australia in the war 1939-1945 the role of science and industry-chapter 14-armoured fighting...

7/28/2019 Australia in the War 1939-1945 the Role of Science and Industry-Chapter 14-Armoured Fighting Vehicles

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CHAPTER 1 4ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

A frequently happens with important inventions, the basic principleof the tank occurred to a number of people independently and abou tthe same time. Among them was an Australian inventor, L. E. de Mole,1who in 1912 made and reduced to practical shape a brilliant inventio nwhich anticipated and in some respects surpassed the one actually adoptedseveral years later .2 De Mole despatched blueprints of his invention to th eBritish War Office, which acknowledged them, pigeon-holed them an dforgot them. Several years later Sir William Tritton and Major W. GWilson submitted to the War Office a design which on being accepted,became the basis of the British tank used in the first world war . On learn-ing that the Royal Commission on War Inventions had awarded Trittonand Wilson 15,000 for their design, de Mole applied for recognitionof his invention and travelled to England for the purpose of supportin ghis claim. He was granted 965 to cover out-of-pocket expenses, and wa sdecorated .In the later years of the first world war Britain introduced the tank intowarfare and at length built up a tank force so large that in the final offen-sives in France as many as fourteen battalions were employed (a big forceeven by the standards of 1940 and early 1941) . British officers anddesigners continued to develop the tank and to work out doctrines o farmoured warfare. During the twenties and thirties little money was mad eavailable to produce tanks in quantity in Britain . When Germany beganto rearm, her leaders, impressed by the work and writings of such Britis hdesigners and strategists as Giffard Martel, J . F. C. Fuller, and Liddel lHart, gradually built up a fairly large tank army and resolved to use itin mass as the British military experts advocated. By 1939, Germanyhad far larger armoured forces than her enemies. The success of theGerman armoured divisions in Belgium and France demonstrated afres hthe power of the tank.Even before this demonstration the Australian Army, which had main-tained a tank training corps since 1935, began to consider whether tank sshould be made in Australia. Australian representatives, including Major-General Northcott, who attended the first Dominion War Conference i nLondon in October 1939 and who afterwards inspected the defence system sof Britain and France, returned fully convinced by what they had seenin Europe that Australia would be compelled to make most of her ow nmilitary equipment . Soon after the fall of France the Department o fDefence decided that an attempt should be made to manufacture tanks ,1L. E de Mole, CBE. (Served 1st AIF .) Engineer; of Melbourne and Sydney ; b. Adelaide, 13Mar 1880. Died May 1950 .2 Se e Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, HM Stationery Office .Leonardo da Vinci has been credited with the first conception of the tank.


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and forwarded a recommendation to this effect to the War Cabinet, a tthe same time placing an order for 859 .In making its recommendation to the War Cabinet it was the army' sintention that in the first instance Australia should attempt to provid etanks for the A.I.F . in the Middle East, where armoured vehicles of allkinds were sadly lacking not only among Australian but among Britis hforces as well . 3 Britain's factories were then fully occupied in preparin gto meet the threatened invasion of her own shores and there was no betterhope of obtaining tanks from the United States, despite the fact that it svast automotive industry was turning to the production of armoured fight-ing vehicles. That tanks might also be required for the defence of Australi ain the event of Japan entering the war was a possibility to which militar yplanners were fully alive .For a country that had not yet manufactured a motor-cara muchless difficult undertakingthis was technically a most ambitious program ,and the serious strain which it was likely to impose on Australian engineer-ing industry led to the growth of two schools of opinion: one opposed tothe manufacture of tanks on the ground that it was beyond Australia' sengineering capacity, the other convinced equally firmly that the challeng ecould be met. The Australian Army leaders' enthusiasm for the tan kproject was, from the beginning, shared by the Department of Munitions .Much later, when the manufacture of tanks in Australia came under criti-

cism from Lend-Lease authorities, it also received the support of Genera lMacArthur, who in a letter to the Prime Minister said : "I am most heartilyin agreement with the proposal that Australia should have a tank produc-tion program." In addition to opposition within Australia there was i nsome quarters in Britain and the United States a strong disinclination tobelieve that Australian industry was capable of making tanks . Among theearly civilian optimists was Sir Langdon Bonython, who, to encourag ethe Commonwealth Government in its efforts to launch tank manufacture ,had made a gift of 25,000 for the express purpose of assisting investiga-tions of tank design .The cruiser tank was only one of a number of armoured fighting vehicleseventually required by the army. There were also machine-gun carriers ,two-pounder anti-tank gun carriers, three-inch mortar carriers, scout cars ,light armoured cars, heavy armoured cars, and heavy (infantry) tanks .The general plan was to make the army responsible for the designs o fthese vehicles, and the Department of Munitions (through the Directorateof Ordnance Production) responsible for manufacture. With these ends inview the army set up a Design Section within the Branch of the ChiefMilitary Adviser, and the Ordnance Production Directorate created a

s At the end of 1940 sprocket and track parts were made in Australia for the British cruisertanks, and were sent to the Middle East . It was unfortunate, in view of the critical stage ofthe campaign and the urgent need for these parts, that they should have proved completel yuseless . The reason for this was found to be that the drawings sent out from Britain to theAustralian contractor were not up to date and did not include the modifications that had beenincorporated in the tracks manufactured in England. When this was realised the drawings werealtered appropriately, and a second large order from the British Ministry of Supply was satis-factorily completed by the contractor, Messrs H. V. McKay-Massey Harris


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES303Section of Armoured Fighting Vehicles . 4 The section's first task was toexplore the general problems of production and to coordinate the develop-ment of army design with the manufacturing capacity and raw materialsavailable. To ensure the closest cooperation between the two sectionsarrangements were made for their staffs to work under the one roof the Crace Buildings in Melbourne .The tank is singled out from other armoured fighting vehicles for adetailed account because its manufacture presented the greatest challeng eto industry . 5Normal procedure in making a complex piece of equipment such a sa tank was first to compile a "user specification" outlining the generalrequirements, such as the degree of protection, speed, armament, numberof crew, range of activity, communication equipment and automotive .per-formancea complex document which could be drawn up only by combatofficers, and must be interpreted by experienced technical officers of th eArmy General Staff. After problems concerning these requirements hadbeen thoroughly thrashed out a workable design was produced . Concur-rently, full-size models in wood ( "mock-ups") were built in order to assistdesigners and users to determine the most efficient disposition of th enumerous pieces of equipment which must be accessibly packed in th evehicle : ammunition, radio, small arms, operating mechanism and con-trols, to mention only a few . A fully-operative prototype, or pilot model ,was built, then tested, and if necessary modified until it was as nearlycertain as possible that it would do what was expected of it . At this stag ethe design was "frozen". Then, and only then, was mass productio nundertaken. In war, these orderly steps in design and production wer eoften too time-consuming to be carried out in the normal sequence, wit hthe result that frequently they had to be overlapped .Design in itself was a complex process in which a number of distinctstages might be recognised . The first step to decide upon was the basi cdesign, which was essentially an elaboration of the user specification . Thenext step comprised the basic engineering design, which delineated th eway the user specification was to be implementedthe nature of th epower unit, for example.This was followed by the detailed engineering design entailing th edrawing up of the dimensions of every component in the vehicle, rangingfrom nuts and bolts to the engine and armour plate . It involved fixingnot only the size, shape and weight of every part but also the degre eof tolerance or permissible variation from these dimensions, which in turnrequired on the part of the designer a thorough knowledge of moder nmass-production methods and interchangeability of components .

