Atlantic Council of Canada Roundtable13 September 2012

ken.hansen@dal.ca 902-494-6444

The Future of the Navy-Coast Guard Relationship in Canada

Halifax MARINE RESEARCH Institute

Aim

• To conduct a ‘blue sky’ vision session

• To discuss five questions in open forum

Published: 22 June 2010 Conducted: 27-29 October 2011

CFPS Research Project CFPS Research Workshop

“Western Hemisphere Perspectives and

Approaches to Future Maritime Security

Challenges”

Five Questions1. How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard

Relationship compare internationally?

2. Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed?

3. What should the role of the Canadian Coast Guard be in time of conflict or war?

4. Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or less in support of Canadian law enforcement?

5. How will the relationship between the RCN and CCG evolve in arctic patrolling operations?

Outline

• The geographic context

• The CCG-Navy by the Numbers (Q1)

• A Typology Analysis of Ships (Q2)

• The Relationship in Conflict and War (Q3)

• The Roles of the Sea Services (Q4)

• Navy-Coast Guard in the Arctic (Q5)

Present Size of Canada’s Offshore

Rank Country Size of EEZ

1 USA 11,351,000 km²

7 Indonesia 6,100,000 km²

8 Canada 5,599,077 km²

9 Japan 4,500,000 km²

Future Size of Canada’s Offshore

Rank Country Size of EEZ

1 USA 11,351,000 km²

4 Russia 7,500,000 km²

5 Canada 7,499,151 km²

6 U.K. 6,800,000 km²

+33.9%

Source: J Matthew Gillis, The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship, CFPS, 2010

Coast Guard-Navy Functions and Organizational Overlaps

Home Away

Reactive ProactiveCivil MilitaryPara-Military

150 states have coastlines – 72 have coast guards

CFPS Research Project

Navy Only 28

Coast Guard Only 9

Coast Guard & Navy 63

Military Coast Guard & Navy 9

Para Military Coast Guard & Navy 53

Civil Coast Guard 2 Navy 2?RCMP RCN

USNUSCG

CCG

Canada

United States

Strategy Begins with Awareness – Similarities & Differences

MonarchyCurrencyHistoryPoliciesManagement Driven

LanguageFree SocietiesAlliedEconomiesDemocraciesBordersArtsSportsFamilies

RepublicCurrencyHistoryPoliciesStrategy Driven

9/11

Context, Context, Context is Key

CFPS Research Workshop

Coastline = 1: 10.29

Landmass = 1: 1.01

Pop., Economy, Capacity = 10: 1

Source: Hansen – Rutgers University, “Institutional Misalignment,” 8 November 2011

‘Average’ Coast Guard(s) by Pop.

Avg. civilian model is 27.2% of the manpower strength of the regular force naval strength = 2,998 people;

Average paramilitary model is 20.9% of naval strength = 2,304 people; or

Average military model runs is 12.2% of naval strength = 1,345 people.

In Canada, the CCG is 84.2% of naval strength = 9,350 people.

Source: J Matthew Gillis, The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship, CFPS, 2010

Question #1

How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard Relationship compare internationally?

Typology of Vessels

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Civil Military

Combatants• Naval, Coastguard and Government-owned vessels/craft which

possess some sort of inherent armed or combat capability primarily intended for offensive use. The general rationale behind the groupings for combatant vessels is as follows:

• SS - Submarines• DD - Principle Surface Combatants• PB - [Coastal] Patrol Vessels• PC - River/Roadstead Patrol Vessels• MM - Mine Warfare Vessels• LL - Amphibious Warfare Vessels• WW - Coastguard: All vessels or craft owned or operated by a

Coastguard service

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

V – Police vessel or craftZ – Government vessel or craft

Non-Combatants• Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel

types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence purposes. The general groupings follow:

• AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General)• YY - Service Craft• VJ – Police Hovercraft• ZS – Government Submersibles• TM – Merchant (General)• TU – Fishing (General)• YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht)

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Typology of Vessels (I)

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Civil Military

CombatantsNon-Combatants7 types5 types

SSDDPBPCMMLLWDDAAYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC

Armed - Defensive Armed - Offensive

NavyCoastGuard

Naval

CoastGuard

?

?

?

Non-Combatants• Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel

types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence purposes. The general groupings follow:

• AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General)Service and Support

• YY - Service CraftGovernment Owned

• VJ – Police Hovercraft• ZS – Government Submersibles

Merchant• TM – Merchant (General)• TU – Fishing (General)

Recreational• YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht)

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Typology of Vessels (II)

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Civil Military

CombatantsNon-Combatants7 types5 types

SSDDPBPCMMLLWDD

AAYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC

Civil Service Support AuxiliaryGovernment-owned

Armed - Defensive Armed - OffensiveUnarmed

NavyCoastGuard

[Canadian] Typology of Vessels

Source: Hansen, “Canadian Naval Operational Logistics: Lessons Learned, Lost, and Relearned?” The

Northern Mariner, Vol. XX, No. 4 (October 2010): 361-383.

