that Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have a unique understanding of the equipment they have designed, constructed and provided to the ADF. All AEOs are therefore expected to include major item OEMs within their DSN. In particular, major airframe, engine and avionics OEMs who will often provide technical advice, both solicited and unsolicited, in support of ADF weapons systems.



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8. The TAR recognises that, in some instances, the OEM for an item will not be best placed to provide design services. Examples are as follows:

a. the nominal OEM for a weapon systems is a company that took over a company that took over the actual OEM and the expertise of the original OEM may have been lost during a corporate restructure, and

b. systems that have undergone large scale change as a result of a mid-life update may now have so little in common with the original configuration that the modification prime contractor is better placed to act as the OEM.

9. In circumstances where the nominal OEM is unable to provide effective and credible design services, the TAR may allow their exclusion from an AEO’s DSN. The TAR will expect to see the rationale for this exclusion.

Organisations Providing Item Management or Design Services

10. Item Management. Most AEOs (particularly those responsible for the management of whole weapons systems) will have arrangements with other organisations (both commercial and Service) to manage items on their behalf. An AEO may sometimes manage an item or items on behalf of multiple Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs). These relationships need to be managed through a documented agreement i.e. a contract or standing offer for commercial AEOs or a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for ADF AEOs.

11. Despite any allocation of item management responsibility, the person ultimately charged with ensuring the technical acceptability of an item is the DAR of the parent weapon system. Thus the DAR for a Maritime Patrol aircraft is responsible for Design Acceptance of changes to the aircraft engine, even if it is managed by another AEO whose aircraft uses a variant of that same engine. In this case, the organisation responsible for item management of the engine would have the Maritime Patrol DAR in its DSN, whilst the Maritime Patrol DAR would have the engine item manager in his DSN.

12. Design. Section 3, Chapter 6 describes the provisions of TAREG 2.5.6, allowing Design Acceptance certification for a design change assessed as Minor, and produced by a non-AEO. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that the competence of the design agency is known and assessed as adequate for the activity being performed. The DSN regulation complements and enhances TAREG 2.5.6, by requiring clearly defined relationships between all organisations that provide design services, to ensure that the roles and responsibilities of all organisations are understood and documented.

13. Technical Information. Any organisation managing an item, particularly a whole aircraft, will receive Technical Information (TI) for that item from the OEM and possibly other operators or Airworthiness Authorities. Where these sources of information are known and the quality of the information is assessed as adequate and likely to be used in support of design, then the organisation would usually include these sources of TI in their DSN.

Centres of Expertise

14. The TAR is responsible for prescribing, revising and interpreting airworthiness standards. The TAR may personally delegate this authority to selected individuals known as Airworthiness Standards Representatives (ASRs). ASRs possess considerable expertise in specialist areas. The organisations to which the ASR belongs to (as the SDE or DSDE) are called Centres of Expertise (COE) and they are listed at Annex A to TAREG 1. COEs of specific relevance to the AEO (e.g. AMTDU for transport weapon systems, ASCENG SQN for any weapon system requiring stores clearance) are to be included within the DSN.

15. Given the nature of the TAR’s relationship with AEOs, the TAR does not require that he or his staff be referenced in an AEO’s DSN. AEOs may include the TAR’s staff in their DSN if that would assist in the performance of engineering activities within their organisation.

Organisations Providing Information or Advice

16. The identification of ‘other organisations providing information and advice’ can be difficult to scope. Similarly, the requirement to list DSTO and other research organisations can be difficult to implement as often an AEO won’t know it requires this support until the actual situation arises. As a guide, AEOs should include those organisations that it knows in advance will provide credible advice on a regular basis.

Dealing With the Unforeseen

17. In addition to having a well-documented DSN, all organisations require a TIR process to review information provided from both within and outside the DSN. Also, AEOs must have procedures for adding new DSN members as circumstances change.



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ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING THE DSN

What are the Minimum Regulatory Requirements of a DSN Member?

18. There are no regulatory requirements limiting who can be a member of a DSN. Rather, each AEO must determine what services it expects to receive from each of its DSN members and assess their competence to provide those services.

Documenting the DSN

19. The DSN is to be documented in, or referenced by, the EMP. DSN examples can be found at Annex A to this chapter. The DSN must:

a. detail the services to be provided by each DSN member;

b. define when these services are to be sought, including any requirements for mandatory consultation (eg. consultation with OEMs and/or relevant ASRs for significant design changes);

c. clearly define how the products and services provided by DSN members are to be treated including any caveats and limitations to be applied (e.g. the processing of approved designs);

d. describe the compliance assurance activities to be applied to commercial AEOs and their subcontractors (including audit responsibilities and schedule – see Paragraphs 23 to 44;

e. provide a methodology for evaluating potential new DSN members; and

f. provide for ongoing reviews of the DSN as a whole, for appropriateness (see Paragraph 20.

Maintaining the DSN

20. TAREG 3.3.3 requires that an established DSN be reviewed periodically for appropriateness and effectiveness. This review concerns the assessment of whether the DSN as a whole, is suitable in supporting the AEO. The review may determine that certain organisations should be removed from the DSN, as well as identifying where the AEO has a requirement for services that the DSN does not cater for. These organisations would be evaluated for their ability to provide the required services as well as to satisfy the regulations. Successful organisations would be added to the DSN, with the required caveats on: what services are to be provided, when these services will be sought, and how they will be treated.

21. Commercial AEOs and their subcontractors will need to be subject to some form of compliance assurance. For further information refer to Paragraph 35, Section 1, Chapter 6 and Section 3, Chapter 3.

What about New EAC Applicants?

22. Organisations seeking AEO certification (either commercial or Service) may not have established and documented agreements with all the organisations required for its DSN. AEO applicants must be able to demonstrate that the relevant organisations have been identified and an evaluation of each has been made to determine their suitability to provide competent design services (to the level required). In most instances some form of agreement will eventually be required (i.e. by the time of the first surveillance audit) for each organisation to clearly define the relationship between the applicant and DSN organisations. In the absence of agreements the plan and schedule for raising agreements should be detailed within the EMP.

SPONSORSHIP OF A COMMERCIAL AEO

23. All commercial AEOs require a sponsor AEO. A sponsor AEO is always a ADF AEO (or Project Office – see Section 3, Chapter 12) and will normally be the organisation with which a commercial AEO has a contract. This section provides guidance on how a sponsor AEO obtains certification for a commercial organisation as an AEO.

24. Any AEO proposing to sponsor a commercial organisation should be aware that the TAR will only assign EA to organisations actually engaged in design and design related activity. For example, any proposal whereby an organisation intends to hold the contract with the Commonwealth, and subcontract all engineering and design tasks to another organisation will generally not be considered eligible for AEO status by the TAR. Sponsor AEOs are strongly advised to contact DAVCOMP-DGTA staff prior to entering into contractual arrangements if there is any doubt on the organisational arrangements proposed.

25. It is assumed that readers of this chapter have already established that the contractor providing design services is required to become an AEO. Section 1, Chapter 5 outlines tailoring of the regulations for non-aircraft applications. Therefore, for certain applications (e.g. flight simulators), there may be no requirement for design organisations to be certified as an AEO. For further assistance, please contact DAVCOMP-DGTA staff.



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The Formal Instrument

26. As described in Section 1, Chapter 2, a commercial AEO is bound to the requirements of a formal instrument with the sponsor AEO. TAREG 3.2.3.b requires that this formal instrument is ‘developed and administered to satisfy the requirements of these regulations’. As a minimum, this means that the formal instrument must define the manner in which engineering and design activities are to be conducted. This may be through reference to literal compliance with the regulations themselves (i.e. ‘the contractor must have a Design Support Network…’) or through reference to existing systems that may be shown to meet the intent of the regulations.

27. The aim is not to force the contractor into ‘blind’ compliance with the ‘letter’ of the regulations when their existing systems can be shown to meet the intent of the regulations. Put another way, the aim is to minimise the resources required by both the Commonwealth as well as the contractor in supporting an initial evaluation for AEO certification. To this end, sponsor AEOs are encouraged to contact DAVCOMP-DGTA staff in the initial stages of contract activity should there be any doubt as to the method by which the contractor will be evaluated for AEO certification.

Already an AEO

28. Where the commercial organisation is already AEO certified against another contract, refer to Paragraph 37 for guidance.

Initial Evaluation Plan

29. Once a formal instrument is in place, the next step towards commercial AEO certification is to determine the plan for initial evaluation. Section 1, Chapter 6 describes the TAR’s principles for compliance assurance, and may assist in providing the context in which a plan for initial evaluation may be formed. To provide TAR oversight, the plan is to be submitted to DAVCOMP-DGTA staff for review and endorsement. DAVCOMP-DGTA staff do not necessarily need to be involved in the conduct of the initial evaluation plan; except for highly complex or high-risk AEO audits (refer to Paragraph 44). In all instances DAVCOMP-DGTA staff can provide advice on the evaluation process.

30. The initial evaluation plan is to outline:

a. the resources required to perform the evaluation (including sponsoring AEO, consultant and DGTA-ADF personnel);

b. the proposed roles and responsibilities of involved agencies;

c. a schedule detailing the timings of:

(1) initial documentation reviews;

(2) formal desktop review of EMP and referenced procedures;

(3) initial AEO compliance audit;

(4) the contracted date for achievement of AEO status;

NOTE

• The schedule should allow at least two working weeks from the time a recommendation for award of organisation EA is provided to the TAR, to the provision of a signed EAC.

d. where AEO applicants may be required to operate in more than one geographic location, the proposed method of evaluating each site;

e. the evaluation of key sub-contractors; and

f. areas targeted for specific audit attention (for example processes identified with potential for a high degree of risk during contract negotiations).



5

Initial and Formal Desktop Documentation Reviews

31. In the first instance it is often preferable for sponsor AEOs to request an initial review of AEO applicant documentation, prior to a formal desktop review. The initial review is often useful in determining at an early stage whether an AEO applicant’s proposed organisational structure, staffing and management procedures have the potential to achieve full compliance with the regulations. Following the rectification of any deficiencies found during the initial review, the AEO applicant will normally provide the first complete draft of the EMP and other key plans and procedures. A formal desktop review is then conducted to determine compliance with the regulations, in preparation for the on site initial AEO audit.

Initial AEO Compliance Audit

32. For conduct of the initial AEO compliance audit, refer to Section 3, Chapter 3.

33. Upon successful completion of the initial AEO audit and documenting audit outcomes, it is the responsibility of the sponsoring AEO to ensure all deficiencies found during the audit are successfully resolved prior to assignment of EA. The TAR may provide exemptions for some specific non-conformances (usually for a limited period); however these must be processed through DAVCOMP-DGTA.

Transition of Engineering Authority (EA)

34. The requirement for an AEO applicant to achieve AEO status is often mandated at a fixed period following contract signature. In the period between contract signature and formal award of AEO status, it is understood that engineering functions may be in transition from the sponsoring AEO to the AEO applicant, which has not yet achieved AEO status. If deemed necessary, the TAR will allow DARs/SDEs to progressively assign organisational EA to AEO applicants prior to the formal award of AEO status. To obtain TAR approval and provide visibility of how the transition of EA is to be achieved, sponsoring AEOs are to provide a plan to DAVCOMP-DGTA that outlines:

a. proposed phasings of organisational EA transition;

b. the minimum requirements (personnel, plans and procedures, data) for the AEO applicant to be assigned interim organisational EA;

c. the evaluation(s) of the AEO applicant to be undertaken by the DAR/SDE both prior to assignment of interim organisational EA and subsequently to increase the level and scope of EA (phasings); and

d. planned revisions to the sponsoring AEOs plans and procedures as EA is passed to the AEO applicant.

Compliance Assurance Program

35. TAREG 3.2.3.c requires sponsor AEOs to develop and promulgate a structured compliance assurance program for a commercial AEO. The compliance assurance program should detail (refer Section, 1 Chapter 6):

a. for commercial AEOs interfacing with two or more ADF AEOs under a single contract or like contracts, the sponsoring AEO;

b. regular system level reviews;

c. regular Quality Assurance/Product reviews;

d. performance measurement activities proposed;

e. scheduled surveillance audit program, including involvement by all interested ADF AEOs (note that a first surveillance audit within six months of award of AEO status is recommended);

f. audit requirements for key sub-contractors, including the involvement of the prime commercial AEO personnel and TAR representatives (sponsor AEO staff); and

g. the method by which non-conformances will be reported to the TAR and oversight of rectification managed by the sponsoring AEO.

36. Compliance assurance programs do not need to be documented in great detail. The intent is to briefly describe how the quality of outputs from the commercial AEO will be verified on an ongoing basis by the sponsor AEO. It is more important that the compliance assurance program, once documented, is adhered to by the sponsor AEO. Examples of how to document compliance assurance programs are provided at Annex B.



6

Multiple EACs, Contracts, or Customers

37. In some instances a commercial AEO may be providing design services to more than one ADF AEO, under one or more EACs or contracts. The following paragraphs explain the TAR’s requirements for the management of these AEOs. Examples of arrangements where this concept may be initiated include:

a. a commercial organisation providing structural design services for all SPOs under contractual arrangements sponsored by ASI-DGTA;

b. a commercial organisation providing avionics integration services for ADF helicopters, under several individual contracts; and

c. a commercial organisation providing technology specialist services (e.g. hydraulic component design services and repairs) to a number of SPOs, under one or more contracts.

38. Initial Evaluation. The first step in evaluating a commercial organisation that is already an AEO is the relevance of that prior certification, in terms of the following:

a. Level and Scope. How applicable is the level and scope of the existing AEO certification to that under initial evaluation? For example, AEO certification for design and development of a radar warning receiver is not necessarily relevant to an AEO application for the complete in-service support of a weapon system.

b. Same organisation. Despite being the same organisation name, how similar are the existing and proposed AEO certifications in terms of Organisation, Personnel, Procedures and Data? For example, the proposed AEO may be in a different location, may be employing different staff, or working to a different set of procedures to the existing AEO.

39. Existing AEO certification is relevant. Ultimately, the level of initial evaluation and compliance assurance activities to be conducted is to be determined by the DAR/SDE, based on their appreciation of the nature of the work to be performed by the commercial AEO, and its competency. To assist with this determination, it may be beneficial to make contact with the existing sponsor AEO. All information concerning the existing AEO’s performance, including compliance assurance activities, may be used to formulate (and potentially reduce) both the initial evaluation plan and the compliance assurance plan for the proposed AEO.

40. The applicant should be encouraged to append its existing EMP and procedures rather than creating a new EMP and/or procedures solely to describe the new scope of work. Consult DAVCOMP-DGTA staff for assistance if required.

41. Existing management. A commercial organisation with more than one contract or standing offer with the ADF will be certified as an AEO via one or more EACs. In the event that each AEO certification describes a substantially different location, workforce, EMP, or procedure set, then it is not possible to combine compliance assurance requirements. The following guidance therefore applies to multiple AEOs describing the same (or very similar) organisation.

42. The TAR expects that Service and/or sponsor AEOs engaging the same commercial AEO for design services will share the results of their compliance assurance activities. This will help to increase knowledge of the commercial AEO’s performance, as well as minimise the amount of compliance assurance activities necessary against each contract or standing offer. Sharing of compliance assurance results may extend to combined on-site or systems audit activities, as well as increased distribution of audit reports and other performance data.

43. In these instances the TAR will normally issue one EAC, with individual contract details provided in the LEA. The LEA (but not the EAC) will be re-issued when contracts expire, or additional contracts are included within the scope of services. Note that the TAR would not amend an existing EAC or LEA in the following circumstances:

a. aerospace firms conducting a large range of unrelated activities at multiple sites using different personnel;

b. contractual arrangements with substantially differing AEO requirements, i.e. contract to an obsolete standard e.g. DI(AF) AAP 7001.025 versus the current standard, AAP 7001.053(AM1); or

c. engineering activity conducted within substantially different Engineering Management Systems.



7

Mandated DGTA-ADF Staff Involvement

44. The TAR may determine that direct involvement of DGTA-ADF staff is required for selected AEO initial evaluation and surveillance activities. Typically this approach will be considered in the following circumstances:

a. initial AEO evaluations for major acquisitions of new aircraft types, or substantial upgrades to existing types;

b. conduct of highly complex or high-risk AEO audits; and

c. audits of commercial AEOs undertaking CI management activities for complete aircraft types.

45. The requirement for mandatory DGTA-ADF involvement will be established early in an acquisition or upgrade project and communicated to the affected parties via a compliance assurance plan.

Annexes:

A. DSN Examples B. Compliance Assurance Program Examples



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4A–1

DSN EXAMPLES 1. The intent of this annex is to provide some fictional case studies as examples of considerations relevant to documenting a DSN. The examples provided are not comprehensive, and are designed to illustrate some common occurrences. The case studies are deliberately fictional, and any similarity to existing organisations or arrangements is entirely unintentional. An example DSN table (suitable for incorporation within an EMP) for XXSPO is shown at Table 4–A–1.

DSN Example 1 – XXSPO

2. XXSPO provides weapons system project and logistics management for the F-XX AUS fighter aircraft. The following subparagraphs are provided as an example of organisations that need to be assessed for the DSN, and considerations applied to each.

a. ADF AEO. BBSPO undertakes CI management for items used on the F-XX AUS. BBSPO also exercises a degree of design control over the items concerned. BBSPO must be documented within the DSN, including the circumstances in which BBSPO can assume Design Acceptance on behalf of XXSPO. Since BBSPO is an AEO with a compliance assurance program undertaken by DAVCOMP–DGTA, XXSPO does not need to evaluate the organisation’s potential to provide design services.

b. COE. As the COE for State aircraft stores clearance, ARDU should be included in the DSN for involvement in the F-XX AUS stores clearance process. As ARDU is an AEO with compliance assurance performed by DAVCOMP–DGTA, XXSPO does not need to evaluate the organisation’s potential to provide design services. Some form of agreement will be required to define the level and scope of services to be provided.

c. DSTO. AMRL provides analytical design services in the assessment of F-XX AUS structural defects and damage, and should be included in the DSN. Some form of agreement between XXSPO and AMRL will be required to define the level and scope of services to be provided.

d. DGTA-ADF. The staff of DGTA-ADF convey the regulatory authority of the TAR. In particular ASI and NDTSL provide approved designs and specialist advice to XXSPO in support of the F-XX AUS, and these may be included in the DSN, particularly for clarification to XXSPO staff. XXSPO does not need to evaluate the potential of DGTA-ADF staff to provide design services and advice.

e. Laser Aeronautics. Laser Aeronautics designed and produced the F-XX fighter aircraft. The F-XX fighter is in service with the US military, and has been sold worldwide in various modified versions. The ADF operates the F-XX AUS version. Laser Aeronautics has an Australian subsidiary, Laser Aeronautics Australia, which was formed primarily to support the F-XX in the Australasian region. In this instance XXSPO could assume that Laser Aeronautics as a major OEM has the potential to provide competent design services and advice, and hence should be included in the DSN. XXSPO would need to document, however, that Laser Aeronautics is fully informed with respect to ADF use of the F-XX AUS. This may require a formal agreement with Laser Aeronautics, including the roles and responsibilities of the subsidiary Laser Aeronautics Australia in supporting the F-XX AUS.

f. Thruster America. Thruster America designed and produced the engines fitted to the F-XX worldwide. The ADF fleet of F-XX AUS is fitted with the same variant of engines as used by the US military and the majority of other F-XX operators. Thruster America provides a Field Service Representative (FSR) permanently attached to XXSPO. In this instance, XXSPO could assume that Thruster America as a major OEM has the potential to provide competent design services and advice, and hence should be included in the DSN. XXSPO would need to document, however, that Thruster America is fully informed with respect to ADF use of the F-XX AUS. This may require a formal agreement with Thruster America, including the roles and responsibilities of the FSR in supporting the F-XX AUS.

g. US Military. The F-XX Air Logistics Centre (F-XX-ALC) provides logistics and engineering support to USAF, the major user of the F-XX. XXSPO has a liaison officer position within the F-XX-ALC. XXSPO does not need to evaluate the potential of the F-XX-ALC to provide design services and advice. Some form of agreement between XXSPO and the F-XX-ALC will be required to define the level and scope of services to be provided, and to control the interchange of data between the ADF and the US military.



4A–2

DSN Example 2 – BBSPO

3. BBSPO provides weapons system logistics management for the CariBus transport aircraft and the Dodo maritime surveillance aircraft. The following subparagraphs are provided as an example of the organisations that need to be assessed for the DSN, and the considerations applied to each.

a. ADF AEO. BBSPO provides CI management, including design services, for a number of items used on the F-XX AUS, managed by XXSPO. XXSPO must be included in the DSN, together with procedures to ensure that the activities associated with design services performed on behalf of XXSPO are defined, and the roles and responsibilities of both BBSPO and XXSPO are clearly documented.

b. COE. As the COE for ADF aerial delivery, AMTDU should be included in the DSN for involvement in the CariBus and (if applicable) Dodo aerial delivery process. As AMTDU is an AEO with compliance assurance undertaken by DAVCOMP–DGTA, BBSPO does not need to evaluate the organisation’s potential to provide design services. Some form of agreement will be required to define the level and scope of services to be provided.

c. DSTO. BBSPO has no ongoing requirement for dedicated support from DSTO in support of either the CariBus or Dodo. When DSTO support is required, each instance is subject to specific and short-term arrangements. DSTO is not required to be included in the DSN.

d. DGTA_ADF. The staff of DGTA-ADF conveys the regulatory authority of the TAR. In particular ASI and NDTSL provide approved designs and specialist advice to BBSPO in support of the CariBus, and SCI in support of the Dodo. These may be included in the DSN, particularly for clarification to BBSPO staff. BBSPO does not need to evaluate the potential of DGTA-ADF staff to provide design services and advice.

e. Lacklustre Aerospace. The CariBus transport aircraft was originally designed and produced 30 years ago by a US OEM no longer in existence. Manufacturing rights for the CariBus now belong to Lacklustre Aerospace, who provide a degree of spares support to the ADF. The main focus of Lacklustre Aerospace is marketing the Super CariBus, a refurbished and re-engined version of the CariBus. In order to include Lacklustre Aerospace in the DSN, BBSPO would have to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the TAR the capability of Lacklustre Aerospace to provide competent design services and advice. This would probably require a formal agreement that documents the organisational structure, personnel and procedures to be used by Lacklustre Aerospace in providing design services to BBSPO.

f. AustPac Aviation Services. AustPac Aviation Services is an Australian organisation involved with repair and modification work on a range of aircraft types throughout the Australasian region, including several ADF types. AustPac Aviation Services has a long-term contract performing deeper maintenance on ADF CariBus transport aircraft, and has been evaluated by BBSPO as suitable for undertaking repair scheme design work. EA for this scope of work has recently been awarded by the TAR. AustPac Aviation Services must be included in the DSN.

g. Busted Aircraft. Busted Aircraft is a European OEM, which designed and produced the Dodo light transport aircraft. The Dodo is used in Australia and worldwide, mostly by small commuter airlines. The ADF operates a highly modified version in a maritime surveillance role. Busted Aircraft has an Australian subsidiary, Busted Aircraft Australia, which was primarily formed to market the Dodo to the civil market in Australia. Busted Aircraft should be included in the DSN, however BBSPO may have to document caveats and limitations on the design services provided, due to the differing use of the Dodo in the commuter and ADF environment. Alternatively, BBSPO may initiate a formal agreement with Busted Aircraft in order to exchange data to ensure that Busted Aircraft is fully informed of the ADF configuration and use of the Dodo. Busted Aircraft Australia would not normally be included in the DSN, unless the organisation could demonstrate the capacity to provide competent design services to BBSPO.

h. Upgrades R Us. Upgrades R Us is a large defence supplier, specialising in avionics system design and integration. Upgrades R Us was awarded the contract to design and install upgraded surveillance equipment in the Dodo, subsequently being granted AEO status by the TAR for the scope of that contract. Under a separate but related contract, Upgrades R Us have also been awarded a contract to upgrade communications systems on the F-XX AUS on behalf of XXSPO. This has been included within the scope of EA awarded by the TAR. BBSPO is the sponsoring AEO for Upgrades R Us, which must be included in the DSN. BBSPO must also promulgate and implement a compliance assurance program to monitor the engineering activities of Upgrades R Us.



4A–3

i. Dodgey Latex Inc. Dodgey Latex Inc manufactures latex and leather recreational clothing, sold through a worldwide mail order service. As a sideline Dodgey Latex Inc also produces a small range of emergency personal flotation devices for use in aircraft cabins, which are standard fit in the Dodo aircraft. The ongoing support provided by Dodgey Latex Inc for its range of flotation devices is extremely limited. Dodgey Latex Inc would not normally be included in the DSN, with any information provided being managed through the TIR process.

j. Gargantuan Avionics. Gargantuan Avionics designs and manufactures a large range of avionics items for use in both civil and military aircraft. The Dodo surveillance aircraft is fitted with a commercial standard radar altimeter and GPS, supplied by Gargantuan Avionics, which BBSPO has no plans to modify. Gargantuan Avionics would not normally be included in the DSN, with any information supplied being managed through the TIR process.

k. Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia (CASA). CASA provides the regulatory system for Australian (civil registered) Aircraft. As the Dodo is in widespread use with commuter airlines, CASA may have cause to issue directives or advice on Dodo operations in Australia. CASA should be included in the DSN.

DSN Example 3 – Upgrades R Us

4. Upgrades R Us has been granted commercial AEO status by the TAR, for the design and installation of upgraded surveillance equipment in the Dodo maritime surveillance aircraft, and upgraded communications equipment in the F-XX AUS. The following subparagraphs are provided as an example of the organisations that need to be assessed for the Upgrades R Us DSN, and the considerations applied to each.

a. ADF AEO. BBSPO is the sponsoring AEO for Upgrades R Us, and must be included in the DSN. Upgrades R Us are also performing design work on behalf of XXSPO, hence XXSPO should also be included in the Upgrades R Us DSN.

b. Busted Aircraft. Busted Aircraft as the OEM for the Dodo aircraft will provide design services to Upgrades R Us as part of the surveillance systems development and integration. Busted Aircraft should be included in the DSN, and a formal agreement raised detailing the scope of the design services to be provided.

c. Gargantuan Avionics. The surveillance equipment being developed by Upgrades R Us is dependent on accurate inputs from the Gargantuan Avionics Radar Altimeter and GPS currently fitted to the Dodo. Interface specifications between the systems will be required. Gargantuan Avionics should be included in the DSN, and a formal agreement detailing the scope of design services raised.

d. Fatal Exception Software. Fatal Exception Software has been sub-contracted by Upgrades R Us to write the software code for the interface between the surveillance system and the radar altimeter and GPS. Fatal Exception Software must be included in the DSN. Furthermore, Upgrades R Us is to ensure, through a contract or other formal arrangement, that Fatal Exception Software has management systems in place to meet the TAR’s regulatory requirements when developing the software for the surveillance system. Upgrades R Us is also responsible for compliance assurance of Fatal Exception Software.



4A–4

Table 4–A–1 XXSPO Example DSN Table

Organisation Status Support provided TI/Contracts/ Agreements

How services are to be treated Third Party Data Release Protocols

BBSPO AEO CI management and Design Approval of specific items used on the F-XX AUS Assumption of Design Acceptance for all avionics CIs

MOA XXSPO/BBSPO of 15 Sep 2000

Designs processed under Assumed Acceptance – subject to TIR for Incorporation Approval and Service Release issues All minor designs – process as an Approved Design All major designs – seek CENGR guidance

BBSPO in-house data – no limits All other data – refer to MOA for specific treatment (copy available from D/CENGR)

ARDU ASCENG COE Stores Clearance Activities MOA XXSPO/ARDU of 03 Aug 2000

Authoritative Airworthiness Advice- process as an Approved Design, notify CENGR if intent is not to follow advice ASCCERT – process as an Approved Design All other advice – subject to TIR

ARDU in-house data – no limits All other data – refer to MOA for specific treatment (copy available from D/CENGR)

DSTO AMRL Nil Analytical design services for structural defects and damage.

MOA XXSPO/AMRL of 04 Jul 2000

All design services and advice – subject to TIR

AMRL in-house data – no limits All other data – refer to MOA for specific treatment (copy available from D/CENGR)

ASI-DGTA TAR staff All Structural Integrity services

AAP 7001.053(AM1) Authoritative Airworthiness Advice- process as an Approved Design, notify CENGR if intent is not to follow advice All other advice – subject to TIR

ASI in-house data – no limits All other data – refer to MOA for specific treatment (copy available from D/CENGR)

NDTSL-DGTA COE All Non Destructive Test procedures

AAP 7001.053(AM1) Authoritative Airworthiness Advice- process as an Approved Design, notify CENGR if intent is not to follow advice All NDT procedures – process as an Approved Design, notify CENGR if intent is not to follow procedure All other advice – subject to TIR

NDTSL in-house data – no limits All other data – refer to MOA for specific treatment (copy available from D/CENGR)

Upgrades R Us AEO Design of upgraded communications system

Communications upgrade project CAPO 789987

All designs – process as an Approved Design If design is rejected for Design Acceptance certification, inform Dodo AV1 BBSPO for performance measurement data recording

Issued to XXSPO by Upgrades R Us under licence. To be used for engineering and maintenance only. Limited copies may be issued to DLM contractor for ADF



4A–5

Organisation Status Support provided TI/Contracts/ Agreements

How services are to be treated Third Party Data Release Protocols

engineering and maintenance tasks only. Laser Aeronautics (USA)

F-XX OEM All design services OEM support services

Follow-on support contract CAPO 1223344

All minor aircraft structural and engine designs – process as an Approved Design All minor avionics designs – subject to TIR for applicability to F-XX AUS configuration All major designs – seek CENGR guidance OEM service bulletins etc. – subject to TIR, advise CENGR if TAAI

Issued to XXSPO by Las Aero under licence. To be used for F-XX AUS engineering and maintenance only. Limited copies may be issued to DLM contractor for ADF engineering and maintenance tasks only.

Laser Aeronautics Australia

F-XX OEM representative`

All design services OEM support services

Subcontractor to follow-on support contract CAPO 1223344

All designs that include evidence of LasAero USA endorsement, process as per above guidance for LasAero USA All other designs and advice – subject to TIR OEM service bulletins etc. – subject to TIR, advise CENGR if TAAI

Issued to XXSPO by Las Aero under licence. To be used for F-XX AUS engineering and maintenance only. Limited copies may be issued to DLM contractor for ADF engineering and maintenance tasks only.

Thruster America F-XX engine OEM

All engine design services OEM support services

Subcontractor to follow-on support contract CAPO 1223344

All minor designs that include evidence of ThrAm USA endorsement, process as an Approved Design All FSR advice – subject to TIR unless endorsed by ThrAm USA All major designs – seek CENGR guidance OEM service bulletins etc. – subject to TIR, advise CENGR if TAAI

Issued to XXSPO by ThrAm under licence. To be used for engine engineering and maintenance only. Limited copies may be issued to DLM contractor for ADF engineering and maintenance tasks only.

F-XX-ALC USAF F-XX operator

All design services Design advice

MOA XXSPO/F-XX-ALC of 25 Dec 2000

All design services and advice – subject to TIR

Release requires USAF approval.

F-XXTLO USAF XXSPO Technical Liaison Officer USAF

All design services Design advice

MOA XXSPO/F-XX-ALC of 25 Dec 2000 Third Party Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with Las Aero USA of 11 Jan 01

Incumbent awarded EA to perform TIR, process on receipt based on recommendation

Release requires USAF approval.



4A–6

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4B–1

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM EXAMPLES 1. The intent of this annex is to provide some fictional examples of compliance assurance programs, based on the DSN case studies at annex A. The examples provided represent the type of documentation expected of sponsor AEOs to meet the requirements of TAREG 3.2.3, and hence are written from the perspective of a direction from the SDE to engineering staff. Terms ‘is to’ and ‘are to’ throughout do not constitute specific regulatory direction from the TAR. In the case of a large number of commercial AEOs, the relevant information below may be provided in tabular format. The examples provided below are for two commercial AEOs that are being sponsored by BBSPO. It should be noted that the case studies are deliberately fictional, and any similarity to existing organisations or arrangements is entirely unintentional.

Example 1 – AustPac Aviation Services

2. Introduction. AustPac Aviation Services is an Australian organisation involved with repair and modification work on a range of aircraft types throughout the Australasian region, including several ADF types. AustPac Aviation Services has a long-term contract performing deeper maintenance on ADF CariBus transport aircraft, and has been evaluated by the AEO as suitable for undertaking repair scheme design work. The TAR in Jan YY awarded EA to AustPac for this scope of work carried out under CAPO 123456 (for the purposes of this example assume EA has only recently been awarded). The following paragraphs are provided to detail the program of compliance assurance activities to be undertaken by BBSPO, as required by TAREG 3.2.3.

3. Sponsor AEO. BBSPO is the sponsor AEO for AustPac Aviation Services, and hence is responsible for ongoing compliance assurance activities. AustPac Aviation Services has not to date been awarded EA for any engineering activity except for work associated with CariBus DM under CAPO 123456.

4. System Level Reviews. During the initial AEO audit of AustPac Aviation Services, the EMP, subordinate plans and engineering procedures were found to be generally acceptable, however were subject to ongoing revision. CariBus ILM BBSPO, as the airfame DE, is to review the EMP and key procedures at an interval not exceeding 6 months, to ensure continued compliance. Significant non-conformances are to be immediately reported to the SDE AustPac Aviation Services, the CENGR BBSPO, with an information copy to DAVCOMP-DGTA.

5. Quality Assurance/Product Reviews. As AustPac Aviation Services has only recently been awarded EA, BBSPO will be required to initially closely monitor the engineering outputs to ensure compliance. All design packages provided by AustPac Aviation Services (including approved designs) will be subject to a detailed review to ensure compliance. CariBus ILM BBSPO, before passing any design package from AustPac Aviation Services to CENGR BBSPO for Design Acceptance certification, is to conduct a review of the complete package to ensure that:

a. the design work undertaken is included within the scope of AustPac Aviation Services EA as defined in their EMP,

b. the design package is complete, including reference to all appropriate specifications and standards, design output documentation and associated calculations, together with adequate verification that design outputs meet the design specification;

c. the appropriate person has signed the Design Approval certification,

d. all personnel that have participated in the design have the appropriate competencies and authorisations, as detailed in the AustPac Aviation Services EMP; and

e. individual components of the design package (eg Judgement of Significance, Design Review) have been completed in accordance with AAP 7001.053 requirements, and as detailed in AustPac Aviation Services EMP, plans and procedures.

6. Performance Measurement Activities. Performance measurement activities were not included in CAPO 123456. As EA has only recently been awarded to AustPac Aviation Services, performance measurement activities have not yet been formally negotiated or agreed.

7. Surveillance Audit Program. Formal AEO status was granted to AustPac Aviation Services by the TAR in Jan YY, with a recommendation from DAVCOMP-DGTA that a surveillance audit be conducted within six months. CariBus ILM BBSPO is responsible for arranging an AEO surveillance audit of AustPac Aviation Services, no later than Sep YY. CENGR BBSPO will lead the audit, with CariBus ILM BBSPO as an auditor, and one representative will be requested from DAVCOMP-DGTA due to lack of experienced audit personnel within CariBus ILM section. (Refer to Section 1 Chapter 6 for the conduct of AEO surveillance audits, and the minimum competencies expected of audit personnel).



4B–2

8. Key Sub-contractor Audits. The work performed by sub-contractors on behalf of AustPac Aviation Services under CAPO 123456 is minimal, and no specific sub-contractor oversight is required by BBSPO.

9. Reporting of Non-conformances. CariBus ILM is to ensure that non-conformances with individual design packages are notified to the SDE AustPac Aviation Services, together with a request for rectification action. Non-conformances or deficiencies found with the EMP, plans or procedures that are found during system level reviews or surveillance audits are also to be notified to SDE AustPac Aviation Services, with an information copy to CENGR BBSPO. Failure on the part of AustPac Aviation Services to rectify any deficiencies in the required timeframe is to be immediately notified to CENGR BBSPO, with an information copy to DAVCOMP-DGTA.

Example 2 – Upgrades R Us

10. Introduction. Upgrades R Us is a large defence supplier, specialising in avionics system design and integration. Upgrades R Us was awarded the contract to design and install upgraded surveillance equipment in the Dodo aircraft, subsequently being granted AEO status by the TAR for the scope of CAPO 654321. Due to their experience in this field, Upgrades R Us has also been awarded a contract to provide related communications systems upgrades to the F-XX AUS fighter on behalf of XXSPO, under CAPO 789987. The TAR has expanded the scope of EA awarded to Upgrades R Us to include work undertaken under CAPO 789987. As the prime user of Upgrades R Us design services, BBSPO has been selected as the sponsoring AEO for Upgrades R Us. (For further information on the sponsoring of commercial AEOs that support multiple SPOs, refer to Section 3 Chapter 4). The following paragraphs are provided to detail the program of compliance assurance activities to be undertaken by BBSPO and XXSPO, as required by TAREG 3.2.3.

11. Sponsor AEO. BBSPO is the sponsor AEO for Upgrades R Us, and hence is responsible for ongoing compliance assurance activities. Upgrades R Us also performs related design work for XXSPO which has recently been included within the EA assigned by the TAR, and hence XXSPO is also involved with the compliance assurance program, and may contribute to the audit team led by BBSPO.

12. System Level Reviews. Upgrades R Us has been assigned EA by the TAR for several years, and has a stable EMS and documentation set. Dodo AV1 BBSPO as the avionics DE is to review the EMP and key procedures at intervals not exceeding 12 months, to ensure continued compliance. These system level reviews are to include the involvement of XXSPO staff. Significant non-conformances are to be immediately reported to the SDE Upgrades R Us, the CENGR BBSPO, the CENGR XXSPO, and an information copy to DAVCOMP-DGTA.

13. Quality Assurance/Product Reviews. As Upgrades R Us has been an AEO for several years, and has a proven record of providing regulatory compliant, high quality design services, BBSPO does not need to conduct specific reviews of all design packages provided. As part of the compliance assurance program, Dodo AV1 BBSPO is to select at least one out of every 10 design packages (10%) and, before passing to CENGR BBSPO for Design Acceptance certification, is to conduct a review of the complete package to ensure that:

a. the design work undertaken is included within the scope of Upgrades R Us EA as defined in their EMP;

b. the design package is complete, including reference to all appropriate specifications and standards, design output documentation and associated calculations, together with adequate verification that design outputs meet the design specification;

c. the appropriate person has signed the Design Approval certification;

d. all personnel who have participated in the design have the appropriate competencies and authorisations, as detailed in the Upgrades R Us EMP; and

e. individual components of the design package (eg Judgement of Significance, Design Review) have been completed in accordance with AAP 7001.053 requirements, and as detailed in Upgrades R Us EMP, plans and procedures.

14. Performance Measurement Activities. As part of the ongoing relationship between BBSPO and Upgrades R Us, it has been agreed that the number of design packages achieving Design Acceptance certification without being returned to Upgrades R Us for further data or correction will be used as a performance indicator. A minimum target of 90% has been agreed. XXSPO has requested participation in this program, which has been agreed to by Upgrades R Us. Dodo AV1 BBSPO is responsible for collecting performance measurement data, which is to be provided to SDE Upgrades R Us, CENGR BBSPO and CENGR XXSPO quarterly in March, June, September and December each year.

15. Surveillance Audit Program. Dodo AV1 BBSPO is responsible for arranging an AEO surveillance audit of Upgrades R Us at a maximum of two yearly intervals, with the next audit to be scheduled no later than Dec YY.



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Dodo AV1 BBSPO will lead the audit, with assistance from XXSPO staff as auditors. No assistance from DAVCOMP-DGTA will be required.

16. Key Sub-contractor Audits. Gargantuan Avionics is a key sub-contractor to Upgrades R Us in the development of the Dodo surveillance system upgrade. Gargantuan Avionics has not been assigned EA by the TAR. As part of any AEO surveillance audit of Upgrades R Us, Dodo AV1 BBSPO is to arrange for an audit of Gargantuan Avionics activities, with the full participation of the SDE Upgrades R Us. (The audit of key sub-contractors must be included within contract arrangements. It may be preferable for SDE Upgrades R Us to lead the sub-contractor audit).

17. Reporting of Non-conformances. Dodo AV1 BBSPO is to ensure non-conformances with individual design packages are notified to the SDE Upgrades R Us, together with a request for rectification action. Non-conformances or deficiencies found with the EMP, plans or procedures found during system level reviews or surveillance audits are also to be notified to SDE Upgrades R Us, with an information copy to both CENGR BBSPO and CENGR XXSPO. Non-conformances resulting from any audit of Gargantuan Avionics are to be raised against Upgrades R Us as the prime contractor. Failure on the part of Upgrades R Us to rectify any deficiencies in the required timeframe are to be immediately notified both CENGR BBSPO and CENGR XXSPO, with an information copy to DAVCOMP-DGTA.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 5

TECHNICAL INFORMATION (TI)

Applicable Regulations

TAREG 3.5.2 Technical Information Review

INTRODUCTION

1. AEOs receive large quantities of Technical Information (TI) related to the aircraft or aircraft related equipment that they manage. This TI potentially varies from information that is trivial or not applicable, to information directly and immediately affecting airworthiness and flight safety. AEOs must carefully manage TI to ensure that the large quantities received are quickly sorted and prioritised so that necessary action can be taken within required timeframes. To do this, AEOs need a process of Technical Information Review (TIR) to collect and register TI, as well as to decide on the appropriate action to take.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to AEOs on the management of TI and the TIR process.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this chapter is to provide extant guidance on the management of TI and the TIR process. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION REVIEW

Philosophy and Concept

4. AEOs performing CI management duties are responsible for the continuing airworthiness and technical integrity of their CIs. Through the DSN and formal data agreements, AEOs establish all necessary links with external agencies having the potential to affect the continuing airworthiness and technical integrity of each CI. This provides the AEO with access to all correspondence and communication concerning the CI. The TIR regulation ensures that an AEO has specific processes to ensure that TI, once received, is promptly actioned by technical personnel holding suitable Engineering Authority. Annex A provides a TI flow diagram showing the various processes that TI can generate together with the corresponding regulations.

Cross References

5. TAREG 3.5.2 is related to TAREG 3.3.3 on Design Support Network. In particular, TAREG 3.5.2.d requires that the formal agreements providing TI are cross referenced to the DSN. For an example of how this is achieved in practice, refer to Section 3, Chapter 4, Annex A, Table 4–A–1.

6. Since the regulation references the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA), it should be read in conjunction with DI(G) OPS 02-2—Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management.

Explanation and Amplification

7. List of TI Sources. Annex B provides an example list of TI. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that all sources of TI are identified and documented in the EMP. A TI source should be considered a DSN member, since provision of TI is assisting the AEO to perform its function, therefore it follows that TI sources be listed in the DSN. In doing so, staff are provided guidance as to what sort of information will be subject to the TIR process. This further ensures that all-important technical information is clearly identified, as distinct from routine administrative correspondence. Refer to Section 3, Chapter 4, annex A, Table 4–A–1 for an example of how this may be achieved.

8. Technical Airworthiness Alert Information. Rather than mandating a priority system for TI, only one type of TI is specified within the regulation as requiring special attention, that of Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI). For TI to meet the criteria of TAAI it must concern unsafe conditions in an aircraft type, or changes to type design which will affect the safety of an aircraft type.

9. Authoritative Airworthiness Advice. Authoritative airworthiness advice is defined at TAREG 1.1.5. It is information issued by members of the TAR’s staff or COEs on behalf of the TAR, and should follow the TI process



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once received by the AEO. Refer to AAP 7001.068(AM1)—Design and Technology Services Support Manual Section 1 Chapter 2 for further guidance on authoritative airworthiness advice. Note that certain forms of authoritative airworthiness advice may be classified as TAAI. In particular, a Technical Airworthiness Directive (TAD) that is for action at the AEO will likely be classified as TAAI. (Refer to Section 3 Chapter 13 for detailed information about TADs.) Other forms of advice may be received from other sources, such as National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs), in which case the treatment of such TI for each source should be documented and justified within the EMP in accordance with TAREG 3.5.2 and paragraph 7 of this chapter.

10. Collection and Registration of TI. TAREGs 3.5.2 requires that TI is collected and registered. In practical terms, collection includes arrangements with clerical staff for the timely on-forwarding of technical correspondence to those responsible for its registration as TI.

11. Since TI is often time sensitive (eg. manufacturer recommendations for inspections to be carried out within x days of receipt), registration is important to provide visibility of receipt details. Registration should include the date of receipt and origin.

12. Personnel. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that personnel be assigned Engineering Authority (EA) to perform the engineering activity of TIR, in accordance with the requirements for assignment of EA at TAREG 3.3.2. The task of TI registration, providing it does not involve any decision or recommendation on applicability or action required does not require formal authorisation.

13. Serially Issued TI. This type of TI is normally provided under a data agreement, which adds the AEO to the distribution list for the TI. Since the TI is issued with a unique and sequential number, it is possible to confirm receipt of all issues of the TI type by checking that all previous issue numbers have been received. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that this checking activity take place, as a measure to reduce the likelihood of the non-receipt of an issue of TI. Sources of TI that are serially issued should also be annotated as such in the EMP. Serial checking should occur at registration.

14. Evaluation. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that a competent and authorised person (who has been assigned the necessary EA) evaluates the TI for applicability and action required in a timely manner. This is not necessarily the same person who has registered the TI. The applicability evaluation considers whether the TI is relevant to the CI being managed, including the ADF configuration of the CI, and the variant or model number of the CI. Applicable TI is then evaluated to determine what action is required. Possible actions are described elsewhere within the CI Management TAREG 3.5 and may also include design change action covered under the Design Control TAREG 3.4.

15. In making a decision not to action TI, the person performing the evaluation should be convinced that the TI falls into at least one of the three following categories:

a. the TI is not applicable;

b. the TI does not on its own or in conjunction with previously reviewed TI show a significant reduction in the required levels of safety or performance sufficient to justify the cost of a design solution; or

c. the design change action proposed by the TI does not provide sufficient improvements in safety, performance or support costs to justify the change.

16. Recording of Decisions. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that the decisions on applicability and action required are recorded against the TI in the TI register. This is a continuation of the TI registration requirement, such that all of the history concerning each item of TI is traceable. Where the TI is related to previous TI that is already being actioned, a cross-reference to the original TI should be included with the decision.

17. Re-transmission of TI to Operational Authorities. TAREG 3.5.2 specifically addresses TI relating to aircraft operating procedures and limitations. This covers instances in which TI is received that does not necessarily concern an engineering or maintenance requirement, but impacts the way the CI is operated. This is to assist in maintaining operational (rather than technical) airworthiness. The regulation requires that the re-transmission procedure is to be endorsed by the relevant OAA, see paragraph 20 for further details.

18. Processing of TAAI. TAREG 3.5.2 provides for the specific treatment of TAAI as follows:

a. All TAAI (including TAAI involving solely technical issues) must be brought to the attention of the DAR and OAA as soon as possible. See paragraph 20 for further details regarding interaction with the OAA.

b. TAAI is exchanged or retransmitted to other affected organisations. This may include other users of the CI, other service or commercial AEOs, interested operational organisations, other operators, and other airworthiness authorities.

c. Necessary instructions that may be required include STIs or other instructions imposing operating limitations, additional maintenance requirements or other design decisions to assure adequate safety of operations. These instructions must be issued in a timely manner following receipt of the TAAI.



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Further, their issue must also be subject to the Design Acceptance requirements, ie normal methods used by the AEO for developing design changes must be followed. In particular, amendments to instructions for continuing airworthiness as well as flight manuals and aircraft operating instructions are to be processed in accordance with TAREGs 3.5.15 and 3.5.16 respectively.

d. Should there be any operational impact caused by the action taken, both operational and maintenance authorities should be consulted prior to release so that the impact may be minimised.

e. Should it be decided not to action relevant TAAI, two things (as a minimum) should happen:

(1) The DAR should provide a Design Acceptance Certificate outlining the justification for not taking action. By definition, this means that a design review and approval should both be carried out by competent and authorised personnel, each also justifying why the decision not to action the TAAI is valid and correct.

(2) The TAR must be notified of the decision (by the DAR as the TAR’s representative).

19. New Sources of TI. TAREG 3.5.2 requires that new sources of TI are continually evaluated for amendment of the existing TI source list within the EMP. For example, in the event that another military force or civilian operator commences operations with the same or similar aircraft to the ADF Type, consideration should be given to adding the operator to the list of TI sources as a potential future source of TI.

20. Endorsement by the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA). The TI processes that involve operational consultation within TAREG 3.5.2 require endorsement by the OAA. In practice, the interface between the AEO and the operational element would generally be between the DAR and the OAA’s representative, which may be an OAAR or subordinate appointment. In the case of a commercial AEO, it is reasonable to expect that OAA endorsement of this procedure would occur through the sponsor AEO’s own established and agreed interface with operational elements. The AEO should be able to provide evidence that the OAA (or delegate) has endorsed these procedures. This provides the added benefit that the operational authorities are aware of these processes before applicable TI, and particularly TAAI, is received. Further, for some AEOs (for example, new aircraft acquisition projects for which an operational element has not yet been established), this regulation may not be applicable.

Acceptable Means of Compliance

21. AEOs with a CI management responsibility must define their Design Support Network completely and accurately, so that all potential sources of TI are identified, and arrangements (including data agreements if necessary) are in place for the receipt of the TI. Further, the DSN should contain adequate instructions to enable authorised staff to efficiently recognise, classify and prioritise each item of TI to ensure it receives an appropriate level of engineering rigour without contributing to a build-up of TI awaiting processing.

22. The AEO must have a procedure to describe the local TIR process that is compliant with all requirements of TAREG 3.5.2.

23. The internal organisation of the AEO must include assigning responsibilities to staff for the collection and registration of TI, as well as formal EA to staff for the evaluation of TI. The professional development or continuation training program as required by TAREG 3.3.2.e should include the following:

a. sources of TI,

b. registration,

c. evaluation,

d. exchange and re-transmission of relevant TI to operational authorities and other affected organisations,

e. serially issued TI,

f. recording of decisions, and

g. evaluation and treatment of TAAI, including:

(1) requirements for speedy processing,

(2) notification of the DAR, and

(3) actions required when applicable TAAI is not actioned.

Annexes:

A. Technical Information Flow Diagram B. List of Example TI



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5A–1

TECHNICAL INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAM

Figure 5–A–1 Technical Information Flow Diagram



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5B–1

LIST OF EXAMPLE TI 1. The following provides example types of TI that an AEO may be expected to collect:

a. Approved designs provided by AEOs;

b. Foreign source data (FSD) including service bulletins and advice from OEMs;

c. Airworthiness circulars from civil airworthiness authorities;

d. Technical Orders and modification advice from other military operators;

e. Authoritative airworthiness advice from a delegate of the ADF Airworthiness Authority;

f. Information, advice and requests from maintenance venues including:

(1) defect reports;

(2) reportable maintenance deficiencies;

(3) improper packaging reports;

(4) TMP amendment suggestions (EE400);

(5) condition reports;

(6) TMP non-compliance reports;

(7) maintenance interval extension requests;

(8) deviation requests;

(9) notification of standard repairs to primary or secondary aircraft structure;

(10) production concession requests;

(11) results of physical or functional configuration audits;

(12) reliability analyses, including CAMM2/MAARS data or AOG/UNDA data;

(13) feedback reports from STIs or modifications;

(14) publication amendment proposals;

(15) technical substitution proposals;

(16) maintenance incident reports;

(17) identification requests for technical equipment;

(18) requests for local manufacture;

(19) requests for approval to install new role equipment;

(20) NDT reports and procedures;

(21) aircraft weight and balance records; and

(22) aircraft stores clearance certificates.

2. The following provides examples of TAAI that an AEO may be expected to receive as a component of TI:

a. Airworthiness Directives from civil airworthiness authorities;

b. Alert and safety notices from other military operators;

c. Directives from the ADF Airworthiness Authority (or a delegate);

d. ASORs and SASORs from operating units; and

e. Alert Service Bulletins from OEMs.



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1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 6

HOW TO PRODUCE APPROVED DESIGNS


TAREG 3.4 Design Control

INTRODUCTION

1. For any design to be incorporated with respect to State aircraft it must be accepted by a Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) in accordance with the requirements of TAREG 2. These regulations give the DAR considerable latitude to accept a wide variety of designs with varying levels of personal involvement and rigour as the situation demands. Whilst there are some exceptions, in general, all designs must be approved by an AEO before they can be accepted. Therefore, the process of producing an approved design is central to the assurance of technical airworthiness and thus is subject to TAR regulation.

2. The regulations require that AEOs performing design institute a design control system that ensures:

a. the design is approved in accordance with the regulations; and

b. design outputs produced by the AEO meet, and are shown to meet, the design requirements.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs), and in particular Senior Design Engineers (SDEs), with guidance as to how they can produce approved designs able to be accepted by a DAR. As the focus of this chapter is on achieving Design Approval, rather than performing design, it is presented in a way many perceive as backwards. The chapter will start with a definition of an approved design and step through the design process in reverse order until design development.

SCOPE

4. The basic process requirements for generating an approved design for use on a State aircraft are independent of the scope of the design. Hence this chapter applies to all organisations responsible for the conduct and/or management of engineering which leads to the production, or acceptance, of Approved Designs, whether those designs are for a new O-ring or a new aircraft. Although the steps described in this chapter are part of the Design Acceptance process, refer to Chapter 7 for information regarding Design Acceptance. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

WHAT IS AN APPROVED DESIGN?

5. If only approved designs can be accepted, just what constitutes an approved design? The simple, and rather trite, answer is that an approved design is any design that has been issued Design Approval certification (TAREG 3.4.3). The more complex, and useful, answer is that an approved design is a design which has been issued a Design Approval certificate and which conforms to all the process and documentation requirements of the relevant regulations. There are quite a number of these regulations and it is the purpose of this chapter to pick them out and describe how they might be satisfied. Broadly, for a design to be approved, it must:

a. have been subject to independent review;

b. comply with the relevant specification;

c. have been shown to comply with the relevant specification after some verification activity;

d. have been developed in accordance with the AEO’s approved systems and procedures; and

e. be fully documented.

Who Can Approve a Design?

6. Who may approve a design depends on two things:

a. The Significance of the Design. The regulations consider all designs as being in one of two categories, significant (high risk) and non-significant (lower risk). The Judgement of the Significance



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of a design is a step that is initially taken during the design planning stage and repeated at intervals later in the design process, to ensure the initial assessment was correct. The principle effect of this judgement is to raise (or lower) the level of authority required to review and approve designs, and the rigour expected of the design and design review processes. The Judgement of Significance is discussed in more depth from paragraph 33.

b. The Authorisations of the Persons in the AEO. The regulations require that persons within AEOs must be authorised to do any engineering activities they may undertake as part of their duties. Authorisations are given in terms of a level and a scope. Therefore, persons may only approve a design if they are authorised to (at least) the level of design approval. Further, the design must fall within the scope of the person’s authorisation. For instance, an avionics DE may not perform Design Approval for a structural design.

7. Significant Designs. In general, the SDE of an AEO is required to personally approve all designs judged as significant. However, the regulations recognise that this may not always be necessary or appropriate, so they provide three ways for personnel other than the SDE to perform this function as follows:

a. TAREG 3.3.2.b allows an AEO the option to establish Deputy SDEs (DSDEs) with authority to perform assignment of internal EA functions, as well as SDE design control functions in accordance with TAREG 3.4. DSDEs are required to meet the same criteria as an SDE, and are approved by the TAR as for the SDE. A DSDE is therefore able to approve a design judged significant within the level and scope of their appointment.

b. TAREG 3.4.3.a(5) specifically identifies the case where the SDE may authorise specific DEs to approve certain classes of design. If the SDE authorises a DE in this way then the SDE is then required to review the DE’s Design Approval decision as soon as practicable. Note the regulations do not mandate the content or timing of this review. The AEO is required to have a procedure describing the content and timing of the SDE’s review of DE Design Approval decisions. The TAR as part of the general compliance assurance process will assess this procedure for the AEO.

a. TAREG 3.4.3.a(4) creates a third option, not explicitly stated but allowed by the phrase ‘except as otherwise authorised by the TAR’. Large organisations, generally commercial AEOs with many diverse contracts, have a need to be able to allow at least one DE in particular sections or divisions to exercise all the Design Approval authority normally invested in the SDE (without subsequent SDE review of decisions). In these cases the applicant for engineering authority can give this authority to a DE as long as this is clearly shown in the applicant’s EMP. Where an organisation seeks to give this authority to a DE, the TAR requires that person to satisfy all the criteria normally applied to an SDE.

8. Non-Significant Designs. Design Approval of designs judged to be non-significant may be performed by competent (ie suitably trained, qualified and experienced) personnel with a level of authority less than that of DE who have been authorised by the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) to do so.

How is an Approved Design Identified as Such?

9. A design is identified as having been approved by the release of Design Approval certification, often shortened to simply a Design Certificate. The TAR has not mandated a format for this certificate and recognises that the format will need to be tailored depending on the size and complexity of the design task. Nevertheless, the TAR has mandated a minimum level of information to be included on all Design Approval certifications, namely a complete:

a. list of the specifications, standards and other requirements to which the design was developed; and

b. index of design documentation including instructions needed for assuring the continuing airworthiness and integrity of the design.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF DESIGNS

10. No matter how simple (replacement of o-ring xyz with o-ring xyz-1) or complex (an AEW&C system) a design may be, all design outputs comprising that design must be subject to independent review. The TAR recognises that for complex designs it will probably not be possible to review the entire design upon its completion, so the regulations talk in terms of design outputs. These outputs could be sub-system specifications, software code, and drawings or test results. Figure 6–1 shows how the concept of Design Review could be applied to both simple and complex design cases.



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Assign Task

Develop

Review

Approve

Accept

Plan

- Ju

dge

Sign

ifica

nce

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Dev

Rev

Design approval certification

Design acceptance certification

Simple Design Process Complex Design Process

Figure 6–1 Example of Both Simple and Complex Design Review Processes

What Does Design Review Do?

11. All engineers are human and all humans make mistakes. No matter how simple the design or how qualified and hardworking the engineer, occasionally mistakes will be made. The purpose of Design Review is to find those mistakes and correct them before a design is incorporated. Thus the design reviewer must ensure the following:

a. The design assumptions, design data, design conditions and the method and tools employed in developing the design solution must be appropriate and valid. For example, if the designer assumes that a box uses a ‘standard’ logic arrangement, the design reviewer should ensure that it is valid, as the maker of that box may use a unique logic that would lead to the box behaving incorrectly. Similarly, if the designer has referenced a stressing report from 1965, the design reviewer should ensure that the report is still valid given the myriad of changes that may have occurred to the aircraft since then.

b. Any calculations or analyses conducted in developing the design output must be properly conducted and correct. The Design Review may simply check the numbers or could try and repeat the entire analyses to determine that the developer performed these tasks correctly. The extent of this aspect of the review would depend greatly on the significance and complexity of the design and needs to be determined by the reviewer on a case-by-case basis.

c. The design outputs must meet their input specifications. This would appear obvious, however it is important to check that all the input requirements, especially those that may be hidden in referenced standards, be satisfied.

d. The verification results must demonstrate that the design outputs comply with their input requirements. Often specification requirements require some modelling of the actual requirement such that a realistic (and affordable) test may be performed. Once the test is complete, the test results will in turn require interpretation back to the actual requirement to determine compliance. This situation introduces a number of areas where the results of tests may not actually demonstrate the compliance of the design with the original high level requirement. It is the role of the design reviewer to detect such anomalies.

12. It must be noted that Design Review is not the stage at which redesign is done to correct errors or where design documentation is completed. To do either of these things eliminates the independence of the review and lessens its value considerably. This issue is discussed in greater depth below.

Who Can Do Design Review?

13. Who may review a design depends on:

a. the significance of the design; and

b. the authorisations of the persons in the AEO.



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14. Significant Designs. Design Review of designs judged to be significant may only be performed by competent (ie suitably trained, qualified) personnel, with a level of authority of DE, who have been authorised by the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) to do so.

NOTE

• Where the design involves many disciplines the TAR requires that either a person or team authorised to act in all those disciplines conduct the Design Review. For example, the installation of an additional radio system into an aircraft will require not only avionics specialisations but also structural specialisations for the mounting of the radio control panel, R/T unit and antenna.

15. Non-Significant Designs. Design Review of designs judged to be non-significant may be performed by competent (ie suitably trained, qualified) personnel, with a level of authority less than that of DE, who have been authorised by the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) to do so.

NOTE

• Where the design involves many disciplines the TAR requires that either a person or team authorised to act in all those disciplines conduct the Design Review.

16. Independence of Reviewers. The key to ensuring that a design is properly reviewed is that the reviewer must not have been involved in the original design work. Thus the regulations require that persons reviewing design output may not have participated in the development of that output. In general this requirement is relatively straightforward and easy to implement. In complex designs, however, the design may move between development and review a number of times and it can be problematic to determine just when the reviewers might lose their independence and should no longer act in that role. Similarly, in small organisations it can be impossible to find sufficient engineers to maintain complete independence. For this reason the TAR has not sought to regulate this matter and will rely upon the judgement of those performing the activities in the field.

17. As a guide, the TAR expects that for most cases design reviewers will not correct errors or complete design documentation, but rather point out errors or missing documentation and return the design to the developer for correction or completion. However, the issue can be far more subtle than that and reviewers can become overly involved in the design simply by providing too much direction to design developers. For example, should a reviewer disagree with the assumptions, methods, tools or data used by the developer it can be easy for the reviewer to be drawn into telling the developer what to do, thus in effect doing part of the design. This problem can often arise where the reviewer is more senior than the developer in the organisation’s hierarchy and where the reviewer also has some mentoring or development responsibility for the developer. As said in the earlier paragraph, the dividing line between review and development can be quite difficult to detect and thus the TAR has not attempted to regulate it in detail. Rather, individual reviewers must exercise their professional judgement to ensure the review remains independent and effective.

Additional Review Requirements

18. For designs judged as significant, the TAR requires that at least two sets of professional engineering eyes oversee the design, a set of professional eyes being defined as those belonging to a DE. Therefore, where a significant design is developed by a DE and then reviewed by a DE the TAR’s criterion has been met and the design can proceed to Design Approval. Where a design judged to be significant has been developed by a person below the level of DE, it must receive formal Design Review, firstly by a DE. Following this, TAREG 3.4.4 requires the SDE to conduct a second level of review. As part of this review, the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) is to ensure that:

a. the persons performing the design development and Design Review were competent for the task; and

b. the design assumptions, design data, design conditions and the method and tools employed in developing the design output were appropriate and valid.

19. It should be noted that this second level of review is not intended to be another check of the numbers or a documentation check, but rather is intended to ensure that the fundamentals of the design development were correct. In addition, the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) is required to consider the competency of the design developer and reviewer.



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DEVELOPING THE DESIGN

Design Control System

20. The regulations require that organisations performing design must institute a design control system. As well as ensuring that the design is approved in accordance with the relevant regulations, there are a number of requirements that apply to the design development process. These process regulations are to ensure that:

a. design development is conducted by authorised persons,

b. the design development process is planned,

c. all organisational and technical interfaces are identified and considered by the design process,

d. the specification for the design has been reviewed,

e. the data to be used in support of the design process is applicable and accurate,

f. the significance of the design has been judged and recorded,

g. the design output meets the specification criteria, and

h. the compliance of the design output with the specification has been verified.

Persons Performing Design Development

21. Design development can take so many forms and cover such a wide variety of activities that the regulations would not be able to adequately define the classes of people able to perform each of them. Therefore, the regulations rely on the AEOs to determine who may perform design development activities and then simply require that the AEO ensure that only people authorised to undertake design work do so.

Design Plans

22. All design development activities are to be planned and conducted in accordance with the plan. The design plan is intended to:

a. describe the design activities to be undertaken under the plan (this description should include, at least, reference to the specifications and standards the design is to meet, the tools and data to be used, and the design and verification methods to be employed); and

b. assign responsibility for the conduct of all the activities to be undertaken under the plan.

23. The design plan should be a living document, updated as the design evolves, so that it remains relevant to the design process. For example if, as the design progresses, the Judgement of Significance is changed for any reason, then the design plan should be updated to reflect the change, and reasons for the change. Similarly, if the personnel, data, tools or any other aspect of the design described by the plan are changed, then the plan must be updated to reflect those changes.

24. Approving the Plan. The regulations require the plan to be approved by the person who will approve the design. At first glance this may appear difficult to implement, particularly for complex designs which are developed over a long period of time. For example, a design for a fast-roping device for a helicopter may evolve over several years with the final design approver being posted into the design agency long after the original plan was developed and only shortly before the design is complete. In this case it would seem impossible for the design approver to approve the plan. However, it must be noted that the regulations do not state when the design plan is to be finally approved. In fact, given that the plan is intended to be a living document, changing as the design evolves, it is expected that the design plan’s final approval will be given at the same time as Design Approval. This would ensure that the regulation requiring the design approver to be satisfied that the design was developed in accordance with all relevant systems and procedures was met, since the final plan should provide the necessary evidence.

25. Format of the Plan. The regulations do not specify a format for the design plan. There will be instances where the regulations are not satisfied by one document, but rather a number of plans, authorisations and procedures that collectively comprise the design plan. For example, the TAR does not expect simple substitutions to each have an individual design plan. In this case the design plan would comprise the agency’s procedure for substitutions and the duty statements of the persons performing those substitutions. At the other end of the scope and complexity spectrum, major projects could have numerous plans addressing different stages and aspects of the design activity. For example, a project may have numerous separate plans at system and component levels that each address different design issues such as hardware design, software design, integration, systems engineering, test and evaluation and so on. What the TAR requires in all these circumstances is that the AEO identify in its EMP how it will satisfy the design planning regulation.



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26. Note that the use of computer based decision recording tools such as Emerald do not, on their own, constitute a design development plan, as they fail to provide evidence that planning occurred prior to the design development starting. Further, unless the AEO requires specific information to be recorded in the comments or justification areas of the computer based system, elements of design planning may be missed out. For some classes of design changes, records of a ‘brainstorming’ session or a ‘team’ meeting in which the design development plan was agreed upon, together with the Emerald (or equivalent) records documenting the Judgement of Significance of the design, may meet the TAR’s requirements for design development planning. In each case, the specific requirements of the regulation (summarised at paragraph 22) are to be met.

Interface Identification

27. One of the areas in which designs traditionally fall-down is the integration of the design with other designs or the existing equipment and systems. Given that poorly designed interfaces may introduce significant technical risk, the regulations require that organisations identify all technical interfaces for the design and the design development process.

28. The TAR also requires that organisational interfaces are identified. This aspect of the regulations is particularly relevant for instances where an AEO has relied on another AEO or DSN member to develop the design. Clearly, where a design has been developed across organisational boundaries, the AEO must document the organisational interfaces, including the arrangements by which information is documented, transmitted and reviewed.

Specification Review

29. The actual development and approval of specifications is a Design Acceptance activity, thus this is not described in this chapter. However, the interpretation and implementation of those specifications is the essence of the design process. It is therefore imperative that the design agency ensures it shares a common understanding of the specification with the customer and that the specification provides sufficient guidance to the design agency to allow it to develop the design.

Data Management

30. Any design is only as good as the design reference data upon which it is based. It is essential, and the regulations mandate, that design agencies have a procedure in place to ensure that data used to support the design process is up-to-date and accurate. For example, when using stressing reports for aircraft the design agency must have a system to ensure that those reports are still accurate and have not been affected by the numerous repairs and modifications the ADF will almost certainly have incorporated during the aircraft’s life. Similar considerations may apply to reports such as system safety, thermal loads and other analyses forming part of the design reference data of the aircraft.

31. The TAR has not mandated any particular system for achieving this outcome. The configuration management processes defined in standards that meet the intent of extant Defence policy, such as DI(G) 4-5-006 (formerly DI(G)LOG 08-4) or AAP 7001.047(AM1), provide a guide as to how this may be achieved. The TAR will accept any necessary tailoring of the systems meeting a selected CM standard that satisfies the basic criteria that; design data be relevant to the design, changes to the data are controlled tracked and reported, and changes are verified.

Design Outputs Meet the Specification and are Verified as Doing So

32. The design control system must ensure that designs meet the specification for that design and are shown to do so. Like every other part of the Design Acceptance process the procedures associated with verifying that the design meets the specification must be tailored to the scope and significance of the design in question. Simple designs, such as substitutions, may have a quick comparison of the specifications of the components to cross-reference the requirements, with the verification relying solely upon testing the manufacturer may have performed. On the other hand the development of a system comprising multiple components, many designed within the design agency, would require a substantial requirements cross reference matrix, probably hosted on a specialised computer tool and supported by a comprehensive test program.

JUDGEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

33. A fundamental principle behind design control is that engineering rigour and expertise is applied to activities commensurate with the significance of the design change involved. The significance of a design change can be resolved into any number of degrees, but the regulations only require two degrees of significance. Thus, design changes are referred to as either significant or non-significant. The latter does not imply no significance (every design change will have some degree of significance), rather a level that does not warrant the additional engineering rigour and expertise that is required for significant design changes.



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34. The significance of a design change (significant or non-significant), is to be judged as early as possible by an authorised person prior to Design Review (since the significance will have a bearing on who is authorised to perform Design Review in accordance with the regulations). As a result of Design Review, however, a design’s significance may be upgraded or downgraded as appropriate. It is possible therefore that a design may be developed and reviewed several times prior to Design Approval and Design Acceptance in the case that the significance of the design has changed.

NOTE

• Care must be taken to ensure that any Judgement of Significance made in the very early stages of a design change proposal remains valid once the proposal is fully developed. Where a design is changed to non-significant, the decision record must include a statement justifying that decision.

35. Judgement of Significance is performed by determining both the consequence and probability of partial performance or failure of a design. The combination of these assessments is generally determined by a matrix that provides the corresponding significance result.

36. Relationship between consequence and probability. TAREG 3.4.5.a.(6) covers three instances in which the consequence of partial performance or failure of a design should be assessed as high. The design is not necessarily to be judged significant, as this depends on the overall probability of failure or partial performance of the design. The design may still be judged non-significant if the probability of partial performance or failure is low.

37. TAREG 3.4.5.a.(7) requires that the probability of partial performance or failure of a design be assessed as high if the design change requires comprehensive justification, assessment and verification. This is because a complex design involves more design assumptions, development work, verification, decisions, judgement, and consideration of factors involved. An omission or error in the design is therefore more likely (ie. ‘there are more things that can go wrong’). In this case, it is likely that the design is judged significant, since the consequences arising from a complex design are generally more serious as well.

38. In the case of a complex design (as shown in Figure 6–1), it is acceptable for individual design activities to have individual judgements of significance performed, in addition to the significance judgement for the whole design. In this case, Design Review and Approval of the individual activities may be performed according to their individual significance. Design Review and Approval of the entire design is to be performed according to the overall significance of the design, noting that:

a. any individual design activity judged to be significant would normally cause the overall design to be significant; and

b. even in the event that all individual design elements are judged as non-significant, their cumulative effect may cause the overall design to be significant.

39. Who can Make a Judgement of Significance? In general, a Judgement of Significance must only be performed by (at least) a DE. The SDE is to ensure that local procedures provide adequate control and clearly define the applicable conditions and limitations (eg. technical substitution process). Persons authorised by the SDE or a DSDE (if applicable) must only make decisions within authorised limits, the limits of available supporting data, and within their self-assessed level of competency.

40. TAREG 3.4.5.a(2) allows for non-DEs to perform Judgement of Significance, providing that the decision process is well defined, and the exercise of professional engineering judgement is not required. Should SDEs choose to authorise staff below the level of DE to perform Judgement of Significance, evidence and justification must be provided that the Judgement of Significance process at the AEO is not compromised. Specifically, significant design changes must not be mistakenly passed through the system as non-significant (and hence not receive the appropriate degree of engineering rigour).

41. By way of guidance, the TAR would normally expect that such an arrangement would only be used for simple classes of design change such as substitutions, and would only apply for selected staff deemed to be suitably experienced and competent. Further, the TAR would expect that the ‘exercise of professional engineering judgement’ criteria is replaced with specific instructions provided to individual personnel. Particular attention should be paid to circumstances in which these personnel judge a design change as non-significant.

THE ROLE OF THE DSN IN PRODUCING AN APPROVED DESIGN

42. The role of a DSN member in producing an approved design will depend on its status. The SDE is required under TAREG 3.3.3 to document in the AEO’s EMP how each DSN member’s services are to be treated, and when they are to be sought. Generally, any DSN member is able to perform design development, including the design development plan. Judgement of Significance and all activities from Design Review onwards may only be performed



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by an AEO or persons assigned internal EA by the SDE. With respect to this chapter, the role of each DSN member is therefore one of the following:

a. Able to undertake design development. In this case, designs or other TI are generally treated as advice (‘Expert Advice’ etc.). The DSN member is not an AEO, and therefore any services, designs, or TI provided must be subject to TIR, Judgement of Significance, Design Review and Approval, by an AEO with applicable scope.

b. Able to provide Approved Designs (in addition to TI and any other advice). The DSN member is an AEO or meets the requirements of TAREG 2.5.6.c for Design Acceptance from a non-AEO. An Approved Design provided by a DSN member of this type may be immediately considered for Design Acceptance certification providing the design:

(1) is within the level and scope of AEO certification (or other agreed services, such as an OEM) of the DSN member; and

(2) meets the requirements for Design Approval, in that a Design Approval certificate has been provided by an appropriately authorised person (ie. not an email from the OEM’s Field Service Representative recommending a course of action).

43. In the case of a non-AEO, in accordance with TAREG 2.5.6.c, the DAR is required to determine the required equivalent documentation to a Design Approval certificate, such as:

a. NAA or UK/US FMS approval and release documentation; or

b. OEM documentation indicating approval and release by a suitably appointed and qualified engineer within the OEM company.

44. All of the considerations described above are precisely the requirements an SDE must consider and document in the AEO’s DSN for staff to follow.

45. Example. Section 3 Chapter 4 annex A provides an example DSN table for the fictitious XXSPO organisation. In this example, ARDU ASCENG, ASI-DGTA, NDTSL-DGTA, and Upgrades R Us are AEOs, and hence they are able to provide Approved Designs within their scope of EA. Laser Aeronautics and Thruster America are OEMs, and hence minor designs may be passed for Design Acceptance certification under TAREG 2.5.6.c. The SDE’s guidance to staff is that they are to be treated as Approved Designs. Note that information originating from the Field Service Representative (FSR) for Laser Aeronautics may only be treated as an Approved Design if it has evidence of endorsement by Laser Aeronautics USA. DSTO AMRL is not an AEO, hence all designs and advice are treated as TI. The F-XX-ALC USAF and F-XXTLO USAF are also neither an AEO nor an OEM, hence their designs and advice are also treated as TI, even if the information originated from an OEM. This is because the configuration, role, and environment requirement of TAREG 2.5.6.c is not satisfied. In other words, since there are configuration differences between the ADF and USAF variants of the F-XX, the SDE wishes to ensure that staff do not assume that designs provided by the USAF are directly applicable.

Annex:

A. Design Control Flowchart for Minor Changes to the Type Design



6A–1

DESIGN CONTROL FLOWCHART FOR MINOR CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

DESIGN TASK

Develop DesignDevelopment Plan

(Reg 3.4.1.c(2))

Non-DE Develops DE Develops

Review by DE(Reg 3.4.4.a(2))

Review by DE(Reg 3.4.4.a(2))

Review byauthorised person

(Reg 3.4.4.a(3))

Approval byauthorised person

(Reg 3.4.3.a(1))Note: 2

SDE/DSDE Review(Reg 3.4.4.a(6))

Approval by DE(Reg 3.4.3.a(4))

Note: 2

Approval by SDE/DSDE

(Reg 3.4.3.a(3))

Review ofApproval by SDE/

DSDE(Reg 3.4.3.a(4))

Approval by DE(Reg 3.4.3.a(4))

Note: 2

Review ofApproval by SDE/

DSDE(Reg 3.4.3.a(4))

Approval by SDE/DSDE

(Reg 3.4.3.a(3))

JoScarried

out by DE(Reg

3.4.5) orauthorised

person(Reg

3.4.5.a(2))Note: 1

Significant SignificantNon-Significant

Accept under Assumption ofDesign Acceptance

(Reg 2.5.9)

DAR certifies DesignAcceptance(Reg 2.5.6)Acceptance

Approval

Review

Develop

Figure 6–A–1 Design Control Flowchart for Minor Changes to the Type Design

NOTE

Note 1. Initial Judgement of Significance (JoS) should ideally be determined at the Design Development Planning stage, but must be carried out prior to Design Review. JoS may be reviewed at any stage prior to Design Acceptance. If the JoS is changed from Non-Significant to Significant, the Design Development Plan is to be reviewed and the process is to start again.

Note 2. This may be the same person who reviewed the design.

• As per TAREG 3.3.2.b(2), the DSDE may perform all Design Control functions prescribed by TAREG 3.4. • The Reviewer must always be independent of the Developer, as required by TAREG 3.4.4.a (5). • The Approver should be independent of the Developer.



6A–2

Blank Page



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 7

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE


TAREG 2.2.3 Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for New Aircraft or Major Changes

TAREG 2.2.4 ADF Statement of Requirements for New Aircraft of Major Changes

TAREG 2.2.5 Airworthiness Standards for New Aircraft and Major Changes

TAREG 2.2.7 Informed RPA

TAREG 2.2.11 Compliance Findings

TAREG 2.5.2 Design Acceptance System for Changes to a Type Design

TAREG 2.5.3 Classification of Changes in Type Design

TAREG 2.5.6 Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to Type Design

TAREG 2.5.7 ADF Statement of Requirements for Minor Changes

TAREG 2.5.8 Airworthiness Standards for Minor Design Changes

TAREG 2.5.9 Assumption of Design Acceptance Certification

TAREG 3.4.6 Design Acceptance

INTRODUCTION

1. Design Acceptance is the cornerstone of the ADF’s technical airworthiness regulatory system and the fundamental reason for the existence of Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs). Design Acceptance means a determination of the technical acceptability of equipment design for Service use regardless of whether the design agency was a Commonwealth organisation or a commercial organisation. In the technical airworthiness context, the regulations deal primarily with aircraft and aircraft-related equipment design; however the concepts are identical for non-aircraft technical equipment. A DAR is a person with a delegation from the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) to undertake Design Acceptance functions in accordance with TAREG 2.

2. Whilst the concept of Design Acceptance is straightforward its application can be difficult to understand and implement, especially when designs can come in a wide variety of forms with varying degrees of completeness. One of the more difficult aspects of Design Acceptance is trying to balance the autonomy of design and item management agencies to achieve good logistics outcomes with the need to assure technical acceptability (which is sometimes referred to as technical integrity). In the regulations relating to Design Acceptance, the TAR has sought to facilitate this balance. The intent is that the regulations provide adequate assurance of equipment technical acceptability whilst imposing the minimum necessary constraint (and Commonwealth interference) with design or Configuration Item (CI) management agency engineering decision-making.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on the Design Acceptance process so that DARs can perform their role more effectively and AEOs can better understand how the Commonwealth accepts their design outputs.

SCOPE

4. This chapter covers the Design Acceptance process for new aircraft, and major and minor changes to the existing Type Design. While this guidance is focussed primarily on aircraft and aircraft-related equipment designs, as stated in Paragraph 1, the concepts are identical for non-aircraft technical equipment. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.



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KEY CONCEPTS OF DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

Regulatory Concepts

5. Before discussing the elements of Design Acceptance, there are a number of core concepts that guide the regulation development process and provide a useful starting point for understanding the regulations. These concepts are:

a. Design Acceptance is a State function which cannot be contracted out.

b. Design Acceptance is a process, not an act, and applies to all technical equipment. It starts when the ADF develops a specification, continues as a design agency is selected to perform design activity and ends in Design Acceptance certification.

c. Although a State function, certain activities within the Design Acceptance process may, and should, be undertaken by a number of suitably authorised people other than the DAR, including commercial organisations.

d. The Design Acceptance process does not necessarily require the DAR to be personally involved in the design process of any specific design.

Principle Elements of the Design Acceptance Process

6. The Design Acceptance process embodies four principle elements. These are:

a. Specification. All designs irrespective of classification require a specification that provides a suitable basis for Design Acceptance in that the Commonwealth’s requirements are sufficiently complete, verifiable and attainable. The specification forms part of an ADF Statement of Requirement (SOR). A specification for design represents a complete and technically rigorous statement of the required design outcomes. The design agency should be able to meet the specification with an acceptable level of technical risk, and it must be possible to verify that the specification has been met.

b. Competency. The design agency must be assessed as having, and must be judged to have applied, the necessary quality systems and competence to complete the design development with acceptable levels of technical risk.

c. Verification. The DAR must be satisfied that there is adequate evidence that the design complies with the specification.

d. Certification. Design Approval certification is required from the design agency attesting that the design has been adequately recorded and verified, and meets the specification.

Design Approval versus Technical Acceptability

7. Generally, design quality is assured through approval of the design by a competent design agency against the approved design requirements and standards plus an acceptable basis of design verification. Thus, the design agency is responsible for the competent execution of the design function (not the DAR) regardless of whether it is a Commonwealth or commercial organisation. Competent design agencies are recognised through award of AEO certification, which is maintained through a suitable compliance assurance program.

8. The DAR is a representative of the TAR for Design Acceptance functions, which determine the technical acceptability of aircraft and aircraft–related equipment for Service use. As such, the DAR is the ‘custodian’ of the Design Acceptance process for the systems nominated by the TAR, in a similar manner to which the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) is responsible for the EMS. In accordance with TAREG 3.4.6, Commonwealth organisations with Design Acceptance responsibilities for the acquisition or support of the equipment must develop and maintain the skills and quality management systems necessary for:

a. the development and approval of adequate technical specifications (the ADF SOR as per TAREGs 2.2.4 and 2.5.7);

b. assessment and ongoing review of design agency competency (the compliance assurance program);

c. assessment and management of technical risk; and

d. the review and acceptance of design verification results (compliance findings).



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Design Acceptance for Changes to a Type Design

9. The regulations covering Design Acceptance for a major change to an existing Type Design and for a new aircraft acquisition are fundamentally similar and are addressed concurrently in this chapter. The regulations covering Design Acceptance for minor changes to an existing Type Design are more flexible and are covered separately.

10. The Design Acceptance requirements for acquisition of a new aircraft are obvious. For aircraft already in ADF service; however, due to somewhat different requirements there is a need to classify changes to an existing Type Design as either major or minor.

Classification of Changes to the Type Design

11. The first step in the Design Acceptance process for a change to the Type Design is to classify the design as either major or minor. This classification determines whether Design Acceptance is to be conducted under a routine process followed by the aircraft CI manager and controlled by the aircraft DAR, or whether the design requires additional oversight by the TAR and, in most cases the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) and Airworthiness Authority (AA), through the Airworthiness Board (AwB).

12. The basic criteria for classification of a design change are listed at TAREG 2.5.3. The distinction between major and minor may be difficult to define. Conceptually, only the TAR may classify a design. However, the TAR recognises that the vast majority of changes to an aircraft’s Type Design are minor and therefore allows the DAR to assume all changes to the Type Design are minor unless they fit the criteria at TAREG 2.5.3. This does not necessarily mean the design will be classified as major rather that the classification is not clear and requires a determination from the TAR.

13. The classification of a design as major or minor is not restricted to its level of technical risk. It is possible for very simple designs to be classified as major and require extra rigour and oversight, if the TAR (sometimes with the concurrence of the Operational Airworthiness Regulation (OAR) where operational considerations need be included) considers the operational implications of that design are of sufficient importance. In fact, it is possible that a role change to an aircraft that did not require any changes to the Type Design may require OAA and AwB oversight, leading to the issue of a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC).

14. Specification. The nature of the specification will depend on the classification of the design. TAREG 2.2.4 contains the requirements for major changes to the Type Design, while TAREG 2.5.7 is applicable for minor changes.

DELEGATION OF DAR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROJECTS

15. Aerospace Systems Division—Acquisition (ASD(Acq)) is an Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) responsible for all DMO aircraft related projects that are not accountable to a DMO aircraft SPO. The Chief Engineer Acquisition (CENGR Acq) holds the SDE appointment within the ASD(Acq) AEO, responsible for ensuring that DAR responsibilities for these projects are properly conducted. Due to the broad range of systems and capabilities being acquired, the TAR recognises the impracticality of the CENGR ACQ undertaking the Design Acceptance functions required by the TAMM. TAREG 1.2.4.a(1) allows for the delegation of DAR responsibilities by the TAR to selected Deputy Senior Design Engineers (nominally Project Engineering Managers) within DMO aircraft acquisition Project Offices. The process by which certain DSDEs are selected and their applications processed, leading to authorisation as a DAR, is detailed in the ASD (Acq) EMS.

