august 8, 2014 cdd lab meeting...2014/08/08 · erik, jon & clara: “cross-domain deterrence:...
TRANSCRIPT
CDD Lab MeetingAugust 8, 2014
CDD News and Updates● July 16th Annual Workshop successful!
○ Workshop report on deterrence.ucsd.edu site
● Erik has returned!● No meeting 29 Aug (APSA)● deterrence.ucsd.edu is live!
○ Check your bio○ Let’s write!
● Post-doc hiring on the horizon● New PM at ONR
○ EG & JRL to brief project on 8/28
● Jon interviewed on China cyber issues○ http://www.businessinsider.com/china-hacked-into-iron-dome-2014-7○ http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/arrest-of-canadians-grabs-the-attention-of-china-watchers-in-us-270185791.
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Upcoming Travel & Events
● JRL to PACOM 10-23 Aug● APSA August 28-31, 2014 in Washington, DC
○ CDD Panel & Opportunity to meet with DC contacts○ Brief ONR PM
● Minerva Conference September 10-11, 2014 in Washington, DC○ Project overview--how much, how long?○ Opportunity to meet with DC contacts
● CDD Annual Conference November 6-7, 2014 at UCSD○ Revised CDD paper--sent○ Awaiting paper topics (9/1) to formulate agenda
Lab Meeting Schedule
● August 8 (Jon & Jack): Space! Cyber! China!● August 15 (Shannon): Deterrence Games
○ Jack: CDD insights from China S&T workshop● August 22 (Rupal): STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium Debrief● August 29: NO LAB MEETING (APSA)● September 5: (Erik) TBD● September 12 (Clara): Conference planning● September 19 (Rupal): TBD● September 26 (Shannon): TBD● Blake--Testing Thucydides?
Blog SchedulePlease check your inbox for an email from quote.ucsd.edu for log-in instructions
● Week of…● June 29: Rupal….● July 6: Clara● July 13: Shannon● July 20: Jack● July 27: Rupal...● August 3: Clara● August 10: Shannon● August 17: Jack● August 24: Rupal● August 31: Clara● September 7: Shannon● September 14: Jack● September 21: Rupal● September 28: Clara
Topics can be on anything CDD related, of any length:
● Commentary on current events● Book or article review● Thought piece● Research note
● Anybody in the CDD group canpost something, any time.
● This schedule just ensures weaverage something each week.
● Beth moderates the posts
deterrence.ucsd.edu
Recent Publications● Jon R. Lindsay, “Cybersecurity and International Relations: Evaluating the Threat from China,”
International Security (forthcoming Winter 2014/15)● Jon Lindsay, “Commentary on the Cyber Revolution,” International Security 38, no. 4 (forthcoming 2014)● Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in
Cyberspace,” Security Studies (forthcoming)● Erik Gartzke, “An Apology for Numbers in the Study of National Security . . . if an apology is really
necessary,” H-Diplo/ISSF, no. 2 (2014): 77-90.● Erik Gartkze, “The Myth of Cyber War: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International
Security 38, no. 2 (2013): 41–73.● Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 365–404.
Papers in progress● Erik, Jon & Clara: “Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity”
○ Working paper, updated July 15, 2014.○ 15 July revision for Conference invitees, Aug APSA, Nov conference
● Jon, Erik: “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited”○ Chapter in Kelly Greenhill & Peter Krause volume on Coercion
● Michael: “Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy”○ Nov conference
● Joe: “Latency and Cross-Domain Deterrence”○ Nov conference
● Jon & Jack: “Interdependence in Space and Cyberspace in U.S.-China Relations”○ Aug APSA
● Erik: “No Humans Were Harmed in the Making of this War: On the Nature and Consequences of `Costless'Combat” [drone war]
○ July RSIS (CENS)● Jon: “The Common Strategic Logic of Counterinsurgency and Cybersecurity”
○ R&R with JSS
Information Infrastructure: Space, Cyberspace, and U.S.-China Relations
Jon R. LindsayUniversity of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Jack ZhangUniversity of California, San Diego
(WIP...very IP...for APSA)
China’s Cross-Domain Challenge
● “Cross-domain operations” newly salientbecause of dependence on space & cyber
● Chinese A2/AD challenges freedom of actionfor US CDO in East Asia crisis scenario
● Uncertainty due to technology, secrecy,interactions, perception, lack of history
● Is CDD eroding or already working?