Then followed the detailed design of tools, jigs, gauges and fixture snecessary to produce the components in quantity with provision for inter -changeability. As already pointed out, under ideal conditions these step s5 It was later (in July 1941) renamed the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Division .6 In writing the story of the Australian tank I was greatly helped by Mr H. JBromley andProfessor C . H. Munro.


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were taken in the order outlined, but simultaneously with any one o rwith all four a review had to be made of manufacturing capacity toensure that the components designed could be made in the time require dfrom available resources of materials and machine tools .The General Staff memorandum on the proposed Australian Cruise rTank issued on 11th November 1940 stated that :Tanks are required to operate in and disrupt the org anisation of hostile rear areas ,thus virtually isolating the troops in forward areas and severely reducing thei rpowe rs of resistance . In order to achieve this object tanks may be forced tobreak through a defensive area which has been organised and prepared to mee tsuch an eventuality . Whether this is necessary or not, it has become inevitable i nmodern war that deep penetration by armoured forces will be met, and counter -attacked, by the armoured forces of the defe nding army .For their operations in rear areas, the attacking tanks must be prepared to

engage unarmoured troops who may defend themselves with obstacles and anti -tank weapons .The tank m ust therefore p ossess considerable immunity from the f ire of anti-tan kwe apons and from fie ld artillery which is prep ared to eng ag e tanks in the vicinity .This partial immunity is achieved by a combination of speed and armour . Thenatural development, greatly accelerated since the outbreak of war, has been toincrease the hitting powe r of anti-tank we apons, including those carried on tanks .This necessitates an increase in armour provided no reduction in performance i sentailed ; otherwise the slower moving vehicles w ill be outmanoe uvred in tank-versus-tank actions .The tank must carry a weapon with which to engage hostile tanks and als oweapons of the anti-personnel type . Thinly armoure d tanks can rece ive their coup-de-grace so easily from those better protected that the whole basis of their tactic sis destroyed. They would be unable to carry out their role . The pre-war conceptio nof fast, lightly armoured tanks for reconnaissance has not withstood the rapi ddevelopme nt of tank and anti-tank we apons . The War Office has advised that in -adequately armoured tanks are a death trap .

Essentially what the army required was a tank weighing between 2 5and 30 tons, mounting a two-pounder gun as the main armament, wit hsupplementary armament of one or two Vickers .303 machine guns, acrew of four or five according to armament, minimum range of actionof 150 miles, speed of 30 miles per hour and covering equivalent to th eprotection of 50-millimetre armour plate, proof against two-pounder anti -tank guns at close range .As soon as the country was committed to making tanks, two importan tsteps were taken. An Ordnance Production engineer, Mr A. Chamberlain ,was immediately sent to the United States to collect the latest informatio non tank production in that country . About the same time the Common-wealth Government, aware that there was no one in Australia with extensiveexperience in tank design, made an urgent request to the British War Offic efor the services of engineers skilled in the design of tanks . In reply, theWar Office put forward the name of Colonel Watson, and the offe rof his services was immediately accepted. Watson, who had been a nartillery officer in the first world war, had spent his life since the n"Col W. D. Watson, OBE, MC. (Royal Artillery 1914-18 .) Vice-President, Mechanisation Board ,Ministry of S upply, 1939-40 ; Chief of Design, AFV Producn, Australia, from 1941 . Regularsoldier; b. 16 Jan 1893.


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES305studying problems of tank design and was eminently well fitted for th etask for which he had been chosen . On his way to Australia he visitedthe United States, where, in company with Chamberlain, he made a clos estudy of the American medium tank, M.3, the tank which, although thenuntried on the battlefield, was selected by the Ordnance Production Direc-torate as the one most likely to meet the requirements set out in th eGeneral Staff's memorandum .

The tank project received a new impetus when, shortly after his arriva lin Australia in December 1940, Watson was made technical adviser t othe newly created Army Design Directorate. It soon became evident thatan experienced hand was at the helm. He quickly modified the army'suser specification to conform with the British views on the necessity o fa low silhouette, and as it became clear that it would not be possible t ocopy the M.3 at all closely, he proceeded to carry out the basic desig nof what subsequently became known as the Australian Cruiser Tank MarkI (A.C .1), a much heavier tank than was originally contemplated by th earmy. Watson's preference for a heavier tank was supported by GeneralMackay,' who said in the course of a radio broadcast : "If Australia isto send many more men overseas to fight in the future, she must als oproduce and send heavy tanks for them to fight with . "In the widest and most general terms, four main engineering problemsconfronted tank designers and manufacturers . Since the tank had to beheavily armoured, there was the problem of deciding firstly what kind ofsteel should be used for armour; secondly how it should be produced ; andthirdly, whether it should be rolled and welded or riveted, or whether i tshould be cast . Lastly, there was the problem of designing the power unit ,which would clearly have to be based on imported engines .

Settling these questions was to prove a lengthy business. Experience withBritish tanks on the Continent early in the war had shown up defects ;consequently there was no ideal, thoroughly-tested Allied tank upon whic han Australian tank might be modelled. In point of fact, just as Watson wa sbeginning his work in Australia, a British mission was discussing problem sof tank design and production with ordnance experts in the United States .Formulation and production of steels suitable for armour of the tankwere assigned to metallurgists of the Commonwealth Steel Company andthe Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd . Preliminary investigation ofthe resources of Australian industry showed that owing to serious limita-tions in the steel industry's capacity to roll plate of the thickness andsize used in oversea tanks, it would be impossible to copy a British o rAmerican tank in its entirety . This limitation was due not to the industry' sinability to carry out the kind of rolling operation required, but to thefact that the machines capable of doing it were already fully occupied wit hmunitions work . The only alternative seemed to be to cast the armourplate. Furthermore, the power unit with which the American M .3 wa s7 Lt-Gen Sir Iven Mackay, KBE, CMG, DSO . (1st AIF: Comd 4 Bn 1916-17, 1 MG Bn 1918,1 Inf Bde 1918-19.) GOC 6 Div 1940-41; GOC-in-C Home Forces 1941-42; GOC Second Army1942-43 . High Commnr for Aust in India 1944-48. Schoolmaster; of Sydney ; b. Grafton, NSW,7 Apr 1882.


