atlas of the world war ii - barnes & noble

8/14/2019 Atlas of the World War II - Barnes & Noble

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The Japanese Sweepthe Pacific

T2,- \>* & * f c: ., \*utV^

June 1942le of Midway

MIDWAY

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... Dawn, 7 December 1941Japanese carrier-borne

aircraft attack Pearl Harbor^^^^^^_^^^^^^_

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Below: Japan's empire-building was finally curtailed as a two-pronged Allied offensive from the east and southwest

forced a retreat. Below right: U S and British combined chiefs of staff discuss A Hied strategy.


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The Allies StrikeBack at Japan

A s US forces gained experience inthe challenging Pacific Theater,their leaders saw the necessity formounting two major lines of advanceagainst Japan. US Navy carrier forceswere strengthened for their essentialrole, amphibious assault capability wasincreased and a fleet train was created tosupply the fighting ships hundreds of miles from their bases. These units wereto advance toward Japan via the centralPacific islands.Test case for the 'island-hopping' strategy was Tarawa, whe re USforces fought one of the costliest battles intheir history in proportion to the num-bers engaged in November 1943. Threethousand US Marines were casualties,and only 17 of the 4000 Japanese defen-

ders were captured. An intensive study of this campaign helped the Americans toavoid their mistakes on Tarawa in subse-quent operations. They accepted the factthat the Japanese would have to beflushed out of their caves and bunkersone by one, using grenades, flamethrow-ers and anyth ing else that came to hand.

The other half of the Allied offens ivewas in the southwest Pacific, whereAmerican and Australian forces underGeneral Douglas MacArthu r made slowbut certain progress with massive sup-port from land-based aircraft. Australianforces had a strong vested interest in de-feating the Japanese, who were sure toattack their homeland if they could iso-late it from American support.


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The Defeat of NaziGermany

Germany's long retreat began in

1943; the Battle of Kursk in Julyof that year was the death knellfor hopes of victory in the east. Twomonths before, Italy had been knockedout of the war, a nd it was on ly a matter of time before the A llies would try to break into Fortress Europe. The German threatto the Atlantic supply routes was effec-tively nullified , and before the year was

out, US and British bombers were attac k-

ing both industrial targets and popula-tion centers within the Reich.By the midd le of 1944, after successful

massive Allied landings in Normandyand breakthroughs aimed at the Rhine,the comb ined might of US and Soviet in-dustry and armies had become over-whelming . Br i t i sh resources werestrained, bu t not to the breaking point. In

fact, Allied organization and equipment

were at their peak. The Germa ns, by con-trast, were drained in every area: men,money, armaments and leadership. Bythe time Allied forces converged on theElbe to link up with the Russians (Ap ril-May 1945), most German units were pre-pared to show the white flag. Town aftertown surrende red eagerly to the Allies inpreference to the feared Russians.


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Below left: The contraction and (below)inal defeat of Hitler's Germany.ight: Berlin lies in ruins, the target of ound-the-clock raids by British and US

bomber aircraft.


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Below: The reversal of Japanesesupremacy in the Pacific was confirmed bthe Allies' recapture of the Philippine s inearly 1945. De feat was then only a matter of months away.

Below right: A postwar view of thebusiness district of Kobe, showing thedamage caused by incendiary attack.


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Dissolution of theJapanese Empire

T he first real check to the Japanesecame with the Battle of the CoralSea, six months after Pearl Harbor.There US carriers commanded by RearAdmiral Frank 'Black-Jack' Fletcherdashed Japanese hopes of capturing PortMoresby, the key to New Guinea. Thebattle made history as the first naval en-gagement in which opposing ships neversighted each other - all fighting was doneby carrier-based planes. Both sides madeserious errors in this new form of war-fare, but many of these were corrected byUS forces in the subsequent Battle of Midway.

In this action, the island of Midwayserved as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'for Admiral Chester W Nimitz. BungledJapanese intelligence contributed to adisaster from which the Japanese Navywould not recover - the loss of every car-rier commanded by Admiral ChuichiNagumo. After Midway, the Japanesewould be incapable of supporting the far-

flung conquests so rapidly made in pre-ceding months.

To preclude a second Japanese attempton Port Moresby, the Americans deter-mined to seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal inthe Solomon Islands. It was a six-monthstruggle in which US forces gained addi-tional skills from day to day despiteheavy losses, and it set the tone for theduration of the Pacific War - a campaignthat moved steadily toward Japan byavoiding heavily garrisoned enemystrongholds and seizing weaker positionsto use as a springboard to the next Amer-ican objective.

General Matsuichi Ino summarizedafter the war: 'The Americans attackedand seized, with minimum losses, arelatively weak area, constructed air-fields, and then proceeded to cut supplylines . . . Our strongpoints were gradu-ally starved out.' It was a brilliant im-provisation on the theme of the indirectapproach.


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The JapaneseJuggernaut


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Previous page: The battleshipYamato fitting out at Kure, Japan, in!941. Above: Japan's occupied territories. R ight and far right: The Pe arl Harbor attacks in detail.

Above right: The magazine of the USdestroyer Shaw explodes during the raids


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Pearl Harbor

The Japanese strike force that

approached Pearl Harbor on 6 De-cember consisted of six fleet car-riers escorted by two battleships and twoheavy cruisers. Anchored in Pearl Har-bor were eight battleships of the USPacific Fleet, numerous destroyers andtenders, and submarines and minesweep-ers. The carriers Lexingtonand Saratogawere away on a supply mission to WakeIsland, which was fortunate for the fu-ture course of the war on the Allied side.

Rad io mon i to r ing o f i nc r ea sed

Japanese radio traffi c in the several dayspreceding the attack made it clear thatan operation was underway. All Pacificforces had been alerted, but those atPearl Harbor remained on a peacetimefooting despite the danger. Aircraft onthe several Oahu airfields were undis-persed, and ships were anchored in linewith many members of their crewsashore. Reconnaissance flights had notbeen increased above the average.

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The Japanese launched the first waveof their two-part air attack at 6:00 AM on7 December. A radar station reported in-coming planes at 7:00 AM , but this reportwas unaccountably ignored. An hour la-ter, torpedo bombers came in to attack the harbor as fighters began to strafe theairfields. Virtually all the US aircraftwere destroyed on the ground. In the har-bor, five of the eight battleships were hitimmediately; minutes later, West Virgi-nia was in flames and sinking, Oklahomahad capsized and California was badlydamaged. Arizona had exploded and

Nevada had to beach herself as she madefor the harbor entrance under fire fromthe second wave of the Japanese attack.Dive bombers and high-level bombershad joined the first aircraft contingent tocreate additional devastation.

By the time the second wave struck, USforces had rallied from the ini tial shock tooffer a more effective defense. At 9:45 AM ,Vice-Admiral Nagumo's aircraft re-turned to their carriers with loss of ninefighters, fifteen dive bombers and fivetorpedo bombers.

Had Admiral Nagumo launched anadditional attack against the harbor, hemight have destroyed the port facilitiesentirely and accounted for the absent air-craf t carriers as well. Instead, he chose towithdraw the strike force, from which hedispatched several units to attack WakeIsland (8 December). US Marines garri-soned there sank two Japanese des-troyers and held the island againststeady air and sea bombardment for twoweeks, until they were overwhelmed by aJapanese landing.


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Malaya

Lieutenant General TomoyukiYa m a s h i t a c o m m a n d e d t h e

Japanese Twenty-fifth Army in itswhirlwind invasion of Malaya. (December1941). In this campaign, which drove allhe way to Singapore and was described

by Winston Churchill as the worst disas-er in British military history, Yamashita

earned the nickname 'Tiger of Malaya.'His force consisted of three divisions sup-ported by 600 aircraft, as against Lieute-nant General A E Percival's two divisionswith some 150 aircraft.

Northern landings met little oppositionexcept at Kota Bharu, where TakumiForce, a regimental group, had to fight itsway ashore. Meanwhile, air attacks wipedout all but some 50 British planes.

A double advance south was led by theJapanese 5 Division, which grappledwith 11 Indian Division around Jitra on11 December. The defenders were pushedback steadily, as the Japanese GuardsDivision moved down the coast and 5 and18 Divisions progressed inland. Within70 days, Yam ashita's troops had overrunall of Malaya through a combination of super ior force, speed and surprise. Gener-al Percival was tricked by skill ful jungle-warfare tactics into believing that theJapanese force was vastly superior insize, and on 15 February 1942 he and hismen surrendered.

