attack on a sigint collector, the u.s. cryptologic series, nsa, 1981)

8/3/2019 Attack on a Sigint Collector, The U.S. Cryptologic Series, NSA, 1981)

1/83

UNITEDSTATESCRYPTOLOGICHISTORY

Attack on a Sigint Collector,the U.S.S. Liberty -fS-OOr

'fntS f)6et:Jr.IEN'f e6N'fA:INS e6f)EW6Kf) r.1A:'fEKIA:L

Classified by NSA/CSSM 123-2Review in April 2011

Dec l a s s i f i ed and approved f or r el ea se by NSA on 11-08-2006 pu r suan t to E.O.12958, as amended. MDR 51712.


2/83

Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminatedoutside th e U.S . Intelligence C o mm u ni ty w it h ou t th e permission of th e Director,NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction a n d d is se mi n at io n sh oul d be directed toth e Office of Cryptologic Archives an d History, T54.


3/83

'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special SeriesCrisis CollectionVolume 1

Attack on a Sigint Collector,the V.S.S. LilJerty-(S=6T

William D. GerhardHenry W. Millington

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE1981

NO'f ItEtEASABLE 'fO fOItEIGN Nlt'fIONltLS

'fOP SECRET UMBRA

-- --- --- - ~ - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . ~


4/83

UNCLASSIFIED

ContentsPage

eword___________________________________________________________________________________ viithors' Note_______________________________________________________________________________ ixpter I POLITICAL-MILITARY BACKGROUND (U) _

II CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO THE SHIP'S DEPLOYMENT (U) _The Requirements for Intelligence (U) _Technical Collection Factors (U) _I Its ee8) ...U.S. Intercept of VHF/UHF Communications { l ,JL------------------------------------- --- _1 I(e eeSJ -----------------------------------------------Airborne Collectors (U) - _The Decision to Deploy the Liberty (U) _

556610101112

~ 1 .Fo 1 .

II I DEPLOYMENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN (U) 15U.S.S. Liberty's Modus Operandi (U) 15Abidjan to Rota, 24-31 May 1967 (U) 17Liberty at Rota, 31 May to 2 June 1967 (U)________________________________________________ 17Air Force Security Service's Technical Processing Center (U)__________________________________ 18Enroute to Operational Area Three (U) 19Directions to Withdraw the Liberty (U) 21Operational Area Three, 8 June (U) 23Liberty's Processing Mission (U)___________________________________________________________ 23

apter IV THE ATTACK (U)______________________________________________________________ 25Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U) 25General Quarters Drill (U) 25Air Attack Begins (U) 26Torpedo-Boat Attack (U) 28Post-Attack Reconnaissance (U)___________________________________________________________ 30Sixth Fleet Reacts (U) 31Washington Informed (U) 32Israel Reports Error (U)__________________________________________________________________ 32Johnson Informs Kosygin (U) 32Liberly Recovers (U) 32U.S. Naval Attache Helicopters to th e Liberty (U) 34Israeli Helicopter Conversations (U) 34Liberty Licks It s Wounds (U) 35

apter V THE ISRAELI EXPLANATION (U)________________________________________________ 37Chronology of Israeli Actions (U) 37Israeli Prosecutor's Charges of Negligence (U) 38Explanation Reexamined (U)______________________________________________________________ 40

apter VI RECOVERY AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT (U) 43Medical Assistance (U)---------------____________________________________________________ 43Commander, Sixth Fleet Arrives (U) 43Replacement Inquiries (U) 43

UNCLASSIFIED iii


5/83

UNCLASSIFIED

Recovery of Sensitive Materials (U) _Assistance to NSA Personnel (e eeO) _Cleanup Continues (U) - _Command Investigations Initiated (U) --- - - - - - - -- _Preparations at Malta (U) _Blalock Returns Home (U) _Liberty's Arrival at Malta (U) - _Evacuation of Wilson (U) _Clearing Damaged Areas (U) _Damage Survey at Malta (U) -- _JCS fact Finding Team's Interviews (U) _Accounting for Classified Material (U) _Joint Survey at Norfolk (U) _

Chapter V II THE INCIDENT UNDER REVIEW (U) _The NSA Review and Reaction (U) _The JCS Review (U) _Congressional Review (U) _

Chapter V III A FINAL LOOK (U) _Safety Estimates for Collection Missions of Mobile Platforms (U) _Availability of Linguists (U) _Communications Problems (U) _File Reduction for Exposed Collectors (U) _Unanswered Questions (U) _Denouement (U) ~ ~ ~ : : -

Bibliography (U ) -"';;::::...- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Illustrations (U )

Maps

I IrsOeo.t ------.-..-...-..-...-..-...-..-...-..-...-..-...-. ------------------------------~ . . . . " . . " , . , . . . . . . . . . . , . . . ~ ~ - : - : - - ~ = - : " : ~ = _ _ ' = " " " j < T 8 G ( J Ql'iFl _EC-121 and C-130 Aircraft Collection Routes (e eeO) ~ _:...__ ...__ .........~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -Projected Track of Liberty on 8 June (U) == --------PhotographsU.S.S. Liberty (U) ..._... ... --... __ - ........."""'''';.:::::::............::::......- - _Manual-morse PositionsI l


6/83

UNCLASSIFIEDPage

Liberty Arriving in Malta (V)___________________________________________________ __________ 40V.S.S. Davis (V)________________________________________________________________________ 42Helicopter Evacuating Liberty's Wounded (V) 44Vice Admiral Martin Visits Liberty (V) 45Dish Antenna on Liberty (V) 46Donald L. Blalock (V ) 48Liberty in Malta (V) 49Inspection of Torpedo-Damaged Hull (V ) 50Navy Divers Recover Classified Debris (V ) 51Manual-morse Positions Destroyed (e ee6) 53Sigint Equipment Ruined by Torpedo Blast O 008) 54Commander William L. McGonagle (V ) 55

UNCLASSIFIED V

-------------------------- ~ - ~ ~ ~ -


7/83

SEeRET

Foreword

(8 GGO) The Israeli attack on th e U.S.S. Liberty some 14 years ago was, indeed, awrenching experience for U.S. Sigint agencies. The loss, particularly in th e case of those Sigintspecialists who gave their lives or were wounded, was difficult to accept. The knowledge that thetragedy resulted not only from Israeli miscalculation but also from faulty U.S. communicationspractices was even more diff icult to accept.(8 060) The passage of time has made it possible for the authors to reexamine the Libertyincident objectively and answer a number of persistent questions. The authors accordingly se tforth th e technical rationale for th e Liberty mission, the particulars of th e Israeli miscalculation,th e details of th e American communications fai lures, a narrative of the attack and of attemptsto minimize the compromise of cryptologic materials, and the lessons to be learned from theevent.(6 660) Finally, this is also an account of the way th e U.S. Sigint agencies organizedtheir response to requirements brought on by a crisis situation. As such, it has much to offer th estudent of U.S. cryptologic operations.(G 000) A word about th e authors, who worked on this project part time after t hey hadretired. An experienced operations officer and research special is t, Mr. Gerhard headed th e NSA-SCA Task Force that produced th e Southeast Asia History Series, as well as th e Special ResearchElement that produced studies of Sigint crisis situations. Mr. Millington, who spent most of hiscareer in research and documentation activities, was for years in charge of th e NSA Library.

Vincent J. Wilson, Jr .Chief, Cryptologic History and Publications Staff

SEURET vii


8/83

UNCLASSIFIED

Authors' NoteMany people contributed to th e completion of this history. The authors gratefully acknowledge

th e efforts of members of th e NSA History and Publications Staff who offered substantivesuggestions and labored over publication format and preparation - Vincent J. Wilson, Jr., Chief;Henry Schorreck, Historian; Priscilla A. Pitts, Edi to r; and Joan M. Hall, Secretary. Robert D.Farley, of the History Staff , spent many hours arrang ing for and conducting interviews ofpersonnel intimately associated with the Liberty inc ident . In turn, I Ipainstakingly transcribed the interview tapes.

To Russell G. Fisher, Cryptologic Records Declassif icat ion Staff , we ar e indebted for hissecurity classification review.

Both Bob Rush, Electronic Secur ity Command, and James Gilbert, Intelligence and SecurityCommand History Staff generously provided useful source materials from their collections.

foLo

!'ii

William D. Gerhard f;Henry W. Millington ! ~

8 December 1980 !

f,ItI

UNCLASSIFIED ix


9/83

SECRET

Chapter I

Political-Military Background (U)

A brief look at th e Middle Easternduring early 1967 is necessa ry for an appre

tion of th e mounting political and mil itary tensionsultimately led to the U.S. decision to positi on

V.S.S. Liberty in the eastern Mediterranean.Since the mid-1950s, the major world

had been keenly aware of and sensitive to theldup of tensions in th e Middle East. Both theet Union and Communist China were quick to takentage of unsettled conditions there to extend their

n influence over governments wherever possible n competing with one another in this effort.

By the end of the 19508 the Chinesehad begun to assert themselves, especially

I raq and Syria. In May 1966, Syria's new president,el-Attassi, scoffed at waging a conventional

against Israel and urged what he cal led a "people'sr of liberation," Chinese-Communist style. 1 The

of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),Shukairy, also admitted to receiving Chinese. PLO representatives had been sent to Vietnam

communist China to observe communist guerrillaan d PLO troops were receiving arms from

munist China. 2As for the Soviets, they had particular

se for not wishing to see th e Syrian Governmentdefeated, and, perhaps , overthrown. Theradical Syr ian Governments which had

med power since th e beginning of 1966 had comerely more and more on Soviet military and economic, to permit increasing numbers of Sov ie t adv isersbe stationed in th e country, and all in all to offermost promising field for Sov ie t penetrat ion and

uence in the Middle East. Th e Soviets genuinelyed massive Israeli retaliation that might toppleSyrian Government; they the re fo re spurred the

on to vigorous counteraction, the full reperions of which they could no t foresee."