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fitted was not available in Australia, nor were there any prospects of im-porting it . For these reasons a basically new engineering design of thepower unit had to be worked out .In attempting to assess the difficulty of making tanks in Australia th eimprovisations forced on designers must be borne in mind . These circum-stances differentiated the tank project from practically every other muni-tions project undertaken in Australia during the war. For guns, ammuni-tion, aircraft, torpedoes and mines the basic design and detailed engineer-ing designs were, with few exceptions, carried out overseas ; in many in-stances Australian manufacturers were even supplied with the detaile ddesigns of tools, gauges and fixtures necessary to produce component part sin large quantities . The tank, on the other hand, had to be almost entirel yredesigned.One of the main problems met by designers of the power unit was t oadapt automotive engines for use in driving a heavy vehicle such as atank. Cadillac engines, which could at that time be imported without diffi-culty, appeared to lend themselves to this kind of adaptation . 8 Despiteopinions to the contrary held by a number of engineers, including somefrom the General Motors Corporation in the United States, Mr Code9(Chairman of the Automotive Engineering Panel) and Professor Burstall(of the University of Melbourne) strongly supported the idea of usingCadillac engines. The indecision that prevailed in the early days of the

project regarding the best method of providing power for the tank is no wquite understandable. Unlike Germany, neither Britain nor the Unite dStates had, before the war, designed and produced an engine powerfulenough or compact enough to fit into a 30-ton tank designed to travel a t30 miles an hour and to be capable of climbing out of deep ditches .As late as 1943 the United States, with all its great industrial resources ,was still in process of developing, from several alternatives, a really satis-factory tank engine, and was obliged to use unsuitable aircraft engines i nits early models . Australian designers were also compelled to improvise .They finally decided to adapt 1940-model Cadillac motor car petrol engine sfor the purpose by combining several engines into a single power unit an innovation in tank design that had not been attempted elsewhere .Having examined general drawings for the tank, the Ordnance Produc-tion Directorate expressed doubts whether Australian industry was capableof producing the intricate synchromesh gears that would be required i fthe design suggested by the army was adhered to . This gear box was oneof the features of the M.3 that had been retained in the Australian design .The only drawing of the M.3 gear box then in the possession of the direc-torate presented little more than a pictorial record of the assembly . DespiteD Arguments concerning the use of Cadillac engines extended beyond the technical to the politicalsphere . The Federal Opposition (Labour) suspected connivance with General Motors, and whenit came into power in 1941 a committee was set up to investigate the matter . These investiga-tions showed the committee that there were no grounds for this suspicionthat the Cadillachad been selected by unbiased experts, mainly Watson and army engineers, and was the onlyavailable engine with the necessary horse-power.D A. R. Code. Engineer; with Vacuum Oil Co till 1941; Dir of AFVProducn 1941-44; Brit Minof Supply in AFVDirectorate 1944-46 . B. Melbourne 1901. Died 11 Sep 1947


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Panel, he had already taken an active part in the exploratory work on thetank between June 1940 and June 1941 . Mr Bromley 4 was appointedController and Production Manager . 5Although Menzies had taken what seems in retrospect to have beenthe only reasonable way out of the difficulties surrounding the tank pro -gram, his action was the subject of criticism, most of which came fro mdisappointed members of the Ordnance Production Directorate and of theArmy Directorate of Design . Neither organisation wholly approved of theseparate Directorate of Armoured Fighting Vehicles . Some members of theMaster-General of the Ordnance Branch were highly critical of what the yalleged to be the army's loss of the right to design the tank .In the production of most munitions, commercial manufacturers, onc ethey were supplied with the necessary high-precision machine tools, experi-enced little technical difficulty since the requirements were clearly laid downin British specifications . Furthermore, the Government helped them ou tby lending them teams of experts from its own munitions factories . Withtanks, on the other hand, there was no such background of experienc eor of equipment of the specialised type needed for their manufacture .Another difficulty that faced tank manufacturers was that of makin gthe most effective use of civilians with first-class experience in design andproduction engineering. The existence of the directorate made it easier torecruit highly-specialised engineers who were not willing to serve as non -commissioned or relatively junior officers in the army . It did, in fact, bringtogether in one organisation the best civilian engineers and scientists an dtop-ranking army experts concerned with the design of tanks .Australian industry at the beginning of the war was reasonably wel lsupplied with engineers experienced in the design of mechanical equip-

satisfied with this arrangement and Armoured Fighting Vehicles became a separate direc-torate once more on 9 Apr 1942.](ii) The head of the organisation shall be in charge of the production of armoured fightin gvehicles .(iii) The army will issue the General Staff specifications .(iv) There will be one Design Section embracing both basic and detail design.(v ) The head of the organisation will at the outset take with him from the Ordnance Produc-tion Directorate all the men he may require from this directorate who have been engagedon armoured fighting vehicles .(vi) The personnel of the Design Section should consist of the present Military Design Section(A.F.V.) and the production draughtsmen reinforced and other personnel as necessary .This section will be a joint Military Civil Section. The military personnel will be secondedto the Armoured Fighting Vehicles project .(vii) The head of the Design Section will be Col Watson.(viii) The Design Section will be part of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Section under th ehead of that establishment .(ix) Both the head of Armoured Fighting Vehicles [Mr Code] and Col Watson will have theright of direct access to the Chief of General Staff.(x ) There will be a branch of the Inspection Dept whose activities will be confined to armouredfighting vehicles . The Officer in Charge of this section [Col R. Smith], who will be knownas the Chief Inspector of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, will have direct contact with theInspector-General of Munitions. He will be concerned only with armoured fighting vehiclesand will maintain the closest contact with the head of Armoured Fighting Vehicles .

' H. JBromley. Production Manager Clyde Engineering 1939-40, NSW Board of Area Manage-ment 1940-45, Siddons Drop Forging Ltd 1945-49, and of Coote and Jorgensen 1949-53 . OfMelbourne; b. Fremantle, WA, 28 Jun 1906. Died 20 Sep 19546 The principal officers of the AFVDirectorate were : A. R. Code, Director of AFVProducn;Col W. D. Watson, Chief of Design; M. S. Walker, Drawing Office Supt; It. Perrier, AutomotiveDesign Engr; A. P. Taebring, Research and Developt; Col R. FSmith, Chief Inspector, AFV ;Maj L. H. Vernon, Liaison Officer for the Director of AFV


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(H . J . Bromley )Hull of the Australian Cruiser Tank from the rear port side .

Testing the Australian Cruiser Tank.


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES30 9ment produced by "jobbing" methods ; but mass-production methods hadnot been developed in Australia to the extent that they were in the UnitedKingdom and in the United States, for example . By the time the ArmouredFighting Vehicles Directorate was established most of the relatively fe wAustralian design and production engineers had been taken into such pro-jects as aircraft production .

Notwithstanding these difficulties, under Watson's guidance the designof the Australian Cruiser Tank Mark I began to take shape towards th eend of 1941 . Watson was a strong believer in close cooperation with th efirms selected to carry out the manufacture of tank components during th edesign period, and as a result of his specialised knowledge of tank require-ments, and thanks also to the ingenuity of Australian industry, the A .C . 1design incorporated a number of interesting and novel technical solution sto the general problem of blending the ideal of army requirements with thehard realities of industrial capacity. The design which finally emerged in-corporated such modifications to the M.3 as

(a ) a simple crash type g ear box (instead of synchromesh) ,(b) modified driving axle casing and details ,(c) simplified track design to reduce machining ,(d) Hotchkiss type suspension ,(e ) one-piece cast hull , eliminating many m achined surface s ,(f) low silhouette ,(g ) the use of Cadillac eng ines .