16. As the DMO aircraft acquisition projects deliver aerospace product and capability, technical airworthiness responsibility will, in all cases, transition to a SPO SDE and DAR for in-service engineering management and Design Acceptance. CENGR ACQ nominally retains SDE responsibility for all such projects until sustainment activities commence, at which point the SDE responsibilities and associated supporting EMS transfers to the in-service SPO. DAR transfer to an in-service agency may be independent of SDE transfer, and should occur when the Design Acceptance workload and, more importantly, associated risk has transitioned from the acquisition to the sustainment environment. As a fundamental principle, at no time will more than one DAR be responsible for Design Acceptance for the same materiel.

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR CHANGES TO A TYPE DESIGN

17. Design Acceptance for new aircraft or major changes to a Type Design is covered under TAREG 2.2. Designs of this classification are generally typified by their large size, duration, and complexity of design activity. Ideally, the DAR performs one act of Design Acceptance certification for the entire design. The certification is based on (usually) large quantities of review and verification activities (generally called compliance finding activities) of each and every facet of the design. Put another way, the DAR’s single Design Acceptance certification may cover many Design Approval certificates issued by the design agency.



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18. Design Acceptance is a process that applies to all technical equipment, regardless of the direct impact upon airworthiness. For aircraft and aircraft-related equipment, the determination of technical acceptability of equipment design for Service use applies to more than just airworthiness aspects. The specification for a new aircraft or major change to Type Design will cover many required design outcomes that relate to mission performance, useability and the Design Acceptance process considers these. TAREG 2 mandates minimum requirements for Design Acceptance to ensure adequate assurance of equipment technical acceptability. As part of the four principal elements of Design Acceptance, the Design Acceptance process for a new aircraft or major change to Type Design includes the following additional steps:

a. compilation of the ADF SOR (TAREG 2.2.4), including the prescription of relevant airworthiness standards for the design activity (TAREG 2.2.5) and reference to the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) (TAREG 2.2.6);

b. compilation of the Design Acceptance strategy (Annex A to TAREG 2), including any applicable planned Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance (TAREG 2.2.7);

c. obtaining TAR endorsement of the SOR noting a new requirement that the DAR formally attests that the SOR meets the requirements of TAREGs 2.2.4 a and b; and

d. issue of the Design Acceptance certificate by the DAR (TAREG 2.2.3).

ADF Statement of Requirement

19. The ADF SOR typically comprises the contract Statement of Work (SOW) and Specification. DMO ASD procedures provide guidance on drafting these documents. The SOR constitutes the complete set of design requirements that the Design Acceptance strategy must address.

20. From an airworthiness regulatory perspective, the TAR requires that the SOR:

a. has been developed in accordance with the Design Acceptance strategy;

b. contains appropriate airworthiness design standards to assure the safe operation of the air vehicle;

c. identifies the agency e.g. AEO, National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or ADF COE responsible for the conduct of the design verification activities;

d. ensures that the data necessary to show compliance against the design requirements is made available by the design agency to support the Design Acceptance strategy; and

e. undergo a regulatory review by DGTA-ADF.

21. Technology Advice and Airworthiness Design Requirements. Section 3, Chapter 12 provides a comprehensive explanation of the application of appropriate airworthiness design requirements for new aircraft and major design changes to existing platforms. DGTA-ADF staff are able to assist POs to assure that appropriate airworthiness design requirements are included in SORs. POs should liaise with DGTA-ADF seeking this assistance, as early as possible in the development of the SOR. This assistance constitutes technology advice.

Design Acceptance Strategy

22. For a new aircraft or a major change to the Type Design, the TAR requires a documented Design Acceptance strategy. The Design Acceptance strategy provides the TAR with evidence that all Design Acceptance activities have been considered, planned, and allocated.

23. The TAR requirements for a Design Acceptance strategy are shown in TAREG 2, Annex A. An example of a completed Design Acceptance strategy is provided at Annex A to this chapter. For major acquisition activities, DMO ASD procedures provide guidance on drafting a Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS). The PDAS is a document intended to meet the regulatory requirements of a Design Acceptance strategy as well as acquisition specific requirements.

Design Approval Certificates

24. TAREG 2 requires that the design agency (or agencies) have submitted Design Approval certificates before the DAR can issue a Design Acceptance certificate. This aspect is very important as it represents one of the four principle elements upon which Design Acceptance is based. By providing a Design Approval certificate (or certificates) as outlined in TAREG 3.4.3, the design agency formally documents compliance of the design to the specified requirements and design standards.



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Design Acceptance

25. For new aircraft or major changes to Type Design, TAREG 2 only requires a formal Design Acceptance certification when the DAR applies to the TAR for a recommendation for issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), STC or Special Flight Permit (SFP). The majority of Design Acceptance activities or steps (e.g. review and acceptance of individual Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) against contract requirements) can be undertaken by staff other than the DAR. The method by which these activities are controlled and authorised is through the Design Acceptance strategy.

NOTE

• In issuing a Design Acceptance certification, the DAR is not required to personally review all design decisions, calculations and design outputs. Rather, the Design Acceptance certification is the method by which the DAR certifies that Design Acceptance functions have been conducted within a compliant Design Acceptance system that addresses the requirements of TAREG 2.2.3.

Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance

26. Frequently, a Design Acceptance strategy relies on a certain level of prior acceptance and/or certification by another airworthiness body. Aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are increasingly turning to civil airworthiness standards (such as FAR 25) to either reduce costs or increase potential applications for their aircraft (i.e. civil as well as military roles). TAREG 2.2.7 prescribes the TAR’s minimum requirements where informed RPA is proposed as part of the Design Acceptance strategy.

27. The TAR will not necessarily recognise prior acceptance or Type Certification from any airworthiness organisation. The NAAs or military airworthiness bodies of the countries listed at TAREG 2.2.7 have been reviewed and assessed by the TAR. The TAR may assess any NAA or military airworthiness body not listed at TAREG 2.2.7, to determine if their systems and procedures provide for an equivalent level of safety. These organisations would generally require a physical inspection and audit by the TAR’s staff of the procedures and systems used. In the event that informed RPA is proposed, this should form part of the ADF SOR. TAREG 2.2.4 requires, at the time of the TAR’s endorsement of the ADF SOR, submission of the documents listed at TAREG 2.2.7.b. The DAR must submit the data necessary to compile a Type Record (of the aircraft type that has been previously accepted) as well as evidence of access to the Type Design data of the type previously accepted.

28. The evidence of prior acceptance must be relevant to the ADF configuration, role, and environment. informed RPA may be proposed for only part of the Type Design of the aircraft being acquired. For example, the Design Acceptance strategy for a B767 based Air to Air Refuelling aircraft may seek informed RPA for the certification under FAR 25 of the basic B767 passenger transport aircraft. Since the basic aircraft’s configuration, role and environment are not compatible with the ADF aircraft, the DAR would also need to propose how the differences, including refuelling system modifications, are to be accepted. These differences may further be based on USAF acceptance of a similar aircraft (as an example). Alternately, if the configuration, role or environment is unique to the ADF, greater in-house verification effort may be required.

Foreign Military Sales – Exemption against TAREG 2.2.3.a.(4)

29. TAREG 2.2.3.a.(4) requires that the DAR must only provide Design Acceptance certification for new aircraft or major changes if the design agency providing the design has achieved and maintained AEO status. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) organisation within the US Department of Defence does not automatically meet AEO criteria. However, DMO POs acquiring items or modification to items under an FMS arrangement can assume this requirement as being met if the conditions within TAREG 2.2.7 Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance or TAREG 2.5.6 Design Acceptance for minor changes to Type Design have been met and documented.

30. On the above basis, the TAR has approved a standing exemption against TAREG 2.2.3.a.(4) for the DMO. This exemption allows all DMO DARs to issue Design Acceptance certification for engineering services provided under FMS. While the assurances provided by design agency AEO status are not present for FMS acquisitions, the TAR still expects that a PDAS developed under these arrangements will demonstrate, as part of the Design Acceptance strategy, that sufficient rigour has been applied to assure design quality.

Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate

31. The actions required of a DAR prior to issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate are listed at TAREG 2.2.3. In particular, the following requirements should be noted:



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a. ADF SOR. The TAR must previously have endorsed the ADF SOR. Any subsequent changes to the SOR must have been approved by the DAR, a relevant ASR, or the TAR, depending on their impact on safety. This regulation is intended to allow the DAR to make minor changes; however, any changes that may reduce the level of safety established by airworthiness standards should be referred to either a relevant ASR, or the TAR.

b. Authorised Engineering Organisation. Note that unlike design changes classified as minor, there is no latitude given for certification of the design agency as an AEO. The design agency for a new aircraft or major design change to the Type Design must be an AEO.

c. Requirements upon design agency. TAREG 2.2.3.a.(5) details specific items that the design agency or agencies must have provided before a Design Acceptance certificate can be issued, including a Type Record and Design Approval certificates.

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE FOR MINOR CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

32. Design Acceptance for minor changes to the Type Design is covered under TAREG 2.5.6. Designs of this classification are generally typified by their relatively short duration and greater frequency. This is because the AEO performing CI management of the in-service aircraft is frequently required to process design changes to, either incrementally improve the capability or maintain the current capability. Design changes may become necessary due to items becoming unsupportable, superseded or to correct manufacturing defects or general wear and tear as a result of operations. Designs may originate from within the DAR’s own AEO or from commercial AEOs or other members of their Design Support Network (DSN). A significant portion of the DAR’s workload is generally devoted to supervising the Design Acceptance process or performing Design Acceptance certification on these types of designs.

33. As outlined in ‘Key Concepts of Design Acceptance’ earlier in this chapter, Design Acceptance represents corporate governance on the part of the Commonwealth. Consequently, the TAR can only delegate this function to a Commonwealth employee and not, for example, to an employee within a commercial AEO. Furthermore, Design Acceptance is a process not an act and many people throughout the design change process, from the development of the original specification through to final sign-off by the DAR, conduct Design Acceptance activities. The DAR controls the overall Design Acceptance process and under the regulations, is the only person who can issue the Design Acceptance Certificate. Except for the specific exemption in Paragraph 16, this final act cannot be delegated.

34. TAREG 2.5.2 requires the DAR to establish a Design Acceptance system. This system should comprise a collection of procedures which prescribe how:

a. designs are to be specified,

b. agencies providing design services are assessed for competency,

c. designs are to be verified as meeting the ADF requirements, and

d. designs receive Design Approval by the relevant design agency.

35. For a minor design change, the equivalent of a new aircraft or major design change DAS is the design development plan. The AEO that provides support to the DAR is required to develop Design Acceptance procedures, in accordance with TAREG 3.4.6. The following paragraphs describe the requirements for a Design Acceptance system in further detail.

Closing the Design Acceptance Process

36. The regulations covering the Design Acceptance process for minor changes to Type Design are subtly different to those for new aircraft and major changes. Nevertheless, these subtle differences are important to understand as they introduce a degree of added flexibility to the process. The Design Acceptance process for minor changes to Type Design is more easily understood by starting with how the process is concluded; therefore, tracing the actions required prior to this step in reverse order back to the start of the process. Further, the application of the intermediate steps is dependent to some extent on how the Design Acceptance process is to be closed off. The regulations allow two ways of closing off the Design Acceptance process for minor changes to Type Design, through either:

a. the issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate by the DAR (TAREG 2.5.6); or

b. the assumption of Design Acceptance by either the design agency or a member of the DAR’s staff (TAREG 2.5.9).

37. Design Acceptance Certification. The first method is the simplest method to imagine and implement. It requires the DAR to sign a certificate signifying that the criteria for Design Acceptance under TAREG 2.5.6 have been met. This process does not require the DAR to personally review all the design decisions, calculations and design



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outputs. Rather, the Design Acceptance certificate is the method by which the DAR certifies that Design Acceptance functions and activities have been conducted within a compliant Design Acceptance system that addresses the requirements of TAREG 2.5.6. Whilst this method of closure is effective it can place an unreasonable workload upon the DAR, depending on the number of designs requiring Design Acceptance certification. Ultimately this could impact upon the airworthiness of the aircraft if important design changes are held up awaiting the DAR’s personal certification.

38. Assumption of Design Acceptance. This method avoids specific DAR Design Acceptance certification for each individual change for certain groups of designs and expedites the Design Acceptance process. Assumption of Design Acceptance enables the DAR to allow an external AEO or individuals within the DAR’s AEO to assume that the DAR would issue a Design Acceptance Certificate, for certain groups of design and under specified conditions. The design’s significance is not a factor. The DAR must document the arrangement through an approved procedure (for the DAR’s AEO staff), or through a formal agreement (for an external AEO), such as a contract or Memorandum of Agreement or Understanding. Specific conditions listed within TAREG 2.5.9 are highlighted as follows:

a. the procedures or agreement must reference the interface, airworthiness and other performance requirements to be maintained;

b. the design changes or classes of design change applicable (e.g. all hydraulic systems or substitutions only);

c. while assumption of design acceptance will not result in a Design Acceptance Certificate (as only a DAR can issue this), it is to result in a record which must:

(1) include certification that the conditions for Design Acceptance have been satisfied,

(2) require that the person recording is at least authorised to certify Design Approval for the design, and

(3) reference the agreement or procedure that allows for the Assumption of Design Acceptance.

d. Commercial AEOs must:

(1) make all records available for the DAR’s review (minimum 10% no less than once per year); and

(2) be monitored for their performance under the assumption of Design Acceptance agreement, and have that authorisation revoked if performance is less than adequate.

39. There are some design changes for which Design Acceptance cannot be assumed and which will require individual endorsement by the DAR (and perhaps the TAR) prior to their incorporation, irrespective of the application of the Design Acceptance process (TAREG 2.5.9.c). These include those designs:

a. introducing a new (or markedly enhanced) capability (since the existing specification will not be relevant, this effectively means designs classified as major);

b. resulting in a reduction (or suspected reduction) in safety standards or mission capability (the TAR recognises that this requires the exercise of considerable judgement);

c. requiring changes in the technical interface with other systems and human/machine interfaces; and

d. involving rejection of mandatory or safety related OEM advice.

40. The above restrictions represent the minimum level of constraint that the TAR will impose on design agencies. DARs are not necessarily expected to permit all design agencies this level of autonomy and may wish to add further restrictions based on the:

a. confidence in performance;

b. quality of specification and design data available;

c. depth of engineering expertise available;

d. involvement of contractors or subcontractors (as applicable); and

e. design change significance.

Specification for Minor Design Changes

41. TAREG 2.5.6 requires that a Design Acceptance Certificate is only issued for a design if the DAR is satisfied that the design complies with the relevant ADF SOR. The DAR may authorise Deputy Senior Design Engineers (DSDEs) or Design Engineers (DEs) from within their AEO, or the SDE of an external AEO, to approve SORs for



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minor design changes within the level and scope of the assumption of Design Acceptance process or agreement. Personnel with Engineering Authority below the DE level cannot approve SORs for minor design changes. These regulations contribute to satisfy the first of the four principal elements of the Design Acceptance process identified at Paragraph 6, i.e. the design must satisfy a specification which states that all of the Commonwealth’s requirements are verifiable and attainable.

42. Design changes under an SOR (via the specification) should ensure the original basis for certification is not compromised, and that the new work either complies with the original airworthiness requirements, or with equally comprehensive updated requirements. TAREG 2.5.7.a. describes the SOR approval requirements for minor changes that conform to the existing aircraft specification. TAREG 2.5.7.c describes the requirement to seek TAR endorsement (by submission of the listed documents) for instances when the SOR does not conform to the existing aircraft specification.

43. What constitutes a specification? A specification is a complete and technically rigorous statement of a design outcome. Many designs, such as minor structural repairs or technical substitutions, would appear to have no distinct specification. Rather, their only requirement is that they restore or maintain whatever integrity or performance the original structure or component possessed. Another common problem is that often Service Bulletins and other Technical Information (TI), which recommend a design change, don’t contain any of the rationale or requirements for the design i.e. no specification.

44. In these cases, the AEO could overcome the difficulty of raising a specification for each and every design change by instituting procedures to ensure the essential elements of the SOR regulation are satisfied. For example, an AEO could have a generic procedure for substitutions which contains the specification for substitutions. One requirement might be that all new components must maintain the technical integrity and functionality of the component being replaced and would reference the appropriate high-level specifications. Such a procedure, if approved by the DAR would satisfy the regulations. Alternatively, the record created from evaluation of the TI after registration can act as the specification for any design change contained in that TI. The evaluation of any TI requires a judgement as to whether the TI is applicable and requires action. The record of these judgements forms the basis of the specification of a design change. All that is required is a procedure to ensure the correct information is entered into the TI evaluation record and that the organisation’s procedures make it plain that the TI evaluation has this dual role.

45. When is the specification approved? The regulations do not specify when the DAR must approve a specification during the Design Acceptance process. They simply require that such approval must be given prior to the award of a Design Acceptance Certificate. The obvious time to approve most specifications is prior to design development. Such a strategy minimises risk that the specification and consequently the design, does not meet the ADF’s requirements. However, there will be occasions where the specification will only be drafted after the design is developed. The example of the TI evaluation serving as an ADF specification referred to above is just one example.

Design Agency Competency

46. The primary method by which design agency competency is determined is through certification as an AEO. Whereas this is an essential requirement for Design Acceptance certification for a new aircraft or major design change, other options are available to the DAR for a minor change to Type Design. Should the design agency be not certified as an AEO, or if the AEO certification scope is not relevant to the design under consideration, then firstly the design must be applicable to the ADF’s configuration, roles and environment. Further, the following criteria apply (TAREG 2.5.6):

a. Informed recognition of prior acceptance. Using the same criteria under TAREG 2.2.7, the DAR may perform Design Acceptance certification for a design previously accepted by a recognised NAA or military airworthiness body.

b. Other. In the absence of a relevant AEO certification or prior acceptance, the following caveats apply:

(1) the design must comply with airworthiness standards prescribed in the specification;

(2) the design agency must be assessed by the DAR to be of acceptable quality and reliability (this should be already documented within the DSN);

(3) the original end-user (customer) of the design must be known; and

(4) the design must be approved by either the relevant OEM, or an engineering organisation of acceptable quality (based on the DAR’s professional judgement).

Verification

47. The DAR must verify that the design meets the ADF’s requirements. The degree and amount of verification activity required varies for each design. Some designs require independent testing, desktop analysis of test reports or a



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physical demonstration. It is not practical to verify each aspect of each minor design change to an aircraft throughout its life, nor is it in keeping with the quality management process approach to Design Acceptance. The regulations therefore do not impose a minimum level of verification activity. DARs are expected to identify the issues that are important to the maintenance of the technical integrity of the aircraft and ensure, via procedures in their Design Acceptance system, that these issues are verified using a satisfactory method.

Design Approval Certification

48. Design Approval certification, by the design agency, is an organisation’s assurance that the design complies with specification requirements. The requirements for Design Approval certification are covered at TAREG 3.4.3 and explained within Section 3, Chapter 6. Design Approval certification is the final of the four principal elements of Design Acceptance at Paragraph 6. For minor changes to the Type Design there can be many forms of document or TI that represent ‘Design Approval certification’ from a design agency. For example, an OEM Service Bulletin may fulfil this requirement. It is therefore important for the TI and DSN processes of an AEO to disclose those items of TI that may be treated as an ‘approved design’ i.e. include a ‘Design Approval certification’ from the design agency.

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE FOR NON-AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

49. TAREG 2 provides the TAR’s minimum requirements for the Design Acceptance of aircraft and aircraft-related equipment. Hence, many of the specific requirements do not apply for Design Acceptance of non-aircraft technical equipment notwithstanding that the basic concepts of Design Acceptance are identical for non-aircraft Technical Equipment. Consequently, Design Acceptance for non-aircraft technical equipment can be greatly simplified. This section provides guidance from the TAR on the minimum requirements.

50. Non-aircraft technical equipment can take many forms, ranging from commercial-off-the-shelf computers hosting aircraft maintenance tools, through to aircraft Ground Support Equipment (GSE), Air Traffic Control and Air Defence systems and ground based navigation aids. Some of the items used to support ADF aviation activities can be procured and design accepted within the technical regulatory system of another environment Technical Regulatory Authority (TRA) For example, the Land TRA will manage aircraft refuelling vehicles. Other items will represent an integral component of an aircraft weapons system e.g. aircraft type specific GSE, and yet these are not required to be managed with the full rigour of the TAMM regulations. The TAR allows that the TAMM regulations be either tailored or used as a management guide only for these systems as outlined in Section 1, Chapter 5. The TAR does not wish to constrain the flexibility available to organisations for supporting non-aircraft technical equipment. Accordingly, the only constraints that the TAR mandates for non-aircraft technical equipment are detailed in the following:

a. Specification. The Commonwealth must approve a document (or suite of documents) that provide a suitable basis for Design Acceptance, in that the design requirements are sufficiently complete, verifiable and attainable. There is no requirement for TAR or TAR staff involvement in development or approval of the SOR.

b. Competency. The design agency (or agencies) must be assessed as having, and must be judged to have applied, the necessary quality systems and competencies to complete the design development with acceptable levels of technical risk. The TAR has no requirement for design agencies to be accredited as AEOs. All that is required is for the Commonwealth to have established a level of confidence in the organisation, with the level of review and audit dependent upon the complexity (and hence risk) of design activity.

c. Verification. The TAR requires that there is adequate evidence that the design complies with the specification. Independent ‘compliance finding’ activity may not be necessary, depending on the level of technical risk.

d. Certification. The TAR requires that the design agency provide a certification attesting that the design meets the specification. Strict compliance with all of the TAREG 3.4 (Design Control) requirements is not mandatory.

51. No other TAR requirements for the Design Acceptance of non-aircraft technical equipment should be assumed or inferred.

Annex:

A. Example of a Design Acceptance Strategy



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EXAMPLE OF A DESIGN ACCEPTANCE STRATEGY

PROJECT AIR 5678 DODO AVIONICS UPGRADE

Introduction

1. This Design Acceptance strategy (DAS) is raised to document the strategy for Design Acceptance of PA5678 Dodo Avionics Upgrade project. This DAS is a living document, and a current and approved version will be submitted prior to:

a. TAR endorsement of the PA5678 Dodo Avionics Upgrade SOR (i.e. Specification and Statement of Work);

b. TAR recommendation for issue of a Special Flight Permit (SFP) to cover test flying requirements; and

c. TAR recommendation for issue of a Supplementary Type Certificate (STC) covering the upgraded Dodo aircraft avionics configuration.

2. PA5678 Dodo Avionics Upgrade project aims to replace ageing and unreliable flight station avionics equipment. The project is based on the installation of equipment and systems common to civil commuter aircraft variants operating in the USA under FAA certification, with the exception of the avionics computer, which is sourced from the UK.

3. Design Change Classification. This DAS is required since the design change incorporating the upgraded avionics equipment is classified as a Major change to the Type Design in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3. The design change classification was agreed during a meeting between DGTA-staff and project executives on 14 Feb 2008.

Airworthiness Design Standards

4. The airworthiness design standards have been compiled in accordance with the Maritime Patrol Group Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) for the Dodo aircraft. Existing equipment and systems identified as unsupportable beyond 2013 were identified during the Dodo aircraft Weapon System Management Committee meeting in Jul 2007 based on analysis performed by BBSPO staff.

5. In accordance with TAREG 2.2.5, airworthiness design standards for the replacement equipment are largely based on FAR Part 25 Amendment H, including all current and relevant Advisory Circulars (ACs). The upgraded avionics computer complies with DEF STAN 00-55 and 00-56, which have been assessed by DGTA staff as approved alternate standards to FAR 25.1301 and 25.1309 and the objectives of RTCA/DO178B. Airworthiness design standards are listed as part of the Certification Basis, within PA 5678 Dodo Avionics Upgrade Specification.

6. In accordance with TAREG 2.2.4.c(3), the Air 5678 Project Office (PO) has engaged SCI-DGTA staff on a regular basis prior to release of the Air 5678 Request For Tender (RFT) in order to compile the project Specification. Further, the TAR endorsed the project SOR as per BBSPO/2548/2/2/Tech Pt 6 (58) of 19 Jan 2008.

7. Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance. As described above, all equipment and systems to be fitted, with the exception of the avionics computer and interface software, are covered by an FAA issued STC for the aircraft type. Copies of the relevant FAA STCs issued may be found at Appendixes 1 to 5 inclusive. BBSPO CENGR proposed to accept the FAA issued STCs as informed RPA without performing any additional compliance finding activities on the equipment covered under these STCs. This proposal formed part of the SOR that was endorsed by the TAR as indicated at Paragraph 6 above.

Design Agency Details

8. The overall design for the installation of the upgraded avionics equipment and systems will be subject to Design Review and Approval by Upgrades R Us Pty Ltd, 132 Lorimer St, Fishermans Bend VIC 3009. Upgrades R Us is certified to ISO9001:2008 and is certified as an Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) vide certificate DGTA069 for the design and installation of Dodo surveillance equipment under a separate contract. The Upgrades R Us Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA) has recently been extended in scope to cover the flight station avionics equipment covered by this DAS.

9. Upgrades R Us intends to involve one subcontractor, Fatal Exception Software Pty Ltd, in software development activity required for the integration of the avionics computer.



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Design Acceptance System Description

10. Engineering Authority. The Senior Design Engineer (SDE) of Upgrades R Us, Mr. B. Modworld, has assigned Engineering Authority (EA) to competent Design Engineers (DEs) within his organisation to undertake Design Approval activities. The design is to receive Design Approval by Mr. Modworld and then forwarded to SQNLDR W. Simmons DSDE AV BBSPO, who will perform Design Acceptance Review in accordance with BBSPO SI(LOG) 2-40 before passing to CENGR BBSPO for Design Acceptance certification.

11. Compliance Finding Agencies. Compliance finding agencies are authorised to perform the following elements of the compliance finding activity:

a. FAA compliance findings with respect to STCs at Appendixes 1 to 5 (retrospective);

b. Mr. Randy Springfield of Software Certification Services Inc. (delegated DER by the FAA) with respect to avionics computer software designed and developed by Fatal Exception Software (under contract and on behalf of the Commonwealth);

c. Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG)-Air Systems Development and Test (ASD and T) Wing with respect to flight testing aspects; and

d. SCI-DGTA with respect to Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3).

12. Compliance finding agencies will undertake compliance finding activities in accordance with TAREG 2.2.11 and AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 1. In particular, compliance finding agencies will ensure that the data being used for compliance finding activities is applicable and current.

13. Certification Basis. The Certification Basis resides within the PA 5678 Dodo Avionics Upgrade Specification, and is the responsibility of DSDE AV BBSPO to maintain and update in accordance with AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 1. (If the CBD is to be managed as a stand alone document then it must be adequately referenced at this point.)

14. Compliance Assurance. XXSPO are the Sponsor AEO for Upgrades R Us under a separate contract for support of the F-XX AUS fighter aircraft. BBSPO has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) XXSPO/4078/25/10/Tech Pt 4 (57) of 25 Apr 2000 that addresses BBSPO participation in surveillance and auditing activities for Upgrades R Us. Upgrades R Us was last subject to a full compliance audit in Jan 2007 with three CARs raised and a satisfactory overall result.

15. Amendments to SOR. There have been no significant amendments to the SOR as at the date of this latest version of the DAS. Any future significant amendments to either document are to be submitted to the TAR for endorsement. Any minor amendments will receive approval by the BBSPO CENGR.

16. Review of SOI. There have been no significant amendments made to the DODO SOI by Maritime Patrol Group. CENGR BBSPO as a member of the Maritime Weapon System Management Committee will be involved with any future changes to the SOI.

17. Special Flight Permit (SFP). This DAS relies on a programme of flight testing activity to be conducted by ASD and T Wing to verify that the upgraded avionics configuration meets the performance and functional requirements of the Specification. SDE AV BBSPO will coordinate the BBSPO submission to the TAR recommending the issue of a SFP covering this activity based on submission of the following documents:

a. certification by the BBSPO CENGR that Design Acceptance activities have been completed as far as practicable at the time that the SFP is sought;

b. a draft Type Record supplement provided by Upgrades R Us;

c. a current version of this DAS;

d. evidence of accomplishments made against the DAS;

e. the proposed SFP in draft format, limited to the flight test envelope recommended by ASD and T Wing as suitable for the test flying activity;

f. certification from Mr. Modworld at Upgrades R Us (as per the contract) of the following:

(1) an interim Design Approval certificate has been provided for the design in its current state;

(2) temporary maintenance and logistics support is ready to support the test flying activity; and

(3) sufficient personnel have been assigned EA to support on-going airworthiness and safety of flight evaluation during the test flying activity.



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18. Issue of a Design Acceptance certificate. At the completion of all compliance finding activities, as well as the successful resolution of any issues arising from the compliance finding activities, CENGR BBSPO will issue a Design Acceptance certificate in accordance with BBSPO SI(LOG) 2-12.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 8

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS


TAREG 3.4 Design Control

TAREG 3.5.11 Special Technical Instructions

TAREG 3.5.15 Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness

TAREG 3.5.16 Flight Manuals and Operating Instructions

INTRODUCTION

1. At Type Certification, aircraft or Aeronautical Product (AP) is deemed by the certifying authority to comply with regulations in respect of design and manufacture at that time. At the commencement of operational service and throughout the life of type, the aircraft or AP is subject to in service ‘wear and tear’. The net result of which, over time, will be to degrade the original design characteristics. Hence, Service Release requirements include consideration of continuing airworthiness aspects and provision of Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) that are maintained through the life of type. The main objective of ICA is to ensure that the aircraft is safe to operate at all times.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) on their regulatory requirement to authorise and control the issue, distribution and amendment status of various types of Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA).

SCOPE

3. The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance that will assist comprehension of the regulations that deal with the authorisation, control, issue, distribution and amendment of various types of ICA. ICA includes, but is not limited to: flight manuals, operating instructions and limitations, maintenance manuals, technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs. Guidance is presented in the following structure:

a. philosophy/concept;

b. cross reference;

c. explanation and amplification; and

d. acceptable means of compliance.

4. Where any conflict occurs between the guidance and regulations, the regulations take precedence.

REGULATION GUIDANCE

TAREG 3.5.11 - SPECIAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS


5. A Special Technical Instruction (STI) is a form of ICA that is issued by an AEO with responsibility for Configuration Item (CI) management of an aircraft or item. STIs are used in circumstance where there is an urgent need to communicate technical airworthiness information that cannot be satisfied by other types of implementing instructions e.g. a publication amendment or modification order. An STI fulfils a similar purpose to that of a civil Airworthiness Directive (AD) or urgent/mandatory Service Bulletin (SB).

Cross Reference

6. This regulation addresses the subjects embodied in the following TAMM regulations and associated publications:



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a. TAREG 3.4.1—Design Control System.

b. TAMM Sect 2, TAREG 3, Annex E.


7. AEOs, having responsibility for CI management, are required to establish an STI management system.

NOTE

• STIs do not remove the requirement to process publication amendments, Engineering Change Proposals or Modification Orders where applicable.

STIs for Multi-Fit Items

8. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) is not prescriptive in the title and number of STI series that are generated. Therefore, while each aircraft AEO generally manages an STI series for the aircraft type, an AEO performing CI management may establish an STI series specifically for those items. For CIs fitted to multiple platforms, STI generation should apply the following principles:

a. The AEO performing CI management of the item should have agreements in place with the AEO performing aircraft management. The agreement should detail the organisational and technical interfaces (TAREG 3.4.1) by which design changes to the CI are processed and include the following:

(1) Design Acceptance Certification. Design Acceptance certification, normally provided by the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR), is required for a design change to a CI for each aircraft type for which the CI is fitted. The DAR may authorise the CI manager to perform Assumption of Design Acceptance certification for a certain scope of design changes.

(2) STI Dispatch. STI dispatch procedures should be understood between the AEO and user units. There should be an understanding as to whether an STI for the item is dispatched directly to user units or forwarded to the aircraft AEO for dispatch as an aircraft STI. This ensures that the aircraft AEO has visibility of all STIs applicable to the aircraft, as well as user unit awareness of the authority for the STI once received.

9. TAREG 3.5.11.b(2)(iii) requires that a design change implemented by an STI is to receive Incorporation Approval (IA) prior to STI release. Further, TAREG 3.5.11.b.(11) requires that STIs are traceable to any related Design Approval and Design Acceptance records. Therefore, the CI manager of a multi-fit item processing an STI involving a design change requires Design Acceptance certification (or authority to assume) from each applicable DAR prior to STI release.


10. Clause a. Self explanatory.

11. Clause b. Self explanatory.

12. Clause b(1). Self explanatory.

13. Clause b (2). The STI must meet the content requirements of TAREG 3, Annex E. Further, for any design change implemented by the STI, the STI must accurately reflect that design and the design must have received IA and therefore; by definition, Design Acceptance certification.

14. Clause b (3). Self explanatory.

15. Clause b (4). STI amendments that reduce the applicability of an STI are not to be performed on an STI, post release. Due to the nature of STIs, any reduction in applicability is an engineering decision and therefore, there should be evidence that the change has been processed through a design control process. This is particularly relevant for STIs relating to an inspection for defects or damage or repairs resulting from such inspections.


17. Clause b (6). STI dispatch methods, due to the urgent and often safety critical nature of STIs, should not compromise STI readability. The AEO’s procedures should include steps to ensure that STI content is reviewed for clarity prior to release.

18. Clause b (7). The STI acknowledgement requirements are to be included in the STI.

19. Clause b (8). The STI is to identify reporting and recording requirements. The STI sponsor should have a method of checking STI incorporation status using tools e.g. NetMAARS and CAMM2.



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20. Clause b (9). The AEO’s procedures should include a requirement to record STIs of an enduring nature as modifications, deviations, substitutions or publication amendments. STIs of a non-enduring nature e.g. one off inspection requirements need not be treated in this manner.



23. Clause b (12). The first page of the hardcopy STI is to be bordered by red and white ‘Warning Page’ hatching. Beyond this, the regulations do not stipulate a format for STIs, providing the minimum content requirements of TAREG 3, Annex E are met.


25. Clause b (14). The status of STIs is to be promulgated via an STI Consolidation List. There should be a procedure for developing the Consolidation List which requires pro-active monitoring of STI incorporation status. The procedure should identify actions to be taken when STIs are not incorporated within their incorporation timeframe.


TAREG 3.5.15 – INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS


27. Maintenance of the Type Design is a responsibility of an AEO and is regulated by several TAMM regulations, including this regulation which deals specifically with ICA. ICA is defined as those instructions required to retain aircraft and aircraft-related equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to: flight manuals, operating instructions and limitations, maintenance manuals, technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs.

Cross Reference

28. This regulation addresses the subjects embodied in the following TAMM regulations and associated publications:

a. TAREG 2—Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance.

b. TAREG 2.2.8—Type Design.

c. TAREG 3.4—Design Control.

d. TAREG 3.5.12—Incorporation Approval.

e. TAREG 3.5.13—Service Release for Minor Changes to Type Design.

f. TAREG 3.5.14—Management of Type Design Data.

g. TAREG 3.5.16—Flight Manuals and Operating Instructions.

h. AAP 7001.038(AM1)—Maintenance Requirements Determination Manual.


29. The acquisition process for State Aircraft encompasses measures that ensure that the Type Design of the aircraft or aircraft related equipment is established prior to introduction into service. Whilst in service, Type Design and departures, are managed though design control processes and ICA.

30. Two primary forms of ICA, the Technical Maintenance Plan and Planned Servicing Schedule, are outputs from the Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) process. MRD is a set of defined processes to develop the preventative and corrective maintenance requirements for technical equipment. Further guidance and assistance on MRD processes can be obtained directly from AAP 7001.038(AM1) or the ADF MRD specialists within AMTR-DGTA.

Foreign Source Data

31. Some Foreign Source Data (FSD) may be classified as ICA. There is no regulation mandating if and when FSD, is to be converted to Australian Air Publication (AAP) format. Such a consideration is the domain of the Common Services Systems Support Office (CSSSO) and further guidance may be obtained from AAP 5030.001CD—Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual, Section 3, Chapter 5.



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32. The requirements of TAREG 3.5.14 are to be met irrespective of whether or not FSD is converted to AAP format. In particular, where the AEO has chosen not to assume control of the content of the FSD (and hence has not converted the FSD to AAP format), arrangements must be in place with the publisher of the FSD regarding the amendment process. The FSD publisher should be a member of the AEO’s Design Support Network (DSN), in which case consideration has already been given to how the publisher’s services are to be treated.

33. Amendments to FSD that involve a design change must be traceable to Design Approval and Design Acceptance records in accordance with TAREGs 3.5.15 and 3.5.16. The status of the FSD publisher, as a DSN member, will determine the routing of FSD amendments received by the AEO. Amendments to FSD that are ICA must receive Technical Approval in accordance with TAREG 3.5.15. Amendments to FSD flight manuals or aircraft operating instructions must receive technical endorsement by the AEO in accordance with TAREG 3.5.16.


34. Clause a. The AEO’s procedures must ensure that the requirements of this regulation are met.

35. Clause a(1). The AEO’s procedure must identify methods to control all aspects of Instruction for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) authorisation, issue, distribution and maintenance of amendment status. The procedure must identify the design control system and the publication management procedures used. Typically, the procedure would be supported by dedicated Logistics Processes in EMERALD, or an equivalent system.

36. Clause a(2). The AEO’s procedures must identify a requirement to ensure that organisations, having to comply with ICA, are provided with a copy of the ICA and all future amendments. Typically, the procedure would be supported through checklists, dedicated Logistics Processes in EMERALD and an Engineering Change Proposal. The person issuing a Design Approval certificate (TAREG 3.4.3) or Service Release for minor changes to the Type Design (TAREG 3.5.13) will attest that the ICA is adequate. There should be a master record held of ICA amendment status and a distribution list that identifies all holders of ICA.

37. Clause a(3). The AEO’s ICA amendment procedures must identify a requirement for either Technical Approval or Incorporation Approval, as applicable. This may be achieved through utilisation of a dedicated Logistics Process (EMERALD) for the design change or publication amendment. The outcome of a Technical Information Review (TIR) process will result in a publication amendment and possibly a related design change. In all cases the publication amendment will receive Technical Approval while any design change, leading to the publication amendment, will receive Design Approval, Design Acceptance and Incorporation Approval. Note that these activities must be performed prior to Service Release (refer to TAREG 3.5.13).

38. In circumstances where an ICA amendment is related to a design change, the AEO may choose to embed the Technical Approval of ICA amendments within the Design Approval step. For ICA amendments that are not related to a design change, e.g. Original Equipment Manufacturer OEM amendments to correct errors in user manuals, the AEO must have a separate procedure for Technical Approval.

39. Clause a (4). The AEO’s procedures must identify methods which ensure that Technical Approval is only provided by an authorised person when the sub-clause requirements of this clause have been met. Technical Approval is a process, unique to ICA, which has been created to separate the publication management aspects of a design change from the design process. Technical Approval can be used to correct publication errors, improve the quality or layout of the ICA and promulgate the outcomes of design changes which have been properly approved and accepted as provided in TAREG 3.4. The Technical Approval approach has no Design Approval or Design Acceptance requirement. The person performing Technical Approval does not have to be a Design Engineer (DE). It can be any competent person who has been authorised by the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) or Deputy Senior Design Engineer (DSDE).

40. Clause a(4)(iv). AEOs are required to ensure that the ICA they are responsible for, identifies Safety Critical Items and Systems (SCIS). AAP 7001.038(AM1) provides further guidance on identifying and promulgating SCIS and related Independent Maintenance Inspections (IMIs). AAP 5030.001CD, Section 9 Chapter 98 provides a Topic -96 that may be used by the AEO to identify and promulgate SCIS and their associated IMIs for preventative and corrective maintenance activities.

41. Clause a(4)(v). The intention of this clause is to ensure that an AEO provides the AMO(s) with a consistent set of IMIs, promulgated across ICA, covering both scheduled and corrective maintenance. In instances where the AEO has determined that a SCIS requires an IMI, that requirement should be promulgated in accordance with the guidance provided at AAP 7001.038(AM1). Where promulgated, IMIs are to be repeatable acts that assess conformance to a prescribed serviceability criteria. The AEO should ensure that the items or systems are those items or systems which undergo direct maintenance, and for which an IMI is both physically achievable and addresses the system or item’s Safety Critical Failure Mode.



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42. For Candidate Items and systems, the AEO is able to accurately identify system or item criticality and specify detailed IMIs as a result of data obtained from the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) analyses. For items and systems not subject to FMECA and RCM (non-Candidate Items and systems), the AEO may not be able to accurately identify that a component is Safety Critical, which also compromises the AEO’s ability to provide detailed IMI requirements. In this situation, the AEO may simply promulgate a list of SCISs for which the AMO is to apply the generic IMI requirements of TAREG 5.1.6.

43. Clause a(5). The AEO’s procedures must identify the record keeping methods that are used to record Technical Approvals. This requirement can be met by utilising a dedicated Logistics Process in EMERALD that embodies a Technical Approval step and managing records via a procedure, as per the requirements of TAREG 3.3.8.

44. Clause a(6). Self explanatory

45. Clause a(7). The AEO must have procedures that identify the methods that will be used to validate ICA which is developed whilst the aircraft or aircraft related equipment is in service. The procedure should satisfy the requirements of Clause a(8) and a(9). In the case of new acquisition aircraft or equipment, the ICA will normally be produced by the OEM as part of the acquisition process. OEM produced ICA is considered to have undergone adequate validation, although the acquisition project office may elect to perform limited validation. When the aircraft or equipment is transitioned into service there should be no further requirement for validation of OEM produced maintenance tasks unless a requirement is identified e.g., as a result of TIR.

46. Clause a(8). The AEO’s procedures must identify data collection and analysis requirements. Specific examples of Technical Information (TI) to be collected and analysed are listed in Section 3, Chapter 5, Annex B. Effective validation of ICA relies on a comprehensive and reliable method of appropriate data collection and analysis. This is largely satisfied by the TIR system, which requires the monitoring of technical issues affecting (CIs) and the initiation of action required to ensure that adequate levels of performance and safety are maintained. Ideally, the results of any analyses should be recorded within a Weapon Systems Database (WSDB) that conforms to DEF (AUST) 5692—Logistic Support Analysis Record Requirements for the Australian Defence Organisation.

47. Clause a(9). The AEO’s procedures must take into account any changes to the aircraft’s roles, operating environment, usage or service envelope, as detailed in the Statement of Operating Intent. Such a requirement is implicit in the scope of a TIR system under TAREG 3.5.2. and explicitly required under this regulation. In-service validation of maintenance tasks is effected through formal validation tasks performed by the AEO and by maintenance personnel, performing tasks in accordance with ICA on a regular basis.

TAREG 3.5.16 – FLIGHT MANUALS AND OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS


48. Flight manuals and aircraft operating instructions provide detailed guidance on how an aircraft and its systems are to be operated. These documents are not usually sponsored by an AEO. Nevertheless, the sponsor and the AEO require effective interfaces to ensure that they remain cognisant of any changes which may impact upon technical or operational airworthiness.

Cross Reference

49. This regulation addresses the subjects embodied in the following TAMM regulations:

a. TAREG 2—Type Certification, Service Release and Design Acceptance.

b. TAREG 3.4—Design Control.


50. AEO procedures must include a step to notify flight manual and operating instruction sponsors (typically Force Element Group staff) of TI received which is likely to affect such publications. Conversely, sponsors of flight manuals and operating instructions are to ensure that their publications are not amended without prior endorsement by the AEO for technical content.


51. Clause a (1). The AEO and the FEG must have a Memorandum of Agreement or procedure(s) to ensure that technical endorsement is received from the AEO prior to flight manual or operating instructions update. This requirement can be achieved through utilisation of a TIR system and design control process that has a technical endorsement step embedded.



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52. Clause a (2). The AEO’s procedures for technical endorsement must ensure that the endorser is referred to the requirements of this regulation. The procedure should identify the process for providing technical endorsement and the tools used e.g. EMERALD and DRMS, to ensure that engineering records are maintained in accordance with TAREG 3.3.8.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 9

DATA, DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS


TAREG 2.2.8 Type Design

TAREG 3.3.6 Data

TAREG 3.3.8 Records

TAREG 3.3.10 Documentation Control

TAREG 3.4.2 Data Control

TAREG 3.5.14 Management of Type Design Data

INTRODUCTION

1. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) technical airworthiness regulatory system mandates minimum requirements for organisations. These requirements are based upon the O.P.P.D. model in Sect 3, Chap 1. The ‘D’ in O.P.P.D. stands for ‘Data’ and Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) use data in various ways, for various purposes. Data may arrive at an AEO either as Technical Information (TI) or as a contract deliverable. It may be internally drafted to amend information stored within the AEO or for release to operating and maintenance units as modifications, deviations, substitutions, etc. While most technical personnel understand the importance of current and accurate data, not all will be aware of the interaction and linkages between the various types of data. In addition, there is often confusion as to which data types must be strictly controlled.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter is intended to define the different types of data, as well as explain the regulations that govern their use.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance on the data regulations. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

DATA


4. For regulatory purposes, engineering design data is classified into three different types. The three types and reasons for these will become apparent in subsequent paragraphs.

5. Type Design. Type Design management is a core principle of the technical airworthiness regulatory system. The ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA) approves the Type Design, through issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) and reviews maintenance and management of the Type Design at annual Airworthiness Boards. AEOs with Configuration Item (CI) management responsibility are required to manage the Type Design in accordance with TAREG 3.5.14. Refer to Paragraph 11 for further information.

6. Type Record. The Type Record is a concise overarching introduction (road map) into the Type Design of an aircraft. Type Records are created in accordance with the format prescribed in Section 3, Chapter 12, Annex E. The Type Design must meet the requirements of TAREG 2.2.8.

7. Design Reference Data. Design Reference data is used as an input to a design process. It includes data that defines:

a. the current approved design (or configuration) of the aircraft or system (existing Type Design data);

b. the specifications of any item to be introduced by the design activity;

c. the specifications and standards that the design activity is to comply with; and

d. any reports or test results that may be relevant to the new design.



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8. For example, a person required to design the installation of a new electronic system into an aircraft will need to compile Design Reference data describing:

a. the electronic system (such as drawings of its physical size, electrical and communication interface requirements, structural and thermal load information); and

b. the area of the aircraft to be modified (Type Design data such as drawings of existing rack equipment and shelving, aircraft communication buses and electrical distribution locations and capacities and cooling capacity).

For the duration of the design process, this data is grouped and referred to as Design Reference data.

9. Design Output Data. Design Output data is all data generated as a result of the design activity, and may include modification orders, new drawings, reports, amendments to Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA). Design Output data updates the Type Design data to reflect configuration changes as a result of design incorporation. Design Output data does not include rough calculations, sketches, draft or superseded documents; hence none of these items should ever find their way into the Type Design data. The diagram at Figure 9–1 shows the relationship between the three data types described above.

Figure 9–1 Relationship between the Three Types of Design Data

10. Type Design data defines the currently approved configuration of the aircraft or system. Change initiators e.g. Statement of Requirement (SOR), TI, defect investigations etc, will invoke a design activity. This activity will use Design Reference data as a starting point for the design activity. Design Reference data will include data on any items to be introduced, specifications and standards to be complied with during the design activity, any test results and reports relevant to the new equipment, and Type Design data that defined the starting point for the design activity. From this starting point, some design development activity occurs, which may result in the production of (final versions of) drawings, calculations, manuals, publications, amendments, and reports. These items are referred to as Design Output data. Once the design is finalised and granted Incorporation Approval, the Design Output data will be used to update Type Design data to define the new configuration.

TAREG 3.5.14 – Management of Type Design Data

11. Type Design data and the Type Record are maintained independent of the design process by the AEO responsible for CI management. Some Type Design data is used as a Design Reference data during the design process; however, not all data created during the design process is used to update the Type Design. Paragraph 10 lists the types

Type Design Data

Design Acceptance Incorporation Approval

New Drawings Publications Manuals Reports Orders

Design Reference Data

Design Output Data

Specification Standards Data on introduced items Reports Test Results Orders

Design Development

TI/ECP/SOR (Change Initiator)



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of data that should not be used to update the Type Design. This prevents the Type Design data from becoming unwieldy and uncontrolled and maintains the structure of the Type Record. TAREG 3.5.14 concerns management of the Type Design data and specifies the mechanisms that must be in place, as well as the instances in which updating the Type Design data is performed.

12. Design Support Network members providing design services and CI management functions must agree with the AEO on conventions to ensure elements of the Type Design are properly identified and controlled. These conventions may include standard terms and numbering schemes for the various Type Design data produced as a result of these activities.

13. All Design Output data produced, as a result of the design process, is to be identified as Type Design data following Incorporation Approval. It is at this point that the Type Design data is updated, adding the necessary cross-references between the replacement data and the data that has been superseded. This ensures that the next time that Type Design data is used for a design activity, personnel may be confident that the data is current.

14. In the event that a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) is issued for a Major design change, the AEO responsible for CI management is required to have a procedure to update the Type Record (as an index to the Type Design).

TAREG 3.4.2 – Data Control

15. TAREG 3.4.2 is applicable to any AEO performing design activities. Further amplification of the regulation is as follows:

a. The regulation requires that all personnel within the organisation have access to Design Reference data, whether externally sourced data or data originating from the Type Design.

b. A competent and authorised person must assess the Design Reference data for suitability and applicability. This may be on occurrence i.e. immediately before the data is used for a design, or as part of a periodic audit of data. As part of this process, any data that is found to be obsolete must be removed from all points of issue or use.

c. The regulation recognises that Design Reference data are ‘living’ documents that may change during the course of a design activity. For documents that are controlled by the AEO, the regulation requires that changes are reviewed and approved by competent and authorised personnel. For externally controlled documents e.g. OEM publications, it must be verified that any changes that have been made to the documents are authoritative. This may be achieved in many ways, although the easiest may be to contact the OEM directly to confirm the correct version of a document.

d. Drawings and reports are also subject to this regulation. The requirements for these types of Design Reference data are that they are produced, checked and controlled in accordance with approved procedures.

Regulations for Design Output Data

16. There is no single regulation for Design Output data, as this type of data can exist in several forms e.g. modification orders, Special Technical Instructions, deviations, and substitutions. Design Output data includes what the regulations refer to as ‘implementing instructions’, which are listed in TAREG 3.5.6 as modification orders and amendments to ICA.

17. Working notes, rough calculations, and sketches that are a product of the design process, are not used to update Type Design data and therefore, are not classified as Design Output data.

TAREG 3.3.10 – Documentation Control

18. TAREGs 2.2.8, 3.3.6, 3.4.2, and 3.5.14 identify data management requirements that are intended to maintain the Type Design during design activities. For documentation not directly related to the Type Design, there is a requirement to maintain adequate control and this is provided by TAREG 3.3.10. This regulation is an extension of the AS/NZS ISO 9001 requirement for control of all documentation used by an organisation. Specifically, it requires review and approval of documentation and subsequent amendments by competent and authorised personnel, access to relevant documentation by all staff performing engineering activities, and removal of obsolete documentation. The regulation covers all plans and procedures in use, such as the Engineering Management Plan (EMP) and local procedures.



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TAREG 3.3.8 – Records

19. TAREG 3.3.8 requires that each applicant establish procedures to manage all engineering records that are generated. Since the engineering records subject to this regulation range through design, audits, reports, management and personnel authorisations it is entirely expected that over the life of a weapon system a considerable number and type of reports will be generated in different media. Where electronic media is employed to raise, store, and manipulate records, each applicant will need make provision for the continuing use and protection of those records. In particular, the applicant will need to consider the following:

a. how read and write access to records is controlled and traceable to personnel holding appropriate authorisations to make changes to those records;

b. that records should be readily identifiable as a draft, approved or superseded copy;

c. the storage system is subject to regular back-up and those back-ups are stored at another secure site;

d. records are protected such as to avoid inadvertent change or deletion; and

e. all hardware and software tools required to extract, manipulate and read the record are retained.

20. Most engineering records are under Commonwealth control and their generation, storage usage and manipulation is normally a straightforward matter; however there will be occasions when some electronic records are initially generated and stored on a foreign system. In such events and in addition to the above each applicant will need to ensure agreement is reached, and procedures established, to assure effective generation, management and transfer of all necessary engineering records into Commonwealth control.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 10

INCORPORATION APPROVAL AND SERVICE RELEASE FOR MINOR CHANGES TO A TYPE DESIGN


TAREG 3.5.12 Incorporation Approval

TAREG 3.5.13 Service Release for Minor changes to Type Design

TAREG 3.5.16 Flight Manuals and Aircraft Operating Instructions

INTRODUCTION

1. Prior to approving the incorporation of a design change into a weapons system, an AEO must ensure that all associated logistics issues affecting technical airworthiness have been appropriately addressed. For Minor changes to the Type Design, the regulations mandate this requirement through the Incorporation Approval step.

2. For aircraft modifications, aircraft/stores configuration changes and aerial delivery clearances, following Incorporation Approval, and prior to releasing a design change into service, AEOs must ensure that all the relevant data and equipment is in the hands of the end-users and maintainers. This requirement is mandated through the Service Release step.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on Incorporation Approval and Service Release for Minor changes to Type Design as applied to in-service weapon systems.

SCOPE

4. The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance material that will assist organisations in understanding the regulations concerning Incorporation Approval and Service Release for Minor changes to Type Design. While both steps require consideration of a range of logistics and financial issues, this chapter focuses primarily on addressing the regulations in Section 2. The introduction of new aircraft or Major changes to Type Design require Type Certification, Service Release and possibly approval of Special Flight Permits by the ADF Airworthiness Authority, and are addressed in Section 3 Chapter 14. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, the regulations take precedence.

INCORPORATION APPROVAL

5. TAREG 3.5.12 requires Incorporation Approval to be granted by the Senior Executive or a nominated representative. Incorporation Approval is only to be granted when it has been determined that:

a. Design Acceptance certification has been carried out;

b. implementing instructions for the change (including modification orders, maintenance manual amendments, and flight manual changes) have been drafted and authorised;

c. operational endorsement for all aspects of the design change has been granted; and

d. any higher level or complementary changes required by the design change have received Incorporation Approval.

6. Configuration Control Boards. One method of meeting the above regulatory requirements is to manage the Incorporation Approval process through the use of a Configuration Control Board (CCB). The CCB structure normally consists of:

a. the Senior Executive, or delegate, as chairman;

b. a technical representative (normally the SDE or DAR);

c. Operational Airworthiness Authority representative (normally drawn from the weapons system Force Element Group headquarters); and



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d. other logistics, engineering and financial specialist members as required.

7. The CCB may choose which types of design changes it wants to prioritise. Usually it prioritises all the modifications proposed for the weapons system and grants Incorporation Approval for modifications. Subordinate CCBs (or individual delegations as required by TAREG 3.5.12.a(1)) would normally provide Incorporation Approval for other design changes (deviations, substitutions, aerial delivery clearances, aircraft/stores clearances, changes to maintenance intervals and procedures). Incorporation Approval is formally recorded by the CCB Chairman or authorised CCB delegate, stating that the provisions of TAREG 3.5.12 have been considered for the design change. This record then forms part of the configuration documentation. If CCB Incorporation Approval for an urgent modification is required before the CCB is able to meet, the change may be forwarded to each relevant member of the CCB (usually defined in the weapon system CMP) for recommendation, and then approved by the Chairman of the CCB. Where the Chairman is a delegate of the Senior Executive, the Chairman must be a nominated representative as required by TAREG 3.5.12.a(1). In summary, CCB considerations should address all the logistics, engineering, operational and financial implications of proposed changes, and hence the scope is considerably larger than the regulatory requirements. However, by following a formal CCB (or equivalent process), AEOs will ensure that all required actions and endorsements are achieved, and decisions are documented as part of the Incorporation Approval process.

8. Decisions not to Proceed. Any decisions not to grant Incorporation Approval, or to not comply with recommended incorporation timeframes, for safety-related changes are to be endorsed by the SDE, and the applicable weapons system DAR. This requirement simply ensures that safety-related changes are not overlooked or subordinated for the sake of financial or operational ‘nice-to-have’ requirements. SDE/DAR endorsement in these circumstances would include details on alternative methods to mitigate against the non-incorporation of the safety-related change (for example increased inspections or other maintenance requirements).

SERVICE RELEASE FOR MINOR CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

9. Service Release, as defined in TAREG 3.5.13, applies only to aircraft modifications, aircraft/stores configuration changes and aerial delivery clearances. Service Release requires that all engineering, logistics and operational matters are completed, or alternatively approved processes are in place to resolve outstanding issues, prior to the release into service of these types of design changes. Aircraft modifications, aircraft/store configuration changes and aerial delivery clearances almost invariably trigger changes to operating characteristics, procedures, engineering or logistics requirements and so must not be released to service until end-users, engineering, logistics and maintenance personnel are made fully aware of such design changes and their implications. This may include requirements for additional training, new or revised publications, modification kits and GSE.

10. All modifications, aircraft/stores configurations or aerial delivery clearances must be released for service by an AEO only after the provisions of TAREG 3.5.13 have been met. In practice, the requirement to issue all associated implementing instructions means that:

a. all affected aircrew and maintenance manuals have been updated to reflect changes to operating characteristics, procedures or maintenance;

b. all applicable configuration documentation has been updated and released; and

c. Configuration Status Account records reflect the new approved configuration by means of appropriate certification by the Configuration Manager.

11. The requirement to update the documentation detailed above will be met upon confirmation that the information has been despatched to end-users. This should be in the form of an authorised and promulgated publication amendment. Note that evidence of a draft amendment simply being forwarded to CSSSO-AP for further processing is not adequate. The manuals in question may not always be in ADF publication format, but it is essential that the information despatched to end-users be validated and in a controlled and authoritative form. For modifications, the content of all such amendments will also need to account for the fact that users will require both pre- and post-modification information for the duration of the incorporation program. Follow-up amendments may well be needed to remove redundant pre-modification information once the incorporation program is complete.

12. TAREG 3.5.13 requires that Service Release be granted by the Senior Executive or nominated representative. This is usually achieved in practice via the use of the CCB (or equivalent). Once the CCB is satisfied that all conditions outlined at TAREG 3.5.13 have been met, Service Release may be authorised and the design change released for in-service operation.

13. Note that Service Release cannot occur before Incorporation Approval, otherwise configuration control would be compromised should Incorporation Approval not be granted. However, CCBs should address the following Service Release issues during consideration of Incorporation Approval:



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a. the individuals who will monitor conditions for Service Release;

b. the timeframe in which Service Release is to be achieved;

c. the form and content of user manual amendments;

d. whether Service Release is to be authorised in-session, out-of-session or by a delegate appointed by the Chairman of the CCB as required by TAREG 3.5.13.a(1); and

e. the manner in which design change details should be despatched once Service Release has been authorised.

DELEGATION OF INCORPORATION APPROVAL AND SERVICE RELEASE FOR MINOR CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

14. TAREGs 3.5.12 and 3.5.13 require that the Senior Executive grant Incorporation Approval and Service Release. Nominated representatives of the Senior Executive are allowable providing:

a. nominated representatives act within the limits and in accordance with the requirements of a written delegation; and

b. a record is maintained of those current and past Senior Executives and nominated representatives within the AEO with authority to grant Incorporation Approvals and/or Service Release. In reality many design changes can take many years to fully incorporate. Senior executives and nominated representatives granting Incorporation Approval and Service Release may not be with the organisation at the completion of the design change. This will ensure traceability of Incorporation Approval and Service Release decisions and associated written delegations for the life of the aircraft type.

15. In practice, many Service AEOs nominate appointments (for example weapons system avionics ILM), rather than individuals, to undertake Incorporation Approvals and Service Release. This is allowed providing:

a. the appointment duty statement clearly specifies the limits of any Incorporation Approval or Service Release delegations,

b. AEO procedures for assignment of authority ensure that an individual is not granted an Incorporation Approval or Service Release delegation from the Senior Executive until appropriate training has been undertaken, and

c. AEO records can disclose those individuals holding current delegations.

16. The intent is to ensure that any individuals holding delegations are aware of the limits and responsibilities of the delegation. While the regulations do not specify any minimum competency requirements for Incorporation Approval or Service Release, it is assumed that the Senior Executive has trained and assessed individuals prior to assigning authority. Note that suitably trained and authorised non-technical staff may hold Incorporation Approval and Service Release delegations.



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1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 11

AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY



TAREG 2.5.3 Classification of Changes in Type Design

TAREG 2.6.1 Change to Planned Withdrawal Date

TAREG 2.6.2 Statement of Operating Intent (SOI)

TAREG 3.5.4 Aircraft Structural Integrity Management

TAREG 5.2.1 Maintenance Record and Documentation Requirements

INTRODUCTION

1. Aircraft are designed to approved airworthiness standards, which are expected to provide assurance of an acceptable degree of safety or alternatively, an acceptable level of risk of failure. However, aircraft structure deteriorates from the ‘as-manufactured’ condition throughout service life. This deterioration is caused by fatigue damage, environmental degradation, accidental or battle damage and even the effects of repair action. Aircraft designers seek to minimise accumulation of structural deterioration during an aircraft’s service life. However, the sources of structural deterioration must be closely managed throughout the aircraft’s life cycle to constrain the risk of failure and the cost of continuing operations, to acceptable levels. Therefore, to assure structural airworthiness, management of Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) is essential from the acquisition stage, when the specification is developed, through to fleet retirement.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to Configuration Item (CI) managers on the regulatory requirements for ASI management.

SCOPE

3. This chapter provides a brief overview of the ASI management process to provide the system for the ASI regulations. Due to the centralised nature of ASI management within DGTA-ADF, the regulations are only provided to cover requirements of CI managers, not the full range of ASI requirements. The full range of ASI requirements is detailed in AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). Further, AAP 7001.068(AM1)—Design and Technology Services Support Manual (DATSSM) provides ASI-DGTA and Rotary Wing Section (RWS-DGTA) roles and responsibilities. ASI management is performed on behalf of the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) by ASI-DGTA for fixed wing aircraft and EHSI-DGTA, for engines, Navy and Army helicopters and Kalkara. To avoid confusion, where responsibilities for ASI management are within DGTA-ADF the responsibility is assigned to the Directorate of Aviation Engineering (DAVENG) rather than individual sections.

4. The chapter provides guidance on ASI and associated regulations to assist CI managers involved in determining ASI requirements and conducting ASI tasks. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

APPLICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Aircraft Structural Integrity Program

5. As mentioned above, to assure structural airworthiness, ASI management must begin at design and continue throughout the service life of aircraft. To achieve the coordination of the many activities required to design, construct and maintain aircraft structure i.e. attain structural airworthiness, military Air Forces often talk of ASI Programs (ASIPs) that extend over the aircraft's full life cycle. Hence, the concept of an ASIP is to assure a holistic view is taken of ASI management throughout the aircraft’s life cycle. This model has evolved from tragic experience where aircraft structure was not managed holistically or in an integrated fashion. The ADF has adopted the ASIP concept of which the general requirements are:



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a. establish, evaluate and substantiate the structural integrity (airframe strength, rigidity, damage tolerance and durability) of the aircraft structure;

b. acquire, evaluate and utilise operational usage and aircraft structural condition data to provide continual assessment of the in-service integrity of individual aircraft structure; and

c. provide a basis for determining logistics and ADF planning requirements (maintenance, inspections, spares, rotation of aircraft, weapon system replacement and future requirements).

6. These requirements can be seen as satisfying the facets of technical airworthiness. Sub-paragraph 5.a. relates to the ‘design’ and ‘constructed’ facets in the definition of airworthiness whereas 5.b. and 5.c. pertain to the ‘maintain’ facet. Whilst a more complete explanation of the ADF approach to ASIPs can be found in Section 2, Chapter 11 of the ADRM a brief overview of the ASIP concept, particularly the Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP), is appropriate so that regulations can be placed in context.

7. The ASIP has five parts as depicted in Figure 11–1. Parts 1 to 4 relate to the first requirement of the ASIP or the airworthiness facets of design and construction. Importantly, Parts 1–3 establish the standard acquired whereas Part 4 defines the system for continuing airworthiness, including provision of the data necessary for in-service ASI management. The ASIMP is an element of Part 4 and it documents the strategies for in-service ASI management. That is, the ASIMP documents the continuing airworthiness system to maintain the standard acquired. Part 5 of the ASIP is about in-service management i.e. implementing the strategies, including continuing assessment of ASI, to assure structural airworthiness is maintained.

Figure 11–1 ASIP Parts



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8. Maintenance of ASI is dependant upon an assurance that structural strength remains at an acceptable level. To ensure that structural strength is not compromised there are two main strategies. The first consists of maintaining the certification basis in design changes and the second is continual assessment of the impact of degradation on the structure. Although not discussed here, ASI management also includes regular assessment of the continuing airworthiness system to ensure it is effective in maintaining an acceptable level of ASI. This later function is performed by DAVENG and documented further in the DATSSM.

9. The two strategies must be addressed in the in-service phase. For the first strategy, this essentially requires that any in service design change meets or exceeds the certification basis. For this reason, the ASIMP contains a summary of the elements of the certification basis that pertain to structure. This subset of the certification basis is referred to as the Certification Structural Design Standard (CSDSTD). However, most in-service ASI management effort is directed to the second strategy-continual assessment. Fundamental to this strategy is recognising the forms of structural degradation. For military aircraft there are four sources of structural degradation; battle damage, accidental, environmental and fatigue. As there are separate requirements for battle damage, this is not considered further as an element of ASI management. Also, accidental damage is usually discrete and repaired such that the CSDSTD is maintained. Thus, accidental damage is not a primary focus of the ASIP. This leaves fatigue and environmental as the two primary sources of structural degradation, which must be the focus of ASI management. The management of both of these sources of degradation requires significant information.

Fatigue

10. Fatigue management is achieved by applying one of two philosophies; Safe Life (that is life limiting components to assure safety) or Safety-by-Inspection (SBI). However, fatigue is predominantly driven by the way in which the aircraft is operated. Hence, usage monitoring primarily collects the data required for fatigue management. Furthermore, structural condition data is fundamental to validating that fatigue management is effective and identification of problems before they become critical. Structural condition data is simply maintenance experience with the structure. Data includes the structural degradation found, the type of degradation and how that degradation was rectified. For ASI management, condition data required is for primary or safety of flight structure. Defining primary or safety of flight structure will vary between aircraft types, such that individual ASIMPs will provide the necessary definitions. While being desirable to collect condition data for structure other than primary, this is not specifically regulated (however, through TAREG 3.5.4.e (2) this may be required for individual aircraft types). Thus referring to Figure 11–2, effective fatigue management requires both usage and condition data as inputs.

Environment

11. With the major form of environmental damage to structure being corrosion, the primary management tool is the Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan (CPCP). Crucial to the success of the CPCP is condition data. Traditionally usage data has been considered relevant to only fatigue. However, there is growing recognition that usage data can assist understanding and forecasting of the deterioration, resulting from environmental causes. Hence, usage and condition data are also fundamental to effectively managing environmental damage to structure.

12. Consequently, Figure 11–2 reflects, as does the ASIMP structure, this complex flow of information. As the systems to collect, manage and analyse the information will vary significantly across weapon systems, the ASIMP provides weapon system specific details of the systems, roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved for the routine activities.

13. Where the ASI assessment process (undertaken by DAVENG) identifies deficiencies in the data collection, associated systems or the actual structure, activities will be included in the ASIMP to correct these deficiencies. This data also enables structural life assessments (SLA) to estimate the structural LOT. SLA is important to answer the question ‘for how long is the structure safe?’ with the result documented in the ASIMP. Thus, the ASIMP is a pivotal document in management of ASI.



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Figure 11–2 Primary Information Flow in ASIP Part 5

Aircraft Structural Integrity Management System

14. DAVENG is responsible for developing and maintaining the ASIP for each aircraft. Aircraft CI managers are responsible for supporting and implementing specific aspects of the program. TAREG 3.5.4.a. requires the CI manager of an aircraft to establish and maintain an ASI management system for each aircraft. TAREG 3.5.4 identifies the specific areas of the ASIP where CI manager involvement is required. Importantly, due to the complexity of ASI management, the aircraft specific requirements to satisfy the regulations are documented in individual ASIMPs. The ASI management system is required to ensure the CI manager is involved in the development of the ASI requirements and has procedures in place to manage the areas of the ASIP for which they have responsibility. The involvement of the CI manager in the ASIP is critical in assisting DAVENG with assuring continued airworthiness of the aircraft structure on behalf of the TAR.

Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan

15. The ASIMP is the vehicle for documenting the in-service elements of the ASIP, which includes the CSDSTD, and systems and strategies for the management of an aircraft’s structural integrity for the type whilst in-service. The ASIMP is a proactive strategic plan that addresses the ASIP activities required to be undertaken during the next 10 years of an aircraft type's service life, with particular emphasis on the next three to five years. As an aircraft progresses through the different phases of its life-cycle, the ASIMP will reflect the activities necessary to ensure its structural integrity does not reduce below that level established by it’s CSDSTD. The ASIMP also provides details of the aircraft specific systems to satisfy TAREG 3.5.4 and identifies roles and responsibilities for the various ASIP systems and activities. Requirements for the layout and content of an ASIMP are contained in Section 2, Chapter 11 of the ADRM. A separate ASIMP is generally not produced for different models of an aircraft type, unless the changes and management requirements are significant; however, the ASIMP, which may cover multiple types, should clearly identify the differences between models and any ASI management requirements unique to a particular model. Note, an ASIMP is still required for leased aircraft. The level of detail required will be provided in the guidance contained in Section 3, Chapter 16.

16. TAREG 2.2.3 requires an ASIMP to have been produced or appropriately amended prior to issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for a new aircraft type, major design changes or significant changes in operations. This requirement is consistent with other airworthiness authorities. For example FAR25.1529 requires Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) to have been issued prior to delivery of the first aircraft or issuance of a standard certificate of airworthiness. The ASIMP, inter alia, is effectively an element of the ICA for Australian military aircraft, documenting the systems for maintaining structural airworthiness, structural inspection requirements, and structural life limits.



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ASIMP Generation

17. While the CI manager must ensure an ASIMP is in place prior to Design Acceptance, TAREG 3.5.4.c (1) identifies the ASIMP for each type is issued by the TAR, including amendments due to major design changes. The following clarifies the responsibilities and process for ASIMP generation:

a. A contractor will normally create an ASIMP as a contract deliverable during the acquisition phase or as part of a major design change. However, due to experience to date with the quality and value for money from contractor delivered ASIMPs, DAVENG may take responsibility for development of the ASIMP. In this case, the data and resources required to develop the ASIMP must be provided by the contractor to DAVENG, via the System Program Office (SPO) responsible for the project. This decision will be on a case by case basis.

b. Draft ASIMPs will be reviewed by DAVENG, with input and comments provided to the contractor through the Project Office for rectification. The responsible SPO is to resource ASIMP development.

c. Delivered ASIMPs will be transferred to the control of DAVENG, who will add detailed planning activities and appropriate system information (including roles and responsibilities) as the aircraft transitions to the in-service phase, before submitting the ASIMP through its approval process for TAR issuing.

ASIMP Reviews and Amendments

18. Since the ASIMP is a component of the continuing airworthiness system, which must be periodically reviewed, TAREG 3.5.4.c (4) requires ASIMPs to be reviewed at least annually while the aircraft is in-service. The review may determine only minor amendments are required or result in a full update and re-issue. Note: DAVENG coordinates the annual ASIMP review process, which includes review of proposed changes by the relevant CI manager before approval and issuing. Other considerations for ASIMP review and amendment are:

a. Any major modifications with ASI implications must include the requirement for ASIMP amendments, with the sponsoring organisation to provide the necessary data and resources for the ASIMP amendment.

b. While the ASIMP is a live document subject to review and amendment, in some instances it will be necessary for DAVENG staff to issue Authoritative Airworthiness Advice or approved designs on a priority basis in advance of an ASIMP update. However, ASIMP amendments should subsequently be produced in a timely fashion.

c. In accordance with TAREG 3.5.4.c (3), if the CI manager determines that amendments to the ASIMP have not been raised, or the ASIMP is inadequate, the CI manager should consult DAVENG regarding the outstanding requirement.

ASIMP Approval Process

19. TAREG 3.5.4.c (1) and (2) requires the TAR to issue the ASIMP for each aircraft type and approve updates. The relevant section OIC (ASI-DGTA or EHSI-DGTA) approves the developed or amended ASIMP, following CI manager review. DAVENG issues each approved ASIMP as the TARs representative.

STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT

20. The Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) is required to inform ASI-DGTA and relevant AEOs and contractors on the usage and environmental factors to support fatigue and life cycle management. The current requirements for an SOI are documented in the respective MILAVREGs and OAREGs. While the SOI has broad application to operators and logisticians, it is still a fundamental document for supporting structural integrity management. As such, the minimum recommended requirements of an SOI to support structural integrity management are:

a. A description of all intended roles and operations of the aircraft including:

(1) flight profile,

(2) mission mix,

(3) operational limitations,

(4) configuration information,

(5) rate of effort, and

(6) planned withdrawal date.



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b. A definition of the operating environment including:

(1) meteorological extremes,

(2) hazardous conditions,

(3) ground movement and parking conditions,

(4) runway surface and arrest conditions, and

(5) vibration conditions.

21. Technical airworthiness responsibility for the SOI lies primarily with endorsement. However, as changes to Type Design resulting from modifications or changes to role equipment and stores can influence operations, the DAR has a responsibility to also inform the OAAR to ensure any subsequent changes to operations are appropriately considered and documented.

22. The TAR must endorse all initial SOIs, as by definition, these would involve material changes. The DAR can endorse changes to aircraft SOIs that are editorial and do not materially change the SOI. Editorial changes are any changes not considered material. Material changes are any that revise role, operations or operating environment. Any material change must be referred to the TAR (through ASI-DGTA or EHSI-DGTA staff as appropriate). Whether a change is editorial or not, the DAR is required to inform DGTA-ADF of any changes. This recognises that not all editorial changes are simply punctuation. For example, an editorial change of specific interest to DGTA-ADF may be the inclusion of pending operational changes.

23. Any technical endorsement of changes made to an SOI should consider the following:

a. the certification basis remains adequate,

b. adequacy of the ASIP and ESIP,

c. adequacy of ICA and configuration control documents, and

d. adequacy of the training systems and logistics requirements.

24. While a change to configuration can initiate a change to the SOI, it is also possible that changes to the SOI initiated by the operators can have a potential outcome on engineering and logistic support requirements. Some of these outcomes include:

a. major or minor modifications;

b. revision of ASI/ESI management policy;

c. clearance of loads, stores, etc;

d. revision of technical maintenance Plans and Planned Servicing Schedule documentation; and

e. revision of flight manuals and training syllabi.

25. The SOI is a very important document. While it is managed under the operational regulations, those with technical airworthiness responsibilities are required to be diligent in ensuring any changes to the SOI, or requirement of the SOI, do not unacceptably compromise technical airworthiness.

MANAGEMENT OF ASI PROJECTS

26. ASIMPs are required to identify and address current or foreseen major ASI deficiencies by execution of ASI projects. ASI projects can include any or all of the following:

a. changes to the method of collecting usage data;

b. structural test requirements;

c. aircraft structural tear-downs;

d. special inspection programs to obtain structural condition information beyond that routinely gathered;

e. corrosion recovery programs; or

f. major repair/replacement and/or modification action in support of structural life of type.

27. TAREG 3.5.4.c (6) requires ASI projects to be managed as directed by the TAR. This will normally occur through ASI projects being planned and agreed by the relevant CI manager, DAVENG and where appropriate, DSTO. Generally, ASI projects dealing with structural degradation problems (specific to a type) such as corrosion would be managed by the CI manager and those dealing with fatigue problems. For example, a problem such requiring a



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Durability and Damage Tolerance Assessment (DADTA), would be managed by DAVENG. In each case, project management of an ASI task is to be decided between the Authorised Engineering Organisation and DAVENG.

STRUCTURAL TEAR-DOWN

28. An essential element of ASI management is the comparison of predicted damage with that actually detected in the aircraft. In many cases, particularly in the absence of full-scale fatigue tests, the tear-down, inspection and analysis of in-service assets (versus test articles) may provide the best method of assessing the validity of fatigue management strategies and structural life predictions. Furthermore, the development of fatigue management strategies for structural issues that arise in service relies on an understanding of the type of degradation present and the behaviour of the degradation over time. Some forms of degradation (e.g. multi-site fatigue and stress corrosion cracking) and their progression can only be correctly identified through fracture surface analysis of the defective component. In addition to these airworthiness considerations, detailed testing and assessment of defective structural components removed from in-service aircraft can support cost of ownership and aircraft availability objectives.

29. Recognising the requirements for structural tear-down, TAREG 3.5.4.c (7) requires the CI manager to retain structure from retired or crashed aircraft and cracked primary structural components removed from in-service aircraft. Cracked structure is defined as either being visibly cracked or having positive indications from NDT inspections. Furthermore, structural integrity programs for specific aircraft types may require the CI manager to retain further defective structure than specified in TAREG 3.5.4.c (7) and additional requirements will be documented in the ASIMP for each platform type. The ASIMP should identify where the structural components are to be sent for analysis purposes.

30. The CI manager is to ensure that the service history of any components retained for tear-down is provided. Structural tear-downs may by undertaken via a DSTO task and the ASIMP should reflect the requirement for routine structural tear-down inspections and analysis. Where appropriate, liaison with other operators to participate in collaborative tear-down programs may be possible.

STRUCTURAL REPAIRS AND MODIFICATION ACTION

31. The CSDSTD is the standard, or group of standards, upon which the aircraft structure has been certified against by the ADF, to provide the assurance of an acceptable level of risk of failure. Managing the in-service aspects of ASI to the CSDSTD is essential in maintaining the acceptable level of risk. Accordingly, TAREG 3.5.4.d (1) requires the CI manager have procedures to ensure all structural repairs and modifications conform to the relevant CSDSTD. To assist with this, each aircraft ASIMP will document the CSDSTD and provide guidance on appropriate action and data sources to ensure repair and modification action conform to the relevant CSDSTD.

32. Where proposed repairs or modifications have potential implications for the structural integrity management of the aircraft, DAVENG should be consulted during their development.

33. The fatigue implications of repairs or modifications must be investigated to no less a standard than that required by the CSDSTD. DAVENG assistance should be sought, as required, to ensure that:

a. damage tolerance principles are applied to the design of repairs, and modifications, with particular care taken of the potential interaction of multiple repairs;

b. inspection requirements are established to ensure their continued integrity; and

c. assessment is made of their impact on the structural integrity management of the aircraft.

34. DAVENG should only become directly involved in activities where the task at hand requires aircraft structural engineering expertise that is:

a. outside the unit's delegated engineering authority or self-assessed level of competency, or

b. may influence the authorised structural inspection program, structural life limits or component retirement lives.

STRUCTURAL LIFE OF TYPE

35. A fundamental function of ASIPs is the conduct of SLA, with this activity performed by DAVENG. A SLA will assist in establishing the structural Life of Type (LOT), with this then compared to the Planned Withdrawal Date (PWD). The requirement is for the structural LOT to meet or exceed the PWD. If it is identified the structural LOT does not satisfy the PWD, significant effort may be required by DAVENG and the relevant SPO to address the identified issues. While the process for conduct of SLA and establishing the structural LOT is further detailed in DGTA-ADF Instructions, major considerations are the PWD and the anticipated usage of the weapon system.



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USAGE MONITORING

36. Usage monitoring is the recording and reporting of usage parameters that significantly influence the structural degradation of an aircraft, for comparison of in-service usage against the certification basis. While civil design standards (eg FAR25 and FAR29) do not require usage monitoring due to the simple and consistent operating environment, military design standards, such as DEF-STAN 00-970 and Joint Service Specification Guide JSSG-2006, require usage monitoring due to the often complex and variable operations of military aircraft. Due to uncertainties in military usage, unmonitored usage can result in significant penalties on the available structural life. While usage monitoring is largely geared towards supporting fatigue management through the recording of parameters such as flight cycles, manoeuvres, speed and altitude, it may also support environmental degradation management through recording information regarding the operational environment (bases, operations over water etc).

37. During the acquisition phase, the usage monitoring system for the aircraft must be developed based on the intended use and structural life management philosophy adopted for the aircraft type. The complexity of the system may vary from a simple paper based system recording mission types and flight cycles, as may be appropriate for a transport type aircraft, to an electronic system recording and processing multiple flight parameters (eg speed, altitude, accelerations, flight control surface movements on a time history) for aircraft with more variable operations. Usage monitoring may include software programs such as a Service Life Monitoring Program (SLMP) to monitor fatigue accrual against the certified fatigue life and/or fleet and individual aircraft tracking capabilities in support of monitoring structural inspection requirements.

38. DAVENG is responsible for establishing the requirements for usage monitoring of State Aircraft at all stages in the life cycle. This includes provision of initial guidance on the appropriate usage monitoring system for the aircraft during acquisition and managing subsequent development activities. The ASIMP details the aircraft specific usage monitoring systems and identifies any deficiencies and associated rectification tasks. However, many agencies play an important role in establishing and supporting the usage monitoring capability and systems, with the aircraft specific responsibilities documented in the ASIMP. In accordance with TAREG 3.5.4.e (1), the applicant for CI management must ensure procedures are in place to implement usage monitoring in accordance with the ASIMP and to maintain the usage monitoring systems. This may include maintaining associated hardware and software from a maintenance and configuration management perspective and the review, acceptance and implementation of design changes to the usage monitoring system as recommended by DAVENG.

CONDITION DATA RECORDING

39. An essential element of ASI management is the ability to acquire, evaluate and utilise aircraft structural condition data to provide continual assessment of the in-service integrity of individual aircraft structure. The requirement for continual assessment has been born through both military and civilian operational experience. Bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) produce guidance on the continuing assessment of structural integrity, clearly establishing the need for recording in-service condition data, refer to International Civil Aviation Organisation Document 9051-AN/896 – Airworthiness Technical Manual. The recording of condition data has the primary aim to validate or improve fatigue and environmental degradation management. Condition data may also be used by AEO’s for in-service management and assessing repair options. This ability is primarily achieved through condition data recording, which is a two step process requiring collection and initial analysis of condition data.

Condition Data Collection

40. Condition data is any form of data that assists with the continual assessment of the in-service integrity of individual aircraft structure necessary, primarily through fatigue or environmental degradation. The data may be sourced from; defect reports, inspections, repairs or modifications gathered during the course of scheduled or unscheduled maintenance activities. This information may be reported, recorded and stored on a manual (paper based) system or on an electronic record system in conformance to TAREG 5.2.1. For any new aircraft entering service, electronic condition data recording systems should be established.

41. TAREG 3.5.4.e (2) requires the CI manager have procedures to ensure collection of condition data records in accordance with the ASIMP. Further, TAREG 3.5.4.e (3) establishes the minimum requirement for data recording to ensure continuing airworthiness, with the CI manager required to maintain records of defects, inspections, repairs, and modifications to the primary structure. The combination of these regulations identifies that there is a minimum requirement for airworthiness, but the data recording for individual aircraft types may require a greater level of data to be maintained (eg secondary structure), with the aircraft specific requirements documented in the ASIMP. Note that the definition for primary structure may vary for each aircraft and different terms may be used (eg Structurally Significant Items (SSI), Primary Structural Element (PSE) etc). The ASIMP should establish the aircraft specific terminology and requirements. Further, inspections required to be reported are formal Non-Destructive Testing (NDT)



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in accordance with approved procedures, rather than details of zonal inspections or similar, with NDT reporting to include when inspections identify nil defects unless otherwise specified.

42. Each aircraft ASIMP provides the specific details of the reporting requirements, including the medium for reporting and storage of the condition data records. However, as a guide the data should include details on the structural items affected and nature of the defect and repair activity, including:

a. aircraft/higher assembly serial number (eg wing if items are swapped from aircraft);

b. part name and number;

c. part history (AFHR, landings etc as applicable);

d. nature of defect (eg fatigue crack, pitting corrosion, stress corrosion cracking);

e. size and orientation of defect;

f. detailed location (BL, WL, FS); and

g. repair activity (eg SRM, RFD/W including part replacement).

