Augustine and The Stoic Tradition

JOHN SELLARS

The philosophy of Stoicism was first articulated by Zeno of Citium, some

time around 300 BC in Athens, and developed by his immediate successors,

Cleanthes of Assos and Chrysippus of Soli. These early Stoics outlined a

materialist ontology in which God permeates Nature as a material force

(Sellars 91-5). They claimed that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness,

with the corollary that external goods and circumstances should have no

bearing on the happy life (ibid. 110-14). They held an intellectualist

account of the emotions, dismissing them as the by-product of mistaken

judgements (ibid. 114-20). These various elements they brought together

in an idealized image of the perfectly rational sage living in harmony with

Nature, completely free, autonomous, emotionless, and infamously

happy even when being tortured on the rack (ibid. 36-41).

The school flourished in Athens until the first century BC, when the focus

of philosophical attention shifted to Rome. Key Stoic ideas were presented

to the Latin-speaking world by Cicero, who had studied with the leading

Greek Stoics of the day Panaetius and Posidonius. The most famous Stoics

of the first two centuries AD were Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius,

whose works have proved to be the most influential Stoic texts to survive

from antiquity. Stoicism appears still to have been a vital element of

philosophical culture at the end of the second century AD but not much

later. It played its part in the development of the then rising star of

Neoplatonism, albeit often negatively. Via the readily available Latin works

of Cicero and Seneca, Stoicism continued to assert its influence in the

West, although it is difficult to refer to a clearly-defined post-antique Stoic

tradition analogous to the way in which one might more legitimately refer

to an Aristotelian tradition.

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Augustine and Stoicism

Aug.s relationship with Stoicism was highly complex. A traditional view

suggests that Aug. was influenced by Stoic ethics in his early works but

later became increasingly hostile (cf. esp. s. 150 and retr. 1.1-2). A more

nuanced view holds that Aug. drew upon not only Stoic ethics but also on

Stoic logic and physics, and did so to varying degrees throughout his work.

Although it is impossible to capture Aug.s debt to or attitude towards

Stoicism in a brief summary, it is possible to note those key doctrines

where the mature Aug. disagreed with the Stoa, disagreements that shaped

the interaction between the reception of Aug. and that of Stoicism in

subsequent centuries.

Three points of philosophical dispute stand out. The first concerned the

possibility of moral perfectionism. While the early Aug., following the

Stoa, thought perfect virtue possible in this life (cf. Acad. 1.2.5), the mature

Aug. came to doubt this. Only in the next life can we achieve perfect virtue

(retr. 1.2; 1.6.5).

The second centred on the autonomy of virtue. Again, the early Aug.

followed the Stoa in holding that virtue (and so happiness) is solely

dependent upon the state of our soul and consequently something

completely within our own power, but the mature Aug. later dismissed this

(retr. 1.2; 1.6.5; s. 150.8). Aug. continues to agree with the Stoics that virtue

is a necessary condition for happiness, but denies that it is a sufficient

condition. Happiness, for Aug., ultimately requires immortality (s. 150.10;

trin. 13.8.11).

The third concerned the nature and value of emotions. Aug. agreed with

the Stoa in holding an intellectualist account of the emotions, conceiving

3them as mistaken judgements of the mind rather than elements of the body

(imm. an. 5.7), but he rejected the Stoic notion of apatheia in favour of

Aristotelian (and Neoplatonic) metriopatheia or moderation of the emotions,

not only doubting the possibility of completely escaping emotions but also

coming to see some emotions (such as love) in a more positive light (civ.

14.9). The Stoic ideal of complete freedom from emotions would rule out

the love of God.

These three points are clearly interrelated and all point to the mature

Aug.s rejection of Stoic moral autonomy. Aug. dismisses the Stoic claim

that through the power of individual reason alone one may become

completely virtuous, free, and happy. For the mature Aug. this is the

height of arrogance and in sharp contrast to his own emphasis on our

dependence on God for our virtue and happiness (retr. 1.1.2; 1.8.4; s. 150.8).

It is this Stoic-Augustinian division over autonomy that appears time and

again when the two philosophies were brought into dialogue by later

authors, although it was by no means the only topic to shape their

subsequent encounters.