The design evolved by Watson was described as a blend of British idea son armour silhouette and shape with American automotive practice .If the intention was to use the Australian Cruiser Tank alongside Britishand American tanks, the more closely it conformed to standard design sthe more readily it could be serviced and repaired . Opponents of the tankproject have criticised the A.C .1 tank on the score that it did not conformclosely with British and American designs, but it should be remembere dthat departures from a standard design were forced upon Australia nengineers by the limitations of Australian industry .Once it had been decided to cast the armour plate, a small-scale mode lof A.C .1 was built and exhibited at a meeting of steel and foundry expert sheld in Melbourne. They were asked if the necessary castings could b emade in Australia . From the resulting discussion it was decided that thefirm of Bradford Kendall Ltd of Sydney, leading steel founders, shoul dundertake casting the main components, including the hull .The bullet-proof steel developed by Mr Bishop of the Broken Hil lProprietary Company Ltd, which had been so successfully used in Bren-gun carriers and other armoured fighting vehicles, was not well suited t omaking tanks by the casting process . In order to render the steel castable ,but at the same time to retain its desirable ballistic qualities, Bishop, work-ing closely with Bradford Kendall, decided to try the effect of lowering thepercentage of chromium, raising that of manganese and silicon, and leavingthe percentage of zirconium about the same as that in bullet-proof steel .


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Zirconium, which had been added because of its capacity to enhancetoughness by removing excess oxygen and hydrogen (both of which hadan embrittling effect), and to render excess nitrogen more or less innocuou sby forming a nitride, also improved the fluidity of the molten steel, thu sfacilitating casting .On account of the failure of earlier token plates under firing tests, th efirst specification for the modified bullet-proof steel was amended slightly .Microscopic examination revealed that when the zirconium content exceede dabout 0.12 per cent, the zirconium nitride which was formed crystallise dinto clearly defined cubes. In the belief that the sharp corners of thes ecubes were liable to initiate cracks under severe shock, it was decided t oreduce the zirconium content from a maximum of 0 .25 per cent to 0 .1 0per cent . This adjustment in formula was found to alter the crystal habitof zirconium nitride from cubes to needles, which were by compariso nharmless. Whether this change in crystal habit was the significant facto rinfluencing the physical properties of the steel was not certain ; the im-portant point was that the steel did become a good deal tougher . Testsmade between October 1942 and January 1943 showed that with a naverage zirconium content of 0.20 per cent, ballistic requirements wer eexceeded by 90 feet per second ; that is, the plate failed only when theprojectile's velocity was 90 feet per second greater than that stipulate din the specification. When, however, the zirconium was reduced to anaverage of only 0.05 per cent, the velocity in reserve rose to 165 fee tper second .As first planned, the hull was to be cast in six parts which were sub-sequently to be bolted together . When completed it would be 17 fee t7+ inches long, 6 feet 82 inches wide, and 4 feet 5 inches deep, andwould weigh approximately 8 tons . Moreover, it would have to be donewith a steel whose castability in these circumstances was quite unknown .The idea of casting the armour for a tank was not new : it had been triedin France, though for a very much smaller tank . As far as can be ascer-tained no other country had tried to cast armour plates for a tank of thesize of the A.C .1 .After some preliminary trials carried out under the enthusiastic leader -ship of James Kendall, 6 skilled foundry men of Bradford Kendall Ltddecided that they could probably cast the hull in one piece, and late i n1941 they were successful . The casting of this large and complex uni twas eloquent testimony to the skill of the tradesmen of the foundry in-dustry.'' Other, less difficult armour castings such as those of the turret ,front axle housing, gun mantles, turret front plate and final drive cover ,were made by the same firm .

The difficulties of fabricating the armour were not, however, over wit hsuccessful casting. The castings had to be subjected to heat treatment i n6 E. James Kendall. (Served AN&MEF 1914-15.) Managing Director, Bradford Kendall Ltd .Of Sydney ; b. Nova Scotia, 13 Dec 1890. Died 5 May 1943 .7 It is a matter of interest to record that about 10 years later it was reported from the UnitedStates (in the Sydney Morning Herald of 2 Jul 1952) that a tank, the Patton 48, embodying aone-piece hull casting, was adopted by the United States Army.


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES3 1 1order to produce the desired physical characteristics in the armour ; finallymany areas of the hull had to be machined to close tolerances . Heat treat-ment, comprising such operations as annealing, tempering and hardening ,was a normal and universally adopted practice in steel making, but n ofirm in Australia had ever before attempted to heat-treat an article of th esize of the hull. The difficulty of the operation lay in maintaining closel ycontrolled temperatures throughout a large volume of space for long period sof time. Coal gas appeared to be the only fuel suitable for achievingthis objective .The task of designing and building these furnaces was undertaken bythe Australian Gas Light Company of Mortlake, New South Wales . 8 In all ,seven furnaces were built, each measuring 9 by 21 by 6 feet . Firing wasso arranged that the temperature throughout each furnace, even in thos eoperated at high temperatures, was uniform to within about five degrees .It was, moreover, possible to hold the temperature as low as 175 degree scentigrade for many hours if necessary . The whole cycle of treatmentcould be carried out by moving the hull into successive furnaces down aline. 9During August 1942 army inspectors found that a number of casting sselected for test under gun fire proved not quite capable of meeting require-ments, despite the fact that the static physical tests laid down were full ycomplied with. Examination of the castings under the microscope failedto reveal the cause and it was thereupon assumed that the particular stee lchosen was capable, in the case of occasional heats, of exhibiting what wa sknown as temper brittleness . This characteristic was revealed only whena test piece, particularly one with sharp corners and re-entrant angles ,was subjected to shock . Though the cause of the phenomenon was un-known, the remedy was simple and consisted of quenching the steel i nwater after it had been tempered . When double tempering treatment wa sgiven, one quenching sufficed . In these circumstances the steel rarely, ifever, failed .Satisfactory as it was to know that Australia had produced cast armou rfor her tanks which fulfilled all tests specified, it seemed desirable to dis-cover how it compared with the oversea product; a few turrets were'The work was done by Messrs Banks, Peterson and Corbett of that company.9 The heat treatment cycle was as follows :

1 . Anneal .Raise to temperature (1050-1100 degrees C.) in 7 hours hold at temperature 3 to 4 hours,cool out in furnace for 24 hours, temperature distribution in furnace to be within plus orminus 20 degrees C.2. Normalise .Raise to 900 degrees C in approx 9 hrs, hold at temperature 3 hours, cool in air . Temperaturedistribution in furnace to be within plus or minus 20 degrees C.3 . 1st tempering (forced convection heating) .Raise to 650 degrees C in 3 hrs, hold at temperature from 7 to 9 hours. Temperature dis-tribution in furnace to be within plus or minus 20 degrees C .4. Hardening .Raise to 850 degrees C in 9 hrs, hold for 3 hrs then quench in water . Temperature distributionin furnace to be within plus or minus 20 degrees C.5.2nd tempering (forced convection heating) .Raise to 600 degrees C in 3 hrs, soak for 9 hrs, cool in air . Temperature distribution infurnace to be within plus or minus 12 degrees C .6. Stress relief if necessary. Heat to 550 degrees C in 3 hrs, hold for 3 hrs .


