Churches' migrant minilstry in Jthe West - were LW- rested in 1961 %or unlawd .aslsembly when they teste'd the TaIIahassee amport restaurant.

For Ithe'e y e a s they fought (the2 convict ion 'but, beoause ojf a technical lderhciency, ,they were never able to get (hheir oase out olf the state courts and imto 'the U. S. Supreme Cowt. Finally legal avenues were IcI'ose'd ka Men1 until they ~c tua l ly went to jd, wllepce bhey could (begin a new round of appeals through I&e #state courts. So when Tlallahassee, for spite, b d e d them to leave ,th'air kmportant wmk and 1,eturn to 'begin) a sixty-day sentence, they went.

At this point ,their ,at%omey, Ho1wa:d Dixon a the American ,Civil Liberties 8Union, kook a sadkcally oan- (did approach to rthejw pproh1,em. He asked a federal circult court of appeds bo give Ms clients either new

' hail ,ol: 'a w i t of habeas corpus, .arguinlg I ~ a t "iil six yeass we have never won la civil ri@h8ts case on apped ih %lorlda comts," amid that in 'race cases "lappeals :to

.them for justice are futile." He begiged 'the fedend panel tso tbalQe jurisdilction.

And the fe'derd jurlsts I&d. Th'ey gave athe state courts three dlays withm whim& to grant Isonnne relief to 'tihe ministers Othelmse, (the dkdecal court mulld ,take over. ACLU attorneys (claim tMs is EL real prece- deat with promise, getting a federal court to take a case away from the Islate COUnbS in m5dstream on Ian open-faced plea that the state courts simply don't dis- pense justice.

At t,his point, with the ministens clearly on t he way to victory at last, >Florxda',s capital clty turned petty in a hilarious way. It redwed >bheir senkmces fio time \served (four days) and threw ,them out IS jail- over their potests-thus bloolung huther efforts by Ithe nine to clear themselves in hderal court.

Gertamly 'the clergymen aannot claim anything unusual about being j,adeld umonstituMolzaNy, but ,they may be (fie f1rs.t persons railrolade,d to freedtom.

i The wexthemd h~e~adstmes in bhe .old Prostestant ce,meltery of P o ~ ~ t u - guese M.acao tell af the misa,dven- tures of many Am8ez%cainls in ,the Gulf olf: Tonkin m d ' t h e S Q U ~ ~ Chana Sea. En (the early years of our Republic, ,the h e r b a n s who &ed in this $ma~~ay area wwe siad'ors, Yankee gaders, milsls+on- a r m ' and visionlasy dip1,omats"like Eidmunld Roberts, who fimt sought treaties for &he United S$a.tes in Southeast A'sla, Journeying to, Co- ahan China, Siam 'and Musoalt in 1832. Toclay, ,the headline7 .toll the delath of m~my Ameniclans pursuing the pohtical interrests of .the United States in Southeaslt Asia.

Flrom s m d beginnings our inter- est i n S,mtheIast Asia 'swelle,d t'o in- chde a odonial empire highlighted by our half century in the,Phiilip- pines. The United Sltates bluadeTed into empire ;in 1898 by d e f e a ~ g the weak Bplanish impedalists in ,the ;Ba!b!ile of Manila Bay. Now we lare fighting again i q the Gulf of Tonkin k d in ,the &elaming jungles of d d Indo-f2hinla. Far,mmy h e r - icans (today o w deep involvement in- Souohearst Asia'ss civil wars is as

J o h n Gange i s director of the Insti- w t e #of bztenrational Studies and OveT- seas , Admamstration, Universitg of Oregon; he serued foT some years as an officer i z the State Deparqnent. Aug@ 24,b1?64

inexpliwbge as was our plunge into emwe in .the PLirprpines. For four- teen pears we have propped ,bhe French efifort $bo 'keep h~doChina, for htawe underwritten $the "demo- ccatic" F e m e s *of ,such as lBmo Dld, Nlgo D i d Diem and the subsequent miLitary dictatom We have stum- bled iwto 'kolonid" wsponsibfl5ties w.it!hout corresponding mtho1-ity sinice (the (defeat of France by ,the Viebnamese in 1954.

