attack on google’s network, december 2009 recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the...

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COLTS IT AUDITING TEAM Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis.

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In December 2009, the corporate network of Google, Inc. was attacked and breached by sophisticated and coordinated efforts originating from IP addresses in Taiwan and China. Upon analysis, it was discovered that access to Google's enterprise network and source code repository had been achieved. The entry point was opened by a Google employee using Microsoft Messenger and clicking on a link opened in Internet Explorer. The web site which was loaded installed the malware onto the user's local computer. This software then connected to a central server, where the perpetrators could obtain access to the user's computer, which in turn gave them access to the Google network. Presented here are our recommendations and a plan of action to reduce the likelihood of this type of attack occurring in the future.

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Page 1: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

COLTS IT AUDITING TEAM

Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009Recommendations to avoid future incidents based

upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis.

Page 2: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Topics Overview of incident Recommend changes to improve the security of

Google’s network infrastructure Total Estimated Cost Closing

Page 3: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

OverviewIn December 2009, the corporate network of Google, Inc. was attacked and breached by sophisticated and coordinated efforts originating from IP addresses in Taiwan and China. Upon analysis, it was discovered that access to Google's enterprise network and source code repository had been achieved. The entry point was opened by a Google employee using Microsoft Messenger and clicking on a link opened in Internet Explorer. The web site which was loaded installed the malware onto the user's local computer. This software then connected to a central server, where the perpetrators could obtain access to the user's computer, which in turn gave them access to the Google network. Presented here are our recommendations and a plan of action to reduce the likelihood of this type of attack occurring in the future.

Page 4: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Recommend changes to improve the security of Google’s network

infrastructure People Procedures Hardware Software Telecom

Page 5: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

People What actually happened?

Instant message was sent to a Google employee with a malicious link

The employee clicked the malicious link, thus allowing the intruder to gain access to the employee’s machine

The intruder was then able to view computers used by software developers at Google’s headquarters in California

Page 6: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

People What is recommended?

The executives at Google Inc. need to set new security policies that prevent intruders from entering a sandbox area.

This sandbox will be highly encrypted, and password protected with at least a 17 character pass phrase.

These new security policies will also include a “revolutionary firewall” that will prevent these types of mishaps from happening again.

All employees at Google Inc. will need to be briefed on the new changes.

Page 7: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

People What is recommended? (continued)

Important to note: without defined employee training, human error is likely to occur.

Page 8: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

PeopleRequired Action: 

Training briefing on new security policies Responsibilities:

The Executives are responsible for giving directions on the new policies, and the training briefing. 

Completion Date: Q3 2010

Cost: Approx. $10,000 will be needed for training. 

Resources:  Security DBA's, as well as the managers from all IT departments 

Communication: Training needs to be enforced on new policies.  This will ensure that mishaps

such as these will not occur again.

Page 9: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Procedures Google’s network security administrators should

consider adding another layer of security to ‘Gaia’ for identification authentication and access control.

Instant messaging with people outside the Google network should be reserved for authorized employees with legitimate job requirements for such communication activities.  

Firewalls should be setup to disable non Google links in employees’ instant messages.

Page 10: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Procedures Google network management should consider

breaking up the ‘Moma’ user directory into smaller manageable subunits. Groups working with critical business data should be separated from less sensitive user groups. An extra layer of security should be added to the most critical subunits. 

Multiple passwords and security certificate authentication should be implemented rather than single sign-on to access a variety of Google accounts. 

Page 11: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Procedures Employee network accounts should have logging features and

these should be made available to the users so they’re able to see and track their session activities. Users will be able to quickly notice unusual access activity in their accounts.

For example: If Sam lives in San Jose, CA and Sam notice a session activity on his account at 2:00am PST on a Monday, when he was probably sleeping, then Sam would have reasonable suspicion that someone other than him had gained access to his personal account. Upon such discovery, Sam should report a security breach forth with to the network security administrator group.

Page 12: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

ProceduresRequired Action:

Track employee login/logout session activities Implement firewalls to disable non Google hypertext links in instant messaging Breakup ‘Moma’ user directory into smaller manageable subunits Institute multiple passwords and certificate authentication for critical user groups

Responsibilities: The IT Director of Network Security shall be in charge of overseeing the implementation of

the above required action procedural changes.Completion Date:

Q4 2010Resources:

Network Managers Network Engineers

Communication: Network engineers shall provide updates to the manager who shall in turn provide regular

updates to the director. The director shall provide weekly or as needed updates to the CIO on the progress of the implementation.