Above left: Aftermath of P earl Harbor,with USSDownes at left, USSCassin at right and USSPennsylvania at rear.Left: The garrison flag flies as HichamField burns.Right: The Japanese conquest ofMalaya,completed in January 1942.Below right: Singapore falls in February.Below: General Yamashita (foreground)surveys newly-conquered territory.


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The Fall of HongKong

Simultaneous with the Japanese in-vasion of the Malay Peninsula on 8December 1941 came the invasion

of Hong Kong, whose defenders werehopelessly outnumbered. Within 24hours they had been pushed back to theGindrinkers Line, which was breachedby the capture of Shing Mun Redoubt.The mainland then had to be evacuated,an operation which was completed on 13December. Five days later the Japanesecrossed Kowloon Bay on a wide front andcaptured more than half of Hong KongIsland. Fierce resistance continued untilseveral days before Christmas, but aftermost of the reservoirs were captured, thegarrison was forced to surrender on 25December.

A bove: British soldiers face captivity after the fall of Hong Kong.

Right: Hong Kong and the surroundingarea.

A bove: The Japanese take Hong Kong onChristmas Day 1941.Opposite top: The Japanese conquest of

Bataan, completed in April 1942.Opposite: The last US forces to hold out onCorregidor Island, south of Bataan, were

finally neutralized on the morning of 6 M ay.


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Victory in thePhilippines

In July 1941, when the Philippine

Army joined forces with the UnitedStates, General Douglas MacArthurwas made commander of US Forces in theFar East (USAFFE). His ten divisionsincluded some 19,000 American troopsand 160,000 Filipinos most of them illequipped and undertrained. There werealso 200 aircraft at his disposal. TheJapanese believed, with some justifica-tion, that their Fourteenth Army of twodivisions supported by 500 aircraft couldconquer the Philippine Islands.

Heavy air attacks struck US air baseson 8 December (the same day as PearlHarbor, but dated a day later by the In-

ternational Date Line). Word of the PearlHarbor disaster had impelled USAFFEto fly its bombers off Clark Field in themorning, but by the time of the middayattack, they were back on the groundwith their fighter escorts. Forty-eighthours of bombing against the airfieldsaccounted for the vast majority of USwarplanes and cleared the way forJapanese landings north of Luzon to seizethe bases at Vigan, Laoag and Tuguegar-ao. In the south, Legaspi was seized as abase from which to interdict seaborne USreinforcements.

The main Japanese landings were atLingayen Bay on 22 December, whencethe invaders broke out of their beachheadto advance against Manila. On 23 Decem-ber MacArthur announced his plan towithdraw to Bataan; five days later, hedeclared Manila an open city. By earlyJanuary, the Japanese were gainingground on the Bataan Peninsula, buttheir troops were overtaken by diseasethere and gained little ground for thenext two months.

On 12 March 1942, MacArthur wasflown out and replaced by LieutenantGeneral Jonathan Wainwright, whofrustrated several Japanese attempts toestablish beachheads behind US lines.Not until 3 April, after reinforcement bya fresh division, were the Japanese ableto launch their final offensive. Within aweek's time, they had penetrated so deep-ly that US forces were compelled to sur-render (7 April). The last Americantroops held out on Corregidor Island in asiege that ran from January until 5 May,when their artillery was almost entirelyknocked out by unceasing bombard-ments. On that day, Japanese troopslanded at Cavalry Point and establishedtheir beachhead. It was all over for the

time being in the Philippines.


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Left: Japanese landings on Luzon,December 1941.Above: Small Japanese field gun In actionduring theBataan campaign, April 1942.

Right: American prisoners of war under

guard by Japanese troops after thesurrender of Bataan.


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The Dutch E stIndies

T he oil and other resources of theDutch East Indies made them aprime target for occupation byJapan, which planned a three-part attack on the islands early in 1942. WesternForce, from Indochina and newly cap-tured Sarawak, would attack southernSumatra, Western Java, and North Bor-neo; Central Force would attack Borneofrom Davao; and Eastern Force would

jump off from the same point against theCelebes, Amboina, Timor, Bali and east-ern Java.

Defense of the islands was undertakenby a combined force of Allies in the South-west Pacific: American, British, Dutchand Australian (ABDA). General Archi-bald Wavell and his forces had more cour-age than support, which consisted largelyof a six-cruiser naval flotilla under DutchRear Admiral Karel Doorman. Theattacks began on 11 January 1942, andproceeded relentlessly from one objectiveto another in the weeks that followed.Naval engagements off Balikpapan (24January) and in the Lombok Straits (19-20 February) provided only a slight check to the Japanese advance. On 27 FebruaryAdmiral Doorman attacked the Eastern

Force convoy in the Java Sea, where bothDutch cruisers were sunk before theycould inflict any damage. In the after-math, HMS Exeter was also destroyed, aswere HMAS Perth and USS Houstonwhen they resisted the Western Force onthe following day - to some effect in termsof damage done. But on 1 March, theJapanese made their inevitable landingon Java, whose Allied defenders suc-cumbed a week later.

Above: Japan captures the East Indies

piecemeal, 1942. Right: A Japanese column in Burmacrosses a footbridge south ofMoulmein.Far right: The invasion of Burma wasaccomplished with lit tle Allied resistance.


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Burma Bows toJapan

The Japanese invasion of Burma be-

gan on 15 January 1942 with theoccupation of Victoria Point by adetachment of Fifteenth Army, whichmoved north to take Tavoy four days la-er. British defenses in Burma were

pathetically unprepared to resist theapanese invaders; only two brigades,

one Indian and one Burmese, were able tocounter the push toward Moulmein thatbegan on 20 January. The British werehen forced back from the town under

constant threat of being outflanked, androm this point on fought a series of de-aying actions all the way to Rangoon -he conduit for all British supplies andeinforcements. Air support from a singleRAF squadron and a squadron of Major

Claire Chennault's 'Flying Tigers' wasnsufficient to prevent the capture of

Rangoon on 8 March. The British garri-son there was very near ly cut off before itcould pull out. Meanwhile, LieutenantGeneral William Slim had taken com-mand of British ground forces, whileGeneral Harold Alexander had assumedoverall command of the deterioratingBritish defense. The Chinese Fifth andSixth Armies arrived to reinforce theAllies, but they fought erratically despitehe best efforts of American commander

General Joseph Stilwell. Throughout themonth of April, Allied forces were in con-inuous retreat from the Japanese, who

were now bring ing in reinforcements andair support from conquered Malaya. Bymid May they were in control of Burma.


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The Conquest of Sicily

When the Tunisian bridgehead

collapsed on 12 May 1943, a de-moralized Italy found herself inimminent danger of invasion. Seriousstrikes in industrial northern Italy hadalready warned both Mussolini and Hit-ler of the depth of national discontent. Ina meeting with Hitler on 7 April, Musso-lini tried - and failed - to persuade hisally to forget about Russia and concen-trate on Mediterranean defense. On 5May General von Rintelin reported to

Hitler that an Allied landing in Italywould probably have 'most unpleasantconsequences, in view of the prevailingatmosphere of fatalism.' Hitler remainedadamant about his doomed adventure onthe Eastern Front, which would finallycollapse in July at the Battle of Kursk.

Even as Russian and German tanksbattered each other in the Kursk Salient,the Allies launched their invasion of Ita-ly, which Churchill had described as 'the

soft underbel ly of the Axis.' Aerial bom-bardment from North Africa struck Axisairfields and communications centers inSicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, be-ginning in early June. Land forces for theinvasion comprised General George SPatton's US Seventh Army and GeneralBernard Montgomery's British EighthArmy; they were transported to Sicily ina fleet of 3000 vessels. Axis defense of Sicily was entrusted to the Italian Sixth

Army under General Alfredo Guzzoni,with strong German support.

On 10 July the Americans landed inSicily's Gulf of Gela, the British in theGulf of Syracuse. The landings were asurprise to the Italians, coming as theydid in poor weather that seemed to pre-clude air- or seaborne operations. Vigor-ous German counterattacks against theAmericans came from German divisionson 11-12 July, but Patton's force pressed

on toward the north coast, clearing west-ern Sicily by 23 July. Montgomery suf-fered a check at Catania, but smallamphibious operations allowed him tocontinue his advance to Messina, whichhe reached on 17 August. Meanwhile, theItalians, who had offered minimal resist-ance from the first, evacuated the island.The Germans were left to fight a rear-guard campaign until the Allied victoryof mid August.