43. Data is to be provided in an appropriate format and timeframe, allowing DAVENG to conduct annual ASI assessments or SLA. For example, recent Structural LOT studies have identified that maintenance records (such as the EE508 forms) do not provide sufficient data or appropriate data on structural condition in a format that is conducive to timely or accurate assessment. While the use of electronic databases is not mandated for the recording and storage of condition data, they are strongly encouraged due to the significant increase in ability to quickly and reliably interrogate and assess condition data. Data in the form of a proposed design change that may affect, or are intended to improve, the airframe primary structure’s resistance to degradation (eg. changes to paint or sealant requirements, material substitution, etc), in accordance with TAREG 3.5.4.e (3), are to be reported to DAVENG.

Initial Analysis

44. DAVENG will initially analyse the data at a high level, to categorise the condition data into the relevant forms of degradation and map this over the structural locations. Typically, fatigue (cracking) data will be assessed under fatigue management, while data on corrosion, bonded panel degradation etc will be assessed under environmental degradation management. However, instances of corrosion in fatigue critical regions may influence assessment of both.

FATIGUE MANAGEMENT

45. There are two basic philosophies for fatigue management, being Safe Life and/or Safety by Inspection, as appropriate to the certification basis. The philosophy applicable to the aircraft will influence the fatigue management program established. However, under either philosophy, the status and validity of the established fatigue management program needs to be periodically assessed in light of current and forecast operations. While the software programs to conduct the routine fatigue tracking are included in usage monitoring, the continual assessment of the fatigue data and validity of the tracking programs, under current and projected operations, is an element of fatigue management. Fatigue management also includes the regular assessment of condition data to ensure that the systems in place to track fatigue degradation remain valid based on in service experience.

46. Operational Loads Monitoring (OLM) systems also form an important element of fatigue management, providing the capability to assess if operational changes significantly affect aircraft loads and verify that fatigue tracking systems and the basis of structural verification remain valid. The aircraft specific requirements for fatigue management, including nature and frequency of OLM, will be developed during the acquisition phase. DAVENG is responsible for implementing and managing the systems and documenting the aircraft specific systems in the ASIMP.

47. TAREG 3.5.4.d (2) requires the applicant for CI management to ensure procedures are in place for implementing Fatigue Management in accordance with the ASIMP. While it is expected that DAVENG will be actively involved, the CI manager has critical responsibilities in supporting fatigue management. TAREG 3.5.4.d (2) identifies the primary fatigue management responsibility for the CI managers as the implementation of the authorised structural inspection programs, structural life limits and component retirement lives. To clarify terminology, where fatigue management is achieved through SBI there will be an associated structural inspection program. For Safe Life managed aircraft there will be structural life limits. Helicopters are generally managed under the Safe Life philosophy by applying life limits to their dynamic components, typically referred to as component retirement lives, compared to a fixed wing where Safe Life is often applied to the aircraft. TAREG 3.5.4 specifically lists component retirement lives to ensure consistency of terminology in the rotary wing environment; however, in the following paragraphs, any reference to life limits under the Safe Life philosophy equally applies to component retirement lives. Some aircraft may have a combination of fatigue management strategies. The CI manager will normally implement the inspection programs or life limits via the maintenance program documented in the aircraft Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP).



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Other important roles for the CI manager in support of fatigue management may include maintaining configuration information such as weight and balance records, as this information may underpin a number of assumptions within the fatigue management systems.

48. TAREG 3.5.4.c (5) identifies that the ASIMP will specify the authoritative source or sources for the structural inspection programs, structural life limits and component retirement lives. This regulation identifies the CI manager may have a variety of sources available (eg DGTA-ADF staff, OEM, other operators, civil regulators) that provide information on the inspection programs or life limits (as appropriate to the aircraft type); however, the TAR (via the ASIMP) is required to approve the authoritative source or sources for application to ADF aircraft. The requirement is established as the source or sources for the intervals or life limits are approved by the TAR, cognitive of the ADF configuration, role and environment, ASI management philosophy and service requirements. Depending on the aircraft, the ASIMP may detail the authoritative source or sources (e.g. most helicopters will utilise OEM data) or actually be the authoritative source providing the necessary details (e.g. F-111 and C-130H). When the ASIMP is the authoritative source, the data would generally be provided in a Volume 2 to the ASIMP.

49. TAREG 3.5.4.d (3) requires the CI manager to have procedures to ensure authorised structural inspection program intervals, structural life limits, or component retirement lives are not to be exceeded without TAR approval. This requirement, which is consistent with AAP 7001.038(AM1) Maintenance Interval Extension allowables (ie maintenance managers are not permitted to authorise extensions on flight critical structure), reinforces that the TAR has management authority for intervals or life limits and that CI managers must receive DAVENG approval (as the TAR representative) prior to exceeding the authorised intervals or life limits. For aircraft managed through SBI, as changes to the inspection technique directly influences the inspection interval, the TAR must also approve these. Note that the TAR may issue other forms of authoritative data that overrides the authorised source or sources to address specific requirements. Where this occurs, subsequent amendments to the ASIMP will establish the long-term requirements.

50. TAREG 3.5.4.d (4) requires the CI manager to have procedures to ensure that any amendments to the authorised structural inspection program intervals, structural life limits, or component retirement lives be advised to the TAR. This regulation is directed to the situation where the TAR has approved an authoritative source or sources other than the ASIMP (eg OEM data). This regulation provides the ability for the CI manager to introduce amendments to the inspection programs or life limits when the authorised source or sources provide the amendments. In this case, the CI manager does not require TAR approval to implement the change; however, advising the TAR is necessary to ensure DAVENG records are maintained and provide the ability for an (informal) assessment by DAVENG of the ongoing suitability of the authorised source of inspection programs or life limits.

Operational Loads Monitoring

51. TAREG 3.5.4.e (4) requires the CI manager to have procedures in place to maintain the integrity of any OLM system installed on the aircraft, as documented in the ASIMP. An OLM system generally will include the ability to record strain data and relevant flight parameters that are sufficient to determine the major structural loading actions. This provides the ability to either identify when operational or structural changes have affected structural loading which may influence fatigue management, or as an independent means of verifying fatigue management systems. OLM systems may not be required to record data at all stages during an aircraft’s service life. Limited survey periods may be appropriate when possible significant changes in usage/loading can be identified through other routine reporting mechanisms. While OLM data may not be required to be routinely recorded and stored, to ensure the capability to investigate possible changes exists, the CI manager is to ensure that any fitted OLM systems are maintained throughout the in-service phase, or that TAR approval is obtained for its suspension. Generally, suspension of an OLM program will only be considered where sufficient evidence exists that the information obtained from the initial program adequately defines the loads environment and that the fatigue management system will detect any change in operational usage which may affect the loading environment. Notwithstanding the adequacy of a usage monitoring and fatigue management systems, the necessity for re-introducing an OLM program will be specifically examined as part of the ASIMP review process or when a change in the aircraft's role is proposed or detected.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION MANAGEMENT

52. Environmental degradation management consists of the programs to monitor, such as a CPCP, and manage environmental degradation of the structures, including the ability to periodically assess management of the effects of environmental damage on structural integrity. The CPCP for an aircraft is aimed to prevent degradation and assess and restore structural damage induced by environmental causes such as corrosion, with the baseline program provided by the OEM (as specified in ADRM Section 2, Chapter 11). While CPCP activities are largely not directly airworthiness related, environmental degradation could have significant logistics and operational impacts, with the CPCP designed to control the escalating maintenance cost. The assessment activity is primarily conducted through review of structural condition data, to determine if the management programs (such as CPCP) are effective. The assessment process will consider factors such as whether damage is identified in a timely manner (ie whilst adequate structural strength is



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maintained) and the frequency of repair activity to determine the success of the management programs. Data sources other than condition data may be used during the assessment process. Other data sources may include the SOI, which includes details on base conditions, plus data repositories on base and onboard environments, material properties and elements used in the CPCP (such as Water Displacing Corrosion Preventative (WDCP) compounds). Where deficiencies are identified, ASIMP tasks will be raised to address the deficiencies through improvements to the management programs, development of improved technologies, or modification activity as appropriate.

53. The aircraft specific requirements for the environmental degradation management system will be developed during the acquisition phase, with DAVENG responsible for guidance for the system requirements and documenting the aircraft specific systems in the ASIMP. In accordance with TAREG 3.5.4.d (5), the applicant is to ensure procedures are in place for implementing environmental degradation management, with the aircraft specific requirements (such as the CPCP) documented in the ASIMP.

AGEING AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL AUDITS

Management of Ageing Aircraft

54. TAREG 3.5.4.e (5) requires Ageing Aircraft Structural Audits (AASA) to be carried out when the aircraft reaches its mid life point or after 15 years in service, whichever is sooner unless otherwise authorised by the TAR. Service experience has demonstrated that there is a need to have continuing updated knowledge concerning the structural integrity of older aircraft. Although an ASIP will be implemented when the aircraft enters service, and includes fatigue and environmental degradation management systems, inter alia, to provide the capability for routine structural life assessments, AASA are effectively a strategically located more in-depth conduct of the continuing assessment elements of the ASIP.

55. The 15 year or midlife point is provided as a reasonable expectation for the conduct of the AASA; however, it is realised that this has already been exceeded for a number of ADF platforms and may not always be appropriate based on planned ADF operation of the platform. The decision for the timing of the AASA will generally be determined by the service experience of other operators, the results of structural tear-down inspections of crashed or retired aircraft, and the results of the ongoing ASIP. Unfortunately, evidence of onset of ageing aircraft problems is often masked by the discrete nature of the damage detected. Therefore, its importance may go undetected by engineering staff, who are necessarily more involved in pressing fleet availability support activities. The ASIMP will document the intention for the conduct of an AASA, with issue of the ASIMP providing TAR authorisation; however, in deciding the timing of the AASA, the following clarification is provided:

a. where change in the original PWD has occurred, the mid-life point is to be based on the original PWD when the Type Certificate was awarded; and

b. where a fleet of used aircraft have been introduced, the mid-life point is to be based on an assumption that the ADF have operated the aircraft since new.

56. As required by TAREG 3.5.4.e (5), an AASA should be undertaken under the guidance of the TAR. This will generally be achieved through an appropriately qualified working group and is to be performed independently of the existing structural integrity management. The level of activity to be undertaken in an AASA will vary by weapon system, and will largely depend on the data provided through, and robustness of, the existing systems. A general guide for conducting an ageing aircraft structural audit can be provided by ASI-DGTA. Whilst its results will be of value to the ASIP; the conduct of this audit is not to supplant other structural integrity management tasks.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 12

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE FOR MAJOR PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION

1. Design Acceptance of a new aircraft, or a major change to type design of an in-service aircraft, can be a particularly challenging activity for a Project Office (PO). Establishing a pragmatic certification basis, and then evaluating evidence to confirm that the design meets the certification basis, can require extensive PO skills and resources. While avenues are available to reduce the impact on PO resources, for example the application of ‘recognition of prior acceptance’, care must be taken in their application if Design Acceptance is to be successfully achieved. A comprehensive understanding of the TAR’s requirements for Design Acceptance of a new aircraft, or a major change to an in-service aircraft, is therefore essential for any PO.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the TAR’s requirements for Design Acceptance of a new aircraft, or a major change to type design of an in-service aircraft. An overview of the interaction required between the PO and DGTA-ADF during the lifecycle of the project is also presented.

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE / TYPE CERTIFICATION IN THE ADF

3. Australian Defence Force (ADF) aircraft on the State Register are not subject to civil aviation regulations. Thus, the ADF must independently promote adequate safety of air operations for the protection of both its employees and the public. Confirmation of the adequacy of the design of an ADF aircraft is achieved through the ADF Type Certification process. The Type Certification concept has been primarily taken from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which issues Type Certificates for commercial aircraft in the United States of America. Under this concept, an airworthiness authority promotes safety of flight by inter-alia:

a. prescribing and revising minimum standards governing the design of aircraft, engines, propellers and other aircraft equipment as may be required in the interests of safety; and

b. administering a program to determine compliance with those prescribed standards and to provide for continued airworthiness.

Type Certification fundamentally involves the specification of airworthiness design requirements and the review and acceptance of sufficient evidence which assures compliance to these requirements.

4. The primary contributor to ADF Type Certification is the Design Acceptance process. Design Acceptance is a determination of technical acceptability by the ADF, which provides confidence to ADF agencies and staff that the product is safe and fit for service. Design Acceptance covers engineering agency competency, specification of all technical requirements (i.e. both airworthiness design requirements and general functional and performance requirements), verification that the specification has been met and Design Approval certification by the ‘doing’ agency (e.g. Prime Contractor).

5. The ADF Design Acceptance process mirrors the FAA Type Certification process. However, an ADF Type Certificate is only issued following an additional, higher level of oversight of design outcomes and supporting PO activities. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR), Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA), Director Airworthiness Co-ordination and Policy Agency (DACPA-ADF), Airworthiness Board and ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF-AA) provide this additional oversight. Whilst this oversight is greater than that required by the ‘routine’ Design Acceptance process (e.g. for minor changes to type design), the purpose is not intended to make the PO ‘do more Design Acceptance work’. Section 3, Chapter 14 of the TAMM and AAP 7001.048(AM1)—ADF Airworthiness Manual provides the necessary guidance on what is to be satisfied by the PO before issue of a Type Certificate.

6. The extra oversight of airworthiness design requirements by ADF agencies, compared to general functional and performance requirements (such as radar, weapon or electronic warfare performance), often causes confusion. As the Design Acceptance process covers all design requirements, DGTA-ADF suggests that in PO management of the determination of compliance by the Prime Contractor with all the requirements of the ADF Statement of Requirement (SOR), the airworthiness design requirements and evidence of compliance be assembled together and the general functional and performance requirements and evidence of compliance be assembled together. In this way the PO need only manage one process for all elements of the SOR, but having the airworthiness design requirements separated (e.g.



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on paper or within a database) from the general functional and performance requirements will more readily allow agencies overseeing the design to view the data they need to. This separation is particularly useful when assessing the maturity of the design when approaching critical milestones such as an application for a Special Flight Permit (SFP), where the ADF AA (via the TAR, OAA and perhaps an Airworthiness Board) will require assurance that airworthiness design requirements have been adequately addressed for the proposed scope of flying.

COMPILATION OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS – THE CERTIFICATION BASIS

7. ADF major capital acquisition policy encourages the use of SORs, whether as part of a commercial contract, a government-to-government agreement, or other arrangement. These normally include specifications and Statements of Work (SOW) which are framed in terms of expected system outcomes and high level performance requirements. Detailed design solutions are not encouraged as they may inhibit contractors from exploring other innovative approaches. The ADF Design Acceptance process is administered to be consistent with this objective by embracing the broad principles applied by civilian authorities, which have a similar objective to impose the minimum necessary constraint on the aircraft industry which they regulate.

8. Although civil airworthiness design standards are developed specifically to impose the minimum constraint on industry, with current design techniques and knowledge it is not sufficient to specify an expected accident rate or other simple performance target as a design outcome, and expect the design agency to be able to demonstrate compliance to the authority’s satisfaction. Consequently, it is in the interests of the design agency and authority that minimum standards be defined to provide adequate assurance of inherent safety in the design and that compliance can be measured. Some standards will require numerical reliability targets to be demonstrated where practical, but much of their content will be design rules derived from experience (and therefore will be subject to continuous improvement) and only imply a level of safety which cannot be directly quantified.

9. However, for a particular design activity civilian authorities must provide a consistent interpretation of the design standard while ensuring that the standard provides a comprehensive basis to accept the design and be prepared to assess alternatives offered by the applicant. To do this, the authority works closely with the applicant to approve the design standards and test / certification plans, develop special conditions which supplement applicable standards when they are found deficient for a novel or unusual design feature, or assess applicant supplied justification for varying of a particular design requirement because they can demonstrate that their design provides equivalent safety.

10. The ADF adopts a similar philosophy to that described above, however it cannot act as an authority in the same way in the administration of an acquisition contract. Once the contract is signed, interpretation of standards and acceptable methods of demonstrating compliance, special conditions or requirements for equivalent safety will be matters for negotiation under the terms of the contract in which each side has an equal say. Therefore, all these matters should be resolved in the pre-contract phases, while the ADF still has the necessary negotiating leverage, and be incorporated into contract documentation (i.e. the ADF SOR). Because pre-contract phases offer limited opportunities to address tender deficiencies, project and DGTA-ADF staff should liaise closely on specifying design requirements throughout the development of the SOR.

11. Although referring consistently to ‘design standards’ in the foregoing discussion of civil type certification programs, the standards are subject to continuous update and improvement and for any particular activity the standard can be tailored through the addition of special conditions or equivalent safety findings. In addition, the ‘standard’ can be updated through the issue of airworthiness directives during an aircraft’s service life. To acknowledge these variations, the term ‘certification basis’ is used to describe the complete set of design requirements against which a design (or ‘type’) is currently certified.

12. While the term ‘certification basis’ is also relevant to military aircraft programs, often there is no identifiable general and comprehensive set of aircraft design standards on which the design requirements for the aircraft development program are based. Instead, for each aircraft program, the acquisition agency, in consultation with relevant specialist engineering agencies, must be satisfied that the aircraft contract SOR, including referenced military, industry and company standards governing aircraft design, will assure an adequate level of safety in its intended role. In this case the certification basis is contained in, but not differentiated from, the contract specifications and related documents and the evidence of compliance will be generated within an overall design qualification program.

13. Organisations such as the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) and the US FAA have assembled design requirements which, when complied with, have been shown to provide assurance of an airworthy aircraft. To gain an appreciation of what an airworthiness design requirement is, one needs to look at, as examples, UK DEF STAN 00-970/971 or US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 23 through 36. Such a compilation of design requirements forms a certification basis. These organisations also provide guidance material for aircraft designers that includes acceptable means of establishing compliance. For example, the certification basis for civilian passenger aircraft is likely to be FAR 25. During the design or upgrade of an aircraft the designer produces evidence, to the satisfaction of the relevant FAA Aircraft Certification Office that the design requirements have been complied with. Annex A is an excerpt from the FAA’s 382J (the commercial variant of the C130J) Compliance Checklist. The ADF Certification



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Basis Description (CBD) is a document listing, inter-alia, the individual design requirements and the evidence that demonstrates contractor compliance with the requirements. The ADF CBD concept attempts to mirror the FAA Compliance Checklist. Annex B is a list of elements that generally cover the scope of design requirements for an aircraft. It may be useful to refer to this list during any design change to check that relevant elements have been included in SORs. This list should not be used as an actual certification basis for any particular aircraft.

14. Comparative Standards. The ADF Design Acceptance approach is based on the practical requirement for a relatively small Defence Force to accept a range of production aircraft and upgrades, with their associated diverse design standards, into safe and effective service. To administer its program, the ADF requires comparative standards, to be supplemented as necessary for ADF purposes. Such comparative standards include UK MoD DEF STAN 00-970/971, US FARs 23 through 36, EASA Certification Specifications (CS) 23 through 36, and those in AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual. These standards have not necessarily been judged to be inherently safer or more complete than other military or civil standards, but they provide accessible comprehensive design standards. These comparative standards are used mainly by DGTA-ADF, to evaluate certification bases which are developed as an integral part of the project specification development and compliance process.

15. Major Modifications or Upgrades to In–Service ADF Aircraft. For major modifications or upgrades to existing ADF aircraft, compliance with the existing certification basis for the aircraft (which is likely to be contained within the specifications and standards to which the original aircraft were designed), with appropriate additions, will normally be acceptable to the TAR (i.e. the level of safety is at least maintained). In such cases, the preparation of a detailed specification that includes the design requirements is probably most appropriate. Particular attention should be paid to the applicability of any outdated standards that may form part of the original certification basis for the aircraft. Later issues of the relevant standards should be reviewed and compliance specified where appropriate. While it is often acceptable to consider the modification of an existing system using the standards to which it was originally built, this may have inherent dangers. Most standards or specifications are updated as a result of identified or perceived weaknesses and while these changes may not seem significant, they can have considerable impact. Existing systems may have a proven in-service history which obviates the need for redesign to updated standards, but new design to obsolete standards can claim no such benefit and may result in products that are below the minimum acceptable performance by modern standards. Specification developers must ensure that where an older standard is used in place of a replacement or updated standard, the reasons for using the older standard are formally documented and endorsed by the TAR as part of the SOR development process.

PRIOR ACCEPTANCE

16. The ADF, as a small military, has only limited capability and capacity to oversight major design activities. The oversight efforts of other civil and military Airworthiness Authorities are therefore relied upon to the greatest extent practicable. Where the ADF is purchasing an existing design, the ADF can often leverage extensively off the design oversight provided by another Airworthiness Authority. Where the ADF is pursuing unique design work, another Airworthiness Authority may be engaged to provide some design oversight on the ADF’s behalf. In either case, the efforts of the Airworthiness Authority in confirming that the design complies with the certification basis can substantially reduce the ADF’s Design Acceptance burden. This is known as 'Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA)', because the ADF is relying partially or wholly on certifications provided by another Airworthiness Authority.

17. For the TAR to permit the application of RPA for an extant aircraft design, the TAR must be satisfied that all airworthiness design requirements have been addressed. ADF policy allows for TAR acceptance of a current military or civil type certification or compliance finding without further independent assessment to the extent that it can be shown to be relevant to the ADF aircraft’s configuration and intended role and operating environment. The concept of Role includes the full description of: flight profiles, day/night operations, external stores carriage, possible cargo configurations, operating weights and speed/altitude ranges. The concept of Environment includes not only the expected physical environment, but also the functional environment. The physical environment encompasses such issues as atmospheric parameters, structural loading conditions (including static, dynamic, vibration and acoustic loads), corrosive environment, runway surface, electromagnetic environment, tie-down loads, and so on. The functional environment encompasses those ADF and external issues that may influence the aircraft design, for example navigation system integrity requirements for certain classes of civilian airspace, ADF policies for aircraft crash protection, and so on. Annex C presents a range of issues to consider when assessing whether an extant aircraft design is compatible with the ADF’s proposed role and operating environment. Annex D presents guidance on applying RPA to an extant aircraft design.

18. For the TAR to permit the application of RPA for an extant system design, the TAR must be satisfied that the airworthiness design requirements for the system have been disclosed, and that compliance with those design requirements has been adequately assured. Annex D provides guidance on the application of RPA to extant system designs. The contribution that RPA can make to Design Acceptance is then dependent on the compatibility of the system with the proposed ADF configuration, role and operating environment; annex C provides guidance on making this compatibility assessment.



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19. For the TAR to permit another Airworthiness Authority to oversight design changes to ADF aircraft, the TAR must be satisfied that the Airworthiness Authority is both competent and suitable for the task.. Annex D presents guidance to POs on establishing the competence and suitability of an Airworthiness Authority, and examines the PO’s residual responsibilities for successfully achieving Design Acceptance.

20. The project’s Design Acceptance Strategy provides a suitable means for communicating RPA intentions to the TAR for approval. The Design Acceptance Strategy should be drafted early in the project lifecycle, well before soliciting tenders from prospective design agencies, and should be updated as RPA arrangements are refined prior to contract signature.

STEPS LEADING TO CONTRACT SIGNATURE

21. Design Acceptance of a new aircraft, or a major change to type design of an in-service aircraft, can be a particularly challenging activity for a PO. Regular engagement with DGTA-ADF throughout the project lifecycle will assure that the TAR’s minimum requirements for Design Acceptance are met. The following paragraphs suggest key opportunities for engagement between DGTA-ADF and the PO.

Pre-1st Pass Involvement of DGTA-ADF

22. Early in the ‘requirements’ lifecycle phase of an aircraft acquisition or major modification project, an Integrated Product Team will normally be established to create the 1st pass capability proposal. A meeting between DGTA-ADF and the IPT should be convened early in the phase, to explore avenues for DGTA-ADF participation in options development and the Capability Proposal First Pass document suite. The level of DGTA-ADF involvement in this phase of the project lifecycle will depend on the scope of the project.

Initial Contact between DGTA-ADF and the Project Office

23. Following Government 1st pass approval, a PO will normally be formed, to undertake the many duties (in particular, solicitation of accurate pricing information) leading up to 2nd pass approval. An important component of DGTA’s initial contact with a PO is to establish a Design Acceptance strategy for the project. This meeting should occur shortly after formation of the PO and include appropriate representation from DGTA-ADF, the PO and the System Program Office (if active). The meeting’s objectives would include:

a. review the acquisition strategy to understand the implications for Design Acceptance;

b. brief PO staff on DGTA’s requirements for, and input into, Design Acceptance activities; and

c. determine how and when the proposed certification bases are to be solicited from tenderers.

24. DGTA-ADF staff are available to provide guidance and assistance to the PO and will likely help draft a number of the elements of the Design Acceptance strategy in concert with the PO. Accordingly, POs should understand from an early stage in the project what the responsibilities of technical staff within the PO for Design Acceptance activities are, including what oversight they, in conjunction with DGTA-ADF, will conduct on contractors.

25. Issue of Engineering Authority to the Project Office. PO engineering authority (EA) will be assigned either by the SPO Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) or Chief Engineer (CENGR) Aerospace Systems Division (ASD) Acquisition (ACQ). Such EA will provide for all Design Acceptance activities including Prime Contractor Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) assessments. Prior to the award of EA, the SPO DAR or CENGR ASD (ACQ) will likely check PO processes including maturity of the Design Acceptance strategy, understanding of technical processes from the relevant Quality Management System (QMS) and overall staff competencies and numbers. The SPO DAR or CENGR ASD (ACQ) will also likely check how engineering related activities are being conducted as the Design Acceptance strategy is progressed.

26. AEO Assessment of Prime Contractor. Normally the Prime Contractor will be required to become an AEO. The SPO concerned, or the PO if not based within a SPO, will be the ADF ‘sponsor’ for this commercial AEO and responsible for AEO assessments. However, this is not necessarily a straight forward process since the intent of the TAMM will often have to be applied to obtain the necessary assurance whilst not placing unnecessary complexity and cost on the contractor. DGTA-ADF, and in some cases CENGR ASD (ACQ), will assist in assessments of the Prime Contractor, leading to the award of AEO by the TAR and ongoing surveillance activities. Such oversight should be documented in the Design Acceptance Strategy and should be mutually agreed between the PO and DGTA-ADF. A checklist for assessing contractors is at Annex E.

27. Some acquisition arrangements, for example those achieved via Government-to-Government agreements (such as US Foreign Military Sales), may not provide the ADF with a mechanism for directly applying AEO requirements on design agencies. The TAR will normally grant an exemption to the AEO requirement in this circumstance, and indeed Sect 3 Chap 7 includes a standing exemption for FMS acquisitions. However, while the



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assurances provided by AEO status are absent, this does not infer that the TAR automatically accepts that the design produced by the design agency will be of acceptable quality. Rather, even if the organisation will not hold an AEO certificate, the TAR still expects that the PO will demonstrate, as part of the Design Acceptance Strategy, that sufficient rigour has been applied to assure design quality. The PO will therefore need to mount a case to the TAR that justifies how the anticipated design agency arrangements will still meet the intent of AEO requirements. Once TAR concurrence has been achieved, the project’s Design Acceptance Strategy should be updated to record the details of the equivalency argument, including any ongoing actions needed by the PO to assure ongoing equivalence.

Ongoing Interaction between the PO and DGTA-ADF

28. DGTA-ADF assigns an internal ‘Project Coordinator’ to each aircraft acquisition and major modification project. The Project Coordinator provides the PO with a single conduit to DGTA-ADF, and is responsible for ensuring that DGTA’s interaction with the PO is timely and consistent. The Project Coordinator will be thoroughly familiar with the project’s Design Acceptance Strategy, and will provide the PO with ongoing advice on the TAR’s requirements for Design Acceptance. Regular liaison between the Project Coordinator and the PO will help the PO to right-size its Design Acceptance efforts.

29. The foregoing paragraphs have mainly discussed the ‘technical management requirements,’ which should be able to be agreed and understood relatively early in the life cycle of the project, and ongoing AEO assessment activities which will progress during the design phase. The remainder of this chapter mainly discusses ‘design requirements’ which necessitates a major input from the Prime Contractor in providing assurance the product is airworthy.

ADF Method of Establishing the Certification Basis

30. To avoid constraining a particular design or the activity required to have it accepted as airworthy, the ADF approach is, where possible, to have tenderers propose the certification basis for their offered equipment for acceptance by the ADF. To verify that a tenderer’s proposed certification basis is adequate to ensure safe operation in the ADF’s intended roles, configuration and operating environment, the ADF will compare the proposed certification basis against its comparative standards or invoke the ‘prior acceptance’ concept. The design requirements would then be specified within the ADF SOR and the contractor would complete the CBD to the ADF’s (or ADF accepted National Airworthiness Authority’s (NAAs)) satisfaction during design and testing. Irrespective of the approach adopted, frequent interaction between the PO, DGTA-ADF, Centres of Expertise (COE) and contractors will be required early in the project to assist with SOR development, minimise deficiencies in the tendered certification bases and develop the Design Acceptance strategy.

31. The establishment of the certification basis will depend on the particular aircraft type or upgrade being acquired. Some examples are provided in the following paragraphs.

32. Aircraft in Service with an ADF recognised Military Organisation such as the RAF or USN. Such aircraft are likely to be designed to a variety of design standards, including both military and company standards (e.g. LIF Hawk, Seahawk). For the ADF to accept such aircraft, the ADF comparative standards may be used to check that the adequacy and/or scope of design requirements within the SOR is comprehensive and that compliance evidence meets levels acceptable by today’s standards. Such a check is necessary as the ADF’s intended role, configuration and operating environment may differ from other users and standards may differ (e.g. the US military’s requirements for personnel RADHAZ differ from the ADF’s requirements). For design changes to such aircraft, the designer of the change will likely require access to the original standards the aircraft was designed to and this would normally include the OEM’s design specifications and test reports etc. For some aircraft types, access to such data might be limited. In such circumstances development of a SOR may require specification of modern standards to comprehensively cover design requirements. However, the term certification basis still has meaning in that all the available, known and understood design requirements effectively constitutes the certification basis for the aircraft type.

33. Aircraft Previously Accepted by a Recognised Civil NAA. For such aircraft types the appropriate FARs or EASA Certification Standards (CS) will likely be the certification basis. Design changes to such aircraft would also likely need to meet the appropriate FARs or CSs. Any systems or military specific requirements, which are not adequately covered in civil standards (e.g. air to air refuelling, ordnance requirements, stores compatibility requirements, etc), can be covered by military standards such as US MIL-STDs or UK DEF STANs. These military standards should be included within the certification basis for the aircraft type.

34. Aircraft Not Previously Accepted by a Recognised Military or Civil Agency. For such aircraft types, the ADF would likely need to undertake or commission a detailed comparison (in both adequacy and scope) of the aircraft type design against the ADF’s comparative design standards. The ADF would also likely require greater involvement in determining the acceptability of the certification basis compliance evidence than it would if a recognised NAA was also involved in determining acceptance. The ADF may also wish to determine the credit it may give to specification or compliance agencies involved in such aircraft design matters, such as other operators. Such



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credit, which provides an amount of confidence to the ADF, may reduce the oversight the ADF may otherwise afford to the design.

Solicitation of Proposed Certification Basis Prior to or at Tender

35. The proposed Design Acceptance Strategy, including certification basis, for a new aircraft type or major upgrade should be established as early as practicable in the tender process (normally prior to second pass approval by Government). This will allow the ADF adequate opportunities to evaluate and comment on the proposal before contract signature. Fundamental to the ADF’s approach to establishing the certification basis for a new aircraft or a major upgrade to an existing ADF aircraft, are the following steps:

a. Prospective tenderers should propose to the ADF a type certification strategy (e.g. involvement of NAAs) and a certification basis including a system safety program (refer Section, 2 Chapter 1 of AAP 7001.054(AM1)), that they believe will provide an adequate level of safety when the tendered type is operated in the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment. Reliance on prior acceptance should be justified by an analysis of its applicability to the configuration being proposed and the ADF’s intended roles and environment. Early identification of novel or unusual design features not covered by mature standards will be particularly valuable.

b. The ADF assesses the completeness of the proposed certification basis by evaluating it against its selected comparative standards e.g. DEF STAN 00-970/971, FARs, and AAP 7001.054(AM1). Note that for upgrades, the certification basis would likely be based on the specifications and standards to which the aircraft type was originally designed.

36. Since the ADF is limited in its ability to influence the certification basis proposed in a tenderer’s Request for Tender (RFT) response, without risk to tendered cost and schedule, prospective tenderers should be requested to propose their certification bases to the ADF prior to the release of the RFT, irrespective of the acquisition approach adopted by the PO. The intention is to identify weaknesses in the proposed certification bases and highlight them to the tenderers prior to RFT so that there are no significant deficiencies remaining at source selection. DGTA recognises the difficulties that tenderers face in providing the ADF with a certification basis at this early stage. If such a pre-tender opportunity is not utilised, the certification basis should be sought via the RFT.

37. Annex F provides a suggested method that could be used to solicit the required certification basis information from tenderers at the pre-tender or RFT stage. It has been designed to require the minimum necessary expenditure of the tenderers’ effort. Briefly, the annex asks respondents to provide details of the certification basis for their aircraft or upgrade, any prior acceptance upon which they propose that the certification basis of their aircraft or upgrade be based and to provide details of any new design assurance activity. Some specific tailoring of Annex F for particular projects may be required and this should be accomplished with the close involvement of DGTA-ADF staff.

38. To assist the PO in the solicitation of proposed certification basis from tenderers DGTA-ADF will, if required:

a. recommend appropriate documentation (based on Annex F) for use by the PO when soliciting the required information from tenderers; and

b. identify weaknesses and deficiencies in the proposed certification bases and ensure that these are addressed by the PO in subsequent documentation, such as the RFT or contract SOR (e.g. by including appropriate clauses or clarifying statements in the documentation).

39. Prior to release of the RFT, a Tender Evaluation Working Group (TEWG) should be established. This group should include appropriate representation from the PO, DGTA-ADF and COEs. The TEWG would be responsible for determining how tender responses are to be evaluated with respect to technical requirements, including evaluating the adequacy of the tendered certification bases. The evaluation approach should recognise that any deficiencies in the tendered certification basis that remain after source selection are only likely to be rectified at risk to tendered cost and schedule.

Source Selection

40. Once the tender responses have been evaluated for their overall technical merit, the TEWG should advise the PO of the acceptability of each of the proposed certification bases, highlighting any significant deficiencies requiring rectification. Deficiencies should be costed to ensure effective comparative assessment of tenders. The PO should then attempt to resolve the identified deficiencies by either carrying them forward for resolution during contract negotiations, or by forwarding clarification questions to the relevant tenderers prior to source selection. All deficiencies in the tendered certification bases should be resolved prior to contract signature.



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Contract Negotiation

41. The ADF and contractor agreed design requirements must be written into the contract. This could be achieved by the PO either amending the SOR to include every certification basis requirement as a specification clause, or by ensuring that the certification basis is a formal part of the contract with which the contractor is legally obliged to comply. The involvement of NAAs or foreign military airworthiness authorities also needs to be ‘contracted’ for. This will provide assurance that the respective NAA has the capacity, capability and willingness to complete Type Certification activities on the ADF’s behalf and to the ADF’s satisfaction. Where certification basis requirements establish a need for specific activities to be undertaken by the contractor, then the SOW part of the SOR may also require amendment.

42. The TAR expects that all deficiencies identified by the TEWG during tender evaluation would be resolved prior to contract signature and any changes should be reflected in the negotiated contract SOR. The TAR requires the PO to involve DGTA-ADF in any changes to the certification basis being considered for cost-benefit reasons.

43. During contract negotiations, it is difficult to fully define the test activities the contractor will need to conduct in order to demonstrate that the specification has been complied with. However, it appears worthwhile for both the ADF and contractor to agree on some basic testing requirements and ‘sign up’ to these. Overall verification activities must be a continual negotiation issue between the two parties during design development and such resolution is necessary to avoid continual changes being made to the contract. Therefore, it is suggested the example CBD at Annex F be completed as far as possible and be included in the SOR. This allows for basic requirements to be agreed and provides a basis to resolve changes to the detailed testing to be conducted. Obviously, changes to the actual design requirements should result in a contract change.

Contract Signature

44. Contract signature formally establishes the agreed certification basis and the delivery of evidence for the intended acquisition or major upgrade/modification. The SOR requires TAR endorsement prior to contract signature, and all subsequent changes to the agreed certification basis require TAR endorsement. The TAR must be satisfied that the contract SOR (e.g. specification and associated documents) contains sufficient design requirements governing the aircraft design. .The TAR will normally provide endorsement for contract signature if:

a. airworthiness design requirements, that promote adequate levels of safety for all system functions and operating modes, and in all proposed roles and operating environments, have been comprehensively specified;

b. provision is made for establishing compliance with the airworthiness design requirements, including agreement on the production of suitable evidence, and agreement on the role of the ADF (and/or another NAA if relevant) in approving the suitability of the evidence produced;

c. provision is made for the prime contractor to achieve and maintain AEO status in accordance with TAREG 3 for the duration of the contract, or an alternative arrangement that provides an equivalent level of assurance is agreed by the TAR; and

d. (if relevant to the scope of the contract) through-life support arrangements for Aircraft and Engine Structural Integrity (ASI/ESI) as well as in-service engineering and maintenance support, are comprehensively defined (guidance on these issues is presented elsewhere in the TAMM).

45. Government-to-Government Acquisitions. Where aircraft or systems are procured via Government-to-Government agreements (e.g. via the USA’s Foreign Military Sales), the preceding requirements for soliciting certification basis information from tenderers and negotiating deficiencies, is not directly applicable. However, prior to signing an agreement to purchase an aircraft or upgrade, for example by signing a US Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), similar outcomes must still be achieved. That is, the airworthiness design requirements for the aircraft or upgrade must be comprehensively disclosed, and any element that does not satisfactorily meet the ADF’s comparative standards must be resolved. Note that this ‘resolution’ can be achieved in numerous ways, and not necessarily via the Government-to-Government agreement. For example, the ADF may elect to treat the risk associated with a design shortfall following delivery of the aircraft/upgrade to the ADF via an in-service modification, an operational limitation or via formal risk retention. The identified shortfalls, and the plans for resolving the shortfalls, should be documented in the project’s Design Acceptance Strategy.

THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE CERTIFICATION BASIS

46. Throughout a project, as well as oversight of the Prime contractor via AEO assessment activities, compliance findings must be made against the contracted SOR including certification basis requirements. Whilst the following paragraphs are focused primarily on the compliance findings for airworthiness design requirements they are also relevant to assessing whether general functional and performance requirements have been met.



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47. A compliance finding is an engineering decision based on relevant evidence, that an aircraft design satisfies an airworthiness design requirement or group of requirements. The relevant evidence may include ‘certifications’ by NAAs, the results of inspections, tests and analyses or proven similarity with other certificated aircraft designs. Ultimately, the TAR must be satisfied that compliance with the certification basis has been adequately assured before recommending the issue of an AMTC/STC for a new or modified aircraft.

48. To document compliance findings it may be useful for the PO to maintain a number of extra columns as additions to the CBD. These columns would record, for each certification basis requirement, the specific agency or person within the ADF assigned as the compliance finding agency and reference to the evidence which demonstrated or their rationale for assessing, that each requirement had been met.

Methods of Establishing Compliance

49. Confidence in the airworthiness of the product will be based on the competence of the contractor (confirmed through the award of AEO status), the adequacy of the ADF SOR, the evidence which demonstrates that the SOR has been complied with, Design Approval certification from the contractor, and any NAA or other operator involvement. Hence, the level of activity conducted by the ADF to provide for issue of an AMTC/STC is built upon the confidence gained throughout the Design Acceptance process.

50. Compliance findings require a flexible and pragmatic approach and engineering and operational judgement by competent agencies and individuals. Contractors should provide evidence which demonstrates compliance with specification requirements. In turn, the ADF requires some level of oversight of these design activities. Such oversight may be provided by a recognised NAA, or the ADF itself reviewing evidence to gain sufficient confidence that the contract design requirements are complied with. Oversight by a recognised NAA is preferred by the ADF. The ADF oversight may vary from acceptance of the Type Certificate from a recognised NAA for an aircraft type, or for specific design requirements, a technical report signed by a designated contractor representative, to actual witnessing of tests and review of results. The PO may also enlist Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) agents with specialist analysis and test skills to undertake oversight and review activities associated with the evidence being presented or to conduct extra testing. Finally, the ADF may undertake further testing and analysis to provide the confidence it requires that the SOR has been complied with. This all constitutes compliance finding activity.

51. The level of ADF oversight is also dependent on such issues as the safety criticality and development status of systems and the role and environment the ADF will operate the aircraft within. Where approved NAAs are involved, the ADF will normally automatically accept their ‘certifications’. Detailed evidence of compliance should be sought for systems or functions where the ADF is not confident that the contractor will meet the full intent of the design requirement, or the agency believes that the additional information provided by the contractor during a rigorous compliance finding process will assist the ADF in learning about the system. Conversely, the ADF may automatically accept, without review, lower risk items on the basis that the contractor is competent and will be signing a Design Approval Certificate. Accordingly, it is likely that the contractor’s normal design, qualification, test, analysis, review and documentation processes will meet many of the ADF’s oversight requirements. The level of ADF review of evidence may vary as follows:

a. Where there is no NAA involvement, the ADF review should confirm that the contractor has produced sufficient evidence to show the certification basis requirement has been satisfied. Note that the ADF should not review the design; that is a contractor responsibility. The ADF merely requires adequate assurance that the contractor is doing a professional job by providing a depth of evidence a reasonable engineer would expect. Most evidence is likely to be acceptable at face value and for low risk design requirements, the contractor’s Design Approval certification will likely be sufficient. Where the ADF has justifiable concerns however, as a competent AA we should be as rigorous as necessary.

b. Where a recognised NAA is oversighting a design activity on behalf of the ADF, the ADF would still review evidence to:

(1) provide confidence that the NAA is doing an appropriate job (i.e. putting in the same care as they would do for their own country); and

(2) ensure that the NAA takes account of the nuances of the ADF’s particular configuration, role and environment; if it could impact the particular certification basis requirement (this will likely be relevant only to a small number of certification basis requirements such as those related to structure or weight increases or weapons carriage).

c. Regardless of the level of NAA involvement, the ADF may review evidence to confirm that it provides an adequate foundation for through-life support of the aircraft e.g., Aircraft and Engine Structural Integrity (ASI/ESI) and Health Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) management.



9

d. Regardless of the level of NAA involvement, the ADF may review evidence to provide us with a greater understanding of the design, such as design margins, limitations and so on.

COMPLIANCE FINDING RESPONSIBILITIES

52. Compliance findings should be made throughout the design and testing phases of a project, however early ADF involvement is encouraged. Indeed, for some process-related compliance findings (for example, software assurance), compliance finding activity will commence as soon as the design activity commences. As is true for all methods of verifying SOR compliance, the PO must be satisfied that compliance findings are relevant to the configuration being offered for acceptance and the ADF’s particular role and operating environment. Such confidence arises from a rigorous configuration control program and functional audit process. DGTA-ADF has produced a guide to assist ADF staff with making compliance findings. It presents an overview of the ‘normal’ compliance finding process, and provides guidance on how much evidence the ADF should review to make a compliance finding. This guide is available on the DGTA-ADF Intranet website.

53. The TAR expects the DAR to take responsibility for:

a. ensuring, in conjunction with DAVENG-DGTA, that a suitable ADF compliance finding agency or person is assigned for all requirements of the certification basis (noting that where another NAA is involved the ADF compliance finding agency work will be minimal with any effort likely only to check the ADF’s configuration, role and environment has been adequately considered by the NAA);

b. ensuring that the contractor provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate compliance with requirements of the certification basis;

c. ensuring relevant NAAs are appropriately ‘contracted’ for; and

d. providing documentation to the TAR (via the Design Acceptance Certificate) attesting that applicable agencies have confirmed that all certification basis requirements have been complied with by the contractor (and are relevant at the time of Design Acceptance to the configuration being offered, through the Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) and Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) process).

54. Suitably staffed POs will likely be the compliance finding agency for most requirements. DGTA-ADF has produced a guide which provides DARs with insight into the competencies required to make compliance findings. The paper presents a list of general competencies that should be held by any ADF member making a compliance finding, plus a detailed list of specialist competencies required for certain complex areas of aircraft design. The paper is available on the DGTA-ADF Intranet website.

55. As the design processes progress, the contractor will be able to further complete the CBD. Normally, this will involve the identification of compliance evidence documents as they become available. However, this update may also involve the contractor proposing to add or delete certification basis requirements, add conditions to a requirement or alter agencies involved in testing. To encourage an orderly update process, it is suggested that the PO require the contractor to provide an update to the CBD at fixed points throughout the contract. Updates might be provided to support the project Contract Deliverable Requirement (CDR), Test Readiness Review (TRR) and FCA / PCA.

56. The TAR, having accepted the certification basis through endorsement of the contract SOR early in the project, and having been involved in administering a program for assuring compliance, requires the PO to deliver the documentation as per TAREG 2 to the TAR (also refer Section 3, Chapter 14 of the TAMM). Annex G explains what information the ADF requires a contractor to provide in a Type Record.

Follow-on Engineering Programs

57. The overarching Design Acceptance philosophy recognises the possibility that an interim determination of technical acceptability of a design, for Service use with defined restrictions, may be needed (e.g. limited life, additional maintenance, operational restrictions), until follow-on engineering programs enable the lifting of those restrictions. Such a determination may be required where a recognised deficiency in technical specification, design or verification is not sufficient to prevent entry into service, but which requires resolution in the longer term. Follow-on engineering programs (e.g. structural integrity programs) will normally involve further design and/or verification effort and must be adequately defined and approved to the satisfaction of the TAR as a prerequisite to a TAR Recommendation for issue of a Type Certificate.

AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPERS

58. Airworthiness Issue Papers are used to ensure visibility of all airworthiness issues judged, by the PO, DGTA or the OAA, during an aircraft type’s life cycle, as significant enough to warrant recording of their resolution in the certification basis. The Issue Paper (an example is at Annex H) enables all information relating to a particular



10

airworthiness issue to be recorded in a single document and has a similar purpose to the Issue Papers raised by the FAA.

59. Aircraft Acquisitions and Upgrades. Issue Papers are to be raised by the PO and managed through to resolution by the PO. As with all certification basis requirements, the Issue Paper should normally be resolved before the TAR will make a Type Certification recommendation. Issue Papers which are not resolved but which do not preclude a TAR Type Certification Recommendation being made should remain open and be presented to the Airworthiness Board. The Issue Paper register should transfer to the in-service DAR when engineering authority transfers to the SPO. Issue Papers might be raised in the following circumstances:

a. to supplement, clarify or document the agreed means of demonstrating compliance with a certification basis requirement;

b. to consider a proposed change to an agreed certification basis requirement (e.g. special condition, equivalent safety finding, deviation or waiver);

c. to record where further activity is required but a SFP or AMTC / STC is being sought; or

d. where the assigned delegate considers that the available evidence (e.g. test and analysis results) is insufficient to support a compliance finding and additional assurance activity is required.

60. In–Service Airworthiness Issues. Any in-service airworthiness issues, which arise either during normal operations or during design changes, judged by the TAR as requiring DGTA-ADF oversight (e.g. recommendations concerning airworthiness resulting from ARDU flight test) should be recorded as Issue Papers and managed to resolution by the SPO DAR. DGTA may direct actions by relevant agencies to perform technical activities and will liaise closely with the applicable aircraft DAR. The following resolutions, amongst others, may permit the closure of an Issue Paper:

a. operational acceptance of a perceived technical deficiency through an operational solution (such as enhanced training or flight manual changes);

b. a reduction in capability through implementation of technical or operational limitations;

c. an agreement to retain risk;

d. a compliance finding of equivalent safety to an agreed standard; or

e. resolution through modification or repair action.

Annexes:

A. Excerpt from the FAA’s 382J Compliance Checklist B. List of Airworthiness Elements for Fixed Wing Aircraft C. CRE Considerations D. Informed Recognition of Prior Acceptance E. Checklist for Auditing Prime Contractors F. Contractor Provision of Certification Basis and Certification Basis Description G. Type Records H. Airworthiness Issue Papers



12A–1

EXCERPT FROM THE FAA'S 382J COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST 1. This annex contains excerpts from the FAA’s Compliance Checklist for the Lockheed 382J (the civil certified variant of the C130J). The Compliance Checklist is broadly equivalent to the ADF certification basis description (CBD). The aim is to show the close parallel between the FAA and ADF systems for documenting the establishment and completion of a certification basis. For information, the full Compliance Checklist was 1026 pages long.

2. The first two columns are self-explanatory. The third column summarises all drawings, analyses, test results, etc that were used to support the compliance finding against the regulation. The remaining columns document the compliance finding process, including references to relevant Lockheed Martin and FAA letters, and finally the FAA person (or authorised representative - DER) who assessed the regulation (i.e. requirement) as being complied with.

Table 12–A–1 Excerpts from FAA's Compliance Checklist for the Lockheed 382J

Regulation Description and Amendment

Documentation LMAS Letter

FAA Letter FAA/ DER

25.405 Secondary control system

Amd 2501

LMAS Report LG93ER0063, Model 382J Structural Design Criteria

L95J0154 06/07/95

L95J0154.f 01/03/96

10256M FAA

25.445 Outboard Fins

Amd 2501

Not Applicable to the Model 382J

25.519 Jacking and tie-down provisions

Amd 25-81

This paragraph was not adopted as part of the 382J Certification Basis. See FAA Issue Paper G-1

25.573 Fatigue evaluation of landing gear

Amd 25-0

Not Affected by Modification. Substantiation based on previous 382G compliance

25.953 Fuel system independence

Amd 25-0

LMAS FTDR 382J-FU-1115, TIA Test Results, 382J Fuel Management System LMAS FTDR C130J-FU-1489, Certification testing of Fuel Supply and Cross-Feed

L98J0179 02/17/98 L98J-512 05/25/98

L98J0654 06/14/98 L98J0868 07/20/98

36245T FAA 37000T FAA

25.959 Unusable fuel supply

Amd 25-40

LMAS FTDR C130J-FU-1393, Unusable Fuel Quantity Flight Test Results

L98J0332 04/03/98

L98J0767 07/07/98

36632T FAA

25.1309 (a) Equipment, systems and installations

Amd 25-0

Vendor drawing 551-0049-000-000, Qualification Test procedure, Model PDA-101, Electronic Circuit Breaker Unit Vendor Report 8172-96-119, Errata Sheets from Gulton Data Systems Vendor Report 9401DI079, Electromagnetic Interference Test Report for the C-130J Electronic Circuit Breaker Unit *** Note: The above documents are the first three of around 1500 documents that supported compliance against 25.1309 (165 pages total).

L95J0069 03/29/95 L96J0715 10/01/96 L97J0015 01/09/97

L95J0398 06/29/95

09271E FAA 22807A DER 23662A DER

25.1316 System Lightning Protection

Amd 25-80

LMAS Report J61A14B600, Lightning Protection Certification Report for the Lockheed Model 382J

L98J0240 03/06/98

L98J0711 06/27/98

36187E FAA



12A–2

Blank Page



12B–1

LIST OF AIRWORTHINESS ELEMENTS FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT 1. The following Airworthiness Elements section provides a list of elements that generally cover the scope of airworthiness requirements for a fixed wing aircraft. While this list should not be used as an actual certification basis for any particular aircraft, it may be useful to refer to this list during any design change to check that relevant elements have been included in SORs.

2. These airworthiness elements have been drawn from FAR 25 and DEFSTAN 00-970 Volume 1, and therefore do not include propulsion system elements.

Table 12–B–1 Airworthiness Elements

Requirement

FLIGHT GENERAL Load distribution limits Weight limits Centre of gravity limits Empty weight and corresponding centre of gravity PERFORMANCE Stalling speed Takeoff speeds Accelerate-stop distance Takeoff distance and takeoff run Takeoff flight path Climb Landing CONTROLLABILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY Longitudinal control Directional and lateral control Minimum control speed TRIM Trim STABILITY Static longitudinal stability Static lateral-directional stability Dynamic stability STALLS Stall characteristics Stall warning GROUND HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS Longitudinal stability and control Directional stability and control Taxiing condition MISCELLANEOUS FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS Vibration and buffeting High-speed characteristics Out-of-trim characteristics

Requirement

STRUCTURE GENERAL Loads Factor of safety Strength and deformation Proof of structure FLIGHT LOADS Symmetric manoeuvring conditions Flight manoeuvring envelope Design airspeeds Limit manoeuvring load factors Gust and turbulence loads Design fuel and oil loads High lift devices Rolling conditions Yaw manoeuvre conditions SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS Engine torque Side load on engine and auxiliary power unit mounts Pressurised compartment loads Unsymmetrical loads due to engine failure Gyroscopic loads Speed control devices CONTROL SURFACE AND SYSTEM LOADS Control surface loads: General Loads parallel to hinge line Control system Control system loads Dual control system Secondary control system Trim tab effects Tabs Ground gust conditions Unsymmetrical loads Auxiliary aerodynamic surfaces Wing flaps Special devices

Requirement

GROUND LOADS Landing load conditions and assumptions Landing gear arrangement Level landing conditions Tail-down landing conditions Side load conditions Rebound landing condition Ground handling conditions Taxi, takeoff and landing roll Braked roll conditions Turning Nose-wheel yaw and steering Pivoting Reversed braking Towing loads Ground load: unsymmetrical loads on multiple-wheel units Jacking and tie-down provisions EMERGENCY LANDING CONDITIONS Emergency landing dynamic conditions Structural ditching provisions FATIGUE EVALUATION Damage - tolerance and fatigue evaluation of structure LIGHTNING PROTECTION Lightning protection

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

GENERAL Materials Fabrication methods Fasteners Protection of structure Accessibility provisions Material strength properties and material design values Casting factors Bearing factors Fitting factors Aeroelastic stability requirements Bird strike damage



12B–2

Requirement

CONTROL SURFACES Proof of strength Installation Hinges CONTROL SYSTEMS Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems Stops Trim systems Control system gust locks Limit load static tests Control system details Cable systems Joints Lift and drag devices, controls Lift and drag device indicator Flap and slat interconnection Takeoff warning system LANDING GEAR Retracting mechanism Wheels Tires Brakes and braking systems PERSONNEL AND CARGO ACCOMMODATIONS Pilot compartment doors Pilot compartment view Windshields and windows Cockpit controls Motion and effect of cockpit controls Cockpit control knob shape Doors Seats, berths, safety belts, and harnesses Stowage compartments Retention of items of mass Passenger information signs and placards Floor surfaces Security considerations EMERGENCY PROVISIONS Ditching Emergency evacuation Emergency exits Emergency exit arrangement Emergency egress assist means and escape routes Emergency exit marking Emergency lighting Emergency exit access Width of aisle Maximum number of seats abreast Lower deck surface compartments (including galleys)

Requirement

VENTILATION AND HEATING Ventilation Cabin ozone concentration PRESSURISATION Pressurised cabins FIRE PROTECTION Fire extinguishers Compartment interiors Lavatory fire protection Cargo or baggage compartments Thermal/Acoustic insulation materials Cargo or baggage compartment smoke or fire detection systems Combustion heater fire protection Flammable fluid fire protection Fire protection of flight controls, engine mounts, and other flight structure Fire protection: other components Fire protection: systems

POWERPLANT Note: Propulsion system certification requirements are not included in this table. As such, they must be defined separately GENERAL Installation Engines Automatic takeoff thrust control system (ATTCS) Propellers Propeller vibration Propeller clearance Propeller de-icing Reversing systems Turbojet engine thrust reverser system tests Turbopropeller-drag limiting systems Turbine engine operating characteristics Inlet, engine, and exhaust compatibility Negative acceleration Thrust or power augmentation system FUEL SYSTEM Fuel system independence Fuel system lightning protection Fuel flow Flow between interconnected tanks Unusable fuel supply Fuel system hot weather operation Fuel tank installations Fuel tank expansion space

Requirement

Fuel tank sump Fuel tank filler connection Fuel tank vents and carburettor vapour vents Fuel tank outlet Pressure fuelling system Fuel tank ignition prevention FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS Fuel pumps Fuel system lines and fittings Fuel system components Fuel valves Fuel strainer or filter Fuel system drains Fuel jettisoning system OIL SYSTEM Oil tanks Oil lines and fittings Oil strainer or filter Oil system drains Oil radiators Oil valves Propeller feathering system INDUCTION SYSTEM Air induction Induction system icing protection Carburettor air preheater design Induction system ducts and air duct systems Induction system screens Inter-coolers and after-coolers EXHAUST SYSTEM Exhaust piping Exhaust heat exchangers Exhaust driven turbo-superchargers POWERPLANT CONTROLS AND ACCESSORIES Power plant controls Auxiliary power unit controls Engine controls Ignition switches Mixture controls Propeller speed and pitch controls Propeller feathering controls Reverse thrust and propeller pitch settings below the flight regime Carburettor air temperature controls Supercharger controls Fuel jettisoning system controls Power plant accessories Engine ignition systems Accessory gearboxes POWERPLANT FIRE PROTECTION Nacelle areas behind firewalls, and engine pod attaching structures containing flammable fluid lines Flammable fluid-carrying components



12B–3

Requirement

Flammable fluids Drainage and ventilation of fire zones Shutoff means Firewalls Engine accessory section diaphragm Cowling and nacelle skin Fire extinguishing systems Fire extinguishing agents Extinguishing agent containers Fire extinguishing system materials Fire detector system

EQUIPMENT GENERAL Flight and navigation instrument requirements Power plant instruments requirements Equipment performance requirements System lightning protection ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS Power supplies (quality, capacity) Circuit control, protection, grounding Batteries Circuit protective devices Distribution systems Electrical cables and equipment Adequacy of primary power Adequacy of emergency power Electrical loads analysis Independence of services Fire precautions CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTS Electronic display instrument systems Navigation instruments Airspeed indicating system Static pressure system Pitot heat indication system Magnetic direction indicator Automatic pilot system Instruments using a power source Flight director systems Power plant instruments installation Indicators for flying controls Electrical controls Radio controls Armament controls Flight instruments Engine displays Warning, cautionary and advisory systems Indicators

Requirement

Arrangement and visibility Reach to controls RADIO AND RADAR INSTALLATIONS Aerial design Aerial location Aerial installation on airframe Radomes and aerials fairings Radio and radar equipment Radio and radar system control INSTRUMENT/DISPLAY INSTALLATIONS Mechanical requirements Power supplies Environmental characteristics AVIONIC EQUIPMENT INSTALLATIONS Physical characteristics Built in test Power supplies Environmental characteristics SAFETY EQUIPMENT Ditching equipment Emergency Liferaft Installations Aircrew kit stowage Ice protection Megaphones Public address system MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT Vacuum systems Hydraulic systems Pressurisation and pneumatic systems Draining of fluids subject to freezing Cockpit voice recorders Flight recorders Equipment containing high energy rotors LIGHTS Instrument lights Landing lights Position light installation and intensities Colour specifications Riding light Anti-collision light system Wing icing detection lights Interior lighting NVG compatibilityExterior lighting NVG compatibility OXYGEN SYSTEMS Protective breathing equipment Oxygen equipment and supply Equipment standards System design and installation Oxygen physiological requirements Chemical oxygen generators

Requirement

Protection of oxygen equipment from rupture

ASSORTED REQUIREMENTS

SYSTEMS SAFETY Hardware safety Software safety Human factors safety SOFTWARE Software assurance Software engineering HUMAN FACTORS Functions can be performed by average skilled aircrew/maint staff Workload assessment Physiological and psychological stresses Information provision Blind spots Cockpit vibration Cockpit noise ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS Equipment qualification Intra-system compatibility Inter-system immunity Lightning Electrostatic discharge Precipitation static Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP) Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to Ordnance (HERO) Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuel (HERF) Bonding Antenna installations ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION Temperature limits Humidity limits Weatherproofing Dust and sand proofing Protection against icing WEIGHT AND BALANCE Weight, centre of gravity, and weight distribution CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS Instructions for Continued Airworthiness OPERATING LIMITATIONS Airspeed limitations: general Maximum operating limit speed Manoeuvring speed



12B–4

Requirement

Flap extended speed Minimum control speed Landing gear speeds Other speed limitations Rough air speed, VRA Power plant limitations Auxiliary power unit limitations Minimum flight crew Kinds of operation Ambient air temperature and operating altitude Manoeuvring flight load factors Additional operating limitations MARKINGS AND PLACARDS Instrument markings: general Airspeed limitation information Magnetic direction indicator Power plant and auxiliary power unit instruments Oil quantity indication Fuel quantity indicator Control markings Miscellaneous markings and placards Safety equipment Airspeed placard AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL Operating limitations Operating procedures Performance information

Requirement

MILITARY-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

ARMAMENT SYSTEMS Gun Installations design and installation Attachment of store to aeroplane Fusing control safety Installation Armament electrical installations Controls and operation Air launched weapon installations Installation of Explosive Devices Jettisoning of Stores Store station structural, flutter, handling limitations Store post-launch safety EJECTION SEATS Controls Ejection seat installations Command ejection

Requirement

PILOT CLEAR VISION Vision requirements for pilots View for other crew members Weapon sighting requirements Operational requirements for clear vision ASSORTED Vulnerability to battle damage Protection of aircrew against conventional weapons Brake parachute installations Arresting hooks Fatigue load meter installations Health and usage monitoring systems Role equipment qualification Air drop (refer AMTDU) In-flight refuelling system design, indicators and lights Formation lights Tempest



12C–1

CRE CONSIDERATIONS 1. The ADF frequently employs designs that are already in use on civilian or military aircraft and have been assessed as adequately safe by a recognised Airworthiness Authority. These extant designs can range from a piece of equipment (e.g. a radio), to an entire system (e.g. an EWSP system), through to an entire aircraft (e.g. using an A330 as the basis for a tanker). Employing an extant design is often an excellent means of reducing program cost, schedule and technical risk, particularly where the design fully meets the ADF’s capability requirements. However, the ADF must be mindful that the extant design was probably not specifically designed to be compatible with the target ADF aircraft; rather, it was designed to be compatible with the original purchasing agency’s own aircraft.

2. The ADF must therefore, as part of the Design Acceptance process, examine the compatibility of the design with the target ADF aircraft. Any incompatibilities must then be resolved, whether through system re-design, additional integration effort or by imposing operational limitations. The assessment of compatibility is achieved by comparing the configuration, role and operating environment (CRE), as assumed by the designers, with the ADF’s proposed CRE. Since even small CRE incompatibilities can have a large impact on the level of safety presented by the design, the CRE assessment is of fundamental importance to Design Acceptance. This section provides insight into the factors that need to be considered when assessing whether an extant design is compatible with the ADF’s CRE.

CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND OPERATING ENVIROMENT

Configuration

3. The specification for a system will define numerous attributes, for example box dimensions, mounting characteristics, strength requirements (including crashworthiness), electromagnetic immunity requirements, power conditioning requirements, electronic interface requirements, and so on. The original purchasing agency will specify each of these requirements, to ensure the system is compatible with a particular target aircraft (e.g. a CH-47D) or perhaps even a class of aircraft (e.g. civilian FAR Part 25 aircraft). Unless the target ADF aircraft is precisely the same configuration as that specified by the original purchasing agency, the design is unlikely to be fully compatible with the ADF aircraft. In practice, it is a rarity for an ADF aircraft to precisely meet the configuration specified by the original purchasing agency. This is often due to the ADF proposing to use the design on a different aircraft type, or a different variant of the same aircraft type, or on an aircraft which now includes extensive modifications to the original type design.

4. When integrating an extant system onto an ADF aircraft, the configuration delta between the ADF aircraft and that assumed by the design agency must be comprehensively identified and analysed, and any shortfalls resolved. This is normally achieved as follows:

a. Where the new system was not specifically designed for the ADF aircraft type, an assessment of design standards compatibility must be conducted. The aircraft certification basis will define the standards to which the aircraft was designed, and this can be compared against the standards to which the new system was designed. Where there are differences in standards, the impact must be analysed and any incompatibilities resolved. For example, if the new system was designed to a less onerous electromagnetic compatibility standard, the new system may cause interference to extant systems and/or be more susceptible to interference.

b. Where the new system was specifically designed for the ADF aircraft type, a configuration audit of the aircraft will be required to assess whether previous ADF modifications might impinge on the new system. For example, the ADF might already have installed a new box near the location of the proposed system, and this must be evaluated for compatibility (for example, physical impingement, electromagnetic compatibility, local heating, and so on). Previous ADF modifications that affect aircraft resources (e.g. weight and balance, environmental conditioning system capacity, electrical loads, power system cleanliness, and so on) must also be examined, since these modifications may invalidate assumptions made by the designer of the new system.

5. The project Design Acceptance Strategy should clearly define how the ADF will assure compatibility of an extant design with the configuration of an ADF aircraft. Ultimately this will be confirmed during the compliance finding process, since the Certification Basis Description for the modification will comprehensively list each of the airworthiness requirements that might be impacted by the modification, and the compliance finding agency will assess whether the design agency has produced suitable evidence confirming compatibility.



12C–2

Role

6. The concept of Role includes the full description of: flight profiles, day/night operations, external stores carriage, possible cargo configurations, operating weights, speed/altitude ranges, and so on. This concept is primarily useful when the ADF is purchasing a new aircraft, and indeed makes only an indirect contribution to the Design Acceptance process.

7. The role for an aircraft drives its configuration. For example, an aircraft whose role is aerial refuelling will require drogues and/or booms, additional fuel capacity, refuelling lights, precise handling qualities, and so on. While this information will influence the ADF specification for a new aircraft or a modification, it otherwise does not materially contribute to the Design Acceptance process.

8. ‘Role’ is, however, particularly valuable in identifying the likely operating environment for the aircraft. For example, an aircraft flying in an anti-submarine warfare role will often fly in a high salt environment, at low altitude (and therefore subject to more frequent gust loads and lightning strikes), for extended flight times, far away from diversionary airfields, and so on. As will become evident in the next section, establishing the compatibility of an aircraft with its operating environment is essential for safe flight, so comprehensively defining the operating environment is absolutely fundamental to Design Acceptance. The concept of ‘role’ therefore makes an indirect contribution to Design Acceptance by helping the ADF to more comprehensively define the operating environment for an aircraft.

Operating Environment

9. The concept of ‘operating environment’ immediately leads engineers to think of the physical environment in which the aircraft will fly, for example the electromagnetic environment, the corrosive environment (e.g. salt, moisture, etc), gust loads, and so on. Engineers would probably also readily agree that it includes the physical ground environment, for example landing loads, taxi loads, tie-down loads and so on. Perhaps less intuitive, but equally important, the operating environment for an aircraft is also defined by the airspace in which it flies and also the locations in which it operates. After all, both of these issues are external to the aircraft, and yet can influence integrity requirements for key systems and also essential aircraft equipage. Finally, the ADF’s own policies, procedures and equipment are external factors that also influence the design of key systems. The operating environment for an aircraft therefore encompasses both the physical environment in which the aircraft will operate, and also the functional environment.

10. The designers of a civilian or military aircraft will make numerous assumptions about the expected operating environment for their aircraft, normally based on who the primary customer(s) are likely to be. For example, the design assumptions for an Airbus A330 would be influenced by the primary roles for the aircraft (e.g. civilian passenger and freight transport), and the resultant EASA and FAA Type Certificates would also assume similar roles. Based on these roles, the likely operating environment would be derived. The ADF’s proposed operating environment, on the other hand, may not be fully compatible with these assumptions. When the ADF acquires a new aircraft or system, the compatibility between the as-designed operating environment and the ADF’s proposed operating environment must therefore be comprehensively established.

11. Previous ADF experience has shown that the operating environment compatibility assessment will almost certainly yield surprising results. For example, the operating environment for an ADF VIP aircraft should intuitively be the same as that assumed by the civilian designers of the VIP aircraft. However, more detailed investigation into the operating environment might reveal that ADF VIP aircraft will operate more frequently from poorly prepared airstrips, may operate further from diversionary airfield, may conduct more frequent pilot continuation training (e.g. touch-and-go landings), may be required to fly in a wider variety of airspaces, and so on. Each of these deltas may have an effect on safety, and may require risk reduction measures such as design changes, operational limitations, enhanced Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA), and so on. These operating environment deltas are likely to be even more pronounced when comparing, for example, an A330 civilian aircraft with an ADF A330 tanker aircraft. A comprehensive and thorough operating environment assessment is therefore a critical element of the Design Acceptance process.

12. Table 12–C–1 presents a list of issues that the ADF will need to examine, to confirm whether a COTS/MOTS aircraft is compatible with the ADF’s proposed operating environment. The list is not comprehensive, so the professional judgement and experience of engineers is required to add to the list and tailor it to each application. Also included in the table are suggestions on how a delta in operating environment might affect the safety of an ADF aircraft.



12C–3

Table 12–C–1 Operating Environment Considerations

Operating Environment Variable Possible Safety Issue

Dust, Salt, etc Systems may fail if used outside design limits

Altitude Systems may fail if used outside design limits

Temperature Systems may fail if used outside design limits

Humidity, Water Systems may fail if used outside design limits

Shock, Vibration, etc Systems may fail if used outside design limits

Icing Some aircraft are not designed for flight in icing conditions

Lightning While safety-critical systems are designed to survive lightning strikes, mission systems may fail.

Physical Environment

Electromagnetic Environment

Systems may be affected by electromagnetic environments beyond design limits (e.g. hostile emitters, friendly emitters, etc)

Flight manoeuvres Some manoeuvres may exceed design limits. Some repetitive manoeuvres may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Control surface loads Some manoeuvres may exceed design limits. Some repetitive manoeuvres may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

System loads (incl. failure and stall)

Some manoeuvres may exceed design limits. Some repetitive manoeuvres may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Turbulence, gust and other dynamic loads

Long-term exposure to turbulence (e.g. repetitive low altitude flight) may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Auto rotations Excessive auto rotations may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Landings Excessive landings (e.g. touch and go in training environment) or higher sink speeds may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Weight Excessive flight at higher weights may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

AAR loads Loads imparted by dispensing aircraft can differ, and need to be accounted for in the design

Flight Loads

Pressurisation cycles Excessive pressurisation cycles may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Landing surface Rough surfaces may exceed design limits (e.g. undercarriage strength, engine dust ingestion, stone impact damage, etc). Repetitive landings on rough surfaces may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions

Taxiing and ground handling

Rough surfaces may exceed design limits.

Ground Loads

Ship landings Required descent rate may exceed design limits. Repetitive hard landings may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions



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Table 12–C–1 Operating Environment Considerations (cont)

Tie-down Tie-down may exceed design usage spectrum assumptions (both land and ship based tie-down)

Extended flight over water

Some aircraft are not designed for ditching. Standard aircraft life support equipment may be unsuitable for prolonged survival

Extended distance from diversionary airfields

Aircraft design and maintenance may not provide sufficient critical system reliability for regular operations at extended distances from diversionary airfields.

Remote operations Lack of beyond line of sight communications may reduce the level of safety for certain ADF operations

Frequent operations close to ground obstacles, aircraft, etc

For certain areas of operation, TCAS, TAWS, windshear detection systems, etc, may make a significant contribution to safety

Area of Operations

Flight over people (UAVs only)

System integrity may not be adequate to permit safe flight over people

Horizontal navigation Navigation system equipage and integrity may preclude operation in some airspace.

Vertical navigation Navigation system equipage and integrity may preclude operation in some airspace

Landing approach (e.g. NPA)

Navigation system equipage and integrity may preclude operation in some airspace

Instrument Flight Rules airspace

Aircraft design may not support flight in IFR airspace

Airspace

ATC Communications Lack of certain communications capabilities (e.g. 8.33kHz channel spacing) may preclude operation in some airspace.

FDR/CVR ADF policy requires certain Flight Data and Cockpit Voice recording capabilities (fitment, parameters, security, etc)

Emergency Locator Transmitter

ADF policy requires certain ELT capabilities

Laser safety Legislation imposes certain safety requirements for lasers

Noise protections ADF policy defines maximum noise exposure levels

Hazardous materials/substances

ADF policy imposes certain limitations on the use of hazardous materials/substances

Oxygen flow sensing For certain aircraft, the ADF requires a system that warns aircrew when positive oxygen flow is not being achieved.

Crash Protection ADF policy requires new and extant aircraft to meet ‘contemporary’ crash protection design standards

ADF Policies

Radiation Hazards to Personnel

Legislation defines maximum RADHAZ exposure levels for ADF and civilian personnel

Compatibility with ADF’s preferred operating procedures

Aircraft operating procedures may not be compatible with ADF’s preferred procedures. May require additional crew training, may present negative training, etc

ADF Procedures

Compatibility with ADF’s preferred emergency procedures

Aircraft emergency procedures may not be compatible with ADF’s preferred procedures. May require additional crew training, may present negative training, etc



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Table 12–C–1 Operating Environment Considerations (cont)

Units of measure (QNH, fuel, etc)

Units of measure may not meet ADF preferred units. May require additional crew training, may present negative training, etc

Extended ground running

Extended ground running (for example, extended use of mission systems on ground) may require amended ICA etc.

Sharp take-off/landing Unusual take-off and landing procedures (e.g. steep take-offs and fast landings in Areas of Operation) may impact ICA, aircraft and engine structural integrity management, etc

Compatibility with ADF’s preferred maintenance procedures, trade structures, etc

While not strictly a design issue, this may affect the implementation Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness, etc

Crewing arrangements Where the ADF elects to crew the aircraft differently to that assumed by the designers and certifying NAAs (e.g. single pilot ops vs dual pilot ops, crewing with a navigator instead of a second pilot, etc), this may invalidate design assumptions throughout the CB.

Personal Survival Equipment

Preferred ADF survival ALSE may not be compatible with aircraft (e.g. may impeded emergency egress, may interfere with controls, may provide insufficient protection, etc)

Helmet May be incorrect impedance, may interfere with overhead switches, may not provide adequate protection

ADF Equipment

Role equipment ADF role equipment (e.g. AME) may be incompatible with the aircraft.

ASSESSING THE CRE

13. The key documents required by engineers to make a CRE compatibility assessment are the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI), the Operational Concept Document (OCD) and the Functional and Performance Specification (FPS). These three documents should clearly describe the operating environment in which the aircraft is expected to operate. Two CRE assessments will normally be required for any project, consisting of a broad assessment early in the project lifecycle, and then a detailed examination during the Design Acceptance process.

Initial Assessment of CRE

14. Some projects conduct their first real assessment of CRE compatibility during the compliance finding process. However, conducting the assessment so late in the design lifecycle increases program cost, schedule and technical risk, since the rectification of shortfalls at this stage of the design lifecycle is often problematic. Often, to maintain program schedule, the ADF is then forced to either retain the risk or accept operational limitations. To avoid this outcome, the initial assessment of CRE compatibility should be conducted during the early project phases, normally prior to the release of a Request for Tender (or equivalent), and further refined during the tender evaluation process. Then, if any CRE incompatibilities are identified, there is still the opportunity to impose additional design requirements, or to confirm that operational limitations are acceptable to the Capability Manager. Further, the ADF will be better equipped to evaluate whether Tenderer claims for acceptance via ‘similarity’ are invalidated by the ADF’s unique CRE; this decision is particularly important, because often no further design effort or NAA oversight will be applied to these aspects of the design.

Final CRE Assessment

15. Regardless of the effort applied earlier in the project lifecycle to assessing the likely compatibility of the design with the ADF’s CRE, a thorough assessment during the compliance finding phase is essential. After all, Design Acceptance will be completed largely on the outcomes of compliance findings, so this represents the last opportunity to verify that the ADF’s proposed operation of the aircraft falls within the assumptions of its designers. Every ADF engineer making a compliance finding is responsible for ensuring they comprehensively understand the operating



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environment for the aircraft. Previous ADF experience has shown that the ‘assumptions’ of engineers (even experienced engineers) can be incorrect regarding the actual operating environment employed by aircrew. An invalid assumption can undermine part of a compliance finding and therefore undermine the Design Acceptance process. When making compliance findings, therefore, engineers must engage with the PO operational member if the SOI/OCD/FPS is not sufficiently clear on an element of the operating environment.



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INFORMED RECOGNITION OF PRIOR ACCEPTANCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The ADF, as a small military, has only limited capability and capacity to oversight major design activities. The oversight efforts of other civil and military Airworthiness Authorities (collectively termed National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs)) is therefore relied upon to the greatest extent practicable. Where the ADF is purchasing an existing design, the ADF can often leverage extensively off the design oversight provided by another NAA. Where the ADF is pursuing unique design work, another NAA may be engaged to provide some design oversight on the ADF’s behalf. In either case, the efforts of the NAA in confirming that the design complies with the certification basis can substantially reduce the ADF’s Design Acceptance burden. This is known as 'Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA)', because the ADF is relying partially or wholly on certifications provided by another NAA.

2. However, assuming that RPA in isolation provides a suitable basis for Design Acceptance is never appropriate. First, some TAR-recognised NAAs may not be assessed as suitable to provide oversight of an ADF certification activity. Also, even where an NAA is assessed as suitable, there are a range of ADF-specific issues that NAAs rarely take into account, for example the specifics of our role and operating environment, our potentially differing tolerance for risk retention, corporate governance requirements, and so on. Summarised, while RPA has the potential to reduce the ADF’s Design Acceptance burden, its limitations must be recognised and managed.

SCOPE

3. This annex provides guidance for DARs and project engineering staff in assessing how RPA might contribute to Design Acceptance for an aircraft acquisition or major modification project.

BENEFITS OF NAA INVOLVEMENT

4. One of the many functions of an NAA is to assess whether the design of an aircraft type, or modification to an extant aircraft type, is appropriately safe for flight. This is achieved by the NAA prescribing appropriate airworthiness design requirements, and then being presented with satisfactory evidence that the design complies with those airworthiness design requirements. Civilian NAAs have little scope for approving designs that fail to comply with the prescribed design requirements, unless an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated by the designer. Military NAAs, on the other hand, may permit a shortfall against a prescribed design requirement, provided any airworthiness risk is appropriately treated. This additional flexibility available to military NAAs recognises the unique nature of military aviation, where aircraft safety must be balanced with operational capability. For brevity in this annex, the term ‘NAA oversight of a design’ is used to encompass the many actions of the NAA leading to their approval of a design.

5. Where an NAA has provided suitable oversight of a design, there is potential for the ADF to exercise RPA. The contribution that RPA can make to Design Acceptance depends on the scope of the ADF aircraft acquisition or modification project, for example:

a. Off-the-shelf aircraft. Where the ADF is purchasing an off-the-shelf aircraft with an extant Type Certificate (or equivalent) issued by a competent NAA, extensive application of RPA is normally permitted, provided the aircraft design is compatible with the ADF’s configuration, role and operating environment (CRE).

b. Developmental aircraft (multinational use). Where a competent NAA is oversighting the design of an aircraft that will be used by both the host nation and the ADF, the ADF may leverage off RPA for the common elements of design, provided the design is compatible with the ADF’s CRE. In this case, the ADF is effectively making use of ‘future RPA’, since the ADF will recognise the NAA’s Type Certificate (or equivalent) once it is issued. Note that this approach applies only to common elements of the design; ADF-unique elements of the design are managed akin to modifications, per paragraph 5d below.

c. Off-the-shelf aircraft systems. Where the ADF is purchasing off-the-shelf systems with a relevant certification issued by a competent NAA, RPA may be applied only to the extent that the design is shown to be compatible with the ADF aircraft’s CRE. While conceptually straightforward, this application of RPA requires a thorough understanding of the NAA’s oversight for that particular system. Guidance on this issue is presented later in this annex.

d. ADF-unique modifications. The ADF frequently leverages off NAA oversight of ADF-unique design changes, particularly during aircraft acquisition projects where the amount of design work can be considerable. However, this arrangement is often far from straightforward. Not only must the ADF



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be satisfied that the NAA is suitable for oversighting the modifications, the ADF also has numerous key roles in assisting and supplementing the NAA assessments. Further, the role of the ADF can differ markedly, depending whether a civilian or military NAA is providing the oversight. Guidance on these issues is presented later in this annex. Apart from reducing the burden on ADF manpower, engaging an NAA to oversight ADF-unique design has numerous advantages, for example:

(1) some NAAs have substantially more experience in aircraft certification programs than the ADF;

(2) some NAAs have access to a wider range of technology specialists than the ADF;

(3) the closer proximity of NAAs to overseas design organisations can facilitate closer oversight of the design effort;

(4) for countries where English is not the national language, NAAs can communicate more effectively with the design organisation (this is particularly important with companies whose design documentation is not routinely produced in English);

(5) NAAs normally have previous relationships and experience with the design organisation, which can facilitate smoother oversight of the design; and

(6) whereas the ADF must normally resort to contract law to enforce certification requirements, other NAAs may not be so constrained.

6. The above broad categories of aircraft acquisition and modification projects are not comprehensive, and are included for general guidance only. Where RPA is proposed as a contributor to Design Acceptance for a project, the DAR must obtain the TAR’s concurrence prior to contract signature. The project’s Design Acceptance Strategy (DAS) is a suitable medium for evaluating the potential scope of RPA and proposing its contribution to Design Acceptance.

7. The following section defines a process for assessing the competence and suitability of an NAA for an ADF project. The subsequent sections provide guidance to projects on the deficiencies and pitfalls of RPA, and how they might be tackled.

NAA COMPETENCE AND SUITABILITY

8. Implicit in the application of RPA, whether for existing or new designs, is that the NAA must be competent. Further, where NAA oversight of ADF-unique design changes is proposed, the NAA must also be assessed as suitable for the scope of the modifications. This section examines how the ADF assesses the competence of NAAs. It also examines how the ADF confirms the suitability of an NAA to oversight a particular design change to an ADF aircraft.

NAA Competence

9. A ‘competent’ NAA is one whose knowledge, practices and standards are assessed as providing a level of safety comparable to the ADF’s own technical airworthiness management framework. A list of military and civilian NAAs recognised as competent by the TAR is included at TAREG 2.2.7. The omission of an NAA from TAREG 2.2.7 does not imply that the NAA is not competent; often the need to engage with that NAA has not yet arisen, so an assessment of their competence has not yet been made. NAAs may be added to TAREG 2.2.7 either by:

a. the TAR conducting an assessment that confirms the NAA’s knowledge, practices and standards provides a level of safety equal to or better than the ADF’s own technical airworthiness management framework; or

b. under exceptional circumstances, the TAR accepting an indirect assessment of an NAA’s competence (for example, their widespread acceptance by other respected NAAs).

Appendix 1 provides a framework for conducting assessments of NAAs proposed for inclusion in TAREG 2.2.7.

10. The TAR does not periodically reassess the NAAs in TAREG 2.2.7 to confirm that each still merits recognition. Rather, the TAR accepts that it takes enormous commitment and resources for an NAA to attain competence, and once competence is obtained it will not be relinquished lightly. Further, every NAA is accountable to a variety of stakeholders; for civilian NAAs it includes the travelling public, government and other civilian NAAs, while for military NAAs it includes the government and taxpayers. This level of scrutiny should exceed what the TAR could realistically expect to achieve with periodic assessments.

11. However, recognition via TAREG 2.2.7 does not imply that the NAA will consistently apply the same level of oversight to every certification activity. Rather, it means that the NAA’s ‘normal’ certification processes and oversight are acknowledged as adequately robust by the TAR. For some certification activities, the NAA may elect to provide oversight in excess of their norm, which is appreciated by the ADF. Conversely, an NAA may elect to apply a reduced



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level of oversight for a particular design, and this may be incompatible with the ADF’s duty-of-care obligations or appetite for risk. Examples might include a civilian NAA certificating a stores carriage and jettison modification (despite it apparently being outside their local competencies), or a military NAA recognising an OEM’s self-certification of a missile guidance system under a performance-based contract. Ultimately, for the TAR to recognise RPA for an extant design, he must be satisfied that the NAA’s certification oversight and processes were appropriate for the criticality of the design. Where shortfalls in oversight are evident, proposed measures to remedy the shortfalls must be submitted to the TAR for approval.

12. The previous paragraph should not be interpreted as meaning that the ADF should critically and comprehensively review extant certifications issued by an NAA. If a competent airworthiness authority certifies the airworthiness of an aircraft being acquired by the ADF, the ADF will not explore the details of their certification (for example, their requirements, verification methods and compliance findings) as part of the ADF type certification program. Similarly, where the ADF intends to modify an existing aircraft by introducing a system/component that has been certified by an NAA, the ADF will accept the NAA certification at face value, albeit the ADF will normally seek formal confirmation that the NAA applied it's 'normal' certification processes. However, there is an important proviso. If, during the course of an acquisition or modification program, the ADF learns of some breakdown or deficiency in the application of the NAA's robust processes, the ADF cannot ignore it. Rather, the ADF must understand the implications for the ADF type certification program, taking care however only to delve as far as is necessary to resolve the shortfall.