Course of Study of Space Operations: A Series of Teaching Materials for Master’s Students at the Academy of Military Sciences, 2nd ed. (2013)
“both our army’s lack of real experience in space and the dearth of quality theories in this area added difficulties to the research.”“Whoever captures and controls the space supremacy controls other theaters of war, guarantees the effectiveness of space information system and the operation stability of ground, sea, and aerial weapon systems.”“Space operations are high-tech, high-cost, and high-attrition operations.”“Military powers such as the United States have stressed that any attack on their space systems by any country is equal to the launch of a nuclear war….therefore, it is necessary to stand on the strategic height…be cautious in decision making, and do all one can to ‘avoid firing the first shot’ at the strategic level in the application of the space force. This space strategy has determined the defensive nature of space operations.”“Any misjudgment of slight error in use will result in serious strategic mistake.”“Mutually checked and balanced by the political progress of democracy, globalization of economy, and military forces, and restricted by fast transmission of media, the population’s pursuit of happiness, major changes in future war will take place, which is that the number will be fewer and fewer, the scale of force be smaller and smaller, and joint actions will be comparatively numerous.”
Rowdy Rhetoric, Restrained Reality
Cyberspace Space
Provocative Chinese rhetoric and behavior
Information confrontationExtensive espionageInformation control & hacktivismEroding US competitive advantage
Space as vital high groundASAT tests and debrisCounterspace research & developmentGrowing Chinese space presence
Factors encouraging Chinese restraint
Historical absence of CNAValue of peacetime interconnectionExposure to US CNEWary of US retaliation/CDDDubious Chinese tradecraftMultistakeholder system/I-star
Historical absence of space warValue of peacetime space infrastructureExposure to US space operationsWary of US retaliation/CDDComplex command and controlInternational treaties and SSA
Information Infrastructure
Features of information infrastructure…
…that make it anattractive target in war…
…also reduce the political incentives for startinga war in the first place
Indirect control [asymmetry]
Low-cost disruption and first mover advantages
[inform] Decreased probability of success:Limited attacks signal limited resolve, while consequential attacks stiffen a capable opponent’s resolve to defend and retaliate
Complex linkages [interdependence]
Offense dominance and systemic paralysis
[constrain] Increased warfighting costs: Operational coordination, negative externalities, opportunity costs of lost civ/mil complements
Many participants[multipolarity]
Access to diverse valuable targets and plausible deniability
[transform] Increased benefits of status quo: Shared interest in preserving the value of efficient transactions and public goods
PLA on CDD“Under informatized conditions, the diversity and complexity of threats and conflicts have resulted in the fact that single measure or single approach military deterrence has become more and more difficult to deter the enemy. Only by combining space deterrence with deterrence forms such as nuclear deterrence and conventional power deterrence while coordinating with struggles in the political, economic, and diplomatic realms, causing various forms of deterrence to complement each other, can the effect of deterrence be given play to the greatest extent. Lastly, the tight combination of various deterrence measures. Aimed at different environments and different objects, offense and defense should be combined, truths should be alternated with misrepresentations, and an overall deterrence effect should be formed, so the initiative in space deterrence is firmly grasped, and the enemy must believe, has no choice but to believe, and does not dare to not believe our operation resolve, strength, and capabilities.”
Questions?
Next Steps?
● Let us know about your plans (or anticipated plans) for Fall Quarter ● Review lab meeting and blog schedule and let us know what, if
anything, needs to be rearranged● Please post blog posts, focus on research notes/progress● Meeting notes to be written, disseminated, uploaded
CDD ContactsProgram Content:● Erik Gartkze, UCSD, [email protected]● Jon Lindsay, UCSD, [email protected]● Michael Nacht, UCB● Celeste Matarazzo, LLNL● Joe Pilat, LANL
Program Administration:● Beth Prosnitz, Project Manager, [email protected]