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therefore taken from imported tanks and tested under gun fire . The resultsobtained demonstrated that the armour on the Australian tank was in n oway inferior to the imported article . If anything, it showed slight superio-rity . The main factors contributing to this happy position were the sound-ness of the foundry technique, and the efficiency of the steel-making an dheat-treatment processes .The considerable amount of scientific investigation and testing at al lstages of this developmental work on the tank armour was carried out b ya team of metallurgists drawn from private and government laboratories .Mr Clark of the B .H.P ., Chief Metallurgical Adviser to the Director -General of Munitions, took a leading part in supervising work on th eheat treatment of the armour plate; investigation of technical problemsof casting was carried out by Mr Ceruttyl of the staff of the SydneyTechnical College. Much of this work was done in the laboratories of theTechnical College, which at that time were fairly well equipped for simpl emetallographical studies. For all physical testing of the cast armour plat e(except ballistic tests) Mr Bennett,2 Senior Metallurgist in the New SouthWales Government Railways, was responsible. These tests were mad echiefly in the Railway Workshops at Redfern .Systematic study of every phase of the production of castings and ofthe quality of the castings themselves was undertaken by the Munition sSupply Laboratories in their branch at Villawood, New South Wales . Asa means of perfecting casting technique and ensuring flawless armour plate ,radiological tests (using radium as a source of penetrating y-radiation )were made on the solidifying, feeding and running of the castings . Themetallurgical section at Villawood also maintained facilities for the mag-netic and ultrasonic method of detecting fine cracks in castings .While all this work on the armour of the tank was in progress problem srelating to the power unit were receiving attention . Adhering to the designof Code and Burstall, General Motors-Holden's succeeded in mounting1940 model Cadillac engines in "clover leaf" formation (two engines sid eby side in front and one engine centrally at rear) . Each engine was con-nected by shafts to a transfer gear-case and from this gear-case a singl eshaft transmitted the full power of the three engines forward to the maingear box and thence to the final front sprocket drive . The transfer gear-case served also as a means for taking off power for the 40-volt generato roperating the turret driver's motor and trailer and for the compresso rwhich supplied air to the servo-controlled steering and braking mechanism .

A distinctive feature of the A .C .1 was its low, streamlined silhouette :it was about three feet lower than the M.3, and in this respect was wel lin advance of oversea design . Watson regarded this feature as most im-portant from the point of view of practical warfare, not only in its effec tin turning direct hits into glancing blows, but also in enabling the tankto push its nose over a hill and fire at the enemy without exposing too1 H S. Cerutty. Metallurgical consultant; of Sydney b . Melbourne, 1 2 Jun 1895.9 R. H. Bennett. Assistant engineer NSW Government Railways 1928 .46, chief metallurgist since1946. Of Sydney; b. Sydney, 22 Feb 1906


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES31 3much of its area to enemy gun fire . Oversea tanks were mainly built upfrom rolled armour plate of rectangular plane sections . In such a form ofconstruction it was difficult to obtain a low, streamlined silhouette ; thecasting technique, on the other hand, made it easier to achieve this . Theturret drive mechanism was novel, and although responsible for muc hanxiety in the early stages of the tank trials it was eventually developedinto quite a satisfactory unit by Captain Harris . 3Early in the process of developing the detailed design of the tank afull-sized wooden "mock-up" was built to exact dimensions, this bein gmuch more rapidly accomplished than a model in steel . Watson used tobring in all who were likely to have anything to do with the tank, includ-ing officers from the armoured division, to discuss many of the mor eminute details of design, using the wooden mock-up as a basis for dis-cussion and demonstration. As soon as he had satisfied himself as full yas possible on the questions of space and dimensions, he gave the signa lfor the construction of working pilot models in steel .Details of these models were as follows : weight, 28 tons ; length, 2 1f ee t ; width, 9 feet ; height, 8 feet 5 inches; main armament, 2-pounde rgun in turret with one Vickers .303 machine gun mounted coaxially anda second mounted centrally in front of the hull ; a Bren gun with anti-aircraft mounting and a sub-machine gun completed the armament . Thetank was designed to attain a top speed of 35 miles an hour and in thi sweight class it would be the fastest tank in the world . Its gear box gavefive forward speeds and one reverse . Its range, when equipped with ajettison tank, was 200 miles . The tracks were adaptable to the use o frubber or steel track links. All later A.C .1 tanks were equipped withrubber-treaded steel links imported from the United States . The body ofthe tank was carried on Hotchkiss bogie suspensions, three on each sid eof the hull. The steering ratio (length of track on ground to distanc ebetween track centres) approximated to the optimum figure and in con -sequence steering and general manoeuvrability were especially favourable .The hull armour was 65 millimetres thick in front, 45 millimetres at th eside and 25 millimetres on top ; that of the turret was 65 millimetres thick .

Internally the tank was roughly divided into three compartments : front ,middle and rear. The front compartment accommodated the driver an dforward gunner, individual seats being provided . The driver's compartmentcontaining the various controls was on the right; the forward gunner 'sseat was on the left beside the Vickers machine-gun . The turret andturret-basket occupied the centre of the tank, which also housed th eammunition for the 2-pounder gun. In the rear compartment were housedthe engine, radiators, cooling fan and fuel tanks . The other three membersof the crewcommander, 2-pounder gunner and wireless operatoroccupied the fighting basket.E Capt L. A. C. Harris, BE. Design and Tech Offr, CMA Branch AHQ, 1941-42 ; DAFV1942-43 ;EME Design Div, MOO Branch, 1943-45. Electrical engineer; of Charlton, Vic; b. Melbourne,31 Jan 1915 .