The dilemma we facetd in mid- 1954 was very diBerent in some respects holm the dilemuna Presi- dent M,cK.idey faced ,h 1898 when he was jl$floEmeld +at aJi of the Phlippine Islands 'were OLXS for the taking-and bol,dhg. In 1954, there was nothing ready Eor, t;he taking in Inldo-China-udess we were pre- pawd to battle the well-anned, well- 1e.d and tough Vietnamese aad al- m'ost ccertainly the Yjoloissuis Olf Com- mun3st China. We neverthelelss de- Icided to try t!o A'dd S'outh Vietnam against a Co8mmu;nist take-over. In doing so w'e ,pnderwti.mated C~oimmunist power lmld Ithe re,sp.anse of great numbers 08 the Vietnamese 60 Ho mi M . d s leadership, plus the extent of Communist outside aid, emspecially froin the Chillese. When Gejcretary Dulles' went to 'the Geneva Conference 08 A p d , 1954, oalled to ,&~Scuss Ibma ,and dispose of khe pieces of Ithe baolcen F r e n a

we w5ll n o doubt figiht this gross $act of our times. Eventually, i,t will h,ave ,to be accepted and i t must h8enceformth be incluldedlin the ingre,dien,ts that shape our Asian policy.

In 1954, we cbose not t o join in the sF&nad Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China orf July 21, 1954. (The United States made sa anilateral statement, h . o m e r , ac- cepting the ~amiis8tilc~e nagreemmts. ) All the other nations (U. X., France, UISISR, Peoples Republic of China, Laos, Camboldia and the Pgorples Re@ublic of Vietnam [North Viet- nam]) at this conferenlce, except the Sta,te of Vietnam (Soulth Viet-

drawn there, South Vieham, with our backing, refiulsed to carry out the provisZonls of ahe 1954 Geneva agreement Eor eleecltims in worth and South Vietnam ,& 8opm one government and insteald set its course against the intent of this (agreement. South Vietnam rehssd to permit ,the electilclns, hagan its miilitary Ibuild-up, and prapared for the inevitable war of Vietnamese agahst Vie~tmamese, ayi~h hoth sides drawing on onbsidle aid to #maintain the fight, Fzoh here on it is ,the old familiar story d who firslt vi,dated the aocords or the intent ,of Ithe ac- cords, etc , etc. The fact that we first refuseid to accept them putts bath the U, .S. alnd South Vie,tnm in a db,biou,s role-in the objeotive light af ihCstory-a role our government bas been dili,gent to gloss over. We refused to permit Tree elections in Viehmn because *we were sure we wmld lose j$hem,

When we f>orund the 1954 Geneva agreements unatroceptdble to m , ai- !though aclceprable $0 tbe other signatory nations, we had two broad alternatives open ,bo ps . One alternative was to reject ,tihe final colllclasions of,, the oonference, a s - regarding .&ereby rhe majority de- cisim, and continue our awn bila- lterd pollicy wit41 South Vietnam. This we chose to d ~ ,

- nam), . :a,ocepted the agreemenas

The secmd alternative w a s to seek a higher, 8omm than the Genev,a Conference n,ations. Resort ,to the United Nations zhnoagh ,var- ious possible arppmaches would have involved c a l l who wenre con- cerne,d with peace and ftreedlom, which we deged were threatened in Inld,o-CMna. The UN aupervised an election and ,a plebiscite ou1 the resftoration of the monarchy in war-

64

torn Greece isn 1996. The coinlditions wexe hardly worse in dl Vietnam in 1954, or even 1956, when a gen- eral election was to bme hel,d in July of that year. To Uhose who way Ithat la UN-supervised election %n Viet- nam would no5 have been laclcept- able to Nor th Vfelham ,and Com- munist China, sone answer is ,that we never tried This munse of action and bence we cant eay what the responlse might have been. Instead, we pres,sed for a ,Southeast Asriam mililkmy selclurity paot, whiuh Secre- tary DuUes Ih,ad mged in 1954.