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The PeninsularLandings

On 24 July 1943, Mussolini was

overthrown. His replacement,Marshal Ugo Cavallero, begansecret armistice talks with the Allies.Hitler suspected that the Italians weretrying to take themselves out of the warand sent German reinforcements intonorthern Italy to safeguard communica-tions. Field Marshal Albert Kesselringadvised him that an Allied landing inItaly could be expected soon after the con-quest of Sicily - probably on the Gulf of Salerno near Naples.

On 3 September, the day that thearmistice with Italy was signed, BritishEighth Army made a landing on the toe of Italy, at Reggio di Calabria - largely as adiversion. The main landing did takeplace at Salerno, on 9 September, afterthe secret armistice with Italy was madepublic. General Mark Clark's US FifthArmy, with British X Corps, secured onlyfour small beachheads in the face of awell-prepared German defense. Farthersouth, Montgomery was advancingthrough Calabria, and there had been asecond British landing at Tarante.

From 9 through 14 September, theFifth Army was in serious trouble atSalerno. German shells from the sur-rounding hills, followed by a powerfulattack on the 12th, almost cut the Alliesin half. Reinforcements arrived two dayslater, barely in time to salvage the opera-tion, and by 18 September Clark's forceshad consolidated the beachhead. WhenMontgomery's advance units arrived on16 September, Kesselring began to with-draw north to the Gustav Line, which ranalong the Rivers Garigliano and Sangro.The Allies pursued from both east andwest until 8 October, when a rest halt wascalled on the Volturno/Termoli Line. Theterrain grew increasingly rougher andthe weather more severe as the Alliedadvance resumed in mid October.

Previous page: US troops liberate Rome,June 1944.Left: Sicily falls to the Allies, 1943.A bove right: The main Allied landing inItaly was undertaken at Salerno byClark's U S Fifth Army.Right: A diversionary attack at Reggio diCalabria by the British Eighth Ar mypreceded the main attack, while a third landing was made at Taranto in the east.


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Allied Drive on theGustav Line

Below: Mussolini (left) an d Hitler coThe former s displacement by MarshalU go Cavallero on 24 July 1943 led to

Anglo-Italian armistice talks. Right: The Germans were less prepared to yield than their former allies, finallyestablishing the Gustav Line as 1943ended.

Fifth Army made a difficult crossing

of the Volturno, swollen by autu mnrains, beginning on 12 October1943. The roadless mountains north of the river posed even greater obstacles.On the east coast, Eighth Army forced apassage over the Trigno River, but theirprogress on both sides of the centralmountains was slowed by skillful Ger-man delaying tactics. Kesselring used

the time gained to complete the impress-

ive Gustav Line, which ran along the lineof the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, overthe central mountains and north of theSangro River to the Adriatic. GermanTenth Army held the line under GeneralHeinrich von Vietinghoff. The westernend was especially strong, as it was back-ed by the moun tains on either side of theLiri and by Cassino.

On 20 November US Fifth Army

attacked this strong sector, at a very highcost in casualties. Painful progressbrought Fifth Army almost as far as theRapido, but there it was halted at year'send by arctic weather conditions. Mont-gomery had forced the Sangro on 15November and broken through the lineeast of Lanciano. The British took Ortonaon 27 December.


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The Fight for MonteCassino

The ancient abbey of Monte Cassino

astride the Gustav Line was theobject of heavy fighting in the earlymonths of 1944. The Allies made a fron talassault on the almost impregnable posi-tion on 17 January, but a whole series of attacks failed to take it by storm. TheFrench Expeditionary Corps had joinedthe Allied forces in Italy, but they madeonly limited advances with very heavycasualties. The New Zealand Corps suf-fered similar repulses between 15 and 18February.

A long hiatus followed the first offen-sive, during which the Allies regroupedand reinforced for a new effort, launched11 M ay along a 20-mile front between thearea east of Cassino and the sea. TheBritish pushed over the Rapido but werethen contained by the Germans, TheAmericans broke through the GustavLine along the coast, only to be stopped atSanta Maria Infante. It was the FrenchExpeditionary Force that crossed theGarigliano and cut the German lines of communication; interdiction of Germansupplies to the point of starvation wasalso a factor. On 17 May Kesselring con-ceded the loss of this key position by awithdrawal. The historic abbey had beenriddled with tunn els and redoubts to pro-tect its defenders from heavy bombard-ment; it was reduced to rubble by thetime the Allies claimed it on 18 May, atthe cost of many lives.

Right: Initial Allied attempts to break theGustav Line at Cassino in early 1944 met

with failure.


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Right: Little remained intact after theabbey at Monte Cassino was finallyoverrun by the Allies on 18 May.Below: The second Allied offensive on theGustav Line was somewhat moresuccessful than its predecessor, pus hingthe Germans to the Fhrer-Senger line.


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Anzio and the Roadto Rome

The Allied landings at Anzio on 22

January 1944 were designed to re-lieve pressure on Cassino, but theresults were just the reverse: only theAllied success at Cassino allowed the USVI Corps to break out of its bungled posi-tion on the coast. Fifty thousand troopscame ashore under Major General JohnLucas, who made the fatal error of estab-lishing a beachhead rather than pressinginland so as to wait for his heavy artilleryand tanks. The Germans, under Macken-sen, seized this welcome opportunity topin down VI Corps at Anzio and massforces for a major counterattack on 16February. Not until the 19th was this

halted, to be followed by a state of siegethat would last until late May. Lucas wassoon replaced by Major General LuciusTruscott, but it was too late to retrievethe situation.

When the Allies finally broke the Gus-tav Line at Cassino, Clark's Fifth Armycould resume its advance northward. In-stead of swinging east in an effort to trapthe German Tenth Army, Clark opted forcapturing Rome - an important moralv ic tory, though hard ly necessarystrategically. The Germans were able todelay his troops at Velletri and Valmon-tone long enough to ensure the escape of virtuall y all their forces in the area. TheAllies finally entered Rome on 4 June1944, just two days before the invasion of France.

Right: The intention of the Anzio

operation was to cu t Germancommunications by landing behind their front line. Below: The Allies on the road toR ome.

Above left: Mount Vesuvius'symboliceruption failed to de ter B-25 bombers of the US 12th Air Force en route to Cassino.

Left: A second pall of smoke hangs over

the city and monastery as the bombs burst.


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The End in Italy

After Rome fell, the Allies forced

the Germans back to their last de-fense - the Gothic Line. The Ger-mans were now being reinforced from theBalkans and Germany, while Alliedtroops, aircraft and landing craft hadbeen drawn off to France. British EighthArmy reached the Gothic Line on 30August 1944 and attacked with consider-able success, but the Germans held com-man ding positions on the Gemmano andCoriano Ridges that slowed the advanceto Rimini until late September.

US Fif th Army had also brokenthrough, but the approach of winterfound Clark's exhausted forces short of their objective of Bologna. The Alliedadv ance did not resume unt il April 1945,by which time Clark had become com-mander of 15 Army Group. Reinforce-ments and new equipment had reachedhim during the winter, and he planned atwo-pronged offensive against Ferrara(Eigh th Army) and Bologna (F i f thA r m y ) .

The German Tenth Army, now underGeneral Herr, was surprised by the Brit-ish attack across Lake Como cchio, whichhad been covered by a major artillerybom bardm ent beginning on 9 April. TheBritish moved into the Argenta Gap andFifth Army, now led by Major GeneralL u c i u s Tr u s c o t t , b r o k e t h r o u g hLemelsen's German Fourteenth Armyinto the Po Valle y ( 20 April ). General vonVietinghoff, who had replaced Kessel-ring as overall commander in Italy, wasforced back to the left bank of the Po,leaving behind all his heavy weapons andarmor. The Fascist Ligurian Army haddisappeared without a trace, and Axisforces in Italy were out of the fight whe nBologna fell on 21 April. Vietinghoff signed the surrender of German forces inItaly on 29 April 1945.

Opposite top left: The unsuccessfulAnziolanding on 22 January 1944 which left both sides in a sie ge position.Aboveleft:A n Axis ammunition trainreceives a direct hit, March 1944.Left: Wehrmacht soldiers are marched into captivity north of Anzio.Top right: Breaking the Gothic Line,the final German defense in Italy.Above right: The Allies advance intoNorthern Italy.Right: US 105mm howitzers fire across

the Arno,August 1944.