Civil Military

CombatantsNon-Combatants5 types6 types

SSDDPBPCMMLLAORYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC

Civil Service Support AuxiliaryGovernment-owned

WPGB

Naval

‘Sustain’

‘Support’AD/AS/AR

‘Supply’AE/AF/AO

Unarmed Armed - Defensive Armed - Offensive

Hybridized Vessels Problems

Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000

Civil Military

CombatantsNon-Combatants5 types6 types

SSDDPBPCMMLLAORYYVJ/ZSTM/UYAC

Civil Service Support AuxiliaryGovernment-owned

WPGB

Naval

‘Sustain’

Unarmed Armed - Defensive Armed - Offensive

US Military Sealift T-AKE T-AFS

Cdn Coast Guard T-AGB

AOPS? JSS?

Cross-Border Crime• Two-way problem

• Criminal organizations seek vulnerabilities in geography and enforcement

• Organized crime is the most prevalent threat encountered

• Over 100 crime groups and 90 criminal entrepreneurs involved in cross-border crime

Link: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/reports-rapports/2010-threat-menace-eng.htm

Source: CSupt. Joe Oliver, RCMP, Maritime Security Workshop, 29 October 2011

“Crime moves swiftly to exploit ‘gap’ areas”

Conflict Coexist Coordinate Cooperate Collaborate Conglomerate

Degree of Alignment

Tac

tica

lIn

stit

uti

on

alN

atio

nal

Lev

el o

f D

irec

tin

g A

uth

ori

ty

Gov’t

Dept

DeptCmtte

Panel

Manager

Culture

?? ?

A National Alignment Plan?

Source: Hansen – CJSOE Security Conf., “Institutional Change,” 4 June 2012

Question #2

Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed?

National Shipbuilding Strategy28 Large Vessels

• Combat Ships:–Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ships (6+2)

–Canadian Surface Combatants (15)

• Non-Combat Ships:–CCG Science Vessels (4)

–DND Joint Support Ships (2+1)

–CCG Polar Icebreaker (1)

Source: NSPS Media Tech Briefing, 18 Oct 2011

The Peace-Conflict Continuum

Source: WT. Johnsen, Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998

Coast Guard in Conflict or War?

Far from emphasizing the extreme case of amphibious assault against defended beachheads, traditional naval support roles in expeditionary warfare most commonly involve cover, administrative support, and supply operations. These are not departures from history. Rather, they are the usual, but nonetheless essential, roles of naval forces in expeditionary warfare.

Source: Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 269.

Questions #3

What should the role of the Canadian Coast Guard be in time

of conflict or war?

Military Role

Con

stab

ular

y R

ole

Diplom

atic RoleUse of

the Sea

Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.

Adapted from: Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontier, 2005, 18.

The Three Functional Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’

A “Tri-Modal” Force Structure• Military Role (How will Canada fight?)

- High-end combat capabilities- Sustainment of Operations

• Constabulary Role (When to use naval force?)- Low-end combat capabilities- Support to OGDs

• Diplomatic Role (What do Canadians expect?)- Support to Humanitarian Support & Disaster Relief- Supply to Capacity Building and Assistance Efforts

Adapted from: Hughes, “A Bi-Modal Force Structure for National Maritime Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, 29-47.

Military Role

Con

stab

ular

y R

ole

Diplom

atic RoleUse of

the Sea

Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.

The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’

In the presence of a recognized military threat.

Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.

Image:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/images/future_surface_combatant3.jpg

Where is the Navy Going? Future Surface Combatants?

Mili

tary

Rol

e

Diplom

atic RoleUse of

the Sea

Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.

The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’

When criminal activity impedes or restricts legitimate activity.

Constabulary Role

Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.

Source: http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat-smamat/documents/Big%20AOPS%20pics/AOaftstbd2.jpg

Where is the navy going? Naval Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship?

Source: http://www.casr.ca/doc-news-mid-shore-patrol-vessel-2009.htmImage: http://www.damen.nl/PRODUCTS/Damen_Stan_Patrol_4207.aspx?mId=8643&rId=150&Big=1

Where is the coast guard going? Mid-shore Patrol Cutters?