The EisenhmeT adldsltration had jusit a w d w e d the bitter pill of negotiating wi& Clomlmunist C,fiina and Noxth Eorea , a n armis- tice in rhe Korean War. The Re- publican eamppailgn locrratory of 1952 woulld bave soulnldeld holhw and mocking indeed 5E the DtuUesim trcumpets (of liberation &om com- munism had aounrde,d amobher re- treat ,on thk roUbacV front. Same prominent Republicans had wanted our fighting f m a s to join the Indo- Chinese fray in emly 1954, beside France, but ,the general in the Com- mander in Chiefs &air had over- rule,d athat, as he had rejected my renewal af fighting in Korea above the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, Re- publican leaders hew f b m I innu- memble charges of their m n what a pmerfiul weapon the Demomats would have in our domestic pollitics i.f e Repuibilican ~drminisbation now lost IndoChina. Ixonically enough, as yviah mainland Chima allegedly loet by Ithe Democrats, the United States never had h d o - China and coukdnt have held it i>f , we had tried. Therefme, amther war in Asima was not .a fe,a,sible political course fcrr a U. S. sdminis- tratlon, even ,one iled by a five-sbax general. ,

Yet we Idid Idedde to bry to ho18d at least pant of Inldo-IChina, namely, the new State ~f Vietnam below the 17th pardel. Amd so new- est ph,ase lof Western adventure in Indo-China began that deci- sion. We have been ,trying for ten years to prove i t a sound one.

1

In Iretrospct the foundations for lour 1954 decision appear lto be part fact and paxt myth-a fairly com~mlon an% in foreign as well mas domestic (policy deciskons. The h a t s were &sat# ( 1 ) Southeast Asia was a wcognized *target oif Com- munist subversion and possible take-over; (2) many of the native

occqants of the hdo-Chineee pen- insula wanteld rno piart of ,a future reigime that might be dominated by C~ommunis1t-orien8ted leaden. For religions, econonGc and political reasons many feared ths kind of society they would have if Hto Chi Minh and Jothem 09 his strolng Corn- munist Ib@lief became the new rulms of t;kis w,ar-weary part of Asia. The fmeign businessmen, rubber plant- em and mine opemators also, of course, feared the sonsequences of a Communist relgime.

Moreover, Ithe United Sjtates had beoome iso conspicmously identified with the Fnench in their struggle against Ho lChi Mi&, (albeit iln the name Iof lde8,ense lagahst intema- tional commun!ism, that no fuTther action by us mow would mean Ithat we, has well as the Frentch, had gone [down ,to (ddeat in another eector of bhe contahmnent peniphery of milibant ~mti-commu~nilsm.

So mmh $or three quite sub- atantial fa\cts: a strong C,ornmunist h ive $or 6outhelast Asia: internal Jnldo-Ohinese ,arnti+Cornmunitst @- ion; ,and +he poslture, m face, of the U. S. if no further &$orts were made .to save hdo-China.

On the lside of &e m y ~ s that entere.d into our policy cdloul,ati~ons, directly OT indirectly, there was finst the one, still &!ten extpresse.d, that it was poslsible to draw a line beyond which ,$here wo;uld not be tolerated any expansion Olf Cam- munist cmt!rol. Thins appoahg mybh evokes images of a resolute U. 6 . cavalry stand ,at the pass, or ils ne passerant a t Verdun in Wlmld Wax I, or la more sophisti- cated but still quite naive can- ~ba inmen t -o f~co~mu~sm ooncept. Thinking d communism (as a m ideology ,ought to *make people chary of expcmnding on drawing a line .ta sttop .&e spread OS ideas. Inter- estingly, history pfiolvidea no ex- ample of a p p e I h g ideas havling heen impeded eHective1y in their sprread laud adoptlon belcaulse Os lines drawn on political maps.