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Battle of the CoralSea

After the Doolittle bombing raid on

Tokyo (18 April 1942), Japanesestrategists sought ways to extendtheir defense perimeter in Greater EastAsia. One of their options was to strikefrom Rabaul against Port Moresby, NewGuinea; extend their hold on the SolomonIslands; and isolate Australia from theUnited States. This task was assigned toa five-part force designated MO, undercommand of Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye.It comprised a Port Moresby InvasionGroup of eleven transports and attendantdestroyers; a smaller Tulagi InvasionGroup charged with setting up a seaplanebase on Tulagi in the southern Solomons;

a Covering Group under Rear AdmiralGoto that included the carrier Shoho; asmaller support group; and Vice AdmiralTakagi's Carrier Striking Force, includ-ing Shokaku and Zuikaku. The opera-tion's complexity suggests that no seriousopposition was expected from the Allies,but Admiral Nimitz, Commander inChief of the Pacific F leet, moved qu icklyto counter it. A hastily improvised Task Force of three components, including the

carriers Yorktown and Lexington, pre-pared to rendezvous in the Coral Sea on 4May. The Japanese attack came one dayearlier.

Tulagi was occupied without opposi-tion, after which the opponents lostseveral days seeking one another in vain.Then Vice-Admiral Frank Fletcher dis-patched British Rear-Admiral John Graceand his Task Force 44 to attack the PortMoresby Invasion Group (7 May). TheJapanese mistook this group for the mainAllied force and bombed it continuouslyuntil Grace made his escape by skillfulmaneuvering at the end of the day - not

without inflicting some damage in re-turn. Another Japanese error led to anattack on the tanker Neosho and the des-troyer Sims at the same time that themain Allied force, still undetected, con-verged on Goto's Covering Group andsank Shoho.

The Japanese had already ordered theinvasion transports to turn back, but nowthat Fletcher's position was known an airstrike was launched against his group on

the night of 7-8 May. Twenty-sevenJapanese planes took off, of which onlysix returned. Then Shokaku was attack-ed and disabled; a reciprocal Japanesestrike fatally damaged Lexingtonand putYorktownout of action. At no time in thebattle did opposing surface ships sightone another - a circumstance new to nav-al warfare, but soon to become familiar inthe Pacific Theater.

Tactically, the Battle of the Coral Seawas a draw: the Japanese lost moreplanes, the US more ships. Strategically- and morally it was a major US victorythat came when one was needed most.


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Battle of Mid wayPrevious page: The final dive of a stricken

Japanese bomber west of the Marianas Islands, June 1944-Opposite below: Coral Sea was the first naval battle fought without surfacevessels sighting each other.

Below: The complex Japanese plan of attack at Midway involved no less thaneight task forces.

Bottom: The battle took place north of Midway and ended in decisive defeat for the Japanese.

M idway was the turning point inthe Pacific War and a watershedin modern history. Having failedto gain their objectives in the Coral Seaoperations of early May 1942, theJapanese were determined to captureMidway as a base within striking dis-tance of Hawaii. The destruction of thePacific Fleet before US industry couldbuild it up again was recognized as a mat-ter of supreme urgency, besides whichthe occupation of Midway would elimin-ate the bombing threat to the home is-lands. The operation was scheduled for 4June 1942.

Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,architect of the Pearl Harbor attack,formed a complex plan involving eightseparate task forces, one of which was tomake a diversionary attack on the Aleu-tian Islands. Almost all of the Japanesesurface fleet would be involved - 162warships and auxiliaries, including fourfleet carriers and three light carrierscommanded by Admiral Nagumo.

Information - and the lack of it - play-ed a crucial role in the battle's outcome.Yamamoto believed that the carrierYorktown had been destroyed in the Cor-al Sea along with Lexington. In fact, thedamaged ship had been refitted for battleat Pearl Harbor in the incredibly shorttime of 48 hours. Nor did the Japaneserealize that the Americans had brokentheir fleet code: Nimitz was fully aware of their plans. Although he had only 76ships, three of them were fleet carriers -Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet, with atotal of 250 planes - whose presence waswholly unsuspected by the Japanese. Asa result, Nagumo sent out few recon-naissance flights, which could havewarned him of their presence.

Before dawn on 4 June, the Japanese

dispatched 108 bombers to Midway, re-serving 93 on deck armed for naval con-tingencies only with armor-piercingbombs and torpedoes. Many US planeswere destroyed on the ground in the firstattack, but those that survived took off tointercept the incoming bombers. Theywere largely destroyed by enemy Zeros,but they made a second strike imperativeand thereby gave their carriers thechance to attack Nagumo's fleet while itwas rearming with high-explosive andfragmentation bombs. When a Japanesereconnaissance plane finally reported de-tection of enemy carriers, Nagumo's

planes were unready to mount a defense.

The first few US carrier strikes inflictedlittle damage, but the decisive blowcaught all the newly armed Japaneseplanes on their flight decks waiting totake off. Five minutes later, three of thefour Japanese carriers were sinking.

Hiryu escaped immediate destructionand disabled Yorktown, but damage in-flicted on her by Enterprise was so severethat she had to be scuttled the followingday. It was the end of Japanese navalsupremacy in the Pacific.


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Guadalcanal and theSolomon Islands

Prior to 1942, few Americans had

ever heard of those far-flung is-lands whose names would becomeso familiar during the war years nameslike Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Guadalcan-al. Japanese forces waged a six-monthbattle for this island in the southern Solo-mons with US Marines who landed thereon 7-8 August 1942. Their objective was aJapanese airbase still under constructionto offset the loss of carrier air cover atMidway.

Admiral Fletcher, who had disting-uished himself at Midway, was in overallcommand of operations in the southernSolomons. Rear Admiral R Kelly Turnerled an amphibious task force responsiblefor landing the 19,000-man 1st MarineDivision and its equipment. The Marinesreached the airbase renamed Hender-son Field - soon after landing and foundit deserted, but they came under heavyattack from the Japanese Navy, whichdominated surrounding waters by nightand soon sent reinforcements ashore toretake the island. The Marines streng-thened the airfield's perimeter and usedit to gain control of the sea lanes by day.

Two costly but inconclusive carrierbattles were fought, one in August (Bat-tle of the Eastern Solomons), the other inOctober (Battle of Santa Cruz), as theJapanese landed additional troops andsupplies on Guadalcanal. On land, therewere three major attacks on the Marine


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garrison, all of which were thrown back

at considerable cost to the Japanese. De-spite reinforcement, the Marines wereexhausted by December, but the XIVArmy Corps relieved them and theJapanese had to withdraw their own de-pleted forces.

Guadalcanal provided a jumping-off place for successive conquests in the Solo-mons, culminatin g with Bougainville inOctober 1943. The campaign was char-acterized by surprise landings, followedby hasty construction or repair of air-strips for local defense and as bases forthe next attack. Even strongly garri-soned islands like Bougainville, whichhad 60,000 widely scattered defenders,were seized and isolated, while Japanesestrongpoints at Rabaul and Kaviengwere bypassed. The Solomons Campaignwound dow n in mid 1944, after successfulAllied landings on New Britain and theAdmiralty and St Matthias groups.

Left and inset: Occupying the Solomonswas a lengthy process that took the Alliesover a y ear to complete.Opposite below: A n attack by US aircraft at the beginn ing of the battle for Guadalcanal.

Below: US Marines land ing on the island head immediately for cover.


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Left: US landings on Guadalcanal and the resistance encountered.

Below left: Japanese supply ships and their escorts met US T ask Force 67 near Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942 inone of the many naval actions off Guadalcanal. On this occasion, the

Japanese emerged on top. Bottom left: Marine reinforcementsdisembark.

Below: US Navy vessels wea ve to counterair attack off the Solomons.

Right: US landings on New Guinea. Below right: General MacArthur (right) passes an encouraging word with a paratrooper at Port Moresby.


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New Guinea

The Japanese made a second

attempt against Port Moresby inJuly 1942 - an overland advancefrom Buna - but it was stopped byAustralian formations in September.Allied forces built an airstrip at MilneBay, then proceeded over the Owen Stan-ley Range against totally adverse groundand weather conditions to capture Bunaand Sanananda at year's end. Australiancoast-watchers were instrumental inAllied success by providing early warn-ing of Japanese moves, but all com-batants were plagued by tropical disease,grueling terrain and a lack of accuratemaps of the area.

After Buna fell, Lae and the MarkhamValley were captured with the assistanceof Alli ed air forces (ex cellent co-ordination of all the services involvedwas a feature of this campaign). A seriesof operations around the Huon Peninsulawas followed by major landings at Hol-landia and Aitape in April 1944. Thesecut off some 200,000 Japanese troops andnumerous civilian workers centeredaround Wewak. The final New Guinealandings, at and near the northern tip of the island, secured airfields to be used insupport of operations in the Marianasand the Philippines. By July 1944, anentire Japanese Army had been neutral-ized in New Guinea, and the SolomonsCampaign had nullified the threat toAustralia and New Zealand.