Page 13: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareTwo recommended security devices:

►Network Security Appliance ◄

► Intrusion Detection System (IDS) ◄

Page 14: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareNetwork Security Appliance should: Provide comprehensive protection for all types

of network attacks Ensure high degree of accuracy Process large amounts of network traffic

efficiently Protect against attack without latency Be easy to use, install and maintain

Page 15: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareSonicWall NSA E7500 Initial hardware: $30,000/unit Ongoing costs: $5,000/year for subscriptions

and service contracts Located at each Internet entry point

Page 16: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareIntrusion Prevention System (IPS) orIntrusion Detection System (IDS) Ability to stop malware before anyone can notice Can stop traffic that exhibits malware tendencies Logs network traffic for future analysis

Page 17: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareJuniper Networks IDP 75 Initial cost: $5,800 Ongoing cost: $250-1000 Locate throughout network at strategic points

Page 18: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

HardwareRequired Action:

Implement SonicWall NSA E7500 units at each Internet entry point. Implement Juniper Networks IDP 75 at critical internal network locations. 

Responsibilities: Network Engineers will be responsible for choosing the appropriate locations for installation.

They along with Network Administrators will be responsible for maintaining and configuring the hardware devices, along with monitoring the logs of all devices to look for any anomalies. 

Completion Date: Q3 2010 

Resources: Network Managers Network Engineers Network Administrators System Vendors

Communication: All network personnel should be trained in the use and configuration of the hardware for their

specific locations and responsibilities.

Page 19: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Software Software Configuration Management (SCM) servers should be

immediately reconfigured to meet current security standards for other systems, especially pertaining to: default passwords, downgraded running user privileges (on Windows Servers), web interface vulnerabilities, and lack of secured communications between clients and server. Special care should also be taken to maintain up to date patches. Detailed logging should be setup (and maintained on a separate server) and the prevention of excessive rights from being granted to users of the SCM system without a 'need to know' along with implementing logging and auditing on Software Configuration Management systems.

Once available, prepare to implement updated host and network based intrusion detection definitions or code designed to thwart malicious activity that resembles the code used in the attack.

Page 20: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Software Consider limiting or removing the use of Microsoft’s

Internet Explorer on programming department computers. Continue patching of stolen software source code and

work to resolve known bugs from the repository that may have been accessed to prevent attacks on the password system.

Separate some instances of seamless sign on:  A correction may involve the use of multiple passwords or digital certificates for access to a variety of sensitive systems. This will hinder ease of use but may increase the integrity of the data.

Page 21: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Software It is also strongly recommended that the use of non

secure instant messaging programs on certain departments machines be reconsidered in favor of a more manageable and secure format. For example, inter-departmental instant messages, a more secure program such as Pidgin (http://pidgin.im/), Jabber (http://www.jabber.org/), or Skype is recommended.

Page 22: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

SoftwareRequired Action:

Harden SCM systems, maintain an up to date host IDS schema, limit or remove MS Internet Explorer, and explore new ways to mitigate instant messaging forgeries and keep communications secure.  

Responsibilities: SCM administrators will implement necessary changes to the SCM systems, network security

team will contact IDS update vendors and request information on when the latest patches for this vulnerability will be available, Microsoft server systems administrators will assist any SCM administrative personnel and reconfigure GPO’s for end user software.

Completion Date: Q3 2010

Resources: SCM administrators Network Security team Microsoft server systems administrators

Communication: Email progress to each department manager. Managers will present progress every other week

during normal meeting hours until project deadline is met or deemed finalized by the CIO. 

Page 23: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

TelecommunicationsImplement SSL VPN for remote users Provides for secure, encrypted connection Part of the SonicWall NAS E7500 Forces traffic through Juniper IDP No additional costs other than already stated No additional software on user’s end

Page 24: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

TelecommunicationsConsider multiple SSL VPN paths Segregates network access Keeps non-authorized users out of certain areas

Page 25: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

TelecommunicationsRequired Action:

Implement SSL VPN connections for all remote users. Responsibilities:

Network Engineers and Network Administrators will be responsible for the implementation and management of the SSL VPNs.

Completion Date: Q4 2010

Resources: Network Managers Network Engineers Network Administrator

Communication: The method of connecting to the Google network via the new SSL VPN must be

communicated to the remote users. This should be done in a secure manner so as not to defeat the purpose of a secure connection. 

Training should be provided to all Network Engineers and Network Administrators as to the management of the systems for their appropriate duties.

Page 26: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Total Estimated CostRecommendation Cost

People Employee training $10,000

Procedures n/a

Hardware Sonicwall NSA $600,000 (20 at $30,000 per unit) + $30,000 for 6yr service contractJuniper IDP $174,000 (30 at $5,800 per unit) + $6,000 for 6yr service contract

Software n/a

Telecom n/a

TOTAL $820,000

Page 27: Attack on Google’s Network, December 2009 Recommendations to avoid future incidents based upon the DS5 component of a COBIT analysis

Closing In an effort to avoid another loss of intellectual

property The Colts auditing team recommends that the People, Procedures, Hardware, Software, and Telecommunications changes are reviewed and implemented at each level of IT department.

Thank you for considering us as your IT auditing provider.