NAA Suitability

13. Where the ADF proposes to leverage off NAA oversight of an ADF-unique design change, the TAR must be confident that the competent NAA is also suitable for the role. After all, the NAA may see this task as extraneous to their primary role of supporting aircraft of their country, or may not have the specific skills needed for a specialised certification task.

14. The ADF may accept a recognised NAA as suitable to provide oversight of an ADF-unique design change provided:

a. the NAA is experienced in the subject certification issue;

b. evidence exists that the NAA is fully committed to the task, and will support the certification effort throughout the duration of the project;

c. there is an effective mechanism for the NAA to enforce their requirements on the contractor;

d. the NAA is fully aware of all ADF specification requirements for the design change;

e. the NAA has a clear understanding of the ADF’s proposed configuration, role and operating environment (CRE); and

f. the ADF is fully aware of what the NAA is, and is not, attesting to.

Appendix 2 contains a checklist of items that may contribute to the ADF’s assurance of these six issues. In all cases, this assessment must be completed and agreed by the TAR prior to contract or Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) signature.

15. Once the TAR has agreed an NAA is competent and suitable for a particular program, there is potential for the ADF’s Design Acceptance to leverage off RPA. The following three sections examine the extent to which RPA leverage might be possible for three common applications of RPA, namely:

a. new aircraft acquisitions,

b. system acquisitions, and

c. aircraft modifications.

RELIANCE ON RPA (NEW AIRCRAFT ACQUISITIONS)

16. Purchasing extant aircraft designs with some in-service history can substantially reduce the ADF’s cost, schedule and technical risk. The application of RPA to off-the-shelf aircraft is relatively straightforward. A core premise is that the ADF, in making the decision to purchase a particular off-the-shelf aircraft, is fully accepting that an NAA has provided suitable oversight of the design (since to do otherwise would force the ADF to conduct an ab-initio type certification program, which is well beyond our resources). When purchasing an off-the-shelf aircraft, the ADF must ensure that:

a. the design has been issued with a relevant certification by the NAA;



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b. the NAA fully discloses to the ADF what the certification does, and does not, cover;

c. the NAA fully discloses the certification basis for the aircraft, as well as the configuration, roles and operating environment for which the certification has been issued; and

d. the ADF has comprehensive insight into any risk treatments (e.g. retention of risk, operational workarounds, and so on) permitted by the NAA to address design shortfalls.

Provided these four points are successfully achieved, the ADF will normally accept that the aircraft is adequately safe, but only for the role and operating environment assumed by the NAA during the certification program. The ADF’s Design Acceptance efforts must then focus on assessing the aircraft’s compatibility with the proposed ADF CRE. Where airworthiness shortfalls are identified, the ADF will either modify the aircraft or operationally treat the risk. The ADF will also analyse and evaluate any risk treatments permitted by the NAA, to establish whether the treatments are acceptable to the ADF.

17. Government-to-Government acquisitions. The elements listed in paragraph 16 are equally relevant for aircraft acquired via the USA’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program or a collaborative acquisition. However, with Government-to-Government programs it is vitally important to include these requirements in the draft Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); otherwise the information can be notoriously difficult to source. Importantly, Project Offices (POs) must rigorously pursue the disclosure of risk treatments identified at paragraph 16d, since this information will not automatically be provided to the ADF. Additional guidance on this issue is included at Appendix 3. The PO must also gain clarity on the US military’s approved CRE for the aircraft; this information is vital to ADF efforts to fully treat risks due to deltas with our own proposed role and operating environment. Without this information, the ADF may be forced to adopt onerous limitations or retain unquantified risks.

18. Developmental aircraft. The ADF normally favours the acquisition of off-the-shelf aircraft, which are then modified to meet the ADF’s specific operational requirements. From time to time, however, the ADF may join in the development of a new aircraft design (that is, a design that has not yet been issued with a Type Certificate (or equivalent) by a NAA) so that ADF-unique requirements are included in the baseline aircraft design. The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) are two examples. For these aircraft, the RPA processes described in Para 16 are of limited relevance. Rather, the contribution that RPA makes to Design Acceptance is more akin to aircraft modifications, as described in a later section of this annex.

RELIANCE ON RPA (SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS)

19. The previous section examined the extent to which RPA could contribute to Design Acceptance for off-the-shelf aircraft. This section examines the extent to which RPA may potentially contribute to Design Acceptance for off-the-shelf equipment and systems that are purchased for integration onto ADF aircraft. Since there are marked differences between the approaches adopted by civilian and military NAAs when oversighting the design of equipment and systems, both are considered separately below.

Commercial Off-the-Shelf Aircraft Systems

20. The ADF frequently purchases civilian aircraft systems for use on ADF aircraft, for example flight data recorders, some radios, some GPS systems, and so on. Generally the design oversight provided by a civilian NAA for these systems can make a moderate contribution to Design Acceptance. This section examines the likely application of RPA for common categories of civilian NAA oversight.

21. Technical Standard Order (TSO). Civilian NAAs may issue a TSO (or equivalent) certification for an item, which certifies that a material, part or appliance meets applicable minimum design and performance standards. It is, however, independent of aircraft type, and therefore is not an approval to install and use the item in any aircraft. The contribution of a TSO to Design Acceptance via RPA is therefore limited. While the TSO certification does confirm that an item meets the applicable performance and design standards (and therefore the ADF does not need to review OEM evidence to obtain this confirmation), the ADF must still establish whether the design standards are compatible with the target ADF aircraft CRE.

22. Supplemental Type Certificate (STC). Civilian NAAs apply STCs in a similar manner to the ADF, namely to certify that a major design change is compatible with a certain aircraft type. Existing civilian STC are normally of little relevance to the ADF, except where the ADF is installing equipment covered by an STC onto an ADF aircraft with a relevant civilian type certificate. Even then, the ADF must confirm that post-production modifications to the aircraft are compatible with the STC.



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23. Equipment installed on civilian aircraft via a minor design change. The ADF may occasionally be offered equipment for integration onto ADF aircraft that has also been integrated onto civilian aircraft as a minor modification. In this case, RPA will not make any contribution to Design Acceptance.

Military Off-the-Shelf Systems

24. From time to time, the ADF purchases modification kits and/or systems that have received a certification from a recognised military NAA (including via FMS). Unlike certifications provided by civilian NAAs, the basis for a military certification can vary widely depending on the particular needs of the military. RPA may contribute to Design Acceptance of the modified ADF aircraft under the following circumstances:

a. There must be explicit confirmation that the military NAA provided formal Airworthiness Authority oversight of the design, and alternative mechanisms such as reliance on design agency self-governance under contractual mechanisms were not used (in which case the military has not acted rigorously in the role of an NAA, so the use of RPA to support Design Acceptance is precluded);

b. Full disclosure of the system design standards (including details of all tailoring of those standards) must be obtained, so that an assessment of compatibility with the ADF aircraft CRE can be completed;

c. Access to key NAA assessment documentation (for example, in the case of US guided weapons, access to the minutes of the Non-Nuclear Munitions Safety Board) should be sought;

d. Where the system is already in use with the foreign military, comprehensive disclosure of the military’s own risk retentions or risk reduction measures (e.g. operational limitations, additional maintenance actions, etc) that were required to address design shortfalls (see Appendix 3 for further guidance on this issue).

25. The requirement at paragraph 24a regarding confirmation that the military is fully discharging its NAA duties, may initially appear superfluous. After all, it seems a reasonable expectation that a military with a rigorous airworthiness management framework would automatically apply this framework for new designs. However, this is not always the case. Some militaries do, on occasion, allow selected design agencies to self-assess their designs without any NAA oversight. In this case, the military’s resulting ‘certification’ is simply an attestation of contractual compliance rather than safety. Some ADF projects have argued that the foreign military is still adequately confident in the safety of the design, so the ADF should share this confidence. This argument is not accepted by the TAR. A fundamental premise of RPA is that an NAA has provided a similar level of oversight to the design as would the ADF if resources were available. Any arrangement that precludes NAA oversight for a design means the foreign military is retaining an unknown, potentially high, level of airworthiness risk. While the foreign military may consider this to be an acceptable compromise when faced with onerous program challenges (e.g. severe resource constraints, operational requirements for rapid acquisition, and so on), the ADF cannot automatically claim the same imperative. For the TAR to accept RPA as contributing to Design Acceptance, evidence must be produced that confirms the military explicitly acted in the capacity of an Airworthiness Authority.

RELIANCE ON RPA (ADF AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS)

26. The ADF routinely requires unique changes to the design of a new or in-service aircraft. To reduce the burden on ADF resources, the ADF has a strong preference to engage other NAAs to oversight the design effort on the ADF’s behalf, particularly during aircraft acquisition projects where the amount of design work can be considerable. While it may initially appear counter-intuitive to manage this NAA involvement as RPA (noting the emphasis in RPA is on prior acceptance), the management issues are similar to RPA and therefore separate terminology is not warranted. An alternative viewpoint is that the NAA, at the completion of the modification program, will issue a Supplemental Type Certificate (or equivalent), and the ADF will rely on this certification to contribute to Design Acceptance. Thus, where an NAA is oversighting design effort on the ADF’s behalf, the ADF is effectively acknowledging the future state where RPA can be exercised.

27. The ADF makes extensive use of both civilian and military NAAs to oversight design changes to ADF aircraft. While military NAAs often offer more flexibility and coverage, civilian NAAs often have extensive experience with complex modification programs and provide a well-established level of oversight. Ultimately, the ADF does not have a preference for either civilian or military NAA oversight of ADF modifications; both have their disadvantages, and these must be managed by the ADF. The following two sections provide guidance on key issues that must be managed with civilian and military NAA oversight of ADF modifications.

Civilian NAA Oversight of ADF Modifications

28. Unlike military NAAs, civilian NAAs adopt a highly standardised approach to approving aircraft modifications. First, the design will only be assessed against NAA-approved design standards, normally derived from



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the aircraft’s original certification basis; the NAA may even refuse to provide any oversight (except on a ‘non-interference’ basis) for military systems that are incapable of meeting civilian design standards. Secondly, the NAA will assume a ‘normal’ civilian role and operating environment for the aircraft type. Thirdly, the NAA focus is squarely on maintaining the level of safety of the aircraft, so they will not permit safety to be sacrificed for the sake of operational effectiveness. Finally, while the ADF considers some mission systems to be safety-related in hostile operating environments, the civilian NAA will not share this view nor provide commensurate oversight. Summarised, a civilian NAA will simply ensure that civilian-like modifications to the aircraft are safe to fly in a civilian-like role and operating environment.

29. While the involvement of a competent and suitable civilian NAA can reduce the Design Acceptance burden on the ADF, there is still a clear (and often sizeable) role for the ADF. At a minimum, the ADF must:

a. fully understand the extent of the CRE considered by the NAA, and make a comprehensive assessment of any deltas across every element of the certification basis;

b. provide full design oversight for systems that the NAA refuses to oversight because they do not meet civilian design standards;

c. provide full design oversight for mission systems that have limited or no oversight by the NAA;

d. ensure the aircraft is ‘compatible’ with ADF policies, procedures and equipment;

e. confirm that the aircraft meets the contracted Functional and Performance Specification (FPS) requirements, and is therefore fit-for-service;

f. obtain sufficient recommendations and information from the NAA to enable the ADF to make compliance findings against the certification basis; and

g. provide ‘corporate governance’ oversight of the NAA’s efforts, to the maximum extent that the ADF can afford and the NAA will permit (although civilian NAAs are normally reluctant to permit ADF involvement).

The project’s proposed approach to achieving these outcomes should be documented in the Design Acceptance Strategy. The TAR will confirm the adequacy of the proposal for NAA oversight of an ADF modification, and the ADF’s role in supplementing the NAA oversight, as part of the TAR endorsement of the Design Acceptance Strategy.

Military NAA Oversight of ADF Modifications

30. The previous paragraph stated that civilian NAAs adopt a highly standardised approach to approving aircraft modifications, and this lack of flexibility can place an additional burden on the ADF. Military NAAs, on the other hand, have considerable latitude in approving aircraft modifications, including the willingness to trade safety for the sake of improved operational effectiveness. For these reasons, military NAAs are generally much more flexible in tailoring their oversight to achieve ADF requirements, for example assessing the design against the ADF’s contracted standards, including mission systems within the scope of their oversight, and so on. However, these advantages are not without a downside: any ‘certification’ issued by a military NAA is virtually meaningless unless the ADF has comprehensive insight into the context adopted, and decisions made, by the NAA throughout the certification process. To ensure a military NAA’s oversight can make a substantial contribution to Design Acceptance, the ADF should negotiate and agree on key aspects of this process. Common issues to be clarified include the following:

a. Obtain confirmation that the military NAA will provide formal Airworthiness Authority oversight of the design, and not use alternative mechanisms such as reliance on design agency self-governance under contractual mechanisms.

b. Gain assurance that the extent of military NAA oversight over the ADF design will be similar to what the ADF would provide for an equivalent modification.

c. Ensure the NAA’s certification basis (or equivalent) for the modification is fully disclosed to the ADF, and that the TAA concurs that it is compatible with the ADF aircraft.

d. Where the NAA will not comprehensively assess the compatibility of the design with the ADF’s proposed CRE (including our policies, procedures and equipment), arrange for ADF access to key design documentation. Depending on the project nature, this might alternatively be achieved directly with the design agency.

e. Ensure mechanisms are in place for the ADF to obtain recommendations and information from the NAA to assist the ADF in making compliance findings against the certification basis.



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f. Ensure the ADF obtains comprehensive insight into risk treatments agreed by the military NAA to account for design shortfalls in the ADF modification.

g. Establish a mechanism whereby the ADF has ‘right of veto’ over risk retention decisions that reduce the level of safety of the ADF aircraft.

h. For modifications based on an existing local military design, arrange for the NAA to comprehensively disclose the local military’s own operational limitations, risk reduction measures or risk retentions that were required to address design shortfalls (see Appendix 3 for further guidance for US military acquisitions).

i. Confirm that the production and incorporation of the modification onto the ADF aircraft will be achieved to a satisfactory standard. While regulations and associated guidance are yet to be included in the TAMM, some considerations include:

(1) confirm that the military NAA will provide the same level of oversight of the incorporation process as they do for their own aircraft;

(2) confirm that the approval authority for waivers /deviations is appropriate, and that the ADF will be provided with full visibility;

(3) confirm that the modification incorporation venue will have all necessary and applicable data for the ADF tail number (e.g. data on previous repairs, configuration differences to US military aircraft, etc); and

(4) confirm with the TAA that the venue is authorised to conduct any required maintenance during the course of the modification process (e.g. periodic maintenance, repairs, etc).

j. Negotiate mechanisms by which the ADF can involve itself in the NAA oversight program, to the maximum extent that the ADF can afford and the NAA will permit. Not only will this provide a means for the ADF to assist the NAA in understanding the proposed CRE, it will also provide the ADF with ongoing confidence that the NAA is fulfilling the agreed oversight role.

The project’s proposed approach to achieving these outcomes should be documented in the Design Acceptance Strategy. The TAR will confirm the adequacy of the proposal for NAA oversight of an ADF modification, and the ADF’s role in supplementing the NAA oversight, as part of the TAR endorsement of the Design Acceptance Strategy.

31. Ultimately, Design Acceptance is an ADF responsibility, so the ADF must establish compliance against the certification basis. Each of the considerations highlighted in the previous paragraph, if satisfactorily achieved, has the potential to reduce the ADF’s compliance finding burden. Where any of these considerations is not satisfactorily achieved, the ADF must find a way to overcome the shortfall.

32. FMS modifications. The issues highlighted in the previous paragraph are fully applicable to modifications to ADF aircraft accomplished via FMS. However, there appears to be a widespread misconception in the ADF that an FMS arrangement ‘inherently’ accomplishes each of these issues. This is incorrect. Without relevant agreements in place, an FMS arrangement can simply result in the delivery to the ADF of a modified aircraft and additional maintenance instructions. Information on risk treatments (including risk retention), compatibility with the ADF’s CRE, and so on, may be absent. It is therefore important that the ADF confirm, and then formalise via the LOA (or alternative mechanism), that each of the issues in the previous paragraph will be satisfactorily addressed by the US government. Once the modification project commences, the ADF must confirm that the US government does in fact provide the information and oversight agreed in the LOA.

Appendixes:

1. Assessment of NAA Competence 2. Assessement of NAA Suitability for Oversighting ADF Design Changes 3. Guidance for Government-to-Government Acquisitions



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex D to Sect 3 Chap 12

12D1–1

ASSESSMENT OF NAA COMPETENCE 1. A ‘competent’ NAA is one whose knowledge, practices and standards are assessed as providing a comparable level of safety to the ADF’s own technical airworthiness management framework. A list of military and civil NAAs currently assessed as competent by the TAR is included at TAREG 2.2.7. Omission from the TAREG 2.2.7 list of recognised NAAs does not imply that an NAA is incompetent; often the need to engage with that NAA has not yet arisen, so an assessment of their competence has not yet been made. NAAs may be added to the TAREG 2.2.7 list either by:

a. the TAR conducting an assessment that confirms the NAA’s knowledge, practices and standards should provide a comparable level of safety to the ADF’s own airworthiness management framework; or

b. under exceptional circumstances, the TAR accepting an indirect assessment of an NAA’s competence (for example, their widespread acceptance by other respected NAAs).

This appendix provides guidance for assessments of an NAA for potential inclusion into TAREG 2.2.7. This assessment will always be conducted by the TAR’s staff. A positive outcome from the assessment must confirmed by the TAR prior to a project entering into any agreements with prime contractors (e.g. via project contract signature) regarding certification processes.

2. The assessment framework for NAAs broadly follows the ‘Organisation, Personnel, Processes, Data, Product (OPPDP)’ assessment framework used for Authorised Engineering Organisations. Key elements are as follows:

a. Organisation. The organisation should clearly understand its roles and responsibilities as an NAA, and be recognised as competent by one or more ADF-recognised NAAs. Responsibilities and authorisations of key personnel should broadly accord with that adopted by other recognised NAAs. The organisation should preferably possess a relevant quality management system certification.

b. Personnel. As a minimum the NAA should have similar coverage of aerospace technology disciplines as encompassed by DGTA-ADF and the aviation CoEs (as listed in AAP 7001.053). The qualifications, training, experience and authorisations of key personnel should be assessed as comparable to other recognised NAAs. Particularly complex and important disciplines, for example structures, propulsion, software, performance and handling, E3 and System Safety, should be comprehensively covered.

c. Processes. The regulatory basis for certification activity should be investigated. The system for prescribing and revising minimum standards governing the design of aircraft, engines and propellers should be reviewed. Additionally the program to determine compliance with those prescribed standards should be evaluated. The airworthiness code, guidance material, and type certification processes should be assessed against those used by recognised NAAs.

d. Data. The NAA should be able to produce key evidence of previous certification activities, for example agreed certification plans, certification bases, records of key certification minutes, records of resolution for key airworthiness issues (e.g. Issue Papers or equivalent), and so on.

e. Product. The NAA should have completed numerous previous certification programs for complex modifications with wide ranging airworthiness implications. The NAA should preferably have completed an ab-initio Type Certification program for a new aircraft design. Evidence should be produced that verifies safe operating histories following these certifications.

The following table provides a checklist of items that may contribute to the TAR’s confidence in the competence of the NAA. While affirmative responses are not expected for all items, an overall impression of acceptable performance is required. The benchmark for ‘acceptability’ is broadly defined as the knowledge, practices and standards generally evident in TAR-recognised NAAs and (where relevant) the ADF.



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EVALUATION CHECKLIST FOR .....................................<NAA NAME>

• The following tables provide a checklist of items that may contribute to the TAR’s confidence in the competence of the NAA. While affirmative responses are not expected for all items, an overall impression of acceptable performance is required. The benchmark for ‘acceptability’ is broadly defined as the knowledge, practices and standards generally evident in TAR-recognised NAAs and (where relevant) the ADF.

ORGANISATION

For civilian NAAs: Establish whether the NAA is recognised as competent by CASA (see CASR(1998) 21.012), the FAA and/or EASA.

For military NAAs: Establish whether the NAA is recognised as competent by a TAMM-recognised NAA.

For civilian NAAs: Establish when the NAA was last audited by ICAO, and assess the outcomes of the audit (See ICAO Flight Safety Information Exchange website: http://www.icao.int/fsix/auditRep1_csa.cfm).

Establish whether the NAA has QMS certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent.

Examine the organisational structure and assess whether it broadly compares with other recognised NAAs.

Examine the level of NAA independence from contractors, major customers, etc.

Confirm that key staff comprehensively understands their own Airworthiness Management System.

Establish who the NAA Senior Executive reports to.

Establish which NAAs are recognised as competent by the subject NAA.

PERSONNEL

Examine closely what specialist airworthiness disciplines are covered by the NAA, and the depth of coverage in each area. Key technology areas should include, as a minimum, Performance & Handling, structural integrity, propulsion, system safety and safety critical software.

Establish how the NAA overcomes shortfalls in airworthiness specialists for particular key disciplines.

Assess the depth and breadth of technical resources the NAA has available to draw on, for example, test centres, engine test facilities, structures test facilities, E3 facilities, etc.

Establish how staff are authorised to make compliance findings, and the level of ongoing oversight.

Establish the extent to which the NAA makes use of peer review for complex issues.

Assess the qualifications, training and experience of key technical and management staff.

Assess the range of certification program management skills available to the NAA.

For military NAAs: Where complex civilian airworthiness issues are involved (e.g. certifications for ETOPS, RNP, RVSM, etc), critically assess whether the NAA has the knowledge to oversight these issues.

PROCESSES

Type Certification Management

Establish exactly what is covered by the final Type Certificate (or equivalent) issued by the NAA.

Assess how type certification projects are coordinated within the NAA.



12D1–3

Obtain copies of the NAA certification processes, and (if allowed) a copy of key certification plans and reports from a previous type certification program. If copies not allowed (e.g. due to non-disclosure agreements with design agencies), step in detail through an example process.

Assess the level of review that the NAA applies to certifications provided by other NAAs.

If major OEMs are authorised to approve designs on behalf of the NAA, examine the NAA processes for controlling and monitoring this.

Comprehensively understand how the NAA permits the concept of grandfathering to be employed in new designs.

Assess the NAA processes for approving design organisations, and ongoing compliance assurance.

Determine whether the NAA has a role in providing through-life airworthiness services (e.g. issuing ADs etc) to non-national customers.

Confirm the NAA has an effective mechanism for managing outstanding airworthiness issues (e.g. Issue Papers).

Assess the processes and standards adopted for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness.

Confirm whether the NAA monitors the continued airworthiness of the type certificated product worldwide and issues Airworthiness Directives (AD) when necessary.

Examine how the NAA notifies other NAAs of pending emergency actions or significant investigations (i.e. impending issue of ADs or equivalent).

Understand any areas in which the NAA believes the ADF has a role/responsibility in the certification process.

Design Standards

Examine how the NAA prescribes and revises minimum standards governing the design of aircraft, engines, propellers and other aircraft related equipment?.

Broadly assess the NAA’s airworthiness design requirements, and assess whether they provide a comparable level of safety to the standards accepted by other NAAs.

Confirm how the NAA will establish a certification basis for a military modification.

Examine the NAA process for assessing and approving any tailoring of military standards (and whether the ADF has a role in this process).

Oversight of Design

Where employed by the NAA, examine how delegation and designee systems work, including how decisions are reviewed and authorisations issued.

Broadly assess the level of certification evidence required by the NAA for key airworthiness requirements, and the plans used to support the process (e.g. compliance finding plans).

Confirm the NAA’s normal approach to oversight/witnessing of OEM test activities.

Examine how the NAA involves itself in safety-related software development activities.

Assess NAA intended oversight and approval of the flight manual.

Assess whether the NAA approves the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness.

Assess the NAA’s requirements for system safety programs, in particular the identification and management of hazards.

Production/Construction

Understand the NAA’s regulatory framework for the production of aircraft and modifications.

Comprehensively examine how production oversight is performed.

Establish how the NAA assesses the competencies of key OEM construction staff.



12D1–4

Establish how deviations, waivers, product concessions, and so on, are approved during the production of aircraft and modifications.

Establish how major repair data is approved.

DATA

Review example Certification Project Plans (or equivalent) to understand how the NAA coordinates schedules, responsibilities and personnel resources within the certification body and its support network.

The following data should be reviewed as part of an on-site visit:

• Safety Risk Retention Decisions and the recording of hazards and risk retention.

• Special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent level of safety Certification Review Items (Issue Papers).

• Compliance Finding Plans.

• Findings of Compliance.

• Statements of Conformity.

• Certification Plans.

• Flight Manual Approval Page.

Assess how the NAA accepts data provided by other NAAs.

PRODUCT

Establish whether the NAA has experience in conducting type certification programs for new aircraft designs.

Confirm the NAA has extensive experience in conducting type certification activity for complex modifications.

Assess the safety record of all aircraft types previously type certified by the NAA.

Examine previous Type Certificate Data Sheets that have previously been issued by the NAA.

Examine previous Mandatory Continued Airworthiness Information (MCAI) such as Airworthiness Directives that has previously been issued by the NAA.

Examine a Master Minimum Equipment List (or equivalent) previously approved by the NAA.



12D2–1

ASSESSMENT OF NAA SUITABILITY FOR OVERSIGHTING ADF DESIGN CHANGES

1. Where the ADF proposes to leverage off NAA oversight of an ADF-unique design change, the TAR must be confident that the competent NAA is also suitable for the role. After all, the NAA may see this task as extraneous to their primary role of supporting aircraft of their county, or may not have the specific skills needed for a specialised certification task. The TAR will normally accept an NAA as suitable for oversighting a specific ADF modification provided:

a. the NAA is experienced in the subject certification issue;

b. evidence exists that the NAA is fully committed to the task, and will support the certification effort throughout the duration of the project;

c. there is an effective mechanism for the NAA to enforce their requirements on the contractor;

d. the NAA is fully aware of all ADF specification requirements for the design change;

e. the NAA has a clear understanding of the ADF’s proposed configuration, role and operating environment (CRE); and

f. the ADF is fully aware of what the NAA is/is not attesting to.

The following table contains a checklist of items that may contribute to the TAR’s assurance of the above six issues. In all cases, this assessment must be completed and agreed by the TAR prior to contract signature.

EVALUATION CHECKLIST OF SUITABILITY OF <NAA NAME>

TO OVERSIGHT MODIFICATION <MODIFICATION NAME>

RELEVANT EXPERTISE

Determine if the NAA has previous experience in similar certification programs.

Confirm the NAA possesses current specialist technical skills relevant to the core challenges of the certification program.

CAPACITY

Obtain an estimate of the NAA resources expected to be assigned to the program.

Obtain assurance that the NAA has sufficient capacity to accomplish the activity.

Confirm the adequacy of the NAA organisational structure to be applied to the ADF’s certification program.

Confirm the adequacy of staff numbers and competence to be applied to the ADF program.

Assess what the impact on the ADF program will be if a higher priority local task emerges.

WILLINGNESS

Establish the NAA’s motivation for undertaking this program, to gain insight into their willingness to diligently prosecute the certification activity on behalf of the ADF.

Obtain confirmation that the program has a senior executive and (if applicable) government backing.

Establish the NAA’s willingness to have ADF personnel involved in the certification effort.

Establish, through MOU or other means, a formal agreement for the certification work to be undertaken by the NAA on the ADF’s behalf.


AAP 7001.053(AM1)

12D2–2

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12D3–1

GUIDANCE FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS 1. From time to time, the ADF acquires military equipment indirectly through a Government-to-Government agreement. The United States (US) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is one example of an indirect acquisition. Under an FMS acquisition the Australian and US Governments enter into an agreement whereby the US Government agrees to acquire materiel from a US commercial supplier on behalf of the Australian Government. A collaborative development is another example of an indirect acquisition. For example, a collaborative development program with the US may involve a Government-to-Government Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and may set up a Joint Program Office (JPO). The JPO, which comprises mainly a US Project Management Authority with a smaller number of Australian Cooperative Program Personnel, manages the development and acquisition contracts with the commercial design agency on behalf of both the US and the ADF. However, it is the US Government that legally enters into the materiel supply contracts (via the JPO) and furnishes the materiel to the Australian Government for ADF use.

2. While these indirect agreements may intuitively appear to be the same as any acquisition overseen by a military NAA, there are key differences that require careful management by the ADF. In particular, indirect acquisitions can provide the ADF with minimal oversight into the actions of the US military as an NAA, which can complicate the ADF’s Design Acceptance effort. Importantly, some of the key agreements, such as the MoU to establish a cooperative development, may need to be enacted well before Government Approval (Second Pass). This means that the Design Acceptance Strategy and MoU negotiating directives need to have a mature understanding of what data will be needed to support Recognition of Prior Acceptance (RPA) well before the Second Pass milestone.

3. This appendix identifies a range of information that can be obtained from the US military, provided it is included in key formal agreement documents, for example the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the US Government and individual Memorandums of Understanding/Agreement (MoU/MoA) with key military organisations. Obtaining this information outside a formal agreement can be very difficult.

Items for inclusion in the LOA

4. Disclosure of the certification basis. As an informed customer the TAR expects full disclosure of the design standards to which the aircraft or modification is designed (i.e. the certification basis). Comprehensive disclosure of the certification basis is fundamental to the ADF assessing the impact of any ADF CRE differences. Due to US Government International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), obtaining the required level of disclosure of certification information can often be problematic, particularly when seeking release of classified certification information such as E3 test reports, which may reveal equipment shortfalls and susceptibilities. Consequently, it is imperative that provisions for release of classified certification information are included in the LOA/MoU and that US State Department approval for the release of this information is sought early in the acquisition process.

5. Where all reasonably practical avenues for obtaining key certification information have been unsuccessful, the DAR should establish an alternative strategy for achieving Design Acceptance without this data, and present it to the TAR for approval. Examples of alternative arrangements might include: conducting local analyses based on reasonable assumptions, repeating equipment testing locally so that test results are available, conducting additional on-aircraft testing to overcome test data shortfalls, pursuing arrangements with US-based companies to analyse data on the ADF’s behalf, and so on. Ultimately, while the ADF can elect to retain risk as a result of access to key certification information being precluded, this should always be a last resort.

6. Designed level of safety. Understanding the inherent level of safety for the aircraft is essential for the ADF to make informed risk treatment, including risk retention, decisions. Typically this is presented as the as-designed aircraft accident, or non-combat loss rate, and identifies the baseline level of accident/incident risk for the platform.

7. Hazard management. The system safety program will identify to the NAA hazards that are above and below the baseline level of accident/incident risk. These hazards must be evaluated in the ADF context. While the terminology and information repository varies between the US Services, the following data should be sought:

a. Executive Level Risk Acceptance. All hazards associated with the aircraft that were accepted by US executives with a Residual Risk Level of either High or Medium in accordance with the System Safety Management Plan must be identified. Levels of risk acceptable to the US armed forces may be different to those which are acceptable to the ADF and must therefore be considered and formally acknowledged at an appropriate level within the ADF. Comprehensive data to support this process must be sought via the LOA/MoU.



12D3–2

b. US Military risk treatment. The US military, like the ADF, adopts procedural risk treatments (for example, local operating instructions that are not documented in the flight manual) to treat certain risks. These are effectively the US equivalent to ADF Special Flying Instructions, Maintenance Standing Instructions, and so on. Full disclosure of these procedural risk treatments must be pursued via the LOA/MoU.

c. Airworthiness Release (AWR) Restrictions. Airworthiness Releases communicate restrictions and operating instructions, warnings, cautions and notes as well as other important information. The PO must assess whether the restrictions and limitations are contained within the operator’s manuals, and if not ensure they have been conveyed to aircrew appropriately. A copy of all AWRs must be sought via the LOA/MoU.

d. Special Technical Instructions (STI) issued by the NAA. US Military mandatory instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA), performing a role similar to ADF STIs, must be sought via the LOA/MoU. Examples include:

(1) US Army Aviation Safety Messages comprising Safety of Flight Messages, Aviation Safety Action Messages, Aviation Maintenance Action Messages; and

(2) USAF issues Safety Time Compliance Technical Orders.

(3) Safety related OEM advice such as urgent/mandatory Service Bulletins.

e. Product Assurance – Product Quality Deficiencies. The ADF must source all relevant US military Category One Deficiency Reports, since these include deficiencies that:

(1) May cause death, injury, or severe occupational illness,

(2) Would cause loss or major damage to a weapon system, and

(3) Would restrict the combat readiness of the using organization.

f. Qualification Waivers. The ADF must source all qualification waivers, so that an assessment of the associated safety impacts in the ADF context can be made.

g. Mishaps - Lessons Learned. The ADF should source insight into all relevant significant safety events, including the cause of the event and actions recommended to prevent re-occurrence.

8. Programmatic Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Evaluation. To assist in meeting Occupational Health, Safety and Environmental requirements system safety products such as health hazard assessments and Programmatic Environment, Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (PEO&SHA), and Occupational Health and Safety Evaluation (OH&SE) reports should be sought.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex E to Sect 3 Chap 12

12E–1

CHECKLIST FOR AUDITING PRIME CONTRACTORS

ORGANISATION

TAREG Questions

1.1.4 Does the organisation require any regulation exemptions.

3.2.6 Does the organisation have QMS certification to ISO 9001 or equivalent.

3.2.8 What is the organisational structure.

Which elements of the organisation are involved in design.

Is there more than one location where design takes place.

3.3.2.a(2)(vi)(b)

3.3.3.c(7)

3.4.1.c(9)

How are subcontractors managed.

Are all subcontracts in place.

Are any subcontractors performing design activities up to the level of Design Review or Design Approval.

If there are, to what EMS are they working to.

How is compliance assurance of subcontractors conducted.

3.3.3 What is the organisation’s Design Support Network.

How is the DSN periodically reviewed for appropriateness and effectiveness.

3.3.9 Does the organisation's internal evaluation system cover the EMS.

Is the organisation’s EMS already approved and subject to regular compliance assurance by another recognised NAA.

3.4.1 If design takes place in more than one location:

How does the SDE manage activities at the other locations.

Is there a robust and well-understood method of information transfer between locations.

PERSONNEL

3.2.8 Does staff understand the EMS and what it consists of.

3.3.2 How are staff authorised to perform engineering activities.

How often are authorisations reviewed.

How is the competency of engineering staff maintained? (Is there a regular continuation training or professional development program.

Does the SDE have access to, and support of, the Senior Executive.

PROCESSES

2.2.3.a.(5)

3.4.1

Are there adequate systems to control design planning and development, Judgement of Significance, Design Review and Design Approval.

How well understood are these processes in the organisation.

2.5.9 If the organisation has been authorised to conduct assumption of Design Acceptance, is there a system to control this.



12E–2

TAREG Questions

3.2.8 Does the EMP accurately describe the level and scope of engineering activities being undertaken.

Has the organisation cross-referenced pre-existing plans, procedures, etc to show compliance with TAMM requirements.

If the organisation has created new plans, procedures, etc to satisfy TAMM requirements, are they well understood in the organisation and how they will be used.

3.3.7 Does the organisation adequately control and maintain facilities, tools and equipment used for engineering activities.

3.3.10 How is documentation used for engineering activities (such as the EMP, manuals, procedures, BLIs) controlled (version, amendment status, etc).

3.4.3 Does the Design Approval procedure ensure that Significant designs are Approved by the SDE or a DSDE.

3.4.4 Does the Design Review procedure ensure that Significant designs receive Design Review by a DE (or equivalent).

Does the Design Review procedure ensure the independence of the Design Reviewer.

3.5.2 How does the organisation control the receipt and processing of TI and TAAI.

DATA

2.2.8

3.3.6

3.5.14

If applicable, how does the organisation control Type Design Data.

Is design output data identified as Type Design Data.

Is superseded Type Design Data cross-referenced to superseding data.

Are there arrangements with DSN members to identify and control Type Design Data.

Is the Type Record updated following STC.

3.3.6

3.4.2

How does the organisation control design reference data.

Is it assessed for currency, suitability and applicability prior to use.

Are changes to design reference data reviewed and approved.

Is obsolete design reference data removed from use.

3.3.6 Has the organisation documented its access agreements (including IP rights) for data sourced externally.

3.3.8 Does the organisation maintain adequate records for:

All engineering activities performed.

Qualifications, training, experience, and authorisation of staff assigned EA.

Designs and design changes.

Certification of assessment of suitability and applicability of design reference data.

Drawings, tests, analyses and reports showing compliance of designs with requirements.

Any CI management activities (mods, substitutions, deviations, STIs, ASI, ESI, NDT, W&B).

Calibrations of tools and test equipment used in design activities.

Audits of subcontractors.

Quality indicators and results arising from internal EMS evaluation.

Reviews of DSN appropriateness and effectiveness.



12E–3

PRODUCT

TAREG Questions

2.2.3.a(5) (ii)

3.4.3

Prior to providing Design Approval certification, how will the SDE:

Ensure that the design was developed in accordance with the EMS.

Ensure that the design outputs have been adequately reviewed (Design Review).

Verify that the design meets each requirement of the ADF SOR.

Ensure that implementing instructions (e.g. work instructions, drawings) are accurate, traceable and controlled.

2.2.3.a(5) (iv) and v)

3.5.15

3.5.16

How will the organisation demonstrate that:

The continuing airworthiness instructions pertain to the ADF product.

The flight manual and aircraft operating instructions, procedures and limitations pertain to the ADF product.

2.2.4.a(1) How has the organisation flowed down ADF SOR requirements to low level design activities.

2.2.7 What ADF SOR requirements will be subject to prior acceptance by a recognised NAA

What documents will be submitted as evidence of prior acceptance.

2.2.8 What data will constitute Type Design Data.

TAREG 2.2.3.a(5)(i) and (iii)). What Type Design Data will the ADF have access to.

TAREG 2.2.4.a(2). How will the organisation show that the data is relevant to the ADF configuration.

2.5.6

3.3.3

3.4

3.5

3.3.6

3.3.7

How will engineering decisions be managed for following aspects of in-service support:

Design Acceptance for Minor changes to Type Design.

In-service DSN.

Design Control.

CI management.

Issue of service bulletins, alert information, and other mandatory and non-mandatory technical and operational information.

Equipment, tools and facilities.

2.4.a(6) How will maintenance decisions be managed for in-service support.

3.5.6

3.5.7

3.5.8

What is the approval process for modifications, substitutions and deviations.



12E–4

TAREG Questions

3.5.19 How will the organisation:

Undertake Production.

Authorised competent personnel to undertake production activities.

Control production equipment, tools and facilities.

Manage production and Type deviations.

Manage part and material substitutions.

Perform inspections of items produced.

Certify that each production item conforms to all specified design requirements.

(TAREG 2.6.3.a) Ensure that each tail number / item is the same as the Type / prototype item.

Perform foreign object control.

3.5.20 If applicable, how does the organisation intend to perform modification installation.

Is there any significant aircraft maintenance activity to be performed during modification.

Is there a nominated individual responsible for all work performed on aircraft.

3.5.20 How will the organisation:

authorise competent personnel to install modifications.

address aircraft safety precautions and human factors in the modification installation.

report and investigate maintenance incidents, defects or unairworthy conditions.

control equipment, tools and facilities used for modification installation.

ensure that modification instructions are approved and appropriate.

ensure that all modification installation work is adequately supervised, inspected, certified and recorded.

maintain accurate weight and balance records for each aircraft.

certify that each modified aircraft conforms to all specified requirements.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex F to Sect 3 Chap 12

12F–1

CONTRACTOR PROVISION OF CERTIFICATION BASIS AND CERTIFICATION BASIS DESCRIPTION

INTRODUCTION

1. The certification basis is the comprehensive set of design requirements, drawn for example from DEF STAN 00-970, FARs, military or company standards, which must be met to assure the ADF that the aircraft type is airworthy. The certification basis description (CBD) is a document listing, inter-alia, the individual certification basis requirements and the evidence that demonstrates Contractor compliance with the requirements (refer appendix 1). Fundamental to the ADF’s approach are the following steps:

a. The Tenderer proposes to the ADF a certification basis that it believes will provide an adequate level of safety when the tendered type is operated in the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment.

b. The ADF assesses the completeness of the proposed certification basis by evaluating it against its comparative standards, and ensures that the Tenderer’s role and operating environment assumptions are valid.

c. An agreed certification basis, and agreed means of establishing compliance, is included in the contracted SOR.

d. The Contractor completes the CBD to the ADF’s satisfaction through the design and testing phases.

Preparation Guidelines

2. This format is intended to facilitate assessment by the ADF of Tenderers’ proposed certification bases and provision of a completed CBD. Deviation from the content requirements described below could make it difficult for the ADF to determine if a Tenderer’s proposed certification basis is sufficiently comprehensive to ensure adequate levels of safety for operation of the tendered type in the ADF’s intended roles and environment (as described in the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) and Operational Concept Document (OCD)).

CONTENT REQUIREMENTS

Type Certification Strategy

3. This section should generally describe the proposed strategy to enable Type Certification (i.e. the issue of an AMTC/STC) by the ADF, therefore providing an overview of the CBD (described in the next section). It may also be convenient to include information to support the CBD, where direct inclusion in the CBD would be unnecessarily complicating. For example, the level of detail expected by the ADF for prior certifications, special conditions and equivalent safety findings, described in the following paragraphs, does not easily lend itself to inclusion in the CBD.

4. Prior Certifications. If the proposed certification basis for a tendered aircraft type (including engines and propellers) or a major upgrade is to be based on prior certifications by a military or civil NAA (e.g. French Military DGA or FAA respectively), the Tenderer must provide the following information:

a. identifying details (e.g. name and model number) of the previously certified type upon which certification of the tendered variant or upgrade is to be based (inclusion in CBD is preferred);

b. identifying details of the prior certifying authority (inclusion in CBD is preferred);

c. comprehensive details of the basis of prior certification, including details of any special conditions, equivalent safety findings, airworthiness directives or certification maintenance requirements (or military equivalents, which might be called waivers and deviations);

NOTE

• The level of detail that the FAA normally provides when describing the certification basis in its Type Certificate Data Sheets would be adequate.

d. a summary of the design changes that distinguish the tendered variant from the previously certified variant (including special maintenance requirements and modifications incorporated since certification);



12F–2

NOTE

• For a major aircraft upgrade, the Tenderer must provide a summary of the design changes proposed for incorporation during the upgrade.

NOTE

• It is expected that new design assurance activity will be required to certify any design changes listed by the Tenderer in response to this sub-paragraph.

e. where the prior certification is not current or the prior certifying authority does not continue to administer aircraft (or engines or propellers) under that certification, a competent assessment of the adequacy of the basis of certification against current standards and type operating experience; and

f. analysis that demonstrates the extent to which the existing prior certification basis is relevant to the tendered configuration, and the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment.

NOTE

• Additional design assurance activity is likely to be required if a prior certification is not valid for all of the ADF’s intended roles and operating environments.

5. Proposed Special Conditions and Equivalent Safety Findings. If the proposed design for a tendered aircraft type or a major upgrade includes unusual or novel design features that may require approval (by the ADF) of special conditions or equivalent safety findings (or their military equivalents such as waivers and deviations), they should be detailed and justified in this section.

The Certification Basis Description (CBD)

6. The CBD is the ADF’s preferred method for documenting, inter-alia, the individual certification basis requirements and the evidence that demonstrates Contractor compliance with the requirements. The ADF prefers the CBD to be documented in a tabular format, similar to that shown in appendix 1, Table 12-F1-1 or 12-F1-2. The first table is suitable primarily for programs that are acquiring and then modifying an aircraft (for example the tanker conversion of a ‘green’ A330 aircraft), while the second table is a simplified version that may be suitable for modification of in-service aircraft (for example the addition of an Electronic Warfare Self Protection system to a Blackhawk aircraft). However, since Tenderers may already have some, or all, of the information that the ADF requires in their own databases, the ADF would normally accept CBDs presented in any format provided they satisfy the following minimum requirements:

a. Each row of the CBD is to contain the certification basis information for either a single design requirement, or for a group of related requirements.

NOTE

• The ADF expects the Tenderer to propose the level to which each of the certification basis requirements needs to be broken down to ensure that the CBD will be a useful tool for managing the program and the resulting compliance findings. As a guide, for an aircraft that was to be certified to FAR 25, an adequately detailed CBD would normally be achieved by listing every numbered section of FAR 25 (e.g. 25.1309) on a separate line of the CBD. Further breakdown of FAR 25 in the CBD to individual clauses may be appropriate in some cases, such as if the numbered section contains several distinct clauses for which different compliance demonstration activities will be required.

b. Each row of the CBD must include the following information, as a minimum:

(1) The parent design standard from which the requirement or group of requirements has been drawn (e.g. FAR 25, CS 25, DEF STAN 00-970, MIL-STD-???, company standard, commercial standard), as well as the reference details (e.g. volume, section, chapter, paragraph number) of the requirement or group of requirements within that airworthiness design standard.

(2) The revision status to which the tendered aircraft or major upgrade is to be certified.



12F–3

NOTE

• The tendered aircraft type does not necessarily need to be certified to the latest revision of a requirement if a competent assessment of the adequacy of the proposed version of the requirement against the latest revision, taking into account relevant type operating experience, satisfies the ADF that the proposed version provides for adequate safety of flight.

(3) A concise description of the requirement or group of requirements.

(4) A description of the compliance finding activities (e.g. types of inspection, analysis, test, similarity) proposed to be conducted to demonstrate compliance with each certification basis requirement.

NOTE

• This description should include sufficient detail to enable the ADF to assess whether the proposed compliance finding activity is likely to be adequate to demonstrate compliance with the relevant certification basis requirements to the ADF’s satisfaction.

(5) The agency that will oversee the compliance finding activity.

NOTE

• Performing a compliance finding is ultimately a Commonwealth responsibility. However, the Commonwealth compliance finding will be supported by any agency that provides evidence of, and attests that, compliance with a certification basis requirement (or group of requirements) has been demonstrated. This information is useful to the ADF when deciding how much oversight of the compliance finding activities it needs to have.

(6) the types of documents to be raised in relation to compliance finding activities to be conducted (e.g. certification plans, test procedures, test reports, systems safety analyses).

NOTE

• The documentation listed in response to sub-paragraph b (6) should be available to the ADF upon request. This includes documents provided to another airworthiness authority.

Appendix:

1. Example ADF Certification Basis Description



12F–4

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex F to Sect 3 Chap 12

12F1–1

EXAMPLE ADF CERTIFICATION BASIS DESCRIPTION

NOTES ON ADF CBD

1. This appendix provides guidance on the information that Tenderers should provide in each column of the ADF CBD Table shown at Figures 12–F1–1 and 12–F1–2. Both of these CBD tables present similar information, but the first CBD table has an expanded structure that better accommodates the additional information relevant to projects whose scope includes both the acquisition and modification of an aircraft. The second CBD table has a simplified structure that is often suited to modifications to in-service aircraft. Additional tailoring of the CBD structure to suit the scope of a project is encouraged, provided the same core information is presented.

Airworthiness Requirement

2. The Airworthiness Requirement column provides a concise description of the subject of the CBD entry. It need not necessarily reflect the title of the relevant design standard, although this is normal where the CBD is based on FAR, CS and DEF STAN 00-970 requirements. Where the airworthiness requirement is sourced from the ADF Specification, a paraphrased summary of the specification clause is appropriate.

Design Standard

3. The Design Standard column contains the design or airworthiness standard from which the requirement has been drawn, and the date and/or amendment status of the standard. The Tenderer may propose the level to which each of the Certification Basis requirements needs to be broken down so that the Certification Basis conveys meaningful information and is a useful management tool. For example, the Tenderer may simply wish to enter ‘FAR 23.991’ as the design standard for fuel pumps in the CBD. Alternatively, if the Tenderer wishes to propose a different means of demonstrating compliance for elements within that design standard (in particular where ‘Similarity’ is proposed for several of the elements within that standard) then further decomposition may be warranted. For example, FAR 23.991 could be separated into individual CBD entries for 23.991a, 23.991b and 23.991c-d.

4. Some design standards inevitably require tailoring for military aircraft; however, the CBD concept is not well suited to documenting this tailoring. Where the Tenderer is proposing a design standard that requires tailoring, the Tenderer should ensure the CBD appropriately reflects the fact. For example, the use of footnotes or an additional column might be adequate where the tailoring is minor. Where substantial tailoring or explanation is required a reference in the ‘Comments’ column to a separate tailoring document might be more appropriate.

Compliance Method

5. In the Compliance Method column, the Tenderer proposes the likely approach to demonstrating compliance, selected from Inspection (I), Analysis (A), Test (T) or Similarity (S), as follows:

(I) Compliance verification by inspection involves visually determining if a specification requirement is satisfied (e.g. appropriate location or size of emergency exits). This may include inspection of the user’s manual to ensure operating requirements and limitations are adequately specified.

(A) Compliance verification by analysis involves modelling the aircraft design and deducing from that model, whether a specification requirement is satisfied. For example, this may include analysis in the form of a Systems Safety Assessment to show compliance with FAR 25.1309—Equipment, systems and installations.

(T) Compliance verification by test involves operating the aircraft or system in the specified environment, collecting data relevant to a specified feature/function and analysing the data to determine if a specification requirement is satisfied. This may include specific ground or flight tests to assure correct operation and performance to a standard (e.g. bird strike impact damage tolerance demonstrations, VHF communication range performance tests or flight handling tests); testing to demonstrate safety where analysis is not acceptable to the airworthiness agency (e.g. whole or part aircraft EMC/EMI testing); or review of test results from the contractor T&E program, other customer’s T&E programs (or in-service experience), or the inclusion of specific test points in the contractor T&E or ADF T&E program.

(S) Demonstration of compliance by similarity (prior certification) involves the assessment and acceptance of a design feature as fit for purpose based on verification activities conducted on a similar or identical feature and previous acceptable performance. The Commonwealth may accept similarity as a suitable method of demonstrating compliance with a particular requirement if the certification basis of the earlier variant, together with previous acceptable performance, is shown to provide an acceptable level of safety. Such assertion of similarity would normally be accepted by the Commonwealth, but only to the extent that the



12F1–2

existing certification basis can be shown to be relevant to the configuration being acquired and the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment. The prior certifying authority must be a civil or military Airworthiness Authority. Certification via a commercial organisation will not be acceptable unless they are operating under the delegation of a civil or military authority acceptable to the ADF which can be shown to have applied a level of oversight equivalent to that which they would apply for aircraft entering their own civil or military registers. Service experience accrued on previously accepted design features may be deemed ‘applicable’ if the corresponding features in the proposed variant are determined to be sufficiently similar, both in design and usage, to the previously accepted components. Where compliance by similarity is claimed, details of the relevant aircraft/system and extant NAA certification should be included in the ‘Comments’ column.

6. Some previous aircraft acquisition and modification programs have expanded on the four basic Means of Compliance categories (i.e. I,A,T,S) presented above. For example, some programs have further sub-divided the ‘test’ element into ‘demonstration’ and ‘test’, where the former is qualitative while the latter is quantitative. Some EASA-based programs, on the other hand, have adopted a range of Means of Compliance codes where, for example, MC6 indicates ‘flight test’ while MC9 indicates ‘equipment qualification’. Provided definitions are provided, and consistency is maintained, expansions to the four basic categories of ‘I,A,T,S’ are acceptable.

7. Annotations of Test or Similarity are of particular interest to the Commonwealth. The former provides the Commonwealth with assurance that adequate testing is proposed and provides some insight into the likely size of the test program. The latter is particularly important since the Commonwealth must be assured that any Similarity claims are justified. Further guidance is provided in the Informed Recognition of Prior Certification section, at Annex D to this chapter.

NAA Involvement

8. The ADF’s firm preference for any aircraft acquisition or modification project is for an ADF-recognised civil or military Airworthiness Authority to oversee product compliance with airworthiness requirements. This reduces the ADF resources required to make compliance findings against the certification basis and enables the ADF to draw on the expertise and experience of those Airworthiness Authorities. Further information on assessing the competence and suitability of Airworthiness Authorities to oversight design work on behalf of the ADF is presented at Annex D to this chapter.

9. In the NAA Involvement column, the Tenderer should enter the name of the Airworthiness Authority (not including the ADF) they propose (some requirements may not involve oversight by an Airworthiness Authority) will have a role in assessing compliance with the airworthiness requirement. Where the Authority has only a partial role in the activity, this should be annotated on the CBD. Where leverage off previous NAA certifications is proposed, this information should not be included in this column. Rather, such proposals for application of ‘Similarity’ should be included in the Means of Compliance column, as described previously in this appendix.

Compliance Evidence Documents

10. During the RFT stage of a project, Tenderers may not have a detailed list of all evidence they propose to produce to demonstrate compliance with airworthiness requirements, nor exact titles of the documents. However, Tenderers should enter into this column the likely scope of documentation, understanding that it will continue to be updated during the life of the project.

Comments

11. The Comments column may be used to expand on the information presented in a particular row, or to refer to other documents that provide further details (for example, tailoring documents, details of claims for ‘Similarity’, and so on).

“ADF Use Only” Columns

12. The final three columns need not be included in a Tendered CBD. However, since these columns will be used by the Commonwealth to manage the CBD through to completion a brief explanation is included here for information:



12F1–3

a. Compliance Finding Agency (CFA). The Commonwealth agency (or person) listed in this column is responsible for making a compliance finding against the airworthiness requirement. That is, they must be assured that the evidence produced by the contractor is sufficient to demonstrate that the airworthiness requirement is adequately satisfied, in full cognisance of the ADF’s intended configuration, role and operating environment. The CFA will normally be a Commonwealth body, although in some instances it may be a person acting solely on behalf of the Commonwealth (for example, a Professional Service Provider (PSP) in a Commonwealth Project Office). An ‘agency’ is normally preferred by the TAR for making compliance findings rather than a ‘person’, since the resultant finding will automatically be a product of the agency’s engineering management system. Examples of CFAs include ASI-DGTA, PO staff (where suitably skilled), ASCENG, AMTDU, etc. In making the finding the CFA may draw on a range of sources including contractor documents, IV&V agent assessments, ADF CoEs, aircrew and of course another Airworthiness Authority’s oversight (which will often be sufficient in itself to allow a compliance finding to be made without further effort).

NOTE • An additional column may be added into this section of the CBD if desired, if the

evidence to be used by the CFA in making the compliance finding is substantially different to the ‘Evidence’ column on the CBD. This may occur where, for example, evidence is subject to onerous access restrictions and therefore the CFA will access only a few selected documents, or where the CFA needs access to additional documents that are not generated by the design agency (e.g. related DSTO analyses), and so on.

b. Compliance Outcome. This column reflects the outcome of the compliance finding process. Three outcomes are normally used, as follows:

(1) ‘Compliant’ meaning that the CFA has assessed that the evidence produced by the contractor fully supports compliance against the airworthiness requirement.

(2) ‘Non-Compliant (Acceptable)’ meaning that while some element of the airworthiness requirement has not been met, it has been assessed by the CFA as not unacceptably impacting airworthiness or functionality. In some cases, an Issue Paper may be necessary to obtain endorsement for such decisions.

(3) ‘Not Established’ denoting that a compliance finding has not been completed. Where an application for Type Certification is being staffed and there are outstanding compliance findings, each should be the subject of an open Issue Paper to ensure that visibility of the issue is retained.

NOTE • CFAs cannot make a finding of ‘Non-Compliant (Not Acceptable)’. Such an

outcome would mean that the design falls short of the design requirement and that the resultant reduction in safety is assessed as unacceptable to the Commonwealth. This outcome would preclude Design Acceptance. Instead, the finding is temporarily annotated as ‘Not Established’, and the PO must pursue an acceptable resolution to the shortfall. Depending on the nature of the shortfall, options might include pursuing a design change, obtaining further evidence or clarification, or implementing risk treatment measures such as risk retention or operational limitations. Once a satisfactory resolution to the shortfall is achieved, the CBD item will either become Compliant or Non-Compliant (Acceptable), depending on the nature of the resolution.

c. Finding Reference. This column will contain the reference to the document produced by the CFA that summarises the rationale for making the compliance finding. Multiple compliance findings can share the same document, if the rationale is applicable to each. Where a compliance finding of ‘Non-Compliant (Acceptable)’ has been made, the document should provide an assessment why the non-compliance is acceptable to the ADF. Where an Issue Paper is current against a CBD item, reference to it should be included in this column.



12F1–4

Certification Basis Description ADF Use Only

Certification Basis

Airworthiness Requirement Standard MoC / Applicable

to NAA

Oversight Evidence Comments CFA Evidence Required by CFA

Finding Outcome Ref

Gust Loads 27.341 Amdt 27-26

(Mar 90) S Baseline A/c --- Extant TC PO (ENG1) (as per ‘evidence’

column)

27.303 Nov 64 S Baseline A/c --- Extant TC & STCs PO (ENG2) (as per ‘evidence’ column)

27.303 Nov 64 I,A,T

ADF Mod:

Gun Mount

ADF

Design installation data

Test Reports ASI-DGTA

ASIMP, test data for structural

loading, test data for structural

integrity, etc, etc

Structure – General

Factor of Safety

27.303 Nov 64 I,A,T

ADF Mod:

Winch FAA


Test Reports ASI-DGTA (as per ‘evidence’

column)

27.1383 Nov 64 S Baseline A/c --- Extant TC

(as per ‘evidence’

column)

Landing Lights 27.1383 +

MIL-L-6503 Apr 75 I,A ADF Mod:

NVG compatibility

ADF

Certificate of conformance, Test

reports, FTA

AAP 7001.054 additional

requirement

PO (ENG1)OEM technical

data, Test reports

Figure 12–F1–1 Example ADF Certification Basis Description

(Suitable for Projects Acquiring and then Modifying an Aircraft)



12F1–5


Certification Basis

27.1357

Amdt 27-26

(Mar 90)

S

Baseline A/c --- Extant TC and STCs (as per ‘evidence’

column)

27.1357 Amdt 27-13

(Jul 77) I,A,T

ADF Mod:

UHF Comms

ADF


Certificate of Conformance

Test Reports

Additional modification to

circuit protection

OEM technical data, NAA analysis

and test reports

Circuit Protective Devices

27.1357 Amdt 27-13

(Jul 77) I,A,T

ADF Mod:

Winch FAA


Certificate of Conformance

Test Reports

Additional modification to

circuit protection

PO (ENG1)

(as per ‘evidence’ column)

UHF Comms MIL-STD-188-243 Mar 89 I,A,

T ADF Mod:

UHF Comms ADF OEM certification, test report, FTA PO (ENG3)

OEM certification documents, OEM technical data, test

reports

Figure 12–F1–1 Example ADF Certification Basis Description (cont)

(Suitable for Projects Acquiring and then Modifying an Aircraft)



12F1–6


Certification Basis

Airworthiness Requirement Standard Means of

Compliance NAA

Oversight Evidence Comments CFA Finding Outcome Ref

Materials and workmanship

FAR 23.603

Amdt

23-23 I, A --- Structural

Verification Report PO (ENG1)

Fasteners FAR 23.607 Feb 96 I, A, T ---

Certificate of conformance, Test

report

Substantial tailoring proposed - refer document xxxxx PO (ENG2)

Cockpit Controls

FAR 23.777

Amdt

23-51 I --- PO (ENG1)

System Safety MIL-STD-882

Version C A --- FTA, FMECA, PHA SCI-DGTA

Circuit Protective Devices

FAR 23.1357

Amdt

23-43 A, T --- PO (ENG1)

Figure 12–F1–2 Example ADF Certification Basis Description

(Suitable for Modifications to In-Service Aircraft)


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex G to Sect 3 Chap 12

12G–1

TYPE RECORDS

INTRODUCTION

1. An aircraft Type Record is a concise overarching introduction (a road map) into the design of an aircraft type. The Type Record is a summary document which defines a type design, at the time of design acceptance by the ADF, by reference to the issue status of all type design data.

2. If major design changes are introduced during an aircraft’s service life, a Type Record supplement is required to provide an historical record of major changes to the original design. It should define any data which supersedes or adds to information in the existing Type Record. If an aircraft Type Record is not available, a Type Record supplement is required simply to define the major change.

3. Prior to seeking a TAR Type Certification Recommendation, the in-service DAR must have accepted the Type Record as providing a suitable basis for in-service engineering support of the aircraft. The DAR accepts the Type Record based on it meeting the following objectives:

a. Design Reference. The Type Record should be a reference source for design engineering staff involved in the specification or qualification of design changes. The Type Record may be viewed as an engineer’s tool to assist in finding information about the design so decisions about future design changes may be made in accordance with the original design standards.

b. Airworthiness. Given the nature of the Type Record it should encompass directly, or by reference, the data which is produced in support of type certification of the aircraft type.

c. Historical Record. The Type Record should be updateable by the addition of data to represent an historical design perspective by recording all major changes from initial inception through the item’s entire service life.

PURPOSE

4. This chapter aims to explain the content of a Type Record.

TYPE RECORD CONTENT AND STRUCTURE

Descriptive Section

5. One section of a Type Record should be descriptive and include:

a. an introduction which presents an overview of the aircraft type detailing its manufacturer (including significant sub-contractors) and provides a brief history of development;

b. reference to all relevant design approval certificates (or similar) from OEMs and contractors;

c. an aircraft type description similar to the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet which describes engines and engine limits, propellers, airspeed limits/flight envelope, weight/balance and centre of gravity range, crew requirements, flight loads, certified passenger or cargo capacity, operating limitations and conditions, fuel and oil capacity, control surface movements and other such information;

d. evidence related to prior acceptance by other authorities including Type Certificates (or similar), and details of any special conditions or equivalent safety determinations or waivers (however described) that were made in the course of the prior acceptance;

e. a listing of, or reference to a listing of, design specifications, standards and requirements the aircraft type was built to including functional, allocated and product baselines and software and interface specifications and control documents;

f. a listing of, or reference to a listing of, test plans and procedures, ground and flight test and qualification results and reports, analysis reports, calculations and other type design data that is necessary to show compliance to the design specifications, standards and requirements;

g. a listing of non-compliances, limitations, deviations and waivers (however described) to the design specifications, standards and requirements with justification to show that any requirements not met are compensated for by factors that provide an equivalent level of safety;

h. reference to documented physical configuration audits (PCA) and functional configuration audits (FCA) conducted;



12G–2

i. a description of the type design documentation systems including identification of the data originators and the features of the document numbering systems for all data including:

(1) drawings and specifications;

(2) test reports and procedures;

(3) continuing airworthiness instructions;

(4) field service documentation; and

(5) design change documentation.

j. a list of all certification maintenance requirements (i.e. systems and powerplant maintenance requirements developed during the type certification process which contain frequency and extent of inspections);

k. a list of safety critical items, components and systems where the original equipment manufacturer or systems integrator has determined that the stipulated maintenance life should not be varied without the manufacturer’s agreement;

l. reference to instructions for continued airworthiness including those required for maintenance, transport and storage of the aircraft and its equipment, and for the transport and storage of parts and materials required to be used in maintenance;

m. reference to instructions detailing operating limitations and other information necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft type; and

n. for used aircraft, a list of issued technical directives and component and aircraft design change/engineering change proposal databases.

Drawing and Specification Structure Section

6. The second section of the Type Record should be devoted to the top level drawing and specification structures (also referred to as trees). It is expected that contractors will break the higher assembly item down into the same systems that the original designers analysed. Each system would be broken down to individual configuration items (CIs). A small portion of an example generic aircraft work breakdown structure that both drawing and specification trees could be derived from is at Figure 12–G–1.

7. For convenience, CIs may be aggregated into theoretical sub-systems which may not have an overall system level documentation, in which case the individual CIs would form the structure. As an example Figure 12–A–1 illustrates a typical end item breakdown with the end item CI subdivided into functional systems (in this case six) each of which is further subdivided to the CI level. The process is repeated until all CIs are included. Typically several hundred high level CIs would be included in an aircraft Type Record.

8. The drawing and specification structures should graphically and descriptively illustrate the top level drawings and specifications of the end item down to CI level. The Type Record should not include the actual drawings or specifications.



12G–3

End ItemAircraft Type

System 1Airframe

System 2Propulsion

CI 2.1Propeller

System 4Navigation

System 5Survivability

CI 5.1Control Panel

System 6Control/Display

CI 6.1Databus

CI 6.2Processor

CI 2.2Engine

CI 2.2.1Compressor

CI 2.2.2Combustor

CI 2.2.3Turbine

CI 2.2.4Exhaust Unit

CI 1.2Fuel Systems

CI 1.1.1Fuselage

CI 1.1.2Empennage

CI 1.1Basic Structure

CI 1.1.3Wing

System 3Communication

CI 3.1HF TX/RX

CI 3.2UHF TX/RX

CI 3.3VHF TX/RX

CI 4.1ADF

CI 3.4SATCOM

CI 3.5IFF

CI 4.2TACAN

CI 4.4GPS/INS

CI 4.4.1Software

CI 4.4.2Antenna

CI 4.3RADAR

CI 5.2RWR

CI 5.3ECM

CI 6.3Control Unit

CI 6.4HUD

CI 5.4Armaments

CI 5.4.1Processor

CI 5.4.2Databus

CI 5.4.3Weapons

CI 6.5HDD

CI 1.3.1Tyres

CI 1.3.2Brakes

CI 1.3Mech Systems

CI 1.3.3Hydraulics

Figure 12–G–1 Part of an Example Generic Aircraft Work Breakdown Structure



12G–4

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AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex H to Sect 3 Chap 12

12H–1

AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPERS

INTRODUCTION

1. The concept of an ADF Airworthiness Issue Paper was derived from the USA’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) use of Issue Papers. The FAA suggests that Issue Papers “… provide a simple means for describing and tracking the resolution of significant technical, regulatory, and administrative issues that occur during the certification process [and] establishes a formal communication for dialogue of significant issues between the applicant … and the FAA.” In the ADF context, Airworthiness Issue Papers are used to ensure visibility of all airworthiness issues judged by the PO, DGTA-ADF or the OAA as significant enough to warrant recording of their resolution in the certification basis.

2. When used appropriately, Airworthiness Issue Papers have historically proven to be an excellent medium for resolving complex airworthiness issues. In particular, they provide a structured and well-understood means of obtaining authoritative input from key airworthiness stakeholders. This annex provides guidance on the use and management of Airworthiness Issue Papers.

USE OF ISSUE PAPERS

3. While Issue Papers may be raised at any time during an aircraft’s lifecycle, they are most often raised during aircraft acquisition and modification projects. Most commonly, Issue Papers are employed by Project Offices (POs) to present a risk treatment proposal (normally required as a result of a design shortfall) to the TAR and OAA for approval. They are also useful for obtaining TAA and OAA concurrence on a proposed resolution strategy for a design shortfall, before the PO expends resources on pursuing the strategy.

4. From time to time, Issue Papers may be used by POs for other purposes, for example to obtain TAR concurrence for a change to the agreed certification basis. However, POs must recognise that Issue Papers by their nature can impose an administrative burden, so they should be reserved for issues that cannot be more efficiently resolved via more direct means (for example, via a minute to the TAR that requests a change to a design standard in the certification basis). Where doubt exists over whether an Issue Paper is the most appropriate means for resolving an airworthiness issue, POs should seek guidance from DGTA-ADF staff.

5. Timeliness is a key attribute of the effective use of Issue Papers. Some POs elect to accumulate their airworthiness issues, and finally release Issue Papers concurrently with their application for an airworthiness instrument (e.g. AMTC/STC or SFP). This has historically proven to be a poor strategy for a number of reasons, including the following:

a. the opportunity for external stakeholders to assist the PO in resolving the issue is lost;

b. the TAR and OAA will both need time to evaluate the Issue Papers, which may delay TAR/OAA Type Certification recommendations; and

c. if the TAR and OAA strongly disagree with an element of the Issue Paper (for example, the PO’s risk treatment proposal), the PO has little time to present an alternative proposal, which may preclude positive TAR/OAA Type Certification recommendations.

Conversely, raising an Issue Paper too early in an issue’s lifecycle can be wasteful of PO resources, particularly if the issue eventually resolves itself through normal PO management processes. Judgement should therefore be exercised by the PO, and guidance from the TAR’s staff should be sought, on the optimum time to raise an Issue Paper. As a rule of thumb, Issue Papers should be raised once a PO realises that TAA/OAA involvement will almost certainly be required to resolve an issue, or earlier when advised by the TAR’s staff. POs should aim to have all Issue Papers presented to the TAR and OAA at least 3 months before submitting an application for an airworthiness instrument.

ISSUE PAPER MANAGEMENT

6. Issue Papers are raised by the PO, tracked by the PO, and managed by the PO through to resolution. On occasion an external specialist agency may draft the Issue Paper, but ultimately it is still the PO that raises and manages the Issue Paper. Where an Issue Paper has not been resolved prior to the PO being disestablished, the Issue Paper should be passed to the in-service DAR for ongoing management.

7. Circulating draft Issue Papers. DGTA-ADF experience has shown that initial PO versions of Issue Papers invariably require rework before they are suitable for submission to the TAR and OAA. Common shortfalls include inadequate analysis of the airworthiness issue, unsupported risk evaluations and inappropriate risk treatments. Where these shortfalls are evident in an Issue Paper that has already been formally submitted to the TAR, two options exist: the TAR can reject the Issue Paper and require its resubmission, or the TAR can argue against the Issue Paper in


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Annex H to Sect 3 Chap 12

12H–2

his/her ‘TAR Position’. Either approach will result in frustration and additional work for the PO. To avoid these pitfalls, the following procedure is commonly adopted by POs:

a. the PO drafts the Issue Paper using the template at Appendix 1, and submits the draft via e-mail to DGTA-ADF;

b. DGTA-ADF will evaluate the draft Issue Paper, and if necessary will assist the PO in resolving any shortfalls;

c. if desired by the PO, DGTA-ADF will present the PO with a draft of the ‘TAR Position’ on the Issue Paper, so that the PO can confirm it meets the PO’s requirements (and if not, an alternative position can be negotiated);

d. once all parties agree with the content of the Issue Paper, the PO formally submits the Issue Paper to the TAR and OAA via minute;

e. the TAR provides a ‘TAR Position’ on the Issue Paper, and formally submits it to the PO and OAA (or the OAA’s delegate, for example the OAAR(Acq));

f. upon receipt of the TAR Position, the OAA (or delegate) provides an ‘OAA Position’ on the Issue Paper, and formally submits it to the PO;

g. the PO then inserts the TAR Position and OAA Position into the Issue Paper, and

h. depending on the nature of the Issue Paper and the TAR/OAA Positions, the Issue Paper may be closed by the PO, or may remain open (if the latter, then the above process is repeated).

8. Some Issue Papers may be closed after just one iteration of the above process. Other Issue Papers may remain open, and may undergo several iterations before closure. For example, an initial version of an Issue Paper might highlight a design shortfall and seek TAR/OAA concurrence on a path to resolution, while the next version may provide a progress update, and ultimately a final version may confirm the problem has been resolved and seek TAR/OAA concurrence for Issue Paper closure. Where revisions to Issue Papers are required, each updated version should retain the full history of the Issue Paper, including all previous TAR/OAA positions.

9. POs should endeavour to achieve closure of all Issue Papers prior to their application to the ADF Airworthiness Authority (via an Airworthiness Board) for a Type Certificate. However, this is rarely possible, and most projects will have open Issue Papers when applying for a Type Certificate. Provided appropriate operational limitations are imposed to maintain aircraft safety, open Issue Papers should not preclude the issue of a Type Certificate. Following Type Certification, open Issue Papers will be presented to annual in-service Airworthiness Boards for re-assessment.

Appendix:

1. Issue Paper Template


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex H to Sect 3 Chap 12

12H1–1

ISSUE PAPER TEMPLATE

AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPER

Project: Issue Paper Number: Issue Paper Version Number: Certification Basis Reference: Issue Status (open / closed): Subject:

References:

1. (all references relevant to this issue) 2.

Statement of Issue

(A comprehensive statement of the issue, including relevant airworthiness requirements, shortfalls against these requirements, contractor’s position on the issue, etc).

Project Office Assessment

(This section presents the PO’s comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the issue, including likely implications to the project, likely airworthiness or functionality implications, recommended actions to investigate or resolve the issue, recommended TAR and OAA positions on issue, recommendation to close Issue Paper (or leave open), and so on. POs should take particular care to ensure the System Safety order of precedence for design (refer AAP 7001.054 Sect 2 Chap 1) has been taken into account when evaluating possible solutions to design shortfalls. Any discussions of risk in the Issue Paper should adopt the language and principles used in AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009. If a Risk Hazard Index (RHI) table is employed, it should be the same as that used in the project’s System Safety Program (which normally adopts the same RHI table as that used by the aircraft OEM). Where the OAA is required to make a decision on the treatment of risk, the Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) definitions for likelihood, consequence and risk, as defined in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual, should be employed.

Optimally, the PO’s position should be sufficiently comprehensive that the TAR and OAA merely agree to adopt the PO’s recommendations. This is often best achieved by the PO drafting their assessment and then e-mailing it to the TAR/OAAR for confirmation of acceptability before formally submitting it to those authorities).

TAR Position

(This section details the TAR’s requirements for closure (or progress) of the issue. It is submitted by the TAR via minute to the PO, and the PO inserts the TAR position here. It must include direction to leave the Issue Paper open, or close it with OAA concurrence).

OAA/OAAR Position

(The TAR Position should be completed before the OAA/R Position is sought. This section details the OAA’s requirements for closure (or progress) of the issue. Normally submitted by OAA/R via minute to the PO, and the PO inserts the OAA/R position here. Must include direction for dispensation of Issue Paper (i.e. whether to close or not)).


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex H to Sect 3 Chap 12

12H1–2

NOTE

• Guidance for subsequent versions. Successive versions of the Issue Paper should retain the previous PO assessment, TAR position and OAA/OAAR position. Revised assessments and TAR/OAA/OAAR positions should be presented serially to ensure that the issue paper history is clearly recorded.

Conclusion

(This section is completed by the PO only when the issue is to be closed; stating the final resolution of the Issue Paper agreed by the PO, TAR and OAA/R. Prior to this, the Issue Paper should periodically be re-issued, with each of the above fields updated to reflect the latest progress).



1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 13

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES


TAREG 1.1.5Authoritative Airworthiness Advice

INTRODUCTION

1. Technical Airworthiness Directives (TADs) are issued by DGTA-ADF in accordance with ADF Technical Airworthiness TAREG 1.1.5.c. They provide a standardised means for DGTA-ADF to promulgate urgent special engineering and maintenance instructions to correct an unsafe or unsatisfactory condition that is generally broader based than a single weapon system. A TAD is similar to an STI, but is issued directly by DGTA-ADF rather than a SPO. It provides specific types of authoritative airworthiness advice that requires mandatory action in accordance with TAREG 1.1.5.c.

2. The TAD system provides the TAR and TAR staff with a formal tool for issuing important and/or urgent technical airworthiness information and directing required action to be carried out to ensure continued airworthiness of State aircraft and associated equipment. Therefore, as with STIs, the incorporation of TADs must be controlled and recorded to ensure that airworthiness standards are maintained.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the responsibilities and procedures associated with TADs.

SCOPE

4. This chapter applies to DGTA-ADF as well as to all Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) and Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs) responsible for the engineering management, operation or maintenance of in-service ADF aircraft or aeronautical product.

TAD MANAGEMENT

5. A TAD is issued in hard copy format as described below; however, that does not preclude a preceding message, email or telephone advice where the urgency of a situation warrants.

6. DGTA, DAVENG, DAVREG or DAVCOMP are the Approving Authorities for all TADs. Any TAD that will or is likely to impact, directly or indirectly, the availability and / or operational capability of weapon systems must involve consultation with the affected OAA(s) and SPOs, in accordance TAREG 2.6.5, prior to the release of the TAD. TADs loosely align with the structure and look of an STI, but they are not registered or tracked on CAMM2.

7. TAD Numbering. Each TAD is serially numbered within each calendar year using a DGTA-ADF identifier (eg TAD 01/2003). TADs are not amended – where a change is needed the first TAD is cancelled and a new TAD issued.

8. TAD Border. The first page of every TAD has a black and white chequered border.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Directorate General of Technical Airworthiness

9. DGTA-ADF:

a. raises, releases and distributes TADs when required,

b. maintains a register of TADs, and

c. issues an annual consolidated index.

Systems Program Offices and Approved Maintenance Organisations

10. Action. TADs will require receiving agencies to take specific action, and report to the TAR on the outcomes of those actions. SPO and AMO TAD addressees are to action any specific TAD requirements and / or outcomes, or



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adapt the requirements and / or outcomes as applicable to their aircraft fleet(s) and aeronautical product, and take the appropriate required action. Reports in relation to taking TAD action, and reporting on associated outcomes are to be provided as required by respective TADs.

11. Certification. TAD action addressees are to respond to a TAD in the same way as they would to an OEM (mandatory) Service Bulletin (for SPOs), or a maintenance unit would to an STI (see Section 2 Chapter 3). SPO action agencies are to treat and process TADs in accordance with TI processing requirements (refer TAREG 3.5.2.c. and Section 3 Chapter 5 of the TAMM).

12. Non-Compliance. If an organisation is unable to comply with the TAD, either fully or in part, it is to advise the DGTA-ADF point of contact immediately, via message, email or minute, ensuring the reason for the non-compliance is fully defined and a preferred course of action is recommended.

13. Deferred Incorporation. If an urgent unforeseen operational requirement develops that overrides the TAD incorporation requirements at an AMO, the SMM may certify a TAD to be deferred as a CFU. The SMM is to seek authority from the DGTA-ADF Approving Authority prior to deferring a TAD.

DISTRIBUTION

14. Distribution. Each TAD will have its own unique distribution list based on the specific needs and required outcomes of each respective TAD. TADs will be distributed in hard copy, though electronic or message distribution may be utilised where urgency warrants.

15. DGTA-ADF Websites. The DGTA-ADF websites (both internet and intranet) will have a TAD section providing access to current TADs and consolidated indexes.

STATUS

16. TAD Status. TADs will have a status of either ‘Active’ or ‘Cancelled.’ The status of released TADs is promulgated by means of a Consolidation Index. All copies of ‘Cancelled’ TADs are to be destroyed except as follows:

a. A master copy, with the word ‘Cancelled’ stamped in red on every page, is to be retained by DGTA-ADF.

b. The MCS of an AMO may, at the discretion of the SMM, retain one copy with the word ‘Cancelled’ stamped in red on every page.

c. AEOs may retain one copy (with the word ‘Cancelled’ stamped in red on every page) to comply with TAREG 3.5.2 and Section 3 Chapter 5 of the TAMM.

ANNUAL REVIEW

17. The currency of all active TADs will be reviewed annually by DGTA-ADF staff and confirmed to action addressees by email.



1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 14

ADF AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND ROLE

CHANGES


TAREG 2.2 Type Certification

TAREG 2.3 Special Flight Permits

TAREG 2.4 Service Release for Major changes to Type Design

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with AAP 7001.048(AM1)—ADF Airworthiness Manual, the ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA) requires additional review of certain aircraft design and role changes than that provided through DMO’s acquisition and through life support processes, and the TAR’s technical and OAR’s operational regulatory frameworks. The additional review is coordinated by the Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA-ADF) and provided by the Airworthiness Board (AwB) and the ADF AA. Such review provides further confidence that the aircraft type will be airworthy when operated in approved roles; signified through issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) by the ADF AA. The review also provides further confidence that the continuing airworthiness of the overall weapon system will be able to be maintained when operated in approved roles; signified through issue of a Service Release (SR) by the ADF AA.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on the requirements of Project Offices (POs) and Systems Program Offices (SPOs) to gain the TAR’s recommendation for the issue of a Type Certificate, Service Release, or Special Flight Permit.

SCOPE

3. New Aircraft. This chapter is applicable to the introduction to service of all aircraft brought into ADF service through loan, acquisition or lease.

4. Major changes to existing aircraft. In accordance with TAREG 2.5.3, the types of changes requiring this additional review include those:

a. introducing a new capability, or significantly varying an existing capability; or

b. having an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the system.

5. ACPA-ADF should always be consulted to determine what review requirements the ADF AA has for such changes to the aircraft’s design or role. The PO should appoint a coordinator to liaise with, and obtain the necessary inputs from, the TAR, Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA), SPO (and other DMO agencies) and Force Element Group (FEG) staff. The PO should regularly liaise with the TAR, OAA and ACPA-ADF for guidance and clarification on meeting their requirements, including the evidence required for submission.

6. While the primary reference for Type Certificates, SR and SFPs is AAP 7001.048(AM1), this chapter provides guidance on technical airworthiness aspects for consideration by Project Offices (POs) and SPOs acquiring new aircraft or managing Major design changes. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, the regulations take precedence.

TYPE CERTIFICATES

7. Issue of an AMTC or STC signifies that the design and operational characteristics of an aircraft type are such that the aircraft will be airworthy when operated in approved roles. For the AwB to recommend to the ADF AA the issue of an AMTC/STC, the AwB will review technical and operational activities conducted by and for the DMO PO. Prior to the AwB:



2

a. The TAR is to provide an AMTC/STC recommendation to the OAA and Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DACPA), and the OAA is then to provide an AMTC/STC recommendation to DACPA with an information copy to the TAR. The TAR’s and OAA’s recommendations will be based on their regulatory requirements being met, as per Section 2 TAREG 2 and AAP 7001.048(AM1) TAREG 2.3 respectively.

b. The PO is to provide a summary of the technical and operational activities conducted to ACPA-ADF at least 28 days before the AwB (for on forwarding to the AwB members), and information copies to the TAR and OAR, as per Annex A.

8. At the AwB, the PO is to arrange a briefing for the AwB members, highlighting the salient points from the summary discussed at paragraph 7.b above. Relevant PO and specialist staff should be available to answer any questions from the AwB members concerning the airworthiness of the system. For this component, the AwB should sit for no more than two hours.

SERVICE RELEASE FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE TYPE DESIGN

9. Issue of a SR signifies that the continuing airworthiness of the product/system will be maintained when operated in approved roles. For the AwB to recommend to the ADF AA the issue of a SR, the AwB will review technical, operational and logistics activities conducted by and for the DMO PO. The ADF AA requires that the TAR, OAA, FEG and relevant DMO agencies oversee the PO activities and provide Recommendations for SR through DACPA and the AwB. The PO is to arrange for the ‘attestations’ and summaries, as per Annex B, to be provided to ACPA-ADF at least 28 days before the AwB.

10. SR may be issued incrementally (eg. with a limit to operations), depending on the need to operate the product/system coupled with the confidence that operational, technical and logistics authorities have in the integrity of, and available support for, the product/system at that time.

11. At the AwB, the PO is to arrange a briefing for the AwB members, highlighting the salient points from the summary discussed at paragraph 9. Relevant staff should be available to answer any questions from the AwB members concerning the SR aspects. For this component, the AwB should sit for no more than two hours.

12. An AMTC/STC and SR need not be sought at the same time. While an AMTC/STC could be issued close to the completion of Design Acceptance activities, in all likelihood, the time constraints associated with acquisition projects, particularly the delivery of documentation, suggest an AMTC/STC be issued some time after the ADF takes delivery of a number of the aircraft type. Hence, and also to reduce AwB administration, the AwB will normally consider AMTC/STC and SR matters at the same sitting.

13. Certificates of Airworthiness (CofAs). Service Release also requires a system for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness to successive aircraft produced following the first of the type. Requirements for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness are covered at TAREG 2.6.3. This regulation does not apply retrospectively to all ADF aircraft, rather CofAs are to be issued for all new ADF aircraft requiring an AMTC, and any ADF aircraft undergoing modification requiring an STC or amended AMTC. In the latter case, the CofA certifies conformance of the aircraft with the updated Type Design covered by the STC, as well as the remaining (unchanged) aspects of the aircraft against the overall Type Design, to the extent that the available data allows.

SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS

14. To provide for limited operations prior to issue of the AMTC/STC and SR, the ADF AA may issue a SFP. A SFP might cover developmental/ production/ operational test flights, ferry flights to a base where repairs or modifications are to be carried out, or ferry flights from a manufacturer. A SFP, in essence, is an interim AMTC/STC and limited SR in one, but is not likely to involve an AwB. If an AwB is to be involved in the issue of a SFP, ACPA-ADF will provide requirements to relevant agencies.

15. For ADF AA issue of a SFP, the PO is expected to have substantially met many of the requirements for issue of an AMTC/STC and SR. Therefore, the process for issue of a SFP is basically the same as the process for issue of an AMTC/STC and SR, except a number of activities may not be complete. Also, the scope of flying activities is likely to be rather limited under a SFP. Relevant DMO agencies, the TAR, OAA, DACPA, FEG and ADF AA will require convincing that any outstanding airworthiness matters (eg. not complete AMTC/STC and SR activities) will not adversely affect the airworthiness of the aircraft within the limits established for the scope of activities sought under the SFP.