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The Battle of thePhilippine Sea

After clearing the Marshall Islands,the US trans-Pacific drive con-

verged on the Mariana group,who se conq uest wo uld cut off theJapanese homeland from the Philippinesand Southeast Asia. When the USassault fell on the main Japanese de-fenses at Saipan, Tinian and Guam, theJapanese Navy was there to counter it(June-July 1944).

The Japanese First Mobile Fleet,under Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa,r e n d e z v o u s e d w i t h Vi c e - A d m i r a lMatome Ugaki's Southern Force on 16June. Three days later, Ozawa's scoutingplanes spotted Vice-Admiral Marc Mit-scher's US Task Force 58 underway togive battle; strike aircraf t were launchedimmedia te ly. Meanwhi le , US sub-marines had located Ozawa's force andtorpedoed his flagship, the carrier Taiho.The veteran Shokaku was also sunk. Anabortive second strike by Ozawa was mis-directed, and US fighters intercepted iton its way to Guam. Japanese losses bynightfall of 19 June included 340 irre-placeable veteran pilots and two carriers.US crewmen dubbed the battle 'TheGreat Marianas Turkey Shoot.'

Ozawa compounded his errors by ling-ering in the vicinity, with the result thathe lost three more ships the followingday. The US had lost only 50 planes and

suffered slight damage to a single bat-tleship. Ozawa's reputation as an out-standing commander was impaired bythis disaster, but his resignation was re-fused by his superiors and he foughtagain at the Battle of Leyte Gulf withskill and tenacity. By that time, however,the Japanese defeat was inevitable.

Top left: The opposing fleets rendezvous.Center and above: The course of the battleon 19-20 June.Top: A Japanese diuebomber narrowlymisses USSBunker Hill of Task Force 58.

Right: Return of anF6F-3 He llcat fighterto Lexington during 'The Great MarianasTurkey Shoot'.


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The Struggle forLeyte and Luzon

General Douglas MacArthur's over-

riding desire to liberate the Phil-ippines played a major part in theAllied High Command decision to makelandings on Leyte in October 1944.MacArthur's forces joined Nimitz's forthis operation, in a rare display of co-operation between these two competitiveleaders. Only 20,000 Japanese held theisland against 130,000 men of GeneralWalter Krueger's Sixth Army, who land-ed on 20 October. Japanese reinforce-ments could not keep pace with this kindof manpower. By Christmas 1944, majorengagements were almost over, withJapanese casualties estimated between

50 and 80,000. The Americans had lost

only 3600 men.At sea, four major actions comprisedthe Battle of Leyte Gulf (21-25 October),in which Japan sought to prevent theAmericans from regaining a foothold inthe Philippines. Admiral Ozawa's de-pleted carrier force was to serve largelyas a decoy, luring Admiral Halsey'spowerful Third Fleet away from the mainaction. The real fighting was assigned tofour task forces of Japanese battleshipsand cruisers, which were still plentiful.On the US side, Halsey's force was aug-mented by Admiral Kincaid's SeventhFleet, backed by carrier formation TF.38.

Left: The land battles for Leyte sawsuperior US forces emerge triumphant.

A boue: A Japanese fuel dump on Leyteblazes as a result of naval shelling.


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Above right: The sea actions comprisingthe Battle ofLeyte Gulf resulted in a USvictory despite the involvement of threeseparate Japanese forces.

Japanese Force A was turned back byUS submarines and carrier aircraft,which then turned north in pursuit of Ozawa's force. Vice-Admiral Nishi-mura's Force C was almost entirely des-troyed in a night battle, and Vice-Admiral Shima's Second Striking Forcewas turned back. Only Kurita's FirstStriking Force was still a factor, but itfailed to capitalize on its opportunity towreak havoc on the Seventh Fleet, andwithdrew after limited success on 25

October. Mean while, m any of Ozawa'sships, including the valuable carrier

Zuikaku, last veteran of Pearl Harbor,had been sunk. Japanese desperationwas manifested in the first of the suicidalKamik aze missions, which struck an Au-stralian cruiser on 21 October.

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l To m o y u k iYamashita, the 'Tiger of Malaya,' hadassumed command of Phili ppine defense

just as Ley te was being attacked. WhenUS forces moved to invade Luzon, the


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Above and inset: The capture of Luzon. Right: The US make landfall onLeyte.

principal island, in January 1945, histroops were ill prepared and poorlyarmed, and most of his air support hadbeen destroyed or withdraw n to Formosa.Doubting that he could hold the beaches,Yamashita made his stand in the inlandmountain areas with the object of tyingup numerou s American forces for as longas possible. In the event, he did not sur-render until the war's end, when he stillhad 50,000 fighting men. By that time,most of Luzon and the other islands hadbeen recaptured in fighting that reachedits crescendo at Manila in February-March 1945.


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Iwo Jima

The rocky is land of Iwo Jima,

although far from Japan, was partof the Japa nese ho mela nd; itoffered the dual advan tage to the Allies of demoralizing the enemy and providing afighter airbase in range of Tokyo - if itcould be captured. On the minus side, IwoJima was devoid of cover and stronglygarrisoned by 22,000 troops under M ajorGeneral Tadamichi Kuribayashi, whohad made the eight-square-mile islandimpervious to aerial bombard ment witha network of pillboxes, caves and tun nels.

The most prolonged and intense bom-bardm ent of the Pacific Wa r preceded theUS Ma rine lan dings of 19 February 1945.

The Japanese held their fire just minutestoo long, hoping to dupe the invaders intobelievin g they would offe r no resistance.By the time their weapons opened upagainst the beachhead, two Marine divi-sions and all their equipm ent had landed,with more to come throughout the day.

The Marines broke out and made

straight for Mt Suribachi, the sugar-loaf massif at the island's tip. There they suc-ceeded in raising the US flag after threedays of combat so costly that it eclipsedeven Tarawa, but the northeast of theisland remained unconquered. The mazeof undergro und d efenses and lack of roomto maneuver made for hand-to-hand com-bat of savage ferocity. Nearly 7000 USMarines and sailors lost their lives in thefighting that raged until 26 March, andthe Japanese died almost to a man. Theirexemplar in courage was Kuribayashi,who contacted Tokyo day s after their foodand water ran out with the message:

'Fighting spirit is running high. We aregoing to fight bravely to the last moment.'

Right: Iwo Jima, a small island withimmense strategic significance.

Below: US Marines advance with flamethrowers toward Mt Suribachi.


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Okinawa

The inexorable Allied advance to-ward the Japanese home islandsreached Okinawa, the main island

of the Ryukyu group, in March of 1945.Okinawa's capture was necessary to pro-vide harbor and air-base facilities for theinvasion of Japan. The island was de-fended by the Japanese Thirty-secondArmy - some 130,000 men - underGeneral Mitsuru Ushijima.

Preliminary air operations were aimedat Japanese air bases on Formosa a nd theislands surrounding densely populatedOkinawa. US and British carrier forcessuffered losses to waves of Kamikazeattacks, but the Japanese paid a higherprice - 90 percent of their planes wereshot down before they could sacrificethemselves on the enemy's ships. From23 March, Okinawa itself was the targetof continuous air and artillery strafing.

Allied forces began to land on 1 April,when General Simon Bolivar Buckner'sTenth Army and associated forces gaineda beachhead at the southern end of theisland. The Japanese had establishedthemselves behind the formidable ShuriLine, which remained almost imperviousto attack until early May, when suicidalcounterattacks disclosed the locations of many Japanese defensive positions.From this point on, both of the US corpsinvolved gradually pushed forward, asUshijima's forces retreated into the hillmasses of the island's sou thern tip. F inalresistance was overwhelmed by a mas-sive two-pronged attack on 21 June.

Throug hout the operation, code-namedIceberg, supporting naval forces wereunder constant attack by Kamikazepilots, who accounted fo r 36 US and Brit-ish ships and damaged hundreds of others. The Japanese lost a staggering4000 aircraft in these suicide missions,and even sacrificed the giant battleship

Yamato, which was dispatched to Okina-wa with insufficie nt fuel for a return tripto do as much damage as possible beforeshe was destroyed. This happened on 7April, long before the battleship couldreach the target area.