The second mytih that we em- braced was that military action would be r a m wcepttarble substitute $or basic polibical and social action. Again the kssfons of the bitter and $mstratin,g Amerrican experience in Niclaxsgu,a, Haiti lmd Ganto Do- minigo in tihe years between Wmld Wars I and I1 were passed over or reje!cteld, if ever remembered. Milirary fmce - if su%cient in amount and rutM,ess anough in di-

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relotion - c m slurpprelss relbelljons, but rarely has i t poduced bhe re- f m l s m a f condit5ons whwh lead men to jloin the ranks of rerbeUiun. We vmtured t o combine lsome econnomic ind te8&nilud aid Mth milibary .sup- post, but the rationale Eor rnlli6a-y unejasures has prevlaibd increasing- ly as our efforts ~ 1 1 hldmo-China have persisted. m e areatiom of SEATO kn 1954 epitomizes this futile faith in mili,tasy power bo solve t h e prob- lems (of disorder in politically in- choate (states de.spelTate$y in need of social reifolm.

The third myth &at we gollowed was-bhe ldomino tiheory of the in- evitable 1,oss of dl of Asia and a vital threat to our own continental secupity if any additional part of Asia came under C~o~mmunist O O ~ - t7ol. This iheo1-y was the delight olf S e n William lhml ,and , who tmm- peted it in .the Senate and across the Band as I& !it had Ithe kfallibdity Olf Newtons l,aw af pavity. Even President Kennedy sapenteld the ar- lguments of fihe domino theory m d few voilces were ra5sed &to quesrion its logic of inevitable, irresistible and

sequential massive defeat once the first (zad,ditional) kitble domino fell against the hastions of our friends.

The domho theory overboks the possibility o f strong reaction by other nations at difrfermt po~ints when h e y are c70mfxonteld by new circumsbances cle,arly threatening their security. The Itheory assumens that , d l power?ful forces la-e on only o n e side, dways moving outward, and it nelgkcts the poss2bility of

dismptive intermd Sonees and ooun- temfonces mwing against $he pre- sumed massive eeimic wave set in mrotilon by any little uhmge of po- liticd status. It is a aeglatwe, fear- fu l ,and mechanistic view of politics and man, but for those very re.a- soins it h ~ d ~ s countless advocates.

So, we took some fIacts l a n i l added some myths and came up wlih ,a decisilon - many times re- affirmed - to deny all S.outhelast A,sia to communism, with rnilictary aid, and we crelated SEATO to do the job lfor uls. Ten years later this quelasy founldatimaf fact amd myth finds us rnireld vexy deeply and sbking in more and more. After expending many billions 08 dcoll*ar8s and sachficing hun&eds of Bivels in combat or related services, after mistings Tmd turnings of CIA nn- dercover operations, with resukimg changes 6: deladers in ,some of Ithe states, there iss still no eqd in sight.

What could we bave done that we fdiddt do? E it had been pols- &ble !for the Republicans to bave ,done ,otihelwise - .or For the Delmn.o- csats #to have altered that policy after they took over in 1961 - one woldd like to ahink $hat they would surely have Idme BO. The losses ob Amerioan laves, &he ou,Qouring of many billilonls af Daxpayem d d a r s and Dhe stnains on our friendship yvjmth many ocher nratilons which bave not seen the issues QS we bave seen dhern, would not normally be calleid lassets to a y political party seeking voter swp$ogt. Amd so ,$he

Amelican people bave been told over #and ,over that Ithere were - and still lare - no other alternatives bat to stand on $he 17bh parallel (,or well sou& of it) land fi&t ,the devils (d4efgedly al l f r o m lahe sor th) in the ancient blattlegrounds of In- do-China. What we have done is intervene in a thlird ckll war in Asia; China and Koma being Ithe other two very costly interventions.

Until relcently, too, we hlave lack- eld critical voices which, while not acting as ithe devih advocate, would at lelast ask if ,we we sure that ,what we are attempting is the only poss?ble alternative larcoeptable to our people. Like McKinley and lohe PhiJippines, the vast majority of the American people itn 1954 had o d y ,the vaguest noltiian of where Lam, Ombodia and Vietnam were - land, h e y careld less. Do (they even now believe these areas so vital ,to theis weifire that very ex- tensive ,and hng+tenn invollvement is that we can aonsidea?