The Middle Ages

Before the translation of Aristotelian texts into Latin in the twelfth

century, both Augustinianism and Stoicism coexisted as important

influences on early medieval thought, although the influence of Stoicism

was far more diffuse. The interaction of the two can be seen most clearly in

the work of Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and especially in his ethical

works Scito te ipsum (or Ethica) and Collationes (or Dialogus inter

Philosophum, Iudaeum, et Christianum).

In the first of these works Abelard argues that moral wrongdoing resides

not in actions but rather in the intentions that stand behind actions. These

4intentions should be identified not with desires that may afflict us but

rather with our consent or acceptance (consensus). It is neither a lustful

action nor the mental experience of lust that is sinful; it is with our consent

to a lust that we morally go wrong (cf. Luscombe 12-14). Here Abelard

echoes the Stoic theory of assent (sunkatathesis) although it has been

suggested that Abelards source of this idea may have been Aug. (ibid. 12 n.

1). Indeed, Abelard himself cites Aug.s view that action adds nothing to

the sin of intention (cf. lib. arb. 1.3). Here, then, Abelard embraces a Stoic

idea supporting it with the authority of Aug.

In the Collationes we also find themes from Aug. and Stoicism in contact

with one another. This work takes the form of a pair of dialogues, one

between a Philosopher and a Jew and then another between the same

Philosopher and a Christian. Abelards Philosopher argues for a number of

Stoic-inspired ethical claims and is explicit about his debt to the Stoa,

calling Seneca the greatest of all moralists (Marenbon and Orlandi 102).

He is presented as someone who believes in a single God, though not the

same God as either the Jew or the Christian, and as one who is content

with natural law rather than the laws recorded in sacred texts (ibid. 2,

144). He also takes up the Stoic doctrines of the unity of virtue, that virtue

is the highest good, and the claim that there are no degrees in virtue,

drawing on Ciceros accounts of Stoic ethics in De Officiis and Paradoxa

Stoicorum (ibid. 116).

At the same time Abelard draws on Aug.s civ., both as an authority

(second only to the Bible) and as a source for ancient philosophy, and it has

been suggested that the same works contrast between pagan and Christian

views may well have formed the inspiration for Abelards project in the

Collationes, even if his conclusions are more equivocal (see ibid. xliii).

Abelards Philosopher has little sympathy for his two opponents and no

desire to effect a reconciliation with either of them. On the contrary, he

5dismisses the Jew as stupid and the Christian as mad (ibid. 4). But by

selectively quoting from Aug., including those early works more

sympathetic to pagan philosophy and later repudiated, Abelard is able to

present his own version of Stoic-inspired ethics in the best possible light

for his contemporary audience.

The Renaissance

Probably the most important admirer of Aug. during the Renaissance was

Francesco Petrarca (1304-74), widely known under the name Petrarch,

whose works are said to contain over a thousand references to the Church

Father. Petrarch was also a great admirer of Stoicism and this is most

evident in his De remediis utriusque fortunae, a work that borrows both its

title and central themes from works attributed to Seneca. These two

influences come together most strikingly in his Secretum, written in 1347.

This work takes the form of a dialogue between a young Petrarch,

depressed and unhappy, and Aug. himself, in the role of older and wiser

teacher. Aug. is made to offer Petrarch advice on how to overcome his

depression and that advice takes the form of a heavy dose of Stoic

psychotherapy. Aug. becomes the mouthpiece for Petrarchs own brand of

Christianized Stoicism, in which Augustinian and Stoic themes are

carefully interwoven.

In the dialogue Aug.s aim is to show the young Petrarch that his

unhappiness is ultimately his own fault, with the corollary that it is within

his own control to escape it. In order to do this he draws heavily on Seneca

and Cicero (especially the Tusculanae Disputationes), as well as a wide

variety of Latin authors including Virgil, Horace, Ovid, and Terence. It is

virtue alone that can make us happy Aug. says (Secr. 1.3.1), and so we

should not be disturbed by external events and objects, echoing standard

Stoic doctrine. He goes on to castigate Petrarch for having dismissed Stoic

6doctrine too quickly in the past, simply for conflicting with popular

opinion. Aug. proposes that only a Stoic life according to reason will cure

Petrarch and, like the Stoics, he says that only those who manage to follow

such a life deserve to be called men (Secr. 1.10.6; see also Secr. 2.8.4, where

the virtuous are called kings, another Stoic trope). In order to achieve this,

the pair embark upon a Stoic analysis of the emotions, the principal

impediment to the rational life, drawing on Ciceros account in Tusculanae

Disputationes 3.24-5. There are, however, a number of un-Stoic remarks

along the way where Petrarch Christianizes Stoicism: the soul, for

instance, is contaminated by the body (Secr. 1.15.1), and must escape its

grossness in order to rise to heaven (Secr. 1.8.3).