On land, known Japanese dead totaledalmost 108,000, and for the first time asignificant number of prisoners wastaken - over 7000. General Buckner waskilled, with over 7000 of his men; almost32,000 were wounded. US Nav y casual-ties were almost 10,000, of whom roughlyhalf were killed and half wounded. SinceOkinawa was considered a 'dress rehear-sal' for the inv asio n of Jap an, the se

figures were so bering to Americ anstrategists; General MacArthur esti-mated that it wou ld take five million me nto capture the home islands, of whomperhaps one mil l ion would becomecasualties. Thus Okinawa strengthenedthe Allied case for ending the war byother means.

Above: The invasion of Okinawa was seenas the dress rehearsal for a similar actionagainst the Japanese home islands.

Above right: Marines await survivors of an explosive attack on a Japanese hideout onOkinawa.

Right: The Japanese battleshipYamatowas sacrificed in a vain a ttempt to stemthe invasion.


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Air Strikes on theHome Islands

The bomber offensive against Japan

could not begin until 1944, for lack of a very-long-range (VLR ) bombercapable of carrying heavy loads for over3000 miles. Such a plane was finally ac-quired from Boeing by the US Arm y AirForce (the B-29 Superfortress), but it wasso newly developed that operationalproblems plagued its early operations.The B-29's bombing altitude of 30,000feet created difficulties with high windsand the effect of ice on instruments andengines. Losses were running high forseveral months after the first raid, fromeastern China, in June of 1944. Addi-tionally, Japanese anti-aircraft defensesproved much more effective than hadbeen anticipated.

Modified tactics resulted in operating

the planes at much lower altitudes with

heavier bomb loads, which paid off in im-proved performance. New bases wereestablished in the Marianas Islands of the Central Pacific in November, afterwhich up to 20 Bombardment Groupsflew regularly over Japanese cities byday and night. They dropped a total of 9365 tons of incendiaries, which gutted32 square miles of urban areas. Thenescort fighters began to arrive from new-ly captured Iwo Jima (early April) andAmerican losses reached a new low. Asmore B-29s became available, mortalblows were dealt to Japanese industry.On 6 and 9 August 1945, the war withJapan was ended - and a new era in hu-man history begun - by the atomic bomb-ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Left: The now-familiar atomic mushroocloud rises over Nagasaki.

Above: The Japanese homeland and (inset) th e radius of US bomber operations over it.

Right: Doolittle's daring one-off raid in April 1942 from the USSHornet had beenas much a propaganda exercise as anattack. The firebomb raids of 1945 were oa different scale altogether.Far right: Tokyo in ruins.


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The Arakan Battles

British and US leaders disagreed on

strategy in the Burma Theater af-ter the British had been driveninto India in May of 1942. The Americansbelieved that Burmese operations shouldfocus on reopening land communicationswith the Chinese Nationalists, who weretrying to contain large Japanese forces ontheir home ground. The British had littlefaith in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalistmovement and maintained their hope of winning back the imperial territories lostto Japan in the 1942 dbcle.

General Archibald Wavell, command-ing Allied forces in India, knew that alarge-scale invasion was out of the ques-

tion for the time, but he sought to employhis men and build up morale via small-scale operations near the Indian border.The first of these centered on the Arakan ,where the island post of Akyab providedJapan with a position from wh ich to bombChittagong and Calcutta. On 21 Septem-ber Wavell's 14 Indian D ivision began toadvance cautiously into Burma by way of Cox's Bazar. General lida, the Japanesecommander, countered with a series of de-laying tactics that created a stalemate last-ing until March 1943 when his counter-attack on two fronts forced a retreat.

In December 1943, the British sentChristison's XV Corps on a second ex-pedition against Akyab. LieutenantGeneral Renya Mutaguchi barred theway through the Mayu Peninsula andsent his Sakurai Column through moun-tainous jungle that was believed impass-able to cut off 5 and 7 Indian Divisions.Lieutenant General William Slim, whohad led the 900-mile fighting retreatfrom Rangoon, airlifted supplies to hisisolated troops until they had foughttheir way through to one another in lateFebruary 1944. (Slim's use of air supplywould ultimately be the key to Britishsuccess in Burma.) In March XV Corpsfinally renewed its advance on Akyab,but was stopped short again by the needto send reinforcements back to Ind ia forthe defense of Imphal.

Previous pages: A 25-pounder gun isbrought ashore in Rangoon.

Above right: The Allied route southwardsalong fair-weather tracks was ha mpered by enemy action.

Right: 5 and 7Indian Divisions reuniteafter being isolated by a Japanese thrust.Opposite: Japanese troops used elephantsas a means of transporting supplies across

Burma's rugged terrain.


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The ChinditOperations

Morale had been a problem in Bur-

ma even before the Allies took what Stilwell described as 'a hellof a beating.' During the disastrous cam-paign of 1942, fighting spirit reached anew low. The Japanese were perceived asunbeatable in jungle warfare, and theAllied forces' sick rate reflected the pre-vailing malaise: thousands succumbed todysentery, malaria, skin diseases andother complaints. The heterogeneousassortment of troops inv olved in Burma-Indian, British and Gurkha comprisedan army beset by problems of disciplineand discrimination.

Brigadier Orde Wingate arrived in the

Far East early in 1943 with guerrilla-

warfare experience gained in Palestineand Abyssinia . Backed by WinstonChurchill and General Wavell, he cre-ated a 'private army' to penetrate behindenemy lines and disrupt Japanese com-munic ations and supplies. In so doing, hewould also prove tha t the Japanese couldbe defeated in the jungle.

The Chindits (so called after Chinthe, amythic al beast) crossed the River Chin d-win into Burma in February 1943 andspent four months raiding Japaneseterr i tory. They cut the Mandalay-Myitkyina Railway in 75 places beforethe Japanese counterattacked in force

and drove them back into India. The

press lionized Wing ate, and the mystiqueof Japanese inv incibility began to lose itspower. Wingate's superiors then autho-rized a far more ambitious operation -involving six brigades - to complementStilwell's advance on Myitkyina.

The main Chindit force was airliftedinto Burma in February 1944 to establishblocking points against supplies movingup against Stilwell. They encounteredimmediate dif ficul ties that grew steadilyworse until midsummer, wh en they hadto be withdrawn. Wingate himself waskilled in a plane crash soon after theabortive operation began.


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Japanese Defeat atKohima and Imphal

Above left: The Chindit operations inBurmain 1943.Left: Wingate (center) briefs pilots oninvasionplans with the assistance o f theUSAAF's Colonel Cochran (left).Above: Troop movements around Kohima.

T hree Japanese divis ions wereordered to prepare for the invasionof India (Opera tion U-GO ) in earlyMarch 1944. It was clear that an Alliedoffensive was being prepared, and theonly practical place from which it couldbe launched was the plain at Manipur,where Imphal and Kohima were located.Lieutenant General Mutaguchi's Fif-teenth Army was to spoil the plannedoffensive and cut the single railway toAssam, north India.

General William Slim, commandingFourteenth Army, expected a Japaneseadvance, but its speed was such that he

and his men were taken by surprise.

Scoones's XV C orps was cu t off at Kohi-ma on 4 April, and the garrison at Imphala day later. Both forces prepared to holdout with the help o f air supply un til relief arrived from XXX III Corps, which wasassembling at Dimapur. The quality of Slim's leadership would be reflected inthe tenacity of his hard-pressed troopsuntil that help arrived.

Relentless Japanese attacks rolledover the small garrison at Kohima be-tween 7 and 18 April, when British 2Division's 5 Brigade pushed through theroadblock at Zubza to reinforce the defen-ders. Then 5 and 4 Brigades undertook a

sweeping pincer movement designed to


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trap the Japanese; this was not achieved

until 3 June. Meanwhile, IV Corps wasstruggling desperately around Imphal,where air supply proved far more difficu ltthan foreseen. Slim reinforced the garri-son to some 100,000 men during thesiege, which lasted for 88 days. British 2Division advanced from Kohima to meetIV Corps at Milestone 107, halfway be-tween the two cities, on 22 June.Japanese Fifteenth Army had foughtwith distinction against increasing odds,but its remnants now had to pull back toward the Chind win, with British forcesin hot pursuit. Mutaguchi had lost some65,000 men in the heaviest defeat suf-fered by the Japanese Army in WorldWar II.

Right: The unsuccessful Japanese siege of Imphal that ended in June. Below: Merrill's Marauders, the US jungle fighters renowned for their expertise in combating the Japanese inunfriendly terrain.