16. The PO is to submit, at least 14 days before the SFP is required, the same packages as per Annexes A and B, plus the extra requirements of Annex C (to account for the differing risks of activities under the SFP). Depending on



3

the scope of design or role changes and SFP activities, the packages may be quite limited in content. The PO should liaise directly with ACPA-ADF for issue of the SFP.

Annexes:

A. Package in support of ADF AA issue of an AMTC/STC B. Package in support of ADF AA issue of a SR C. Package in support of ADF AA issue of an SFP



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14A–1

PACKAGE IN SUPPORT OF ADF AA ISSUE OF AN AMTC/STC 1. To provide for issue of an AMTC / STC, the ADF AA requires the DMO PO to provide various ‘attestations’ and evidence, as discussed below, in a ‘Package in Support of ADF AA issue of an AMTC / STC’, via ACPA-ADF to the AwB. The ADF AA also requires that the TAR and OAA oversee the PO activities and provide recommendations for AMTC / STC. The ADF AA expects that the same information presented to the TAR and OAA to provide for their recommendations will meet the majority of the requirements for this package.

2. The following is to be overseen by the TAR, but provided / managed by the DAR / PO in accordance with TAREG 2.2.2:

a. A relevant Design Acceptance certificate. The certificate must attest that the Type Design (TAREG 2.2.8) and the product / system meet the ADF SOR (all airworthiness and functional requirements) or provide an equivalent level of safety appropriate to the configuration, role and operating environment (as documented in the Statement of Operating Intent or similar). The Design Acceptance certificate is issued by the DAR, and must include compliance findings from operational and technical staff. The certificate should effectively be a minute covering the requirements of paragraphs 2b to 2d below.

b. A current version of the Design Acceptance strategy (TAREG 2.2.3).

c. A summary of achievements made against the Design Acceptance strategy, including:

(1) Reference to TAR endorsement of the ADF SOR, and notification of amendments to the SOR (which might be detailed within the certification basis description) that reduced the level of safety established by the airworthiness standards (TAREG 2.2.4). Requirements traceability from the specification to the product should be evident.

(2) An assessment of the acceptability of the Type Record (or definition of Type Design if interim product / system is to enter service (TAREG 2.2.9).

(3) Establishment and maintenance of design agency AEO certification, including a summary of compliance assurance outcomes.

(4) Outcomes of major steps in the design process, including design reviews, FCAs and PCAs.

(5) Design Approval certificate (TAREG 3.4.3).

(6) The airworthiness Certification Basis Description (CBD) which shows or references the test reports, calculations and other Type Design data necessary to show compliance with the ADF SOR (TAREG 2.2.11). An assessment of the suitability of the CBD to the ADF configuration, role and environment by the DAR is also required. A list of airworthiness requirements, where the PO is not confident the evidence shows the requirement has been met, and is likely to result in limitations or mitigations being required of operators or maintainers, should be separately included in the Design Acceptance certificate minute at paragraph 2a above.

(7) An assessment of the acceptability of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (eg. instructions to enable the product / system to be maintained in accordance with its CBD).

(8) A list of operating limitations resulting from the design that have been provided to OAA representatives for inclusion in operating instructions and procedures.

d. Copies of all Issue Papers and attestations by the DAR that they adequately cover all airworthiness matters and are being managed to resolution (TAREG 2.2.11).

3. The following is to be overseen by the OAA, but provided / managed by the PO / FEG:

a. The approved SOI or description of approved role, environment and usage. The scope of flying to be conducted must be clearly described, along with any operating limitations and procedures required for the product / system to be safely operated.

b. Attestation by the OAA that the elements of the CBD, where appropriately qualified and competent aircrew have made compliance findings against the ADF SOR, are acceptable. This should include a summary of the test and evaluation activities and an assessment of their acceptability to clearly define all limitations and procedures necessary for the product / system (and product / systems which are interfaced to) to be safely operated in the approved role and operating environment.

c. Attestation by the OAA that the aircrew operating instructions / documents clearly define all limitations and procedures necessary for the product / system to be safely operated. Detail of the formal validation



14A–2

activities conducted on the flight manuals should be provided. Clear definition of all operational airworthiness regulation waivers sought / granted is also required.

d. An assessment of the acceptability (safety and suitability) of the product / system’s operating characteristics (eg human factors) for the role and operating environment. This should include a summary of how any incidents or accidents that occurred during the acquisition phase have been addressed.

e. Issue Papers are being managed to resolve outstanding airworthiness matters.



14B–1

PACKAGE IN SUPPORT OF ADF AA ISSUE OF A SR 1. To provide for issue of a SR the ADF AA requires the DMO PO to provide various ‘attestations’ and evidence in a ‘Package in Support of ADF AA Issue of an SR’, via ACPA-ADF to the AwB. The ADF AA also requires that the TAR, OAA, FEG and relevant DMO agencies oversee the PO activities and provide recommendations for SR. The ADF AA expects that the same information presented to the TAR, OAA, FEG and relevant DMO agencies to provide for their recommendations will meet the majority of the requirements for this package.

2. Attestation from the TAR (TAREG 2.4), based on the evidence from the PO, that:

a. an AMTC or STC has been or will be issued;

b. a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the aircraft following SR;

c. an AEO is in place including an appropriate Design Support Network (TAREG 3);

d. an AMO is in place including an appropriate Maintenance Support Network (TAREGs 4 and 5);

e. appropriate ASI and ESI management systems are in place (TAREGs 2.2.3, 3.5.4, and 3.5.5); and

f. there is a process that provides assurance that all same or similar products/systems meet the Type Design (TAREG 2.6.3 issue of C of As).

3. Attestation from the OAA (refer AAP 7001.048) based on the evidence from the PO, that:

a. there exists an adequate operational airworthiness infrastructure to support operation of the product/system. This includes assessments of the acceptability of aircrew operating instructions and procedures including:

(1) aircrew manuals, standing instructions, checklists, aircrew/mission crew orders;

(2) approved training system or plan;

(3) categorisation and currency requirements; and

(4) flying supervision and authorisation process.

b. all operating instructions and procedures have been formally validated and represent a philosophy consistent with ADF aircrew training;

c. sufficient competent aircrew / mission crew are available and capable of safely conducting the proposed scope of operations;

d. safety (AVRM) analysis of scope of proposed operations has been completed and appropriate risk mitigations are in place; and

e. the TAR’s Recommendation has been reviewed and any operational implications have been addressed through documented limitations or special operating procedures.

4. Attestation from the OC SPO or Project Director (PD) that:

a. there is the capability to manage engineering activities; including sufficient competent staff and a training system, publication management etc;

b. there is an appropriate maintenance management system (eg. CAMM2, LSAR, TMP, Type Record, technical publications, servicing schedules, weight and balance procedures, configuration control procedures etc);

c. there are sufficient integrated logistics support elements in place, ie spares and consumables combined with arrangements for their continuing availability, sufficient competent staff and a training system (eg. established repair pipelines, contracts, and contractor software support); and

d. Stores clearances have been completed and are appropriately reflected in operating instructions/documents.



14B–2

5. Attestation from the FEG/AMO that:

a. maintenance activity can be adequately performed; ie there are sufficient competent staff, a training system and appropriate and useable instructions, including sufficient technical publications, TMPs and servicing schedules, weight and balance procedures, CAMM2, IPB.

b. There are sufficient support equipment, tools, test equipment and maintenance handling equipment to enable necessary maintenance to be carried out.



14C–1

PACKAGE IN SUPPORT OF ADF AA ISSUE OF AN SFP

1. A Special Flight Permit (SFP) might be sought for a limited scope of flying activities when the requirements for issue of an AMTC/STC and SR are not completely satisfied. To provide for issue of an SFP, the ADF AA expects all the elements for an AMTC/STC and SR to be satisfied sufficiently (some elements may be in the early stages of development) for the scope of flying activities to be conducted. The packages for AMTC/SR (annex A) and SR (annex B) should also be substantially complete and provided to the TAR, OAA and DACPA. These packages may be quite limited in content, depending on the scope of design or role changes and SFP activities. Further, the following are to be met and overseen by the TAR and OAA before recommendations are made to the ADF AA:

a. The PO is to draft the SFP in consultation with the OAA/TAR and DACPA. The SFP must state the scope of aircraft operations to be conducted along with any limitations and mitigations to account for airworthiness requirements not being complete (eg. CBD elements where data is not available to provide for a compliance finding).

b. The Type Design must be defined at the time of issue of the SFP.

c. The airworthiness control system (both technical and operational) for Test and Evaluation (T&E) through to total operations must be defined (ie. who is responsible to perform on-going airworthiness and safety of flight management; appointment of a test director).



14C–2

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1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 15

ASCENG’S, DOS’S AND GWEO’S ROLE IN DESIGN ACCEPTANCE AND SERVICE RELEASE OF AIRCRAFT/STORES CONFIGURATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. To maintain a degree of self-reliance and flexibility, the capability and capacity to adapt aircraft stores/weapons (hereafter referred to as stores) to meet Defence needs is vital. This requires an organic ADF capability to develop, upgrade and integrate stores to aircraft. An appropriate engineering management system and infrastructure, and personnel competent in aircraft/stores compatibility (A/SC) processes are also required. Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency (ASCENG), within Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG), provides this capability. ASCENG is a Centre of Expertise (COE) and the Director of ASCENG is an Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR). Project Offices (POs) or Systems Program Offices (SPOs) introducing new, or changes to in-service, aircraft delivered stores will need to use the services of ASCENG.

2. The classes of store ASCENG will be involved with includes:

a. Self-Defence and Range Enhancement. Such stores (flares and chaff, fuel and spray tanks, pods (refuelling, gun, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, stores suspension equipment) etc) normally require aircrew initiation of the function only; be it dispense flare or jettison fuel tank.

b. Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface ‘Accurate’ Systems. Such stores (rockets, bombs, mines, gun ammunition, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys etc) normally require aircrew sight or on-aircraft systems to aim.

c. Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface/Sub-surface ‘Precision’ Systems. Such stores (guided weapons, torpedoes, beyond visual range weapons etc) normally require real-time targeting information (from aircrew, aircraft systems, or ‘off-launch’ aircraft systems) via data links.

3. ASCENG services will need to be used when the following is planned:

a. any new, or any change to an, aircraft/stores configuration; and

b. variations to the approved carriage, employment or jettison envelopes defined for a specific aircraft/stores configuration.

4. ASCENG services may be summarised as providing assurance that the MIL-HDBK-1763 (Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engineering Data Requirements and Test Procedures), or equivalent, methodology, applicable tests and standards, and data delivery requirements have been complied with. In checking compliance with MIL-HDBK-1763, ASCENG will determine the extent of compatibility between the aircraft and store, and examine, inter alia, the following (taken directly from MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C):

a. functional description;

b. fit and function;

c. structure and environment;

d. aeroelasticity;

e. captive carriage, flying qualities and performance;

f. employment and jettison;

g. mission planning, ballistics (and software validation and verification), safe escape (and safety templates) and munitions effectiveness; and

h. stores preparation (-32), aircraft/stores loading (-33), performance manual (-2), aircrew tactical manual (-34), and flight manual (-1) procedures.

5. The technical airworthiness processes for introduction into service of a new or modified store, whether part of a minor or major design change, are no different to those for introducing a new or modified aircraft. Accordingly, this manual (in particular Section 3, Chapter 12) provides DGTA’s expectations for Design Acceptance of new or modified stores by the applicable Design Acceptance Representative (DAR). In reading Chapter 12, ASCENG may be viewed as another element of DGTA-ADF, in that they prescribe standards (both airworthiness design requirements and functional and performance requirements) as elements of the overall Certification Basis (CB) and wider ADF



2

SOR, and make compliance findings. However, the terminology and standards associated with A/SC often causes confusion. Also, there are potentially a number of agencies involved which also adds confusion, such as:

a. the store OEM,

b. the integrator of the store to the aircraft,

c. the PO,

d. Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Branch (GWEO),

e. ASCENG,

f. the in-service SPO,

g. other SPOs (eg where a store may be carried on different platforms, some non-aircraft),

h. Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS), and

i. the operators.

PURPOSE

6. This chapter aims to explain the desired interaction required between the PO, the in-service SPO and ASCENG during the life of the project leading to Design Acceptance of the aircraft/stores configuration by the applicable DAR. Section 3, Chapter 12 of this manual should be used in conjunction with the additional guidance provided here. This chapter will assist in:

a. clarifying ASCENG’s role in the Design Acceptance and Service Release processes;

b. detailing data ASCENG requires to carry out its work; and

c. detailing ASCENG deliverables; and what ASCENG and DGTA-ADF expect recipients to do with these deliverables.

DEFINING THE CAPABILITY

7. ASCENG staff, collectively, have a great deal of experience. Hence, ASCENG can provide assistance in developing Operational Requirements Documents and trade-off studies that include new or modified stores. Further, early engagement of ASCENG will allow ASCENG to assess the design requirements and hence the activities Contractors and/or the ADF will likely need to perform. For example, the assessment may determine that sufficient data is available to support an ASCENG A/SC Clearance by similarity, analogy or prior acceptance. ASCENG will likely provide such an assessment to the PO, SPO or other originating agency in a document titled ‘A/SC Similarity Survey’. Such a documented assessment will help guide and tailor future A/SC activities, including test and evaluation requirements.

COMPILATION OF THE AIRCRAFT/STORES COMPATIBILITY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

8. Interaction between the PO, SPO and ASCENG should occur early in the project so the ADF SOR (eg specification and SOW) contains the appropriate A/SC design requirements and provides for the elicitation from contractors of sufficient evidence that the design requirements have been complied with. In essence, these design requirements may be seen as the A/SC Certification Basis (CB), which is a subset of the overall CB concept discussed at Section 3, Chapter 12. The involvement of NAAs (who may have previously ‘certified/accepted’ the A/SC configuration (or similar), or may be undertaking such activities on our behalf) will also determine the activities ADF agencies need to undertake to provide for Design Acceptance. A suggested method that could be used to solicit design data from Contractors before contract signature is at Annex A.

9. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator’s (TAR’s) preferred design requirements for A/SC to be specified within the ADF SOR are in AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2, Chapter 12 (and are based on MIL-HDBK-1763). However, the PO/SPO will need to liaise closely with ASCENG to tailor the standards for the specific store and aircraft configurations.

10. Draft ADF SOR requirements to solicit the required design activity and data from Contractors to enable ASCENG (or other National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs)) to make compliance findings against the ADF preferred design standards (or equivalent) are at Annex B. This collective set of data is known as an A/SC Engineering Data Package (CEDP – refer MIL-HDBK-1763 appendix C). However, for most design changes, ASCENG will undertake some testing and evaluation activities, and/or task ARDU, AMAFTU or another suitable agency to do so.



3

11. ASCENG will also need data concerning the aircraft and associated aircraft/stores suspension equipment, which should be provided by either the Contractor, for new aircraft, or the in-service SPO, for changes to an existing aircraft. The applicable data requirements are in MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C.

12. ASCENG will also need data concerning the store itself (eg physical characteristics), which should be provided by GWEO, for Explosive Ordnance (EO), or other agencies for non-EO stores. These agencies should provide the PO or SPO with appropriate ADF SOR requirements for the particular store and make compliance findings against these requirements.

13. For stores containing EO, most of the applicable data requirements are in MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C. However, GWEO’s role is wider than meeting MIL-HDBK-1763 requirements. GWEO will effectively provide Design Approval of the technical integrity (ie safe and fit for service) of the store, via an ‘EO Design Certificate’, and satisfying A/SC needs is a subset of the overall GWEO activity. Hence, POs and SPOs will need to liaise directly with GWEO to obtain all their requirements for inclusion in the ADF SOR. Also, GWEO may need to use the Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS) to specify certain design requirements for the EO and to make compliance findings against these requirements. The compilation of DOS specified requirements and compliance findings will be based on OPSMAN 4 ‘Safety and Suitability for Service of Explosive Ordnance (S3)’. In such circumstances, DGTA views DOS as COE-like, and their compliance findings are a subset of those the GWEO CENGR will need for issue of the GWEO ‘EO Design Certificate’. However, the acquisition PO or SPO should only need to liaise with GWEO, with GWEO managing activities between itself and DOS.

14. The CEDP will be maintained by ASCENG, and the in-service SPO should include the CEDP as part of their design data. The need for POs, SPOs, ASCENG (and other NAAs) and GWEO to work together to define the Contractor activities and those to be conducted within the Commonwealth (or other NAA) is paramount.

15. To make some compliance findings, ASCENG will need to liaise with and manage suitable operational authorities, as some design requirements (whether airworthiness or functional and performance) will require operators to determine compliance (ie as recorded in the Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS)). This concept is no different from an aircraft procurement where suitable operators are the most competent to make compliance findings, and the Project Engineering Manager (or DAR) manages the compliance finding activity.

16. On completion of the ASCENG managed compliance finding activity, ASCENG will provide an A/SC Clearance to the applicable DAR. In essence this is an attestation that all the prescribed requirements (eg MIL-HDBK-1763 methodology and associated standards, tests and data requirements) have been met, or limitations are in place to provide for an airworthy, and performance wise suitable, product. The A/SC Clearance defines the extent of A/SC such that the:

a. aircraft/store can be prepared, handled, loaded and unloaded by qualified personnel;

b. identified aircraft/stores configurations are suitable for relevant ground operations and for carriage within specified flight operating envelopes;

c. identified aircraft/stores configurations can, if applicable, be employed and jettisoned safely and reliably within specified flight operating envelopes; and

d. minimum safe release heights and safety templates for all stores are established for necessary delivery profiles and jettison envelopes.

17. The GWEO managed compliance finding activity will likely occur in two parts. Firstly, GWEO will provide data and various compliance findings to ASCENG to enable ASCENG to do their job. The results of ASCENG’s activities will later be provided to GWEO, who will then make further compliance findings (some based on recommendations from ASCENG’s analyses and tests). GWEO will then provide an ‘EO Design Certificate’, to both ASCENG and the applicable DAR. This attests to the technical integrity of the store. GWEO will also ensure appropriate store preparation, maintenance, storage and transportation procedures are promulgated.

18. The TAR expects the DAR to treat both the ASCENG output and GWEO output as ‘Design Approved’ products. When coupled with any ‘Design Approved’ products relating to aircraft design changes, the DAR’s Design Acceptance Certification for the overall configuration should be straightforward.

WHAT IS AN AIRCRAFT/STORES CAPABILITY CERTIFICATE (ASCCERT)?

19. The Aircraft Stores Capability Certificate (ASCCERT) concept has been used for some time and quite widely. However, its relationship to Design Acceptance, Type Certification and Service Release has not been stated. Accordingly, this section attempts to describe the ASCCERT concept in current terminology.

20. An ASCCERT is a concept that suggests Design Acceptance and Service Release (SR) processes are complete, but it is not an ASCENG managed process or document. For changes requiring oversight by the ADF AA via the AwB, as determined by DACPA, the ASCCERT concept suggests both STC (effectively design acceptance but



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with extra oversight from the TAR and OAA) and SR processes are complete. The concept appears to have developed as the processes for Design Acceptance (and STC in some cases) and SR were not well defined for introduction of new or modified stores. However, this manual now provides clear guidance on the processes to be followed (for issuing of STCs / SRs in particular refer Section 3, Chapter 14), and this guidance is relevant for new or modified stores. Accordingly, the ASCCERT concept is no longer required, as Design Acceptance and Service Release are as germane to aircraft/stores configurations as they are to any other aircraft orientated design change. The SFP concept is also germane to stores in circumstances such as for OT&E.

21. Design Acceptance (and in some cases STC) and Service Release comprise attestations from various authorities, and the PO or SPO would normally manage the provision of these attestations, but should contain the elements described in the following paragraphs.

DESIGN ACCEPTANCE (OR STC) ELEMENT

22. Finalisation of the activities in the following two paragraphs effectively provide for Design Acceptance (or STC), these paragraphs should be read in conjunction with the flow chart in Annex C. (Note: POs and SPOs should liaise with DACPA to determine whether the ADF AA requires additional review of the introduction of the store via the AwB (eg STC)).

23. The in-service DAR will make a Design Acceptance Certification (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex A to this manual). This will be based mainly on the:

a. ASCENG provided A/SC Clearance (effectively Design Approval of the technical integrity of the A/SC);

b. GWEO provided ‘EO Design Certificate’ (effectively Design Approval of the technical integrity of the store; which in turn might include a DOS S3 assessment), or for non-EO stores, suitable attestation from the applicable agency (which in turn will be based on Design Approval from the relevant OEM or prime Contractor); and

c. SPO or Contractor Design Approval of aircraft design changes.

24. The OAA or delegate will oversee/attest to the suitability of the SOI, operating limitations, compliance findings against the ADF SOR made by operators, operating instructions, and the system’s operating characteristics (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex A to this manual).

SERVICE RELEASE ELEMENT

25. Finalisation of the activities in the following six paragraphs effectively provide for a SR. (Note: POs and SPOs should liaise with DACPA to determine whether the ADF AA requires additional review of the introduction of the store via the AwB (eg SR)).

26. The TAR, or delegate, will attest, inter alia, that Design Acceptance Certification has been completed, and a suitable DAR, AEO and AMO is in place (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex B, paragraph 2 to this manual).

27. The OAA, or delegate, will attest, inter alia, that an adequate operational airworthiness infrastructure to support the system is in place, operating instructions and procedures have been appropriately validated, sufficient competent aircrew/mission crew are available to safely conduct operations, a safety (AVRM) analysis has been completed, and the TAR’s, or TAR’s delegate’s, recommendations have been reviewed (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex B, paragraph 3 to this manual).

28. The aircraft OC SPO, or Project Director, will attest that aircraft and associated equipment engineering, maintenance and logistics support systems are in place (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex B, paragraph 4 to this manual).

29. For EO stores, GWEO will attest that store engineering, maintenance and logistics support systems are in place, and that maintenance activity can be adequately performed.

30. The aircraft FEG/AMO will attest that aircraft and associated equipment maintenance activity can be adequately performed and sufficient support equipment to enable maintenance to be carried out exists (refer Section 3, Chapter 14, Annex B, paragraph 5 to this manual).

Annexes:

A. Contractor Provision of Aircraft/Stores Compatibility Plan B. Draft ADF SOR Requirements C. Flow Chart to illustrate Design Acceptance and Service Release processes for stores configuration changes to

ADF Aircraft



15A–1

CONTRACTOR PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT/STORES COMPATIBILITY PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. For the ADF to accept into service a new aircraft/store configuration, it requires a satisfactory Aircraft/Stores Compatibility Engineering Data Package (CEDP), equivalent to MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C. The CEDP establishes, inter-alia, the extent of aircraft/stores compatibility (A/SC) by assessing compliance with the ADF’s preferred standard, MIL-HDBK-1763 (tailored as per AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual Section 2, Chapter 12).

2. The A/SC Plan is the medium for the Tenderer to propose how they intend to achieve an acceptable CEDP during the contract. As such, the A/SC Plan will provide an outline of:

a. the relevance of aircraft and stores data already produced by, and available to, the contractor, and the additional data that will need to be produced during the contract; and

b. the relevance of ground and flight testing already completed by the contractor or other agency, and additional testing that will need to be conducted during the contract.

3. For each of these items, the Tenderer will also describe the responsibilities of relevant agencies, resource requirements and an approximate schedule.

CONTENT REQUIREMENTS

4. The Tenderer is to provide a compliance assessment against each requirement of MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C (tailored as per AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2, Chapter 12).

Note to Tenderers: A suggested format for presenting this compliance assessment is included at Appendix 1 to this DID. The Contractor may use an alternate format, provided the same scope of information is presented.

5. For each element of MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C, the following information is to be included:

a. A brief summary of relevant data and testing already completed by the Tenderer and an outline of the data and testing that will need to be completed during the contract.

b. A description of the compliance finding activities (eg types of inspection, analysis, test, similarity) proposed to be conducted to demonstrate compliance with each element.

c. The agency proposed to perform these compliance finding activities.

d. The agency that will oversee the compliance finding activity (eg French Military DGA or US DoD).

e. A/SC activities integrated into the Master T&E Schedule.

f. Description of Ground Support Equipment and other Test Equipment needed.

6. Where alternate standards to those prescribed in MIL-HDBK-1763 Appendix C are proposed, the Contractor is to provide the following information:

a. The title of the parent design standard from which the requirement or group of requirements has been drawn (eg ASCC standard, MIL-STD-xxx, company standard, commercial standard).

b. The reference details (eg volume, section, chapter, paragraph number) of the requirement or group of requirements within that design standard.

c. The revision status of the standards to which the tendered configuration is to be certified.

7. Where ‘Prior Certification’ (also known as prior acceptance) is proposed for a particular element of the proposed aircraft / store configuration (based on prior certifications by an airworthiness authority (eg French Military DGA or US DoD)), the Tenderer must provide the following information:

a. identifying details of the previously certified configuration;

b. identifying details of the prior certifying authority;

c. comprehensive details of the basis of prior certification;



15A–2

NOTE

• The level of detail expected includes the standards the design has been shown to comply with, and any deviations, and what data will be provided to the ADF.

d. a summary of the design changes that distinguish the tendered configuration from the previously certified configuration; and

NOTE

• It is expected that new design assurance activity will be required to certify any design changes listed by the Tenderer in response to this sub-paragraph.

e. analysis that demonstrates the extent to which the existing configuration is relevant to the tendered configuration, and the ADF’s intended roles and operating environment.

NOTE

• Additional design assurance activity is likely to be required if a prior certification is not valid for all of the ADF’s intended roles and operating environments.

Appendix:

1. Example of an A/Stores Compatibility plan presentation template.



15A1–1

EXAMPLE OF AN A/STORES COMPATABILITY PLAN PRESENTATION TEMPLATE

Table 15–A1–1 Example A/SC Plan Presentation Template

Note to Tenderer: The example below covers Part 2 only. Similar entries would be required for remaining Parts. MIL-HDBK-1763App C

Item Description Tenderer’s Statement of Compliance Compliance

Method* Agency

Performing Activity

Agency Overseeing

Activity

Comments

Part 2 Fit and Function C.I.I.1 Physical Description

C.II.1.1 Aircraft Data C.II.1.2 Store data C.II.1.2a Geometric Data C.11.1.2b Materials C.II.1.2c Surface finish and markings C.II.1.2d Radar cross section data C.II.1.2e Illustrations C.II.1.2f Arming wire/lanyard routings C.II.1.2g Wiring diagrams

C.II.2 Mass properties C.II.2.1 Aircraft data C.II.2.2 Store data C.II.3 Interface control data C.II.3a Interface information C.II.3b Store management system C.II.3c Fit and function issues

(etc) * Explanation for this column is included on following page.



15A1–2

NOTES ON COMPLIANCE METHOD

Compliance Method

1. In this column, the Tenderer proposes the likely approach to demonstrating compliance, selected from Inspection (I), Analysis (A), Test (T) or Similarity (S), as follows:

(I) Compliance verification by inspection involves visually determining if a specification requirement is satisfied (eg appropriate location or size of emergency exits). This may include inspection of the user’s manual to ensure operating requirements and limitations are adequately specified.

(A) Compliance verification by analysis involves modelling the aircraft design and deducing from that model whether a specification requirement is satisfied.

(T) Compliance verification by test involves operating the aircraft or system in the specified environment, collecting data relevant to a specified feature/function and analysing the data to determine if a specification requirement is satisfied. This may include specific ground or flight tests to assure correct operation and performance to a standard; testing to demonstrate safety where analysis is not acceptable to the airworthiness agency; or review of test results from the Contractor T&E program, other customer’s T&E programs (or in-service experience), or the inclusion of specific test points in the Contractor T&E or ADF T&E program.

(S) Demonstration of compliance by similarity (prior certification) involves the assessment and acceptance of a design feature as fit for purpose based on verification activities conducted on a similar or identical feature, and previous acceptable performance. The Commonwealth may accept similarity as a suitable method of demonstrating compliance with a particular requirement if the certification basis of the earlier variant, together with previous acceptable performance, are shown to provide an acceptable level of safety. Service experience accrued on previously accepted design features may be deemed ‘applicable’ if the corresponding features in the proposed variant are determined to be sufficiently similar, both in design and usage, to the previously accepted components.

2. Annotations of Test or Similarity are of particular interest to the Commonwealth. The former provides the Commonwealth with assurance that adequate testing is proposed, and provides some insight into the likely size of the test program. The latter is particularly important since the Commonwealth must be assured that any claims for prior certification are justified.



15B–1

DRAFT ADF SOR REQUIREMENTS

1. Note for Drafter - Ensuring Compliance to Aircraft / Stores Compatibility Design Standards and Data Requirements. For aircraft / store configurations, the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) prefers AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2 Chapter 12 design standards and data requirements (which are based on MIL-HDBK-1763) are complied with. However, depending on the acquisition strategy, the design activities and data may be provided from different agencies. For example, a new aircraft with a new store may require the prime Contractor to conduct all activities and provide all data. However, for a new store, or major change to an in-service store, for an in-service aircraft, the store OEM, the platform integrator (ie integrator of store to aircraft), GWEO, ASCENG, in-service SPO, PO and operators may all need to conduct elements of the design activity and provide elements of the data required to provide for the A/SC Clearance. Hence, it is paramount the PO/SPO, ASCENG and GWEO liaise early to establish which agency is best placed to conduct design activities and provide data.

2. For Insertion in ADF SOR. The contractor must comply with the MIL-HDBK-1763 methodology, applicable tests and standards, and data delivery requirements tailored as per AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2 Chapter 12.

Note to Tenderer: Compliance with requirements may be demonstrated by provision of details from prior testing by, and compliance evidence from, recognised agencies.



15B–2

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15C–1

FLOW CHART TO ILLUSTRATE DESIGN ACCEPTANCE AND SERVICE RELEASE PROCESSES FOR STORES CONFIGURATION CHANGES TO ADF AIRCRAFT

Contractor (eg BAE for LIF)/NAA and/or ADF agencies provide the following ‘design approvals’:

• Aircraft design changes from Contractor/Aircraft SPO/Project Office (23.c)

• An EODC from Contractor/GWEO for EO (23.b) (may include a S3 from DOS)

• An SDC from Contractor/GWEO or other suitable organisation for Non-EO(23.a)

• A/SC Clearance from Contractor/ASCENG

If a contractor performs ‘design approval’ processes, the Commonwealth (eg ASCENG) conducts compliance findings against contractor deliverable’s to support the DAR in performing Design Acceptance.

• Design Acceptance from the Aircraft DAR (23)

Design Acceptance Processes

Design Approval Processes

Contractor (eg Eurocopter for Tiger) and/or ADF agency deliverable’s can include:

• Designs

• Data (eg CEDP (MIL HDBK-1763))

• Certificates up to, and including, the equivalent of the following step

Design Processes Service Release Processes

Certification from:

• FEG (Eg. WGCDR SOCD) (30)

• Wing (Eg.WGCDR OPS) (30)

• OC SPO (Eg.CO SPO) (28)

• GWEO (29)

• OAA (Eg.FEG CDR) (27)

Certification from:

• FEG (Eg. WGCDR SOCD) (30)

• Wing (Eg.OC WG) (30)

• OC SPO (28)

• GWEO (29)

• OAA (Eg.FEG CDR) (27)

• TAR (26)

MINOR DESIGN MAJOR DESIGN

There will be some involvement from the SPO (for ILS) & OAA/FEG (for operations & maintenance) and an attestation that will feed into Service Release Processes

Received in the form of recommendations

At ADF AA discretion this may result in an STC requiring AwB involvement



15C–2

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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 16

GUIDANCE FOR TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT


TAREG 2.7 Civil Leased Aircraft

INTRODUCTION

1. In 1998 CAF directed (refer CAF 1158/1998) that future operations using civil-owned aircraft, operated by RAAF pilots, to perform ADF tasks were to be conducted under ADF airworthiness regulations, and that the aircraft were to be brought onto the State register. Exceptions to this ruling were to be agreed to by CAF. CAF, as the ADF Airworthiness Authority, advised CN and CA that Army and Navy operations using Australian registered aircraft would be accountable to CASA, and not the ADF Airworthiness Authority (refer CAF 1161/1998). Subsequently, the Department of Transport and Regional Services has proposed an amendment to the Civil Aviation Act 1988 to fully align with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requirements, which will change the definition of ‘State aircraft’. As a consequence of this proposed change, it is likely that in most instances of an ADF extended use of civil-owned aircraft, the aircraft will be required to be transferred to the State register for the term of the lease.

2. Under normal circumstances, aircraft listed on the State register should be managed in accordance with all the components of TAREGs 1 to 5. TAREG 2.7 has been specifically introduced to cater for those circumstances where alternative management practices, more directly in line with civil aviation regulatory requirements, may be more cost-effective. Maximum use of existing civil regulatory systems, documentation, certificates and approvals should minimise the effort required to transfer aircraft from a civil register to the State register, and return to a civil register at the end of the lease period.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on TAREG 2.7, which defines the TAR’s requirements for the provision, acceptance, inspection, maintenance and design of leased aircraft, including used aircraft, that are to be listed on the State register, yet managed in accordance with civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals.

SCOPE

4. The scope of this chapter is the provision of guidance material that will assist organisations determine the requirements for the provision, acceptance, Type Certification, and implementation of technical airworthiness management systems for civil leased aircraft. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, TAREG 2.7 takes precedence.

BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

5. For the TAR, the easiest method for undertaking technical airworthiness management for civil leased aircraft is to treat them like any other State aircraft, and apply the requirements of TAREGs 1 to 5 in full. However, this approach is sometimes not practical under leasing arrangements, particularly when the aircraft involved must be returned to a civil register at the end of the lease period. Recognising the competence of National Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs) from a number of recognised countries (as specified in TAREG 2.2.7), the TAR may allow civil leased aircraft to be managed under the technical regulatory system of civil aviation authorities. However, as a State aircraft the ADF retains the role of the airworthiness authority during the lease period, and hence must regulate to ensure safe operation whilst in ADF service.

6. Whilst the TAR recognises the competence of a number of NAAs, the ADF has a duty of care to exercise due caution when accepting an aircraft type onto the State register. This can be especially important in the instance of leasing used aircraft, as the technical acceptability of individual aircraft cannot be assumed. To ensure this duty of care is exercised, whilst attempting to minimise the resource overheads associated with ADF Type Certification and ongoing technical airworthiness management, the TAR has developed a flexible management system for civil leased aircraft which provides for full recognition of civil aviation technical regulatory systems. This system is defined by TAREG 2.7, in conjunction with this guidance chapter.



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7. The TAR regulatory system for civil leased aircraft is based on the following assumptions:

a. The aircraft will be operated and registered as State aircraft;

b. The aircraft will be operated by a Force Element Group with a nominated Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA);

c. A Senior Design Engineer (SDE) from a nominated Service Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) will act as the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) for the aircraft, noting that civil airworthiness regulatory systems often have different ‘acceptance’ processes;

d. The logistics management (including design activities) and maintenance (all levels except that performed by aircrew) will be contracted out;

e. All design, construction and maintenance activities will be carried out in accordance with appropriate civil airworthiness requirements;

f. The aircraft will transition back to a civil register at the expiration of the lease; and

g. The ADF operation of the aircraft will not compromise the certification basis specified within the civil type certificate.

NOTE

• While these assumptions underpin the TAR requirements, they are not TAR requirements. The ADF use of civil owned aircraft is normally driven by operational or other requirements. TAREG 2.7 was developed specifically to allow civil leased aircraft to be managed using the civil airworthiness technical regulatory system, as many leasing arrangements make the use of the full range of ADF Regulations prescribed in this publication difficult (but not impossible) to implement.

WHEN TAREG 2.7 MAY BE APPLIED

8. There are a number of circumstances whereby the ADF may use civil owned aircraft to conduct ADF tasks. TAREG 2.7 has been primarily developed to provide a technical regulatory system for civil owned aircraft that are to be State registered for the term of the lease period. TAREG 2.7 is not applicable to civil owned aircraft, operated by the ADF that retain civil registration. TAREG 2.7 is also not applicable to civil owned aircraft that are military aircraft, or are based upon a civil type that has been substantially modified to perform military roles. A brief description of the applicability of TAREG 2.7 to the various possible circumstances is provided in the following paragraphs. These examples are not exhaustive, and are provided for illustrative purposes only. In all cases the application of TAREG 2.7 to ADF aircraft types is at the TAR’s discretion.

Civil Owned and Civil Registered

9. Civil owned civil registered aircraft that may be classified as State aircraft for limited periods or the purposes of individual tasks are subject to the technical regulatory system of the NAA under which the aircraft is registered, and hence are not subject to TAREG 2.7 or any other regulation within this publication. There may be instances where the ADF will utilise a short-term lease of a civil registered aircraft to fulfil special (eg cargo) or specific (eg transport for deployed units) tasks. There may also be instances in which ADF personnel are required to perform specific tasks while flying in civil registered aircraft (eg AME, SAR, and UN operations). In these instances the TAR recommends that an aircraft holding a current and valid Certificate of Airworthiness from a recognised NAA (refer to TAREG 2.2.7.c) be utilised. If a civil registered aircraft does not hold a current and valid Certificate of Airworthiness from a recognised NAA, the TAR recommends that a limited inspection in accordance with Annex B be undertaken.

Civil Owned Military Types

10. It is conceivable that the ADF may lease military or ex-military type aircraft from a civil owner (non-Government) to be placed on the State register. A military or ex-military type is defined as an aircraft that was originally designed against military specifications, rather than civil airworthiness standards, to fulfil primarily a military role. Examples of this type might include a combat jet trainer, an attack helicopter, or a military airlifter. In these instances the use of TAREG 2.7 is not appropriate, and the aircraft would be processed for issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), Service Release, and ongoing engineering and maintenance support in accordance with the full requirements of TAREGs 1 to 5 inclusive.



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Civil Owned Civil Certified Types Adapted for Military Roles

11. The ADF may lease aircraft from a civil owner to be placed on the State register, that have been subject to civil certification requirements, with additional adaptation for military roles. The aircraft may be returned to a civil register at the end of the lease period. The additional adaptations may or may not have received supplementary type certification from an NAA. Examples of this type of aircraft may include:

a. Utility category aircraft originally certified under FAR 23 (or equivalent), with modified fit-out for use by the ADF in a navigational training role.

b. Transport category aircraft originally certified under FAR 25 (or equivalent), with additional modifications for use by the ADF in an air-to-air refuelling role.

12. The key point to note here is that the intended role and modifications required for ADF use may be outside the basis for which the aircraft were originally certified by civil airworthiness authorities. Regardless of whether the modifications have received supplemental type certification from an NAA, the ADF as an airworthiness authority has a duty of care to ensure that the modifications are suitable and safe for the intended ADF role, and that differences between expected ADF usage and the original civil certification basis have been adequately addressed. For example, the ADF Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) may specify flight profiles (for example extended operations at low altitude), that were not envisaged by the manufacturer or NAA when the aircraft was originally certified. As it is not possible to specify all of the potential variations, it is the TAR who will make a determination on the applicability or otherwise of TAREG 2.7. The TAR will make a determination on the applicability of TAREG 2.7, based upon:

a. the extent of adaptation for military roles;

b. the differences between intended ADF usage (including flight profiles and operating spectrum) and the use assumed within the original civil certification basis; and

c. the degree of ADF involvement in ongoing maintenance and engineering support, versus support from NAA accredited commercial organisations.

Civil Owned Civil Certified Types Utilised by ADF for Civil Equivalent Roles

13. The ADF may lease aircraft from a civil owner to be placed on the State register, that are largely unmodified, and utilised by the ADF in a role very similar to a civil equivalent (including the intended operating spectrum). The leasing arrangements may include engineering and maintenance support from an NAA accredited commercial organisation. The aircraft may be returned to a civil register at the end of the lease period. Note that minor changes to avionics fit-out or cabin layout, which are based upon civil available options, are not considered a substantial departure from the original civil certification basis. Examples of this type of aircraft may include:

a. transport category aircraft originally certified under FAR 25 (or equivalent) to be used by the ADF in a VIP transport role;

b. utility category aircraft originally certified under FAR 23 (or equivalent) to be used by the ADF in a light transport role; and

c. utility category helicopter originally certified under FAR 27 (or equivalent) to be used by the ADF in an initial aircrew training role.

14. The role and environment in which the ADF intends to use these aircraft is closely aligned with that under which the aircraft were originally certified by civil airworthiness authorities. Accordingly, the type certification activity undertaken by the NAA of a recognised country can be accepted by the ADF as suitable. The TAR may agree that the ADF can therefore recognise this prior relevant certification activity, the accreditation of maintenance and engineering support organisations, and the aircraft can be subsequently managed under TAREG 2.7.

Commonwealth Owned

15. For ADF owned State registered aircraft, placing the aircraft on a civil register at the end of ADF service life is not a priority consideration. Therefore, all ADF owned aircraft, regardless of the original certification basis of the type, are to be managed with the full application of TAREGs 1 to 5 inclusive. These regulations contain sufficient flexibility to recognise prior certification activity, where relevant to the ADF.

Obtaining a TAR Authorisation

16. In all cases it is the TAR who will make the determination on the applicability or otherwise of TAREG 2.7 to a particular aircraft type. As not all leased aircraft will necessarily be eligible for management under TAREG 2.7, it is suggested that a TAR determination be sought prior to entering into contractual arrangements. Agreement for the application of TAREG 2.7 is obtained by the DAR (or Project/Logistics Manager in the absence of a DAR) defining



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the technical airworthiness management concept proposed, and seeking the TAR’s authorisation. The information that the TAR will require in order to make a determination on the applicability of TAREG 2.7 is to include:

a. a brief description on the operating role and environment of the type in ADF use;

b. a brief description of the leasing arrangements proposed, including length of lease and any special conditions the Commonwealth will be required to meet in operating the aircraft;

c. a description of the aircraft type (or types) proposed to be leased, and the airworthiness standards and codes used by the NAA to certify the aircraft type (eg FAR 23);

d. a description of any modifications that will be made to the aircraft type in order to meet ADF requirements;

e. an outline of the logistics support concept to be used to support the aircraft in service, including division of work between Service and commercial organisations;

f. details of the commercial organisations proposed for provision of engineering and maintenance support (if known), including the relevant NAA approvals held;

g. nomination of the ADF AEO that will host the DAR, and perform sponsor AEO functions; and

h. any other supporting information to justify the recognition and use of civil airworthiness systems, certificates and approvals in lieu of the standard ADF technical airworthiness regulatory requirements.

17. TAREG 2.7.3.c(5) requires that the DAR submit evidence to the TAR that ‘appropriate systems are in place to undertake technical airworthiness management for the term of the lease’. Due to the potential range of civil leased aircraft arrangements and support options, it is not possible to be more prescriptive in the regulation. In order to obtain a TAR authorisation, the DAR need simply convince the TAR that the requirements of this guidance chapter have been met, in particular those aspects covered under the heading of ‘Continuing technical airworthiness management requirements’ starting at paragraph 34.

ADF TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

18. Civil leased aircraft can be managed using existing TAREGs 1 to 5. However, these regulations are written primarily to address the unique requirements of the ADF as an owner, an operator and a regulator. Therefore the following requirements are enshrined within the regulations:

a. An appropriate Design Acceptance system is in place for all designs and design changes.

b. Type Certification is undertaken by the ADF.

c. Management of the Type Design is undertaken by the ADF.

d. Configuration item management is the responsibility of the ADF.

e. Maintenance management is undertaken to ADF standards and requirements.

f. Authority is delegated to individuals and organisations based upon competence, compliance with ADF regulations, approved procedures and access to all required data.

g. Elements of the role of an airworthiness authority are often undertaken by the same organisation that manages the Type Design (eg the SPOs).

19. Some leasing arrangements require the civil owned aircraft to be maintained in a condition that will facilitate an easy return to a civil register at the end of the lease period. This requires that all design change and maintenance activity is conducted and documented to the requirements of the applicable NAA, and most often CASA. Meeting these requirements within TAREGs 1 to 5 is possible, however this requires numerous adaptations and exemptions against specific regulatory requirements. Accordingly, TAREG 2.7 and associated guidance has been developed to provide a system for the technical airworthiness management of civil leased aircraft, to allow for the recognition and implementation of civil aviation regulatory systems, certificates and approvals. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the requirements to achieve ADF Type Certification and Service Release under TAREG 2.7.

ADF Type Certification and Service Release

20. All aircraft that are to be listed on the State register must be issued with an AMTC. All State aircraft require a Special Flight Permit (SFP) or a Service Release prior to operation by the ADF. These fundamental requirements are fully applicable to leased aircraft, including those that the TAR has agreed will be subject to TAREG 2.7. The



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following paragraphs provide details on how to obtain a TAR recommendation for Type Certification, SFP and Service Release for civil leased aircraft.

21. Issue of a Type Certificate Recommendation. Although the method for achieving ADF Type Certification under TAREG 2.7 is similar to that required for any State aircraft, the full recognition of NAA certification activity streamlines the process. The majority of ADF compliance finding and certification activity will be focussed on those differences introduced for ADF use. This is to meet the ADF responsibility for assuring that the aircraft is safe for ADF use, in that the changes to Type Design and/or proposed utilisation have been adequately considered for impact on the original certification basis by a civil airworthiness authority. Further details on ADF Type Certification requirements under TAREG 2.7 are provided at Annex A.

22. Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate. Due to detail differences between civil aviation regulations and the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system, requirements for Design Acceptance certification for new aircraft or major changes to aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 are somewhat different to that for other State aircraft. Specific guidance on the requirements for the DAR to provide a Design Acceptance certificate is included within Annex A.

23. ADF Statement of Requirement (aircraft delivery and acceptance). The ADF Statement Of Requirement (SOR) for the delivery and Commonwealth acceptance of any civil leased aircraft should contain, as a minimum, the following requirements:

a. evidence that the Type Design holds a Type Certificate (or equivalent document) from a recognised NAA;

b. disclosure of any equivalent safety determinations or waivers that were provided by the NAA in the course of type certification;

c. the Commonwealth (or a nominated third party) to have access to facilities and records in order to undertake audit and surveillance of all organisations engaged in design, development and production activity;

d. provision of a simplified Type Record (refer Annex A);

e. nominate any specific military standard or requirement that is to be met in lieu of a civil airworthiness design standard;

f. development of an Aircraft Structural Integrity management system;

g. development of an Engine Structural Integrity management system;

h. continued supply to the ADF (or a nominated organisation) of instructions for continued airworthiness, service bulletins, instructions and manual amendments for the aircraft type (refer Annex A);

i. each aircraft to be issued with an NAA Certificate of Airworthiness or equivalent document prior to delivery to the Commonwealth (an NAA Export Certificate will be acceptable);

j. Commonwealth (or a nominated third party) access to undertake individual aircraft inspections prior to delivery (refer to Annex B); and

k. an NAA approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) to be provided.

24. ADF Statement of Requirements (maintenance and support). The ADF SOR for the maintenance and support of any civil leased aircraft should contain, as a minimum, the following requirements:

a. all organisations engaged in design activity to hold and continue to hold relevant NAA approvals, appropriate to the scope of work proposed;

b. the organisation with primary responsibility for engineering management support for the civil leased aircraft type to be authorised by the TAR as an AEO (refer Annex E);

c. all organisations engaged in maintenance activity to hold and continue to hold relevant NAA approvals, appropriate to the scope of work proposed;

d. the organisation with primary responsibility for maintenance management of the civil leased aircraft type to be authorised by the TAR as an Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) (refer Annex F);

e. nominate any ADF or military maintenance practices or standards to be employed in lieu of civil practices for the conduct of maintenance on the civil leased aircraft;

f. a contracted organisation to undertake Certificate of Registration holder functions on behalf of the Commonwealth (refer Annex C);



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g. the Commonwealth (or a nominated third party) to have access to facilities and records in order to undertake audit and surveillance of all organisations engaged in design, construction and maintenance activity; and

h. the commercial AEO in sub-paragraph b. and the commercial AMO in sub-paragraph d. to provide submissions and attend ADF annual Airworthiness Board reviews of the civil leased aircraft type.

25. Airworthiness Standards. Airworthiness standards for civil leased aircraft are to be approved and managed in accordance with TAREG 2.2.5. Any aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 will have been designed and certified to a civil airworthiness design standard (such as a FAR, JAR or equivalent), which are fully covered within AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). The airworthiness standard that the leased aircraft was designed and originally certified to must be appropriate for the intended ADF usage, as defined in the SOI. For civil leased aircraft the TAR will normally accept the civil airworthiness standard, unless the intended ADF usage will require a military alternative. In these instances, the TAR will specify the military specification or standard that is required to be met.

26. Statement of Operating Intent. The SOI should clearly identify any differences between ADF flight profiles and operating environment to that normally expected from the aircraft in civil equivalent use.

27. Type Record. The requirements for provision of a Type Record to adequately define the Type Design in TAREG 2.2.9. may not be achievable for civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7. Normal civil airworthiness regulatory requirements are somewhat different to the ADF requirements, and provision of the following will meet the intent of Type Record requirements:

a. a brief description of the aircraft and its major design features;

b. a copy of the applicable Type Certification Data Sheet;

c. flight manual documents approved by the NAA that issued the type certificate;

d. an index to OEM instructions for continued airworthiness, as approved by the NAA; and

e. a list of all current field service documents, service bulletins and NAA Airworthiness Directives applicable to the aircraft.

28. Special Flight Permit. TAR recommendations for an SFP are to be processed in accordance with TAREG 2.3. It should be noted, however, that there is often a substantial delay between an NAA issuing a Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate number, and actually providing the certificate. This is acceptable, providing the DAR can demonstrate that the NAA has approved the Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate.

29. Service Release. The intent of obtaining a TAR recommendation for Service Release for a civil leased aircraft is the same as for any other State aircraft. That is, the DAR must demonstrate that:

a. appropriate type certification activity has been undertaken,

b. Certificates of Airworthiness have or will be issued, and

c. arrangements are in place for ongoing maintenance and engineering support for the aircraft.

30. The only substantial difference is that for a civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7, the DAR will have to demonstrate that the arrangements in place for ongoing maintenance and engineering support meet the intent of ADF technical airworthiness management requirements. Further guidance is provided within Annex A.

Certificates of Airworthiness

31. Certificates of Airworthiness are issued for individual aircraft to certify compliance to their Type Design. Conceivably, an ADF Certificate of Airworthiness could be issued purely on the basis of an extant and valid Certificate of Airworthiness issued by the NAA of a recognised country or CASA. Based on past experience, however, the ADF must exercise a duty of care requirement before adding individual aircraft to the State register. This is particularly true for used aircraft, where records of usage, maintenance, modifications and repairs may not be to the standard normally required by the ADF. Accordingly, TAREG 2.7 requires that an aircraft inspection be undertaken prior to the issue of any ADF Certificate of Airworthiness. The level of inspection required is different for used aircraft versus new build aircraft.

32. Aircraft inspection requirements. The aircraft inspection is to be performed by a third party independent from the aircraft owner or primary maintenance venue, to confirm the condition of each individual aircraft is suitable for ADF use. The extent of the inspections required would be dependent upon whether the aircraft are new, or have substantial prior use. If the aircraft do not have current Certificates of Airworthiness, then the aircraft



7

inspection should confirm eligibility for issue of Certificates of Airworthiness by the NAA of a recognised country or CASA. Further details on aircraft inspection requirements are provided in Annex B.

33. Issue of an ADF Certificate of Airworthiness. Prior to the issue of an ADF Certificate of Airworthiness, the DAR must ensure that each aircraft has either been issued with a civil Certificate of Airworthiness, or is eligible for one to be issued. Further, used aircraft are to be closely inspected to ensure that individual aircraft are airworthy for ADF use. ADF Certificates of Airworthiness should only be issued if:

a. the aircraft has a current, or is eligible for issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness or equivalent document from the NAA of a recognised country or CASA; and

b. the aircraft inspection has confirmed that the aircraft is airworthy and suitable for ADF use.

CONTINUING TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS

34. The intent of continuing technical airworthiness management for civil leased aircraft is to recognise and make the maximum use of the civil technical regulatory system and organisations. However, due to some detail differences between the way the civil and ADF regulatory systems are established and managed, some specific requirements unique to civil leased aircraft must be defined. The range of options available under TAREG 2.7 is broad, and the following information is provided to describe the TAR’s requirements.

Design Acceptance

35. Civil airworthiness regulatory systems do not include the same concept of Design Acceptance as specified within the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system. Design changes are either ‘approved’ by the NAA itself, or in many instances ‘approved’ by individuals holding specific airworthiness delegations.

36. Changes normally requiring NAA approval. As the ADF is appointed the airworthiness authority for civil leased aircraft, the concept of Design Acceptance is maintained for those classes of design change which would otherwise be ‘approved’ by the NAA. These are generally major changes requiring a new Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate, or a change to a Type Certificate. There may be other changes, however, that require NAA approval. For these changes, the DAR must issue a Design Acceptance certificate, after following a process that meets the intent of TAREG 2.2.3. Issue of the Design Acceptance certificate is to be recognised by the contractor as equivalent to NAA approval.

37. Changes not requiring NAA approval. In most of the cases where an NAA delegated appointment may ‘approve’ a design change without reference to the NAA, the TAR will accept the same level of delegation. In these instances, Design Acceptance certification is not required. Therefore, providing that the commercial AEO holds the appropriate NAA delegations for ‘approval’, it is not required to seek a Design Acceptance certificate from the DAR nor ‘assume’ that one would have been provided (ie as per TAREG 2.5.9). Despite there being no Design Acceptance certificate, the principles of Design Acceptance are nevertheless upheld by:

a. NAA delegations held by the commercial AEO (eg CASA CAR 30, CASR Part 146) and its staff (eg CASA CAR 35, CASR Part 183); and

b. The maintenance controller functions and oversight performed by the DMR (see para 42 below).

38. There may be circumstances where the DAR requires Design Acceptance certification in addition to NAA delegated appointment ‘approval’, for operational or cost effectiveness reasons. These instances should be documented within the EMS. Examples may include changes to the MEL being restricted to ensure operational oversight by the ADF, and the incorporation of ‘optional’ design changes being restricted to ensure Commonwealth consideration of costs. Designs of this category should follow the same process as those normally requiring NAA approval as described at paragraph 35 above.

39. The following examples provide guidance on typical instances where a Design Acceptance certificate may be required from a DAR:

a. major changes to Type Design that will require a revised AMTC or an STC (TAR mandated);

b. minor changes to Type Design that involve non-mandatory design changes, and require a Commonwealth decision on implementation;

c. minor changes to Type Design that impact the aircrew interface or aircraft operating limitations, which require consideration and agreement from the OAA (or a nominated representative);

d. exemptions from those civil airworthiness technical requirements applicable to the civil leased aircraft (TAR mandated);



8

e. exemptions or variations to NAA Airworthiness Directives applicable to the civil leased aircraft (TAR mandated); and

f. approval to operate civil leased aircraft with an unserviceability not covered in the MEL (TAR mandated).

40. Management of Certificate of Registration holder functions. Civil airworthiness regulatory systems normally require the Certificate of Registration holder to be responsible for ensuring that aircraft are maintained in an airworthy condition. This responsibility includes ensuring that:

a. an approved system of maintenance is implemented,

b. only approved personnel undertake maintenance and design activity, and

c. all Airworthiness Directives are actioned as required.

41. Note that the Certificate of Registration holder may not actually operate or maintain the aircraft. For civil leased aircraft to be managed under TAREG 2.7, the ADF is both the ‘Certificate of Registration holder’, and the airworthiness authority. It will usually not be practical for the ADF to perform all of the individual functions of the Certificate of Registration holder, and the majority of these will be contracted out. Despite this, the ADF retains the ultimate responsibility for these functions. It is therefore important that:

a. Certificate of Registration holder functions to be performed by contractor(s) are clearly identified; and

b. an ADF appointment is nominated to ensure that Certificate of Registration holder duties with respect to design and maintenance activities (including actioning Airworthiness Directives) are carried out.

42. Identification of ADF Design and Maintenance Representative (DMR). Further, due to detail differences between the civil airworthiness systems and the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system, it would be advantageous to have an appointment nominated as the interface between the two systems. Importantly, ADF aircrew will require a technical representative to facilitate coordination and understanding between the commercial organisations (using civil regulatory systems) and operational staff (using ADF regulatory systems). While the DAR could perform this task, it is unlikely that the DAR would be able to provide effective oversight of day-to-day operations, this usually being provided by contract management and liaison staff. In order to ensure that suitable oversight and interface exists, the TAR requires that an appointment be nominated to perform these functions. This appointment is the Design and Maintenance Representative (DMR). The DMR may receive a specific delegation of Engineering Authority (EA) and/or Maintenance Authority (MA) from the TAR. Note that the TAR does not preclude the DAR from also being the DMR. Responsibilities of the DMR appointment and Certificate of Registration holder functions that may be performed by contractors are detailed at Annex C.

43. Changes to Type Design. For aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7, changes to the Type Design should only be developed in accordance with civil airworthiness regulations. Changes to the Type Design can thus only be developed by the holder of the original type certificate (generally the OEM) as issued by a recognised NAA, or by an NAA approved design organisation authorised by the TAR. TAR authorisation of design organisations under TAREG 2.7 is covered in subsequent paragraphs.

Aircraft Structural Integrity Management

44. DGTA is responsible for the management and oversight of Aircraft Structural Integrity for all State registered aircraft. For State owned aircraft, this function is performed by both ASI-DGTA and EHSI-DGTA in conjunction with the applicable weapons system management SPO, using a program outlined in an Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP). For aircraft subject to TAREG 2.7, DGTA-ADF staff will undertake the regulatory function only. Accordingly, the nominated CI manager (usually a commercial organisation) of aircraft types subject to TAREG 2.7, is to establish an appropriate ASI management system. The established system will be fully in accordance with the instructions for continued airworthiness as issued by the type certificate holder, and approved by CASA or the NAA of a recognised country, while being cognisant of the ADF SOI.

45. From an ASI perspective, the two situations in which aircraft are subject to TAREG 2.7 are:

a. civil owned civil certified types adapted for military roles (selected cases); and

b. civil owned civil certified types utilised by the ADF for civil equivalent roles.

46. In either case, a fundamental requirement of ASI management is to ensure that the certification basis is not compromised by in-service operations not forecast in the SOI. As this is not generally required of aircraft operating under civilian regulations, the following is to be included in the ASI management system:

a. a statement to the effect that the System of Maintenance for the structure accounts for the usage and environment described in the initial approved SOI; and



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b. the requirement to undertake an annual review of the:

(1) SOI (to ensure it adequately reflects the actual usage and environment); and

(2) System of Maintenance for the structure (to ensure that it accounts for the usage and environment described in the SOI).

47. There is no requirement for an explicit ASIMP for TAREG 2.7 aircraft, unless directed by the TAR. Generally, TAREG 2.7 aircraft will have extant civil maintenance systems that cover all certification and continuing airworthiness requirements. Therefore, if the TAR is satisfied with the current System of Maintenance, the only additional mandatory requirements are those described in the previous paragraph. Notwithstanding, the CI manager must provide an overview describing the manner in which ASI is to be managed. As an example, the CI manager may describe the ASI management system in the AEO submission, using Annex D as guidance.

48. An explicit ASIMP may on occasion be required for a TAREG 2.7 aircraft. Typically, this would be where the aircraft is civil owned, civil certified but adapted for military use. In this instance, the TAR may consider that a more thorough ASI management overview is warranted. Annex D provides a guide for the ASIMP that may be tailored to suit these circumstances. Care must be taken that, in approving the ASIMP as well as the contractor’s maintenance program, two systems of maintenance for ASI have not been approved simultaneously.

49. For TAREG 2.7 aircraft, the CI manager is responsible for ASI management, whether using an ASIMP or not. DGTA will therefore require a plan to manage the regulatory aspects. An Aircraft Structural Integrity Regulatory Plan (ASIRP) to be developed and approved within DGTA-ADF and should include the following:

a. a brief description of how ASI is managed by the CI manager;

b. detail on the DGTA-ADF audit and review requirements of the CI manager including:

(1) audit of ASI management processes,

(2) audit of the System of Maintenance, and

(3) review of the CI manager submission on applicability of the SOI and System of Maintenance against usage and environmental conditions.

Engine Structural Integrity Management

50. DGTA-ADF is responsible for the regulatory oversight of Engine Structural Integrity for all State aircraft. For the majority of State aircraft, this function is performed by ESI1 in conjunction with the applicable weapons system management SPO, using a program outlined in an Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP). For aircraft subject to TAREG 2.7, ESI1 will undertake the regulatory function only. Accordingly, the nominated CI manager (usually a commercial organisation) of aircraft types subject to TAREG 2.7, is to establish an appropriate Engine Structural Integrity management system. CASA AD/ENG/7 titled ‘Replacement of Life Limited Turbine Engine Components’ provides adequate requirements for continued engine structural integrity for civil leased aircraft. ESI1 requires that the CI manager outline how the requirements of CASA AD/ENG/7 (or equivalent) will be met. The specific areas that need to be addressed are:

a. clear identification of the specific OEM service document that details the life limits of the life limited components;

b. a description of the OEM approved method for recording the engine life usage for each life limited component, together with a reference to the applicable document (note that this should include details of the engine life usage parameters to be recorded, with OEM definitions of the applicable parameters);

c. details of how the CI manager will implement the OEM recording system; and

d. nomination of the individual(s) responsible within the organisation for ensuring that the requirements of CASA AD/ENG/7 are complied with.

51. The minimum DGTA-ADF requirement is that these issues are identified as part of the AEO submission. In some instances the proposed ADF utilisation may require a documented ESIMP to fully disclose and manage Engine Structural Integrity. Typically, this would be in those situations where the aircraft is civil owned and civil certified, but adapted for military use, or alternatively subject to substantially different operating profiles than normally expected in general civil use.

Other CI and Maintenance Management Issues

52. Operational interface. Although civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 will use, to the maximum extent possible, civil regulatory systems, procedures and approvals, it is important to remember that the aircraft are State aircraft. As such, they will be operated by ADF personnel within an ADF airworthiness context. Therefore any



10

design change or maintenance activity that may impact an aircrew interface or aircraft operations should be approved by the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) or a nominated representative. Accordingly, the Sponsor AEO must develop and implement sufficient processes to ensure that:

a. the OAA (or a nominated representative) can request a change to aircrew manuals, MEL, or aircraft configuration;

b. changes to the aircraft Type Design that affect aircraft limitations, operations or aircrew publications (regardless of how generated) are referred to the OAA (or a nominated representative) for approval; and

c. any configuration change (including temporary changes introduced by maintenance activity) that impact the aircrew interface or aircraft operating limitations are notified to the OAA (or nominated representative) immediately.

53. Maintenance management requirements. The maintenance program to be applied to aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 must be approved by the OEM, or a recognised NAA. In general, the TAR will require a maintenance program that is specific to the aircraft type, and includes consideration of aircraft utilisation. A generic maintenance schedule (eg CASA Class B aircraft), regardless of NAA approval, will not normally be acceptable. Organisations undertaking maintenance are to be authorised by the TAR, as described in subsequent paragraphs. Note that some commercial organisations have an NAA delegation to develop and approve systems of maintenance for civil aircraft (eg CASA CAR 42M).

54. Minimum Equipment List. Under the civil airworthiness regulatory system, each aircraft is provided with a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) which specifies what minor unserviceabilities are allowed for continued aircraft operation. For aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 an MEL (that has been approved by either the NAA that issued the original type certificate, or CASA) is to be utilised. In some instances the ADF may require adjustment of the MEL to include specific operational requirements (for example additional radio or navigational aids to be serviceable). The NAA or CASA approved MEL may be adjusted for ADF requirements, providing the changes are approved by an individual holding an appropriate NAA delegation (eg CASA CAR 37).

55. Access to Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI). Civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 will rely substantially on support from the OEM, the NAA that issued the original type certificate, and in many instances CASA. The DAR must ensure that the sponsor AEO has arrangements in place to receive all relevant service bulletins, NAA Airworthiness Directives, and other important alert information. While this access may be assumed to be through a commercial AEO, care should be exercised to ensure that all the required information is being received, registered and actioned.

NOTE

• An Australian based commercial organisation may rely totally on CASA for the provision of alert information (in the form of Airworthiness Directives). This arrangement will not be satisfactory if the aircraft type being leased by the ADF is not otherwise listed on the CASA Australian register. For this reason any AEO submission for a commercial organisation providing engineering management support should clearly identify sources, agreements and methods for tracking relevant Technical Information, refer Annex E.

Authorisation of Engineering (Design) and Maintenance Organisations

56. Aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7 are to be produced and supported to the maximum extent possible using civil aviation regulatory systems and approvals. For aircraft production, an organisation holding production approvals (eg FAR 21 subparts F and G) from the NAA that issued the aircraft Type Certificate will be sufficient. Since the ADF retains airworthiness authority and responsibility, however, all organisations involved in the engineering management and maintenance support of the aircraft once placed on the State register, must be authorised by the TAR. In most instances, the TAR authorisation will be in the form of AEO and AMO, based upon recognition of existing civil aviation regulatory system approvals. For those organisations providing ‘off-aircraft’ component engineering and maintenance support, AEO and AMO will not be mandatory, and the TAR will accept appropriate NAA approvals.

57. Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs). The Sponsor AEO is to be a ADF AEO, authorised in accordance with TAREG 3. Commercial organisations will be issued an EAC from the TAR based upon current civil technical regulatory approvals (eg CASA CAR 30, CASR Part 146), which must be relevant to both the aircraft type and scope of work to be undertaken. Further information on AEO submission requirements for commercial organisations is provided at Annex E.

58. Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs). Commercial organisations will be issued an MAC from the TAR based upon current civil technical regulatory approvals (eg CASA CAR 30, CASR Part 145), which



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must be relevant to both the aircraft type and scope of work to be undertaken. This includes both an approved system of maintenance, together with specific aircraft type approvals. Further information on AMO submission requirements for commercial organisations is provided at Annex F.

59. Independent audit of AEOs and AMOs. Wherever possible it is expected that the civil airworthiness authority that issued the approvals will undertake ongoing surveillance of commercial organisations. If this is not possible, or the civil airworthiness authority audits do not cover the activities related to the civil leased aircraft, then the Sponsor AEO is to implement a compliance assurance program to address any shortfall. It is unlikely that either the Sponsor AEO or DGTA-ADF staff will have the required expertise to effectively audit civil airworthiness authority approved systems. The Commonwealth may therefore engage an independent support contractor to assist with the compliance assurance program. The program is to ensure that the AEOs and/or AMOs continue to comply with civil aviation system regulatory requirements, and that these systems are in fact being applied to the ADF leased aircraft. DGTA-ADF staff may participate in independent audits as specialist advisers, or in an observer capacity.

ADF Annual Airworthiness Board Reviews

60. Civil leased aircraft will be subject to annual reviews by the Airworthiness Board, on behalf of the ADF Airworthiness Authority. The Airworthiness Board will review the adequacy of the operational and technical airworthiness management systems, in order to make a recommendation to the ADF Airworthiness Authority regarding existing AMTCs, STCs and Service Release. As civil leased aircraft types will be largely supported by commercial organisations, it will be the responsibility of these organisations to provide submissions and to attend the annual Airworthiness Board reviews. Full details on the conduct and submission requirements for Airworthiness Boards are provided in AAP 7001.048(AM1)—ADF Airworthiness Manual.

Annexes:

A. ADF Type Certification Requirements for Civil Leased Aircraft B. Aircraft Inspection Requirements for Civil Leased Aircraft C. Certificate of Registration Holder Functions and Responsibilities of the ADF Design and Maintenance

Representative (DMR) D. ASIMP Structure for Civil Leased Aircraft E. AEO Requirements for Recognition of NAA Approvals F. AMO Requirements for Recognition of NAA Approvals



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16A–1

ADF TYPE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

TAR Recommendation for AMTC

1. Aircraft that are nominated by the TAR for technical airworthiness management under TAREG 2.7 will all have achieved some form of prior civil type certification. The degree of further ADF Type Certification activity is based upon the:

a. review of the Type Design offered, and its existing civil type certification status;

b. degree of modification from the civil baseline Type Design for ADF service; and

c. review of the SOI, to determine the role, environment and flight spectra likely to be encountered in ADF service.

2. If it can be demonstrated that the proposed ADF configuration and intended usage of an aircraft is essentially the same as the certification basis under which the Type Design originally achieved civil type certification by the NAA of a recognised country, then full acceptance of the civil type certificate is warranted. This allows for the rapid transfer of certain civil owned aircraft onto the State register, thus allowing for greater ADF airworthiness authority oversight of activities for civil owned aircraft subject to ADF use under a lease arrangement, while minimising the ADF Type Certification overhead.

3. In order to obtain a TAR recommendation for Type Certification, the DAR will be required to submit documentary evidence that prior NAA certification exists, and is relevant to the ADF. The information required is essentially similar to that required by civil aviation regulation CASR 21.29A, under which CASA automatically recognises prior type certification by recognised NAAs. All that the DAR is required to provide is:

a. evidence that the Type Design has received type certification from a recognised NAA, and that the type certificate remains in force;

b. details of any equivalent safety determinations or waivers that were provided by the NAA in the course of type certification;

c. evidence that a Type Record is available, which includes:

(1) a copy of the applicable Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS); and

(2) copies of an approved flight manual, an index to instructions for continued airworthiness, and a list of all current field service documents, service bulletins and Airworthiness Directives applicable to the aircraft;

d. evidence that the type certificate holder (which may be obtained through the aircraft owner) will continue to supply the ADF (or a nominated organisation) with instructions for continued airworthiness, service bulletins and instructions, and any amendments required to ensure that the ADF can continue to manage the technical airworthiness of the Type Design;

e. a summary of the design changes that distinguish the tendered variant from the previously certified variant (including military standard equipment fitted, special maintenance requirements, and modifications incorporated since certification); and

f. the relevant Design Acceptance certificate.

4. In general, there will be no need for ADF compliance finding activity for the NAA type certification. Additional ADF Type Certification and compliance finding activity will concentrate upon ensuring that the changes to Type Design identified in sub-paragraph e have been undertaken and certified in accordance with TAREG 2 and AAP 7001.054(AM1) requirements, or equivalent civil aviation systems. If the TAR is satisfied that the Type Design is largely unmodified for ADF service, and will be used in a manner substantially similar to expected civil equivalent use, then a recommendation to issue an ADF AMTC will be made.

Design Acceptance Certificate

5. TAREG 2.2.3 prescribes a number of conditions that must be met before a DAR can issue a Design Acceptance certificate for a new aircraft type being acquired for ADF operations, or a major change to Type Design. Some of the specific requirements of TAREG 2.2.3 are not relevant when a civil leased aircraft type is to be managed in accordance with TAREG 2.7. Accordingly, a DAR may issue a Design Acceptance certificate for a new aircraft type or a major change to a Type Design under TAREG 2.7 if he has ensured that:



16A–2

a. the Design Acceptance strategy has been documented in accordance with TAREG 2 Annex A;

b. TAR endorsement has been obtained for the ADF Statements Of requirements (SOR), and any substantial amendments to the SOR;

c. the design agency or agencies providing aircraft engineering services to the Commonwealth for the acquisition hold the required NAA approvals for the scope of work being undertaken;

d. the design agency or agencies have submitted a Type Record, including:

(1) a copy of the applicable Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS); and

(2) copies of an approved flight manual, an index to instructions for continued airworthiness, and a list of all current field service documents, service bulletins and Airworthiness Directives applicable to the aircraft.

e. safety issues identified through the course of the Design Acceptance process have been resolved to the satisfaction of the TAR, the NAA certification is relevant to the intended operations, and no feature or characteristic of the aircraft makes it unsafe for its intended operations.

TAR Recommendation for Service Release

6. In order to obtain a TAR recommendation for Service Release for a civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7, the DAR will need to provide:

a. evidence that an AMTC or STC has been or will be issued by the ADF;

b. nomination of a ADF AEO (sponsor AEO) to provide management of formal instruments between the Commonwealth and commercial organisations providing engineering and maintenance support;

c. evidence that an appointment has been identified to carry out the duties of ADF Design and Maintenance Representative (DMR) following Service Release;

d. a strategy for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness is in place;

e. evidence that appropriate CI management systems (including ASI and Engine Structural Integrity management) are in place;

f. a Minimum Equipment List that has been approved by the NAA (or CASA) is available for the aircraft;

g. evidence that a Design Support Network (DSN) including Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) has been established;

h. evidence that a maintenance support network including Authorised Maintenance Organisations (AMOs) has been established; and

i. evidence that the sponsor AEO has made arrangements for ongoing support and interchange of alert and defect information with the aircraft OEM, the NAA that issued the type certificate, and CASA (if the aircraft type is also on the Australian register).



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AIRCRAFT INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

Aircraft Inspection Requirements for Used Civil Leased Aircraft

1. Overall Requirement. Prior to the award of an ADF Certificate of Airworthiness, the DAR is to ensure that each aircraft is subject to an airworthiness inspection to confirm that the aircraft conforms to the Type Design and is in a condition for safe operation. Used aircraft have a more stringent inspection requirement than new build aircraft. In most instances, the Commonwealth will enlist the assistance of a third party to perform the aircraft inspections.

2. Inspecting organisation. The airworthiness inspections are to be performed by an appropriately qualified and experienced third party organisation, that is independent from both the aircraft owner and the primary aircraft maintenance organisation. This independence is required to ensure that the Commonwealth receives an objective report on the condition of the aircraft, including past maintenance activities. The tasks required of the inspecting organisation (usually a contractor) in support of this process are:

a. preparation and submission of an Airworthiness Inspection Plan (AIP) for Commonwealth review and approval;

b. inspection of the airframe structure, engines and other systems in accordance with the AIP;

c. review of the aircraft configuration, design, maintenance and operational documentation in accordance with the AIP; and

d. preparation and submission of an inspection report for each aircraft detailing the inspection results.

3. Inspection Requirements. The purpose of the inspections is to verify that each aircraft is airworthy in accordance with the basis of certification referred to under the aircraft’s civil Type Certificate. The following minimum requirements are to apply:

a. A comprehensive review of the aircraft design, maintenance and operational documentation is to be conducted to:

(1) confirm the completeness and correctness of each aircraft with respect to the appropriate civil airworthiness regulations;

(2) confirm the completeness and correctness of each aircraft with respect to the OEM original documentation and subsequent service bulletins and NAA Airworthiness Directives, and

(3) ensure the actual usage records and maintenance documentation for the aircraft, particularly maintenance and repair records, are internally consistent.

b. A physical inspection of the airframe structure, engines and other systems is to be carried out to the extent considered necessary to:

(1) confirm that the physical configuration (including repairs and modifications) of the aircraft matches the documentation provided;

(2) confirm that all repairs actually made to the aircraft are properly recorded;

(3) ensure that all lifed items are within their approved component lives;

(4) assess the condition of critical components, particularly where these components may have been affected by unusual use; and

(5) confirm the aircraft structure is sound.

c. Personnel conducting the airworthiness inspections are to hold appropriate NAA authorisations and will be required to certify their actions and judgements in accordance with those authorisations.

d. The DAR may accept the results of any pre-purchase, NAA Certification and Registration or similar inspections in partial satisfaction of the military airworthiness inspection requirement, provided that these prior inspections:

(1) have been performed by an organisation or organisations independent of the aircraft owner and primary maintenance organisation;

(2) have been performed and certified by appropriately authorised individuals; and



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(3) are supported by objective evidence in the form of appropriately certified inspection reports or similar documentation.

4. Airworthiness Inspection Plan (AIP). The inspecting organisation should provide an AIP that addresses the above aircraft inspection requirements for DAR consideration. For guidance, as a minimum the AIP should provide:

a. an outline of the inspecting organisation’s qualifications and experience relevant to the airworthiness inspection task;

b. detail of the qualifications, experience and NAA authorisations of the individuals who are to carry out the inspection task, including those of any personnel required to assist with any teardown of the aircraft or the performance of functional tests or checks;

c. a list of the aircraft documentation to be reviewed as part of the airworthiness inspection, as well as an outline of the review methodology to be adopted;

d. details (and copies if available) of any prior inspection reports or similar documents to be offered in partial satisfaction of the airworthiness inspection requirement;

e. an outline of the factors to be considered and logic to be applied in determining the extent of physical inspection required to confirm the airworthiness of the aircraft;

f. an outline of the methodology to be adopted for the performance of any physical inspection; and

g. an estimated schedule for completion of the airworthiness inspections and delivery of the inspection reports.

5. Inspection Reports. Upon completion of the activities outlined in the AIP, the inspecting organisation is to provide inspection reports detailing the airworthiness inspection results for each aircraft. These reports are to be delivered to the Commonwealth and should include, as a minimum:

a. details of the aircraft inspected, including civil registration number, manufacturer, serial number, model designation, and NAA Certificate of Airworthiness number;

b. the as-inspected configuration of the aircraft;

c. a summary of the usage and maintenance history of the aircraft, engines and propellers, including current maintenance, weight and balance, and lifed component status;

d. details of any major structural and life-limited component changes made to items such as wings and tailplanes, and a summary of the individual histories of such components, unless new when fitted;

e. details of any accidents or incidents in which the aircraft has been involved;

f. details of any major repairs or modifications performed on the aircraft, engines and propellers and verification that they have been properly approved and incorporated;

g. details of any applicable aircraft-general, type-specific, engine or equipment airworthiness directives or service bulletins and verification that the aircraft complies;

h. a condition assessment of flight safety critical components and fatigue-sensitive structure; and

i. recommendations for the resolution of any airworthiness deficiencies or concerns arising as a result of the airworthiness inspection.

6. Data Requirements. The DAR is to ensure that the following data is provided to the Commonwealth as part of the acquisition activity for used civil leased aircraft:

a. a statement by an authorised person under NAA delegations (eg CASA CAR 1998 Part 21.176(2)) that the aircraft conforms to the provided NAA Certificate of Airworthiness, or would be eligible for a Certificate of Airworthiness;

b. records of the total hours and landings accrued by each airframe;

c. records of the number of cabin pressurisation cycles and the pressure differential to which each cabin has been subjected during its life (where applicable);

d. records showing the total life consumed by each installed life-limited aircraft, engine and propeller component;



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e. documentation describing the past operational usage of the aircraft, including any non-standard mission roles (particularly any use as a flight or ground test vehicle) and the approximate times spent in each role;

f. records of all major structural and life-limited component changes made to items such as wings, rotors blades, tailplanes, and the individual histories of such components unless new when fitted;

g. records of all major structural repairs, and details of salvage schemes, including the nature and cause of the damage in each case (eg corrosion, cracking, lightning strikes and accidental damage); and

h. complete and accurate weight and balance records.

Aircraft Inspection Requirements for New Build Civil Leased Aircraft

7. Overall Requirement. ADF requirements for aircraft inspection for new build aircraft are simplified. ‘New build’ means that the ADF is the first organisation to operate the aircraft following production, with the exception of post production, modification and delivery flights. To award an ADF Certificate of Airworthiness, the Commonwealth simply requires assurance that the aircraft conforms to an NAA certified Type Design, and is in a condition safe for operation. This can be demonstrated by either:

a. the NAA issuing a Certificate of Airworthiness, or

b. an authorised person certifying that the aircraft would be eligible for issue of an NAA Certificate of Airworthiness.

8. NAA Issued Certificate of Airworthiness. In some instances, the NAA that issued the Type Certificate, or alternatively CASA, may issue a Certificate of Airworthiness. This normally requires an inspection by an NAA authorised delegate to ensure conformance with the authorised Type Design. The ADF will accept only a Standard Certificate of Airworthiness (eg issued under CASA CASR 1998 21.183, FAR 21.183), or an Export Certificate of Airworthiness (eg issued under FAR 21.269) as a basis for issuing an ADF certificate of Airworthiness. Special or Restricted Certificates of Airworthiness are not to be automatically accepted, and DGTA-ADF staff should be consulted for advice. This is because some NAAs will issue ‘Special’ or ‘Restricted’ Certificates of Airworthiness for highly modified aircraft, designed for very specific utilisation (eg in support of Government agencies), with very little oversight and minimal inspection of the Type Design, under the assumption that this work is the responsibility of the end-user.

9. Eligibility for Issue of an NAA Certificate of Airworthiness. For new build aircraft being delivered direct to the ADF, the NAA of the country in which the aircraft is being produced may not allow issue of any form of Certificate of Airworthiness. This is because the ADF is not recognised as a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in terms of ICAO agreements. For the purposes of civil leased aircraft, the requirement for an NAA Certificate of Airworthiness can be demonstrated if an NAA authorised delegate provides a document that attests the aircraft would be eligible for issue of a Standard or Export Certificate of Airworthiness, if the aircraft was to be registered by a CAA.



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CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION HOLDER FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADF DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE

REPRESENTATIVE (DMR)

Certificate of Registration Holder Functions

1. For civil leased aircraft managed under TAREG 2.7, a commercial organisation will normally be contracted to perform the majority of functions associated with the Certificate of Registration holder. These functions include:

a. passing on airworthiness related information to the ADF DAR, pilots and maintenance release issuer;

b. not permitting the use of materials that do not comply with the aircraft specification;

c. remedying unsafe conditions specified in an Airworthiness Directive;

d. ensuring all maintenance required by the system of maintenance is carried out when due;

e. requesting changes to the system of maintenance if the current system is not correct;

f. taking action to change the maintenance schedule if it is no longer effective;

g. electing to use the aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance schedule;

h. electing a system of maintenance for the aircraft;

i. not allowing any contraventions of the civil aviation regulations when the aircraft is overseas;

j. not allowing maintenance in Australia by unauthorised persons;

k. not allowing maintenance overseas by unauthorised persons;

l. not allowing maintenance when overseas unless correctly certified;

m. passing on information regarding suspension, cancellation or conditions placed on a maintenance release;

n. annotating maintenance release if the aircraft is not airworthy;

o. annotating maintenance release with details of a permitted unserviceability;

p. annotating maintenance release if aware of a defect;

q. keeping logbooks for the aircraft and relevant major components;

r. keeping maintenance records in any approved alternative log books;

s. making maintenance records available for inspection by ADF and NAA personnel; and

t. having defects investigated when brought to the Contractor’s attention.

Responsibilities of ADF DMR

2. While a commercial organisation may perform the majority of Certificate of Registration holder functions, the ADF retains the overall responsibility. In order to provide adequate oversight of contracted activities, as well as providing a dedicated interface between the civil and ADF regulatory systems, the ADF will nominate a Design and Maintenance Representative (DMR). The DMR is to:

a. act as ADF Airworthiness Authority interface and liaison with the commercial design and maintenance support organisations;

b. provide day-to-day oversight of commercial organisation activities to ensure that Certificate of Registration holder functions are undertaken in accordance with civil aviation regulatory requirements;

c. provide coordination and interface between the commercial organisation activities, and ADF aircrew and the OAA;

d. ensure that any configuration changes that impact the aircrew interface, or affect aircraft operating limitations, are immediately reported to the OAA (or nominated delegate);

e. within the scope of any EA provided by the TAR, provide Design Acceptance functions for minor changes to Type Design which are either optional, or outside commercial organisation NAA delegations;



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f. assist the commercial organisation to document design packages for major changes to Type Design, and forward to the DAR for Design Acceptance certification;

g. advise the DAR of any deficiencies or changes to commercial organisation Engineering Management Systems or Maintenance Management Systems that may affect the authorisations provided by the TAR;

h. coordinate and assist with independent audit and surveillance of commercial design and maintenance support organisations; and

i. immediately advise the DAR of flight safety defects or conditions affecting civil leased aircraft.



16D–1

ASIMP STRUCTURE FOR CIVIL LEASED AIRCRAFT

Section 1

1. Chapter 1 – Introduction. Provides a brief introduction to the structural management philosophy applicable to the specific aircraft type, any major issues associated, and details of the personnel responsible for ASI management of the aircraft.

2. Chapter 2 – ASIP Master Plan. Provides a high level plan of activities for ASI management, including the specific tasks, and assigns responsibilities and timeframes for completion.

Section 2

3. Chapter 1 – General Aircraft Description. A general description of the aircraft, including historical development, main operating features, roles and physical features. Diagrams of the general structural layout should be included.

4. Chapter 2 – Aircraft Design Information. Provide summary details of the Type Certification Data Sheet relevant to ASI.

5. Chapter 3 – Structural Verification. A brief summary of the structural verification activities, including specific analysis and testing programs, is to be provided.

6. Chapter 4 – Critical Structure. This chapter is to define the primary structure for the aircraft, and identify the subset of primary structure that is considered critical. An explanation of the definition of critical structure, as it applies to this aircraft, is to be provided, along with background for selection of individual structural items. Management of the critical structure is to be documented in either Chapter 9 or 10.