At the beginning of the second dialogue, there is a nod towards Aug.s own

doctrine of grace, when the young Petrarch says that he can hope for

nothing from himself, only from God. While Aug. is made to agree, the

discussion nevertheless continues in a thoroughly Stoic fashion, restating

the opening claim that Petrarchs troubles are entirely within his own

control (Secr. 2.1.1), although the importance of Gods grace remains in the

background (see Secr. 2.11.7).

The culmination of the work, in the third dialogue, is Aug.s attempt to

show Petrarch that his obsessional love for Laura is central to his present

unhappiness. The diagnosis follows typical Stoic lines but the cure owes

more to Augustinianism. The way in which Petrarch might overcome his

love for this woman is not through rational psychotherapy but rather by

replacing that passion with a healthier one, namely the love of God (Secr.

3.5.2).

7Early Modern

The late sixteenth century saw a marked revival of interest in Stoicism

(often labelled Neostoicism) and the most prominent figure associated with

this was Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). Lipsius attempted to revive

Stoicism in a form that would be palatable to his Christian audience. There

were, however, two central points of conflict: determinism and pantheism.

In his early work De Constantia (1584), Lipsius argued that there were four

points where the Stoic theory of determinism must be modified in order to

rescue it from heresy. These are the claims that God is submitted to fate,

that there is a natural order of causes (and thus no miracles), that there is

no contingency, and that there is no free will (Const. 1.20). However, in his

later work Physiologia Stoicorum (1604), Lipsius suggests that the Stoic

theory of fate can in fact be reconciled with Christian doctrine without

modification (Phys. Stoic. 1.12). In order to do this, he draws upon Aug.s

discussion of Stoic definitions of fate in civ. 5.8 where it is argued that fate

does not impinge upon the power of God but rather is the expression of the

will of God.

Lipsius also draws upon arguments in Aug. in order to reconcile Stoic

materialist pantheism with Christianity (Phys. Stoic. 1.8, citing civ. 7.6).

God cannot be identified with the world; rather He is the soul of the world,

immanent to matter, which constitutes His body. He is, for Lipsius, the

reason within matter, but not material Himself. However, the Stoics call

the world God, just as one might identify a person with the whole human

being even though their identity and character resides only in their soul

and not in the matter that constitutes their body. Lipsius quotes Aug.s

solution: But just as a wise man, although he consists of body and soul, is

called wise in virtue of his soul; so the world is called God in virtue of

its soul, although consisting both of soul and body (civ. 7.6). Lipsius thus

8uses the authority of Aug. to underwrite his reconciliation of Stoicism with

Christianity.

In the seventeenth century, in the wake of Lipsius, fascination with

Stoicism reached its highest point since antiquity. Stoic and Augustianian

ideas were brought into contact by a variety of authors. One of these, Jean-

Franois Senault (1601-72), author of De lusage des Passions (1641), is a

particularly complex example. Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether

Senault should be read as attempting to reconcile Stoic and Augustinian

accounts of the emotions or whether he should be seen as the first of a

number of authors to mount an Augustinian attack on Stoicism for its

intellectual arrogance and pride (cf. Levi 214 and Lagre 166).

Senaults own view is made fairly plain at the outset of the work, in the

Preface, where he sets up the Stoics as opponents of Aug. In an

Augustinian vein, Senault affirms the necessity of grace for all things, for

without it all our actions are at fault. Quoting Aug. directly (s. 150.8),

Senault insists that the key difference between Stoicism and Christianity is

that while the Stoic thinks virtue alone can bring happiness, the Christian

knows that only through grace may this come about. Moreover the Stoic

suffers from arrogance and pride, while only the Christian is humble

enough to acknowledge the necessity of human weakness. For Senault,

then, Aug. stands clearly opposed to Stoicism. Having said that, Senault is

also prepared to engage in some syncretism, once more following Aug.,

suggesting that in some respects the Stoics differ from other philosophers

more in words than in ideas. He is also prepared to acknowledge the role of

reason in the development of virtue alongside grace. However, his general

attitude towards Stoicism is one of suspicion, a suspicion nourished by both

his reading of Aug.s own comments about the Stoics and his commitment

to Augustinian ideas about grace.