Jn due h e , pkb.ably later than would h,ave bean an optimum ticme for us, we will be forced to $ace Ithe untihin~karbh$ poslsibility of &he neutmlization of all of the 1ndo-Ch;lnese peninsula. Secretary of State Rusik and Selcretary olf De- feme IMcNwmra repeatedly say that n o thought is being given to .this alterhadive to our present mas- sive militaly aid-cunz&eeurs.for- K.hlanh .as our apprrolarch to .tihe prob- lem. The MuNamara lslhutQe .to SA- gon o d e s tlmeadbme calls for Igrelater resolve lmd warnings Q- an unfoaseeable end to the efcont, and then Dhe k&ar and uixcon- vincing reports o f gnatifyimg pro- gres,s and encouraging develop- ments 011 the Wcestbound mln back #to Wmhington. In ,the meantime, the Viedmong strike villages and citi,es at will in SOutJj Vi,eltnam and ,simultaneousiy odetail qm-e foxes t o , pnsh their ckrpa&n in Laos. Re~cl7uits~ and rmilitiary equipment are pickeld up in lhbundsance from (the south Vietnqese civilian and mditaxy fonces.

Why are we hvolved in South- east Asima? Where do we go for the next ten ye1arsl Tthe$e are hhe queshiions thtat Ibecg and receive n o dear mswers,: other than Clarry on! Whmat wasrvldid in 1954 is stiU valid 5n 1964 dthoulgh the Asian world bas @Ihan.ged [giready since Ithen. At some p o h t - a d soon perhaps - we must face up to:

August 24, 1964 I 65

(1) our dubious legal position in SOLI'^^ Vietnam, w i l b h our sh,oolting and des,tsoytng of military forces under the t!hin ,de:c,eit of being ad- vlsers; (2) the soiundlnelss of ow conti,nuing passivity toward a strong role for the UN in Southecast Asilan strife, &iJe ,at ,the s m e ticme we ulave pressed for UN ac- tion in the inniternelcine flghtrng s f the Congo, Cyprus and $he Middle East; ( 3 ) a new look a t neutraliza- tion of ;bor;der tareas between East aad West in Asia land tihe establish- ed examplmes, both satisfac~ory a n d ansati,sfacdory, !of neutralization in Europe and elsewhere; (4) a hmd review of all our interests in Asia, eventually in conferenoe with Com- munist Chlina; land (5) ablandoning Ithe shibboleth olf oontrainia?lg com- rnunkm aloag artificial latitudes or

loagitudes. The tmth is that the ideologicd appeal of Macest doc- ,trine and olre refomls that colmmu- nism s$ten bas espoused efJectively appeal to nmny people around the world; rmd *&e spread od bhese ideas will not be stopped by military fiat. Nor wiLl i t help at all to continue the repelated plaintive 1amen.t of Secretary Rusk that there would be peace in IndoJChina if only the Noroh Vietnamelse ,and the Chiftese wodd leave their neighbors alone. If !dl uountxies wodd Jeave bheir neighbors alone, i t would b e a very different world, hut it is not realis- ttc to expect rhils change in our time,s. To expland ,the war would assure only lmolther Xorea or w w e , with d the pdssibilities of a nu- clear war.

Will tlhe new year or the post- * .>

2. Th nly War Weve Got Saigon, Vietnam

You hear &e phrase everywhere. A young Special Forces captain, f;reslh from >Okinawa, ldelclares: All I want #i?olrn Vietnam is #nithe C I B ( ~ e com- bat infantrymans badge, a long rifle on a blue field wibh a silver wrelath , b e h d i t ) . Hell, man, its the ody war weve got. And an eamest mfajlolr in corps headquarters says: Xouill rneet the brravest and best soldiers in the U S . Army right here. This is ,the o d y war weve got, and Id mtate the whole Army through here if I couid. AIS i t is, Im ,told Ifhe volunteers axe bacle,d up for four mmonths.