(U) The United States supported th eUnited Nations ' efforts to maintain peace in t he areaand, while championing the right of the State of Israelto exist, urged restraint and respect for the rights ofall nations.(U) Within th e Arab world, PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic(U.A.R.) sought to overcome opposit ion to his leadership by th e monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan."In l ate January 1967, when U.A.R. aircraft bombedNajran in Saudi Arabia, relations between the twocountries were further strained. In Yemen, the U.A.R.supported th e insurgents against th e Royalists. Jordan,trying to keep from becoming embroiled in IsraeliArab frictions, ordered in March a halt to Arabinfiltration into Israel through Jordanian territory aswell as a cessation of Palestine Liberation internalagitation against the Jordanian Government.(V) Between January and April 1967, theSyrian-Israeli frontier was the scene of a series ofescalating clashes ranging from potshots at tractors toexchanges of fire between tanks, artil lery, and aircraft.Both sides refused, at different times, to permit theUnited Nations Mixed Armistice Commission to markthe armistice line at disputed points and insisted onfarming and patrolling disputed areas. S(8 GGO) On 7 April 1967, a Syrian-Israeli clashescalated from an exchange of fire between tanks toattacks by both Syr ian and Israeli aircraft. By theend of the day, Israeli planes had appeared over th eoutskirts of Damascus and six Syrian planes had beenshot down. This event triggered a Sigint Readiness"Alfa" cal led by NSA for Middle East t arge ts . TheAlfa was terminated three days later."(B-CCO) As the tempo of the civil war withinYemen increased, V.A.R. aircraft dropped poison-gasbombs on Yemeni Royalists on 22 April. Later thatmonth when th e Yemeni Government imprisoned twoAmericans from th e Agency for International Devel-

IIANBtH fA C O f t f H N ~ CIIANNHI:iS ONI:iY SHCRHq:' 1


10/83

(U) The U.S.S. Liberty was commiss ioned in May 1945 as a vi cto ry ship and later converted into a technical research ship (December1964). She had an overall length of 455 feet. a maximum speed of 18 knots with an a llowable personnel complement of 9 officers and151 enlisted men a long with an additional 6 officers and 128 enlisted men from the Naval Security Group.

(Photograph courtesy of the Depar tment of the Navy.)(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)


11/83

opment (AID),IIr-------------( ~ - e e ~ ) From 11-14 May, UA.R. aircraft at -Itacked towns in Saudi Arabial I(8-888) When on 14 May the D.A.R. placedits air defense units on full alert and deployed itstactical naval units, NSA expanded its Alfa to embraceall Middle East targets. 9(U ) On 17 May, th e D.A.R. requestedthat the United Nat ions Emergency Force (DNEF)withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The UN. complied,and Nasser immediately began moving troops into th eSinai. This decis ion by th e D.A.R. government presumably encouraged by the Soviets and Syrian s- to move i ts a rmed forces up to the Sinai armis ticeline thus reestablished the direct Egyptian-Israelimilitary confrontation which had been the majorimmediate cause of th e 1956 war. 10(8 GGO) Five days later on 23 May 1967, theD.A.R. blockaded the Strait of Tiran, thereby closingth e Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and prohibitingunescorted tankers of any flag from reaching theIsraeli port of Elat. This action reproduced anotherelement that had brought on the 1956 war. BecauseIsrael had repeatedly asserted that she would go towar if the UA.R. blocked the Gulf, NSA raised itsAlfa to a Sigint Readiness "Bravo Crayon" for allMiddle East communications. II(D) The D.A.R. blockade precipitatedquiet bu t full-scale mobilization by Israel. Arab forceswere repositioned, and on 30 May Egypt and Jordans igned a five-year military alliance, completing Arabencirclement of Israel. Shortly thereafter, Soviet navalvessels entered th e Mediterranean through th eDardenelles. 12(D) On 1 June, as pressure to open theStrait of Tiran built within Israel, Moshe Dayan wasappointed Israeli Minister of Defense. The next day,Friday, 2 June, th e United States and the UnitedKingdom issued a joint statement declaring the Gulfof Aqaba an international waterway to which all stateswere entitled free passage.(D) The weekend of 3 and 4 June passeduneventfully, bu t t hen lightning struck. On Monday,5 June at approximately 0845 Middle East time, Israellaunched simultaneous ai r strikes against all forwardD.A.R. a ir fie lds on th e Sinai and in th e Suez CanalZone. While th e bulk of th e 40o-plane Israeli ai r forceconcentrated on U.A.R. targets , the remaining Israelijets made coordinated attacks against a ir fields inJordan, Syria, and Iraq. Israeli raids against Arab ai rbases continued throughout 5 June and by nightfall

SECRETIsrael had complete mastery of the sky having virtuallydestroyed four Arab a ir forces. 13(8m(J09)ummummF'orty-fiveulninutesmaftel' the la.unchiIlgof the Israeli ai r offensive, Israeli troops started theircrushing ground attack against U.A.R . forces in theSinai. In th e Gaza Strip, I srae li g round forces tookRafah and Khan Yunus. Meanwhile tank columnsraced thirty miles west into th e Sinai to capture Al'Arish. With this rapid spread of hosti li ties , NSAinstituted a Si in t Readiness Alfa to watch Soviet

'- - ..1moves.(D) On Tuesday, 6 June, UA.R. PresidentNasser, charging that D.S. and Brit is h planes hadintervened in the war on th e side of Israel, closed th eSuez Canal to all shipping and severed diplomaticrelations with the US. In turn, the US. brokediplomatic t ies with Cairo.(U) On th e battlefield, Israeli tank columns advanced toward th e Suez Canal on three majorfronts: through Al 'Arish toward Al Qantarah in thenorth; through AbuUwayjilah along the central routetoward Ismailia; and to Al Qusaymah on the southernroute. Farther south, other columns advanced to AlKuntillah in th e Sinai.(D) Opera ting aga in st th e Jordanianforces, Israeli troops captured th e cites of Janin,Qalqilyah, and Ram Allah and took the high groundnorth of Jerusalem on 6 June.(U) On 7 June, Israeli units swept acrossthe Sinai to advance within eighteen miles of the SuezCanal in the nor th and reached toward the Mit la Passin th e south. Other Israeli forces captured Ash Sharmah at the entrance to th e Gulf of Aqaba, breakingthe blockade at the Strait of Tiran. Also on th e 7 th ,Israel gained control of the Gaza Strip plus th e WestBank of t he Jordan River. The Jo rd an ian army andaccompanying Iraqi units were defeated.(D) The United Nations cal led for a ceasefire. Israel accepted provided th e other belligerentscompl ied. On 7 June, Jordan agreed to the cease-fire,but the UA.R. rejected it. The following day (8 June),however, both the D.A.R. and Syria accepted thecease-f ire. At approximately 1400 hours this samedate th e US.S. Liberty was attacked.(D) On 9 June, following an Israeli chargethat Syria had violated th e cease-fire, Israeli troopsand armored forces smashed deep into Syria. By th etime both sides agreed, on 10 June, to observe th eUN. cease-fire, the ent ir e sou thwestern corner ofSyria was in Israeli hands, including th e Golan Heightswhich dominated Israeli territory in the Jordan Valleyand around th e Sea of Galilee.

r1.4I

)I/:j[:

IIIII

IIANBfJE \"lA Cer-HN'f' CIIANNEfJS el\TfJ\' SBCRfi'f 3


12/83

SBURBT(8 eeO) On th is same day, when th e Sovietrepresentative to the U.N. threatened direct Sovietintervention if th e Security Council did not halt thefighting, NSA extended Bravo "Crayon" to Soviet

L . . _ ~ . .. .J targets. A cease-fi re, negoti-ated by th e U.N. , finally went into effect and allhostilities ceased at 1830 hours Mid-Eas t t ime onSaturday, 10 June 1967.

NotesSource documents are in the "Cris is Col lect ion" of the NSA HistoryCollection.

'(V) Theodore Draper. Israel and World Pol it ics.Viking Press, New York, 1968, p, 35.' (V) Hal Kosut, editor. Israel and the Arabs: The

June 1967 War. Facts on File, New York, 1968, p. 32.

EO 1. 4l(U) Charle,.W;Ollt, "The Arab-Israeli War; Howit Began," Foreign.Atiairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968), p. 310.'lUi The United Arab Republic was formed in 1958with the union of Egypt and Syria and then dissolved in September1961. Even though the union was dissolved, Egypt was still referredto as the V.A.R. until 2 September 1971 when the name waschanged to the Arab Republ ic of Egypt. In this his tory V.A.R. isused throughout to mean Egypt.'(U) Ibid, p. 306.'(e eee) NSA (P2) , "Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon

Critique," Serial: P2/00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8.' (V) Ibid.' (V) Ibid.9(V) Ibid.IO(V) Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War; How

I t Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968), p. 319.1'(8 SSe) NSA (P2), "Sigint Readiness Bravo CrayonCritique," Serial: P2I00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8." (V) Ibid.Il(V) Ibid, p. 9." (V) Ibid.15(U) Ibid.

4 SBURBT I I ~ B L B VIAOOMIN'f OH....NNBLS ONI.


13/83

'fOP BECKE'f

Chapter II

Considerations Leading to the Ship's Deployment (U)

Looking back upon the Liberty incit today, Americans might well question why the. introduced an intelligence ship into a war theaterhich Americans were not direct participants and

that ship to the risk it did. The decision toloy, it should be noted, came before the Six Dayr erupted. It came after careful NSA considerationcustomer requirements for intelligence from thisbled region, of t echnical factors which would

the collection of Middle East communications,of the need to develop technical Sigint data inevent future U.S. involvement in Middle Eastilities should bring a requirement to support U.S.

The NSA decision to request the Liberty'sloyment on 23 May, the day it raised its Sigintiness condition to Bravo-Crayon, was, moreover,one of many actions taken to improve Sigintection, processing, and reporting in the criticals before the Six Day War as the NSA actione, G6, began a round-the-clock Sigint operation att Meade. Ie Requirements for Intelligence (U)

The long-standing Middle East tensionproduced a growing requirement from U.S. intelnce users for information on a number of military

(8 CeO) I

(CPS GGO) In late May-early June 1967, whilesti ll focusing for the most part on the U.A.R. theintelligence requirements took on a sense of urgency.

hltelligElnceusers define, of course, thecategories of information they need from Sigint, andit is up to the Sigint specialists to translate theirrequirements into meaningful, responsive collectionand processing actions. In so doing, these specialistshad to take into their calculations some I

EO 1 .4

ElO 1 .4EO 1. 4

1. 4. (

IIA-NBt.e ViA C6M1N'f CIIA-NNet.S 6Nt.\" 'FOP SBSRH'F 5


14/83

TOP SECRET . ~ 1 . 4 .~ 1 . 4 .