7. Chapter 5 – Certification Information. This chapter must provide details of the type certification by the appropriate civil airworthiness authority. The status of the Commonwealth’s AMTC, including any limitations and significant changes from the civil certification are to be documented, particularly those that affect ASI-DGTA.

8. Chapter 6 – In-service Operations. A summary of the ADF Statement of Operating Intent should be provided, with any significant differences from normal civil operations identified. Brief details of the fleet makeup are to be provided, including aircraft that have crashed, been retired or otherwise disposed of. Details of previous operators of the aircraft and usage summary upon transition to State register are to be provided.

9. Chapter 7 – Usage Monitoring. An overview of the usage monitoring philosophy adopted for the aircraft type, with details on the systems to achieve this, including hardware and data processing and reporting. The chapter should also detail the associated roles and responsibilities of the various organisations involved, including any development activities associated with the usage monitoring system. Summary usage statistics are to be provided.

10. Chapter 8 – Condition Data. An overview of the philosophy adopted for management of structural condition for the aircraft type, with details on the systems to achieve this and the associated roles and responsibilities of the various organisations involved, including any development activities associated with the condition data recording systems. Summary condition data statistics are to be provided.

11. Chapter 9 – Fatigue Management. An overview of the fatigue management philosophy adopted for the aircraft type, with details on the systems to achieve this, are to be provided. In support of this, summary details of any safety-by-inspection programs or structural life limits for the aircraft type are to be provided. Details of fatigue assessments, including any specific issues and resultant development activities, are to be provided. The roles and responsibilities of the various organisations involved in fatigue management are to be detailed.

12. Chapter 10 – Environmental Degradation Management. An overview of the environmental degradation management philosophy adopted for the aircraft type, with details on the systems to achieve this, are to be provided. In particular, summary details of any corrosion prevention and control program for the aircraft type are to be provided. Details of environmental degradation assessments, including any specific issues and resultant development activities, are to be provided. The roles and responsibilities of the various organisations involved in environmental degradation management are to be detailed.



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16E–1

AEO REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOGNITION OF NAA APPROVALS

Definition of Design

1. For the TAR’s purposes, design is defined as:

a. any change to the Type Design of the aircraft;

b. any change to the approved maintenance schedule, including changes to either maintenance intervals or processes; and

c. any decision not to incorporate mandatory or recommended design changes from the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturers.

Authorisations

2. The commercial organisation should hold a current NAA Certificate of Approval (eg CASA CAR 1988 Part 30) and comply with NAA regulations and applicable instructions for the conduct of design with respect to the aircraft while the aircraft remain on the State register.

3. The commercial organisation should employ, or have access to, personnel to approve designs, repairs, maintenance programs and aircraft MEL for the civil leased aircraft type, depending on the level and scope of activity proposed. These personnel should hold relevant NAA authorisations (eg CASA CAR 1988 Part 35) that are applicable to the aircraft. Personnel employed to approve replacements for aircraft components should also hold relevant NAA authorisations (eg CASA CAR 1988 Part 36).

Basis of Authorisation

4. The commercial organisation’s Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) status will be based upon its NAA authorisations. The TAR will issue an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC), with the Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA) clearly defining the basis upon which the EAC is issued.

Content of AEO Submissions and Engineering Management Plan (EMP)

5. The AEO submission (AEOS) must function as both an application for TAR AEO certification and must describe the commercial organisation’s plans for the management, organisation, control, and execution of all aspects of design and engineering support. The AEOS describes the role of the engineering support organisation, the level and scope of the design and engineering activity to be carried out and provides a comprehensive picture of the make up of the organisation and how it accomplishes its role. The AEOS provides a ‘roadmap’ to all relevant plans, procedures, work instructions and other documentation, and data that are used. It also provides the application by which the Commonwealth will assess the commercial organisation's ability to satisfy the TAR requirements for certification as an AEO. The main component of the AEOS is the Engineering Management Plan (EMP). The minimum contents of the EMP, to provide adequate disclosure of engineering support arrangements under TAREG 2.7, are described in the following paragraphs.

6. Organisation. This introductory section should describe the organisational structure proposed to support the civil leased aircraft under TAREG 2.7, and the method by which ongoing compliance with the AEOS and referenced plans and procedures will be demonstrated. The organisational structure is to include nomination of the following appointments:

a. Senior Design Engineer (SDE). The SDE is to be a single, nominated engineer ultimately responsible for ensuring all design and engineering aspects will be managed in accordance with the AEOS and referenced procedures. This responsibility must not be distributed or delegated further within the organisation.

b. Senior Executive. The EMP is to include a statement, signed by Senior Executive, that the organisation will continue to meet all NAA requirements and maintain all NAA authorisations required for design and engineering support for the civil owned State registered aircraft.

7. Existing Authorisations and Quality Certifications. This section is extremely important, as it will outline the existing NAA approvals, upon which the TAR’s AEO certification will be based. This section is to include:

a. a description of existing NAA organisational authorisations and approvals that are offered as demonstration of competency to conduct design and engineering support under TAREG 2.7;



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b. a description of any other engineering or design certifications issued by other airworthiness authorities that are relevant to the services offered; and

c. a description of existing and proposed quality certifications for all contractor sites that will conduct design and engineering activity in support of civil leased aircraft.

8. Scope of DGTA-ADF Authorisations. This section is to detail, specifically, those activities required for design and engineering support for the civil leased aircraft that are not authorised by the NAA, and/or require specific DGTA-ADF authorisation.

9. Facilities, Tools and Equipment. This section is to include:

a. details of all locations and key facilities where design and engineering activity under TAREG 2.7 will be conducted; and

b. details of the equipment and tools that will be used to provide design and engineering support under TAREG 2.7, including computer based maintenance systems.

10. Key Personnel. The number of key personnel identified will be dependent on the level and scope of work the commercial organisation proposes in support of the civil leased aircraft. Key personnel include external consultants or contractors that may be required to support civil leased aircraft design and engineering management activity. This section is to include, as a minimum:

a. detail of the design and engineering support staff structure at each location, identifying key personnel;

b. an organisation chart showing lines of responsibility for key personnel; and

c. the name, contact details, qualifications (including NAA authorisations and delegations) and experience held by all key personnel identified. (A tabulated listing of personnel with NAA delegations is acceptable).

11. Personnel Competencies. This section is to describe the method by which the commercial organisation will ensure design and engineering support staff are be assessed for required competencies, and how these competencies are maintained.

12. Outline of the Approved System of Maintenance. This section is to provide a brief description of the system of maintenance to be utilised for the civil leased aircraft, together with associated design and engineering support activities. The system of maintenance is to be approved by the OEM, or under an NAA delegation. The system of maintenance is to be specific to the civil leased aircraft type (that is, generic maintenance programs such as for Class B aircraft are not acceptable), and are to take into account aircraft utilization.

13. Interface with the ADF as Airworthiness Authority. This section is to provide a description of how the design and engineering support systems used will interface with the ADF as an airworthiness authority, and nominated representatives, including:

a. the method for reporting mandatory Service Bulletins and NAA Airworthiness Directives that have been, or will be incorporated;

b. the method for notifying of optional Service Bulletins and design changes that the ADF must decide on incorporation; and

c. the method by which design changes requiring an amendment to the Australian Military Type Certificate, or requiring a Supplemental Type Certificate, or affecting instructions for continued airworthiness, or any other process which would normally require direct approval from the NAA, are passed to the ADF for Design Acceptance certification (NAA approval).

14. Data. This section is to provide:

a. a brief description of commercial organisation access to the data required to support design and engineering activity for the civil leased aircraft; and

b. a cross-reference to the procedures for collection, review and action of Technical Airworthiness Alert Information, from all sources, that may impact the civil leased aircraft.

15. Design Support Network. This section is to include, as a minimum:

a. A description of the Design Support Network (DSN) to support the civil leased aircraft. The description is to include details of any contracts and agreements for supply of services and/or data, and reference to procedures for assessing, authorising and monitoring DSN members. DSN members will include:



16E–3

(1) OEMs,

(2) Subcontractors,

(3) organisations that issued ADF aircraft unique STCs, and

(4) the NAA that issued the type certificate.

b. A description of how the commercial organisation will report to civil airworthiness authorities (NAA, and CASA where appropriate) of defects found on the civil leased aircraft.

16. Amendment to AEOS. This section is to describe the method by which the Commonwealth is notified of any changes to the basis of AEO certification and amendment to the AEOS (the EMP is to be subject to amendment review at least every 12 months).

Maintenance of Authorisation

17. The commercial organisation should continue to comply with the civil regulations against which it was initially assessed and authorised. The commercial organisation should allow the Commonwealth, or an agent of the Commonwealth, to verify the organisation’s continuing compliance with the relevant civil regulations, and hence AEO status, via a document review and on-site audit.

Limitations on Design Incorporation

18. Unless otherwise authorised, in writing by the applicable DAR and the aircraft Lessor, the commercial organisation should not incorporate any designs which have not been approved by suitably authorised persons under the relevant NAA civil airworthiness regulations, or which are otherwise likely to prevent the smooth return of the aircraft to a civil register at the conclusion of the lease.

19. Unless otherwise authorised, in writing by the applicable DAR and the aircraft Lessor, the commercial organisation should not incorporate any designs that may invalidate the aircraft’s civilian Certificate of Airworthiness.

20. Unless otherwise authorised, in writing by the applicable DAR and the aircraft Lessor, the commercial organisation should not incorporate any designs that would require a change to the existing Type Certificate or the issue of a new Type Certificate.

Notification of Design

21. The applicable DAR will authorise the incorporation of defined classes of design in the absence of a Design Acceptance certificate. The commercial organisation should provide a list of these designs to the Commonwealth DAR and a brief description of those designs incorporated each month.


22. The sponsor AEO is to ensure that the commercial organisation is subject to an ongoing compliance assurance (including audit) program. CASA or alternatively the NAA that provided the civil authorisations preferably should conduct this program. If this is not possible, then the ADF will conduct compliance audits, as directed by DGTA-ADF. In general, TAREG 2.7 relies on the contractor being subject to ongoing surveillance by the NAA that issued the original approval. The ADF compliance audits will thus focus on ensuring that the NAA approved systems are in fact being applied to the civil owned State registered aircraft.



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16F–1

AMO REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOGNITION OF NAA APPROVALS

Authorisations

1. The Contractors responsible for design and maintenance with respect to the aircraft should hold current NAA Certificate of Approvals (eg. CASA 1988 Part 30) for the aircraft being brought into service.

2. The Contractor responsible for maintenance of the aircraft should employ personnel with the appropriate licenses to perform maintenance on the aircraft provided in accordance with NAA requirements (eg CASA CAR 42ZC and 42ZD).

3. The Contractor performing maintenance of the aircraft will be required to seek, attain and maintain Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) status from the Commonwealth for the scope of work, and period, of the maintenance contract.

Basis of the AMO Certification

4. The Contractor’s AMO status will be based upon its NAA authorisations. The TAR will issue a Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC), and accompaning schedule clearly defining the basis upon which the MAC is issued, following successful review and audit.

Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) Requirements

5. The Contractor will be required to submit an application to the TAR for AMO certification, through the AMO sponsor. The main component of the submission will be the MMP, which describes the role of the maintenance organisation, the scope and level of the maintenance work to be carried out and provides a comprehensive picture of the make up of the organisation and how it accomplishes its role. The MMP is a ‘road map’ to all relevant plans, procedures, work instructions and other documentation, and data that are to be used. It provides or contains reference to the information that the Commonwealth will use to assess the Contractor’s ability to satisfy the TAR’s requirements for certification as an AMO. The MMP should include the following:

a. details of the applicant, including the organisation’s name and address, and the reason for the application;

b. a description of the level and scope of the maintenance to be undertaken;

c. relevant certifications held by the organisation;

d. any exemptions required;

e. details of the applicant’s quality management system and certification;

f. a description of the maintenance organisation structure, describing the internal and external interfaces of the organisation and its various authority levels;

g. a description of the organisation’s facilities, sufficient to provide an adequate appreciation of their location and suitability for maintenance administration, management and operations;

h. details of the applicant’s maintenance support network (subcontractors) and reference to procedures for assessing, authorising and monitoring them;

i. details of the accountable manager, including name, position, duties and authority;

j. details of the key responsible maintenance managers, including name, position, duties and authority;

k. details of the quality manager, including name, position, duties and authority;

l. reference to the procedures for training, assessing and authorising personnel as competent to perform the maintenance;

m. reference to procedures for training and authorisation of aircrew to perform maintenance;

n. a description of the applicant’s system of maintenance with reference to the applicant’s procedures and instructions;

o. reference to the data to be used for the maintenance;

p. reference to procedures for managing the pre-installation qualification, tracking, labelling, handling, storage and local manufacture of aeronautical product; and



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q. reference to procedures for notifying the Commonwealth of changes to the basis of AMO certification and amendment of the MMP.

6. The application must include copies of, or provision for Commonwealth access to, all procedures referred to in the MMP.

Maintenance of AMO Status

7. The Contractor should continue to comply with the NAA regulations against which it was initially assessed and authorised. The Contractor should allow the Commonwealth, or an agent of the Commonwealth, to verify the Contractor’s continuing compliance with the relevant civil regulations, and hence AMO status, via a document review and on-site audit process.

System of Maintenance

8. The Contractor should implement and define a System of Maintenance for the aircraft.

9. The Contractor should prepare and submit a System of Maintenance for the aircraft that meets the requirements of the OEM and/or the NAA (eg CASA CAR 1988 Part 42L) for Commonwealth acceptance.

10. The approved System of Maintenance should include the methodology and boundaries to be applied to changes in that maintenance system within the scope of the approval.

NOTE

• If the Contractor does not include the methodology and boundaries of changes to the approved maintenance schedule, these changes must be approved by a properly authorised person under the NAA regulations and accepted as a design change by the applicable ADF DAR.

11. The approved System of Maintenance should be based upon the OEM maintenance schedule.


12. The sponsor AEO should ensure that the Contractor is subject to an ongoing compliance assurance (including audit) program. CASA or alternatively the NAA that provided the civil authorisations preferably should conduct this program. If this is not possible, then the ADF will need to conduct compliance audits, as directed by DGTA-ADF. In general, TAREG 2.7 relies on the contractor being subject to ongoing surveillance by the NAA that issued the original approval. The ADF compliance audits will thus focus on ensuring that the NAA approved systems are in fact being applied to the civil owned State registered aircraft.



1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 17

ENGINE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT


TAREG 3.5.5 Engine Structural Integrity Management

INTRODUCTION

1. To promote the continued airworthiness of ADF aircraft gas turbine engines, DGTA-ADF has established the concept of an Engine Structural Integrity (ESI) management system for the acquisition and in-service life management of gas turbine engines. An ESI management system is any structured scheme for managing the technical airworthiness of a particular engine type. TAREG 3.5.5 requires that each Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO), responsible for the CI management of an ADF aircraft gas turbine engine, establish and maintain an ESI management system. The minimum requirements for an ESI management system are prescribed by this regulation. TAREG 3.5.5 also requires the ESI management system to be documented by an ESI Management Plan (ESIMP).

2. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) preferred ESI management system for ADF propulsion systems is known as an ESI Program (ESIP). An ADF ESIP provides an organised, holistic system within which a gas turbine engine may be certified and maintained. An ESIP requires that during acquisition, appropriate data is obtained and adequate engineering rigor is applied to allow Type Certification and Service Release (SR) to occur. Subsequently, an ESIP requires effective fatigue life management and condition assessment to be carried out during service to ensure airworthiness is maintained.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to AEOs on how to establish and maintain an acceptable ESI management system. The chapter will largely focus on the TAR preferred ESIP approach. A background section provides additional information on the origin of ESI requirements and the reasons why the ESIP is the preferred approach to ESI management.

SCOPE

4. This chapter provides guidance on TAREG 3.5.5 regulatory requirements for an ESI management system, with a particular focus on how to implement the TAR preferred management system – the ESIP. It must be noted that where conflict occurs between the guidance and the regulations, the regulation takes precedence.

5. This chapter is separated into three main sections:

a. background, providing contextual information in support of ADF ESI policy;

b. guidance on the implementation of TAREG 3.5.5, to assist applicants to comply with TAREG 3.5.5 requirements; and

c. guidance on other ESIP issues, for ESIP program implementation.

BACKGROUND

Evolution of Standards

6. Similar to Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) requirements (refer Section 2, Chapter 11), ESI design requirements evolved from an increasing number of fatigue failures. During the 1960s and 1970s, the USAF experienced numerous catastrophic engine failures caused by material defects, manufacturing defects or fatigue induced cracks. A number of drastic and unexpected lifing reductions followed, which required large scale programs to recover operations.

7. In the US prior to 1970, military engine standards were deficient in areas such as rotating component life requirements. Structural assessments were based on very limited engine testing, which did not reveal service related problems because it was not typically based on the intended mission profiles or mission mix. In 1973, the USN issued the MIL-E-5007D general specification, which established rigorous standards to ensure engine durability. This document included the ‘safe life’ to crack initiation philosophy, and recognised that components should be retired at a minimum calculated and validated fatigue life. MIL-E-5007D has now been superseded by JSSG-2007.



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8. At a similar time, a US scientific advisory board recommended development of a structural integrity program for engines, similar to the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) required by MIL-STD-1530. On this recommendation, the USAF developed Engine Structural Integrity Program (ENSIP) requirements and in 1984, issued MIL-STD-1783 to document these requirements. ENSIP requires a damage tolerance analysis to be performed during engine design.

9. In the civil arena prior to 1965, both the US Civil Air Regulations (CAR) and the British Civil Air Regulations (BCAR) dealt with durability issues through testing. In 1965, the United States Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) were codified. These regulations defined operating limitations for discs and spacers in terms of service life. By 1970, FAR 33.14 placed restrictions on the allowable life of a “critical”1 part through test demonstration. By 1980, the FARs permitted approved lifing procedures to be used in determining LCF life limits. Such procedures covered analytical methods and testing.

10. In Europe, the BCARs were combined into the Joint Aviation Requirements for Engines (JAR-E), Change 9 permitting analytical life prediction. JAR-E 515 contains regulations for critical parts integrity. Following the loss of a commercial DC-10 airliner in 1989, as a result of an uncontained titanium disc failure attributed to hard alpha inclusions, the FAA carried out a review of manufacturing processes for titanium alloy critical parts leading to the issue of AC 33.15-1 in 1998. The FAA continues to be active in managing programs to reduce the number of uncontained engine critical parts failures experienced on commercial aircraft. The FAA has implemented initiatives such as the Jet Engine Titanium Control Committee and the US Aircraft Catastrophic Failure Prevention Program (ACFPP), which addresses all safety critical aircraft systems.

11. Both MIL-HDBK-1783 and JSSG-2007 provide excellent resources for additional information on gas turbine engines. Other useful documents are discussed in AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) Section 4, Chapter 1.

Critical Part Lifing Philosophies

12. Critical part life limits are normally set using the ‘safe life’ to crack initiation philosophy. Safe life components are typically retired at a point where statistically, one part in 1000 parts (with 95% confidence) exhibits an “engineering” (0.030 inch) crack2. Until recently, no design requirements existed for residual strength analysis or test, since life limits did not utilise crack propagation life. Safe life design philosophy is adopted primarily for two reasons. The first is due to the extreme operating environment experienced by some engine parts (stress and temperature), necessitating the use of low weight, high strength alloys with poor fracture toughness and damage tolerance properties. The second reason relates to the difficulty in analysing and testing engine critical parts under the correct thermo-mechanical stress conditions, in order to validate life accurately.

13. Safe life design is generally very conservative (statistically, 999 parts in 1000 have no detectable damage on retirement from service). However, after several civil and US military engine fatigue failures it was recognised that the safe life design philosophy may be non-conservative in some cases. Therefore, parts should be designed to accommodate manufacturing process anomalies or damage occurring during manufacture or maintenance. Modern standards now require damage tolerance design and analysis. LCF life limits remain based on safe life philosophy in most cases, but with the additional confidence of a damage tolerance assessment.

Evolution of the ADF ESIP

14. For ADF propulsion systems the TAR prefers a particular type of ESI management system known as an ESIP. The ADF ESIP concept is derived from MIL-HDBK-1783 Engine Structural Integrity Program (ENSIP). This US Military handbook establishes ‘structural performance, design development and verification guidance to ensure structural integrity for engine systems’. The handbook includes lessons learned from previous USAF systems and is intended for use in conjunction with JSSG-2007.

15. MIL-HDBK-1783 is used as the basis for the ADF ESIP concept because the TAR recognises it as a detailed, thorough and authoritative source from which to base the ADF ESI management system. The adoption of this standard also maintains consistency with ADF ASI initiatives, based around ASIP (MIL-STD-1530).

16. MIL-HDBK-1783 specifies five phases for a complete ENSIP, one of which relates to in-service structural integrity management. As noted above, an ADF ESIP normally focuses only on the acquisition and in-service phase, thus the overall scope of an ADF ESIP is much reduced compared to an ENSIP. However, an ADF ESIP expands the scope of in-service activities in ENSIP to include more than pure “airworthiness” requirements, such as a requirement

1 FAA and EASA definitions for the term critical part are provided in Annex A. The TAREG 3.5.5 definition of critical part is discussed in the next section. 2 Specifics can vary between OEMs. Safe life limits have been set with other criterion, such as 1/741 with 95% confidence and 1/10,000 with 50% confidence. The crack length defined as “initiation” may also vary.



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to measure ESIP Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and to maintain a system of Condition Monitoring (CM) which influences not only airworthiness but also engine Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) and Life Cycle Cost (LCC). Differences between ENSIP and ESIP activity have been summarised in Annex B.

17. The primary reason why an ADF ESIP focuses on in-service aspects alone is because it is constrained by a lack of data. The ADF is normally unable to obtain adequate information on engine design (ENSIP tasks 1 and 2 in particular) to benefit from its use in other areas. For example, the ADF relies heavily on engine OEM derived lifing policy for critical parts (life limits, inspection and Usage Monitoring (UM) requirements). The ADF also relies on this policy being applicable to the ADF, even in cases where ADF mission data is not provided to the OEM. ADF Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of OEM lifing policy (especially component life limits) is normally not possible, since the relevant design data is highly prized proprietary information and will not be provided to the ADF. Such constraints may not apply to airframes if the ADF is able to develop a specific set of inspection and retirement limits based on the provision of OEM data, supported by an ADF managed Full Scale Fatigue Test (FSFT) or major component structural test program.

18. The differing ability of the ADF ESIP (when compared to the ADF ASIP) to influence issues such as lifing policy, manifests itself primarily in a reduced ability/flexibility to react to in-service issues, should they arise. Using lifing policy as an example, an aircraft OEM may recommend a downward revision to the lifing policy of a particular aircraft structure. In this case, the impact to the ADF may be minimal if the applicable ASIP has derived ADF specific life limits and it can be proven that the OEM recommendation is unduly conservative or not applicable to the ADF Configuration, Role, and Environment (CRE). The lifing policy may remain unchanged with little or no increase in airworthiness risk to the ADF. However, if an engine OEM recommends a similar revision, it may be very difficult for the ADF to deviate from that recommendation due to the lack of design data. The only course of action should the existing life limits need to be maintained is to approve (through the ADF Airworthiness Authority) operations at an increased level of risk.

19. Given that some propulsion system design aspects (ie lifing policy) are heavily dependent on usage, ADF CRE must be assessed during ADF Type Certification. Engine OEMs typically do not provide operator-specific lifing policy and in most cases, the ADF is unable to derive its own lifing policy due to a lack of OEM data. As a result, it must be shown during ADF Type Certification that the lifing policy adopted is appropriate for the ADF CRE. Engine certification issues will be discussed in greater depth below.

GUIDANCE – IMPLEMENTATION OF TAREG 3.5.5

20. This section amplifies and discusses the intent of all TAREG 3.5.5 requirements. Each part of the Regulation is addressed in order. Guidance regarding ESIMP content will not occur in this section, since an ESIMP template is provided in AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1.

TAREG 3.5.5.a

21. TAREG 3.5.5.a. prescribes that every ADF aircraft gas turbine engine must have an ESI management system and that management system must be established by the “applicant”. The applicant is the ADF or commercial organisation responsible for the CI management of the gas turbine engine in question (and will normally be an AEO).

22. The regulation is deliberately non-specific in stating that a generic ESI management system is required, as opposed to the TAR preferred ESIP. This is to allow the applicant some flexibility to determine which management system best suits the propulsion system in question. The fundamental requirement is that any system must provide an equivalent level of safety to that of an ESIP. Examples where other systems may be preferable include those for:

a. civil leased aircraft engines, which may operate under a recognised National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) management system. Some parts of an ESIP may not be required, including the requirement for an ESIMP. Section 3, Chapter 16 of this publication provides further guidance;

b. UAVs, which may operate with a simplified ESI management system depending on their Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The requirement for an ESIMP may also be wavered by the TAR on a case-by-case basis (for example, BAe Kalkara). Section 2, Chapter 15 of this publication provides further guidance; and

c. reciprocating engines, for which TAREG 3.5.5 technically does not apply, but which have significant enough issues to warrant the application of particular aspects of an ESI management system (for example, the R2000 engine has an ESIP focussed on CM and ESIP performance measurement only). Further information on reciprocating engines is provided in the next section.

23. AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1 provides further guidance on applications which may not require an ESI management system, such as missiles.



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24. For the remaining guidance below, the term ESIP is used throughout to stress that the TAR preferred ESI management system is an ESIP. However, as guidance, the content of this chapter applies equally to any ESI management system.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(1) – Appointment of ESI Manager

25. The SDE of the applicant organisation must appoint an ESI manager, who is to be responsible for the ESIP of the gas turbine engine. The ESI manager must be a competent individual who is familiar with the concepts, aims, principles, requirements and processes of ESI management, including fatigue life management of critical structure, and principles of UM and CM. The appointment must be identified in appropriate instructions, sponsored by the applicant organisation. These steps are essential to ensure that the applicant has allocated appropriate resources to, and remains accountable for, ESI management.

26. The ESI manager may conduct other tasks where the applicant is able to justify such a scenario will not impact proper ESI management. For example, if the airframe/engine fleet is small, the ESI manager may also be identified as the ASI manager. In more complex situations it may be necessary to establish an ESI management section within the applicant organisation. The functional head of that section would normally be identified as the ESI manager.

27. There is no regulatory requirement for ESI managers to have a Tertiary Qualification (TQ). Nevertheless, the applicant must provide appropriate engineering oversight to the ESI management process. Whilst ESI management has procedural elements, significant engineering judgement is at times required to make ESI decisions to assure airworthiness. The inputs, timings and requirement for these decisions are not always obvious and are usually precipitated by a series of indicators which in isolation are no cause for concern, but together signify a potential airworthiness (or logistics) risk. The applicant is required to provide sufficient levels of engineering oversight and management to the ESI management process to ensure key assessments and decisions are made in an appropriate and timely manner. Where the ESI manager is non-TQ, any additional oversight required to achieve this objective must be provided by the SDE.

28. Irrespective of qualification, ESI managers within the applicant organisation are supported by DGTA-ADF staff assigned to the propulsion system. DGTA-ADF assigned staff are identified as ESIP managers where the applicant organisation resides in the ADF, or desk officers where the applicant is a contractor. This delineation infers the greater overall responsibility of the applicant where ESI management is contracted. Roles of relevant DGTA-ADF staff are discussed in the next section.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(2) – Critical Parts Identification

29. TAREG 3.5.5.b.(2) requires that ‘critical parts’ be identified. For the purposes of this regulation, a critical part is defined as any engine component whose failure has the potential to cause loss of aircraft (hull loss) or loss of life (aircrew or ground crew). This consequence is often termed ‘catastrophic’. It should be noted that engine critical part failure does not always result in a catastrophic consequence. US FAA figures state that only one in 20 critical part failures lead to hull loss.

30. Several definitions exist for the term ‘critical part’. For comparative purposes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) definitions for engine critical parts is examined in Annex A. Critical parts are also known as ‘Group A parts’, ‘safety critical parts’ or ‘fracture critical parts’ depending on the organisation and engine in question.

31. Given the definition above, critical parts include all rotating components whose failure will likely result in the release of high-energy debris that cannot be contained within the engine casing (ie disks, spacers, shafts, cooling plates, etc). Such parts have a risk of causing secondary damage which may lead to aircraft loss or death to personnel. Critical parts may also include static parts such as the combustion chamber case, whose failure may result in aircraft loss through explosion or fire. Bearings are critical parts if their failure leads to wear, imbalance or fire with associated severe consequences as described above. In some engines, some blade stages may create significant secondary damage should they fail and they must also be considered as critical parts (especially where ‘corn-cobbing’ is possible, where a failed blade strips multiple blades from downstream stages). Examples include the P&W TF30 (uncontained fan blade failure) and GE F404 (fan blade causing damage and uncontained fire) engines.

32. Critical parts will normally be identified by the engine OEM, however the effects of installation and mission may require assessment by the ADF.

Installation

33. Blading (rotor and stator stages) for single engine aircraft must be defined as critical parts if any blade failure could result in a catastrophic consequence. For example, a Dec 2002 ‘failure’ of a P&W PT-6 turbine Nozzle Guide Vane (NGV) fitted to a (single engine) Pilatus PC-9 aircraft led to the fatigue failure of one or more Compressor



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Turbine (CT) blades and elimination of power output from the engine. This failure could have lead to a catastrophic consequence and CT blading should be defined as critical parts3. CT blading of the PT-6 engine fitted to the (twin engine) Beech King Air aircraft need not be considered as critical, since the aircraft should be recoverable on a single thrust-producing engine.

Mission

34. The type of mission flown may also affect the decision to classify parts as critical. For example, a single engine helicopter which suffers a compressor blade failure should be able to autorotate to landing even if complete power loss occurs as a result of that failure. However, if hull loss is to be avoided, the helicopter must autorotate to a safe landing. If the helicopter mission requires flight over water 90% of the time, then it would be reasonable to classify compressor blading, capable of causing a significant power loss, as critical parts since autorotation will still most likely lead to loss of aircraft.

35. Components cannot be classified as a critical part unless a conceivable catastrophic failure mode actually exists. In the PC-9 example above, the ADF does not identify CT blades as critical parts. This is because a revised Remote Visual Inspection (RVI) procedure was introduced in 2003 to inspect the NGVs which (if conducted correctly) eliminates the NGV cracking failure mode from occurring. Since no other conceivable turbine blade failure mode exists, neither the NGVs nor turbine blades are identified as critical parts.

36. In theory, modern engine blade and casing design should eliminate the potential for catastrophic blade failures. For example, a modern single engine fighter aircraft should be designed to allow failed compressor blade(s) to escape from the engine casing, but to then be contained within the engine bay, thus reducing the likelihood of significant secondary damage to downstream compressor stages (typically referred to as compressor “corn-cobbing”) and permitting the aircraft to recover on reduced power.

37. To allow critical parts to be recorded within the ADF ESIP in an authoritative sense, all critical parts and associated life limits must be identified in the applicable Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP) by part number and be identified as Safety Critical (annotated in the TMP with a criticality of ‘S’).

38. The intent of this regulation is to identify all engine components which could conceivably cause a catastrophic consequence to occur. Such identification allows both the applicant and DGTA-ADF (where required) to focus an appropriate amount of attention on components with extremely serious failure modes. ESI1-DGTA is able to assist applicants in classifying individual components, where doubt exists. Identification of critical parts must occur at the ESIMP level and also at TMP level.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(3) – Critical Part Lifing Policy Identification

39. The default position for the TAR is that the lifing policy (component life limits, inspection and UM requirements) adopted by the ADF must be that recommended by the OEM. It is extremely unlikely that an engine OEM will not provide lifing policy, or make it unavailable to the ADF. However in the absence of such advice, TAREG 3.5.5 allows the advice of a recognised NAA, recognised foreign military force or the TAR to be used. In such cases, AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1, Annex A requires that adequate design disclosure be obtained during acquisition and maintained in-service to allow ADF review of critical part lifing policy.

40. The intent of this regulation is to acknowledge that as a result of the lack of data/design disclosure from the OEM to any external organisation, the OEM is in the best position to define lifing policy. Operators such as the ADF should therefore adopt such policy without amendment. Variations to OEM lifing policy will only be considered where adequate design disclosure allows the ADF to assess the risk of such variations. Variations to OEM lifing policy are discussed in more detail below.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(4) – UM System

41. A UM ‘system’ is defined as the Organisation, People, Processes, Data and Tools (OPPDT) necessary to ensure effective life management of critical components (and other components, where applicable). Life management entails capturing, recording, downloading, interrogating and storing part life accrual information to ensure life limits are not exceeded. A UM system therefore encompasses both on and off-aircraft tools/equipment.

42. As stated above, the default position for the TAR is to adopt the engine OEMs lifing policy and as a result, the UM system adopted by the ADF must ensure that this policy is correctly applied. Typically, the ADF will need to develop some aspects of the UM system indigenously because the OEM is unable to provide a complete ‘plug and play’ UM system for the ADF. For example, the OEM UM policy for the Turbomeca Arriel 1B engine (AS350 BA Squirrel) recommends an engine cycle counter, which records gas generator cycles automatically, be used to conduct 3 Fortunately, this incident did not lead to aircraft loss. CT blades are not currently defined as critical parts, as discussed later in this section.



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UM. Unfortunately, ADF aircraft were not fitted with such a counter and as a result, pilot monitoring of the cockpit gas generator speed gauge was necessary. Furthermore, since CAMM2 was unable to incorporate the UM algorithm defined by the OEM, some tailoring was required to develop a simpler algorithm. This was a less than ideal approach and the method of UM was later amended to record usage based on the number of autorotation and quickstop events per flight – far more easily recordable metrics. In both cases, the ADF adopted a modified UM system which met the intent of the OEMs policy, but required significant effort in terms of process.

43. A more significant example of where the ADF was required to develop aspects of the engine UM system is the GE F404 engine (F/A-18 Hornet). In this case, the ADF developed and maintains its own sophisticated ground system known as Engine Service Life Management Plan (ESLMP)4 to record, analyse and store the UM data supplied by the aircraft (including integration with CAMM2), in a manner intended by the engine OEM.

44. The TMP must specify the OEM recommended equation for calculating life usage parameters, including all lifing parameters such as full and partial cycles, damage (‘K’) factors.

45. All engine usage should be recorded, including all installed and uninstalled ground run usage, unless the OEM has specifically stated that certain engine usage (eg ground running) does not need to be recorded.

46. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that an appropriate UM system exists to maintain an acceptable level of airworthiness.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(5) – CM System

47. Broadly, a CM5 “system” is defined as the OPPDT necessary to ensure effective management of engine condition. CM system management entails capturing, recording, downloading, interrogating and storing condition data to ensure the engine is maintained at a level to “optimise” RAM and LCC, whilst maintaining an acceptable level of airworthiness. A CM system therefore encompasses both on and off-aircraft tools/equipment.

48. Notwithstanding this definition, this regulation is focussed solely on ensuring the CM system is adequate to maintain an acceptable level of airworthiness. As a result, the optimisation of a CM system for RAM and LCC is beyond the scope of this regulation. Audits against this regulation will be restricted to airworthiness aspects of the CM system only.

49. The CM system initially adopted by the ADF will usually be that recommended by the engine OEM. The ‘optimisation’ of a CM system over time involves trade-off studies between RAM and LCC, which may require much engineering effort. RAM and LCC optimisation aspects are evaluated separately as part of an ESIP CM system effectiveness review. Further information on effectiveness reviews is contained in the next section.

50. Modern CM systems may incorporate a Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS), which allows automated data recording and analysis. Nevertheless, the complete CM system still encompasses the remaining OPPDT necessary to ensure effective management of engine condition.

51. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that an appropriate CM system exists to maintain an acceptable level of airworthiness.

TAREG 3.5.5 b.(6) – Applicability to ADF CRE, Including Adequate Review

52. Lifing policy and the CM system adopted for use by the ADF must be assessed as being suitable for the ADF CRE. Such assessment must be completed during aircraft acquisition and then periodically during in-service operation. To do this, the basis from which OEM policy was determined must be compared to the ADF CRE, to identify any differences and assess the impact of those differences.

Lifing Policy

53. The OEM determines life limits and inspection intervals on the basis of a defined mission. In most cases, the ADF specific SOI will not be accounted for by the OEM during engine design. As a result, the acquisition applicability assessment must be done prior to AMTC, by the ADF compliance finding agency (typically, the acquisition PO or ESI1-DGTA). Where the CRE of the ADF can be proven to be substantially similar to that used for design, the OEM policy may be adopted as applicable for the ADF. Where such similarity cannot be shown, the impact of variations must be assessed. OEM advice may be required before a final determination can be made. In most cases, it should be expected that OEMs publish life limits conservatively enough to account for “global fleet” usage. Exclusions to this include aircraft with a large potential for variation in fatigue cycle-per-hour accrual, hence fatigue life accrual may vary significantly between operators depending on SOI (eg the F/A-18 Hornet). 4 ESLMP supersedes the original Engine Condition Assessment Program (ECAP) developed by the ADF for F404. 5 Engine CM is the discipline of determining the mechanical or functional condition of an engine or engine components.



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54. During service, periodic assessments are required to identify and assess any changes in ADF CRE. Unless otherwise dictated by a mission analysis or conversion factor program (both discussed in the next section), assessments should be made either as the change occurs (for ‘step’ changes such as an engine configuration change), or at an interval of around five years (for gradual changes such as a variation in mission over a long period, not significant enough to warrant an SOI amendment and thus identified through review of in-service usage). ESI1-DGTA should be contacted where doubt exists.

55. The optimal state for assessing applicability of lifing policy is either that the OEM has provided the ADF with written confirmation that published lifing policy is applicable to the ADF or that the OEM has accounted for ADF CRE by analysing ADF mission data via a mission analysis.

CM Policy

56. The OEM defines a CM system on the basis of factors such as experience with previous engine types and OEM preferred technology insertion. It may be very difficult for the OEM to predict some in-service failure modes, even with accelerated engine tests. Again, ADF CRE aspects will not typically be considered in engine design. During acquisition, it will normally be acceptable for the compliance finding agency to accept the OEM CM system on the basis that it represents a best assessment without in-service experience. If the engine is equipped with a HUMS, additional certification requirements may be needed, as defined by a HUMS Validation Plan (HUMSVP), refer AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2, Chapter 19. HUMS are discussed further in the next section.

57. During service, periodic CM system review is essential to ensure continued airworthiness is maintained. As in-service experience grows, it is likely that some CM system improvement will be required. Even if ADF CRE is similar to that of other operators, the ADF should advise the OEM of in-service issues to allow the OEM to update the CM system for all operators. This may be done via an OEM Field Service Representative (FSR). More significantly, if ADF CRE varies from other operators, in-service use may result in ADF unique component defects/failures. In such cases, it is essential that a CM system review program be established to ensure airworthiness is maintained in light of service experience. Such review should be carried out through the normal Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) process. ESI1-DGTA has established a program of CM system effectiveness reviews to complement MRD, which aim to assess airworthiness, RAM and LCC aspects of an ESIP. Effectiveness reviews are discussed in the next section.

58. The intent of this regulation is to ensure ADF CRE aspects are appropriately considered during acquisition and in-service use, to ensure airworthiness is maintained to an acceptable standard.

TAREG 3.5.5.c - ESIMP

59. The sole purpose of an ESIMP is to document the ESIP, thereby ensuring a high level of visibility and management continuity is maintained throughout the service life of the engine type. As a result, the intent of this regulation is to ensure the ESIP is documented.

60. Information on specific content of an ESIMP (including a template for an ESIMP) is contained in AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1. This template may be tailored for each specific ESIP.

TAREG 3.5.5 d – ESIMP Review Period

61. Each ESIMP must be reviewed at an interval not exceeding two years. This period was chosen as a reasonable compromise between the need to maintain accuracy and the effort involved in ESIMP amendment. The two-yearly review cycle need not lead to ESIMP amendment if no changes have occurred in the ESIP.

62. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that the ESIMP adequately documents the ESIP at all times and as a result, the two year review period must be considered the minimum requirement. An ESIMP may be amended at any time to include changes to the ESIP. The ESIMP should be amended as soon as possible where large changes occur, such as results from a mission analysis or revision of the UM policy.

TAREG 3.5.5.e – ESIP Implementation

63. The success of any ESIP hinges on the UM and CM programs contained within it. Such programs are derived by engineering effort on the part of the OEM, the applicant AEO and other organisations within the Design Support Network (DSN) (DGTA-ADF and DSTO). UM and CM programs are then implemented by procedures. As detailed above, both the UM and CM program have a significant role in the continued airworthiness of the propulsion system.

64. Necessarily, the execution of a large part of an ESIP’s UM and CM program is carried out by Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO). AMOs do not have the authority to deviate from the UM or CM programs without authorisation from the applicant AEO, except in extreme cases as specified in TAREG 5 and AAP 7001.059(AM1)— ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual (AMMM). The most effective way to ensure deviations do not occur



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is to require that all procedures relating to the UM and CM program are sponsored by the applicant and not any other organisation (which could otherwise make changes to those procedures at any time).

65. A large part of an ESIP’s UM and CM programs will be defined by technical maintenance publications, which are easily controlled through the applicant’s publication amendment process. However, local instructions introducing new or amended requirements relating to UM and CM must also be controlled by the applicant AEO. For example, if part of the UM system for an engine requires a database to record lifing data, this database must be approved and version controlled by the applicant. Operating units should not be able to modify the database algorithms or amend data, once stored.

66. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that the applicant, as the appropriately authorised AEO for ESI management, maintains control of ESIP activities relating to airworthiness.

TAREG 3.5.5.f.(1) – TAR Approval: Deviation to Critical Part Lifing Policy

67. Adopting OEM recommended lifing policy (life limits and UM methodology) is the default position for the ADF. As a result, the applicant must seek TAR approval before making any non-conservative deviation from OEM life limits, inspection and UM requirements for critical parts. This includes the establishment of a cycle-to-hour conversion factor policy for UM (discussed in the next section).

68. This ruling applies during all stages of acquisition and service life, including activities prior to the issue of a new or Supplementary Type Certificate. The TAR position on deviation from OEM policy is that it must only be considered in order to meet operational imperatives. LCC reduction is not reason enough to deviate from OEM policy, due to the increase in airworthiness risk typically implicit in any decision to deviate from OEM policy.

69. Component life prediction methods used by OEMs are complex and make use of proprietary data and techniques that the OEM itself has generated or developed, normally at great expense. Without the support and assistance of the OEM, it will be difficult for the ADF to adequately assess the impact (probability of failure) of deviating from the OEM lifing policy. Applications for deviations should therefore be accompanied by OEM risk assessment results where possible. Further details on critical part life extension and risk management may be found in the next section.

70. In unusual cases, an OEM may also assign life limits to non-critical parts. This issue is discussed in the next section.

71. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that any proposal to deviate non-conservatively from OEM lifing policy receives rigorous review by DGTA-ADF. This ensures that an appropriate level of resources, knowledge and experience is applied. Most importantly, not even the TAR can approve non-conservative deviations to OEM policy: the TAR makes a recommendation to the OAA, who may then accept or reject the deviation.

TAREG 3.5.5.f.(2) – TAR Approval: ESIMP Issue or Amendment

72. The purpose of an ESIMP is to document the applicable ESIP. In doing so, corporate knowledge is retained by primary members of the ESIPs DSN (DGTA-ADF and DSTO), as well as the applicant organisation. DGTA-ADF staff involvement in any ESIMP issue or amendment is mandated to provide an additional level of technical rigor, given the important function of the ESIMP. This is especially important for contractor drafted ESIMPs where the Commonwealth Project Office (PO) or Systems Program Office, tasked with contract compliance assurance, may not have sufficient expertise to evaluate the ESIP changes.

73. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that an appropriate level of technical rigor is applied to ensure an ESIMP documents the parent ESIP effectively.

GUIDANCE – OTHER ESIP ISSUES

Non-Critical Life Limited Parts

74. In unusual cases, an OEM may specify life limits for non-critical parts. For example, the GE F404 number four bearing is a life limited part, however the worst case failure mode when fitted to the twin engine F/A-18 Hornet is In Flight Shut Down (IFSD).

75. The applicant may deviate from lifing policy for non-critical parts without TAR approval, through application of the normal design control process defined by TAREG 3. Before any investigation into life extension occurs, the applicant must fully understand why a part was assigned a life limit. A close relationship with the engine OEM would normally be expected in order to access the appropriate data required for any engineering determination. In some cases, DSTO advice may also be required. Provided appropriate justification is made, deviations may occur for any



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reason (operational, cost reduction, etc). As OEM lifing policy constitutes Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI), DGTA-ADF must be advised of any deviation in accordance with TAREG 3.5.2.

76. Irrespective of criticality, the TMP must identify all engine parts that have been assigned an OEM life limit. The TMP must also specify the life limit prescribed by the OEM or applicant. The ESIMP must also reflect this information.

Conversion Factors

77. The most common use of a conversion factor is to convert OEM prescribed cycle based life limits to ADF engine hours based life limits. Conversion factors derived by the ADF are a deviation from OEM policy and require TAR approval.

78. The engineering effort to establish a conversion factor based lifing policy may be large. Since a conversion factor must not allow usage to be unsafely underestimated for any component in a given fleet, usage will necessarily be overestimated for the vast majority of components in that fleet. FAA AC 33-2B Section 33.14, recommends consideration of ‘a representative severe operation cycle, identified from service experience’. Over a long period, the conservative rate of life accrual for the majority of fleet components may lead to early retirement of components and a higher overall LCC through unnecessary part replacement, compared to a more accurate method of UM. Conversion factors are most wasteful where there is wide variation in usage between individual engines in a fleet. For these reasons, conversion factor based lifing policy is not preferred and should only be implemented after assessing other UM alternatives such as the fitment of an automated cycle counter.

79. Conversion factors derived by the ADF must be reviewed regularly to ensure they remain valid and do not underestimate the life consumed on any part in the fleet as a result of variations in usage. The review periodicity may vary with each ESIP and DGTA-ADF will prescribe the appropriate period (typically 2-3 years). Conversion factor review is usually achieved by calculating actual cyclic accrual rate, from a representative sample of recent fleet usage data, in accordance with the OEM lifing policy and assessing any differences between the in-use conversion factor and the calculated current accrual rate. Data used for the review must be representative of fleet usage (sampling period, detail and range of data recorded etc) and should consider the impact of ESIP specific issues such as engine or aircraft fleet rotation policies.

Mission Analyses

80. Fatigue and creep damage accrual can be affected by changes to CRE. Unless the UM system is extremely sensitive, design life limits and UM requirements will require regular validation to ensure they remain acceptable. A mission analysis compares ADF engine usage data to that on which the OEM lifing policy is based. The mission analysis process normally requires submission of ADF mission data to the OEM for analysis.

81. As guidance, OEM (or other competent authority) review of ADF usage against design usage should occur during the first two years of service and approximately every five years thereafter. The former requirement aims primarily to identify any significant differences between the usage assumed during design and the actual in-service usage, however a mission analysis at this stage may also be useful in establishing introduction to service variations which may need to be accounted for (eg usage variations in establishing a flying program for a fighter trainer aircraft).

Automated UM Systems and HUMS

82. HUMS or any automated UM system used to track engine critical part life consumption should be validated to ensure that as a minimum, embedded algorithms correctly calculate part life consumption. Increasingly, HUMS are utilised as a major component of the CM system. In these cases, CM functionality should be validated also to ensure appropriate maintenance policy is being applied. HUMS validation is an ADF certification requirement and is addressed through a HUMSVP. Requirements for a HUMSVP are detailed in AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 2, Chapter 19.

Critical Part Life Extensions, Risk Assessments and In-Service Risk Management

83. The ADF has experienced, or been faced with, major disruptions to aircraft operations due to unexpected lifing reductions. In the late 1990s, RAAF F/A-18 Hornet operations were severely impacted by life reductions on some GE F404 engine critical parts. These reductions were advised by the engine OEM following re-analyses of fatigue life limits, triggered by separate in-service failures on US aircraft. Other significant OEM-initiated lifing reductions have occurred to the T700, T53, T56, TF30, Arriel 1B and Gnome fleets operated by the ADF. In the majority of these cases, the lifing reduction impacted ADF operations and in some cases, this impact was minimised by issuance of an OAA-approved life extension.

84. Critical part life extension requires detailed risk analyses to be conducted, usually with assistance from the OEM. Applicants must contact ESI1-DGTA in the first instance before any critical part life extension can be



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considered. ESI1-DGTA policy on risk assessments does not define a hard ‘limit’ for determining what level of risk is acceptable. This allows flexibility in dealing with varied situations (rather than a limit which may never be crossed), and reflects AAP 7001.053(AM1) and AAP 7001.048(AM1) policy that the OAA, not the TAR, makes the final determination regarding what risk may be retained for operations. In the past, DGTA-ADF has made recommendations to the OAA to apply life limits with a Per Part Probability of failure of around one part failure in 741 parts, (ie -3σ Nf).

85. Currently, DGTA-ADF will only consider life limit extensions to critical parts where a significant operational impact would result from continuing with the status quo.

CM System Review – Optimising The CM Program

86. A CM system should normally be reviewed as part of the MRD program for an aircraft type. To compliment the MRD process, ESI1-DGTA has instigated a CM system review program (known as ‘CM program effectiveness reviews’). Such a program is aimed at supporting airworthiness requirements of TAMM regulations, but also to investigate RAM and LCC aspects (beyond TAREG 3.5.5) in order to ‘optimise’ each ESIPs CM system. In particular, compromises must usually be made between RAM and LCC aspects to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness is maintained. Optimisation implies no attempt to maximise one aspect to the detriment of another.

87. ESI1-DGTA will lead CM program effectiveness reviews independently from TAREG 3.5.5 audits (to emphasise the delineation) but always in conjunction with the respective AEO. Further information on effectiveness reviews may be obtained by contacting ESI1-DGTA.

ESIP Performance Measurement

88. The ESIMP template, located in AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1, includes a requirement to conduct ESIP performance measurement. The intent of such a requirement is to monitor performance against Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) within the ESIP to assist in maintaining the health of the ESIP. Various KPIs are recommended including Average Time On Wing (ATOW), IFSD rate and causes, Mission Abort (MA) rate and causes, unscheduled shop visit drivers, etc. A full list of performance measures is included in the ESIMP template. It should be noted that although such measurement is not currently a regulatory requirement, ESIP performance measurement is strongly encouraged as a tool for best practise.

89. Where the Commonwealth is responsible for ESI management, ESI1-DGTA will submit IFSD and MA rates, with their respective causes, to the annual Airworthiness Board for each aircraft. Where ESI management is a contractor responsibility, the contractor is encouraged to provide similar data at each Airworthiness Board (guidance on submission requirements can be provided by ESI1-DGTA).

ESIP Performance Measurement for Through Life Support (TLS) Contracts

90. In addition to Airworthiness Board review, many ESIP performance KPIs are often used for measuring the success of, and determining payment for, TLS contracts. In such situations, it is essential for the Commonwealth contract sponsor to maintain an adequate level of ESIP performance measurement. ESI1-DGTA is available to provide support and oversight for all ESIP performance measurement. The DMO ASD Performance Based Contracting (PBC) Handbook also provides useful guidance on KPIs and performance management for ADF aircraft engine fleets.

Piston Engines

91. The content of TAREG 3.5.5 is applicable to gas turbine engines specifically. Many aspects of the regulation will not be applicable to reciprocating engines, such as the definition of critical parts. Nevertheless, there may be benefits in establishing an ESI management system to apply some aspects of TAREG 3.5.5 (in particular, CM and performance monitoring aspects). ESI1-DGTA is able to provide guidance to establish such management systems.

Auxiliary Power Units (APUs)

92. An APU is a small gas turbine engine, used for any of several purposes including main engine starting and secondary power generation. Generally, an APU does not warrant management under an ESIP and will not be considered as applicable to TAREG 3.5.5. This is primarily as a result of the absence of any life limited part within an APU (including critical parts), which would necessitate the adoption of a UM program to prevent significant failure modes occurring. The remaining aspects (such as safety and CM) may be managed under TAREG 3 by considering the APU as a typical Repairable Item (RI).

93. In some cases, incorporating APU ESI management into the parent engine ESIP may be warranted (eg, where an APU contains life limited parts). The parent engine applicant should assess any such requirement. ESI1-DGTA staff are able to assist in such determinations.



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Extended Operations

94. Formerly known as ‘Extended Twin-engine Operations’, current Extended Operations (ETOPS) requirements form part of the US Government’s Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and EASA Certification Specifications governing civilian flight operations. Traditionally, ETOPS restricted the operation of twin engine aircraft to flight routes with a maximum diversion time of one hour at the one engine inoperative cruise speed. Extensions to the one hour limit could be sought from the FAA or EASA, provided certain airframe/system/engine and operator criteria were met. A revision to the ETOPS rule in Jan 07 led to the extension of ETOPS requirements to all turbine powered, multi-engine passenger carrying aircraft and twin engine cargo carrying aircraft. Relevant FAA ETOPS guidance is provided in AC 120-42A and the FAA Final Rule on ETOPS of Multi-Engine Airplanes. For the EASA, ETOPS guidance can be found in AMC 20-6.

95. There are no specific ADF regulatory requirements relating to ETOPS for ADF propulsion systems. Nevertheless, civil-derivative aircraft such as AEW&C (based on B737) and KC-30B (based on A330) are acquired with the potential for extended range operations and the application of certain propulsion system ETOPS aspects should be considered. In such cases, advice on the application of specific ETOPS requirements should be sought from ESI1-DGTA, during the aircraft acquisition phase.

96. As many ETOPS requirements form part of in-service engine management, aircraft already in service with the ADF, such as C-130H, C-130J and P-3C, may also benefit from implementation of ETOPS requirements. ESI1-DGTA is available to provide assistance in determining and assessing compliance against ETOPS requirements for any ADF propulsion system.

Commonwealth Participation in Component Improvement Programs (CIPs)

97. AAP 7001.054(AM1) Section 4, Chapter 1 discusses the participation of the ADF in engine Component Improvement Programs (CIPs) or equivalent international user groups. Attendance at these forums is strongly recommended by ESI1-DGTA. Due to the detailed engine-technical nature of discussions at these forums, any ADF representative should have an in-depth understanding of the engineering and logistics issues associated with the relevant engine type. Typically, it is the ESI manager who will be in the best position to attend a CIP. The applicable ESI1-DGTA Desk Officer or a DSTO representative may attend in support of the ESI manager if desired. Where the ESI manager is a contractor, attendance is expected irrespective of Commonwealth attendance.

Roles of ESI1-DGTA

98. Traditional functions of ESI1-DGTA are clearly defined in AAP 7001.068(AM1). For acquisition projects, ESI1-DGTA may also act on behalf of the PO as a compliance finding agency for propulsion systems. With the proliferation of Through Life Support contracts, ESI1-DGTA is also able to assist POs with corporate governance functions such as contract compliance assurance.

99. ESI1-DGTA conducts annual ESI management audits for each ESI management system. Annual desk-top audits are done within ESI1 section and should not require involvement from the applicant organisation. However, if deficiencies in the ESI management system are identified, the applicant will be formally notified. Once every two years, ESI1-DGTA will conduct a more detailed audit involving an on-site presence at the applicant organisation. Such audits are typically conducted with AIRREG to ensure minimal disruptions.

Annexes:

A. NAA Definitions of Critical Parts B. ENSIP and ESIP Comparison



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17A–1

NAA DEFINITIONS OF CRITICAL PARTS 1. In accordance with FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 33.14-1, a critical (rotating) part is defined as any engine component whose failure could produce ‘hazardous effect’. A hazardous effect is defined in AC 33.75-1 as any operation/event which causes the engine to:

a. catch fire;

b. burst (release hazardous fragments through the engine case);

c. generate loads greater than ultimate; or

d. lose the capability of being shut down.

2. The term ‘hazardous effects’ is deliberately used since at the ‘engine level’ (the level applicable for engine certification, hence its significance), it cannot be known what the ultimate consequence of failure will be: the aircraft level consequence is dependent on installation or mission (or both).

3. The ‘generation of loads greater than ultimate’ criterion exists to identify parts whose failure may cause loads at a magnitude which the engine assembly cannot sustain. Therefore, leading to possible separation of the engine from the engine mounts; clearly a very significant and undesirable situation. Components which may fall into this category include shafts and bearings.

4. The ‘loss of capability to shut the engine down’ criterion exists since the inability to shut an engine down may prevent the aircraft from continued safe flight or landing safely. In modern engines, adequate redundancy should exist to prevent this failure mode occurring.

5. In accordance with EASA CS-E 15, a critical part is defined as any engine component that relies upon meeting prescribed integrity specifications of CS-E 515 to avoid its Primary Failure, which is likely to result in a Hazardous Engine Effect. A hazardous effect is defined in EASA CS-E 510 as:

a. non-containment of high-energy debris;

b. concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air for the cabin sufficient to incapacitate crew or passengers;

c. significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot;

d. uncontrolled fire;

e. failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent Engine separation;

f. release of the propeller by the engine, if applicable; or

g. complete inability to shut the engine down.

6. The ADF need not use these definitions for critical parts because invariably, engines procured by the ADF have a known application. Thus, the ADF may benefit by applying these definitions to the actual engine configuration and aircraft role and operating environment to determine the aircraft level affect of component failure.



17A–2

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17B–1

ENSIP AND ESIP COMPARISON 1. Table 17–B–1 below compares the scope of activities for a MIL-HDBK-1783 ENSIP and an ADF ESIP. A listing of ‘N’ under the ADF ESIP requirement column means the efforts made by the OEM are acceptable for the ADF, or that there is no need for the ADF to be involved in the activity even if it were possible to do so (eg Accelerated Mission Test). A listing of ‘P’ means it may be possible for the ADF to become involved in the activity with OEM and (most likely) DSTO assistance, but it would not normally do so (eg, a detailed stress and thermal analysis of a turbine disk, followed by spin pit testing to extend the life limit of that part, given an operational requirement to do so).

Table 17–B–1 ENSIP and ESIP Activities

Task Sub Task Task Activity ENSIP Requirement (Y/N)

ADF ESIP Requirement (Y/N)

ENSIP Master Plan Y N Durability and Damage Tolerance Control Plans

Y N

Materials Process Characteristics Plan

Y N

Corrosion Prevention and Control

Y N

Task 1:

Design Information

Development Plans

Inspect and Diagnostics Plan

Y N

Design Duty Cycle Y P Material Characterisation

Y P

Design Development Tests

Y N

Analysis (sensitivity, critical parts list, thermal, strength, containment, vibration/flutter, stress/ environment spectra, durability, damage tolerance, creep).

Y P

Installed Engine Inspectability

Y P

Task 2:

Design Analysis, Material Characteristics & Development Tests

Manufacturing Processes and Quality Controls (VSR, NDI demonstration)

Y N

Strength Y P Vibration Y P Durability Y P Damage Tolerance Y P

Component Tests

Containment Y P Thermal Survey Y P

Task 3: Component and Core Engine Tests

Core Engine Tests Vibration, Strain and Flutter Boundary Survey

Y P

Thermal Survey Y N Ground Engine Tests Ground Vibration,

Strain and Flutter Boundary Survey

Y N



17B–2

Unbalanced Rotor Vibration

Y N

Strength Y N Impedance Y N Clearance Y N Containment Y N Ingestion Y N Accelerated Mission Tests (AMT)

Y N

Damage Tolerance Y N Fan Strain Survey Y N Nacelle Temperature Survey

Y N

Installed Vibration Y N

Flight Engine Test

Deterioration Y N Updated Analyses Y Y Engine Structural Maintenance Plan

Y P

Operational Usage Survey

Y Y

Individual Engine Tracking

Y Y

Durability and Damage Tolerance Control Actions (Production)

Y N

Retirement For Cause Actions/Plan

Y P

Engine CM program N Y ESIP Performance Monitoring

N Y

Engine CM program effectiveness review

N Y

Task 5: Engine Life Management

ESIP airworthiness audit

N Y



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 18

OHS IN DESIGN



TAREG 2.4.1 Service Release Submission and Recommendation

TAREG 2.5.6 Design Acceptance for Minor Changes to Type Design

TAREG 2.5.9 Assumption of Design Acceptance Certification

TAREG 3.4.1 Design Control System

TAREG 3.5.13 Service Release for Minor Changes to Type Design

INTRODUCTION

1. The Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) provides a technical airworthiness system for ADF weapon systems and related Aeronautical Product. The technical airworthiness system does not, in isolation, consider Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) aspects of individuals, although this is a desirable outcome of an effective design control system. The lack of regulatory attention to OHS was identified as a shortcoming in the F-111 Deseal/Reseal Board of Inquiry and led to four recommendations which have resulted in changes being incorporated into Sect 2, TAREGs 2 and 3.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to support the regulatory requirements resulting from NPRM 02-07.

SCOPE

3. The scope of the chapter is all AEOs and Project Offices providing design services to ADF aviation.

DEFINITIONS

4. For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

a. Commonwealth Employee. OHS Act 1991) Commonwealth employee is a person who is employed by the Commonwealth, whether the person is so employed under a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or under a contract of service or apprenticeship.

b. Competent Authority. An organisation that has the responsibility and accountability for the provision of authoritative design reference data and for exercising professional judgement in the provision of such data.

c. Competent Person. (OHS Act 1991) A competent person, in relation to a specified task, means a person who has, through a combination of training, education and experience, acquired knowledge and skills that enable the person to perform correctly the task. (SAFETYMAN Vo1, Pt 3, Chap 1, Annex A)

d. Hazard. (AS/NZS 4360:2004) A source of potential harm. (HB205-2004) May be physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic or psychosocial or a combination of these. A hazard does not represent an OHS risk if people are not exposed to it. An OHS risk arises when a person is exposed to a hazard.

e. Hazardous Substance. A substance that is described/listed in the Hazardous Substances Information System database; or has been determined to be a hazardous substance by the manufacturer, in writing and in accordance with the National Code of Practice for the Approved Criteria for Classifying Hazardous Substances [NOHSC:1008 (2004)].

f. Risk. (AS/NZS 4360:2004) The chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives.



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g. Risk Level. (AVRM DI(G) OPS 40-2) Risk level is a qualitative or quantitative measure of risk, resulting from an assessment of potential damage to equipment or personnel; degradation of capability; or effect upon morale or professional image.

h. Risk Treatment. (AS/NZS 4360:2004) Process of selection and implementation measures to modify risk.

i. Risk Management. (AS/NZS 4360:2004) The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards realising potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects.

j. Risk Management Process. (AS/NZS 4360:2004) The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of communicating, establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.

APPLICATION OF NEW REQUIREMENTS

5. The revised regulations, as a result of NPRM 02-07, exist to ensure that OHS considerations in design are afforded appropriate consideration consistent with the safety expectations for the platform. The revised regulations are applicable to all platforms. There is no discrimination on the basis of a platform being in an acquisition phase, in-service, or having a different support concept ie Commonwealth or contractor management arrangements under TAREG 2.7.

6. Some AEOs have already incorporated OHS considerations into their design control systems. Additionally, NPRM responses from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) indicate that they have procedures in place for OHS assessments. These procedures are used to satisfy the Commonwealth’s Contract Deliverables (CDRLs) that form the basis of Statements of Work (SOW) for ASDEFCONs (AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual(ADRM) refers).

7. AEOs should include Australian specific OHS requirements in the respective CBD and contract for supplies. If these requirements are not included, the AEO will be responsible for design changes as required prior to the acquisition/change to type design being presented for Service Release. Human Systems Integration aspects currently being considered by Defence Personnel Executive Project Safe Design may also be applicable.

TRANSITION PERIOD

8. DGTA acknowledges that transition to the new requirements will take time due to redevelopment of AEO procedures, EMERALD processes and possibly contract change proposals. Appropriate instructions to satisfy the new regulations should be developed within 12 months from promulgation of AL1 to the 06 Jan 05 version of the TAMM. AEOs and Project Offices who are unable to comply with this timeframe are to apply to DGTA for an extension under the provisions of TAREG 1.1.4.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 1991

9. The revised requirements should be viewed in the context of increasing the visibility of existing Commonwealth legislation in terms of its application to the ADF technical airworthiness system. The OHS Act of 1991 applies to all employers, employees and all States and Territories. Recent changes to the 1991 Act (Preliminary Part, 1 Sect 11, subclause (4) (a)) state that a Commonwealth employee is subject to proceedings, liable to be prosecuted and liable to pay any fine or penalty under the 1991 Act or regulations.

10. The Act requires that employers ‘take all reasonably practicable steps to protect the health and safety at work of the employer’s employees’ and that employees ‘do not take any action, or make any omission, that creates risk, or increases an existing risk, to the health and safety of the employee, or of other persons (whether employees or not) at or near the place at which the employee is at work’.

SOURCES OF SPECIALIST OHS DESIGN REFERENCE DATA

11. The new regulations require AEOs and Project Offices to seek specialist OHS reference data from a competent authority. This data is available through the OHS and Compensation (OHSC) Branch. OHSC has primary responsibility for safety policy and provision of services and expert advice. The OHSC Branch leads and coordinates Defence efforts to prevent or reduce the incidence and severity of occupational injury and disease by providing expert advice, policies, tools and services that enable Defence Groups to manage safety effectively, as an integral part of their everyday activities.



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12. In addition to the OHSC Branch, the Directorate of Defence Aviation & Air Force Safety (DDAAFS) has a charter to ‘provide CAF and Air Force Commanders with authoritative policy, advice and guidance on occupational health and safety and RAAFSAFE’. DDAAFS services have application to the wider aviation community and support CAF in his role as the ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF-AA). Information on the services provided by OHSC and DDAAFS support can be obtained via http://ohsc.defence.gov.au/. This website has links to valuable sources of OHS information including:

a. Army OHS programs;

b. Navy OHS programs;

c. OHS library;

d. OHS policy and support tools;

e. SAFETYMAN;

f. Material Safety Data Sheets – ChemAlert2;

g. Hazard Alert;

h. Workplace Safety Management Systems;

i. Defence OHS organisations;

j. Management of Hazardous Substances (Excluding Explosives and Radioactive Materials);

k. OHS training courses; and

l. OHS programs.

13. DAVENG-DGTA can provide assistance to AEOs and Project Offices in regards to OHS considerations that are related to specific technologies. This advice can be obtained directly from AMPTS1 or via the technologies (Chemicals and Electroplating) link at http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dgta/.

14. Design changes are reliant on approved design reference data and for the purposes of this chapter, the specifications and standards approved in AAP 7001.054(AM1) provide are considered approved design reference data. For maintenance processes involving hazardous substances, the recommended source of reference data is a MSDS.

PERSONAL COMPETENCE AND EXPERIENCE-OHS

15. Effective design outcomes are dependant upon the qualifications, training and experience of personnel who develop, review, approve and accept design changes. These persons are awarded a level of Engineering Authority (EA) that is commensurate with their skills in a particular discipline or their ability to interpret design reference data that has been developed by competent persons or organisations. With respect to design changes that introduce or increase the level of a previously identified OHS risk, there is no expectation that an AEO or Project Office should have specialist staff with specific professional skills in OHS. Rather, the OHS data from a competent authority is to be treated the same as other design reference data.

16. The effectiveness of the design outcome for OHS considerations is no different that of other designs, which requires professional and technical personnel to make an appropriate self assessment of competence. External support should be sought from specialist providers (as is the case with engineering services already sourced from Design Support Network (DSN) members and COEs) as required.

HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS

17. Whenever an OHS risk has been identified, the AEO or Project Office should apply the hierarchy of controls with the primary aim being elimination of the risk and the least desirable outcome being the use of PPE. An example of a hierarchy of controls is:

a. elimination,

b. substitution,

c. isolation,

d. engineering controls,

e. administrative controls, and

f. Personal Protective Equipment.



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OHS PLANS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

18. There is currently a broad variety of plans and systems in use throughout AEOs and Project offices. The intent of the new regulations is for OHS to receive appropriate attention, which may require a specific plan. If existing plans, such as those required by SAFETYMAN, provide adequate coverage, additional plans are not required.

SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM

19. The TAR requires System Safety Programs (SSPs) to be considered throughout the Life-Of-Type (LOT) of weapons systems from concept development to disposal. The SSP provides confidence that the weapon system is fit for service and poses acceptable hazards to personnel, public safety and the environment. Within this context, aspects of aircraft operational and deeper maintenance are also included, where the opportunity to affect Technical Airworthiness exists. At a local level, SSPs are co-ordinated by SPO or Project Office System Safety Managers (SSMs) (Ref ADRM Sect 2, Chap 1). Note that whilst there is no direct relationship between System Safety and OHS, by virtue of considering and reducing aircraft system hazards, the SSP may contain some OHS considerations. The SSP is not a suitable alternative for an OHS Plan.

AS/NZS 4801:2001 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

20. This Standard sets auditable criteria for an OHS management system and provides guidance on how the criteria may be achieved. This Standard is applicable to any organisation that wishes to:

a. implement, maintain and improve an OHS Management System (OHSMS);

b. assure itself of its conformance with its stated OHS policy;

c. demonstrate such conformance to others;

d. seek certification/registration of its OHSMS by an external organisation; or

e. make a self-determination and declaration of conformance with the Standard.

RISK MANAGEMENT

AS/NZS 4360 RISK MANAGEMENT

21. This Standard is preferred by DGTA for risk management within AEOs and Project Offices. The Standard can be applied to many situations, due to its broad nature, and is suited to OHS risk management. The main elements of the Standard are:

a. communicate and consult,

b. establish the context,

c. identify risks,

d. analyse risks,

e. evaluate risks,

f. treat risks, and

g. monitor and review.

22. The Standard comprises of several supporting documents. Handbook (HB) 436:2004 and HB 205-2004 having significant relevance to this chapter. HB 436:2004 is the Risk Management Guidelines Companion to AS/NZS 4360:2004. This document provides generic guidance for establishing and implementing effective risk management processes. It demonstrates how to establish the proper context and then how to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, communicate and monitor risks. HB 205-2004 is the OHS Risk Management Handbook and provides guidance on an integrated system to implement OHS risk management.

COMMUNICATION OF IDENTIFIED OHS RISKS

23. All OHS risks that have been identified and treated during the design process are to be communicated to those that will be exposed to them in the course of their duties. This communication, including updates to Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness, is to be managed as an element of Service Release. AEOs and AMOs are required to maintain appropriate instructions for aspects such as storage, handling and disposal of hazardous materials and the use of PPE.



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RISK LEVELS AND RISK REDUCTION

24. Information currently provided in AAP 7001.054(AM1) on System Safety Programs employs a Hazard Risk Index to assist design engineers in determining when further reduction is required. This approach is not directly applicable to those OHS aspects of designs. As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principles (as explained in HB 436:2004) provide additional tests for Design Engineers and Design Acceptance Representatives to determine when additional efforts to reduce OHS risks are required. The Standards identified in this guidance material are also useful when considered in terms of ALARP. DAVENG-DGTA can provide additional guidance to AEO and Project Office DARs on the ALARP principles.

AAP 7001.054(AM1)

25. AAP 7001.054(AM1) currently has a range of requirements to be considered during aircraft acquisition and in-service management. Annex C to Section 2, Chapter 1 has SOW requirements to be placed upon contractors and CDRL-12 identifies a requirement to perform a Health Hazard Assessment Report (HHA) to identify and determine quantities of the potentially hazardous materials. The HHA should also analyse how these materials and physical agents are used in the system and for its logistical support and provide a description as to why alternative non-hazardous materials are not suitable. The in-service SPO is able to use this report as design reference data for OHS considerations.

26. CDRL-13 requires generation of an Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) to evaluate activities for hazards or risks introduced into the system. The analysis also evaluates the adequacy of operational and support procedures used to eliminate, control or reduce other identified hazards or risks.

27. Where current or proposed contracts use alternative plans to satisfy the intent of the new regulations, the responsible AEO is able to determine suitability. There is no requirement to demand a specific plan when existing contractor plans are acceptable.

TECHNICAL APPROVAL OF ICA

28. Technical approval of ICA amendments should only be granted if the authorised person is satisfied that the amended ICA promulgates sufficient and appropriate notes, cautions and warnings to intended users. These notes, cautions and warnings must be observed to ensure the protection of health and safety of individuals and the environment.

29. In many cases, ICA amendment is initiated by a design change triggered by a variety of design change initiators. In these circumstances, OHS steps should be recorded in the design management system eg EMERALD, to ensure that OHS aspects are considered.

Referenced Instructions and Publications

AAP 7001.054(AM1)—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual(ADRM)

AS/NZS 4360:2004—Risk Management

AS/NZS 4801:2001—Occupation Health and Safety Management Systems – Specification with Guidance

AS/NZS 4804: 2004—Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems – General Guidance

Defence Safety Manual Vol 3, Pt 2—Aircraft Accident OHS Information for ADF Platforms

HB 205-2004—OHS Risk Management Handbook

HB 436:2004—Risk Management Guidelines Companion to AS/NZS 4360:2004

Australian Safety and Compensation Council www.ascc.gov.au/ (Hazardous Substances Information System (HSIS))



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1

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 19

WEIGHT AND BALANCE


TAREG 3.5.17 Weight and Balance

INTRODUCTION

1. The weight and balance characteristics of an aircraft and other airborne equipment must be maintained within certain limits to ensure safe operation. Management of weight and balance is therefore an important process for both weighing venues and Logistics Management organisations. Weighing venues must ensure that aircraft are weighed accurately while the Systems Program Offices (SPOs), as fleet managers, must manage the overall process and the data generated. This involves monitoring weight and balance data to detect any adverse trends and carefully managing the weight and balance impact of new design changes.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this Instruction is to identify the relevant TAREGs that apply to Aircraft weight and balance, and the publications which define the way in which aircraft weight and balance is to be managed within the ADF.

SCOPE

3. This Instruction applies to all organisations responsible for managing the weight and balance of ADF aircraft and airborne aircraft equipment. It must be noted that where any conflicts occur between the guidance and the regulations, regulation takes precedence.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

4. The following ADF Technical Airworthiness Regulations govern the mandatory requirements in the management of aircraft weight and balance within the ADF:

a. Design TAREG 3.5.17 – Weight and Balance; and

b. Maintenance TAREG 5.1.11. Weight and Balance

PROCESS GUIDANCE

5. The ADF has a standardised procedure for the management of aircraft weight and balance. Unless the AEO or AMO has an alternate procedure, which has been authorised by the TAR and documented in the EMP or MMP for the AEO or AMO, the aircraft weight and balance procedures defined in the following ADF publications are to be followed:

a. AAP 7021.008–1(AM1)—Aircraft Weight and Balance General;

b. DI(AF) AAP 7001.006–2—Technical Maintenance Control and Associated Documentation; and

c. The specific weapon system weight and balance publication, eg AAP 7213.006-5 Hornet (AF/A-18) Weight and Balance Summary Manual. (Each weapon system will have its own weight and balance publication, which addresses the specific requirements for that weapon system).

SPONSOR

6. This chapter is sponsored by AMPTS1-DAVENG within DGTA-ADF.

Referenced Instructions and Publications

AAP 7021.008–1(AM1)—Aircraft Weight and Balance General.

DI(AF) AAP 7001.006–2—Technical Maintenance Control and Associated Documentation.



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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 20

CENTRES OF EXPERTISE AND AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES


TAREG 1.1.5 Authoritative Airworthiness Advice

TAREG 1.3 Airworthiness Standards Representatives



TAREG 3.3.11 Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards

INTRODUCTION

1. Prescription, revision and interpretation of airworthiness standards is normally the responsibility of the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). However, in a number of specialist areas this responsibility may be delegated to an Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR). The ASR will have a personal delegation which authorises them to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards in accordance with TAREG 3.3.11. This delegation enables the ASR to perform the design standard definition role of the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) within a defined level and scope.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the ASR and Centre of Expertise (COE).

SCOPE

3. This chapter provides guidance to assist ASRs and COEs in providing airworthiness standards advice and design services.

REGULATION GUIDANCE

TAREG 1.3 – AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES


4. The TAR, or his staff, would normally prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards and provide Authoritative Airworthiness Advice; (AAA) however, the TAR recognises that there are other organisations that can perform this role on behalf of the TAR. These organisations are referred to in the regulations as COEs in which the Senior Design Engineer (SDE) position is occupied by an ASR. The ASR has a personal delegation to perform the TAA role and issue AAA in accordance with TAREG 1.1.5 and 3.3.11. Importantly, an ASR is acting as a ‘regulator’ when exercising their ASR delegation.

Cross References




TAREG 3.3.11 Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards


5. Commonwealth employees may apply to the TAR for delegation as an ASR. The scope of authority of an ASR will be to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards during acquisition and through life support. Authorisation of an ASR is provided through a Certificate of Authority as described by TAREG 1.3.4. The Certificate



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of Authority and the AEO Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA) will detail the scope and level of Engineering Authority, along with any conditions and limitations. An AEO in which an ASR is appointed should note the requirements of Annex A. This document identifies the additional procedures that need to be included in the EMP.

6. ASR or SDE? The distinction between the role of an ASR and an SDE can be confusing considering both roles are being performed by the same person using a single Engineering Management System (EMS). To clarify; the ASR is acting on behalf of the TAR via a delegated authority to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards (refer TAREG 1.3 and 3.3.11). ASRs may issue AAA and provide the recommended certification basis and design requirements for aircraft and aircraft systems. This authority is not vested in SDEs and provides a clear delineation between the ASR and SDE. The SDE is responsible for execution of the technical airworthiness regulations. He is not authorised to define design requirements or issue AAA. Individuals who are authorised as both an ASR and SDE perform the following two distinct functions:

a. Functions provided by an ASR:

(1) identification of deficiencies with airworthiness standards;

(2) recommendation of supplemental requirements to overcome deficiencies in airworthiness standards (as promulgated in ASR sponsored chapters of AAP 7001.054);

(3) approval for the use of alternative airworthiness standards that have been shown to establish an equivalent level of safety to the originally prescribed standards; and

(4) approval for the use of older standards for upgrades to in-service aircraft and related equipment.

b. Functions provided by a SDE:

(1) assignment of internal EA;

(2) design control;

(3) configuration item management;

(4) maintaining the EMS internal evaluation system;

(5) ensuring the EMS is understood, implemented and maintained;

(6) ensuring that there are sufficient personnel to undertake all activities in the EMP; and

(7) compliance management of commercial AEOs.


TAREG 1.3.1 - Applicability

7. Clause a. Definition and scope of regulation – self explanatory.

8. Clause b. Definition and reference to related regulations – self explanatory.

9. Clause c. Statement of responsibility in situations where an ASR appointment has not been made – self explanatory.

TAREG 1.3.2 - Application for Delegation as an ASR

10. Clause a. The application for delegation as an ASR must include:

11. Clause a(1) Self explanatory.

12. Clause a(2) Details of the position held and the airworthiness standards the ASR applicant proposes to prescribe, revise and interpret.

13. Clause a(3) Evidence that the applicant meets the ASR qualification requirements at TAREG 1, Annex B as well as the SDE requirements at TAREG 3, Annex A. Any deficiencies against these requirements must be stated in the ASR application.

14. Clause a(4) Evidence that the ADF AEO has certification to ISO 9001 and is authorised as an AEO vide a current EAC and LEA.

TAREG 1.3.3 - Eligibility

15. Clause a. The TAR has defined the minimum eligibility requirements for delegation as an ASR in the following paragraphs. The TAR may amend the eligibility requirements on a case by case basis.



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16. Clause a(1). Self explanatory.

17. Clause a(2). The ASR will be performing a subset of the TAR’s role under a personal delegation and therefore, must be a Commonwealth employee (either ADF or APS).

18. Clause a(3). The qualifications, training and experience of an ASR applicant will be assessed against the requirements of TAREG 3, Annex A. Any deficiencies against these requirements and mitigating factors must be stated in the ASR application.

19. Clause a(4). For nominated COEs, qualifications for an ASR applicant will be assessed against the requirements of TAREG 1, Annex B. Any deficiencies against these requirements must be stated in the ASR application.

TAREG 1.3.4 – Certificates of Authority

20. Clause a. The TAR may issue a Certificate of Authority to ASR applicants who satisfy the requirements of TAREG 1.3.2 and 1.3.3.

TAREG 1.3.5 – Duration of Certificates

21. Clause a. Self explanatory.

TAREG 1.3.6 – Delegation of ASR Responsibilities

22. Clause a. The ASR has a personal delegation from the TAR to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards on behalf of the TAR. Except as provided in Paragraph b, this authority cannot be further delegated without the explicit and written permission of the TAR.

23. Clause b. The ASR is not compelled to delegate his authority during periods of absence. The choice to do so is a personal one based upon the ASR’s assessment of the effect his absence will have on recipients of the specialist advice he provides.

24. Clause b(1) A competency assessment should consider the qualifications, training and experience of the candidate and the scope of authority of the COE. This assessment should consider the requirements of TAREG 1, Annex B and TAREG 3, Annex A.

25. Clause b(2) The written authorisation should identify the period of authorisation and any conditions or limitations that apply to that authorisation.

26. Clause b(3) This assessment will consider the period of authorisation and the complexity and workload of the ASR in regards to provision of specialist advice.

27. Clause b(4) There should be documented evidence of the review and endorsement actions performed by the ASR.

TAREG 3.3.11 – Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards


28. TAREG 3.3.11 outlines the procedural requirements for an ASR to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards.

Cross References




TAREG 3.5.2 Technical Information Review

TAREG 3.6.2 Changes to an AEO’s Organisation


29. As defined in TAREG 3.3.11, Commonwealth employees may apply to the TAR for delegation as an ASR. The scope of authority of an ASR will be to provide airworthiness standards advice and design services on acquisition and through life support for the materiel or technology that the AEO is responsible for. The ASR will be appointed to



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a COE which is required to establish and maintain an EMS. This system must identify how the ASR will provide the services normally provided by the TAR.


TAREG 3.3.11 – Prescribe Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards

30. Clause a. The procedure(s) should describe how the COE is to manage the requirements of this regulation and the interfaces with other procedures and regulatory requirements.

31. Clause a(1). The COE should identify in their EMP, the airworthiness standards for which the ASR has delegated authority to prescribe, revise and interpret. There should be a procedure(s) to ensure that all documents are managed in accordance with TAREG 3.3.10. This responsibility extends to sponsored chapters in AAP 7001.054, for those COEs promulgating the TAA’s preferred standards in this publication.

32. Clause a(2). The COE should identify in its EMS, a procedure to ensure that it pro-actively monitors any developments related to the airworthiness standards applicable to their scope.

33. The TAR is to be notified in writing prior to any change of the ASR. The ASR position must be occupied by a SDE or DSDE who satisfies the special qualification requirements of TAREG 1, Annex B and has been authorised as an ASR by the TAR. The qualifications in Annex B and the application process, provides the TAR with a level of assurance that the ASR is capable of fulfilling the ASR role.

34. Clause a(3). TAREG 1.1.5a. defines AAA as advice issued on behalf of the TAR by an ASR or authorised members of the TAR’s staff. TAREG 1.1.5c. states that AAA carries the authority of the TAR and that action required by the AAA is mandatory. To ensure that the intent of TAREG 1.1.5 is met, the COE must ensure that AAA is authorised by the ASR and is clearly identified as AAA. The TAR is to be informed of AAA issued on his behalf. The COE’s procedures should identify a method to ensure that acknowledgement of AAA receipt and compliance with, or rejection of AAA is recorded.

35. Clause a(4). The ASR must ensure that the organisation’s personnel are compliant with the personnel requirements in TAREG 3.3.2. The TAR expects that the competency of the ASR and any key COE personnel is maintained through formal professional development, participation in standards development working groups or attendance at seminars. The intent is to foster a proactive and informed approach to the role the ASR performs on behalf of the TAR.

ENGAGEMENT WITH AND AUTHORITY OF AN ASR

36. ASRs are not always engaged by Project Offices or at times when they are, are not engaged early enough in an acquisition or upgrade process. This situation is a symptom of having several technical regulatory frameworks and a corresponding limited understanding, outside of the technical airworthiness regulatory domain, of the ASR’s role and authority. ASRs should be engaged when the TAA is not in a position to fulfil the design standards definition role. The AAA issued by the ASR has the authority of the TAR and compliance is mandatory.

37. ASRs are encouraged to actively engage with Project Offices to ensure that the services they provide are known and their input is recorded in the PDAS prior to submission to the TAR. Methods to assist in advertising the role and authority of the ASR include sponsorship and maintenance of applicable standards in AAP 7001.054(AM1) and a COE website. These mediums should describe, as a minimum, the following:

a. the scope and level of organisational EA held by the COE,

b. the services the COE will provide and how to access those services,

c. where mandatory consultation is required, and

d. any advice on standards or publications that must be used during design of particular systems.