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Three models were constructed : one for automotive tests, the secondfor gunnery tests and the third as a prototype for mass production . Thefirst automotive pilot model was delivered in January 1942 by the Ne wSouth Wales Railways and was tested at the tank range at Puckapunya lon 15th February 1942. Automotively the pilot model performed remark -ably well, and attained a speed of 40 miles per hour . Before this the armyhad carried out many preliminary tests at Fishermen's Bend and Torquay ,Victoria. The second pilot model was delivered for gunnery trials o n5th April 1942 and the third on 3rd June .Early in 1942 when a Japanese invasion seemed imminent the Direc-torate of Armoured Fighting Vehicles arranged for components of the tan kto be put into mass production as drawings were progressively released ,without waiting for pilot models to be completed and tested . A survey ofindustry having revealed that Sydney possessed the greatest potential fo rtank production, Sir Philip Goldfinch, Chairman of the New South Wale sBoard of Area Management, promptly took up the challenge and organise dstaff to implement the plans for industrial development outlined by th eDepartment of Munitions .This arrangement, by which the designers were in one State and th emanufacturers in another, added a further complication to the tank pro-ject . It is difficult to see how it could have been avoided, since very clos eliaison between the Directorate of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, the Gen-eral Staff, and the Master-General of Ordnance was essential at all stage sof the program. Location of the design staff in Sydney would have severel yhandicapped progress and army approval of designs . On the other hand ,when there was great pressure to release for production components tha thad not yet been tried out in pilot models of the tank, many advantageswould have accrued if the design staff had been closer to the manufacturers .The authorities originally responsible for the decision to make tanks prob-ably did not foresee all these complications .The section of the New South Wales Board of Area Managemen tspecially created to supervise the manufacture of tanks was responsiblefor a new departure from general practice when it undertook to act a smajor coordinating contractor for the tank project . Until then the commonpractice had been for the Board of Area Management in each State toappoint a private firm as major coordinating contractor, to be responsibl efor placing orders on hundreds of other firms for mass production o findividual components, and also for production planning, scheduling andfollow-up work. This procedure worked smoothly for smaller project swhere complete designs were available, but when production was begu non a major project before designs were finalised, as with the tank, ther ewas a risk of undue delay . In its capacity as major coordinating con -tractor, the Board of Area Management was able to avoid much delayby placing, at the outset, a bulk order for materials likely to be used inthe construction of the tank . Orders were even placed before it was knownwhich contractors would make the different components . If bulk orders


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES31 5for materials had not been so placed the A .C .1 would probably neverhave been produced.Had there been any private firm experienced in the production of tanks ,the ideal arrangement would of course have been to use it as the majo rcoordinating contractor, but few Australian firms possessed organisation seven remotely adequate for tank production . In fact the various Stat erailway departments were the nearest approach to what was required .The Victorian Railways, however, had been appointed major coordinatingcontractors for the production of Bren-gun carriers . At the time the NewSouth Wales Railways were asked to act as major coordinating contractor sfor the tank project they had already been committed to participation i nthe manufacture of the Beaufort Bomber and could not undertake respon-sibility for any phase of the work other than the final assembly of the tank .

Major contractors selected for the manufacture of tanks in New Sout hWales were : 4(a) Armour castings, including the hull, turret, front axle housing, entry andex it doors, etc : Bradford K endall Ltd .(b) Gear box : Sonnerdale Ltd .(c) Driving axle assem bly and transfer box : Coote and Jorgensen Ltd .(d) Power unit : Ge neral Motors-Holden's Ltd .(e) Suspension : Tullochs Ltd .(f) Radiator assembly : Harris Hutchinson Pty Ltd.(g) Ste el casting s other than armour casting s : Hadf ields Ltd and Industrial Steels ,

Ltd .(h) Turret drive me chanism : Electric Control and Eng ineering Ltd .(i) Final assem bly of all tanks from comp onents to be su pplied by the M inistryof Munitions : N S .W . Government Railways .In addition there were 312 minor direct contractors with the Board ofArea Management and 259 sub-contractors .As it would have been impossible to make the tanks in the number s

required with the engineering facilities then existing in New South Wales ,the program provided for the construction of six major workshop s(annexes) as follows :Bradford Ke ndall Ltd .

.

est cost 249 ,00 0Coote and Jorge nsen Ltd

, , 113 ,00 0Sonnerdale Ltd

98,000Hadfields, Ltd 45,000Industrial Ste els Ltd 28,00 0N . S .W . Govt Railways . 108,000

The annexe at Bradford Kendall's at Alexandria, New South Wales ,which was built on a site previously occupied by a "tin hare" dog-racin gcourse, was designed and equipped expressly to produce the hull, 5 turret ,front axle housing, front turret plate, gun mantles and final drive cover .Equipped with a modern sand-handling equipment, moulding machines and'Victorian contractors were selected later when the intention was to double the rate of produc-tion . The tank program was terminated about the time the extra capacity in Victoria wascompleted. Ruwolts were to have made the armour plate casting and the Steel Co of Austcastings other than armour plate .*The first three hulls were cast in their old foundry


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special-purpose milling machines, it became the most modern steel foundryin the Commonwealth. One of the reasons for casting the hull in on epiece was the belief that much labour and expense would be saved byeliminating the drilling, welding and riveting (or bolting) that would hav ebeen necessary had it been fabricated from five separate components . Inpoint of fact this economy was not fully achieved, owing to the lon gtime it took to mould a hull by hand . A moulding machine had beenordered from the United States about the time of Pearl Harbour ; by thetime it had been built and shipping space had been found for it, the han dmethod was so well established that the question arose whether productionshould be interrupted to allow the installation of the new machine . Sincean output of six hulls a week did not warrant any change, the new machin ewas not installed .

A one-piece hull possessed certain advantages apart from the saving o fmachines and manpower; it provided greater rigidity and obviated thenecessity for close-fitting joints . It was also less vulnerablelead from astriking bullet would "splash" through even the best joint if a direct hi twas made .On being furnished with the requisite machine tools, many of whic hwere obtained from the United States under the Lend-Lease Agreement ,the annexe at Sonnerdales in Sydney went into production of the larges tgear box made in this country during the war, at the rate of ten a week .The manager of this annexe, Mr Jones, 6 was sent to the United Statesto study the latest methods of producing gears and to select machine tool sfor use in Australia .Tooling of the annexe at Coote and Jorgensen's for the driving assemblywas not completed until about August 1943, which meant that the fir mhad to manufacture its own tooling.Late in 1941 Messrs H. W. Muter and G. J. Blattman (assistantengineers in the New South Wales Department of Railways) were sen tto the United States to study techniques used in the assembly of tanks .In the light of their experience of the most modern practices in the larges ttank factories in the United States, they helped to design the final assembl yshop at Chullora, which was completed by July 1942 . In this shop all thetank components, numbering more than 2,000, were brought together fro m

some forty-seven different contractors .The target originally aimed at was five tanks per week by May 1942 .Output fell short of the target owing to the difficulty of finalising design sand making working drawings available to manufacturers . The tank pro-gram was also in serious competition with other munitions programs formanpower. However, by the use of a large staff of follow-up liaison officers ,Mr Munro,7 Supervising Engineer for Production on the staff of the BoardC E. Jones. Works Manager Sonnerdale Ltd to 1941 ; Manager Tank Transmission Annexe1941-50 . Of Sydney ; b . Charters Towers, Q1d, 22 Aug 1900.7 C . H. Munro, BE. Lecturer in charge Engineering, Sydney Technical College, 1936-41 ; Super-vising Engineer (NSW) AFV Division and Controller of Production Small Craft ConstructionDivision 1941-45 ; Major RE, Brit Army in Burma, 1945-46. Professor of Civil Engineering, NSWUniv of Technology ; b. Toowoomba, Qld, 23 Mar 1904 .