"EO 1 .BD l .(Figure isBlfJefilfJ'I' eeBj~ ( J ( J O ) I - - - - - " 7 F i ; ; ; ; : ; ~ e ; ; ; ; : : : e E ; e : ; : _ - - - - - - ~

Technical Collection Factors (U)(B eeo) u . s ~ IcOllec-tion of Middle East commumcahons had developedover the years in response to intelligence requirementsarising out of one crisis s ituat ion after another. Inplace at the time of the Six Day War ~ d / t h edeployment of the Liberty were ground-rsites andairborne collectors for the Middle East communications which were likely to yield.atIeast a part of theinformation specified in tl:le/requirements.('1'8-006) AtU;Sr Igrounds i t e ~ ~ r t t e r c e p t positions, according to a post-Liberty NsA review/ were on hand primarily forMiddle East communications. Almost one half of thiscoverage was on communications of the U.A.R.

('t'B eOO) For collection of VHF and UHF communications, the U.S. dependedon USN and USAF mobile, airborne collectors.

Ll ,SaeeO)tqJS 660)I = - - - _ ~ _

6 TOP SEORH'F IIkNBfltl ViACOMIN" CIIA-NNtlflS ONt.." EO 1 . 4 . (c)EO 1 . 4 . (d )


15/83

. Ie

.4 . IEO . 4 . I

OP SECRET UPtIBRA-

- -I I"

J I -.J

I L --.J,

i

'EO .4

Ii/

(Figure .i. 'P8P 8 B e ~ l i J r p eeB X17

N8F81tN TOP SECRET UMBR2\ 7


16/83

TOP SHCRHT

ls, ~ --- 1

....

. 4 . (d )

I( ~ eeO) Inte rcept assignments as of 8 June1967 at the U.S. stations illustrate the varied natureof the collection missions.

1 . 4. (c )

(C CCO) Intelligence and Security. Command(INSCOM) manual-morse positions I II I(Photograph courtesy of INSCOM.)(Figure is e " ' 1 " : l " 2 l l i ~ W T ' 1 l ' 1 : l : - e e " "

. ~ ~ I

1WI

,1 . 4.

8 TOP SHCRHT IIkNBItB ViA e9M1N'F UIIANNIL8 ONL


17/83

TOP SECRET UMBftA

...................

1 .............................II .........

18r

(0 (00) u.s. Army Sigint a n a l Y 8 t ~( P h o t o g r a p : : t ' h - : : : c ~ o u : : ; r t = e t I : : : - y ':


18/83

'fOP SECRE'f Ur.IBRA

I

I(S 0 0 0 ) I

110(CPS 0 0 0 NF)

if3Q.J-. 4 . (c )

U . S ~ l n t e r c e p t o f VHF jUHFCommunicatibns (U)

(S 0 0 0 ) Since normal reception ofVHF/UHcommunications depends onaline-of-sight relationshibetween receiver and transmitter..... ... successful collection of VHF/UHF communicat ions depended on intercept by l I sitelocated n ea r t he t ra ns mi tt er s a nd by airborne collectors which could fly orbits in their . vicinity. Close-iintercept facilities located preferably within groundwave distance of transmitters were also a prerequisitto effective intercept of low-powered Hcommunications.

iSet- Sigint collectors ha d gradual ly increased their knowledge of Middle East VHF/UHcommunications. HF communications occasionally referred to other communications in th e VHF/UHmodes.I

I


19/83

( ~ 000 nF)

( ~ S O ~ , F ) I

IThe U.A.R. had usedU.S.S.R. mil itary radio equipment from 1960, muchof which came with aircraft, tanks, and radar s theU.S.S.R. provided the U.A:R.I

( ~ 000 ~ W

ffS OOO-fo(F'

!EO 1 . 4 . (c )'fOP SECItE'f UMBItA

1"---- _Electrical communications betweenINSCOM detachments and the ir parent INSCOMorganization, the U.S. Army Communications SupportUnit, as well as their communications with NSA, were

via U.S. Army Strategic Communications Commandfacilities, off-line, and encrypted on KL-7A equipmentusing the Adonis system (KAK-199).( ~ 000)

Mobile airborne collectors in orbits off the coast~ ~ of the U.A.R. and Israel had somewhat greaterflexibility. 12Airborne Collectors (U)

('I'S 000) The major part of the U.S. VHF/UHFcollection came from Navy EC-121 and Air Force C130 flights out of Athens on intercept missions largelyspecified by NSA. Prior to 23 May, U.S. AirborneCollection Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) C-130sflew some eight sorties a month in the eastern Medi-terraQean,1 II 'The EC-121 aircraft were also flying about eight sorties amonth in the eastern Mediterranean for both Comintand Elint intercept and another eight sort ies a monthI I(S-OOO' After 23 May, when NSA declared aSigint Readiness Bravo condition, C-130s flew dailyflights with NSA-specified intercept missions. Therequirement for daily flights resulted in a reduction ofsorties1 pd the reassignment of oneC-130 I EC-121s also began daily,and after the outbreak of war twice-daily, flights intothe eas tern Mediter ranean in direct support of theU.S. Sixth Fleet. At NSA's suggestion, the U.S. Navyrescheduled its flights so that they would complementtheC-130 flights, the C-130s flying during the morninghours commencing at 0300Z and the EC-121 aircraftdeparting at 08;..;;.O;..;O;.;;;Z;.;.' ----,(tpS 000)

'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA 11EO 1 . 4 . ( c )


20/83

tFOP SBRBtF Ul\IBRA

ILEBANON",,;",",-,) \,)ISRAEL y

-:..\..f

35

." )0'J 0 R,.D A-/N, . / ),

'f I SRAE L ')REPUBLIC

330

ARAB

32

UNITED

31

3 3 - t - - - ~ ; : : - - - - - - + - r = . . . . . . . . , ~ c . = , ; , ~ - - f - - - - - - ~ ' - - - - - - - + - ~ - - - - ~

3 2 + - - - - ~ - _ _ _ j r _ - - - - - - _ + _ - - _ _ _ _ i . _ - - _ 1 - - ~ ~ . . ! ! . . ! . ~ = _ _ _ + _ + + _ - - - - _ _ _ 1

~ eeo) After NSA declared a Sigint Readiness condition for the eastern Mediterranean, collectionflights of the EC-121 and C-130 aircraft were increased to once daily instead of the usual eight flights amonth.(Figure is eBN-FfBBN'PMfJ e e B ~

0 1 . 4 . (c )producingComint responsive to requirements, partie

I I h UAR d h tlar y those re ating' to t e . an to mere anshipping.I

......................

r4 ..............r13

The Decision to Deploy the Liberty (U)f f s e t During May and early June 1967, theU.Sc=JSi.gintorgllIlization performed moderatelywell with its existing groundancl air collection in12 tFOP SBCRBtF Ul\IBRA EO 1 . 4 . (c )EO 1 . 4 . (d )


21/83

EO 1 .4 . (e ) TOP SECRET UMBRA

...JThis kind of a response was, theynew, unlikely with the then available collectiop

000) NSA considered the categories of MidEast communications for which the existing collecon organization was either inadequate or for whichoffered small promise for sustained intercept.

Sigintllection managers concluded that the then existingllection organization would be able, at best, only toake a moderate response to many of the intelligencequirements in view of technical l imitations in thellection of VHF/UHF communications.000) In the case of the airborne collectors,e Sigint planners felt that the average orbit t ime ofe C-130s and EC-121s - about five hours on stationallowing for time to and from orbit areas - waso short for the sustained collection desired.U) Expansion of airborne collection waspossibility, but additional aircraft in sufficient numers would be difficult to obtain, and there was thensideration of downtime for maintenance which/forcraft was greater than for othy Platforms.iS

~ GGO ~ l F ) In the case of the sites, Sigintanners considered their fixed locations and thesulting confinement of their VHF/UHF intercept tone-of-sight distances from those locations. They also

anticipated that, in the event of war, certain

Arab countries would break diplomatic relations withthe U.S. and that,'

~ ~ 000) For consistent, close-in intercept, Sigin t specialists decided that th e assignment of a collection ship to work..offshore from the U.A.R. was inorder. It was/natural that they would decide uponshipbomecollection. A technical research ship (TRS)was, according to one estimate at the time, theequivalent of 13 airborne collectors and, besides that,was more economical to operate than the airbornecollectors.'? In addition to tasks such as susta inedcollection as in the case of U.S.N.S. Mulleroff the shore of CubaL- ----' the special ships wereprepared by design for quick reaction to exigencies ofone kind or another."(8 000) Choice of a ship for the Mediterraneannarrowed between the U.S.N.S. Valdez I Ithen near Gibraltar, and th e Liberty in port atAbidjan, Ivory C 0 8 : s t ~ NSA chose the Liberty becauseshe had superior speed (18 knots vs. 8 knots forValdez), because her VHF/UHF multichannel collection capability was better, and because she was, unlikeValdez, at the beginning of a deployment;'? NSAaccordingly requested the Joint ChiefsofStaffiJointReconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) on 23 May 1967 todivert the Liberty to the Mediterranean.

NotesSource documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the NSA HistoryCollection.

leu) NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," undated.'(S Ssel NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint Readiness BravoCrayon," 10 July 1968, pp, 31-47, hereafter cited "Critique-SRBCrayon" and NSA Staff, "Report to the Director, NSA: U.S.S.Liberty CAGTR-5), 23 May-8 June 1967," 12 June 1967, pp. 1-4,hereafter cited "Report to the Director, NSA."'cU) "Report to the Director, NSA," p. 1.'eseee) Informal information from NSA Staff Officer,Clarence Toomerl rSigintreIations{Jurie1980):

'CUI NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.16 Jun 1967.

'CU) NSA (G62), "Briefing on 1967 Middle EastCrisis," undated document; "Report to the Director, NSA," Tab C.

EO 1 .EO 1 .

EO 1 . 4. (e

EQ 1 .EO 1 .

NOFORN TOP SECRET UMBRA 13

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~


22/83

'(UJ John R. Rasmuson, A History of KagnewStation and American Forces in Eritrea, 25 May 1973.

