attitudes in 1945 the soviet union and the usa had very different and contradictory attitudes in...
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Attitudes in 1945
The Soviet Union and the USA had very different and contradictory attitudes in 1945 and this caused stress and tension.
The Soviet Union and the USA had very different and contradictory attitudes in 1945 and this caused stress and tension.
Attitudes in 1945Stalin and the Soviets:Stalin and the Soviets:
Wanted Security for the USSR
Wanted a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
Wanted back land lost in 1917 under the Peace Treaty.
Wanted limits on Germany’s power.
Wanted reparations from Germany
Wanted aid with economic reconstruction.
The USA:The USA:
Wanted International Cooperation via the United Nations.
Wanted to stop any spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.
Wanted to spread Democracy and Freedom.
Open door trade policy.
World reconstruction via the IMF and World Bank.
Clearly there were lots of potential Clearly there were lots of potential conflictsconflicts..
Changing US AttitudesChanging US AttitudesRoosevelt died – Truman much
harder and disliked the the Soviets. Developed the Iron
Fist approach.Anti-communist politicians in the USA were becoming more
forceful and demanding action.
US diplomats and politicians feared that the USA was
Appeasing the Soviets and this would lead to a Hitler-style
situation.US industry wanted to stop
communism and wanted new markets in Europe to replace
the lost war production.
US soldiers and diplomats had met the Soviets at the end of the War and were now very worried about the reality of
Soviet thinking.
The USA did not understand the Soviets’ demand for
security.
A much more aggressive and
intolerant approach to the Soviets grew up.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945
The War was still on.
Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt met in the Soviet Union.
They reached an agreement – but it was open to interpretation.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945agreement on the establishment of the United Nations;
the division of Germany, Berlin and Austria into temporary zones of occupation controlled by the USSR, USA, Britain and France;
the principle of free elections in eastern Europe.
the Soviet Union also agreed to join the war against Japan, which was still going on, in return for receiving some of Japan’s islands in the Far East.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945
Poland remained a problem
there was a Free-Polish government waiting in London – this was sympathetic to the West
when the Soviets liberated Poland at the end of the war – a new Soviet-friendly communist government in Lublin.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945An agreement was reached:
Stalin would allow members of the London-based government into the new Lublin administration to work alongside the Communists.
Free elections would be held as soon as possible. The West hoped that this would reduce the influence of the communists in the government.
The USA and Britain would allow the Soviet Union to keep areas of Poland gained in 1939 at the start of the Second World War. Poland was to be given some land new land to compensate for these losses.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945In order to try and ensure the rights of the newly liberated countries in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt pushed Stalin to sign a Declaration on Liberated Europe to commit the three governments to:
jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
Yalta: February 1945Yalta: February 1945In order to try and ensure the rights of the newly liberated countries in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt pushed Stalin to sign a Declaration on Liberated Europe to commit the three governments to:
jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
Potsdam: July 1945Potsdam: July 1945The War against Germany was over, but the war with Japan was still on.
Stalin, Churchill (later replaced by Atlee) and Truman met in the Soviet Union.
Stalin came with a new list of demands, including control of parts of North Africa and Turkey.
These discussions were more bitter.
Potsdam: July 1945Potsdam: July 1945
The main areas of debate disagreement were:Free Elections for Eastern Europe: The West wanted free elections, Stalin wanted pro-Soviet governments on his border.
The Future of Germany: Germany had been divided into four zones at Yalta, but the USA wanted the rebuilding of Germany as a driver for general European economic recovery. Stalin saw a rebuilt Germany as a threat to his security.
Reparations: The USA wanted massive reparations to compensate for her losses in the war.
Economic Reconstruction: The USA wanted to rebuild Europe as a capitalist powerhouse. The Soviet Union wanted to see communist economics at work to provide for the ordinary people. Stalin also wanted a huge loan from the USA, the USA was reluctant and lost the application before turning it down altogether.
Potsdam: July 1945Potsdam: July 1945
The Atomic BombThe USA used the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945.
Stalin was angry at the lack of consultation.
Stalin was also worried about the USA being a nuclear power.
However, Stalin was not cowed by the atomic and remained hard line.
Kennan’s Long Kennan’s Long Telegram, 1946Telegram, 1946
The USA had tried to do a deal with the USA – this was pointless and could not carry on.The Soviets had a policy making process that could not be influenced by external factors – the Soviets needed to scare their people with an external enemy to stop them revolting. The USA was that enemy and the demand for a buffer zone was part of creating the fear.The Soviets were too attached to Communist ideology to compromise on anything.
The Soviets would always try and use their influence over Western Communist parties to strengthen their position.
Truman liked the assessment and started to act upon it. He was tired of “babysitting the Soviets” and started to adopt the “Iron Fist” approach. The aggressive Soviets needed tough handling.
Move to ContainmentMove to ContainmentThe following year Kennan named the policy that flowed from his Telegram as one of “containment”. The ideas caught on in the USA for a number of reasons:
The policy of Appeasement towards Nazi Germany was seen as being a major cause of the Second World War, they did not want to repeat the error.
The US was feeling insecure militarily, it feared it was overstretched and facing a new war – the analysis backed this up.
Economic worries also occupied the American mind. They feared another depression in Europe and the USA and economic hardship would be a breeding ground for communism. A solution was a strong free-trade bloc with Western Europe.
The new policy would stimulate military spending; this pleased both the armed forces and business.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
Conflicts with the Soviets would be done in the open and with no promise of concessions.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
There would be no attempt to liberate Eastern Europe, but there would a line drawn beyond which Soviet expansionism would be resisted.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
Negotiations would continue with Moscow, but only to make the World see that the USA was reasonable and to leave Stalin with no doubt about the US position.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
It was hoped that the USSR would realise that the USA was strong and determined and therefore some form of fair and equitable settlement would be sensible.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
America must speak the language of military might and make the containment of communism the policy goal.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
Those outside the Soviet sphere of influence should be extended economic aid, trade agreements and technical help to show them the benefits of capitalism and an alliance with the USA. Where necessary, military aid should not be rules out.
The Policy of ContainmentThe Policy of Containment
Launch a propaganda and media campaign in the USA to convince the public of the merits of the new policy. Key figures within the Truman administration published articles in magazines and newspapers. The media obliged with sympathetic articles showing how Russian expansionism could threaten world peace.
An iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. All these famous cities, and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to leadership and power far beyond their numbers, and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.
Iron Curtain Speech, 1946Iron Curtain Speech, 1946