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To Mandalay andMeiktila

Lieutenant General Shihachi Kata-

mura took co mmand of JapaneseFifteenth Army after the dis-astrous losses at Kohima and Imphal, forwhich his predecessor was unjustlyblamed. During the summer of 1944, herebuilt his force of 10 divisions and thenawaited the expected Allied push intocentral Burma. This operation, code-named Extended Capital, began on 19November and included Stilwell's North-ern Combat Area Command, BritishFourteenth Army and the XV Corps. On4 December bridgeheads were securedacross the Chindw in, and the B ritish ad-vanced to meet elements of Stilwell's force

for the drive across the Irrawaddy intoMandalay. Only General Slim, of all theAllied leaders in Burma, correctly sur-mised that Katamura would attempt todestroy the Fourteenth Army at the rivercrossing.

On 3 March 1945, Slim struck atJapanese communication lines to Ran-goon located at Meiktila, achieving totalsurprise. The capture of this vital railcenter opened the door to the larger cityof Mandalay. Kimura pulled so manytroops away from Mandalay to assaultMeiktila that he lost both cities to theAllies. Slim raced on to reach Rangoonbefore the monsoon, but when he arrivedthe Japanese had already evacuated.Sum's outstand ing leadership in the Bur-ma Theater led to his appointment asCommander in Chief of Allied LandForces in Southeast Asia.

A bove right: Operation Extended Capitaltook the Allies across the Chindwin and on to Mandalay.Right: Flamethrower and rifle-equipped infantry of the United States Army

prepare for action .


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Left: Control ofMeiktila was to prove of crucial importance in the battle for Mandalay. Below: US troops pause on a Burmese jungle trail. Below right: General Claire Chennault,whose 'Flying Tigers' struck at Japaneseground troops in China andFormosa.Far right: China's struggle to repel the Japanese invaders.


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China - An ErraticAlly

Japan's war on China predated WorldWar II by several years, and by 1939the aggressive island empire had

seized control of China's richest areas.The 'sleeping giant' was especiallyvulnerable on account of the internalstrife between the Nationalists (orKuomintang) led by GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung'sCommunists.

US General George C Marshall warnedthe Allies that Nationalist China must bepropped up; otherwise, the Japanese Gov-ernment could flee to China when thehome islands were invaded - as was thenplanned - 'and continue the war on agreat and rich land mass.' Throughoutthe war, the US shipped enormous quan-tities of supplies to China, first by theBurma Road, and after 1942 by air overthe Himalayas - a dangerous routeknown as 'the Hump.' Chiang's positionwas strengthened by the creation of theUS 14th Air Force, impressively com-manded by Brigadier General ClaireChennault, which inflicted heavy dam-age on Japanese troops both in China andFormosa. General Joseph 'Vinegar Joe'Stilwell was sent in to help retrain theChinese Army. However, many of thesupplies destined for use against theJapanese were diverted into Chiang'swar on the Communists; corruptionflourished in his Nationalist Party.

US air strikes by Chennault's 'FlyingTigers' provoked a Japanese offensiveagainst the airfields at Liuchow, Kwei-lin, Lingling and other sites in the springof 1944. Chinese resistance did not holdup, as was often the case, and the loss of

these bases hampered Allied operations

until December. Meanwhile, a truce waspatched up between the Communists andNationalists, allowing greater activityagainst the Japanese, who renewed theiroffensive in 1945.

In the war's final year, Japanese

General Okamura overextended the de-ployment of his China ExpeditionaryArmy , and the Chinese were able to cutoff the corridor to Indochina. They heldthis position for the duration, afte r whichthe Nationalists and the Communistspromptly resumed their civil war.


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The German Drive tothe Volga

Germany's critical oil shortage was

decisive in Hitler's first 1942 cam-paign plan for the Eastern Front.In April he instructed that the maineffort was to be in southern Russia, whereGerman forces must defeat the Red Armyon the River Don and advance to the co-veted Caucasian oil fields. For this cam-paign, Bock's Army Group South wasreorganized into Army Groups A and B,A to undertake the Caucasus offensiveand B to establish a protective front alongthe Don and go on to Stalingrad. Theneutralization of 'Stalin's City' soongained a compelling hold on Hitler'smind, despite his staffs objections to di-viding the German effort before the RedArmy had been shattered. Stalingradwas a major rail and river center, whosetank and armaments factories offeredadditional inducements to attack it.

The obsession with Stalingrad was adisastrous mistake on Hitler's part, com-pounded by his seizure of control from hisdissenting officers. Army Group A madea rapid advance from 28 June to 29 July,capturing Novorossiysk and threateningthe Russian Trans-Caucasus Front. Butthe diversion of 300,000 German troopsto the Stalingrad offensive preventedthem from achieving their original objec-tive the Batumi-Baku Line. They wereleft to hold a 500-mile Caucasian frontagainst strong Russian opposition -leaderless, except for the erratic and con-tradictory orders of Hitler himself.

The Russians had made good their1941 manpower losses from the subjectpeoples of Asia, and they threw the T-34tank into the field at this point to com-plete the German fiasco in the Caucasus.The vital oil fields were lost to Germany.Army Group B raced toward Stalingradto attempt what had now become the onlypossible success of the campaign. The city

could not be encircled without crossingthe Volga, which General Weichs lackedthe resources to attempt, so a frontalassault was launched on 31 August.

Previous pages: Red Army sappers clear German barbed wire defenses.

Above right: The original German battle plan, with oilfields the main objective. Above far right: Splitting the forces tostrengthen the attack on Stalingrad

proved a major error. Right: The German advancesoutheastwards with armor and artillery.Opposite: Commander Chuikov of the

Russian 62nd Army at the Volga.


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Stalin's City HoldsOut

Below: The German forces attack. Below left: Stalingrad's position on thebanks of the Volga enhanced its defensivecapabilities.

Bottom: Manstein's forces are repulsed.

The slow pace of the German sum-

mer offensive of 1942 allowed Sta-lingrad's defenders to strengthentheir position considerably . The city washome to half a million Russians, whowere united in their determination to re-pel the German assault. Most of theSoviet soldiers were assigned to the de-fense perimeter, the city itself being en-trusted largely to armed civilians, whosehigh morale promised fierce resistance.

The Volga wound through many chan-nels around the city, posing seriousobstacles to any attempt at bridging it.The Germans made no effor t to establisha bridgehead north of the city so as toblock river traffic and reinforcement.


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Right: A Ger man soldier shows the strainof fighting an un winnable battle.Bottom: The red flag flies victorious over Stalingrad in February 1943 as theGermans finally surrender.

This was only one of man y mistakes, the

worst of which was the decision to carrythe city by direct attack. The resultantbattle would become the Verd un of WorldWar II.

By the end of Augus t, the Russian de-fenders had been squeezed into a smallperime ter, and twelve days later the Ger-mans were in the city, striving to fighttheir way to the western ba nk of the Vol-ga. Soviet civilians and soldiers strug-gled side by side in a c onstant barrage of bombs and artillery fire, falling back afoot at a time. House-to-house fightingraged until 13 October, when the ex-hausted German infantry reached the

river in the south city. But the northernindustrial sector remained unconquered.Hitler ordered intensified bom bardmentsthat served only to make the infantry'stask more difficult. Stalingrad's de-fenders continued to fight regardless.

By 18 November, when the winterfreeze was imminent, Hitler's armiesaround Stalingrad were undersupplied,overextended and vulnerable to the Rus-sian counterattack that was forming.Before the Germans were forced to sur-render (February 1943), they had lost100,000 of the 200,000 men involved.Five hundred Lu ftwaffe transport planeshad been destroyed in impotent efforts tosupply them, and six months' worth of German war production had been thrownaway. Wehrmacht morale was shattered,not only by the great defeat itself, but bythe wanton intrusions into military plan-ning that had wrecked the campaignfrom Berlin.


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The Battle of Kursk

The success of the 1942 Russian win-

ter offensive left a large salientaround Kursk that tempted theGerman High Command into mounting amajor attack. The fact that US and Brit-ish aid was now flowing freely into Rus-sia lent urgency to this plan of attack, asGermany's resources were steadilydraining away.

The armored pincer movement againstthe Kursk Salient - codenamed Opera-tion Citadel - was scheduled for July of 1943. Early intelligence of it enabled theRussians to prepare by moving in twoarmies and setting up eight concentriccircles of defense. When the Germanslaunched their attack on 5 July, it was inthe belief that they would achieve sur-prise. On the contrary, Russian defensesat Kursk were the most formidable theyhad ever assaulted. The Soviet T-34 tank was superior to anything the GermanPanzer groups could field, and air com-mand was seized at the outset by multi-tudes of Russian planes. They were notequal to the Luftwaffe in technology, butthey were far superior in numbers.