ASR COMPETENCY

38. The competency of an ASR is initially assessed during the ASR application process described in Regulation 1.3. Ongoing competency of the ASR is essential and the expectation is that the ASR will seek out and participate in professional development relevant to the ASR appointment. The form of which could be participation in formal training, standards development or attendance at DGTA-ADF or other airworthiness authority seminars.

COE COMPLIANCE

39. A COE must be compliant with the AEO applicable suite of regulations leading to award of an Engineering Authority Certificate. Compliance assessment of the COE will be AEO like with the exception of ensuring that the



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COE is compliant with TAREG 1.3 and 3.3.11. Compliance auditing will ensure that the COE is complying with all procedures and that the scope provided in the LEA has not been exceeded.


ASR QUALIFICATIONS

40. TAREG 1, Annex B identifies the mandatory ASR qualification requirements for selected COEs. The efficacy of the nominated qualification requirements in Annex B is reliant upon ongoing COE assessment. COE’s should monitor the qualifications nominated for their organisation and advise DGTA-ADF of any changes e.g. change in qualification title, non-availability of training or the training and corresponding qualification having no relevance to the scope of the COE. DGTA-ADF will review any proposals for inclusion in TAREG 1, Annex B.

Annex:

A. Roadmap – Centres of Expertise and Airworthiness Standards Representatives



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20A–1

ROADMAP –CENTRES OF EXPERTISE AND AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVES

1. A Centre of Expertise (COE) is an AEO with an ASR having delegated authority, from the TAR, to prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards within a defined scope. The COE’s EMP must identify how the ASR will provide the services he has been delegated to provide.

2. The purpose of this annex is to list the tasks required of an ASR/COE, the methods and references applicable to achieving the task; and the corresponding development and approval responsibilities.

Table 20–A–1 COE and ASR Roadmap

Task References / Method Develop Approve Determine and document the scope of proposed / existing ASR functions. That is, the systems and airworthiness standards that the ASR is, or will be, responsible for.

EMP AAP 7001.054(AM1) COE Website (document – preferred medium) AAP 7001.068(AM1) (least preferred – limited life expectancy)

AEO AEO AEO AEO

DGTA DGTA AEO DGTA

Determine the qualifications required of an ASR to cover the scope of proposed ASR functions.

AAP 7001.053(AM1) TAREG 1, Annex B AEO DGTA

Apply for delegation as an ASR.

TAREG 1.3.2 ASR AEO TAR

Develop procedures, in the EMP, that describe how to apply for an ASR delegation and how the ASR and COE will prescribe, revise and interpret airworthiness standards.

TAREG 1.1.5 – Authoritative Airworthiness Advice TAREG 1.3.2 – Application for Delegation as an ASR TAREG 1.3.3 – Eligibility TAREG 1.3.6 – Delegation of ASR Responsibilities TAREG 2.2.5 – Airworthiness Standards for New Aircraft and Major Changes TAREG 2.5.8 – Airworthiness Standards for Minor Design Changes TAREG 3.3.10 – Documentation Control TAREG 3.3.11 – Prescribe, Revise and Interpret Airworthiness Standards Sect 3, Chap 13 – Technical Airworthiness Directives Sect 3, Chap 20 – Acceptable means of compliance - Reg 3.3.11

AEO AEO

Develop, promulgate and maintain information informing customers of the COE’s capabilities, processes, services and roles.

COE Website (preferred method) AAP 7001.054(AM1) AAP 7001.068(AM1) (least preferred – limited life expectancy)

AEO AEO AEO

AEO DGTA DGTA

Identify ASR approved airworthiness design standards and their application to ADF systems.

AAP 7001.054(AM1)

AEO

DGTA



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SECTION 4

CHAPTER 1

APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS GUIDANCE –REGULATION SPECIFIC

Regulation Reference:

TAREG 4

INTRODUCTION

1. The Technical Airworthiness Regulator’s (TAR) responsibilities include the approval of organisations to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. Such organisations are referred to as TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs). This chapter provides guidance on AMOs that can be used, and managed by relevant Sponsor organisations, for the conduct of maintenance.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on:

a. the AMOs that can be used to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product;

b. the role and responsibilities of the Sponsor;

c. how an organisation becomes TAR approved;

d. elements that an AMO must have within its Maintenance Management System (MMS), including personnel requirements, human factors and maintenance error management system, and facilities;

e. the criteria that Senior Design Engineers (SDEs) of ADF AEOs must comply with when granting Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA); and

f. how organisations, or personnel involved in management or conduct of maintenance, may request an Exemption from one or more applicable clauses from TAREGs 4 and 5.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance to assist an organisation in understanding the regulations and to provide an acceptable means of compliance for TAR approval of an organisation to conduct maintenance. This chapter uses the following format to address each regulation:

a. Philosophy and Concept. Philosophy and concept is the information that provides, from an airworthiness perspective, the reason for the regulation.

b. Cross Reference. Cross reference refers to any current ADF publications and/or other regulatory systems (Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs), Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), etc) which either parallel the requirement of the stated regulation or apply to that regulation.

c. Explanation and Amplification. Explanation and amplification information provides clarification of the intent of the regulations. Also highlighted (where applicable), is how and why the regulations may differ from civil regulatory requirements.

4. Acceptable Means of Compliance. Acceptable means of compliance information is no longer added to the guidance pertaining to every regulation clause. Acceptable means of compliance statements regarding regulation clauses will only be made when acceptable means of compliance is not available elsewhere or when DGTA-ADF needs to highlight a compliance issue with a particular clause. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual provides a means by which ADF AMOs could meet some specific regulation clauses; however it is not necessarily a complete means of compliance for ADF AMOs as they are expected to supplement its guidance with instructions regarding unique local conditions. Commercial AMOs may examine AAP 7001.059(AM1) for guidance when developing their own operating instructions but there is no regulatory requirement for commercial AMOs to adopt the ADF’s solutions, noting an exception could be when a contractual requirement to use particular ADF procedures exists. It should also be noted that there may be a number of different acceptable methods available to commercial AMOs to comply with the regulations in this manual.



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REGULATION GUIDANCE

4.1 – GENERAL

TAREG 4.1.1 – APPLICABILITY – WHO MAY MAINTAIN STATE AIRCRAFT AND AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT


5. The ADF Aircraft Maintenance Regulatory system described in this manual promulgates the minimum technical airworthiness criteria for the maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. The Chief of Air Force is responsible for technical airworthiness of all State Aircraft and delegates this authority to the TAR, who has established the technical airworthiness regulatory system for maintenance of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product.

6. The intent of this regulation is to identify all military and commercial organisations, within and outside Australia that can conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. Such organisations are referred to as TAR AMOs that must be managed by relevant Sponsors under TAREG 4.1.2, and are defined as follows:

a. Certified AMOs as required by TAREG 4.3;

b. Organisations that are part of an AMO’s Maintenance Support Network (MSN) as required by TAREG 4.4.3, and are conducting maintenance on behalf of, and within the certified AMO’s scope and level of maintenance;

c. Organisations granted TMA by the SDE of an ADF AEO as required by TAREG 4.1.3;

d. Organisations holding accreditations from TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities as required by TAREG 4.1.4, and which provide the applicable Authorised Release Certificate (ARC) for the maintenance performed;

e. Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) undertaking maintenance confined to the installation of modifications, which have been developed by that AEO as required by TAREG 3.5.20.c.; and

f. Organisations that have been approved by the TAR in accordance with TAREG 4.1.5 following TAR assessment of the organisation’s Maintenance Management System (MMS). The TAR approval will be for a defined period and will normally include a limited scope and level.

7. Technical airworthiness assurance is maintained by reviewing, assessing, and auditing prospective and established AMOs. Each Sponsor, acting as the owner (and sometimes the operator) of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product, is also involved in the technical airworthiness assurance process. The Sponsor contributes to technical airworthiness assurance by prescribing the scope and level of maintenance, and is responsible for maintenance management support for AMOs to conduct maintenance. Technical airworthiness integrity is maintained by:

a. the Sponsor ensuring that only TAR approved organisations are used to conduct maintenance;

b. DAVCOMP-DGTA assessing new applicants for AMO approval for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5 in accordance with the proposed scope and level of maintenance to be conducted;

c. DAVCOMP-DGTA compliance assurance activities of prospective and established AMOs; and

d. the TAR managing compliance or limiting, suspending or withdrawing AMO certifications or other TAR approvals from organisations that fail to abide by their certification / approval responsibilities.

Cross References

8. The following references are relevant to the requirements of this regulation:

a. DI(G)OPS 02-2—Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 145; and

c. Federal Aviation Administration Regulation Part 43.1.

Explanation and Amplification.

9. Clause a. The only organisations that are permitted, by TAREGs 4 and 5s, to be used by Sponsor organisations to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product are those organisations defined as TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations.



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10. Clause b.

a. Clause b.(1). Unless the TAR provides other specific approvals, military and commercial organisations seeking to conduct maintenance of complete State Aircraft or complete engines are required to be certified AMOs. To qualify as a certified AMO, an organisation must hold a current Maintenance Authority Certificate (MAC) issued by the TAR. Each MAC consists of a certificate signed by the TAR with an accompanying Schedule that details the scope and level of maintenance. Sponsor activities are regulated by the TAR to ensure that Sponsors only use approved organisations to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical product. Commercial AMOs can become, or remain, certified AMOs if they demonstrate a regulatory compliant MMS. Where AMO certification is a contractual requirement for a commercial organisation, applying for AMO certification would normally occur after contract signature. In such cases where AMO certification is a contractual requirement, DGTA-ADF’s involvement should be as early as possible in the contracting process to assess contractual linkages to TAREGs 4 and 5, AMO certification requirements or other requirements for AMOs. All ADF AMOs conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product are required to become certified AMOs and to align and sustain their maintenance activities with the regulatory requirements detailed in this manual.

b. Clause b.(2). Sub-contractors to a certified AMO can only conduct maintenance of Aeronautical Product when the services are provided as part of the prime AMO’s MSN in accordance with TAREG 4.4.3, in which case the Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM) of the certified AMO remains responsible for all maintenance outsourced from the prime AMO. This regulation clause does not intend that a sub-contractor can further regularly sub-contract maintenance services to another party; the prime AMO would be expected to enter into an arrangement with each provider. Organisations holding accreditations from TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities (AA) may be included as part of an AMO’s MSN conducting maintenance of complete engines, provided the organisation holding such accreditations provides an ARC for the maintenance performed in accordance with TAREG 4.1.4. Finally, it should be noted that DAVCOMP-DGTA assessment of the MSN members will be conducted as part of DGTA-ADF’s certification and surveillance of the prime AMO. Approval of the MSN members is implicit in the certification of the prime AMO.

c. Clause b.(3). There will be occasions when short term maintenance support is required to overcome a surge in demand or for the installation of simple modifications, when implementation of the full AMO certification process would take too long or be otherwise inappropriate. In these cases, the SDE of an ADF AEO only may consider granting TMA in accordance with TAREG 4.1.3 to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance for a defined period of time not to exceed 12 months. The SDE who grants TMA will be responsible for the technical integrity of the work.

d. Clause b.(4). There may be occasions where maintenance could be outsourced to organisations that hold accreditation from other AAs for the same scope of work, noting that TAR recognised AAs can include both civil and military authorities. The TAR can currently recognise organisations that hold EASA, FAA or CASA accreditations, and which provide an applicable ARC for the maintenance performed in accordance with TAREG 4.1.4.

e. Clause b.(5). Organisations may be contracted to design, develop, produce and install modifications. Where the scope of the maintenance activity to be undertaken is confined to modification installation and does not involve any additional significant aircraft maintenance, the applicable AEO may install modifications, which have been developed by that AEO in accordance with the requirements of TAREG 3.5.20.c. Under this situation, there is no requirement for the organisation to become a certified AMO. Any concurrent aircraft maintenance should be conducted by a TAR AMO. Ongoing in-service maintenance of the modification should be conducted by an appropriate TAR AMO, normally a certified AMO. Further guidance is provided in relation to TAREG 3.5.20; see Section 3, Chapter 1.

f. Clause b.(6). Resource availability and risk considerations will inevitably limit the scope of application of TAREGs 4 and 5 to industry. This may particularly impinge on overseas repair item maintenance contracts, including US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support contracts. For such contracts, the full implementation of TAREGs 4 and 5 would require resource allocations out of proportion to the risk being addressed. Where the risk of compromised airworthiness can be assessed as acceptable, for example where contracts are underwritten by US DoD and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) quality systems, the TAR may approve an organisation based on the TAR’s assessment of the organisation’s MMS with the level of risk associated with the maintenance being conducted. The TAR approval will be for a defined period of time as set by the TAR, and the organisation will be limited in scope and level to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or



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Aeronautical Product, noting that the TAR approval is not intended to apply to maintenance of complete State Aircraft or complete engines.

TAREG 4.1.2 – SPONSOR

11. The intent of this regulation is to define the role of ADF organisations that are responsible for the maintenance management support of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

Philosophy and Concept.

12. Clause a. ADF Force Element Group Headquarters (FEG), ADF AEOs or other ADF organisations are the only organisations that are entitled to act in the role of Sponsor, and discharge their responsibilities through maintenance management support of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

13. Clause b

a. Clause b.(1). Sponsor activities are regulated by the TAR to ensure that Sponsors only use TAR AMOs to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical product.

b. Clause b.(2). Sponsors are to provide details to the TAR of all organisations that the Sponsor is using, or is proposing to use to conduct maintenance. Notification should be in the form of a minute with applicable supporting information enclosed or attached to the minute, and addressed to DAVCOMP. This provides the TAR with visibility of all military and commercial organisations conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product, within and outside Australia.

c. Clause b.(3). Sponsors are required to notify the TAR when the Sponsor becomes aware of adverse maintenance issues that could affect technical airworthiness of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product that has been maintained by a TAR AMO. Adverse issues include: changes to key personnel, significant increase or decrease in AMO personnel numbers, sudden increase in maintenance tempo, or declining maintenance standards. The TAR will assess each situation on a case by case basis and advise the Sponsor on an appropriate course of action.

Acceptable Means of Compliance – TAREG 4.1.2

14. An example of a Sponsor organisation is a Royal Australian Navy Force Element Group Headquarters being entitled to act in the role of Sponsor, and discharge its responsibilities through maintenance management support of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product maintained by Navy maintenance units.

TAREG 4.1.3 – TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE AUTHORITY (TMA)


15. The intent of this regulation is to define the role of a SDE of an ADF AEO, and the criteria to be applied when the SDE considers granting an organisation TMA to conduct limited maintenance of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product.


16. Clause a. SDEs of ADF AEOs are the only individuals entitled to grant TMA to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance. The intent of TMA is for short term maintenance support, and the duration of maintenance conducted under TMA is not to exceed 12 months.

17. Clause b. Unless the TAR provides other specific approvals, military and commercial organisations seeking to conduct maintenance of complete State Aircraft or complete engines are required to be certified AMOs. Therefore, organisations are not to conduct maintenance of complete State Aircraft or complete engines under TMA.

18. Clause c

a. Clause c.(1). CAF, acting as the Airworthiness Authority for all State Aircraft, has determined (at DI(G) OPS 02-2) that to be considered airworthy, from a technical perspective, an aircraft must be designed, constructed and maintained: to approved standards, by competent and approved individuals, who are acting as members of an approved organisation, and whose work is certified as correct, and accepted by the ADF. In considering the maintenance activities relevant to technical airworthiness management, an SDE considering granting TMA to an organisation is required to assess that organisation’s MMS to ensure there is a nominated individual in the organisation that meets the intent of TAREG 4.5.1, who will be responsible for all maintenance conducted of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product under the TMA. This provides the TAR with a level of confidence that the



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organisation has personnel in key appointments to manage maintenance activities in the organisation specific to the TMA granted by an SDE. Refer to additional guidance on TAREG 4.5.1 Senior Maintenance Manager in this chapter.

b. Clause c.(2). The SDE considering granting TMA to an organisation is required to assess that organisation’s MMS to ensure there are documented processes in place for assessing and authorising personnel as competent to perform maintenance, that meet the intent of TAREG 4.5.3. The TAR expects that all maintenance will be performed by competent and approved individuals who are acting as members of an approved organisation. Refer to additional guidance on TAREG 4.5.3 Maintenance Personnel in this chapter.

c. Clause c.(3). An SDE is required to assess the organisation’s facilities prior to granting TMA. The organisation must have, or have access to the necessary facilities for all maintenance activities to be conducted under TMA, that meet the intent of TAREG 4.6. Refer to additional guidance on TAREG 4.6 Facilities in this chapter.

d. Clause c.(4). A broad range of technical information and data including but not limited to: specifications, standards, drawings, instructions, reports, servicing schedules, publications, orders, and maintenance manuals are necessary in the conduct of maintenance on aircraft and associated components. An SDE considering granting TMA to an organisation is required to assess that the organisation has a system in place to ensure that only authorised technical data is used to conduct maintenance. This provides the TAR with a level of confidence that the organisation has access to necessary technical information and data in the conduct of maintenance by the organisation being granted TMA. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.1.1 Authorised Maintenance Data.

e. Clause c.(5). For the purpose of TAREG 5.1.2, certification means the act of an authorised person signing that they have discharged their responsibilities for a specific task. The act of certifying also signifies that the person has performed the maintenance that has been certified, and that the maintenance is complete and appropriate to the required maintenance. An SDE considering granting TMA to an organisation is required to assess that the organisation has a system and procedures in place to ensure that all maintenance performed is certified in a manner that meets the intent of TAREG 5.1.2. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.1.2 Maintenance Certification.

f. Clause c.(6). An organisation under consideration to be granted TMA must have procedures in place to prevent the ingress of foreign objects into, and the detection and removal of those objects from, State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. This provides the TAR with a level of confidence that the organisation has processes and procedures to control foreign objects during the conduct of maintenance.

g. Clause c.(7). An organisation under consideration to be granted TMA must have procedures in place to document and certify maintenance in a manner that meets the intent of TAREG 5.2. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.2 Maintenance Records and Documentation.

h. Clause c.(8). An SDE must ensure that unserviceable and unairworthy conditions and maintenance incidents that occur during maintenance conducted by an organisation granted TMA are reported and investigated in accordance with TAREG 5.3. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.3 Reporting and Investigation Requirements.

i. Clause c.(9). An SDE must ensure that all tools and support equipment required by an organisation granted TMA are managed meeting the intent of TAREG 5.4.1. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.4.1Tools and Support Equipment.

j. Clause c.(10). An SDE must ensure that all Aeronautical Product maintained, stored, or used by an organisation granted TMA meets the intent of TAREG 5.4.3. Refer to Section 4, Chapter 2 for additional guidance on TAREG 5.4.3 Aeronautical Product.

19. Clause d. The TAR requires a level of technical airworthiness assurance of products maintained by an organisation granted TMA by an SDE. A level of technical airworthiness assurance is primarily provided through product acceptance checks when items are returned from maintenance by an organisation granted TMA. The SDE is required to specify product acceptance checks, to be carried out by a nominated representative for items maintained under TMA. The product acceptance checks are to be specific to each item maintained under TMA. The level of technical airworthiness assurance would be strengthened by combining product acceptance checks with functional testing post installation in the aircraft.

20. Clause e. The TAR requires visibility of all military and commercial organisations conducting maintenance. In order to provide the required visibility, the SDE is required to notify the TAR when TMA has been granted,



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suspended, removed or expired. Notification can be in the form of a minute, or email with attached supporting information.

21. Clause f. SDEs are to carefully consider the grant of TMA as there may be occasions when the scope and level of maintenance conducted by an organisation is such that the organisation will require direct DGTA-ADF oversight. In these cases, the TAR will direct that the organisation involved is to become a certified AMO.


22. An example where an SDE may consider granting TMA to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance could be for the installation of an AEO approved minor modification of a non-flight safety critical item, and the maintenance activity is not expected to exceed 12 months.

TAREG 4.1.4 – AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY ACCREDITATIONS RECOGNISED BY THE TAR


23. The TAR recognises that organisations that hold accreditations from certain Airworthiness Authorities can conduct maintenance of Aeronautical Product. Maintenance conducted by organisations that hold accreditations from TAR recognised Airworthiness Authorities is deemed to have been conducted within a regulatory system equivalent to the ADF technical airworthiness regulatory system, provided that maintenance is accompanied by an ARC or equivalent.

Cross References


a. Regulation 42WA of CAR 1988, specifies the information that is to be contained in documentation covering the supply of certain Aeronautical Products;

b. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 42W-1 identifies overseas documentation acceptable to CASA and specifies the appropriate documentation for release or return to service of Aeronautical Products in Australia;

c. CAAP 42W-2(5): Authorised Release Certificate;

d. EASA Part 145.A.42 Provides guidance on the information to be provided on the EASA Form 1 Authorised Release Certificate;

e. FAA 14 Current FAA Regulations (CFR) 43.5 and Advisory Circular (AC) 20-62D, provides information and guidance for use in determining the quality, eligibility and traceability of aeronautical parts and materials intended for installation on U.S type-certificated products and to enable compliance with the applicable regulations; and

f. AAP 7001.053(AM1) TAREG 2.2.7—Recognition of Prior Acceptance.


25. Clause a

a. Clause a.(1). Form 1 is the ARC used by EASA. Further details on EASA Form 1 can be found on the EASA website.

b. Clause a.(2). FAA 8130 series is the FAA means of certifing products and parts whilst FAA Form 337 is the Certification Form for major repairs and alterations to airframe, powerplant, propellers, or appliances. Further details on the FAA Form 8130 series and FAA Form 337 can be found on the FAA website.

c. Clause a.(3). Form 1, or Form 917 is the ARC used by CASA. Further details on CASA Form 1, or Form 917 can be found on the CASA website.

26. Clause b. There are many Airworthiness Authorities in the civil aviation industry that use ARCs, or an equivalent document for the release or return to service of Aeronautical Product. Therefore, a Sponsor may apply to the TAR for approval to use organisations that hold accreditations from AAs other than EASA, FAA or CASA, or other Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAAs). In such cases, the Sponsor is required to provide information in support of the application, and also provide any additional information when requested by DGTA-ADF.



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27. CASA approved organisations holding CAR 30 approvals, and which can provide an ARC (e.g. CASA Form 1, or Form 917) for the maintenance performed would be an organisation that the TAR would consider approving to conduct maintenance of Aeronautical Product.

TAREG 4.1.5 – OTHER TAR APPROVALS


28. Resource availability and risk considerations will inevitably limit the scope of application of TAREGs 4 and 5 to industry. This may particularly impinge on overseas repair item maintenance contracts, including US FMS support contracts. For such contracts, the full implementation of TAREGs 4 and 5 would require resource allocations out of proportion to the risk being addressed.


29. Clause a. The intent of this regulation is to afford Sponsors flexibility in the maintenance environment. The following sub-clauses detail the situations when the TAR may approve the use of an otherwise non-TAR AMO and the subsequent requirements that a Sponsor will need to adhere to:

a. Clause a.(1). The intent of this regulation is to highlight that where the risk of compromised airworthiness can be assessed as acceptable, for example where contracts are underwritten by US DoD and OEM quality systems, the TAR may approve an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. The TAR approval will be for a defined period of time as set by the TAR, and the organisation will be limited in scope and level, noting that the TAR approval is not intended to apply to maintenance of complete State Aircraft or complete engines.

b. Clause a.(2). The TAR may approve an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product based on the TAR’s assessment of the organisation’s MMS with the level of risk associated with the maintenance being conducted.

c. Clause a.(3). Sponsors must apply to the TAR for approval to use an organisation to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product when the resources required for that organisation to become a certified AMO are considered excessive, and the organisation has a MMS commensurate with the level of risk associated with the maintenance being conducted. The application would normally be in the form of a minute or letter with attached supporting information

30. Clause b

a. Clause b.(1). The Sponsor’s application to the TAR must include the name and address of the organisation proposed to conduct maintenance.

b. Clause b.(2). The Sponsor’s application to the TAR must include details of the organisation’s MMS. This will provide the basis of the TAR’s assessment to determine if approval is to be awarded to the organisation.

c. Clause b.(3). The TAR requires visibility of all military and commercial organisations conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. In order to provide the required visibility, the Sponsor’s application to the TAR must include the level and scope of maintenance activity proposed to be conducted by the organisation.

d. Clause b.(4). The TAR requires a level of technical airworthiness assurance of products maintained by an organisation granted TAR approval under this regulation. A level of technical airworthiness assurance is supplemented by a risk assessment in support of the Sponsor’s application. The Sponsor may consider additional mitigating activities such as product acceptance checks when items are returned from maintenance by an organisation approved by the TAR, coupled with functional testing post installation in the aircraft.

e. Clause b.(5). The TAR recognises organisations that hold accreditation from EASA, FAA and CASA, and which provide the applicable ARC for the maintenance performed, as approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. There are many Airworthiness Authorities that use ARCs or equivalent. Therefore, a Sponsor’s application will be strengthened with the inclusion of any relevant certifications or approvals held by the organisation.



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31. Clause c. In certain cases where a Sponsor’s application to the TAR is incomplete, the approval process may be suspended until such time that supplemental information is provided by the Sponsor, when requested by DAVCOMP-DGTA.


32. An acceptable means of compliance to this regulation is where a Sponsor uses a CASA accredited organisation for the maintenance of an aircraft engine that is common to both civil and State registered aircraft, and that organisation provides a Form 917 for the maintenance performed.

4.2 – EXEMPTIONS

TAREG 4.2.1 – EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS


33. TAREGs 4 and 5 cover a broad spectrum of maintenance organisations and activities. There may be justifiable reasons for an organisation not to comply with certain TAREGs 4 and 5 requirements that are applicable to the organisation. Therefore, where practicable and justifiable, such organisations may apply to the TAR, through their relevant Sponsor, for an Exemption from one or more applicable TAREGs 4 and 5.

34. Applications can be submitted as part of the initial application for AMO certification, or when a prospective or existing AMO has a change in circumstances and can no longer, or has justifiable reason not to, comply with TAREGs 4 and 5. The TAR will review the Request for Exemption and make an appropriate judgement.

35. Any non-compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5 by an organisation will not necessarily prevent the organisation from being a AMO. In addition, nor will it mean that an existing TAR AMO will necessarily have its TAR AMO status withdrawn.

36. TAREGs 4 and 5 are written to encompass all aspects of maintenance. Rarely will an AMO’s scope and level of maintenance embrace every circumstance envisaged in TAREGs 4 and 5. Where any TAREGs 4 and 5 do not pertain to the scope and level of maintenance, an Exemption is not required. However, all certified AMOs are expected to provide details of the circumstances or justification of the non-applicability of specific TAREGs 4 and 5 in their Maintenance Management Plans (MMPs).

Cross References

37. This regulation addresses the subjects embodied in the following civil regulations:

a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.95; and

b. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 303A, 308, 42Z, 42ZQ, 42ZR, 42ZS, 42ZT, 42ZU;


38. Clause a. Approval from the TAR is required prior to any organisation or person(s) involved in maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product operating in accordance with the intent of any proposed Exemption.

39. Clause b. Where organisations or person(s) find that they cannot comply with one or more applicable TAREG 4 and 5 or believe that sufficient justification exists not to (strictly) comply with regulatory requirements, the organisation or person(s) is required to apply for an Exemption from the TAR.

40. Clause c. The TAR will only review and consider approval of a Request for Exemption that has been endorsed by the relevant Sponsor. Endorsement from a Sponsor is to be in writing, usually in the form of a Minute or letter including any applicable supporting information attached to the Minute or letter.

41. Clause d. This clause details the requirements that must be adhered to by an individual or organisation that has been granted an Exemption by the TAR.

42. Clause d. (1). An organisation or person(s) needs to be able to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the TAR, that it has fully complied with any terms and conditions associated with an approved Exemption.

43. Clause d. (2). An organisation or person(s) granted an Exemption by the TAR are required to maintain a permanent record that details all requested Exemptions, changes to associated plans and procedures, and any applicable subsequent incorporation details. The system used to maintain a permanent record of all Exemptions should be fully defined in the MMP or other controlled documents, and should also provide an effective mechanism for processing and recording Requests for Exemption.



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44. Clause d. (3). The TAR is to be advised when the grounds of an Exemption approved by the TAR no longer apply. This provides a level of technical airworthiness assurance through establishment of other processes (or other Exemptions) to comply with one or more applicable TAREG 4 and 5 in lieu of the previous approved Exemption, and in turn continues to maintain a regulatory compliant system.


45. The Request for Exemption is to be submitted in writing to the TAR and is processed through the relevant Sponsor. Each Request for Exemption, as a minimum must contain the following information:

a. title (a basic description of the request);

b. description of the problem and its origin;

c. nature and extent of the required Exemption, including an expected duration;

d. impact on aircraft maintenance and maintenance standards (if determinable);

e. impact on engineering, aircraft safety, and maintenance standards; and

f. details of why the organisation is unable to meet the subject regulatory requirement and attempts that have been made to do so.

4.3 – AUTHORISATIONS

TAREG 4.3.1 – APPLICATION FOR AMO CERTIFICATION


46. Any organisation seeking AMO certification needs to prove to the TAR that it is capable of conducting maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product within the proposed scope and level of maintenance. In addition to this, the applicant needs to assure the TAR that it is capable of, and will operate in strict adherence to TAREGs 4 and 5. The provision of the organisation’s documentation that demonstrates support of these requirements allows the TAR to assess the applicant’s capacity and capability to conduct the required maintenance.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 145.51;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.15, 145.70; and

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 30.


48. An applicant for AMO certification should provide documentation to the TAR that completely describes its organisation in terms of location, structure, capacity and capability, MMS and its commitment to compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5. A system audit will be conducted by DAVCOMP after which a site assessment will be carried out. Favourable results from both the system audit and site assessment provides the basis for a recommendation for AMO certification to be made to the TAR.

49. Clause a. A Sponsor must only use those organisations that have been approved by the TAR in accordance with TAREG 4.1.1. Where a Sponsor has identified that there is a requirement for an organisation to be certified as an AMO, arrangements must be made for an application for a MAC to be submitted to the TAR through that Sponsor. The application for a MAC is referred to as an AMO submission. On receipt of an AMO submission; the Sponsor must review it for:

a. consistency with the Sponsor’s identified maintenance requirement;

b. applicable contractual clauses regarding AMO requirements; and

c. any significant concerns or issues that need to be addressed before the AMO submission is forwarded to the TAR.



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NOTE

• DAVCOMP is responsible for assessing every AMO submission for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5.

50. Clause b. An applicant for AMO certification should submit documentation that demonstrates, accurately and thoroughly, how it intends to satisfy all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5. The AMO submission normally comprises a MMP and all referenced data, procedures or instructions. Further detail about the content and format of an MMP is provided at TAREG 4.4.1. The complete submission should provide the TAR with an understanding of the organisation’s operations and system(s) of maintenance. This will allow the TAR to gain sufficient understanding of the organisation to make a judgement concerning initial certification. All documentation submitted should be complete, controlled and fully referenced. Additional documentation, either sought by the TAR or submitted by the applicant, should be clearly identifiable as distinct from the regulation compliant minimum documentation set comprising the AMO submission.

51. Clause b. (1). The AMO submission should, along with the organisation’s name and address details, clearly identify the appointment, including phone number, of the person managing the AMO submission. The reason for the AMO submission would normally relate to:

a. For Service organisations. Type certification leading toward Service Release (in accordance with TAREG 2) of new or substantially modified State Aircraft, or creation of a new maintenance organisation for another reason; or

b. For commercial organisations. Contract award/renewal.

52. The AMO submission should include a clear and detailed statement that explains the reason for the application. Commercial organisations should make reference to the contractual requirements leading to the submission and Service organisations should include information about the organisation’s formation and intended scope of operation to explain the anticipated scope and level of maintenance expected be conducted.

53. Clause b. (2). The MMP is the key document in the AMO submission. The purpose of the MMP is to define the organisation’s MMS and it is regarded as a dynamic document which will evolve with the organisation. The MMP must comply with the requirements of TAREG 4.4.1. The MMP needs to be developed, reviewed and approved by the applicant organisation.

54. Clause b. (3). Where an applicant believes it has justifiable reason/s not to comply with one or more applicable TAREGs 4 and 5, the applicant must provide as part of its submission, a Request for Exemption in accordance with TAREG 4.2. As a general rule, the TAR expects that all AMOs will comply with all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 and will only consider granting an Exemption that has been endorsed by the relevant Sponsor.

55. Clause b. (4). The AMO submission needs to include details of any relevant military or civil Airworthiness Authority accreditations held by the applicant. This information may strengthen the applicant’s submission.

56. Clause c. Applicant organisations are to provide sufficient information in their AMO submission for the TAR to assess the suitability of the AMO submission against TAREGs 4 and 5. From time to time either the MMP or a referenced procedure may be unclear or deficient, in which case the Sponsor or DAVCOMP-DGTA Desk Officer will request additional information, documentation or clarification. Until requests for additional information, documentation or clarification have been satisfied, the AMO certification process will not proceed.


57. Compliance with this regulation will be demonstrated by the receipt at DAVCOMP-DGTA of an AMO submission that has been raised by the applicant organisation and endorsed by the Sponsor.

TAREG 4.3.2 – AWARD AND RETENTION OF AMO CERTIFICATION


58. The TAR will only certify an organisation, as an AMO, that has demonstrated an ability to comply with the TAREGs 4 and 5. The certification process requires the TAR to assess submissions and evaluate the organisation against TAREGs 4 and 5. A successful AMO submission will result in a MAC and accompanying Schedule being raised, detailing the name and location of the organisation and the certified scope and level of maintenance. Unsuccessful AMO submissions will be returned to the applicant via the respective Sponsor.

59. All certified AMOs, Service and commercial, will undergo periodic reassessment (compliance assurance) to assure the TAR that each AMO continues to comply with the applicable TAREGs 4 and 5, and continue to be a certified AMO.



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Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 145.51, 145.53; and

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.15, 145.20, 145.75.


61. Clause a. The initial assessment of the AMO submission will be a system (desk top) audit that is conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA. The purpose of the system audit is to make a judgement about the applicant’s ability to comply with all applicable clauses of TAREGs 4 and 5.

62. The intent of this regulation and its sub-clauses is to detail the elements of an applicant’s AMO submission that must be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA as part of the award and retention of AMO certification. DAVCOMP-DGTA must be satisfied that maintenance is going to be conducted to ADF approved standards, by competent and authorised personnel who are acting as members of an authorised organisation and whose work is certified as correct. Each AMO submission will be assessed to ensure the AMO has sufficient competent personnel available to plan, perform, inspect and certify all maintenance performed in the AMO. The AMO may demonstrate this through the provision of an organisational diagram that shows the functional breakdown of the organisation as well as major functional groups within the organisation. Further, the AMO submission will be assessed to ensure that the applicant has adequate facilities, all necessary tools, Authorised Maintenance Data, equipment and material to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

63. Clause b. Each AMO submission will be assessed by DAVCOMP-DGTA for compliance against all applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 through a system (desk top) audit. In the case where the system audit is not successful, DAVCOMP-DGTA will fully document the reasons for rejection and advise the applicant so that the detected deficiencies can be corrected.

64. Clause c. Applicants will need to facilitate the conduct of a site assessment and audits by DAVCOMP-DGTA to demonstrate that the applicant’s organisation complies, and continues to comply, with the TAREGs 4 and 5.

65. Clause d. Site assessments are carried out as part of AMO certification and are conducted as soon as possible after the system audit has been finalised. The purpose of the site assessment is to assure the TAR that the applicant has sufficient resources to conduct maintenance in the manner described in the AMO submission even though maintenance to the expected scope and level may not have commenced. Once the system audit and site assessment have been satisfactorily completed, the applicant can expect to be certified as an AMO.

66. Clause e. AMO certification is awarded by the TAR issuing a MAC, which includes an accompanying Schedule that is used to detail the scope and level of maintenance to be conducted by the AMO. Changes to the certified scope and level of maintenance will normally be reflected in an amendment of the MAC and accompanying Schedule.

67. Clause f. Each AMO will be certified to conduct a specified scope and level of maintenance. All AMOs may conduct maintenance to the extent of that certified in the MAC and accompanying Schedule, but are not allowed to exceed the MAC or Schedule.

68. Clause g. The TAR will periodically examine each AMO to verify that the AMO’s certification remains valid. Compliance assurance will be managed in accordance with Section 1, Chapter 6. Verification will require objective evidence confirming that the AMO is operating in accordance with the applicable TAREGs 4 and 5. In many cases this will be established by audit.


69. The clauses in this regulation specify assessment and evaluation activities conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA for the award, and ongoing assessment, of AMO certification to maintenance organisations. AMOs will be required to comply with their certified scope and level of maintenance to ensure continued certification.

TAREG 4.3.3 – CHANGES TO AMO CERTIFICATION


70. An AMO’s certification may need to be changed either by the Sponsor, to modify the scope or level, or by the AMO where regulatory compliant activities have resulted in the actual maintenance systems or organisational structure no longer reflecting the basis of AMO certification. Under these circumstances, the initiating organisation should apply to the TAR for a change to the certification and gain approval prior to incorporation of the change. This



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allows the TAR to ensure that proposed changes do not contravene TAREGs 4 and 5 and that the AMO’s certification remains valid. The preference is that changes be referred to the TAR as soon as possible so they can be managed in the best possible manner.

Cross References


a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.85;

b. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 145.57; and

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 30A.


72. Clause a. (1). AMOs will be expected to continue to operate in accordance with the MAC and accompanying Schedule. Exemptions granted by the TAR will be factored into the MAC.

73. Clause a. (2). The MMS described in the MMP, all of its referenced documents and any additional documentation requested by DAVCOMP-DGTA establishes the basis of AMO certification. Since the MAC is based on the MMS, any changes to the MMS have the potential to affect the basis on which the MAC and Schedule were issued.

74. Changes such as those to an organisation’s name or location, personnel filling key appointments, facilities, or changes considered to be significant that could affect the basis of AMO certification need to be reported to the TAR within two working days. A change that could affect the scope and level of maintenance might include significant changes to major maintenance systems such as tool control, personnel authorisations, or maintenance documentation. The details of the nature of the change need to be notified to the TAR to ensure that the change is both acceptable to the TAR and is managed appropriately. A change of the organisation’s name does not affect technical airworthiness; however, the change does necessitate the issue of a new MAC. Minor changes not affecting the basis of certification will normally be accounted for during on-going compliance assurance activities conducted by DAVCOMP-DGTA; therefore they do not need to be advised to the TAR. Examples of minor changes include editorial changes to the MMP and referenced documentation and non-significant changes to the MMS.

75. Clause a. (3). Depending on the nature of the change, the TAR may withdraw or amend the MAC and Schedule to reflect the change provided there is confidence the AMO can comply with applicable TAREGs 4 and 5 requirements. However, most changes, such as changes to key personnel and MMSs, will be considered on their merit and approval provided by means of correspondence. In all cases where the TAR has provided approval of a change, the AMO must update all affected plans and documentation. Documentation that has been changed to reflect a TAR approved change will be reviewed to confirm the intent of the change has been accurately documented.

TAREG 4.3.4 – DURATION OF AMO CERTIFICATION


76. An AMO’s certification will remain valid whilst acceptable compliance assurance can be demonstrated to the TAR, and there remains a requirement for the AMO to continue to maintain State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. As the certification authority, the TAR has full discretionary powers to suspend, limit or remove any AMO certification if sufficient evidence is available to support such an action.

Cross References




c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 30, 32.


78. The duration of an AMO’s certification is correlated to ongoing compliance with the TAREGs 4 and 5 by the AMO and an ongoing need by the Sponsor for the AMO to maintain State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. A certified AMO may continue to conduct maintenance as long as the MAC remains in force and is not expired, terminated, surrendered, suspended, or superseded.



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79. AMOs provide maintenance services only while they hold a valid MAC.

4.4 – MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

TAREG 4.4.1 – MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN (MMP)


80. A MMP is the means by which an AMO documents accurately and completely how it intends to comply with applicable TAREGs 4 and 5. The MMP is of considerable practical benefit to the AMO, the relevant Sponsor and the TAR because it discloses the AMO’s MMS in a single concise document. Although MMPs are mandated as a part of an AMO submission, their value as a living document that continually describes the AMO’s MMS can not be understated. While the format for an MMP is not mandated, requirements regarding content are mandated in TAREG 4.4.1.

Cross References




c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, CAR 30


82. The MMP is the means by which an AMO accurately and completely discloses its MMS and, hence, it’s intended way to comply with TAREGs 4 and 5. There is no mandated format for the MMP, however experience has shown that MMPs arranged in regulation order tend to be the most successful in terms of readability and useability. Additionally, an MMP which includes a regulation-to-procedure compliance matrix is useful in managing the compliance of the AMO’s MMS with TAREGs 4 and 5.

83. Clause a.(1). In addition to documenting an organisation’s MMS, each MMP needs to be authorised for use by a senior executive. Before authorising the MMP for use the senior executive must be satisfied that the MMP is regulatory compliant and the MMS so described accurately reflects the organisation’s actual management and maintenance related practises. The senior executive should seek objective evidence from the SMM and QM to reach a conclusion that the MMP properly discloses the actual MMS. Further, the approval of the MMP for use also carries an affirmation by the senior executive that the AMO can effectively discharge its responsibilities under the regulations. For the purposes of approval of the MMP, the Commanding Officer of an ADF AMO is the senior executive. In the case of a commercial AMO, a person having direct corporate authority for the AMO should authorise the MMP for use. In recognising a trend toward corporate MMPs covering multiple AMOs, a suitable senior executive at a higher organisational level is also acceptable. For example, a FEG Commander, or person at CEO level in a commercial organisation, may also authorise an MMP noting that the responsibility for confirming the AMO is capable of providing all the maintenance services in its approved scope and level remains extant.

84. Clause a.(2). The MMP must include details of the system used to manage Exemptions that complies with TAREG 4.2.1.

85. Clause a.(3). The MMP must include the details of the organisational structure, ensuring that all management and supervisory positions and that the chains of management and maintenance responsibilities are described therein. The information presented must be sufficiently detailed so that a clear understanding of the maintenance structure of the AMO is readily achieved.

86. Clause a.(4). The MMP must include the details of how it intends to manage all matters relating to the regular outsourcing of maintenance support services from its own scope and level of maintenance. The system must comply with TAREG 4.4.3.

87. Clause a.(5). The MMP must include the details of the Quality Management System (QMS) used within the AMO. Details relating to the regulatory requirements for an acceptable QMS are in TAREG 4.4.2 and associated guidance.

88. Clause a.(6). The MMP must include the details of the SMM`s responsibilities and the associated selection criteria expressed in terms of qualifications, training, and experience. The particular responsibilities for the SMM need to be sufficiently detailed such that a clear understanding of the SMM’s span of control is readily gained and they



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must include those instances where TAREGs 4 and 5 specifically state the SMM is responsible for either doing nominated activities or ensuring they are done.

89. Clause a.(7). The MMP must include the details of the selection criteria for the Quality Manager (QM). They should include details of applicable Lead Auditor training, qualifications and experience in QMSs.

90. Clause a.(8). The MMP must include the details of the selection criteria for all personnel who will be authorised to plan, perform, supervise, inspect, and certify for maintenance performed at the AMO.

a. Plan maintenance. The selection criteria for persons planning maintenance need to include at least: a demonstrated extensive understanding of the MMS in use at the AMO; suitable management related personal qualities; the degree of required technical competence in their particular trade discipline; and a strong broad understanding of aviation and maintenance matters. Authorisations for planning maintenance should be restricted to those personnel whose primary job in the AMO is associated with managing, organising, and coordinating the AMO’s resources to meet the AMO’s workload.

b. Perform maintenance. Personnel who can be authorised to perform maintenance in an AMO include tradespersons, inspectors, certifiers, non-technical persons, trainees and aircrew. Individuals from each of the preceding groups of persons who can be authorised to perform maintenance would normally be authorised to a variety of scopes and levels and, therefore, will attract differing selection criteria, training methods, and assessment strategies. For example, the scope and level of allowable maintenance authorisations for a tradesperson and a non-technical person are quite different and their selection, training, and assessments will be equally different. Selection criteria for tradespersons must include reference to applicable aviation trade training and any other qualification/s where applicable, specific aircraft or Aeronautical Product training, and workplace experience. Non-technical, trainees and aircrew personnel can also be authorised to perform a limited scope and level of maintenance that would normally include less complex tasks. The AMO will need to define exactly how such personnel will be trained (normally on the job) and assessed. Once the training and assessment has been completed, authorisation would be provided using the AMO’s standard process. AMOs will need to account for both the extent of, and variations in, base knowledge and skills of non-technical, trainees and aircrew personnel when considering their authorisations.

c. Supervise maintenance. The selection criteria associated with supervision of maintenance need to ensure that, the authorised person supervising the maintenance has appropriate qualifications, training, and experience to guide, direct, and correct the person being supervised and performing the maintenance.

d. Inspect maintenance. The selection criteria must ensure that only personnel who have appropriate qualifications, training, and experience can be authorised to perform Independent Maintenance Inspections (IMIs) in accordance with TAREG 5.1.3.

e. Certify maintenance. The selection criteria must ensure that only personnel who have appropriate qualifications, training, and experience can be authorised to certify maintenance. TAREG 4.5.3.c details the standards that must be met for staff to be authorised to certify maintenance.

91. Clause a.(9). Foreign object refers to any item, material or substance that, either deliberately or inadvertently, is left in or gains access to any part of an aircraft or Aeronautical Product. The presence of foreign objects can cause damage to, or present a hazard to, aircraft, Aeronautical Product and personnel safety.

92. The MMP should include, or provide a reference to another controlled document containing, the details of the system used by the AMO to prevent foreign object damage. The system should include, as a minimum:

a. an awareness program that ensures all personnel are educated on the need for foreign object control around aircraft, Aeronautical Products and maintenance areas;

b. a means of identifying, reporting and controlling potential sources of foreign object damage; and

c. a requirement that maintenance personnel perform an inspection for foreign objects at completion of a maintenance task prior to an area being sealed or otherwise enclosed.

93. Clause a.(10). The MMP must include the details of the system the AMO maintains to manage and record all assessments and authorisations performed within the AMO. The system used must comply with TAREG 4.5.3.

94. Clause a.(11). The MMP must include the details of a human factors and maintenance error management system that complies with TAREG 4.5.4.

95. Clause a.(12). The MMP must include a description of the facilities used in the conduct of maintenance that meets the requirements of TAREG 4.6.1.



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96. Clause a.(13). The MMP must include the details of the procedures used to assess facilities, away from the main facility, for the conduct of maintenance.

97. Clause a.(14). The MMP must include the details of how the AMO intends to comply with the requirements of all applicable clauses in TAREG 5.

98. Clause b. The MMP must include a clear statement of non-applicability against all clauses within TAREG 5 where the AMO believes that clause does not apply. The statement of non-applicability must include the reason/s why the clause does not apply to the AMO.

Acceptable means of compliance – TAREG 4.4.1

99. Clause a. The acceptable means of compliance for these clauses requires the production, use and maintenance of a MMP that clearly and accurately describes the AMO’s intended means to comply with each sub-clause.

100. Clause b. Where an AMO believes a clause in TAREG 5 does not apply to the applicant’s maintenance organisation, the MMP must have a statement to that effect and supporting reasons to justify the claim.

TAREG 4.4.2 – QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM


101. A QMS is considered an integral part of good management practice for maintenance organisations. It provides a system for managers to guide their organisations towards improved performance. No external quality standard has been specified in TAREGs 4 and 5; rather, a requirement for a system acceptable to the TAR has been stipulated to allow AMOs flexibility with respect to their compliance arrangements.

Cross References


a. AS/NZS ISO 9001:2000;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.65; and

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, CAR 30.


103. Clause a (1). Although the QMS need not be third party accredited, such accreditation may provide the TAR with an immediate and higher level of confidence in the effectiveness of the AMO’s QMS. The QMS should also provide an organisational ‘health monitoring’ capability to allow measurement of maintenance activity effectiveness. The QMS needs to have the following characteristics (based on the AS/NZS ISO 9001-2000 standard) to be acceptable to the TAR:

a. documented procedures that detail the operation of the QMS;

b. a review process that involves the management team and participation by other AMO personnel;

c. reviews of processes, procedures, and audit findings; and

d. processes for measurement analysis and improvement (for example, internal quality indicators, corrective action follow-up and preventative action procedures);

104. Clause a (2). For the purposes of this regulation, quality indicators are any quantitative means that are used by the AMO to measure the performance of specific elements of the MMS and QMS. Quality indicators could include:

a. rejection rates and warranty claims;

b. maintenance documentation errors, serviceability rates, sortie cancellations and delays;

c. Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) trending;

d. QMS performance (CAR closure rates and rejects of corrective and preventative action); and

e. foreign object damage incidents.

105. Clause b. DAVCOMP-DGTA’s compliance assurance programme specifically highlights an AMO’s compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5 and the AMO’s conformance with its MMS. The fundamental aspect of an AMO’s QMS, therefore, is a robust internal audit program which involves two main elements; internal system audits to ensure



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MMS compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5, and an internal audit programme that demonstrates the AMO continued conformance with its MMS. The following clauses identify the minimum requirements relating to an AMO’s internal audit program:

a. Clause b(1). There are two main events only that will trigger the AMO to programme an internal review of the MMS for compliance with TAREGs 4 and 5. Those main events are when an MMP is initially drafted and is about to be locally approved, or when the AMO subsequently amends the approved MMP. Regarding the development of an MMP leading to initial approval, the AMO should programme its own system audit to provide the necessary confidence that the MMP complies with TAREGs 4 and 5. Once an MMP is approved and in operation, AMO’s are expected to conduct management reviews of the MMS so described, to ensure continuous improvement through the development of changes to the in-service MMP and referenced instructions. When specific changes are proposed for the MMS, the AMO will need to programme smaller targeted system audits to ensure continued compliance of all proposed changes to TAREGs 4 and 5.

b. Clause b(2). The greater emphasis of an AMO’s internal audit schedule should aim to ensure the AMO’s ongoing compliance with its processes and procedures as documented in the MMP and referenced instructions. The AMO should consider tailoring the frequency of internal evaluations of the AMO’s MMS as some processes and/or procedures may require more frequent oversight than others. Such tailoring of the internal audit programme will directly lead to a more balanced internal evaluation workload.

c. Clause b(3). The AMO must be able to use its QMS to review both internally and externally generated corrective and preventive actions. Follow up actions can include, liaison with internal and external audit teams to clarify or progress any matter resulting from an audit, and development and review of any process or procedures changes resulting from audits.

d. Clause b(4). The QMS must also provide the means for management’s assessment of the effectiveness of preventive actions and the reporting of corrective and preventive actions leading to formally requesting close out.


106. A third party accredited QMS will provide an acceptable means of compliance for this regulation. A QMS that satisfies the foregoing requirements, but without third party accreditation, will also provide an acceptable means of compliance.

TAREG 4.4.3 – MAINTENANCE SUPPORT NETWORK (MSN)


107. This regulation recognises that AMOs may not have sufficient internal resources or facilities to carry out the full scope and level of maintenance, and may therefore obtain additional support from external organisations. The utilisation of external organisations to satisfy shortfalls is permitted under TAREGs 4 and 5, provided that a formal management system is identified by the AMO and is acceptable to the TAR. For the purpose of this regulation, the collective term used for these support organisations is ‘Maintenance Support Network’ (MSN). The certification of the AMO is therefore based on an examination of the organisation and its management system as a whole.

Cross References

108. The following reference is relevant to the requirements of this regulation:

a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.75(b).


109. This regulation mandates the requirement for an AMO to define those external organisations that provide maintenance support to the AMO. The AMO should include a system which details the arrangements for the regular outsourcing of maintenance that is beyond the AMO’s internal resources. The scope and level of maintenance conducted by each external organisation identified in the MSN needs to be defined, either directly or by reference, in the MMP, so that the TAR has visibility of the total maintenance capability both retained and outsourced. The MSN regulation relates only to those instances where the AMO itself intends to regularly outsource part of its certified scope and level of maintenance.

110. Clause a. The SMM assumes and retains full accountability for all maintenance conducted by the identified MSN. Therefore, before identifying an external organisation as part of the MSN, or sub-contracting maintenance of an



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ad hoc nature, the SMM should ensure that the intended organisation has, or has access to, applicable Authorised Maintenance Data, the correct tools, test equipment, facilities, and has competent personnel to carry out the maintenance required.

111. Clause b. Maintenance of complete State Aircraft, complete engines, and major engine sub-assemblies are not to be conducted by organisations that are part of a certified AMO’s MSN unless:

a. the organisation is operating under its own AMO certification provided by the TAR; or

b. the organisation can release aircraft, complete engine/s and/or major engine sub-assemblies under an ARC or equivalent.

112. This regulation does not intend to preclude an MSN organisation from conducting specific or component maintenance tasks on an aircraft.


113. Where an AMO requires to outsource maintenance from within its certified scope and level, the AMO has a system in place to demonstrate that the SMM remains accountable and assures the technical integrity of the maintenance conducted by the MSN.

4.5 – PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

TAREG 4.5.1 – SENIOR MAINTENANCE MANAGER


114. Each AMO will have a senior person who retains overall responsibility for all of the maintenance conducted by that organisation; that person is the SMM. The SMM needs to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the AMO, its MMS and TAREGs 4 and 5 such that assurance can be gained that the SMM is competent from a technical sense to perform the role.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 145.151;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.30; and

c. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual.


116. Clause a. The SMM is the senior appointment with direct technical responsibility for all functions related to the maintenance conducted by the AMO. The SMM needs to ensure that all maintenance, supervision and inspection of maintenance conducted by, or on behalf of, the AMO is performed by competent and authorised personnel, in accordance with ADF approved standards and practices.

117. Clause b. At a minimum, the SMM is expected to demonstrate sufficient competence to comply with all applicable requirements in this manual. While the Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) does not specify particular selection criteria for selection as a SMM, AMOs should understand that the competence required of an SMM varies according to the complexity and scale of maintenance conducted by the AMO. For example, the SMM of an ADF operating squadron will be expected to demonstrate a considerable range of qualifications, training and experience sufficient to meet the challenges of the position. However, the SMM of a smaller specialist deeper maintenance AMO may be required to demonstrate varying levels of qualifications, training and experience specific to the scope and level of maintenance being conducted. As a consequence, AMOs will be expected to account for scale and complexity of maintenance conducted by the AMO when determining the selection criteria the SMM must meet.

118. Clause c. The SMM is directly responsible for all of the maintenance conducted by the AMO. Therefore, the SMM is responsible for ensuring the AMO is adequately resourced for the scope and level of maintenance to be conducted and that the maintenance is conducted to approved standards, methods, and practices. Should the level of resourcing fall below an acceptable level, then the SMM will be obliged to either restore the level of resources required or seek higher corporate assistance for the required adjustment. A SMM should not allow maintenance to be conducted when there are insufficient resources unless a reduction of effort can counteract the deficiency. The SMM should establish either a system, or other means, whereby maintenance conducted within the AMO can be demonstrated to be performed to approved standards, methods, and practices.



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119. Clause d. The SMM will be required to demonstrate a thorough understanding of TAREGs 4 and 5 that apply to the AMO. The SMM’s understanding of TAREGs 4 and 5 is normally assessed during DAVCOMP-DGTA audits. The assessment would be based on the scope of only those TAREGs 4 and 5 that apply to the AMO in question.

120. Clause e. The regulations allow for the SMM to make delegations to AMO personnel. This is necessary for the smooth and efficient management of the AMO, however it is stressed that the SMM retains responsibility for all decisions made by the delegates. The underlying principle of this clause is that authority can be delegated, but responsibility cannot.


121. The acceptable means of compliance to this regulation is that the AMO has appointed an SMM who is responsible for the maintenance conducted by the AMO.

TAREG 4.5.2 – QUALITY MANAGER


122. Each AMO must have an individual responsible for all quality matters relevant to the AMO. These responsibilities include managing and monitoring the organisation’s compliance to their documented quality control system and maintaining compliance assurance checks against TAREGs 4 and 5. For the purpose of this regulation, this individual will be known as the QM.

Cross References


a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.30a, 145.65; and

b. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual.


124. Clause a. The QM is responsible to the AMO’s senior management for all quality matters within the AMO. This includes monitoring the organisation’s compliance with both the organisation’s internal QMS and with the regulatory requirements contained in this manual, with emphasis on TAREG 4.4.2. Each AMO will have a QM who has overall responsibility for the QMS. Should an organisation elect to have more than one QM, a senior QM may need to be authorised to co-ordinate the quality function across the AMO.

125. The QM position forms an integral part of the AMO’s upper level management structure. The incumbent would therefore require access to consult all AMO personnel directly on quality related issues.

126. Examples of activities performed by the QM are:

a. preparation of quality plan(s), responsibility for preparing and maintaining quality records;

b. manage solutions for improvement in all areas of business and maintenance practices and verify the implementation and effectiveness of those solutions;

c. manage corrective and preventive actions of non-compliances and non-conformances; and

d. conduct of awareness programs in quality management throughout the maintenance environment.

127. Clause b. The QM needs to have qualifications and experience commensurate with the roles and responsibilities associated with their position, and acceptable to the TAR. An example of the standard acceptable to the TAR for the selection of QM is:

a. Formal Training:

(1) Diploma/Advanced Diploma in Quality Management from a recognised institution; or

(2) JAS-ANZ/QSA or similarly accredited QA Certification and External (Lead) Auditor Training; or

(3) formal training to Certificate III/Certificate IV standard in Quality Management from a recognised institution may be suitable where the applicant has experience that significantly exceeds the experience described below.

b. Experience:



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(1) managing/auditing processes in a quality environment; or

(2) documenting and implementing a QMS; or

(3) facilitating and/or leading Quality Teams.


128. An AMO that has documented Quality Management procedures and processes and an appointed QM holding acceptable qualifications, training and experience would be compliant with this regulation.

TAREG 4.5.3 – MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL


129. Personnel performing maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product need to be appropriately authorised to perform the tasks associated with their duties. Personnel who perform ‘hands on’ maintenance tasks within an AMO need to be authorised by the SMM, or delegate, to allow the AMO to meet its maintenance obligations under the certified scope and level. For the purpose of this regulation, maintenance personnel includes aviation qualified technical personnel, non-technical personnel, aviation trade trainees and aircrew.

Cross References



b. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulation 30;

c. Federal Aviation Regulation FAR 145.151, 145.153;

d. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual; and

e. DEF(AUST) 9022—Requirements for Civilian Personnel Maintaining State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product.


131. Clause a. AMOs need to ensure they have sufficient personnel to meet all anticipated maintenance activity in the AMO. Maintenance activity in an AMO covers the spectrum of planning, performing, supervising, inspecting and certifying maintenance. This regulation acknowledges that maintenance can be performed by a variety of personnel having quite disparate qualifications, training and experience. In accounting for the varied backgrounds of the personnel who can be authorised to perform maintenance, the AMO still needs to match the skill sets of available personnel against the total amount of maintenance to be carried out.

132. Clause b. Ultimate responsibility for all authorisations in an AMO rests with the SMM. However, in some instances it may not be reasonable to expect the SMM to personally provide all required authorisations to personnel who plan, perform, supervise, inspect and certify maintenance. In those instances, the SMM may authorise a delegate provided the delegate is acceptable to the TAR.

133. A delegate acceptable to the TAR is a senior person in the AMO who holds similar or equivalent qualification to the SMM or who has been vested with relevant corporate authority. When authorising a delegate, the SMM should consider the extent of the proposed delegate’s knowledge of the qualifications, training, experience and attitudes of the person/s the delegate will authorise, and the depth of appreciation of the consequences of providing an authorisation to an unfit person.

134. Personnel other than tradespersons, such as non-technical, trainees and aircrew, may be authorised to maintain State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. However those authorisations attract a higher risk; it is these authorisations that should be provided by the SMM.

135. Clause c. Certification for maintenance is a formal act attesting to the integrity of the maintenance performed and/or supervised. Persons performing and/or certifying maintenance must meet a qualification, training and experience standard acceptable to the TAR. One such standard acceptable to the TAR is DEF(AUST) 9022. It is expected that personnel authorised to perform and certify maintenance will comply with the requirements of DEF(AUST) 9022, however AMOs may propose an alternative standard for the TAR’s approval.

136. Clause d. The assessment and authorisation process must demonstrate through documentation that all authorised persons are competent to perform their maintenance related duties and responsibilities. For the purposes of



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this clause “competent” includes both the applicable selection criteria detailed in the MMP and a thorough familiarity with the AMO’s MMS to the extent required by each authorisation.

137. Clause e. All authorised persons need to be re-assessed and re-authorised at least every 12 months. This requirement should be stated as part of the assessment process. Reassessments mainly intend to ensure the continued validity of the authorisation, all required training has been completed, and the authorisation matches the person’s intended employment. Re-assessments do not necessarily need to be performed to the same depth as the initial assessment; therefore, an abbreviated reassessment may be conducted in lieu of a repeat of the full initial assessment. This form of reassessment should only be conducted where there has been; little to no change in the authorised person’s scope and level of authorisation, and there has been no observable change in the person’s work habits or attitudes, and the system under which the re-assessment is being made has been documented and found acceptable to the TAR.

138. Clause f. The scope and level of maintenance tasks that an individual may be authorised to perform must be documented in an appropriate formal record. All re-authorisations of authorised persons, conducted by the SMM or delegate acceptable to the TAR should also be appropriately documented as a formal record. For Service organisations, an appropriate person other than the SMM may make authorisation entries in RAAF Record of Training and Employment (RTE), A Cards, or Army Aircraft Technical Trade Record (AATR) providing the SMM’s authorisation is formally documented elsewhere.

TAREG 4.5.4 – HUMAN FACTORS AND MAINTENANCE ERROR MANAGEMENT


139. Human Factors (HF) are commonly reported as related causes of maintenance accidents and incidents. The AMO has an obligation to the TAR and the organisation’s personnel, to mitigate the effect on maintenance caused by HF. An AMO is responsible to the TAR for ensuring that only personnel, whose performance is not adversely affected, either physiologically or psychologically, perform maintenance. The management of HF and the development of a culture supporting voluntary disclosure of potentially detrimental personal conditions reduce the chances of compromising the technical integrity of State Aircraft.

140. This regulation identifies the AMO’s responsibilities for the effective management of HF and Maintenance Error Management (MEM). MEM is a system that incorporates HF and provides the means to: properly manage risk during maintenance; examine a MMS for latent failures and propose measures for redress of those failures; investigate incidents to identify root causes and develop relevant preventive actions; and provide the means for competent analysis, reporting and review of incidents. HF relates to the person – machine – environment interfaces and provides a means for the technical workforce and management to better understand, and interact within, a technical environment in terms of risk to people and equipment. Proper application of an effective HF and MEM system will assist an AMO to move from reactive error management, through proactive, to predictive error management.

Cross References



b. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual;

c. OPS 40-5 ADF Human Factors and Aviation Maintenance Error Management;

d. SAFETYMAN Volume 3 Part 1—Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM);

e. AVMED Report 3/99—Maintaining the Maintainers: Alertness Management for Maintenance Personnel; and

f. ABR 5150 Naval Aviation Instructions, Chapter 12.


142. Clause a. AMOs must establish a system that provides the means for effective identification, notification, reporting and management of HF and MEM. HF and MEM form part of a larger safety management system however, for the purposes of this regulation, the topic’s scope is deliberately restricted to the application of HF and MEM within an AMO.

143. Clause b. All AMO personnel need to be cognisant of the effects on personnel by work duty times and rosters. In addition to fatigue, all personnel need to be aware of other conditions that adversely affect performance,



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such as stress, anxiety and medical and non-medical use of drugs. The AMO should have a system for the management of HF in maintenance that supports, as a minimum, the following:

a. the responsibility of all AMO personnel to notify their immediate supervisor should they be, or suspect any other person of to be, under the influence of drugs (prescription or otherwise) or alcohol that may adversely affect the performance of their duties;

b. the responsibility of all AMO personnel to notify their immediate superior should they have, or suspect any other person of having, any physiological or psychological condition that may adversely affect the performance of their duties;

c. the requirement for supervisors who identify a person whom they believe is impaired to immediately remove the person from the task at hand, to ensure correct procedures are implemented for the return of tools, foreign object control and completion of maintenance documentation and to consider any requirement for checking work recently completed by that person;

d. where shift work is required, the SMM should manage a roster system that takes into account adequate maintenance personnel rest and recuperation periods. Commercial AMOs should conform to Federal or State policy guidelines. As well as identifying the requirement for a Human Factors management system the TAR expects AMOs to have procedures covering the following:

(1) working hours and rosters; and

(2) HF awareness programs;

e. open reporting to foster a culture within the AMO that discloses, to the appropriate authorities, any personal condition (observed or experienced) that has the potential to adversely affect technical airworthiness; and

f. the development and maintenance of a just culture with respect to HF and MEM.

144. Clause c. Since contemporary world aviation statistics now indicate that approximately 80% of all aviation incidents have HF as a contributing factor, there is a clear requirement for AMOs to actively manage awareness programs that address HF and MEM matters. All technical personnel need to be exposed to a level of HF and MEM awareness training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities in the AMO. For example, the subject is introduced during initial employment training for ADF tradespersons and engineers alike. However, as each member’s duties and responsibilities to maintenance expand so too must their level of HF and MEM awareness.

145. Clause d. All instances of incorrect or inappropriate maintenance must be investigated and reported to, at least, the Sponsor and the TAR. The purpose of the investigation is to understand the HF and MEM factors relating to the incident and use the resulting information to assess and address latent and active failures in the MMS and to determine follow-on requirements relating to failures and violations.

146. Clause e. The integrity of the content of all reports resulting from investigations of incidents must be maintained. To that end, AMO personnel conducting investigations and raising reports must be competent to do so. Additionally, personnel who conduct investigations of maintenance incidents need an authorisation from the AMO. There is no particular requirement that the SMM provide the authorisation, however it should be provided by a person in the AMO who is both senior in the organisation and who also understands the need for only competent personnel to conduct investigations and raise reports.


147. Clause a. SAFETYMAN Volume 3 Part 1—Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) provides an acceptable means of compliance for this regulation. Commercial AMOs are encouraged to refer to the reference when they develop their HF and MEM system, noting that some commercial AMOs may be contracted to conduct HF and MEM related functions in accordance with the reference. In all cases, each AMO will be expected to have a formal system that covers the range of identification, notification, reporting, and management of HF and MEM.

148. Clause b. A procedure that requires the AMO to be continually alert to the need for maintenance personnel to be in an acceptable condition to be able to perform maintenance. Further, the procedure needs to include the means for maintenance personnel to be able to alert the AMO management when there is a heightened risk to maintenance due to a person’s physiological or psychological condition.

149. Clause c. Documentary evidence of a HF and MEM awareness continuation training program being conducted in the AMO including training material and personnel records showing receipt of such training. The content of the awareness program should be graduated to meet the needs of personnel at all levels of the AMO. For example, tradespersons may not need as deep an understanding of HF and MEM as would a senior person whose duties include investigation and reporting of incidents.



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150. Clause d. Reference D, SAFETYMAN Volume 3 Part 1—Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) provides an acceptable means of compliance for this clause.

151. Clause e. An AMO using trained and authorised personnel to investigate and report maintenance incidents would be considered an acceptable means of compliance.

4.6 – FACILITIES

TAREG 4.6.1 AMO FACILITIES


152. Facility requirements are an integral part of maintenance. Suitable facilities will improve the technical airworthiness and work environment aspects of maintenance conducted. Conversely, inadequate facilities may result in below standard maintenance practices and/or damage to the product being maintained. Special considerations should be given to storage facilities due to the impact they have on technical airworthiness with respect to segregation, preventing deterioration and providing security. To ensure that only appropriate facilities are utilised, the TAR will assess AMO facilities for adequacy with respect to the scope and level of maintenance conducted.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations FAR 145.103, 145.105, 145.203;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.A.25; and

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 30, 213.


154. For the purposes of this regulation, facilities are defined as fixed plant, hardstands, buildings or other structures that serve to house, store and secure aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product including associated equipment, instructions, data and documentation and include those areas where maintenance is managed, planned, and conducted.

155. TAREGs 4 and 5 do not replace the requirement for an AMO to comply with government or other applicable authority regulations and legislation (with respect to facilities). The TAR would expect AMOs to meet, and have documented proof of compliance with, all applicable Occupational Health and Safety and Environmental Protection Agency requirements.

156. Where the AMO proposes to utilise a facility not previously included as part of their AMO certification process, they should ensure that those facilities:

a. supports the level and scope of maintenance being (or to be) conducted;

b. is formally submitted to the TAR via the relevant Sponsor; and

c. is formally accepted by the TAR prior to the commencement of maintenance in the proposed facility.

157. In addition to the general facilities requirements, the AMO needs to be cognisant of the storage requirements for Aeronautical Product and associated documentation for which they are responsible. The AMO should be able to prove to the TAR that the storage facility requirements determined by the relevant AEO are applied. Where the AEO does not specify storage requirements, the OEM and/or national standards should be adhered to.

158. The TAR recognises that an AMO may be required to conduct maintenance at a location other than its parent facilities for operational deployments, emergency repairs/modifications or to conduct in-field specialised services such as Non Destructive Testing. Where the AMO is required to, or have the capability to, conduct maintenance at another location, the AMO needs to have a system that determines the facilities required and allows for the assessment of those facilities. The system of assessment for away-base facilities should consider the same aspects listed above for permanent maintenance facilities, paying additional attention to the following:

a. the specific scope and level of maintenance to be conducted at the alternate facility and consequent required features (hangar space, hardstand size, compass swing area, consumables storage, compressed air, waste disposal, explosive ordinance requirements);

b. any noteworthy environmental considerations, such as salt spray, high humidity, and/or heat; and

c. possible or identifiable security threats.



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159. Facilities that provide appropriate: working space; security; segregation; protection against deterioration, contamination, corrosion and damage for the conduct of maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product within the AMO’s certified scope and level are acceptable.



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1

SECTION 4

CHAPTER 2

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

Regulation Reference:

TAREG 5

5.1 – CONDUCT OF MAINTENANCE

TAREG 5.1.1– AUTHORISED MAINTENANCE DATA

Philosophy and Conduct

1. An Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) needs to have access to all the information required to conduct maintenance to the scope and level to which it is certified. That information will be located in various publications, instructions, directives, orders or other data repository (for example, electronic media) and there must be a system in place to ensure its continued validity.

Cross References


a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.A.45;

b. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulation 2A, 42V;

c. AAP 5030.001CD—Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual; and

d. NAP 7000.001–2—RAN Technical Publication System.


3. Clause a. For the purpose of this regulation, Authorised Maintenance Data is publications, instructions, orders, directives and data including all technical information such as specifications, drawings, and technical handbooks approved for use by Directorate General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA)-ADF or relevant Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO).

4. Clause b. An AMO is to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product in accordance with DGTA-ADF and relevant AEO Authorised Maintenance Data. The AMO needs to ensure that any data approved by DGTA-ADF or the relevant AEO is applicable to its certified scope and level. All Authorised Maintenance Data must be held and used by the AMO. Where Authorised Maintenance Data is not readily available, AMOs should have a system to obtain the required Authorised Maintenance Data prior to the commencement of maintenance.

5. Clause c. When an AMO identifies any deficiencies with Authorised Maintenance Data the AMO must notify the Sponsor of the Authorised Maintenance Data to enable the deficient Authorised Maintenance Data to be amended and updated.

6. Clause d. Authorised Maintenance Data is current at the time of issue, however over time data is revised, superseded, expires or is removed. An AMO must maintain a documented system for the review and management of Authorised Maintenance Data to ensure the data used to conduct maintenance remains current.

7. Clause e. An AMO must hold and continue to hold Authorised Maintenance Data that is complete, up to date, in good order, accessible, and applicable. An AMO must be aware of the Authorised Maintenance Data it holds and manage that data.

8. Clause f. There will be times when the AMO cannot comply with the Authorised Maintenance Data. In these instances the AMO must notify the Sponsor of the Authorised Maintenance Data so that the sponsor of the Authorised Maintenance Data can provide authoritative direction to the AMO.

9. Clause g. Often AMOs hold data such as training notes which are not approved for use by DGTA-ADF or the AEO for the conduct of maintenance. This information may be useful for trouble shooting or providing maintenance staff with generic system and maintenance related guidance. This is acceptable provided the data is clearly identified as not to be used for maintenance and AMO staff are aware of the status of the data.



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10. Clause h. Authorised Maintenance Data used in the conduct of maintenance is documented in both State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product specific and generic maintenance manuals. A broad range of philosophies are applied when developing these maintenance manuals which results in various levels of detail in the maintenance steps stipulated in these manuals. Some manuals contain procedures broken down into very detailed steps with minimal assumptions made about technical competence of personnel involved in the task. Alternatively, some maintenance manuals provide broad direction on a task, and rely on some assumed knowledge possessed by a technically competent maintenance workforce.

11. Since the ADF uses a wide range of manuals, maintainers have historically been given discretion to amplify and clarify maintenance procedures. This allows time-efficient maintenance without the need for continual recourse to the engineering organisations that sponsor the maintenance manuals.

Deciding serviceability criteria within AMOs

12. Allowing authorised AMOs maintenance staff to make defined engineering decisions is a long-standing, accepted element of the ADFs technical airworthiness system. Localised time-critical, risk based decision making is entirely appropriate in some situations to increase operational availability or improve efficiency in the maintenance effort. One type of engineering decision that can be made, in defined circumstances, is a decision on serviceability.1 Creating new serviceability criteria, and amending existing criteria are engineering decisions. Applying those criteria to decide whether a component2 is serviceable is a maintenance decision. Deciding serviceability criteria is the normal purview of the AEO. Nevertheless, in some defined circumstances maintenance staff are able to decide serviceability criteria. Note that it is not possible to determine a component’s serviceability without using serviceability criteria.

13. Link between criteria and disposition of unserviceability. Once a component has been determined to be unserviceable, it may be dispositioned in one of two ways. First, it may be repaired so as to return the component to serviceability before the next flight. Second, the unserviceability may be deferred using the established deferment of maintenance process.

14. Importantly, any work required to confirm the unserviceability of the component, including decisions on serviceability criteria, is a necessary precondition to initiating the deferment of maintenance process, but it is not part of the deferment of maintenance process. The deferment of unscheduled maintenance process may only begin once a component is determined to be unserviceable.

15. Types of serviceability criteria. There are two broad types of serviceability criteria. The first type is objective in that it requires maintenance staff to determine the value of a measurable parameter and compare that measurement against a defined value. Such measurable parameters include fluid level, pressure, temperature, time, resistance, weight, leakage rate and physical dimensions. The defined value is specific to the component in its aircraft application. For example, whilst leakage rate is relevant in determining serviceability of all hydraulic actuators, the defined value may vary in different applications. The same actuator, fitted to different aircraft, may have different allowable leakage rates. The second type of criteria applies to unserviceabilities that can not always be defined by measurable parameters. The AEO recognises and accepts that these subjective criteria require maintenance staff to apply their training and experience to determine whether, for example, there is ‘free play’, and ‘corrosion’, ‘contamination by oil and grease’, ‘adequate clearance’ or ‘loose rivets and fasteners’.

16. Publishing serviceability criteria. Serviceability criteria are published in different types of maintenance publications. First, an AEO responsible for a system will publish both objective and subjective criteria, relevant to a particular component in the component’s maintenance manuals. For example, the maintenance manual for a hydraulic component fitted to a Caribou may have specific serviceable criteria for allowable pressures and leakage rates.

17. Second, AEOs publish both objective and subjective serviceability criteria in the servicing schedules and scheduled servicing worksheets for systems and their components. Both types of criteria may be documented for a specific component. Subjective criteria are commonly implied by zonal inspections during scheduled servicings. These inspections use standard terms and words3 that invoke universally recognised serviceability criteria, such as:

a. Any incorrect sequencing of assembly or orientation of assembled components is unserviceability.

b. Any missing component constitutes unserviceability.

c. Any component that physically interferes with function or performance of another component is unserviceability.

1 Other types of engineering decisions that may be authorised within an AMO are deferment of maintenance, and the ability to vary, within limits, published maintenance procedures. 2 The term component will be used as a generic term for all parts of the system, including structural elements and fasteners. 3 Refer to AAP 7001.038(AM1)—Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) Manual.



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d. Any failed locking device is unserviceability.

18. Third, DGTA-ADF and AEOs with broader technology-based responsibilities may publish, in generic technology manuals, serviceability criteria relevant to components used across multiple systems. For example, there are serviceability criteria relevant to aircraft wiring, structural repair and integrity of fasteners.

19. Time critical decision making. Three different scenarios are explored in the following. In each scenario the regulatory position described is based on;

NOTE

• Where resolving uncertainty about serviceability criteria would markedly reduce operational availability or maintenance efficiency, then it is reasonable to quickly default to deciding the component is unserviceable and then apply rigour to disposition the unserviceability.

a. Scenario 1. Clear serviceability criteria. For some types of potential Unserviceabilities on specific components, the serviceability criteria are unambiguous, clear and sufficient. AMO maintenance staff do not usually require advice on the criteria or its application to the component. In this scenario maintenance staff have no discretion to create new criteria or modify existing criteria without reference to the AEO.

Maintenance staff must apply the specified criteria to decide whether the component is serviceable or unserviceable.

b. Scenario 2. Unclear serviceability criteria. In this scenario there are documented criteria for a potential unserviceability of a specific component. Nevertheless, AMO maintenance staff may consider that the criteria may be interpreted in different ways. There may also be conflicting criteria relevant to the same component. AMO staff may choose to seek direction from the relevant AEO. When they consider that seeking AEO direction would markedly decrease operational availability or maintenance efficiency, they must elect to choose reasonable interpretation that makes the component more likely unserviceable.

For example, one reasonable interpretation of the criteria may lead to a decision that the component is serviceable and another reasonable interpretation that the component is unserviceable. If there is no reference to the AEO, the maintenance staff must default to the interpretation which makes the component unserviceable.

In another situation, one interpretation of the criteria may set a higher standard of serviceability than other interpretations. Maintenance staff must default to selecting the more conservative interpretation. The outcome might still be that the component is still serviceable, but it is a tougher test.

Note that the subjective serviceability criteria are not, by their nature, always within this scenario. The absence of measurable parameters does not, by itself, make the criteria unclear.

If the documented serviceability criteria are so vague or insufficient, as to be incapable of reasonable interpretation, maintenance staff are to assume that no criteria have been published. Maintenance staff must then treat the decision as discussed in scenario three below.

c. Scenario 3. No documented serviceability criteria. In this scenario, there are no serviceability criteria specifically documented for the particular potential fault. For example, this scenario may arise during an unscheduled arising, since the criteria documented in the scheduled serving worksheets do not, at face value, apply to unscheduled arisings. In this situation AMO maintenance staff should use these documented serviceability criteria to the extent they are relevant.

If there are still no relevant documented criteria, AMO maintenance staff may choose to seek immediate direction from the AEO. When they consider that seeking AEO direction would markedly decrease operational availability or maintenance efficiency, they must develop relevant serviceability criteria that make the component unserviceable.

For example, during an unscheduled replacement of a hydraulic line in an aircraft’s wheel well, a potential unserviceability in another component may be detected. If there are relevant serviceability criteria for the wheel well’s zonal inspection in the R2’s worksheets, these criteria may be used. If there are no criteria in the worksheets, no criteria in the component’s maintenance manual and no



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criteria in generic technology manuals, then maintenance staff must seek AEO direction or create criteria which make the component unserviceable.

20. Which AMO maintenance staff can decide serviceability criteria?

a. Scenario 1. In this scenario there is no decision-making by maintenance staff.

b. Scenario 2. Deciding whether an interpretation is reasonable requires judgement. Therefore, the choices between reasonable interpretations must be made by maintenance staff of at least, or equivalent to, Trade Supervisor status. Trade Supervisors in doubt about their interpretations are to seek the advice of, or refer the serviceability criteria decision to, their senior maintenance staff.

c. Scenario 3. In scenario 3, all authorised maintenance personnel, irrespective of rank or position, can decide serviceability criteria in accordance with limitation discussed above. The rationale for this broad authorisation is the severe and conservative constraints on maintenance staff’s ability to decide criteria.

d. SMM discretion. SMMs may choose to exercise tighter control, within their AMOs, on who can decide serviceability criteria in scenarios 2 and 3.

21. Seeking advice. To inform the decision on serviceability criteria, the decision maker may choose to seek advice from other people on:

a. The documented location of relevant serviceability criteria;

b. Deciding serviceability criteria for those situations in which AMO staff can create criteria (as discussed at Scenario 3); and

c. How to apply a conservative interpretation to existing criteria open to various interpretations (as discussed at Scenario 2).

22. In the ADF technical airworthiness system, there is no concept of authoritative engineering advice being provided to AMO maintenance staff making decisions on, or applying, serviceability criteria. There is not, nor has there ever been, a concept that people must be authorised to provide advice to decision-makers who seek advice.

23. Importantly, any person asked to provide advice should, to the extant that she or he considers capable to comment:

a. Refer the maintainer asking the question to the relevant part, if it exists, of the authorised documentation that provides serviceability criteria.

b. Provides advice on interpretation of serviceability criteria open to multiple reasonable interpretations;

c. Suggest serviceability criteria allowable under Scenario 3; and

d. Comment on the developing view of serviceability criteria expressed by the decision-maker.

24. Operational availability and maintenance efficiency. The above discusses the ability of AMO maintenance staff to take specific engineering decisions, when transferring the decision to the AEO would markedly reduce operational availability or maintenance efficiency. The intent is not to create a situation where AMO maintenance staff stop seeking direction from AEO staff on serviceability criteria in situations when awaiting direction from AEO staff on serviceability criteria in situations when awaiting direction would not create these effects. The AMOs ability to create serviceability criteria should not be abused.

25. Feedback to AEOs. AMOs who discover problems with existing AEO-published serviceability criteria, or would like an AEO to document new serviceability criteria, should advise the relevant AEO through the normal PIRR process. Ideally, this engagement should occur in a considered manner without putting the AEO under adverse time pressures.

Clarifying and amplifying maintenance procedures

26. Maintenance procedures are part of the Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness for an aircraft or Aeronautical Product. They are normally provided by the relevant AEO, after the procedures have been processed through the Design Acceptance process. They must be distinguished from maintenance management procedures, which are the means by which an AMO describes how it intends to manage its maintenance activities. For instance, a procedure describing the removal of a component from an aircraft is a maintenance procedure. A procedure that describes the method of authorising a tradesperson to remove the component is a maintenance management procedure. AMOs can create and amend maintenance management procedures without reference to the relevant AEO.



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27. Amplifying or clarifying a maintenance procedure requires that an AEO-authorised maintenance procedure exists to achieve the desired maintenance outcome. The maintainer seeks to vary part of the procedure. The ability for AMOs to clarify or amplify maintenance procedures depends on the type of maintenance procedure. For the purposes of TAREGs, maintenance procedures are characterised by the extent that they:

a. describe serviceability criteria;

b. contain quantitative criteria that do not form part of serviceability criteria (torques, pressures, dimensions);4

c. provide a sequence of specific steps required to complete the maintenance activity;

d. relate to safety-critical systems or non safety-critical systems;

e. require inspections or disassembly/assembly;

f. pose Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) hazards to maintainers,

g. prescribe zonal/system cautions and warnings,

h. detail the use of tooling and Ground Support Equipment (GSE); and

i. detail the use of Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) and other consumables.

28. Maintainers are not able to amplify or clarify quantitative criteria, or their units of measure, in any maintenance procedure. Such clarification or amplification is to be sought from the relevant AEO.

29. Any maintenance procedure contains a series of sequenced steps. Maintenance procedures may be amplified or clarified by:

a. inserting steps:

(1) between existing steps;

(2) before the first documented step, where the new step(s) is necessary in order to perform the maintenance procedure; and

(3) after the last documented step, where the new step(s) are necessary in order to complete the maintenance procedure.

b. not performing existing steps which are clearly not applicable to the maintenance task being performed.

30. Distinction must be made between the sequence of steps in a maintenance procedure and a sequence of maintenance procedures. Whilst there should be some safety-based rationale for the former sequence, there is often no rationale for the latter. For example, a flight servicing schedule contains a sequence of maintenance procedures, some of which are not associated. The publication may imply that a maintainer should examine aircraft brakes before checking cockpit switches, but performing these steps in the reverse sequence would have no impact on aircraft safety.5 Maintainers can vary the sequence of maintenance procedures. In contrast, the sequence of steps required to remove and reinstall a component are critical. Thus within a maintenance procedure, amplifying and clarifying does not include amending existing steps or the sequence in which the existing steps are to be performed relative to each other.