8(U) Kagnew Station, Office of Operations, AnnualHistorical Report, FY 1967, vol, IT ; "CritiQue-SRB Crayon," pp,11-12, 20.

9(UJ NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca.16 Jun 1967; "Critique-SRB Crayon," pp. 20, 37.

lO(UJ Electronic Security Command, History of the6931st Security Group, 1 Jan-30 Jun 1967, pp. 8-9, 16, eo-sa, 78,86, 92; "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 21.

Il(UJ Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Re-search Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970; Interview with GeneSheck, 11 Aug 1980, p. 5.

l"fet- U.S. Army Communications Support Unit,Annua l Historical Report , FY 1967, vol. I, 1 Oct 1967; (UJ"CritiQue-SRB Crayon," pp. 12-14; (UJ "Report to the Director,NSA," Tabs A and B.

14 CONPIBHN'fIAL

13(UJ NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the MiEast," undated; NSA Staff, "Operat ions Staff Summary," caJun 1967; "Report to the Director, NSA," p, 2; "Critique-Crayon," pp. 17-18.

I4(UJ NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary,"16 Jun 1967.

I5(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DffiNSA,"dated; "Repo rt to the Director, NSA," Tab A; "Critique-Crayon," pp. 16-17. Interview with Gene Sheck, 11 Aug 1980, pl U.S. Army Communications Support UAnnual Historical Report. FY 1967, vol. I; (UJ "Critique-Crayon," pp. 12-14.

lJ(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DffiNSundated.

I8(UJ Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technicalsearch Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970.

I9(UJ "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 18.


23/83

SHRET SPOKE

Chapter III

Deployment to the Mediterranean (U)

With Sigint unit USN-855 on board,U.S.S. Liberty had been in operation for two years

d four months when NSA sen t its message to theS asking for deployment of th e Liberty to thediterranean. During th is time it had under taken" , ,". ,ate mi"ion, off the ~ , ,oo,t 0; : : ~ ' ~ Jexecuted a number of difficult tasks locating,0mmunioatioD,j I

Other US. Sigint ships at th is timethe U.S.S. Oxford and Jamestown in South

st Asia, the US.S. Georgetown and Belmont inuth America, th e US.N.S. Muller off Cuba, ande U.S.N.S. Valdez en route to the US. from the

I

u.s.s. L j h e r t . r ~ Modus Operandi (U)us. reconnaissance operations came

the purview of the J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff. ADirector for Reconnaissance assisted th e J-3

the exercise of operational control over reconnaisnce activities of the unified and specified commands.

Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) worked fore Deputy Director for Reconnaissance and hadority over U.S. reconnaissance operations. NSA

d a representative to th e Joint Reconnaissancenter, Mr. John Connell.

In 1965 th e JCS had given generalidance on th e conduct of technical research shipRS) operations. Operational control of th e ships wasbe effected by unified and specified commanders

"through th e naval component commander to a specificfleet or force commander." In May 1967, the US. S.Liberty, an auxiliary general technical research ship(AGTR) was operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The TRS commanding officer was Commander William L. McGonagle.(8-CeO) The JCS also specified that technicalcontrol of Sigint activities \Vasto be exercised by theDirector, NationafBecurity Agency via direct communication to th e ships or through th e Director, NavalSecurity Group. A collection assignment, the JCSstated further in it s 1965 message, would take intoaccount technical factors as determined by NSA andsafety factors as determined by military operationalcommanders.(C-CCO) Liberty's Sigint detachment, USN-855,therefore, came under the technical con trol of theDirector, NSA and under the management control ofthe Director, Naval Secur ity Group. On board theLiberty, the Sigint detachment was known as the"Research Department." Its space below decks wascompartmented with access permitted only to staffhaving the proper clearances. Commanding officer ofthe Research Department was Lieutenant CommanderDavid E. Lewis. The ship's Captain, CommanderMcGonagle, had th e clearances needed for access tothe Research Department, visited th e departmentdaily , received brief ings, and reviewed the "specialtraffic" available there.(C-CCO) Paddy E. Rhodes, during an interview,described the area of the Liberty which housed USN855: "The research spaces had really three decks. Onth e lowest deck we had a training room and a fanroom. The next deck was the R Branch (collection)spaces, the 0 Branch (communications) spaces, andprocessing and reporting. The one above it was TBranch (other than morse signals)."

SECRET SPOKE 15

"11:0 1 . 4


24/83

-_ ~ _ o = - - - _ -

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) A small portion of the antenna configuration of the U.S.S. Liberty included:(34) Discone antenna(35) Monocone antenna(36) ECM antenna(41) VHF-receive antenna(42) 35' whip antenna

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

(11) Long-wire VLF/LF antenna(12) ECM antenna(27) 10' whip antenna(32) ECM antenna(33) ECM antenna

1t' Typical of communications arrange-ments of th e AGTR class, th e Liberty had circuits forth e ship's command in one locat ion and those for it sSigint detachment in a separate location. Liberty'snaval communications station, which served th e command, had a "receive" terminal for fleet broadcasts,three circuits for on-line ship/shore radiotelephone andvoice communications, and one additional orderwirefull-duplex circuit. In a separate location, USN-855had an on-line , ful l-duplex radiotelephone circuit, asecure one-channel moon-relay system - technicalre se arc h ship special communications system(TRSSCOMM) - and a "receive-only" terminal forfleet broadcasts. In case of need several off-line encryption devices were also available.

(0 000) Sigint collection positions included ofor direction finding, 17 for radiotelephone, 20manual morse, 7 for automatic morse, 7 for electrocountermeasures, and 33 for nonmorse search adevelopment, th e latter for frequencies both aboand below 30 Mhz.(U) Perhaps th e most visible technifeature of th e ship was its antennas, some 45 in al. (U) Not so visible was, however, th e shiarmament, which was minimal - four .50-calimachine guns, 2 forward and 2 aft, one Brownautomatic rifle, and a number of small arms.?

16 CONFIBBNHl.J. H A H l n . J ~ V:IA C O ~ H H T CIIAHHBJ;.S OHJ;.Y


25/83

Abidjan to Rota, 24-31 May 1967 (U)(0 000) The TRS was at Abidjan, Ivory Coast,at the end of May on its fifth African cruise when, inresponse to NSA's message on 23 May, the JCS/JRC,with approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense,directed movement of the ship to the eastern Mediterranean via Rota , Spain, and requested the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic to change operational control of the ship to th e Commander-in-Chief, Europeupon it s arrival at Rota.: ' At th e time, the Libertywas under the operational control of the Commander,Service Squadron 8, a component of the Commanderin-Chief, Atlantic, and on 24 May the Commander,Service Squadron 8 issued sailing orders to the Liberty,with information copies to Commander, Sixth Fleetand others, d irec ting the ship to move at once toRota. 4 The Liberty departed Abidjan at 0530Z, 24May, with estimated time of arrival in Rota, 31 May.s

Lihertyat Rota,31 May to 2 June 1967 (U)(V) When the Liberty arrived at Rota on31 May, it came under the operational control of theV.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Gen. L.L. Lemnitzer) who turned over control to the Commander-inChief, U.S. Navy Europe." While delegating his control, General Lemnitzer still wanted operational information on the ship's progress and asked on 1 Junethat situation reports (Sitreps) and planned intendedmovement (Pim) reports from the Liberty arrive athis headquarters daily and that any incidents bereported as soon as possible in accordance wi th theexisting reconnaissance reporting instructions.7to-CCO) After taking control, Admiral John S.McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe,directed the Liberty to send to his headquarters dailySitreps and position reports and in those reports toinclude the Pim for the next 24 hours and anycomments on status of the ship. He directed theLiberty to depart for the eastern Mediterranean whenready, provided guidelines for it s staying within international waters, and asked for adherence to established communications procedures for the region. NSAalso received the situation repor ts being required byCommander-in-Chief, Europe and Commander-inChief, V.S. Navy Europe and used these, along withship posit ions given in Liberty's daily informal technical summaries, to plot on a routine basis the courseof the Liberty. 8(U) At Rota, the Liberty prepared for itsdeployment to the eastern Mediterranean, taking on. ,

SHCRHT SPOKHprovisrons and fuel, acquiring the military documentation necessary for it s assignment to Commander-inChief, U.S. Navy Europe and later to the U.S. SixthFleet, and repairing its TRSSCOMM which had afaulty hydraulic system.

Six Arabicl hinguistsjoined USN-855 for the expected work on V.A.& andI IcolIlmunications. Three of the Arab linguists, NSA civil ians.Allen M. Blue, Donald L.Blalock, and Robert L. Wilson;weJ,'e among the specialistswho came on board at Rota, theremllining linguistebeing Naval Secur ity Group special ist s. ThtaNSAlinguists brought with them selected technical material, I IAssigriri:lentof civilian linguists to work on board a U.S.Na.Vy shipwas not unusual. On TRS deployments along theAfricanI !coastlines, civilian linguists had worked alongside the military linguists, whoat times were not available in sufficient number forthe missions at hand.~ CCG) NSA action officers established a telecon with USN-855 (Lieutenant Commander D. E.Lewis and his assistant, Lieutenant Maury H. Bennett) on 1 June in order to confirm the arrival of thepersonnel, special equipment, and technical materialsneeded in the eastern Mediterraneen." In order toassist VSN-855's reporting and transcribing functions,NSA had previously arranl(ed withI

(S-CCO) To facilitate the planning for USN855's collection mission, Sigint managers had designated five operational areas numbered west to east inthe eastern Mediterranean near the coastline of theD.A.R., Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, each measuringabout 5Q-by-50 miles. In proposing the five operationalareas to the JCS, the Director, NSA had indicatedhis preference, based on wave propagation analysis ofD.A.R. communications, for operational area t hr ee(32:00-33:00N to 34:00E) if operational and safetyfactors did not dictate otherwise. 10 With the territoriall imits established by Middle East countries in mind,JCS subsequently directed the Commander-in-Chief,Europe to deploy the Liberty to operational area threewith closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya,and the U.A.R. of 13 nauti cal miles during transit.On arrival in operational area three, CPA was to be12.5 nm to the U.A.R. and 6.5 nm to Israel. II Actingupon the JCS message for Commander-in-Chief, Europe and after hearing from the Liberty th at it had

SHCRHT SPOKB 17

"EO 1.4:1

I!