In the north, German Ninth Army ad-vanced only six miles in the first fewdays, at a cost of 25,000 killed and 400tanks and aircraft. In the south, Man-stein's Fourth Panzer Army drovethrough the Russian Sixth Army - againat high cost - only to face fresh Soviet


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Opposite far left: The German offensiveagainst Kursk, launched on 5 July.Left: By 20 July German forces were infull retreat.Right: The heavily armoredKV-1 tanksgave the Germans many problems.Below: Soviet T-34s take part in thebiggest tank battle of the war near Prokhorovka in the south.

tank units f rom the Russian Steppe Frontreserve. The largest tank armies in his-tory clashed near Prokhorovka on 12July and fought for seven days. InitialGerman success was followed by increas-ing Soviet ascendancy, and by 20 July allGerman forces were in full retreat. Twomillion men had been involved, with6000 tanks and 4000 aircraft. Many of the surviving German tanks were dis-patched immediately to Italy to counterthe Allied offensive that had begun withlandings in Sicily. The Russians main-tained their momentum in successfuladvances south of Moscow.


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The Dniepr andSmolensk

By fall of 1943, the Soviets hadpushed their front line far to thewest against diminishin g German

forces that managed to stay intact andresist, althoug h they could not prevail. Inmid September the Russians threatenedSmolensk in the north and Kiev in thecenter. They crossed the Donets in thesouth and by 30 September had capturedSmolensk and established themselvesalong most of the Dniepr.

German Army Group A, virtuallyabandoned at its bridgehead in the Cau-casus since the previous summer, waspulled out to operate on the right of Ma n-stein's Army Group South, its parentformation. Manstein had recapturedKharkov in February against numeric-al odds of seven to one b ut his losses hadbeen staggering. When the Russians took Kiev (6 November) and penetrated hissector, he called for evacuation of theSeventeenth Army from the Crimea. Hit-ler's characteristic 'No retreat' order wasManstein's reward for months of super-huma n effort. Seventeenth Army was cutoff in the Crimean Peninsula, just as hehad foreseen, and by year's end the Rus-sians had effectively regained all theterritory lost in 1942 and more.

Left: The scope of Soviet reoccupation at their western border.

Above: The eventual German withdrawalwas made all the more inevitable by theremoval of armor and personnel to the

Italian Front.Opposite: A German NCO leads hisinfantry section at the front line.


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The Relief of Leningrad

Leningrad had been isolated from

the rest of Russ ia since 1941 by theGerman-held corridor betweenTosno and Lake L adoga. For 900 days itspeople were deprived of food, fuel andarms; by the end of the siege, they weredying of hunger and cold at the rate of 20,000 a day. Throughout this ordeal,Leningrad's citizens continued to pro-duce goods in their factories, even atgreatly reduced levels, and to provide forcivil defense. A trickle of supplies beganto arrive in January 1943, thanks to aconcerted effort by the Leningrad andVolkhov Fronts to secure a supply linesouth of Lake Ladoga. It was little

enough, but it prevented total starvation.Not until a year later did real relief reachLeningrad.

In mid-January 1944, three RussianFronts- Leningrad, Volkhov and 2 Baltic- launched attacks against GermanArmy Group North, commanded first byKchler and after 29 January by FieldMarsh al Walther Model. By that time theRussians had cleared the Moscow-Leningrad Railway and recaptured Nov -gorod. Now threatened by encirclement,Model withdrew Army Group N orth eastof Lake Chudskoye and subsequentlystopped the Soviet advance into the Bal-tic States. Beleaguered Leningrad wasrestored to the Soviet Union.

Above: Supplies reached Leningrad inlimited quantities through the so-called 'Corridor of D eath'.

Above right: The earlier division of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Right: Final relief of the siege wasachieved early in 1944.Opposite: Defenders dig in a t Leningrad's

perimeter.


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Regaining theUkraine

During the drive to relieve Lenin-

grad, Russian forces in the southwere equally active. The 1 and 2Ukrainian Fronts launched attacks onall German forces in the Ukraine be-tween 24 December 1943 and 5 January1944. German First Panzer Army wastrapped, and both Manstein's ArmyGroup North Ukraine and Kleist's ArmyGroup A were hard pressed. Mansteintried to counterattack under blizzard con-ditions, but could do little to slow theRussian advance to the Rivers Bug andDniestr.

An improvised airlift kept First Panzer

Army supplied unti l it could fight its wayout behind Russian lines. German tena-city in south Russia at this time wasalmost unbelievable, but it was a losingfight. Kleist had to fall back to Odessa,leaving elements of Sixth and EighthArmies surrounded. On 10 April he wasforced out of Odessa, and the Russianfront was extended almost as far as BrestLitovsk.

The last rail link between the Germansin Poland and those in southern Russiahad been severed in March with the cap-

ture of Chernovtsy by First Ukraine

Front. The abandoned German Seven-teenth Army was driven from theCrimea, and Sevastopol fell to the Sovietson 12 May.

Hitler was enraged by the losses in theUkraine, whose rich mineral resourceswere desperately needed by the Reich.Instead of rewarding Manstein's heroicrole there, he relieved him of his com-mand and put the trouble-shooting Modelin his place. Kleist was ousted in favor of the ambitious Field Marshal FriedrichSchrner.


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Left: A column of Germans ca ptured near the pocket of resistance at Korsun-Shevchenkosky.Above: Soviet advances o n agrandscale.Right: German soldiers advance throughthe maize fields of the Ukraine.


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From Warsaw to theOder

Early summer of 1944 found widelyscattered German forces trying tohold a 1400-mile Eastern Front

with very few reserves. On 23 June theSoviets struck along the central sectorwith three fronts under overall commandof Marshal Georgi Zhukov, now deputysupreme commander in the USSR. Witha density of almost 400 guns per mile,these troops assaulted General Busch'sArmy Group Centre just as partisanactivity in its rear disrupted communica-tions entirely. There was no contest inthe air, as many Luftwaffe units hadalready been taken west. Busch lost half a million men, killed or captured, fromhis 33 divisions and was replaced by Mod-el immediately. By the end of August,Zhukov's offensive was at the gates of Warsaw in the the north, at Riga. Modelbarely succeeded in preventing the Rus-sians from entering Warsaw; their ownpause to resupply outside the city wasprovidential for him. Farther south,Soviet troops had crossed the Vistula fora combined advance of 450 miles in twomonths. Operations had to be suspendeduntil supply lines could catch up.

By January 1945 the Russians werepoised to invade Germany for the first

time since 1914. Rokossovsky's 2 Be-lorussian Front of nine armies assaultedthe German Second Army north of War-saw, while the Russian Forty-seventhArmy encircled the city, which fell on 17January. Army Group Centre was drivenback into a few pockets along the Bay of Danzig, from which the German Navyextricated some half a million men inMarch and April. On 9 May the last Ger-man beachheads surrendered.

As Rokossovsky attacked north of theVistula, the 1 Belorussian and 1 Ukrai-nian Fronts advanced at top speed on awide front from Warsaw to Jasto. Theyhad reached the Oder by 31 January,bypassing pockets of German resistance.Russian armies of over 1,500,000 menconfronted German forces of 596,000,with still greater inequalities in arma-ments and aircraft. By 24 FebruaryPomerania and Silesia had fallen, givingSoviet forces a solid front along the Oderless than 40 miles from Berlin. Only onesizeable German force would be left inEurope after the fall of Berlin: Schrner'sArmy Group Centre, which had movedinto Czechoslovakia. The Russian 'libera-tion' of that country would be a micro-cosm of what transpired in EasternEurope after the German defeat.

Below: The frontiers of Germanoccupation are pushed back.

Bottom: Marshal Ivan Konev,Commander of 1 UkrainianFront, 1944.

Right: R ussian forces halt at the Oder prior to the final push to Berlin. Below right: Troops of4 UkrainianFront plod over the Polish Carpathians in thewinter of 1944-45.


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The Drive intoCzechoslovakia

Desperate Nazi plans focused on theformation of a 'national redoubt'on the German/Czechoslovak bor-

der after the fall of Berlin. These planswere based on Schrner's armies of almosta million men, which held the Reich's lastimportant industrial area. In reality,however, their situation was hopeless,surrounded as they were by the Russianson three

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