31. The distinction between the sequence of logical steps within a maintenance procedure and the sequencing of maintenance procedures for efficiency can be blurred. Maintainers are to exercise their professional judgement in making such distinctions.

32. Further, maintainers can only add additional steps to a maintenance procedure when:

a. such steps only require the techniques/skills required of appropriately task-authorised maintainers; and

b. the maintainer has available the tooling/GSE/POL and other consumables required to perform the step.

Examples of Clarification and Amplification of Maintenance Procedures

33. There may be certain cases where amplification/clarification of an AEO-authorised maintenance procedure may appear to cross the line and lead to the apparent creation of a new maintenance procedure. Instances of creation of 4 Serviceability criteria can include quantitative criteria. Usually a measurement is taken and compared to benchmark criteria to determine serviceability. Other maintenance procedures can include quantitative criteria without any requirement to determine serviceability. 5 Although the steps may be sequenced for ergonomic/time-efficiency reasons.



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such a maintenance procedure usually imply that no AEO-authorised maintenance procedure exists to achieve the desired maintenance outcome. A maintenance procedure can also be created, in specific circumstances, when there is an extant procedure, but the maintainer has good reasons to create an alternative procedure.6 Maintainers can create new maintenance procedures only in the following scenarios:

a. Scenario 1. A maintainer needs to maintain component X for which there is no specific documented maintenance procedure. Nevertheless, generic maintenance manuals exist for the class of components containing component X. The maintainer is able to create a specific maintenance procedure for component X provided that this maintenance procedure falls entirely within the bounds of the allowable procedures in the generic manual. For example, a maintainer may develop a specific repair procedure for a structural defect if the type of defect is identified in the relevant structural repair manual and a generic repair scheme is detailed.

b. Scenario 2. A maintainer intends to perform an AEO-authorised maintenance procedure on component X. In order to gain access to component X, the maintainer needs to temporarily remove component Y. There is no AEO-authorised removal/installation process for component Y. The creation of a removal/installation procedure for component Y could be considered the creation of a new maintenance procedure. The regulatory position is that this situation falls within the discretion of AMOs to create new steps before an existing AEO-authorised maintenance procedure, when those steps are necessary to perform the authorised procedure. The critical consideration is whether Component Y is part of an AEO-specified safety critical system. If so, the AMO can only perform the removal/installation if the AEO has provided an authorised procedure for confirming the serviceability of the safety critical system after it has been disturbed by the removal and reinstallation of component Y. If the system is not safety critical, maintainers can exercise their professional judgement in deciding the steps for confirming serviceability.

c. Scenario 3. During a zonal inspection a defect is detected in component X. There is no specific AEO-authorised maintenance procedure for the removal/installation of component X. Maintainers can remove unserviceable components, without reference to the AEO, in defined circumstances. For components in AEO-specified safety critical systems, the caveat discussed in scenario 2 applies. The AMO can only perform the removal/installation if the AEO has provided an authorised procedure for confirming the serviceability of the disturbed safety critical system.

NOTE

• In these scenarios, the caveats discussed at paragraphs 16 through 19 apply to the ability of the maintainer to create steps in any maintenance procedure.

d. Scenario 4. A maintainer wants to create a maintenance inspection that does not require the component to be disassembled or reassembled. A maintainer may create a maintenance inspection, at any time, for the purposes of highlighting a potential unserviceability. The maintainer may not create a maintenance inspection containing serviceability criteria.

Occupational Health and Safety

34. In creating, amplifying or clarifying maintenance procedures, AEOs are required to consider their impact on the OHS of maintainers. In creating, amplifying and clarifying maintenance procedures, maintainers are also to consider OHS impacts.

Zonal/system cautions and warnings

35. In creating, amplifying or clarifying maintenance procedures, maintainers are required to consider the relevance of any zonal/system cautions and warnings.

Compelling emergency or contingency situations

36. In compelling emergency or contingency circumstances, maintainers can create, amplify or clarify maintenance procedures without the constraints described above. The AMO must be prepared to justify such actions to the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) after the return to normal operations.

6 In this latter case, there is potential for overlap with an amplified/clarified procedure.



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Decision to defer maintenance

37. The decision to defer unserviceability is often accompanied by a decision to introduce some targeted maintenance procedure to reduce the risk posed by the deferred maintenance. Maintainers can create new maintenance procedures, or amplify/clarify existing maintenance procedures, in this situation without the constraints described above. The maintenance procedure would need to be agreed by the deferment authority as part of the total decision. Such decisions could be subject to review by the AEO or TAA.

Contingency Maintenance and Battle Damage Repair

38. TAREG 5.1.12 allows maintainers to exercise Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT) and Battle Damage Repair (BDR) procedures approved by the relevant AEO. These AEO-approved procedures may provide maintainers with discretion to amplify, clarify and create maintenance procedures. In this situation, maintainers would not be subject to the constraints described above.

Time-criticality of decisions

39. In exercising their ability to create, amplify or clarify any maintenance procedure, maintainers should be cognisant of the time-criticality of the decision. Maintainers should only create, amplify or clarify maintenance procedures in situations where not to do so would markedly reduce aircraft availability or maintenance efficiency.

Self-assessed competence

40. Although maintainers have a restricted ability to create, amplify or clarify maintenance procedures, they should not do so where they believe such action would be outside their self-assessed level of competence. They are to take particular care in exercising their ability to create, amplify or clarify maintenance procedures on AEO-specified safety critical systems.

Who can authorise

41. TAREG 5.1.1.h only authorises Senior Maintenance Managers (SMMs) to amplify or clarify maintenance procedures. Taken literally this requirement would require constant referral of decisions to the SMM that would overload the Maintenance Management System (MMS). This regulation is to be interpreted as requiring the SMM to document, as a maintenance management procedure, the system to be applied within the AMO to create, amplify or clarify maintenance procedures. The maintenance management procedure is to:

a. specify who in the AMO can amplify, clarify and create specific types of maintenance procedures;

b. include all the constraints and considerations discussed above;

c. explain what ‘time criticality’ means in the context of that AMO; and

d. describe the method to be used in documenting approvals.

Advice to AEOs

42. The Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM) requires that the AMO must report to the relevant AEO any deficiencies in authorised maintenance procedures. Thus AMOs are to advise the relevant AEO of:

a. regular creation, amplification and clarification that should be documented by the AEO in the relevant maintenance manual, and

b. any creation, amplification or clarification of maintenance procedures for safety-critical systems.

TAREG 5.1.2 - MAINTENANCE CERTIFICATION


43. All maintenance must be certified by a person who is authorised for that maintenance to ensure that the maintenance has been performed completely, correctly and in accordance with Authorised Maintenance Data. AMO personnel need to understand that they are responsible and accountable for the maintenance they certify.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Regulation 43.2;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.A.50;



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c. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Regulation 42ZE;

d. Canada Transport Civil Aviation (CTCA) Regulation 571.10/11; and

e. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Regulation 43.101/145.103.


45. Clause a. When an authorised person certifies for maintenance by signing (electronically or physically) they are taking responsibility for that maintenance and will be accountable for that maintenance.

46. Clause b. An authorised person certifying maintenance must ensure maintenance being performed is accurately and progressively documented in accordance with the requirements defined in TAREG 5.2.1. The description of maintenance performed must be precise and reflect the actual maintenance that was performed.

47. As maintenance varies in complexity, difficulty, cross trade requirements and duration it is difficult to define the requirements for progressive certification of maintenance. However, an AMO should ensure, as a minimum, authorised persons certify for maintenance at the end of a shift, prior to another trade category beginning their phase of a maintenance task, and at the completion of maintenance.

48. Clause c. A person may only certify maintenance if they are duly authorised to certify the maintenance performed and they either physically performed the maintenance, or supervised the performance of the maintenance. When a person certifies maintenance they supervised they must be satisfied the maintenance was performed correctly and accept responsibility for that maintenance. In addition where an authorised person performs maintenance, and requires the assistance of other personnel, including trainees, the authorised person certifying the maintenance is responsible for all maintenance performed.

49. Clause d. All maintenance must be certified as complete but only after the following sub-clauses have been ensured:

a. Sub-Clause d(1). Maintenance can only be performed by authorised persons. The AMO Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) will detail the process for authorising persons for the performance of maintenance. The AMO will define the scope and level of the maintenance activities that authorised persons can perform. Authorised persons must only perform maintenance within the limits of the authorisation granted by the AMO.

b. Sub-Clause d(2). Authorised Maintenance Data will define the required maintenance actions to be carried out. When certifying maintenance the authorised person must ensure that the maintenance performed was appropriate and applicable to the required task and that the product is fit for return to service.

c. Sub-Clause d(3). The AMOs MMP documents the AMO maintenance management system that is compliant with TAREGs 4 and 5. As such, an authorised person must ensure that the maintenance is performed in accordance with the AMOs maintenance management system prior to certifying for the maintenance.

d. Sub-Clause d(4). A foreign object hazard is any item left behind after maintenance that may cause damage to, or prevent the correct operation of, an aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. The AMO MMP will detail the process for foreign object control. A person certifying for maintenance must ensure that no foreign objects remain in the item being maintained.

e. Sub-Clause d(5). If the maintenance completed is a stage of maintenance, or further maintenance is required, all further required maintenance must be documented in the aircraft or Aeronautical Product maintenance documentation.

50. Clause e. The authorised person who certifies the maintenance accepts responsibility for the maintenance whether they performed the maintenance or they supervised the performance of the maintenance. Although other authorised persons may have performed the maintenance, the authorised person certifying the maintenance as complete accepts responsibility for the maintenance being completed correctly.

TAREG 5.1.3 – INDEPENDENT MAINTENANCE INSPECTIONS


51. All maintenance tasks carry varying levels of risk. To ensure the integrity of maintenance, those tasks that carry high risk and whose consequences of maintenance error include a direct, adverse affect on flight safety need to be identified and independently inspected. Independent Maintenance Inspections (IMIs) are performed by an



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independent authorised person on certain maintenance tasks to verify the quality of workmanship, integrity of items systems and equipment is maintained, and detection and subsequent correction of maintenance errors.

Cross References


a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.A.65;

b. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Regulation 42G; and

c. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Regulation 43.113.


53. Clause a. The person performing the IMI needs to be authorised in accordance with TAREG 4.5—Personnel Requirements. Where an IMI is required, the authorised person may carry out the inspection, providing that person was not involved in the maintenance task. A person is to be considered as being involved in the maintenance task if they performed or supervised any of the maintenance to be inspected.

54. Clause b. For the purposes of this regulation safety critical items, as determined by maintenance personnel, are those items where maintenance error would lead to functional loss or secondary damage that have a direct and adverse effect on the controlled flight of the aircraft.

55. The systems referred to in this regulation are further defined as:

a. Sub-Clause b(1). Flying controls including all components and parts, the movement of which, in the functional sense, whether manual, power operated or power assisted, or electric/fibre (fly by wire/light), results in operation or locking of the aircraft’s movable aerodynamic surfaces (including flaps, airbrakes, trimming controls, helicopter rotor pitch change gear and dual control systems).

b. Sub-Clause b(2). Engine controls including all components and parts, the movement of which, in the functional sense, controls the power output of the engine (including propeller pitch, fuel delivery and control systems, engine air inlet controls and reverse thrust controls).

c. Sub-Clause b(3). Undercarriage controls including all components and parts, the movement of which, in a functional sense, results in operation of the aircraft undercarriage (including retraction, lowering, up and down locking, steering and wheel braking).

d. Sub-Clause b(4). Airborne oxygen equipment including gaseous and liquid distribution systems, on board oxygen generating systems, emergency systems and portable oxygen storage and distribution systems.

e. Sub-Clause b(5). Emergency egress equipment including those aircraft systems that are designed to function in an emergency to aid the safe escape of personnel from the aircraft. This includes maintenance of equipment operated by explosive means when the equipment cannot be otherwise functionally tested and where correct operation of the equipment is critical to the safety of personnel7.

f. Sub-Clause b(6). Loaded, stowed and installed explosive ordnance.

g. Sub-Clause b(7). Other systems as specified by the AEO in accordance with TAREG 3.5.15.

56. Clause c. Completion of maintenance means the maintenance has been certified by the person who performed the maintenance prior to an IMI being performed. An IMI must be performed prior to any subsequent maintenance that could impair or prevent the effective performance of that IMI. An example of subsequent maintenance is the installation of a panel that prevents access to the item(s) being inspected.

a. Sub-Clause c(1). A check for correct assembly, adjustment and/or locking at the completion of maintenance requires the person carrying out the IMI to determine or verify that the item and its parts have been assembled; adjusted and/or all locking devices have been made safe in accordance with the Authorised Maintenance Data.

b. Sub-Clause c(2). A check that an item and its parts operate with full range and freedom of movement, and in the correct sense requires the person carrying out the IMI to verify that item being

7 This regulation is not intended to include items that are designed to support the safety of personnel following safe escape from the aircraft. These items should not require additional IMIs when installed on the aircraft as sufficient maintenance assurance on these items may be achieved in the life support workshop environment.



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inspected have full and free movement, in the correct sense, throughout their operating range in accordance with the Authorised Maintenance Data.

57. Clause d. In accordance with TAREG 3.5.15, AEOs specify items and systems that are subject to IMIs. This will be issued in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness and subsequently issued to an AMO as Authorised Maintenance Data. IMIs are to be performed in accordance with Authorised Maintenance Data.

58. Clause e. The application of IMIs is not exclusively limited to the conduct of maintenance on flight-safety-critical items. An IMI is an independent verification of maintenance quality, and as such it may have a broader use within the maintenance being conducted by an AMO. Reasons why an AMO may wish to identify additional IMIs include the need to manage the effects of fatigue, environmental extremes and other factors on maintenance standards.

59. AMO specified IMI requirements should be used sparingly. IMIs should not be used as a substitute for additional levels of supervision or inadequate publications. In the first instance, changes or improvements to the Authorised Maintenance Data and/or improved effectiveness of supervision should be considered. This is to preserve the intent of IMIs, and remove the temptation for AMOs to specify excessive and unnecessary IMIs that can reduce maintenance efficiency within the AMO.

60. Clause f. TAREG 5.1.2.d guidance applies to this clause.

TAREG 5.1.4 – MAINTENANCE RELEASE OF AIRCRAFT


61. The purpose of an aircraft being released from maintenance is to allow aircrew to make an informed decision concerning the condition of the aircraft and the suitability for operational purposes. The practice of releasing an aircraft from maintenance should ensure that all required maintenance has been carried out, the aircraft is in approved configuration and no maintenance will fall due during the scheduled period of operation.

Cross References



b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.A.50;

c. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Regulation 42ZE;

d. Canada Transport Civil Aviation (CTCA) Regulation 571.10/11; and

e. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Regulation 43.101/145.103.


63. Clause a. On completion of all required maintenance an authorised person must make a certification in the maintenance record that will be visible to aircrew identifying that aircraft is released for operations.

64. Clause b. When an authorised person makes a certification that the aircraft is released from maintenance they are responsible to ensure that all required maintenance has been completed, or a determination made in accordance with TAREG 5.1.6, the aircraft is in the required configuration, tooling is accounted for and no maintenance will fall due in the scheduled period of operation.

65. Clause c. Normally maintenance should only be performed when an aircraft has been released to maintenance; however, it may be necessary to perform minor maintenance and/or tasks while the aircraft is being operated by aircrew. This regulation allows an AMO to select and authorise maintenance tasks that may be conducted after the aircraft has been released from maintenance and that do not compromise safety or adversely affect technical airworthiness and places a level of control over such maintenance activities. It should be noted that there will be occasions when a need for further maintenance becomes apparent in the period after maintenance release and before aircrew acceptance. In this case, the AMO should address whether there is a reasonable requirement to get aircrew authorisation before deciding to conduct the required maintenance. The aircrew decision will need to account for the expected duration of the maintenance task and the programmed time of aircrew acceptance of the aircraft. Should the maintenance task be able to be completed before the expected aircrew arrival then the AMO should consider the merits of releasing the aircraft back to maintenance for the required maintenance to be carried out. Should the aircraft be released back to maintenance then it means the maintenance is no longer subject to this regulation clause. However, once the aircraft has been accepted by aircrew, any further maintenance must be authorised by the aircraft captain before commencement of that maintenance.



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66. The AMO will need to promulgate in local instructions the processes, procedures and allowable maintenance that can be carried out after an aircraft has been released from maintenance. That list of allowable maintenance tasks must be authorised by the SMM. Maintenance carried out after an aircraft has been released from maintenance may not be subject to the same airworthiness safeguards normally available and applied when the aircraft is released to maintenance. Accordingly maintenance carried out after maintenance release can be a dangerous activity, therefore the SMM needs to ensure sufficient controls are in place so that there is an adequate level of safety, supervision, documentation and foreign object control can be assured in relation to the performance of any required maintenance.

TAREG 5.1.5 – SAFETY


67. Within maintenance publications and instructions, warnings and cautions are provided to ensure safety of personnel and protection of equipment during particular maintenance processes. Every person involved in maintenance is responsible, not only for their own safety, but also the safety of subordinates and others within the workplace. This regulation requires that AMOs comply with all safety requirements specified by DGTA-ADF and the relevant AEO.

Cross References


a. Defence Safety Manual, Volume 2, Part 4, and



69. Clause a. The regulation requires that, in addition to ADF and Government requirements, AMOs comply with other safety requirements stipulated by DGTA-ADF and the relevant AEO. This regulation does not exclude an AMO from complying with ADF policy or Government Legislation for OHS.

TAREG 5.1.6 – DEFERMENT OF REQUIRED MAINTENANCE


70. Airworthiness and operational requirements require that every item of equipment installed in the aircraft must be operational at the beginning of a flight. Under certain conditions an acceptable level of safety can be maintained with specific items of equipment inoperative or defective, until repairs can be made. Deferment of required maintenance allows the AMO to make an aircraft available for operational requirements. Consideration should be given to the circumstances associated with the deferment of required maintenance including the severity of any damage, or the criticality of the inoperative or defective item or system. The deferment of required maintenance may require the application of specified operational limitations for the period of deferment.

71. The effective management of deferment of required maintenance can allow for increased operational availability. However, the impact on airworthiness, both operational and technical, needs to be considered when assessing and authorising deferment of required maintenance. Continued operation of an aircraft with deferred maintenance must be made by appropriately authorised personnel within the AMO, in accordance with an approved procedure. The SMM must review every deferment of required maintenance to ensure that sufficient rigour was applied to the decision.

Cross References



b. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Regulation 42L; and

c. Canada Transport Civil Aviation (CTCA) Regulation 625.07 Minimum Equipment List.



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Explanation and Amplification – TAREG 5.1.6

73. Clause a. Deferment of required maintenance should only be approved after an assessment has been made by the SMM or delegate that ensures an acceptable level of flight safety is maintained. The SMM or delegate are authorised to defer maintenance as they are considered, inter alia, competent to judge:

a. when they need advice;

b. what type of advice they need and from whom they should source that advice;

c. what advice is useful and what is not;

d. when they are required to seek direction from the relevant AEO;

e. the relative weighing of differing or conflicting advice;

f. the technical, operational and personnel safety consequences of their decision; and

g. when they are not competent to make the decision (and thus the need to defer the decision to another authorised decision maker).

74. Seeking advice. The SMM or delegate may seek advice to inform their decision for the deferment of required maintenance. They may seek advice from anyone they consider able to add value to the decision. Importantly, there is no concept of people needing to be authorised before they are able to provide advice to decision makers of deferment of required maintenance. The types of technical advice that would be useful to a decision maker for deferment of maintenance include risk relevant advice on the:

a. consequences of failure or partial performance of the relevant system;

b. likelihood of failure or partial performance of the relevant system;

c. appropriate period of the deferred maintenance;

d. evaluated level of risk in approving the deferment of maintenance;

e. potential risk treatments to reduce residual risk; and

f. impact of the deferred maintenance on the capability of the aircraft (including mission effectiveness).

75. Decision makers for deferment of required maintenance may also seek;

a. technical data to inform their decision, including component performance and reliability data; and

b. to have another person comment on their thought processes, without requiring specific information or other advice from that person.

76. Seeking advice is not transferring decision making. An authorised decision maker who seeks advice is not transferring the decision to the person providing the advice. The person asked to provide advice will never have complete understanding of all the relevant considerations. In many situations, he or she will be geographically distant and cannot see the unserviceable component or even photographs or diagrams of it. The extent to which good advice can be provided depends largely on the information provided, and the questions asked by the decision maker. Therefore people asked to provide advice should do so to the best of their ability, without fear of them becoming liable for the overall integrity of the overall decision.

77. Advice that is not relevant to decision makers. Seeking advice on the serviceability criteria, or the criteria’s application to a component is not relevant to a decision maker. Any uncertainty about serviceability must be removed before the deferment of maintenance process can begin. The deferment of a maintenance process may only begin when a component is deemed to be unserviceable. This can be confusing when the same person decides serviceability criteria, and then approves the deferment of maintenance. Nevertheless, the two processes are conceptually separate.

78. Clause b. There are a number of conditions under which the SMM or delegate may not defer required maintenance. The conditions are set to ensure that deferment of required maintenance is only authorised by appropriately trained, qualified and experienced personnel, with the required information available to them and without being influenced by environmental, local or human factors.

a. Sub-Clause b(1). The SMM or delegate may choose to refer to any relevant data that they believe will assist in an informed decision being made. If that data is considered inadequate, in doubt or is not available the SMM must not defer the required maintenance.

b. Sub-Clause b(2). Although the SMM or delegate may hold an authorisation to approve deferment of required maintenance, this does not necessarily mean that they are competent to approve every



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deferment of required maintenance that may arise during the operation of an AMO. The SMM or delegate must be aware of their self-assessed level of competence. They should not approve the deferment of maintenance if the decision is outside their self-assessed level.

c. Sub-Clause b(3). The SMM or delegate may be subjected to various environmental, local or human factors whilst making a decision to defer required maintenance. These factors can include things like fatigue, adverse weather conditions (extreme heat or cold) or limited availability of aircraft, spares and personnel. The SMM or delegate should be aware of the influence of these factors, and ensure that their ability to assess deferred maintenance is not unacceptably impaired.

79. Clause c. The SMM or delegate may make a decision to defer maintenance based on relevant technical data for the particular aircraft, item or system. There will be situations where they are not aware of the full effect of the deferred maintenance on the operational or handling characteristics of the aircraft. For maintenance that falls into this category an authorised aircrew member should be consulted to gain endorsement.

80. Clause d. There are a number of recording requirements related to the deferment of required maintenance.

a. Sub-clause d(1). Maintenance should only be deferred if necessary. Clearly defined deferment periods must be specified to ensure that the rectifications are carried out within reasonable timeframes.

b. Sub-clause d(2). Deferment of maintenance decisions should have the appropriate amount of rigour applied to them under the given circumstances. Deferment decisions should not be made on the basis of previously deferred maintenance. The decision by the SMM or delegate should be clearly documented including all factors considered when the decision was made. This ensures traceability of the deferment and allows for review of the decision at a later stage. Reference to material used to support a decision to defer maintenance may include:

(1) Australian Air Publications (AAP);

(2) Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)/AEO advice;

(3) Minimum Equipment Lists (MELs) or approved list of permissible unserviceabilities;

(4) risk assessments;

(5) aircraft systems Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consultations; and

(6) authorised aircrew consultations.

c. Sub-clause d(3). The system used to document maintenance should clearly present items of deferred maintenance to aircrew upon aircraft acceptance.

d. Sub-clause d(4). The documentation detailing the justification of the decision to defer maintenance must be retained by the AMO as part of the aircraft record.

81. Clause e. Review of deferment of maintenance decisions is required to ensure that; conditions associated with deferment are met, and to provide a level of SMM oversight for these decisions, given that the SMM is accountable for these decisions, as stated in TAREG 4.5.1. Regular review refers to a periodic review by the SMM of deferred maintenance decisions should be frequent enough to ensure the SMM maintains oversight of decisions made by delegates. This could occur at a weekly or fortnightly maintenance review meeting within the AMO.

82. The sub-clauses to this regulation define the SMM’s requirements when reviewing all decisions applicable to authorising the deferment of maintenance.

83. Clause f. Procedures for the deferment of maintenance may be divided into two general areas. The first relates to the method by which delegates are assessed and approved. This should detail the training, qualifications and experience required for authorised deferment of required maintenance personnel, as well as the method by which they are assessed.

84. The second area relates to the method by which maintenance is deferred. This should detail the procedure by which the decision is made, as well as applicable data that must be consulted as part of the process. All procedures relating to the deferment of required maintenance should form a part of the approved MMS as detailed in TAREG 4.4.1.

TAREG 5.1.7 – MAINTENANCE GROUND RUNS


85. All reasonable steps need to be taken to ensure aircraft systems are serviceable prior to releasing an aircraft for operation or releasing an aircraft engine to serviceable stock after maintenance. Maintenance instructions may



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require the confirmation of aircraft or engine serviceability through engine ground runs and/or engaged ground runs (for rotary wing aircraft).

Cross References

86. The following references are relevant to the requirement of this regulation:

a. Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) 43.170, 43.175; and



87. Clause a. Maintenance Ground Runs are required to ground test aircraft engines, to investigate in-flight unserviceabilities, prove aircraft systems prior to flight, test engine performance post maintenance activities as well as to certify serviceability performance parameters.

88. Clause b. Engine ground runs will usually be mandated by AEO Authorised Maintenance Data. The AMO will need to ensure that ground runs are also conducted (when applicable) for unscheduled maintenance (including disconnection and removal for access).

89. Ground runs that form an integral part of AEO approved maintenance procedures fulfil the requirements of this regulatory clause. The AMO also needs to possess and comply with the AEO authorised engine operating procedures and limitations.

90. Clause c. Aircrew qualified on aircraft type and personnel authorised by the SMM may perform installed engine runs for maintenance purposes.

91. Clause d. The dangerous nature of operating rotary wing aircraft with rotors engaged requires type-authorised aircrew to perform these engine runs.

TAREG 5.1.8 – MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHTS


92. Aircraft test flights are not maintenance activities, however a requirement for maintenance test flights (MTF) may be generated by the completion of certain maintenance tasks. MTFs may be conducted to verify the performance of an aircraft or aircraft system, where workshop tests and maintenance ground runs cannot prove safe operation.

Cross References

93. The following ADF references are relevant to the requirement of this regulation:

a. AAP 7001.038(AM1)—Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) Manual;


c. DI(AF) OPS 1-10—Flight Authorisation and Captaincy; and

d. DI(AF) OPS 2-1—Aircrew-Qualifications, Categorisation and Employment.


94. Clause a. Unless specifically stated otherwise by the AEO, MTFs should normally be conducted when an item that forms part of an aircraft flight control or helicopter rotor system has been changed or a major adjustment has been made to an engine or propeller control.

95. Clause b. As a general principle, MTFs in support of maintenance should only be conducted after all methods of determining serviceability on the ground have been carried out.

96. In the context of this regulation, MTFs are dedicated flights conducted as a result of maintenance being performed to verify the performance of an aircraft or aircraft system. These regulations do not apply to maintenance check flights where verification of maintenance is conducted during the course of a routine flight.

97. Clause c. The AMO must ensure that aircrew are provided with Authorised Maintenance Data that details the requirements to be performed during MTFs, for example, MTF Schedules.



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TAREG 5.1.9 – AIRCRAFT GROUND HANDLING


98. During aircraft operation and maintenance, aircrew and maintenance personnel should ensure that the risk of damage or personal injury is minimised when aircraft are being moved or handled. Ground handling should only be performed using AEO approved equipment and procedures.

Cross References


a. Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 20.3—Marshalling and Parking of Aircraft;


c. ABR 5419—Ship Helicopter Operations Manual; and

d. Air Standardisation Co-ordination Committee (ASCC) Air Standard – (AS) 44/42 and 65/37.


100. Clause a. Ground handling procedures (approved by the relevant AEO and/or DGTA-ADF) such as aircraft towing, mooring and wing walking requirements should be stated directly or by reference in the MMP.

101. Clause b. The AMO should have appropriate training and authorisation procedures in place for personnel involved in ground handling tasks. Personnel need to be authorised prior to performing ground handling duties.

102. Clause c. Marshalling signals need to be consistent with DGTA-ADF prescribed procedures.

103. Clause d. If local procedures are promulgated they must not conflict with DGTA-ADF or AEO approved procedures.

104. Clause e. The MMP need only state, or refer to another document containing, the approved reference listing the marshalling signals that are used. If locally developed marshalling signals are utilised, the specific details of those signals should be described in the MMP or other referenced document.

TAREG 5.1.10 – STRUCTURAL REPAIRS


105. Standard structural repairs are defined as those repairs that have been documented in Authorised Maintenance Data (and are, in effect, pre-approved Deviations). Standard structural repairs represent a departure from the current approved configuration and must be notified to the relevant AEO. Repairs to primary and secondary structure should always be notified to the relevant AEO as these repairs could potentially affect future changes, modifications and any future repairs in the adjacent areas.

Cross Reference

106. The following ADF referneces address the requirement of this regulation:

a. DI(G)4-5-006 (formerly DI(G)LOG 08-4)—Defence Policy on Configuration Management, and

b. AAP 7001.047(AM1)—Defence Aerospace Configuration Management Manual.


107. Clause a. Structural repairs carried out on primary or secondary aircraft structure must be monitored by AEOs so aircraft structural integrity can be maintained. Part of the process that allows AEOs to maintain current data includes the requirement that AMOs notify the relevant AEO when structural repairs are carried out. Details should include repair scheme used, location of repair and any other information that may be deemed relevant.

108. Clause b. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that an AMO does not develop and implement their own structural repair. AEOs must be made aware of all required repairs. The sub-clauses of this regulation detail the information that an AEO requires.



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TAREG 5.1.11 – WEIGHT AND BALANCE


109. The weight and balance characteristics of an aircraft and selected Aeronautical Product need to be maintained within certain limits to ensure safe operation. While the management of basic weight and balance is the responsibility of the aircraft AEO, the venue responsible for conducting aircraft and selected Aeronautical Product weighing will be an AMO. Where there is a requirement to conduct aircraft or Aeronautical Product weighs, the AMO needs to ensure that aircraft are weighed in accordance with relevant AEO and/or DGTA-ADF approved procedures and periodicities.

Cross References


a. Civil Aviation Orders Part 100, Section 100.7—Weight Control of Aircraft; and

b. AAP 7021.008–1(AM1)—Aircraft Weight and Balance General.


111. Clause a. Weight and balance information should be retained in accordance with TAREG 5.2.1— Maintenance Records and Documentation Requirements. The weight and balance report needs to be based on an actual weighing of the aircraft or Aeronautical Product. This requires that either the SMM, or an appropriately trained individual appointed by the SMM, be responsible for aircraft and equipment weighs. The person appointed should have gained practical experience with aircraft weighing. The duties of this individual are to:

a. ensure aircraft or equipment documentation is annotated, when necessary, as requiring a weigh;

b. accurately perform the weigh in accordance with the procedure approved by the relevant AEO;

c. ensure the weighing equipment (scales, weigh pads, etc) is serviceable and correctly calibrated;

d. accurately complete the aircraft and equipment weight and balance records;

e. forward a copy of the weight and balance records to the relevant AEO; and

f. sign off the aircraft or equipment documentation when weighing is completed; and transfer pertinent details into the aircraft maintenance documentation set.

112. Clause b. The AMO should defer to the relevant AEO for clarification on which State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product require weight and balance records and what constitutes a major repaint and major modification. A minor change is one that has no appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of an aircraft, aircraft engine or propeller. All other changes are major changes.

113. Clause c. The relevant AEO is responsible for the management of basic weight and balance progressive weight and balance relating to modification of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product and as such must be kept informed of all results of State Aircraft weighs.

TAREG 5.1.12 – CONTINGENCY MAINTENANCE AND BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR


114. Peacetime maintenance policy for State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product is developed to ensure serviceable, mission ready equipment is available to meet identified needs. That maintenance policy considers cost reduction and asset preservation. Peacetime maintenance may or may not be appropriate during a contingency as the priority to make aircraft mission worthy takes precedence over cost and asset preservation. CMAINT and BDR schemes are required to expedite maintenance to allow an aircraft to meet compelling operational requirements whilst preserving an acceptable level of technical airworthiness.

115. CMAINT comprises those maintenance activities that are performed during a declared contingency operation, when invoked by the Operational Commander. CMAINT may involve revised servicing schedules and component lifing, and revised repair philosophies.

116. BDR, which is a subset of CMAINT, is the means by which damaged aircraft can be repaired quickly to restore sufficient strength and airworthiness to permit aircraft to fly additional sorties. Alternatively it may be used to restore sufficient airworthiness to enable an aircraft to make a one time ferry flight to a major repair facility.



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Cross References


a. DI(G)LOG 08-11 (DI(G)LOG (4-5-010))—Contingency Maintenance;

b. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual; and

c. AAP 7001.038(AM1)—Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) Manual.


118. Clause a. (1) and (2). The AMO should document the process for transitioning from peacetime maintenance to CMAINT and BDR. The documented process should contain:

a. the publications and instructions referenced to perform CMAINT, for example the generic and aircraft specific aircraft BDR manuals and the CMAINT requirements detailed in the Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP);

b. the lines of authority, both internal and external, for approving BDR and changes to maintenance policy;

c. any additional document requirements and control procedures; and

d. procedures to be followed after ceasing contingency maintenance to restore aircraft to peacetime standards (if required).

119. Clause a. (3). The AMO needs to determine and state either directly or by reference in the MMP the qualifications and training requirements for personnel to be authorised as BDR assessors (repair development), BDR engineers (design approval) and BDR technicians. Selection for BDR training should be based on the level and nature of previous training and experience. BDR engineers should be sufficiently experienced in aircraft structures and materials to allow them to approve BDR schemes without reference to higher authorities for repair approval.

120. Clause b. Contingency refers to any situation that involves force element groups committed to higher rates of effort and equipment availability than expected in normal operations. In this respect a “contingency” could involve a civil assistance, peace keeping operation or a conflict.

121. Clause c. Unlike maintenance training, BDR training must not be carried out on State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product.

122. Clause d. Due to the nature of a declared contingency in may not be possible to notify an AEO immediately of any CMAINT performed. At the first opportunity the AMO must notify the relevant AEO of the details of CMAINT performed.

123. Clause e. State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product that has been subject to contingency maintenance may have undetected damage or penalty maintenance required. Therefore, it is important that an aircraft be surveyed to determine the extent of any damage so that the normal levels of safety can be restored as soon as practicable.

124. Clause f. At the cessation of a declared contingency and as soon as circumstances allow, all aircraft used in a contingency operation should be restored to peacetime standards. Additionally, aircraft subjected to contingency operations will require a detailed inspection to:

a. detect any undocumented battle damage, and

b. assess and repair any unusual degradation caused by environmental conditions.

125. Clause g. During contingencies, when Aeronautical Product is assessed for salvage, the SMM should consider the following (as a minimum):

a. whether any crash loadings might have taken the Aeronautical Product above its proof load;

b. whether there are any cracks and/or residual stresses and strains; and

c. whether the Aeronautical Product was subject to contamination, fire or overheating which may have changed the material characteristics or distorted the product.



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5.2 – MAINTENANCE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION

TAREG 5.2.1 – MAINTENANCE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS


126. Maintenance Records and documentation record the current physical configuration of aircraft and Aeronautical Product at any point in time. They may be paper based, electronic or a combination of both. The physical requirements of a Maintenance Record that make it useable, irrespective of the information recorded therein are all similar.

127. The integrity and security of the information contained in Maintenance Records have a direct bearing on technical airworthiness judgements made by the DGTA-ADF and responsible AEOs. AMO promulgated record security and storage requirements should reflect the assessed threat to physical and intellectual property.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 43.2, 43.9, 43.11, 43.17, 145.61, 145.79;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.50, 145.55;

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 43, 50A;

d. Defence Security Manual—(eDSM); and

e. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual.


129. Clause a. AMOs must have a system for documenting all maintenance activities. Such a system should allow for the accurate and systematic documenting of all maintenance actions in the Maintenance Record. Maintenance that is being performed for training purposes on State Aircraft and Aeronautical product poses the same risk to airworthiness and must also be documented in the Maintenance Record.

130. Clause b. Any person who makes an entry in the Maintenance Record must be authorised to do so (and be identifiable from their certifications). The reason for this requirement is to ensure the integrity of the Maintenance Record through control of those who alter them.

131. Clause c. A person who makes an entry into a maintenance record making an Aircraft or Aeronautical Product unserviceable must ensure that the entry is accurate and clearly describes the unserviceability to allow the correct maintenance to be carried out. It is also important that the person is identifiable so they can be contacted if any confusion remains. The purpose of including the date of unserviceability is to allow an auditable trail following maintenance.

132. Clause d and e. The intent of theses clauses is to prescribe the content requirements of Maintenance Records. Maintenance Records capture component changes, modifications, adjustments, weapon and configuration changes etc and the certifications made by the authorised personnel who performed these activities. Should an aircraft be involved in an accident, this information needs to be preserved for examination by the Accident Investigation Team.

133. Clause f. The physical ability of a Maintenance Record to be secured also allows for its safe transportation (where required) and the limiting of access to the Maintenance Record. This ensures that only authorised personnel are permitted to gain access to Maintenance Records and make changes to them. For the purpose of traceability, any Maintenance Record keeping system needs to be able to physically preserve evidence of changes made to a Maintenance Record and the identity of the person making the change.

134. Electronic Records. Electronic Maintenance Records, due to their nature, have their own particular requirements in addition to satisfying the requirements of paper-based Maintenance Record systems. Electronic Maintenance Records need to remain readable. Any tools used to access, manipulate and read current and archived electronic Maintenance Records need to be maintained along with the training for personnel using these tools. An AMO using electronic Maintenance Records needs the ability to preserve and recover data should the devices supporting the system or the current Maintenance Record become unavailable. The provision of back-up Maintenance Records and/or hardcopy print-outs minimises data losses and subsequent impact on technical airworthiness should an electronic system fail. Other concerns with an electronic Maintenance Record keeping system centre around the requirement to track changes to the system and identify those persons making the changes. The security access



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requirements of an electronic or paper based Maintenance Record system should align with ADF and Australian Government promulgated requirements.

TAREG 5.2.2 – FALSIFICATION, REPRODUCTION OR ALTERATION OF MAINTENANCE RECORDS


135. Fraudulent activities that undermine the integrity of a Maintenance Record jeopardise the technical airworthiness of the equipment it supports. The process for altering Maintenance Records needs to be strictly controlled to minimise the risk of inadvertent or fraudulent alteration.

136. The level of access to Maintenance Records should be commensurate with the sensitivity of the information contained within the Maintenance Record and the level of Maintenance Authority held by the individual. Maintenance Record falsification is to be prohibited, whilst reproduction and/or alteration is to be strictly controlled.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 43.12, 65.20; and



138. Clause a. Regardless of the situation a person must not make a fraudulent entry in Maintenance Records. A person who makes an entry into Maintenance Records will be accountable for that entry.

139. Clause b. A person is considered to have been caused to make a fraudulent entry when they have been pressured to change, or falsely enter, information. Regardless of how trivial an entry or change to an entry in Maintenance Records may appear, a person must not be caused to make a fraudulent entry into Maintenance Records.

140. Clause c. In addition to the requirements of clause a, an AMO can preserve the integrity of Maintenance Records and avert fraud by ensuring that:

a. all changes made to a Maintenance Record allow the original entry to remain visible;

b. the identification of the person(s) making change(s) can be determined; and

c. where copying a Maintenance Record is appropriate, ensuring the copy is documented and controlled.

5.3 – REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS

TAREG 5.3.1 – REPORTING OF UNSERVICEABLE CONDITIONS


141. All unserviceable conditions need to be reported in the applicable record to allow for corrective and/or other management action. Any unserviceable condition that is not the result of fair wear and tear may require additional reporting and subsequent analysis by the relevant AEO to determine any airworthiness implications.

142. For the purpose of this regulation, unserviceability is defined as a loss in performance compared with, or the degradation beyond, stated limits in the approved design of an aircraft or aeronautical component. This may include damage or cracking which is due to normal wear. Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and other civil airworthiness authorities use the term ‘defect’ in the same context as this regulation uses the term ‘unserviceability’.

Cross References


a. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 50, 51, 52; and

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.60.


144. Clause a. The AMO will need to have procedures that ensure the timely recording of unserviceabilities and provide assurance that any unserviceabilities found during operation and maintenance are recorded (and therefore satisfactorily actioned) before release from maintenance.



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145. Clause b. Maintenance Records vary depending on the aircraft platform and the AMO. The Maintenance Records used (paper-based, electronic or a combination of both) to document unserviceable conditions must be part of the approved Maintenance Records as detailed in TAREG 5.2.

146. Clause c. Aircraft and Aeronautical Product is expected to deteriorate during normal operations. However if a person identifies wear and tear that may be considered abnormal it must be reported in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated by the relevant AEO. AMOs must provide information on these unairworthy conditions with in the timeframes stipulated by the relevant AEOs.

147. Clause d. Aircraft or Aeronautical Product identified as being subject to unfair wear and tear in accordance with TAREG 5.3.1.c must be segregated and quarantined so that the evidence can be retained and investigated.

TAREG 5.3.2 – REPORTING OF UNAIRWORTHY CONDITIONS


148. An essential element of the ADF airworthiness management system is the reporting of all conditions that may affect airworthiness. When the AMO considers that unserviceability may adversely affect airworthiness (as further amplified below), the unserviceable condition becomes known as an ‘Unairworthy Condition’ and additional reports are required.

Cross References


a. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 145.63, 145.79;

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.60;

c. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 51, 51A, 51B, 52, 52B.


150. Clause a. AEOs are responsible for the continued assurance of the Type Design of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product. When an AMO finds any unserviceability that meets the intent of clauses (1), (2) or (3) of this regulation it is mandatory that the responsible AEO be notified within 24 hrs so that the impact on the design and potentially ADF fleet can be assessed and appropriate action taken. Aircrew escape and emergency equipment includes those aircraft systems that are designed to function in an emergency to either prevent injury to personnel or possible loss of an aircraft. This includes maintenance of equipment operated by explosive means when the equipment cannot be otherwise functionally tested and where correct operation of the equipment is critical to the safety of personnel.

TAREG 5.3.3 – AMO INVESTIGATION OF REPORTED UNSERVICEABLE AND UNAIRWORTHY CONDITIONS


151. Investigation and subsequent Reporting by AMOs of unserviceable and unairworthy conditions, categorised under TAREG 5.3.1.c and 5.3.2.a, are required to provide first hand knowledge to assist the AEO to:

a. establish the cause of the condition;

b. assess all implications that the condition may precipitate; and

c. evaluate, in a timely and rational manner, the action necessary to prohibit or prevent unairworthy conditions or failure.

Cross References


a. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 50, 51, 52; and

b. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.60.


153. Clause a. Investigations need to cover the incident itself, suspected prime cause, contributing root causes, and where applicable, recommendations and/or the implementation of corrective and preventative action. Where



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applicable, the following information should be considered in the investigation and be forwarded to the relevant AEO when further investigation is necessary:

a. the details of any other unserviceability or damage;

b. possible prime and contributing causes;

c. the test equipment used and diagnostic procedures followed;

d. description of the tests, measurements and adjustments;

e. details of irregularities observed during the investigation;

f. probable cause of the condition;

g. proposed action and recommendations to prevent recurrence; and

h. details of any items placed in quarantine pending further investigation.

TAREG 5.3.4 – OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS


154. The ADF, DGTA-ADF and relevant AEOs have developed several systems for reporting technical equipment performance or condition that is outside normal accepted standards. Technical reports are also used to notify authorities of an organisation’s inability to comply with, or to forecast problems in complying with, promulgated maintenance instructions.

155. Instances of unapproved Aeronautical Product being received or installed, poor product quality or parts received in a manner that could cause deterioration or damage, need to be reported to the relevant AEO. Any technical reporting system should aim to capture as much information as possible to allow full analysis, investigation and/or corrective action to take place. Systems used to notify authorities of compliance inability, defects, maintenance deficiencies, equipment condition and damage or safety issues; should do so in a timely manner to allow for the appraisal of airworthiness impact and intervention if required.

Cross References

156. The following references are relevant to this regulation:

a. AAP 7001.047(AM1)—Defence Aerospace Configuration Management Manual;

b. AAP 7001.038(AM1)—Maintenance Requirements Determination (MRD) Manual; and

c. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual.


157. Clause a. Where Aeronautical Product is identified as, or is suspected of being substandard for the purpose it was intended, the relevant AEO responsible for the identification and source selection of that Aeronautical Product needs to be informed to ensure appropriate action is taken.

158. Instances where Aeronautical Product is unacceptable for use and must be reported includes the:

a. receipt and purchasing documentation do not match,

b. Aeronautical Product fails a technical inspection,

c. Aeronautical Product is damaged,

d. Aeronautical Product is suspected of being unapproved, or

e. packaging is not at a standard that would prevent damage or deterioration.

159. Clause b. Generally, investigation and reporting will be done to prevent a recurrence of an event and in turn, contribute to the improvement of maintenance standards and practices. When an AEO mandates the requirement for such a report the AMO must comply with the defined reporting requirements.

160. Clause c. Authorised Maintenance Data may mandate reporting requirements to gather data on performance, condition monitoring or other reasons. Generally this data will result in improvement to maintenance standards and practices. When Authorised Maintenance Data defines a reporting requirement the AMO must comply.



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5.4 – TOOLS, EQUIPMENT AND AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT

TAREG 5.4.1 – TOOLS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT


161. Unapproved or unserviceable tools and support equipment can compromise the technical integrity of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product. Additionally, uncontrolled tools and support equipment present a foreign object hazard. The AMO needs to ensure they have, or have access, to approved and serviceable tools and support equipment for the conduct of maintenance.

162. An essential element of the ADF technical airworthiness management system is the assurance of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product technical integrity through the use of only appropriate and serviceable tools and support equipment. The effective control and accounting of tools and support equipment minimises the likelihood of any item or object presenting a potential hazard to safety or serviceability.

Cross References

163. The following civil regulations and ADF references relate to this regulation:

a. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Regulation 145.40(b)—Equipment, Tools and Materials; and

b. Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 30.


164. Clause a. An AMO needs to have, or be able to access, the necessary tools and support equipment to conduct the scope and level of maintenance in accordance with the Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC). Tools and support equipment are those items necessary to maintain measure, calibrate or test State Aircraft, aircraft system, and/or Aeronautical Product to approved standards (support equipment includes a wide range of equipment from stands and docking to highly sophisticated test equipment).

165. Clause b. The control of tooling and support equipment requires the AMO to have procedures to maintain, service, inspect, and, where appropriate, calibrate such items in accordance with the relevant AEO or DGTA-ADF standards prior to use. A system is required to indicate the item’s inspection, service or calibration status. Maintenance records should be maintained for all precision tooling and measuring equipment together with a record of service, inspections, calibrations and standards used.

166. Tool and support equipment management procedures should control tool usage by minimising the risk of tools being left in aircraft and Aeronautical Product and ensure that only authorised, appropriate and serviceable tools and support equipment are used in the conduct of maintenance.

167. Clause c. Flight safety can be compromised by tooling being left in State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product and particularly aircraft engines. To minimise the possibility of tools and support equipment being left where they could cause damage or present a potential foreign object hazard to the safety or serviceability of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product, the AMO is required to be able to account for tooling at shift changes and the completion of maintenance. The intent of this regulation is to ensure an AMO does not release an aircraft or product from maintenance with tooling left undetected in the product.

168. Clause d. There are many instances where Authorised Maintenance Data does not specify the specific tool to be used to perform a maintenance task, generally standard tools will fall into this category. In these cases the authorised person should have the skills necessary to determine which tool to use. However, when the Authorised Maintenance Data specifies specific tool/s and/or support equipment to be used, that tool or support equipment must be used in the conduct of maintenance. If that tool or support equipment is not available the relevant AEO approval must be attained prior to using alternate tooling and/or support equipment.

169. Clause e. When a tool or item used in the conduct of maintenance can not be accounted for, the SMM or delegate should ensure that maintenance release does not occur, and search procedures implemented. Such procedures may include:

a. cessation of all maintenance in the area and return of all tools and items for accounting purposes;

b. quarantine of the maintenance area so that waste bins or any other potential containers are not removed or emptied, as they may contain the missing tool or item;

c. annotation of unserviceability in all relevant aircraft or Aeronautical Product maintenance documentation, stating:



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(1) the tool/item as missing, including serial number (where applicable) and a full description;

(2) the most probable areas of the aircraft to be searched first; and

(3) results of the subsequent search;

d. instigation of a thorough search of the aircraft, Aeronautical Product or adjacent area.

170. If the tool or item is found, previous annotations in the aircraft maintenance documentation should be signed off by an appropriate supervisor and the tool returned to the tool repository. In situations where the tool or item is not found the SMM, or a delegate specifically nominated for this purpose, are the only persons who should sign off the missing tool/item annotation in the aircraft maintenance documentation. That person should establish that everything reasonable and possible has been done to locate the tool/item before the missing tool/item entry is signed off and where appropriate, aircrew is informed on acceptance of the aircraft.

TAREG 5.4.2 – LOCAL MANUFACTURE OR MODIFICATION OF TOOLING


171. The proper selection and correct use of tooling for maintenance is a necessary element in preserving technical airworthiness. Local manufacture or modification of tools may be required where adequate tooling is not readily available. This regulation provides AMOs with the ability to manufacture and/or modify and subsequently use these tools. This regulation is not intended to apply to simple modification of standard hand tools, such as grinding or cutting down of spanners to allow easier access where the modification poses no risk of damage or any threat to airworthiness.


172. Clause a. Where a SMM is confident they have adequate qualifications, training and experience they may authorise the modification or manufacture and use of standard tools. For the purpose of this regulation Standard Tools is defined as those tools required for the maintenance of State Aircraft and Aeronautical Product that are not specifically identified in the Authorised Maintenance Data. Standard tooling does not include test equipment.

173. Clause b. The intent of this clause is to ensure that when a SMM exercises their authority in relation to this regulation they ensure that the tooling will not cause damage to State Aircraft or Aeronautical Product and will perform the function required. The AMO must have a documented system that ensures locally manufactured or modified tooling is used only for its intended purpose, is maintained to ensure ongoing effectiveness and is identifiable. The relevant AEO is to be provided a copy of all approvals so that they have visibility of decisions being made by SMMs.

TAREG 5.4.3 – AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT


174. Aeronautical Product management, which involves the procurement, transportation, receipt/inspection and installation thereof, has a direct impact on technical airworthiness. The management of Aeronautical Product involves input from not only the AMO but also the AEO and logistics organisations. To ensure technical airworthiness is maintained, regulations for the control and management of Aeronautical Product are required. The ADF requires that those Aeronautical Products used for rectification or maintenance of State Aircraft to be AEO approved products.

175. Manufacture, purchase, distribution, storage and installation of Aeronautical Product is frequently undertaken by a variety of organisations. As TAREGs 4 and 5 pertain to AMOs, TAREG 5.4.3 is directed at both the organisation and the individuals within that organisation. At the individual level, anyone who uses or installs Aeronautical Product is responsible for ensuring that the product is authorised and fit for use. At the organisational level, the AMO is responsible for ensuring that systems, procedures and controls are in place to support the installation of Aeronautical Product.

Cross References


a. AS/NZS ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management Systems—Requirements;

b. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 20-62D – Eligibility, Quality, and Identification of Approved Aeronautical Replacement Parts, provides information on control of aeronautical replacement parts;



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c. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 21-29B – Detecting and Reporting Suspected Unapproved Parts, provides information and guidance for detecting and reporting suspected unapproved parts;

d. Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, Regulations 42W, 42X; and

e. DEF (AUST) 1000C–ADF Packaging Standard.


177. Clause a. The MMP needs to include, or provide a reference to another controlled document containing, the AMOs procedures for logistics management of Aeronautical Product. Utilisation of the AMOs Quality Management System (QMS) to control the procurement (if applicable), transportation, receipt, inspection and storage of Aeronautical Product is recommended.

178. Clause b. The ‘reasonable steps’ could include, as a minimum that the maintenance personnel ensure:

a. the Aeronautical Product is received with the correct documentation;

b. the identification number on the Aeronautical Product is authorised for fit against the AEO approved list; and

c. where possible, the Aeronautical Product is physically inspected against the removed item, or an AEO approved drawing/illustration to ensure that the item being fitted appears to be the same as that removed, or that any differences in configuration can be validated.

179. The procurement of Aeronautical Product through the ADF supply system is controlled to ensure that only approved and airworthy product enters the inventory from either domestic or international sources. This process minimises the risk of unapproved Aeronautical Product being supplied to AMOs and organisations provided with Aeronautical Product by the ADF. The relevant Systems Program Office (SPO) determines and arranges the supply source, the identification and, for ADF supplied product, most procurement of Aeronautical Product. However, the SPO may authorise an AMO to procure Aeronautical Product from relevant AEO approved supplier and associated parts listings. When the AMO is authorised by the SPO to procure Aeronautical Product, the AMO should ensure that the initial receipt procedures are in place and referenced in the MMP. The AEO is also responsible for the determination of Aeronautical Product storage life and disposal requirements with which the AMO should comply.

180. Documentation produced as part of the manufacturing and supply processes (i.e. quality assurance documentation) is an important element in the determination of whether a part is airworthy. The documentation needs to provide traceability to both the approved source of the Aeronautical Product and the Type Design Specification, and be retained as part of the historical record for the product until such time as the Aeronautical Product is removed or replaced.

181. Clause c. Topics that should be included in the AMOs procedures for specific sub-clauses are:

a. Sub–clause c(1). AMOs must ensure that Aeronautical Product used to conduct maintenance is the Aeronautical Product that is stated in the Authorised Maintenance Data. If alternate Aeronautical Product is used AEO approval must be granted. However, where Authorised Maintenance Data specifies products generically, then maintainers can choose to use an appropriate product that fits within the generic description.

b. Sub–clause c(2). Many organisations throughout the world will offer Aeronautical Product for sale. AEOs execute a process that will ensure an organisation provides Aeronautical Product that is form, fit and function acceptable. Therefore to maintain technical airworthiness Aeronautical Product must only be sourced from those organisations that have been nominated by the relevant AEO.

c. Sub–clause c(3). – Initial Receipt Procedures. On initial receipt of an Aeronautical Product into an AMO, the organisation should have procedures to ensure that:

(1) the inspection documentation matches the requirements of the purchasing documentation;

(2) the product conforms to the details appearing on the purchasing documentation (e.g. Manufacturers Reference Number, Part Number, etc);

(3) the product shows no obvious signs of damage or other unacceptable condition;

(4) any initial inspection or functional testing that is required by the ordering authority or mandated in Defence publications is carried out; and

(5) there is no evidence that the product or product’s documentation is unauthorised.



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d. Sub–clause c(4). – Aeronautical Product Identification and Tracking. The intent of the regulation is primarily to ensure that only approved Aeronautical Product is installed. AMOs should be able to show that they control the installation of Aeronautical Product in the aircraft. A secondary intention is to provide a degree of traceability of installed Aeronautical Product. DGTA-ADF recognises that many Service organisations will be limited by systemic constraints beyond their control. Consequently, AMOs can expect DGTA-ADF to apply a practical interpretation to traceability of installed Aeronautical Product, particularly with respect to small breakdown spares (BDS) and consumables. However, there is an expectation that AMOs can demonstrate a commitment to, and a move towards, an effective traceability culture.

e. Preparatory to all Aeronautical Product being tracked through a traceability system from initial receipt to installation, AMOs should initially concentrate on flight safety critical items. The system should be able to provide procurement documentation stating the item serviceability status, historical status (including lifing history), modifications, deviation status, Special Technical Instructions (STIs) etc.

f. Sub–clause c (5). – Labelling. A practical approach to implementing the intent of the regulation is acceptable. The intent being to prevent the fitment of unserviceable or unapproved parts, or inadvertent interchange of parts between aircraft or Aeronautical Product. Thus, individual labelling of parts temporarily removed is not necessary, providing adequate storage/handling procedures (e.g. segregation in labelled locations) are in place.

g. Sub–clause c (6, 7, 8). – Storage and Handling. Where the storage of an Aeronautical Product is the responsibility of the AMO, it is to ensure compliance with the storage, shelf life, packaging, labelling and handling requirements stipulated by the relevant AEO. Where the AEO does not specify storage requirements, reference should be made to DEF (AUST) 1000C or instructions sought from the Aeronautical Product manufacturer.

h. Sub–clause c (9). – Certificates of Conformance. Any Aeronautical Product received without supporting documentation, or incomplete documents, should be segregated, quarantined and reported to the relevant AEO until the following minimum information can be obtained or validated:

(1) correct item identification;

(2) source and conformance details;

(3) serviceability status;

(4) modification status (where applicable);

(5) lifing details (where applicable); and

(6) servicing history (where applicable).

i. Sub–clause c (10). – Suspect Unapproved Aeronautical Product. As suspect unapproved Aeronautical Product can impact technical airworthiness, both DGTA-ADF and the relevant procurement authority need to be notified to enable further assessment and actions as required.

j. Sub–clause c (11). – Segregation and Quarantining of Unapproved Product. Suspect unapproved product is not suitable for use and should be segregated and quarantined from other Aeronautical Product. In addition, suspect unapproved product is to be reported, labelled with investigation and full identification details to prevent inadvertent use and assist relevant authorities with further investigations as required.

k. Sub–clause c (12). – Segregation of Aeronautical Product. Serviceable and unserviceable Aeronautical Product must be segregated to prevent the inadvertent fitment of unserviceable Aeronautical Product. The areas used to store Aeronautical Product should clearly identify the serviceability status of the product being stored.

l. Sub–clause c (13). – Transportation and Packaging Requirements. Where the transportation of Aeronautical Product is the responsibility of the AMO, it is to ensure compliance with the transportation requirements stipulated by the relevant AEO.

m. Sub–clause c (14). – Disposal Requirements. Aeronautical Product identified for disposal should be processed in a manner directed by the AEO to such point that it would be prevented from re-entering the aviation supply system. Where the Aeronautical Product is to be converted to a training aid, the AMO should consider:

(1) permanently marking or stamping the Aeronautical Product, as "UNSERVICEABLE/ TRAINING AID ONLY." (Ink stamping is not an acceptable method);



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(2) remove original part number identification;

(3) maintaining a tracking or accountability system, by serial number or other individualised data, to record unserviceable Aeronautical Product as training aids; and

(4) including written procedures concerning disposal of such Aeronautical Product.

TAREG 5.4.4 – TRANSFER OF AERONAUTICAL PRODUCT – (CANNIBALISATION)


182. The transfer of Aeronautical Product between aircraft or from a higher assembly to another location (colloquially called ‘cannibalisation’) should only be considered when such action is necessary to support an essential flying or maintenance requirement. Cannibalisation is a process that allows logistic shortfalls to be managed at an AMO level. The maintenance of aircraft technical integrity requires that any cannibalised Aeronautical Product should be assessed by appropriately authorised AMO personnel prior to or on installation (i.e. a fitted serviceable Aeronautical Product cannot be assumed to remain serviceable throughout the removal process).

Cross References

183. For Service organisations, the following reference addresses the requirement of this regulation:

a. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual.


184. Clause a. Cannibalisation introduces extra removal and installation activities which may instigate unserviceable conditions. In some cases, notably with older electronic items, there is no absolute guarantee that an installed (serviceable) item will remain serviceable following removal and installation. Furthermore, some mechanical or structural items may be subject to a limited number of installations before the fastening process exceeds wear limits. Management of the lifing policy of an item or aircraft is also essential during cannibalisation so that it is not compromised.

185. The AMO should have a system in place for the management of Aeronautical Product transfer which supports, as a minimum:

a. checking of transferred Aeronautical Product for configuration and serviceability;

b. accurately updating aircraft and Aeronautical Product records to reflect the transfer action; and

c. checking and amending any lifing records, especially where an item’s number of installations/removals is limited.

5.5 – AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

TAREG 5.5.1 – INITIAL REQUIREMENTS


186. Full investigation of aircraft accidents is required to ensure that all possible causes are identified and measures can be taken to prevent further occurrences. Evidence of why an aircraft accident occurred may be found at the accident site, within the relevant AEO and at the AMO. To ensure the integrity of any subsequent investigation, the AMO needs to identify and preserve all matter that may constitute evidence until it has been investigated or cleared by the Accident Investigation Team.

187. For the purpose of this regulation an aircraft accident is when an aircraft is damaged during the period of operation. This regulation applies to an AMO that has been assigned State Aircraft.

Cross References


a. AAP 7001.059(AM1)—ADF Aviation Maintenance Management Manual, and

b. DI(AF) OPS 5-27—Recovery Action - Damaged Aircraft and Airborne Technical Equipment.



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189. Clause a. The AMO needs to ascertain from the AEO and Force Element Group Headquarters any general reporting and action requirements and document them either directly or by reference in the MMP. Such requirements should include the responsibilities of key personnel and the procedures to be followed in the event of an aircraft accident.

190. Clause b. Some of the actions required to preserve evidence may include:

a. Quarantine of Documentation and Records. Aircraft documentation/records need to be quarantined for subsequent investigation. When quarantining aircraft documentation/records, the SMM or delegate needs to ensure that no entries, deletions or alterations can be, or are, made. Where electronic media is used for recording maintenance, the SMM needs to ensure that the media contains a feature that allows the data to be quarantined. For essential maintenance such as rendering the aircraft safe, the SMM or the Officer in Charge of the accident investigation team may authorise entries into the documentation, after it has been quarantined.

b. Sampling. The AMO may need to consider obtaining samples of any replenished gases and fluids (fuel, hydraulic fluids, and oxygen). Unless otherwise advised by the Accident Investigation Team, samples of any replenished fluids should be taken from the supply that was used prior to operation of the crashed aircraft. The methods for taking samples need to be defined as part of the procedures, including the requirement to have, or have access to, any equipment required. The SMM may need to consider quarantining supplies and grounding other aircraft, if it becomes apparent that those supplies may have contributed to the accident.

c. Inspection of Tools and Equipment. The SMM needs to ensure that all tools and equipment used on the aircraft prior to the accident are identified and assessed for serviceability at the time of use. Any tools or equipment that requires calibration or other check before use should be re-checked to confirm the calibration and serviceability state. Any tools or equipment found unserviceable need to be quarantined and the Accident Investigation Team is to be advised.

TAREG 5.5.2 – RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT


191. AMOs with responsibility for runway clearance, including clearance of ship flight decks, or for the recovery of crashed aircraft need to be prepared to respond in a timely manner. Every accident is different and not every eventuality can be foreseen or countered, however, all reasonable eventualities should be anticipated.

Cross Reference


a. DI(AF) OPS 5-27—Recovery Action - Damaged Aircraft and Airborne Technical Equipment,

b. Defence Aviation Safety Manual—(DASM),

c. Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Instructions (EMEI) Aircraft Section E 019,

d. ABR 5147—RAN Aviation Safety Manual, and

e. ABR 5419—Ship Helicopter Operations Manual.


193. Clause a. The intent of this regulation is for AMOs to have documented procedures, any required recovery equipment and competent and authorised personnel to carry out recovery of accident damaged aircraft.

TAREG 5.5.3 – SALVAGE


194. Salvage of aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product can assist an AMO in effectively meeting its maintenance obligations. When an AMO makes the decision to salvage aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product it needs to ensure that the technical integrity of the product has not been compromised. Unless operating under Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT), an AMO will not normally have sufficient engineering authority to determine if salvaged products are still airworthy, therefore the relevant AEO will need to assist in the decision on whether to approve the salvage of the aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.



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Cross Reference

195. The regulation addresses the subject embodied in the following civil reference:

a. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 21-38—Disposition of Unsalvageable Aircraft Parts and Materials.


196. Clause a. Aeronautical Product subject to an aircraft accident may have been subject to abnormal stresses, temperatures and other conditions that may not be necessarily readily visible. Prior to using any Aeronautical Product that has been in an aircraft accident the AEO must assess these potential conditions prior to authorising their use.


AAP 7001.053(AM1) Glossary

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GLOSSARY


Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) set out a TAR approved means of compliance by which a regulation can be met. It is an acceptable method of demonstrating, but not the only possible means of compliance with specific regulations. If an applicant follows the relevant AMCs they are assured of satisfying the associated regulatory requirements.

Aeronautical Product

Aeronautical Product is any aircraft system, sub-system, component, part or materiel, including computer systems software/firmware and Petrol Oils and Lubricants, whose intended end-use is to form a physical part of an aircraft.

Aircraft

A device that is used, or intended to be used, for flight in the air.

Aircraft Maintenance Documentation (AMD)

The aircraft’s maintenance and operational certificate, maintenance forecast and technical particulars record. The AMD may be paper based, electronic or a combination of both.

Aircraft-related Equipment

Aircraft-related equipment can be aircraft airborne equipment or aircraft non-airborne equipment whose performance could directly affect airworthiness.

Aircraft-related Equipment

Aircraft-related equipment can be aircraft airborne equipment or aircraft non-airborne equipment whose performance could directly affect airworthiness.

Aircraft Store

Any device, excluding air cargo, intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. Stores include missiles, rockets, bombs, mines, torpedos, gun ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys, signal underwater sound devices, fuel and spray tanks, dispensers, pods (refuelling, thrust augmentation, gun, electronic countermeasures, etc), targets, chaff and flares from countermeasures dispensing systems, and suspension equipment (racks and pylons).

Aircraft/Stores Configuration

Refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific stores suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft/stores configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).

Airworthiness

Airworthiness is a concept, the application of which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgement of the suitability for flight of that aircraft, in that it has been designed, constructed, maintained and is expected to be operated to approved standards and limitations, by competent and authorised individuals, who are acting as members of either an approved or authorised organisation and whose work is both certified as correct and accepted on behalf of the Australian Defence Force.

Airworthiness Standards

Airworthiness standards must mean the design requirements, including where appropriate the means of demonstrating compliance, prescribed for the purposes of establishing adequate levels of safety.



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Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR)

A Commonwealth employee with delegated authority from the TAR to prescribe and revise airworthiness standards for the ADF.

Allocated Baseline (ABL)

The initially approved documentation describing an item’s functional, interoperability and interface characteristics that are allocated from those of a system or a higher level configuration item, interface requirements with interfacing configuration items, additional design constraints, and the verification required to demonstrate the achievement of those specified characteristics.

Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO)

Organisations that have been approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.

Australian Aircraft

An aircraft maintained on the Australian civil register under CASA regulations.

Authoritative Airworthiness Advice (AAA)

Formal comment released on behalf of the TAR that is authoritative in nature. AAA will be identified as such and any organisation that decides not to comply with, or vary from AAA is required to inform the TAR.

Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC)

A certificate issued by Chief of Air Force, as the ADF Airworthiness Authority, for an aircraft type entered on the register of State aircraft. The AMTC signifies that the particular aircraft type has been assessed (undergone type certification) by the ADF as airworthy and supportable in its intended ADF role/s.

Authorised Person

An individual who is authorised by the Senior Maintenance Manager, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, as being competent to perform specific activities in the AMO.

Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO)

An organisation that has been certified (awarded an Engineering Authority Certificate) by the Technical Airworthiness Regulator to provide design or engineering management services to the ADF.

Authorised Maintenance Data

All recorded information of a scientific, technical and engineering nature relating to a weapon system. Includes specifications, standards, engineering drawings, instructions, reports, manuals, tabular data, test results and software documentation used in the development, production, in-service operation and logistics support (such as maintenance, provisioning, codification, testing and modification), and disposal of a weapon system.

Authorised Tradesperson

An individual, operating as part of an Approved Maintenance Organisation, who is authorised by the Senior Maintenance Manager or delegate as being competent to carry out a specific scope of maintenance activities.

Aviation Materiel

Aviation Materiel comprises aircraft, aeronautical product and technical equipment which directly supports ADF aviation capability.

Battle Damage Repair (BDR)

Battle Damage Repair is a maintenance process used to restore sufficient strength and serviceability to permit damaged aircraft to fly additional operational sorties or to enable those aircraft. BDR comprises assessment, design, approval, acceptance and repair.



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Centre of Expertise

An ADF AEO in which the Senior Design Engineer position is a designated Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR) appointment.

Certification

The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating authority.

Certification Basis

The set of standards which define the criteria against which the design of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment, or changes to that design, are assessed to determine their airworthiness.

Configuration

The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof, as set forth in technical documentation (which includes specifications, standards and drawings) and ultimately achieved in a product.

Configuration Item (CI)

An item of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment designated for configuration management separately from the aircraft.

Configuration Management Plan (CMP)

A document that defines CI management responsibilities and overall configuration management processes for a particular system or related groups of systems.

Configuration Control Board (CCB)

The CCB comprises technical and logistics members as required and controls the process of creation, change and deletion of CIs and their associated Configuration Records. The CCB's role is to maintain the required level of system integrity, capability and supportability through the review, approval and monitoring of change requests.

Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT)

Those maintenance activities that are performed during a declared contingency operation. CMAINT involves revised servicing schedules, component lifing strategies (plans) and repair philosophies, including Battle Damage Repair, which will maximise operational availability while constraining and managing risk.

Day

Day means any calendar day.

Deeper Maintenance (DM)

This level of maintenance includes tasks that are more complex than operational maintenance and normally require specialised equipment and technical skills and which relies on access to extensive support equipment and workshop facilities for successful conduct.

Design

The process or act of creating or changing a product and related technical process descriptions through the application of scientific and engineering effort (verb), or the outcome of that process (noun). The design therefore encompasses not only the configuration of the product, but also the:

a. testing and evaluation needed to validate that the design meets performance and safety requirements;

b. manufacturing processes (including production test requirements) which require special control to ensure the product meets requirements;

c. in-service monitoring requirements, maintenance processes and authorised repairs;

d. maintenance lives and intervals and fatigue life; and

e. operating procedures and limits.



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Design Acceptance

The process whereby a design or design change (ie an output of the design process) involving aircraft or aircraft-related equipment is determined to be technically acceptable for ADF use based on a determination that the specified requirements and design standards are sufficient and applicable (to the ADF authorised configuration, maintenance policy and procedures, and operations) and that the quality of the design has been proven to the satisfaction of the responsible DAR. Generally, design quality is assured through approval of the design by an AEO against the approved design requirements and standards plus an acceptable basis of design verification.

Design Acceptance Certification

The final act of the Design Acceptance process whereby a DAR provides a certified record of the technical acceptability of a change to aircraft or aircraft-related equipment Type Design.

Design Acceptance Representative (DAR)

A Commonwealth employee with delegated authority from the TAR to perform Design Acceptance certification of changes to aircraft or aircraft-related equipment.

Design Approval Certification

The act of approval of design output resulting from a process that formally examines and documents compliance of a design (or design change) with specified requirements and design standards.

Design Change

A change to the approved configuration documentation of an item, or a proposed deviation from the approved design configuration.

Design Engineer (DE)

A professional engineer within an AEO with assigned authority from the Senior Design Engineer to perform certain engineering activities, including judging the significance of design changes and undertaking design review of significant design changes.

Design Review

The act whereby a design (or design change) is independently checked by an authorised person (other than the person who developed the design) to: verify the validity of the assumptions, conditions, data and methods used in design development; and to verify that the design output meets the specified design input requirements.

Design Support Network (DSN)

A collective term used to describe a group of agencies that provide design support to an AEO.

Deviation

A specific written authorisation to temporarily depart from an item’s current approved configuration documentation. A deviation differs from an engineering change in that an approved engineering change requires revision of documentation defining the affected item whereas a deviation does not revise the applicable document or drawing.

Engineering Authority (EA)

The authority assigned expressly to an organisation (AEO) or to an individual within an organisation to undertake specific engineering activities.

Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC)

The certificate awarded by the TAR to an organisation to operate as an AEO.

Engineering Change

A change to the current approved configuration documentation of a configuration item (CI) at any point in the life cycle of the CI.



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Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)

An Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) is defined as a proposed change to the current approved configuration of a CI and the supporting design documentation via which the change is described, justified and submitted to the Configuration Control Board (CCB). Although proposals in the initial stage may use different terminology such as System/Software Change Request or Software Trouble Report, all formal proposals to change the current approved configuration documentation are categorised as ECPs.

Engineering Management Plan (EMP)

A controlled quality document containing the details of an organisation’s Engineering Management System (EMS) including references to all engineering plans, processes and procedures to which the organisation must comply. The EMP describes all of the requirements that are satisfied by an organisation to become, and to remain, an AEO.

Exemption

A written authorisation granted by the TAR to either an AEO or AMO to depart from a particular technical airworthiness regulation for a specified period of time.

Flight Safety Critical Item

Any part, assembly or installation containing a critical characteristic whose failure, malfunction or absence could cause a catastrophic failure or an uncommanded engine shutdown, resulting in loss or serious damage to the aircraft or an unsafe condition.

Incorporation Approval

The formal process of permitting a design change to proceed from the design to the incorporation phase and has the effect of committing whatever resources are required for implementation. Incorporation Approval is granted by the Senior Executive or a nominated representative.

Independent Maintenance Inspection (IMI)

An IMI is a discrete conformance activity utlised to verify the conformance of the maintenance task or component against a prescribed standard carried out by an authorised person who was not involved in the performance of the maintenance being inspected.

Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA)

Those instructions required to keep aircraft and aircraft-related equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to: Authorised Maintenance Data, flight manuals, operating instructions and limitations, maintenance manuals, servicing schedules, component lifing policies, and inspection programs.

Inspection

An inspection is a visual or physical verification that determines compliance with engineering or maintenance standards.

Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA)

An attachment to an Engineering Authority Certificate which defines the scope of activity and any caveats and limitations under which the EAC is issued.

Maintenance

All actions taken to retain material in or restore it to a specified condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspection, condition monitoring, servicing, repair, overhaul, testing, calibration, rebuilding, reclamation, upgrades, modification, recovery, classification and the salvage of technical equipment.

Maintenance Authority (MA)

The authority to undertake specific maintenance activities.

Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC)

The certificate awarded by the TAR to certify an organisation as an AMO. The certificate includes an accompanying schedule that lists the certified level and scope of maintenance.



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Maintenance Certification

Maintenance certification is the act of authorised persons signing (electronically or physically) that they have discharged their responsibilities regarding the maintenance performed

Maintenance Manager (MM)

An authorised person who is responsible for the management of maintenance activities on nominated aircraft type or aeronautical product within an Approved Maintenance Organisation.

Maintenance Management Plan (MMP)

A Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) details all activities in an AMO affecting the maintenance of aviation material. It specifies processes to control maintenance and material management activities to assure the technical integrity of all material, as required by the TAR to become, and to remain, an AMO.

Maintenance Management System

A documented system that describes every one of the procedures and processes for managing the conduct of all maintenance in an AMO.

Maintenance Personnel

Maintenance personnel are those personnel authorised to plan, perform, supervise, inspect, and certify maintenance.

Maintenance Support Network (MSN)

A collective term used to describe a group of agencies that provide maintenance support to an AMO.

Maintenance Task

An activity having a defined start and finish and where the responsibility for completion is assigned to a single tradesperson. The task may include one or more actions which will be potentially effective in preventing or detecting failures, will restore equipment to a serviceable condition or prepare an aircraft for a particular mission. Such maintenance activities include replenishment, scheduled servicing and rectification. A particular maintenance task may rely on other maintenance tasks for completion.

Maintenance Test Flight (MTF)

Is a flight to ensure that an aircraft meets specification in regard to performance and handling characteristics and to establish, on prescribed occasions, that no deterioration of that standard has occurred during maintenance.

Material

Product that is used in the manufacture of components and in the maintenance and operation of aircraft, including fuels, oils and lubricants.

Mission Critical Item

An item whose failure will seriously degrade an aircraft’s ability to complete an assigned mission or lead to a mission being aborted.

Month

Month means any calendar month, historically based on the phases of the moon.

Non-Conformance

The failure of a product, process or system to meet its regulatory, specification, drawing, or quality requirements.

Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)

The OEM is the manufacturer listed as the approved source of manufacture for components in the type certificate data sheet. The OEM owns and controls the source drawings, ie the design of the component.



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Operational Maintenance (OM)

Tasks directly related to the preparation of equipment for immediate use, recovery and minor repair of the equipment after use. OM tasks require a limited range of support equipment and may involve the limited use of workshop facilities.

Procedure

A documented course of action to be followed to ensure a consistent outcome.

Quality Management System (QMS)

All activities of the overall management function that determine the quality policy, objectives and responsibilities and implement them by means such as quality planning, quality controls, quality assurance and quality improvement within the quality system.

Safety Critical Items and Systems (SCIS)

These are items/systems whereby loss of the function provided by that item/system could, in a worst credible representative environment, directly affect the aircraft’s ability for continued safe flight and landing.

Senior Design Engineer (SDE)

A senior professional engineer within an AEO, responsible to the senior executive for overall adequacy of the engineering activities conducted by the AEO and for ensuring compliance with the regulations. The SDE is also authorised to approve significant design changes and to assign engineering authority to other competent personnel within the AEO. Overall responsibility for the Engineering Management System (EMS) is the responsibility of the SDE.

Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM)

The SMM is the senior appointment with direct technical responsibility for all functions related to the maintenance conducted by an AMO.

Service Release

The approval to release an incorporated design change for use in service, based on the condition that all implementing instructions relating to the design change have been issued to user organisations. Service Release is granted by either the Chief of Air Force (for major type design changes) or the Senior Executive of an AEO (for minor type design changes).

Specification

A document defining the essential function and performance requirements of a product and which also identifies the relevant standards for the acquisition process. Specifications, in contrast to standards, provide a more complete description of requirements and include the basis for establishing conformance (particularly during test and evaluation), and hence validation for the acceptance of material.

Sponsor

Any ADF Force Element Group Headquarters, ADF AEO or other ADF organisation having responsibility for management support of engineering or maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product. For TAMM purposes two types of Sponsor exist; Sponsor AEO responsible for management of an instrument between the Commonwealth and a commercial AEO and AMO Sponsor responsible for identification, nomination and broad oversight of approved maintenance organisations.

Standard

A description of a material, product, doctrine or process meant for repeated applications by many users. A technical standard is an established norm or requirement. It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.

State Aircraft

An aircraft operated by the ADF other than any aircraft that, by virtue of registration under CASA regulations, is an Australian aircraft.



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Statement of Requirement (SOR)

A document or documents defining the complete set of DAR requirements on a design agency to allow DAR acceptance of an aircraft or aircraft-related equipment design or design change. The SOR includes or references a Specification, which is the document defining the specific essential function and performance requirements for the product design or design change.

Stores Suspension Equipment

All aircraft devices such as racks, adaptors, missile launchers, internal guns, countermeasure dispensers and pylons, used for carriage, employment and jettison of aircraft stores. Aircraft guns and countermeasure dispensers for flares and chaff must be considered to be stores suspension equipment.

Supervision of Maintenance

Supervision of maintenance is the personal observation to the extent necessary of the performance of maintenance and includes guiding, directing, and correcting the person being supervised.

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)

A certificate issued by Chief of Air Force for an aircraft which undergoes a major design change or role change that is beyond the type design defined in the original AMTC, but is not substantial enough to require a complete re-investigation of compliance of the aircraft with the applicable airworthiness standards (ie does not require a new AMTC).

Support Equipment

Support Equipment includes all equipment other than standard tools required to maintain State Aircraft and/or Aviation Materiel.

Task Authorisation

The legal authority allowing a person to perform a specified maintenance task, recognising that the person has completed the prerequisite training relevant to the task and has demonstrated competency in performance of the task. Task authorisations are recorded in the persons ‘A’ card, AATTR or RAAFRTE or equivalent document.


A concept which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for the judgement of its sustainability for flight in that it has been designed, constructed and maintained to approved standards by competent and authorised individuals, who are acting as members of an either an approved or authorised organisation and whose work is certified as correct and accepted on behalf of the ADF.

Technical Airworthiness Directives

A form of AAA that requires mandatory action. A TAD is used to correct a condition that the TAR considers unsatisfactory or unsafe, to be urgent, or where consistency is required across a number of organisations.

Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR)

The person with delegated responsibility from the ADF Airworthiness Authority for technical airworthiness management of State aircraft and aircraft-related equipment.

Technical Integrity

An item’s fitness for service, safety and compliance with regulations for environmental protection.

Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA)

An authorisation issued by the Senior Design Engineer of an ADF AEO to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance for a defined period of time not to exceed 12 months.

Tool Control

A systematic means of controlling tool usage that intends to eliminate the risk of tools being inadvertently left in an aircraft or aircraft components/equipment.



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Type Certification

The process of: (i) prescribing and revising minimum standards governing the design of aircraft, engines, propellers and other aircraft equipment as may be required in the interests of safety; and (ii) administering a program to determine compliance with those prescribed standards and maintain certification integrity with a higher level of oversight, specification and compliance than the normal Design Acceptance process requires. Successful type certification activity leads to the issue of an AMTC.

Type Record

A summary document that defines the (aircraft) type design at the time of acceptance by the Commonwealth, by providing an index to the issue status of all type design data.

Unapproved Aeronautical Product

Any part, component or material that has not been manufactured and certified as conforming with the technical data against which type certification is provided.

Working Week

The working week begins on Monday and ends on Friday. Saturday is considered the last day of the week, with Sunday the first day of the new week.

Working Day

A working day is the normal working routine for the unit, be it one or two shifts, with the usual complement of personnel.



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AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Abbreviations

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Definition

AAA Authoritative Airworthiness Advice AASA Ageing Aircraft Structural Audits ABDR Aircraft Battle Damage Repair ABL Allocated Baseline ADF Australian Defence Force AEO Authorised Engineering Organisation AM Accountable Manager AMD Aircraft Maintenance Documentation AMO Approved Maintenance Organisation AMTC Australian Military Type Certificate APS Australian Public Service ARDU Aircraft Research and Development Unit ASD Aerospace Systems Division ASIMP Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan ASR Airworthiness Standards Representative ATR Annual Technical Review CAMM2 Computer Aided Maintenance Management CAR Corrective Action Request CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation CBD Certification Basis Description CFU Carried Forward Unserviceability CI Configuration Item CM Configuration Management CMAINT Contingency Maintenance CMP Configuration Management Plan COE Centre of Expertise COSC Chief of Staff Committee DACPA Director – Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency DAR Design Acceptance Representative DE Design Engineer DAVCOMP Directorate of Aviation Compliance DAVENG Directorate of Aviation Engineering DAVREG Directorate of Aviation Regulation DGTA Director General Technical Airworthiness DGTA-ADF Directorate General Technical Airworthiness-Australian Defence

Force DI Defence Instruction DM Deeper Maintenance DSDE Deputy Senior Design Engineer DSN Design Support Network DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation EA Engineering Authority EAC Engineering Authority Certificate EMP Engineering Management Plan EMS Engineering Management System ESIMP Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan FAA Federal Aviation Administration (USA) FAR Federal Aviation Regulation FCA Functional Configuration Audit FEG Force Element Group FSD Foreign Source Data FMS Foreign Military Sales GSE Ground Support Equipment ICA Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness ILS Instrument Landing System IV&V Independent Verification and Validation


AAP 7001.053(AM1) List of Abbreviations

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Abbreviation Definition

JAA Joint Aviation Authority JAR Joint Aviation Requirements (European) LEA Letter of Engineering Authority MA Maintenance Authority MAC Maintenance Approval Certificate MCS Maintenance Control Section MM Maintenance Manager MMI Maintenance Managed Item MMP Maintenance Management Plan MMS Maintenance Management System MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet MSN Maintenance Support Network MTF Maintenance Test Flight NAA National Airworthiness Authority NDT Non Destructive Testing OAA Operational Airworthiness Authority OAR Operational Airworthiness Regulator OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OM Operational Maintenance QM Quality Manager PCA Physical Configuration Audit PO Project Office RFD Request for Deviation RFT Request for Tender RI Repairable Item SCIS Safety Critical Item and System SDE Senior Design Engineer SFP Special Flight Permit SSM System Safety Manager SMM Senior Maintenance Manager SOI Statement of Operating Intent SOR Statement of Requirements SPO Systems Program Office STC Supplemental Type Certificate STI Special Technical Instruction TAA Technical Airworthiness Authority TAAI Technical Airworthiness Alert Information TAD Technical Airworthiness Directive TAR Technical Airworthiness Regulator TAREG Technical Airworthiness Regulation TEWG Tender Evaluation Working Group TIR Technical Information Review TMP Technical Maintenance Plan UK MoD United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