26/83

SECRH'I'

(U) The Liberty docked in Rota, Spain, to be readied for deployment to the easterMediterranean. In Rota, the operational control of the Liberty was turned over to the U.SCommander-in-Chief, Europe, who in turn delegated the control to Admiral John S. McCaiJr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe.

(Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson.)(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

the intercept acquired directly from th eon t he ir r eturn to base. At th

L- ..1 was processing the intercepairborne collectors with NSA performing theprocessing on Arabic language materials andfull responsibility for processing of i n t e r c ecommunications. Courier time for delivery of

was 72 hours.

completed repairs to th e TRSSCOMM hydraulic system, Admiral McCain directed the Liberty to followthe schedule prescribed by JCS. 12 The Liberty thendeparted Rota on 2 June at 1230Z through the Straitof Gibraltar on a course paralleling the North Africancoastline.

Air Force Security Service's TechnicalProcessing Center (D)(8 GGO) While th e Liberty was enroute to Rotafrom Abidjan, NSA was arranging with the Air ForceSecurity Service (AFSS), now the Electronic SecurityCommand, for more expedit ious processing of Navy'sVQ-2 EC-121 and Air Force 's C-130 intercept, whichhad increased considerably from the now daily flightsoff the Israeli and U.A.R. coastline. The objective wasto establish a technical processing cen te r (TPC) for18 SHCRH'f IIkNBLB ViA eOr.HN'f elIANNBLS ONL\' 1 . 4. (c )


27/83

SECRET

Enroute to Operational Area Three (U)

EO 1 . 4 .

and 33 other addressees including the Commander,Six th Fleet that as of 000lZ, 7 June, th e Libertywould be guarding th e fleet broadcast from the NavalCommunications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia, whichserved th e eastern Mediterranean. In accordance withcustomary communications procedures, the Libertywould guard the fleet lJroadcast of the Naval Communications Station, Morocco, until it reached theeastern Mediterranean.(U) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. NavyEurope apprised Commander, Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral William 1. Martin, on 3 June, that the Liberty'smission was to conduct an "extended independentsurveillance operation in the eas tern Mediterraneair'and that Six th Fleet might be called upon to providelogistic and other support. 17(U) With th e outbreak of the war on 5June, th e Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe ina message to the Commander, Sixth Fleet and otherstook note of the movement of some 20 Soviet warshipswith supporting vessels and an estimated 8 or 9 Sovietsubmarines into th e eastern Mediterranean and Aegean and, along with other guidance,instructed ViceAdmiral Martin to keep his ships arid aircraft at least100 nm away from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria,Israel, and th e U.A.R. and a t least 25 nm away fromCyprus. 1M The Commander , Six th Fleet d irec ted hisunits to comply later/that day.19 Nei ther the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe nor the Commander, Six th .Fleet directives included specific instructions to.the U.S.S. Liberty.(0 GOO) Liberty was to the south of Italy whenthe Six Day War broke out. With th e war's inception,th e Liberty assumed a readiness condition, and USN855 began to keep abreast of events from NSA andfield s ite Sigint Readiness Crayon and o th er reportson the Middle East situation and, of course, from it sown intercept. ,0 Members of the USN-855 fel t someapprehension as they approached what they now knewto be a war zone; they appreciated perhaps more thanbefore th e need for general quarters drills, bu t theytook comfort from their noncombatant status and, ofcourse, the visibility of the flag. One USN-855 survivorrecal ls being told that" .. . if anything were to happenwe were wi thin ten minutes of ai r s tr ik e and help.None of us were very worried .... "21(0-000) While it was neither NSA's responsibility nor intention to adjudge the safety fac to rs ofthe Liberty's mission, in view of the outbreak ofhostilities, NSA's Gene Sheck and Dick Harvey d id

eeej When the TPC became operational onJune, the linguists, divided into four operationalfts, processed the tapes as they were brought intoe TPC compound from the aircraft, and the ana

issued their contents with a minimumf delay as Critics, Spots, electrigrams, or . in the

supplements to post-mission flight reports. 13

GGO) On 29 May in a message to USN-855,e D irec to r, NSA had outlined the mission for the

dur ing i ts voyage to the eastern Mediterrathe changing geographical and hearability con

erations to govern specific collection activity duringe trip. The Director, NSA des igna ted USN-855itions for search and development of Moroccan HF,

HF, UHF, and radioprinter communications andHF, VHF, and possible VHF multichannelmmunications. USN-855 was to forward by electrical

technical summaries of Moroccan andlgerian communicat ions to NSA, with informationpies going tol Ind courier delivery of tapes and traffic to NSA's

East Office, G6. 14Liberty's move into the Mediterranean

roceeded according to plan. It reported that itand passed three Soviet ships during its

through the Strait of Gibraltar;'? Followinge North African coastline, its collection positionsere on the prescribed Algerian and Moroccan comOrientation and training for the mainjec tive , U.A.R. communications, detracted somefrom performance on th e secondary Algerian and

assignments, bu t this was to be expected. 16) At 1330Z, 2 June the Liberty in

the Navy Movement Report Office in London

IGOO) I

I-

SECRET 19


28/83

'fOP SECRECf UMBRAask the NSA liaison officer to th e JCS/JRC, Mr. J.Connell, on 5 June if any consideration was beinggiven there to a change in th e Liberty's operationalarea. They reminded Connell that during th e 1962Cuban missile crisis five years earlier th e V.S.S.Oxford had been pulled back from the Havana area.The NSA concern was for th e technical collectionarrangements which would have to be adjusted if th eLiberty was to be withdrawn. The NSA liaison officerdiscussed the matter with JRC's ship-movement officerand then advised Sheck and Harvey that no ac tionwas then under consideration. 22(V ) On 6 June, as it was passing betweenLibya and Crete, the Liberty reported to Sixth Fleetthat its TRSSCOMM, which had had malfunctions inits power supply and hydraul ic systems on the tripfrom Rota, was again operating satisfactorily and, inreply to a Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europequery concerning Pims not being received, providedthe date-time group of Pims previously sent.VSN-855's communications on th e 6thto NSA were normal - it s 24-hour summary for 5Jun e, its informal technical summary no. 3, a SpotIreport, it s follow-up to Iand o ther reports all being received without communication difficulties. I t was also in satisfactory com-munication w i t ~ lin this period. 23(V ) On this same day, 6 June, the Commander -in-Chief , U.S. Navy Europe to ld th e Com-lmander, S ix th Flee t that th e Liberty was to comeunder his operational control at OOOl.Z, 7 June 1967in order "to facilitate area command and control andany possible requirement for protect ion during th eMiddle East hostilities" and pointed \.out that th eLiberty's schedule might be revised for safety reasons"as dictated by th e local situation. ,,24 Liberty acknowledged th e instructions concerning its operational con.trol at 2036Z on th e 6th. Liberty's commandingofficer, Commander McGonagle, also told\\ th e Commander, Sixth Fleet that th e ship was in a "ReadinessCondition Three-Modified" and reminded his superiorthat th e ship's "self-defense capability" was limitedto four .50-caliber machine guns and small arms.(V ) Three hours later the Commander,Sixth Fleet cautioned its new charge by message to"maintain a high state of vigilance against attack orthreat of attack" in view of the "unpredictability ofV.A.R. actions." He directed th e Liberty to report byFlash precedence any threatening actions o r r anydiversion from schedule necessitated by e x t ~ r n a fthreat" and to submit "reports of contact with ship$,aircraft, and submarines which are unidentified, df

intelligence interest, or engage in harassment." Admiral Martin also instructed th e Liberty to copy thfleet broadcast and to use his fas t car rier task forc(TF-60) tactical circuits if necessary." Liberty did noreceive, for one reason or another, this message. 26(V) On 7 June at 0800Z th e Liberty waoff the coast of the V.A.R. and approaching operational areas two and three . Despite th e ImmediatPrecedence assigned to th e Liberty's Sitrep/Posit report at 0908Z, 7 June, giving it s position at 0800Z a33-06N 28-54E, it took, according to a JCS postmotem report, some fifteen and one-half hours for thLiberty's position report to reach th e CommandeSixth Fleet, the action addressee.r ' Liberty was noguarding th e fleet broadcast of th e Naval Communcations Station, Asmara . On this day a number oactions were under way to minimize th e appearance oU.S. involvement in th e Middle East hostilities anto change th e Libert's 0 erational area.( ~ S C )

In a message to th e Commander, SixFleet, the JCS took note of new V.A.R. allegationpossibly derived in JCS's opinion from the V.A.R.I Ito the effect that U.S. personnwere in communication with Israel and were possibproviding military assistance. Equally concerned aboth e earlier U.A.R. allegations that U.S. aircraft haparticipated in th e Israeli air strikes against thU.A.R., th e JCS asked for assurance from Vice Admiral Martin that his aircraft were not within 20miles of th e U.A.R., Syria, or Israel and that therwere no Sixth Fleet communications or other contacwith Israel .19 The Commander, Sixth Fleet replienegatively, observing only that radio voice circuits habeen established with the American Embassy in TeAviv and that transmissions so far had only been fotesting purposes. 30(8 eeO) Studying th e successful Israeli drivinto V.A.R. territory, the Director, NSA decided thath e Liberty's opportunity for effect ive collect ion o

20 'FOP SECRB'F UM:BRA EO 1 . 4 . (c )


29/83

R. communications might best take place inarea two to the west of the originally

a re a t hr ee . The Director, NSA asked atthat the JCS/JRC change the Liberty's schedule

satisfy technical requirements." Since this requestthe JCS/JRC as th e latter was having secondabout th e Liberty, no action would be takenthe NSA request.

irections to Withdraw the Liherty (U)000) In view of the sensitivity regarding the.R. charges of U.S. complicity with Israel andowing a question from the US. Chief of Naval

about the wisdom of Liberty's assignmente war zone;" th e JCS/JRC made a new assessmentt he danger inherent in the Liberty's operations.considered the distance of th e Liberty from th eh Fleet , some 300 to 400 miles. After it learned

m NSA the degree to which the collection missionuld suffer if th e ship's CPA was changed;" JRCided to accept the mission degradation. At thee of these deliberations - 2300Z, 7 June - the

arrived on station in operational area three.In a message conveying the s ense of

then developing in the Pentagon staff, JCSressed concern in a message at 2230Z to Com