9Senault was not alone in this view. A similar attitude towards Stoicism can

be found in the work of Blaise Pascal (1623-62). Pascal, an associate of

the Jansenists, developed his own neo-Augustinian theory of grace via

an encounter with Stoic ideas as he found them in the works of Epictetus.

While there are a number of brief discussions of Stoicism in his Penses,

Pascals most sustained engagement with Stoicism is to be found in the

Entretien de Pascal avec M. de Sacy. This short text is the record of a

discussion between Pascal and the confessor at Port-Royal, Isaac de Sacy

(1613-84), probably dating to 1655, but reported by Sacys secretary

Nicolas Fontaine long after the death of both participants. Pascals aim is

to examine critically both the ideas of Epictetus and Montaigne, presented

as two extremes, using one to attack the other, thereby clearing both away

in order to make way for Pascals own neo-Augustinian view.

During the course of the discussion Sacy calls into question the orthodoxy

of Pascals engagement with Epictetus, reminding him of Aug.s rejection

of his own youthful fascination with pagan philosophy (cf. conf. 4.16.28;

7.20.26). However, Pascal continues and goes on to acknowledge that

Epictetus is in fact a pious thinker who wants sincerely to be obedient to

his God who governs the cosmos. Where Epictetus falls short is in his

refusal to accept the powerlessness of the individual. His commitment to

Stoic autonomy and in particular his claim that we may become free and

happy through our own rational powers alone make him, for Pascal,

wickedly proud, just as he would have been for Aug. (cf. s. 150.10). If

Epictetus is too proud, Montaigne is too despondent; for Pascal we must

follow a middle path in which we embrace the use of reason alongside

Christian faith. Pascals project shares something in common with Aug.s

own attempt to try to reconcile pagan philosophy with faith. For Sacy,

however, Pascals refusal simply to submit to the authority of Aug. betrays

his own intellectual pride.

10

The confrontational interaction between Augustinian and Stoic ideas in the

seventeenth century continued in the work of Nicolas Malebranche

(1638-1715). In his Recherche de la vrit, Malebrance mounted an

Augustinian-inspired attack on the Stoic Seneca (Recherche 2.3.4). Senecas

image of the Stoic sage is both pompous and vain, while the sages

supposed invulnerability to fortune is simply a myth. We are, Malebranche

claims, destined to be miserable and wretched in this life, even if we do

manage to attain virtue. In this, our fate is no different than St Pauls. In

opposition to Stoic rational autonomy, Malebranche claims that if we do

possess virtue it is only through Gods grace and likewise happiness can

only be granted by God, which He chooses to withhold from all in this life

(cf. retr. 1.2; trin. 13.8.11). Although Malebranche does not cite Aug.

explicitly in his polemic against Seneca, he deploys broadly Augustinian

arguments against Stoic autonomy and, alongside Senault and Pascal,

illustrates the ways in which Stoicism and Augustinianism came into

conflict in the early modern period.

Summary

Throughout his works, Aug. says so many things about Stoicism, both

positive and negative, that it is impossible to summarize neatly his own

attitude towards Stoicism. This also means that it has been possible for

subsequent thinkers to draw selectively from those comments in their own

attempts either to reconcile or to counterpoise Stoicism and Christianity.

Aug.s preeminent authority among Christian writers has meant that his

views have constantly been sought out by those wishing to seek support

for their own interpretative agendas. The more we come to appreciate the

complexity of Aug.s own relationship with Stoicism, the more we shall

come to see the inevitable limitations in any attempt to use his texts to

adjudicate between Christian doctrine and Stoicism.

11

Bibliography

PRIMARY LITERATURE

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, Physiologia Stoicorum (Antwerp, 1604).

Jean-Franois Senault, De lusage des Passions (Paris, 1641).

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560-574.

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