Whkh is one reasoin why we are fighting a war and losing a revo- h i o n in South Vietnam. The back- bone of any =my is its N.C.0.s and company-grade ofchcers, and i t is no #accident bhat most of )&he Arneri- can (advisers at,taohed to ahhe Viet- namese a m y axe sergeanbs, first lieu:tenantms m d capitains in their twenties. A man m e t see combat before he is truly a soldier. Our Woxld Wkx $1 veterans are midde- laged desk soldiars now, land even (our Korean vetemns are in their

Danzel F . Ford, a freeJance journalist, has been in South Vietnam for the past two months on a magmane wrzters grant from t he Phzlzp M . Stern Fnmzly Fund. This is the last article in a series he has w r ~ t t e n for %e Nla- tion f r o m the war zone. 6 G

thizties and pastsing beyond the stage where they might be leading platoom md8cmplanieis in a f,uture war: Thus there is a very h p n a n desire on Ithe part of the, U.8 A m y to exploit the chaos in Smolutheast AsPa to hain a new lgenezation of co,mbat-experienced soldiens.

Niolt dl Amedcan servicemen in South Vietnam share ;this lattimtlude. Many, probably a majloxity, did not want ,to come %ere, and now th,at they =e here they woulld like nothing bebter ~thm to ,go, home. Bu.t the prorfessional sddiers are positively *gleeful at hi ch,ance to [advance theirJ,profe~slsiond status.

Paafessionalisrn is not the only reason we are overemphasizing the Ubary s role in lSoutheaslt Asia. There is also the fact Ithat sold,iers are lborund to v i m affairs fcom a military standpoint, even is the re- sults are disoouraging, as they have been so far. The appointment of General Maxwell Taylor as our am- bassador to Soath Vieltnam can h . a d y be expected t o reverse ithis tendmcy.

But even more crucial is our re- fusal to naune.the fighting here for what i t is: a revolution. For a peo- ple born out of revolruition, we are strangely reluctant (to recognize the symptolmls in other lands. We in- sist that 8th is i,s wax-guerrilla war, limited war , cou~ten~sunge~cy war,

election peri,ocl see LIS re-examine OUT ,d,ecade o :active deSeasel in Soueheast Asias Indo4Xinese pen- insula? Perhaps noit; it has become a habict to lmgue las we have -for so Ilomg. AppaFen:tly only a Senlator Wayne Monse can change hia mind as f d y as h e circumsbances re- quire and .still retain his following. Pmolitics doesnt stop at the wateis edge, but rather i,t governs all we [do. Only a sltatesman above pol i t ics clan change our coume now. Events in Indo-China may not wait for our politicians %o clelar the Novem- bey election hurdle before bhey can lead our discontented pelople to a new amd more realistic settlsn~en~t in 6outheast Asi,a, and extricate us from a rniQadventure kern of good motives based on sfome faulty c~al- culations land, expectations.

. . . Daniel &. Ford some kind ) o f wa!r-ldespite all evi- ldence to the ~con,trary. I bave spent IWO months in Soulth Vietnam. I have been shot at, rained on and chewed by insec,ts, but never h v e I had the Zeeling that 11 was witness- ing la was. Mast 8correspondenta who go out into $he field have a sindar experieace. Fulllscale battiles are such a aasity here Ithat when one does take place, like the Do Xa operation in June, ,$he trophies are fllorwn to Saigon for ex.hibdtion, a n d mass decorations =,e awarded in the publilc squares.

I tried the notion [o.f revohtion upon several Ameriican advisers. The moat common ccetori was: Ib this isnlt .a war, why are they 6hoo.t- innlg ,at me? I poimed out that men w,me 1bei)ng shot 60s ci,vil rtghts lac- tiviMes in the Sltatels. Was that war? But ,theyre nolt using automatic weapms, was lthe reply, ignoring the fact that most orf the ViehconIgs autamaMc weapon8s have been oap- ltured horn ,government fomes. ,

A more sophisticated angument goes like ,this: revoLutions are in- digenous to the c o u n ~ , while $he fighting in South Vietnam is di- relctefd rom Hanoi. This masked aggression themy is official Army doctrine. Quite ap,arrt from I&e fact that most revolutions - including our own-were lassisted by foreilgn powers, it overlooks th,e evidence which suggests fiha,t even hard-core

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