Europe over th e Middle East situaand stated that the JCS-directed operational areathe Liberty was "for guidance only" and could be

as local condit ions dictate." JCS also inthe Commander-in-Chief, Europe to change

A to th e U.A.R. to 20 nm , to Israel 15 nm. 33hough a copy of th e message was to have gone toLiberty, it would no t reach the ship prior to the

The Depar tmen t of Army Communicationster in error sent it to th e Naval Communicationsion in the Pacific. 34

Further deliberation within th e JCS/following discussions with the Chief of Naval

erations, who was press ing for a 100-mile CPA forLiberty, now resulted in a JCS dec is ion to moveLiberty well off the hostile shoreline. Contributinge decision, as JRC's Captain Merriwell VineyardN) told NSA's JRC representat ive, John Connell,on t he 7 th , was the desire of General Wheeler,

JCS, to support in any way th e US.taken a t th e UN. in answer to U.A.R. charges

omplicity. U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldbergstated on the 6th to th e Security Council thatSixth Fleet a ircraf t a re and have been several

miles from th e area of conflict."At 2350Z, one hour after the JCS had

its instructions restricting the Liberty to the 15-

CONPIDENTIAL20 nm CPA, JRC's Major Breedlove, skipping normalCommander-in-Chief, Europe channels, on Yocomcalled Commander-in-Chief, U.S . Navy Europe's command center to convey th e JCS/JRC decision and todirect that th e Liberty be moved back to a CPA of100 nm to the coasts of Israel, U.A.R., and Syria anda CPA of 25 nm to Cyprus. He indicated to LieutenantE. L. Galavotti, the operations duty officer there, thata confirming JCS message would follow. Breedloveexplained the urgency of t he mat te r "because time[was] getting short to where she will be in thoselimits." Galavotti said he would go to Sixth Fleet rightaway and had an appropriate message ready by080001Z for r el eas e by his superiors to Sixth Fleet.Some fourteen minutes after calling Commander-inChief , U.S. Navy Europe, Breedlove called the Commander-in-Chief, Europe JRC watch officer, informinghim of th e verbal request to NAVEUR and telling himthat NAVEUR had promised to take action. 35(U) Within the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.Navy Europe command center, an unfortunate delaytook place, however , in relaying this JCS/JRC instruction to the Sixth Fleet for act ion. Mindful that thisdirective had skipped channels and was only verbal,Galavotti's superior, Captain M. J. Hanley, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Navy Europe, directed thatthe message to Sixth Fleet not be released until th edate-time group of t he JCS confirming message was athand. NAVEUR policy allowed for acceptance of oralinstructions from higher headquarters to move shipsand aircraft only if given by flag or general officers orif firm evidence of a message directive were provided- for example, the date-t ime group of a confirmingmessage. Instead of releasing th e message, CaptainHanley told th e NAVEUR command center dutyofficer, Commander C. G. Jorgensen, to apprise Commander-in-Chief, Europe of the matter and ask thatheadquarters to obtain the dat e- time group of theconfirming JCS message. Jorgensen then called th eUS. European Command's (EUCOM) command dutyofficer at 080030Z, who indicated he would check andcall back. The JCS confirming message, JCS 08011OZwas, of course, not yet released at the time of th ecall. It s transmission by the Depar tment of ArmyCommunications Center in th e Pentagon to Commander-in-Chief, Europe was at 080211Z. 36(U) Not hearing from the highe r headquarters, Commander Jorgensen repeated his call at0325Z on 8 June to check again on the s ta tus of th eact ion and again asked EUCOM to obtain a date-timegroup, th is t ime speaking with a duty officer in theJRC sec tion of EUCOM, Lieutenant Colonel C. K.Russell. European Command's delay of three hours in

HAN"BLE VIA C01fHN'f CHANNELS ONLY COKPIDENTIAL 21


30/83

The Liberty would not receive th e critical message intime.

preparations on board th e D.S.S. America for a pressconference relating to the U.A.R. charge s of V.S.complicity with Israel in th e prosecution of th e warand to Sixth Fleet's need to transmit other traffic ofequal or higher precedence.r" Meanwhile Liberty was,of course, already in i ts ope ra tional a rea. I ts positionat 080800Z was within 30 nm of 31-45N 33-30E inarea three.(V ) When it rains, it pours, and therewould be even further delays in the a ttempts to getthe word to th e Liberty.(V ) JCS's investigating team, the U.S.Navy Court of Inquiry, and later a congressional staffgave close attention to the Six th Fleet message to th eLiberty, following the status of the message in thecritical hours before it came under attack. Essentially,the findings were these:

UNCLASSIFIEDresponding to NAVEUR had resulted from it s assumption, based on Breedlove' s call from th e JCS/JRC,that NAVEUR was already taking action. 37 Shortlythereafter, Russell was able to give Jorgensen therequired JCS date- time group, th e message havingjust arrived in th e EVCOM JRC duty officer's hands,bu t this was about th e same time as NAVEUR'sinformation copy of JCS 080110Z, the confirmingmessage, arrived in the NAVEUR command centeritself - the time, 0325Z, 8 June. A precious fourhours had gone by s ince Major Breedlove's call.(V ) Commander Jorgensen then asked fora telecon with Sixth Fleet's s ta ff duty officer and at080355Z was experiencing difficult ies in establishingcontact because of atmospheric conditions. He thenhad his radio operator contact Sixth Fleet lAy singles ideband radio and request th e telecon as soon aspossible. The two-way telecon with Sixth Fleet beganat 080410Z.(D) When th e Sixth Fleet staff duty officertold Jorgensen his command did not have JCS 080110Zas ye t (the Army Communications Center, Pentagon,having misrouted this message to Hawaii), Jorgensenpassed it to him three times before gaining an acknowledgement at 080440Z from the Sixth Fleet's dutyofficer, who was having difficulty in hearing NAVEUR.Jorgensen then sent a confi rming message: "FromCINCNAVEDR Command Duty Officer to COMSIXTHFLT Duty Officer. Be advised that JCS 0801lOZFORAC. Official msg follows."(V ) Ironically, the Sixth Fleet 's duty officer then indicated to Jorgensen that Sixth Fleet didno t hold reference (a) on the critical JCS message andasked for a copy. Since NAVEUR also was without acopy of the referenced message, despite both NAVEURand Six th Fleet's having been designated for infor mation copies (JCS 7337/072230Z), Jorgensen wouldobtain it from Commander-in-Chief, Europe and later ,on obtaining a copy, outline to the Six th Fleet 's dutyofficer i ts con tent s which had, by that time, beenovertaken by events.(D) From 080440Z June 67 it became th eCommander, Sixth Fleet's responsibility to direct theLiberty to a safer area of operations t han the one inwhich she was then steering. Vice Admiral Martin'smessage to the Liberty, directing it no t to approachth e coast of the D.A.R. , Syr ia , or Israel closer than100 nm, went ou t some four and one-half hours later,at 080917Z, the delay in this case being attributed to22 UNCLASSIFIED

Time0630Z, 8 June

0917Z1035Z

1050Z

1510Z

1525Z

StatusSixth Fleet Staff Duty Officer hadmessage ready for release by AssistantChief of Staff (Operations).Message released with ImmediatePrecedence.Message transmitted to th e NavalCommunications Station, Morocco,for relay to the Liberty, th e delaysowing to the transmission of equal orhigher precedence messages. Unawarethat the Liberty, pursuant to its instructions, was now guarding th e fleetbroadcast of the Naval Communications Station, Asmara, the SixthFleet routing clerk erred in sendingthis message to Morocco.Message received at the Naval Communications Station, Morocco, andpassed over Defense CommunicationsSystem to DCS station, Asmara.Through error, th e Asmara DCS station sent the message to th e NavalCommunications Station, Greece, at1238Z. The latter sent it back to theAsmara DCS station.Asmara DCS station delivered themessage to the Naval Communications Station.Naval Communications Station, Asmara, put the message on it s fleetbroadcast.


31/83

DIRNSA msg to VSN-855, 292201Z May 1967.Liberty msg, 022108Z Jun 1967.

The action messages directing withawal of the Liberty to a CPA of 100 nm were threenumber: JCS OBOllOZ, Sixth Fleet OB0917Z referredin the foregoing, and Commander-in-Chief, Europe's

to NAVEUR confirming informal exchangesaction on th e JCS message to NAVEUR. Infor

t ion copies of the JCS and the CINCEUR actionessages were to have gone to the U.S.S. Liberty,d it is, of course, entirely possible that timelyceipt of t he se might have triggered a withdrawalt ion on the part of the Liberty's Commander Me

But the same unkind fate guarding th e actionssages was also looking after the information copies.ese too ran into communications problems of one

ind or another, and the Liberty would no t receive39

Operational Area Three, 8 June (U)

eeO) Once on station off Port Said in operarea three , USN-855 employed its collectionorimarilv to develon U.A.R.I

Icommunications I

The Liberty had no speci fic ass ignent to intercept Israeli communications while it wasoperational a rea thr ee . Omission of this tasking

as, in part, owing to the lack of Hebrew linguists.ut on th e morning of 8 June i ts VHF search positionsd produce three tapes of Israeli ai r traffic. Thentents were, as determined later, routine operationalessages. As a by-product of searching for U.A.R.

unications in th e Sinai, USN-855 also identifiedme 22 f requencies as Israeli, bu t again there was

relatable in any way to the forthcoming

SECRETSPOKELihertys Processing Mission (U)

(8 eeO) On station in operational area three ,USN-855's processing and reporting constituted acomplex undertaking. I t was to provide dai ly technicalsummaries for use by other collectors and NSA,enabling them to remain up to date on the Liberty'soperation. Upon complet ion of it s deployment, USN-~ . . to ; : ~ V i d e t ,allie and unpwe". .d tap" tOI( e eeO) The war had changed th e status of theU.A.R.'s Armed Forces and had diminished significantly th e Liberty's opportunity to collect the specifiedcommunications. Much of the U.A.R. 's Air Force nolonger exis ted , i ts Army was in disarray, and communications had declined accordingly.

NotesSounedowmentsare'nthe"CrisisCollection"oftheNSAHistt;l,.yCullett/ofL

I (V ) Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Re-search Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970.