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES31 7of Area Management of New South Wales, was able to reduce to aminimum the time between the release of drawings for production an ddelivery of the required item to the assembly line . Pending the completionof tooling, design and construction, jobbing methods were used to star tthe production line .In August 1942, after many delays, the first Australian Cruiser Tank

left the assembly line. By the end of October sixteen more had complete dthe test run . Comprising 50 miles of road and 25 miles over a courseinvolving sixteen circuits of cruising ditches, creeks and embankments ,the course, in the opinion of Watson, was as severe as those in Britain .Twenty-two months before it made this test run, the A .C .1 existed onlyas a General Staff user specification .

Once the complaints of the production engineers against the designstaff, because of continual minor changes in design and delay in releasin gproduction drawings, had died down, industry might reasonably haveexpected to settle down to steady production with a goal of five tanks aweek . But this was not to be . The rapidly changing scene on the warfront and the development of improved tanks (particularly by the enemy )pointed to the necessity for major changes to match this progress . It wa stherefore decided to limit production of the Mark I tank to sixty-six i nall and to incorporate several improvements in a second mark . Themain weakness of the A.C .1 when compared with the latest oversea design swas its poor fire power . 8 The means of improving this were limited t oweapons made in Australia. Therefore the A.C .1 was fitted, for test pur-poses, with a 25-pounder gun in a redesigned turret . Firing trials exceededthe expectations of designers and of army observers . An eye-witnessaccount of the test, which was made at the old Fort Gellibrand at Williams -town (Victoria) on 29th June 1942, states :

As there was no previous experience in firing so powerful a gun from a turret ,and our tank was a new ly desig ned tank and had not been te sted for firing anythin gmore than the customary anti-tank 2-pounder gun, practically a toy alongside the25-pounder, safety precautions were taken on first firing ; a lanyard of some 80 feetwas attached to the firing trigger in the turret and the gun crew and visitors wer eordered be hind the rebutme nts of the fort . The re was difficulty, however, in obtain-ing a straight pull on the lanyard and after several efforts the firing officer wen tinto the turret and disregarding all the unknown factors and dangers released th efiring trigger with his hand and thus proved the gun and turret to be completel ycoordinated and successful . W e all saw this being done and several more shots wer efired before we left .9

This was the first time, as far as is known, that so powerful a gunhad been thus mounted and fired in an Allied tank . The redesigned tankwas known as the A.C .3 . In general form it was similar to the Mark I ,but the turret was of necessity slightly larger and the hull angles weremodified to give improved protection . To accommodate the larger gun the Other weaknesses were that the bogie wheel tyres wore out too quickly; the turret drive geardid not operate satisfactorily with the tank on an incline of 25 degrees or over; its engine coolingwas not entirely satisfactory

Jensen's personal recollections.


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coaxial Vickers machine-gun in the turret was eliminated and the onein the front of the hull was removed, together with the gunner's accommo-dation, to make way for storage of the larger ammunition. The turrethad a full 360-degree traverse and was operated either manually or elec-trically. Thus, instead of having more or less to aim the tank itself at th eenemy, as was the case with the American M.3 Medium Tank, the A.C . 3(and A.C .1), even if brought to a standstill, could fire in all directions .The tank now had a crew of four : commander, driver, gunner and radiooperator.The prototype, complete with all its guns, was tested at Wakefield,South Australia, in February 1943 and by April a final decision was mad eto mount this gun on a production basis . Observers from the AmericanArmy are said to have been favourably impressed by the A .C .3 . The

following paragraph appeared in the Washington Post of 30th July 1942 ,under the heading "Australian Tanks Held Better Than Nazis ' Or Ours" :United States officers today declared that tanks built in New S outh W ales, Aus-tralia, were superior to tanks of corresponding weight and armament used by th eUnited S tates , British and Ge rman Armies . The tanks were designed by ColonelWatson of the British Army, an expert on tank design loaned to Australia by th eBritish W ar Office 1 8 months ag o . . . .Commenting on this article Sir John Jensen said : "We did not knowthe source from which this information was derived and did not inquire ,

and we did not know whether in fact American officers had said wha twas attributed to them, but certainly some of us believed the statementsto be well founded . "A better-authenticated assessment of the tank program was made b yColonel Green' of the United States Army who visited Australia unde rthe auspices of Lend-Lease and prepared a report on all three marks o fthe cruiser tank . While not favourably disposed to the idea of a reallylarge-scale manufacture of tanks in Australia, and highly critical of som efeatures of the tanksuch as the lack of synchromesh gears and the us eof bronze bushings instead of roller bearingshe did make some favour -able comments :Considerable ingenuity has been displayed throughout all design phases . . . .Deve lopment of cast armour represe nts a real contribution . Gun m ounting is excel-lentthis provides m aximum fig hting compartment space utilisation .In June 1943 Munro reported to the Board of Area Management thatfifty-eight A.C .1 tanks had been assembled and had satisfactorily com-pleted the test course, but that production of the A .C .1 had been deliber-ately slowed down awaiting the detailed production drawings for th e

A.C .3 . Further pilot models of the A .C .3 were being assembled .r Col G. A. Green, MC. (Capt in Royal Tank Corps 1917-18.) Consulting Engineer to U .S . Secof War 1940-41 ; Lend-Lease Administrator in London ; Asst Dir of Industry on Marshal Plan ,Paris, 1948-49 . B. Sydney 8 Jul 1882 . Died 21 Feb 1949. Green was educated in Australia .Before the first world war he went to England where he became superintendent of design an dconstruction in the London General Omnibus Co . and later to America where he became genera lmanager of the Fifth Avenue Coach Co . In the first world war he became Deputy ChiefMechanical Engineer of the Tank Corps. After that war he held senior posts in General Motorsand other companies.


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES3 1 9A novel feature of the A.C .3 was the design of the power unit, fo rwhich Monsieur R. Perrier, who had joined the directorate's staff fromJapan, was largely responsible . With the introduction of the larger gu nand ammunition of Mark III, greater economy of space within the tank ,and increased power, were essential . The "Perrier-Cadillac" power unit ,in which the engines were mounted radially in a single row on a commontriangular, fabricated steel case, was designed to satisfy both requirements .Mark III was not the last of the pilot models of the Australian Cruise rTank to be built . Yet another, Mark IV, an experimental model, was builtincorporating several major changes, including the installation of the high -velocity 17-pounder gun which had just been manufactured by the Depart-ment of Munitions . Mark IV was a much heavier tank than its predeces-sors . The nearest approach to a wholly Australian-made tank, its mass o f32 tons was moved by a power plant consisting of four Gipsy Majo rengines built by General Motors-Holden's .As late as March 1943 the army was still asking for tanks . In a memo-randum to Lewis the Chief of the General Staff stated that the arm yrequirements of tanks were :

A.C.I (2-pdr) .