' (8-886) Source doc ument s used for informati on onLiberty's mode of operation include: NSA Station Facili ties Book V.S.S. Liberty (VSN-855); (V) NSA OPINS No. 2855, Manual ofU.S. Sigint Operations, 12 Mar 1965; (V) JCS message c ite no.5838, 052235Z Nov 65; and (U) NSA oral h is to ry int ervi ew withTerry L. McFarland on 23 Jun 1980.

' (V) JCS msg cite no. 6499, 291602Z May 1967.4(V) COMSERVRON 8 msg, 240020Z May 1967.' (V) Liberty msg, 241732Z May 1967.6(V) USCINCEUR msg, 300932Z May 1967.'(U) VSCINCEUR msg 010035Z Jun 1967.' (V) NSA Staff, "Informal Paper on Liberty's Com-

munications," 22 Jun 1967; NSA oral history interview with GeneSheck on 11 Aug 1980.

2(8 886) Source documents relating to Liberty's prepa-rations at Rota include: DIRNSA msg to NSAEUR Office, Germany,26 May 1967; DIRNSA msg to VSN-855, 252317Z May 1967; andDIRNSA msg, 232133Z May 1967.

10(V) DIRNSA msg to JCS/JRC, 292013Z May 1967." (V) JCS msg cite no. 6724, 011545Z Jun 1967.12(V) Liberty msg to CINCNAVEUR, 021132Z Jun

1967; CINCNAVEUR msg, 020717Z Jun 1967." (V) Source documents used in discussion of the Air

Force's TPC include: ESC, History of the 6931st Security Group,1 Jan-3D Jun 1967; NSA Staff , "Operations Staff Summary," ca.16 Jun 1967; NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the Middle East,"undated; NSA Staff (062), "Briefing on the 1967 Middle EastCrisis," undated.

I4(V)15(V)

SECRET SPOKE 23

EO 1 . 4 .EO 1 . 4 .

"EO 1 . 4


32/83

CONFIDENTIAL'"(U) NSA oral history interview, Terry L. Mc-

Farland, 23 Jun 1980."(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg 031016Z Jun 1967."(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msgs, 051352 and 051850Z

Jun 1967.'"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg, 052015 Jun 1967.,o(U) NSA oral history interview, Robert L. Wilson,

6 May 1980; DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 252317Z May 1967."(U) NSA 'oral his tory interviews with Robert L.

Wilson on 6 May 1980 and with Paddy E. Rhodes on 13 June 1980."(U) NSA Staff, "Report to the Director," 12 Jun

1967; House Appropriations Committee Surveys and InvestigationsStaff, A Report to the Commit te e on Appropriations - U.S. Houseof Representatives on the Effectiveness of the Worldwide Communications Systems and Networks of the Department of Defense,vol. I, p. iv, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," December 1967.

2'(U) NSA Staff, "Informal Paper on Liberty'sCommunications," 22 Jun 1967.

24(U) CINCNAVEUR msg to Sixth Fleet, Liberty,and others, 061357Z Jun 1967.

"(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg to Liberty and others,062349Z Jun 1967.

'"(U) MG J. R. Russ, USA, "Report of the JCS FactFinding Team-U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 Jun 1967," p. 17. Hereafter cited as the Russ Report.

"(U) Russ Repor t, p. 18.

"(U) NSA Staff (G62), "Briefing on the 1967 MidEast Crisis," undated.

'"(U) JCS msg cite no. 7239, 070259Z Jun 1967.'o(U) COMSIXTHFLT msgs to JCS, 070626Z

071503Z Jun 1967."(U) Russ Repor t, p. 19."(U) NSA Staff, "Report to the Director," 12

1967, chronology section."(U) JCS msg cite no. 7337 to CIN

EUR with information copy to Liberty, 072230Z Jun 1967."(U) Russ Repor t, pp. 35, 36."(U) Russ Repor t, p. 23; NAVEUR Continge

Watch Team, "Memorandum-U.S.S. Liberty Incident, " 121967; NSA Staff, "U.S.S. Liberty-Chronology, 23 May-8 Jun."

'"(U) Russ Report, p. 23 and Tab 2 to Annex D37(U) Ibid, p. 24.'"(U) Ibid, pp. 26-27.39(U) Detai led information on the communicat

delays is in the Russ Repor t and also in the House AppropriatiCommittee report c ited in footnote 22.

40(U) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 14I(S SSQ) NSA Staf f, "Note for the Director, Si

Reflection of Liberty Incident," 27 Jun 1967; (U) NSA St"Questions by Gen. Carroll , Director, DIA - Answers ProvidedG Group/PM," 27 Jun 1967.

4l(S SSQ) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 19NSA Staff, "Critique-SRB Crayon," 10 Jul 1968.

24 eONFIDBNCfIAL II /..NB"bB ';1/..GOMIN'I' GlIl.rNNB"bS ON"bY


33/83

CONPfDENTIAL

Chapter IV

The Attack (U)Thursday morning, 8 June 1967, found

Liberty cruising slowly in international waters onation as directed. At approximately 0830 hours (local

the Liberty notified th e Commander, Sixththat her position for the next 24 hours would be

thin 30 nautical miles of coordinates 31-45N andI The sea was calm and the clear sky permitted

ibility of ten miles; a light breeze ruffled th eensign. 2Liberty's projected course for that day

as to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the.A.R. coast at 31-27.2N, 34-00E (Point Alpha),ence to 31-22.3N, 33-42E (Point Bravo), thence to-31N, 33-00E (Point Charl ie) retracing thi s t racktil new orders were received. Normal steaming speedas to be five knots and typical steaming colors (whichdicated conditions were normal) were flown.3 Aondition of readiness three, modified" was set; i.e.,normal steaming watch, except that one man was

at each of th e forward two .50-cal iberchine guns, numbers 51 and 52. Lookouts on th eidge were designated to man machine guns 53 andjust af t of th e bridge, in the event of a surprise airsurface attack.") At about 0930 hours, it was possiblevisually s ight the minaret at Al 'Arish on th eA.R. coast. This was used as a navigat ional aid ande ship's position was verified as being within itsrating limits. There were no other conspicuous orstanding navigational features in the area."

Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U)) Shortly before 0900 hours (Iocal time),o delta-wing, single-engine je t a ircraft orbited the

three times at 31-27N, 34-00E. The planes'itude was estimated at 5,000 feet, at a di st ance ofproximately two miles. Liberty notified the Com

Sixth Fleet and others of this reconnaissance,that identification was unknown and that no

plifying report would be submitted. 6

(U) Later in th e morning, at 1056 hours,an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcarcrossed astern of the Liberty at a distance of aboutthree to five miles. The plane circled th e ship aroundthe starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship andheaded back toward the Sinai peninsula . This reconnaissance was repeated at approximately 30-minuteintervals. It was impossible to see any identifyingmarkings on the aircraft. The plane never approachedth e Liberty in a provocative manner and made noattempt to signal the ship. Nor did th e Libertyattempt to signal it. 7 Subsequent investigations of theattack on the Liberty identified th e aircraft as aFrench-built Noratlas NORD 2501, piloted by Israel iAir Force.-tet" Though this plane was unident if ied,th e thoughts of Robert L. Wilson (one of three NSAcivilians aboard th e Liberty) must have been sharedby his shipmates. Wilson remembered thinking whenhe saw the plane, that "it must be Is rael i becausewhat else is flying out here at this point in the warand also it's coming from th e direction of Israel andit's going back to Is rael , so it was obvious that it wasIsraeli . I didn't think much of it. They were just outthere checking us out. That's wha t I would do tOO.,,8(V ) Being sensitive to it s exposed andunprotected position, the Liberty reported to th eNaval Security Station Command, at approximately1100 hours, that she had destroyed all supersededMay publications (e.g. crypto documents) and intendedto des troy all i rregu lar ly superseded material dailybecause of the "current situation and shallow water inoperating area.""

General Quarters Drill (U)(V ) After the lunch hour, at 1310 hours,th e Liberty's crew was exercised at general quartersfor drill purposes for a mandatory noncompetitiveexercise to t rain t he crew in chemical-attack procedures. This was a rout ine ac tivi ty , part of the ship's

ONFIDfiN'fIAL 25

- -- -- ---------


34/83

SECRE'f

(U) The Dassault Mirage je t bomber of the type which attacked the Liberty on 8 June.(Photograph courtesy of Jane' s All the World' s Aircraft.)(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

training program established by the Commander, Service Force, Atlan tic F leet , and was not related to hermission in the eastern Mediterranean. The drill wasperformed satisfactorily and th e ship returned to her"modified condition three" at 1345. LO(U) Following the general quarters drill,th e Liberty's Commanding Officer, Commander Will iam L. McGonagle, fixed her position by radar asbeing 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret at Al'Arish, which was to th e southeast (bearing 1420 true.)

Air Attack Begins (U)(8 000) Amidships below deck, th e Liberty'sResearch Department (the Sigint collection, processing, and repor ting area) resumed normal operations .Robert L. Wilson was in th e analysis/reporting areatogether with th e other civilians, Allen M. Blue andDonald L. Blalock, plus th e Marine linguists. Thingshad been slow and Wilson considered going up on deckto do some sunbathing but changed his mind. Communications Technician (CT) Terry L. McFarland,seated at his manual-morse osition

That far below deck it was diffi-.. - ---Icult for anyone to hear much of what was happeningtopside.(U) During th e general quarters (GQ)drill, Lieutenant James G. O'Connor (Assistant Technical Operations Officer of the Research Department)had been officer of th e deck on the bridge. At th econclusion of th e drill, he went up to the 04 level(above the bridge) to see if he could locate th e

approaching airplanes that had been pickedradar by the lookouts. It was 1400 hours. Frostarboard wing of th e bridge, Commander McGobserved a single jet a ircraft that appeared simnot ident ical , to those that had been sightedin the day and about which a sighting report hasubmitted. The relative beari ng of this planabout 1350 , its position angle was about 450-5elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was aimately five to six miles from th e ship. I t appeMcGonagle that the plane was t rave ling paraand in the same direc tion as th e Liberty. Wbinoculars trained on th e aircraft, t he Comwas unaware of a second plane swooping in froport side to launch a rocket directed towabridge. When the rocket exploded two levels bebridge, McGonagle ordered th e general alarmsounded.

(U) CT3 Paddy E. (Dusty) Rhodheaded below decks from his GQ station, dcontrol detail. At the end of the GQ driCommander had ordered th e whaleboat engineand, when Dusty heard a muffled explosithought, "Those damned deck apes blew that band I've got to go back up and fight theSimultaneously, Dusty heard the general qalarm. Scampering back up th e ladder, he coulburning powder and started "dogging down"when a rocket tore through a bulkhead to hir ipping steel all about .

26 SHURHr:P IIANBI:JB ViA COMIN" CIIANNBI:JS ONI:J\"EO 1 . 4 . (c )


35/83

) Down in th e Research Department,ry McFarland, wearing his headphones, was vaely aware of flickers of l ight coming through th elkhead. He didn't realize that these were armor

tracer bullets slicing through th e Liberty'sTh e "f lickers" were accompanied by a strangethat sounded to Terry like chains being pulledth e bottom of th e ship. Next, he saw Seaman

ed" Addington race down th e ladder from aboveth blood running down his right leg from a wound inknee. "Somebody's up there shootin' at us," said. Nobody spoke, bu t Terry could see th e fear infaces abou t him. Someone ordered th e men torform emergency destruction, an d they turned toping classified material in th e weighted, whitenvas bags specially made for this purpose. Robert,

CONFIDENTIAL

L. Wilson went up to th e second deck from th eprocessing and reporting (P&R) spaces to empty safeson that upper level.(0 eeS) Hearing th e general quarters alarm,CT3 Clyde W. Way ra n from th e mess deck to hisstation in th e T-Branch spaces one deck above th e RBranch. Way plugged in his radio receivers and heardnothing; he called th e R2 area only to learn that theirreception ha d also gone dead.(U) Topside, one level above th e maindeck, th e exploding rocket ha d started a blazing firein two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed below th ebridge on the port side. McGonagle quickly orderedhis Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander PhilipM. Armstrong, to go down an d release th e gasolinecans. Lieutenant O'Connor joined th e Exec. Just as

(U) Starboard side of the Liberty, scorched by fire from exploding rockets that were launched by theIsraeli attack aircraft.(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

I12tNBtJE ViA COMlN'f CII2tNNELS ONLY CONfIDENTIAL 1:1


36/83

- - - - - - - - _ . _ - - ~ - - - - - - - _ .............._......_UNCLASSIFIEDboth reached th e top of the ladder to proceed down,a bomb hi t near th e whaleboat on th e starboard side,immediately af t of the bridge. Armstrong and O'Connorwere thrown back onto th e bridge and other personnelin the pilot-house were blown from their feet. McGonagle grabbed the engine order annunciator andrang up all head flank speed - an order for maximumspeed. At the same time, he ordered LieutenantMaurice H. Bennett to report to the Chief of NavalOperations (CNO) via th e high-command radio circuit(hicom) that th e Liberty was under attack by unidentified je t aircraft and required immediate assistance.This Flash message, giving the Liberty's position as33-25E, 31-23N, was received by the aircraft carrierV.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) and relayed to Commander,V.S. Naval Forces Europe; Commander , Sixth Fleet;and Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60).ll Liberty'st ransmission was not made without difficulty. Duringthe a tt ack and intermittently thereafter, the hicomvoice circuit was subjected to loud jamming regardlessof frequency. This electronic interference was described as a steady carrier without modulation.'?(V ) After being blown back onto the bridgefloor, Lieutentant O'Connor realized he had no feelingin his body from the waist down. To get out of th eway, he dragged himself into the combat informationcenter (CIC) behind the bridge, where several othershad also sought safety. Lying face down, O'Connorsoon noticed that there was a lot of blood on the floorand then realized it was his. About this t ime, EnsignO'Malley stepped into th e CIC and helped stopO'Connor's bleeding by stuffing a T-shirt into the holesin his back.(V ) A few moments after the bomb blaston th e starboard side, Commander McGonagle was hi tby flying shrapnel and knocked offhis feet, but, thoughshaken up, he remained on the bridge, totally incommand.(V ) For th e next five or six minutes, aircraft made criss-cross attacks on th e Liberty at aboutone-minute intervals, h it ti ng her with rockets andmachine-gun fire. A final count entered into th e Courtof Inquiry 's record, showed 821 separate hits on th eship's hull and superstructure. The attacking aircraftwere later identified as French-built Dassault Mirageje t fighters whose armament consi sted of two 30mmcannon, two 1,000-pound bombs, and four rocket pods(18 rockets each).(V ) During the first or second strafing run,th e ship's public-address system, the electrically powered intercom system, and most sound-powered phonecircuits were severed or destroyed.28 UNCLASSIFIED

(V ) In th e first minutes of th e ai r athe Liberty suffered a complete loss of externalmunicat ions because of bad ly damaged radio tmitting equipments and antenna systems. In spthis, emergency restoration of hicom voice capawas completed within minutes . All U.S.S. Lcommunications immediately thereafter were vihicom voice network."(V ) The coordinated strafing, rocketincendiary air attacks created three major fires tothat covered large areas of the Liberty with fand heavy smoke. Eight men were killed or diinjuries received during the a ir a ttack: two killmortally wounded on th e bridge, two killed at magun 51, one killed at machine gun 52, one diedwounds received on th e main deck starboard sidetwo died of wounds received on the 01 level porThroughout the topside area, 75 men hadwounded by shrapnel and shock of exploding roc(V) During this period, the Libertyually built up speed from five knots; her exactwas not known bu t it is doubt fu l that she exceedor 12 knots while under at tack.

Torpedo-Boat Attack (U)(V ) At about 1424 hours, look-outs sthree high-speed boats approaching th e Libertyth e northeast on a relative bearing of approxim1350 at a distance of about 15 miles. Theappeared to be in a wedge-type formation, sabout 150 to 200 yards apart, and closing in a torlaunch attitude at an estimated speed of 27knots. Commander McGonagle ordered a sai lorthe bridge to man the starboard gun and takboats under fire. Using the hicom circuit, th e Libradioman reported the approach of th e torpedoThis was received and relayed by th e V.S.S. Sarto Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe andCommander, Sixth Fleet. 14(V ) It was then that the Commandticed that th e Liberty's American flag had beedown. He immediately ordered a s ignalman tothe "holiday ensign" - the largest flag aboarproximately 7 x 13 feet) - from th e yardarmnormal flag halyard having been destroyed. Thesmoke from the burning whaleboat and o ther tfires in the vicinity of th e bridge.(V ) Commander McGonagle passeword, "Stand by for torpedo attack." He hecourse, since turning away from the boats wouldth e ship closer to land, and turning toward them

-----------------------------------


37/83

th e ship broadside toward the attackers, givingm a larger target.

When Robert L. Wilson heard theattack warning, he remembered one of the

men telling him to sit on the floor and brace hisagainst th e wall.In the processing and reporting area,

Terry McFarland was told to "tuck pant legs intor socks, button top collar, get rid of loose material,lie flat on floor and hold your head in your handsrotect your face."

When the motor torpedo boa ts wereoximately a mile away, th e center boat was seenhing a signal . l ight. Because of smoke and flames

e direction from which the boats were approachCommander McGonagle could not read th e signals,he saw what he believed to be an Israeli flag. Asair attack had knocked out the Liberty's starboardal light, he attempted to signal with a hand-helds lamp. This may not have been powerful enoughenetrate the smoke pouring from th e fires startedthe attackers. Believing that th e air attack mighte been in error , Commander McGonagle quicklyted to the starboard forward gun to withhold fire.gunner fired a short burst at the motor torpedots before he understood the CO's order. At thee t ime, though unattended, the af ter gun on theboard side opened fire: flames from th e burning

had ignited bullets in the gun and in the

) During the attack, severe damage wasne to one of the two forward area 50-calibern mounts.eee) Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, NSA.l(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIALammuni tion box, causing the gun to fire in thedirection of the attacking boats.(U) At this time, th e motor torpedo boatsopened fire with their gun mounts, killing th e Liberty'shelmsman. In a matter of seconds one torpedo crossedastern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time wasthen 1434 hours. A minute later, a second torpedos truck the ship on the starboard side, just forward ofthe bridge and a few fee t below the water line. Again,using the hicom net, the Liberty broadcast that theship had been torpedoed and was l ist ing badly. TheSaratoga picked up the transmission and relayed it tothe Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe and tothe Commander, Sixth Fleet. 15(U) To Lieutenant O'Connor, lying on thefloor of the combat information center, the torpedo'sdeafening explosion seemed to l if t th e ship r ight outof th e water, and when it settled back he thought itwas going to roll over.(V ) In th e Research Department whereth e torpedo struck, everything went black; oil anddebris were everywhere. Water rushed in and equipment fell over Terry McFarland, bu t he managed tokeep clear and make his way in the darkness to th eladder to go topside. When he got out there was abouta foot and a half of air space left.(U) CT Clyde W. Way was in T-Branchspaces above the processing and reporting area. Withth e explosion below, all equipment fell to the floor andsmoke poured from th e P&R hatch. Way startedpulling men out as they came up th e ladder. Therewas no panic. A Marine went down the ladder to helplocate men possibly trapped in th e water . As th e waterrose in the Research Department, Lieutenant MauriceBennett realized that he had to close t he hatch tocontain the flooding. Attempts to contact the Marinewho had gone back fai led, and Lieutenant Bennettreluctantly and sorrowfully ordered the hatch closed.McFarland and Way then went topside to help fightfires and attend the wounded.(U) The torpedo explosion had t orn a holein th e side of the ship that extended from a few feetabove the water line to below the turn of the bilge. Itwas shaped like a tea r-drop , and was 39 feet across atit s widest point. It s immediate effect was to flood allcompartments on two decks below the water line, fromframe 53 to f rame 66. These f rames suppor ted wate rtight bulkheads, and marked th e location of th eLiberty's Research Depar tmen t and store rooms.Twenty-f ive men died in these spaces some from th eblast, others drowned.(U) The torpedo hi t did not start a majorfire, probably because of the immediate flooding of th e

HANDLE ViA e6M1N'f etlANNELS 6NLY CONFIDENTIAL 29


38/83

UNCLASSIFIED

!LEBANON",.;,,----.) \,)ISRAEL y(',,---J"

" )"J 0 R,.O A,./N.. .:l

ISRAEL )REPUBLIC

33

ARA

attack on a sigint collector, the u.s. cryptologic series, nsa, 1981)

Documents