65

A.C.3 (25-pdr)

2 0 0

A.C .4 (17-pdr)

400

A.C.4 (25-pdr)

11 1

But in fact the Mark III Australian Cruiser Tank was never produced inquantity; before it reached that stage, Lend-Lease authorities in theUnited States had begun to query the wisdom of Australia's continuin gwith the tank program, holding the view that it would be better for he rto concentrate on building more railway locomotives and waggons instea dof importing them from the United States. Furthermore they believedthat men and materials being taken up by the tank program could be bette rused in servicing the 600 American tanks then in or about to arrive inAustralia. For this reason they temporarily held up all new requisition sfor the Australian tank program. A spirited defence of the MunitionsDepartment's policy and a fresh endorsement of this policy by Genera lMacArthur caused the Lend-Lease authorities to modify their attitudeslightly, but by the middle of 1943 the writing was on the wall . Therebeing no further need for Australian tanks and every reason for divertingthe manpower employed on the project to more valuable purposes, th eWar Cabinet ordered cessation of their production, in July 1943 .The strenuous efforts of Australian industry (at least 2,000 men wer eemployed directly in making tanksand possibly double that number wer eemployed indirectly), with the expenditure of more than 4,000,000, pro-vided yet another example of the frustration of a people 's best endeavour,which is so typical of war . Of the 66 Mark I tanks delivered to the army ,none was ever used in operations against the enemy .It has been said that the Australian Cruiser Tank was obsolete by th etime it was produced. This is only partly true. The army, acting on the


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views prevailing at the time, had asked for a 2-pounder gun but durin gthe time it took to produce the tank, oversea designs, especially in regar dto the armament of the tank, had made great advances . A 2-pounder gunwas no longer adequate. This kind of thing happened to a great manymunition projects and it was a result to some extent of the inevitable tim elag between design and large-scale production, and to some extent of thechanging strategical situation .The reason why Australian tanks were never used in operations wasthat by the time they came off the assembly line mastery of the sea lane sof the Pacific had been won, and American (General Grant) tank swere arriving in Australia in sufficient numbers to equip three division sof the Australian Military Forces . One division had already been equippedwith them before the A.C .1 came into production .

The technical assessment of the Australian Cruiser Tank by engineer smay create an unduly favourable impression of its merits as a weapon o fwar. Since the tank was never put to the real testnamely use in actionone can do no more than guess what its military usefulness might hav ebeen. Some military authorities remained sceptical about its fighting quali-ties long after the war . On the other hand it must be pointed out that thearmy saw fit to use the Australian Cruiser Tank, under the name of th eSentinel, for training, and it was not declared obsolete for this purposeuntil early in 1956 .This is not to say that the tank project was not open to criticism. Prob-ably one of the most serious grounds for criticism is the fact that it wa scarried on for so long after the need for tanks had disappeared . The

obvious time to discontinue production was in late 1942 when the armoure ddivisions were fully equipped with American tanks . Early in 1943, whe nit became apparent that a Japanese invasion with consequent armouredwarfare in open country was no longer likely, the army began to disban dits armoured divisions . It would have been wise to cease tank productionabout nine months earlier than the time eventually decided on. The verysuccess of the tank program in its later phases, especially that whic hattended the mounting of heavy guns ahead of most Allied countries, nodoubt had its share in tempting the authorities to hold on after the rea lneed had disappeared .As far as its actual military use was concerned, the machine-gun carrierwas far more important, though technically its manufacture was much les sinteresting than that of the Australian tank . Production, delegated to fou r

main concerns (Victorian Railways' Newport Workshops, South AustralianRailways' Islington Workshops, Metropolitan Gas Company's FitzroyWorkshops, Victoria, and the Ford Motor Company, Homebush, Ne wSouth Wales), followed the same general pattern as the tank, except, o fcourse, that the complete design was supplied by Britain . One major altera-tion was made to the design: steering from a pilot stick to a wheel control .Like a tank, the carrier was powered by an imported engine (the Ford) ,but since the carrier was a great deal lighter than the tank, being less


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ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES32 1heavily armoured, a much less powerful engine was required . The armourof the carrier consisted of plates of rolled Australian bullet-proof stee lwelded together. Successful manufacture of the carrier was achieved in allfour of the above centres with complete interchangeability of all com-ponents. New South Wales firms played a big part in making spare parts ,which equalled the value of the vehicles themselves .By far the largest contributor to the program was the Victorian Rail -way Department, which had a long record of participation in manufactur-ing for defence extending back to 1900. The workshops at Newport, withthe assistance of 644 sub-contracting firms, beginning in December 1940 ,made altogether 4,023 machine-gun carriers, and spare parts for 5,583 .The Railway Workshops at Islington contributed 1,560 carriers . Manywere also assembled by the Ford Motor Company. Assistance given bythe Metropolitan Gas Company was especially noteworthy because it cam efrom an industry whose previous activities were of an entirely differen tcharacter. The Gas Company developed to a high pitch of efficiency th etechnique of welding the hull of the carrier .Large numbers of carriers, along with appropriate spare parts, weresupplied to the Australian forces in the Middle East . Owing to unsatisfac-tory labelling and ordering of spare parts considerable confusion resulte dwhen the time came to use them. It was from the bitter lessons learne das a result of this experience that the Aftag plan for labelling and handlin gspare parts for tanks was devised . The benefits of this plan were neverreaped.The consensus was that the machine-gun carrier was the most satis-factory vehicle, as far as its operational use was concerned, producedby the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Directorate. Light and heavy armouredcars, the mortar carrier and the 2-pounder anti-tank gun carrier, togetherwith the Australian Scout Car, were all eventually discarded as unsuitabl efor use by the Australian Army ; 2 this, after each had been designed byan authorised representative of the General Staff, the design specificatio nand prototype approved after exhaustive field tests, and the finishe dvehicles given severe acceptance tests . That a program of the magnitud eundertaken by the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Directorate succeeded i nproducing, with the one exception of machine-gun carriers, so little equip-ment of use to the army, calls for some comment. In the case of the tankthe time factor was all important, but there was more to it than this .

Perhaps the fundamental reason was that in the fields of manufactur erepresented by armoured fighting vehicles, Australia was unprepared forwar. The majority of engineers and other technical men associated withthe tank program within the army, munitions and industry were new t othe technical problems and new to each other. Design and productionof armoured fighting vehicles were not new to Colonel Watson, but Aus-tralia and her immature automotive industry were .2 This statement is made on the strength of opinions given in the MGO History .


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On the other hand, manufacture of guns, rifles, ammunition and ex -plosives was successful almost from the first months of the war becaus eof the existence of a peacetime nucleus, small as it was, of technical expert sfamiliar with the production of such munitions . These, together with tech-nical experts in the government munitions factories, provided the basi sfrom which an expansion of production was possible .What remedies were suggested as a means of avoiding the kinds ofdifficulty which surrounded the A .F .V. programdifficulties that migh twell arise again in attempts to manufacture equipment new to Australianindustry? This matter was discussed, among others, by Bromley, who pro -posed that after the war there should be an organisation consisting of tech-nical men from industry who would in peace time engage actively, thoug hin a part-time capacity, on working out plans for wartime production ;and who would, in the event of war, immediately assume responsibilitie sin a full-time capacity within the munitions organisation . This suggestedarrangement implied the fullest active collaboration in peace time betweenthe service authorities and industry, with the idea of evolving a planne dorganisation that could be put into operation as soon as the need shouldarise .

australia in the war 1939-1945 the role of science and industry-chapter 14-armoured fighting...

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