Specifications for the new Mid-Shore Patrol Vessel / Damen Stan Patrol 4207:Length overall:  42.80 mSpeed range:  23.0 - 30.0 knots (42.6 - 55.5 km/h)Ship's Boat:     RHIB (rigid hull inflatable boat)

Military R

ole

Con

stab

ular

y R

ole

Diplomatic Role

Use ofthe Sea

Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.

The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’

When foreign policy goals/national interest are at stake.

Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.

Images: German and French navies.

Left - Berlin-class (Germany)

Right - Mistral-class amphibious assault, command and force projection ship (France)

Where is the navy going? JSS or Oiler-Replenisher?

Military Role

Con

stab

ular

y R

ole

Diplom

atic Role

Ken Booth’s Triangle – Adapted for the ‘New Security Environment’.

The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.

Order

Peace

Goo

d G

over

nanc

e

CompassionRespect

Reputation

Response

Questions #4

Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or less in support of Canadian law

enforcement?

Canada’s 18 IcebreakersType Number Notes Built

Heavy 2 Not same class 1968, ‘83

Medium 4 (–1) Amundsen: scientific 1979-‘87

Light 7 (1+6) High Endurance & Multi-purpose

1970, 1986-‘87

Light 3 (1+2) Medium Endurance &

Multi-purpose

1968,1985-‘86

Light 2 Air Cushion Vehicles 2009

Arctic/Gulf Icebreakers

River Icebreakers

Source: Hansen – Sino-Canadian Conf., “Practical Arctic Security,” 26 June 2012

CCGS Louis St. Laurent ‘Heavy’ [Arctic] Icebreaker

Image: shipspotting.net

CCGS AmundsenT1200-class ‘Medium’ [Gulf] Icebreaker

Image: Marc Tawil Arctic Net

CCGS Sir William AlexanderT1100-class ‘Light’ [River] Icebreaker

Image: shipspotter.com

AOPS Deficiencies?

• “Endurance: 6,800 nm at 14 knots transit speed– 6,800 nm ‘not enough’ according to CCG;

– Should be able to increase range with speed of 10 knots (+/-10,000 nm).”

• AOPS is “slow and dumb” according to Senator Colin Kenny; it is a “slushbreaker.”

Source: AOPS Briefing, Project Manager, Dalhousie University, 5 Oct 2011.

Where Does AOPS ‘fit’ as an Icebreaker?

Class St. Laurent T1200 T1100 AOPS

Displace’t 11,345 t. 6,097 3,809 5,730

Length 119.6 m. 98.2 83.0 97.5

Beam 24.4 m. 19.8 16.2 19.0

Draught 9.9 m. 7.4 5.8 5.7

Engines 29,400 kw 17,700 8,847 13,200

Motors 20,142 kw 12,174 5,250 9,000

Speed 20 kts 16.5 16.5 17

Range 23,000 nm 15,000 6,500 6,800

Endurance 205 days 192 120 120

Bunkers 3,500 m³ 2,200 785 690

CCG Class Comparisons (I)

Range

Dis

plac

emen

t

.5

5

15

1.5

10

1.0

20

2.0

25

2.5 3.0 3.5

KNM

Kt

St Laurent

T1200

T1100

?

River

Gulf/

Arctic?

Arctic

CCG Class Comparisons (II)

Bunkers

Pow

er

.5

5

15

1.5

10

1.0

20

2.0

25

2.5 3.0 3.5Km³

KW

St Laurent

T1200

T1100

River

Arctic/

Gulf?

AOPS Class Analysis

Range

Dis

plac

emen

t

.5

5

15

1.5

10

1.0

20

2.0

25

2.5 3.0 3.5

KNM

Kt

St Laurent

T1200

T1100

Pow

erK

W

Bunkers Km³

T1100

T1200

St Laurent

AOPS

AOPSRiver ?

Gulf/

Arctic?

AOPS V1 versus V2Class T1200 AOPS V1 AOPS V2 Change

Displace’t 6,097 t 6,940 5,730 -17.4%

Length 98.2 m 109.6 97.5 -11.0%

Beam 19.8 m 18.2 19.0 +4.4%

Draught 7.4 m 7.0 5.7 -18.6%

Engines 17,700 kw 18,000 13,200 -27%

Motors 12,174 kw 15,000 9,000 -40%

Speed 16.5 kts 20 17 -15%

Range 15,000 nm 8000 e 6,800 -17.4 e

Endurance 192 days 120 120 NC

Bunkers 2,200 m³ 810 e 690 -17.4 eNote: e = estimated using change in displacement.

AOPS Class Analysis (II)

Range

Dis

plac

emen

t

.5

5

15

1.5

10

1.0

20

2.0

25

2.5 3.0 3.5

KNM

Kt

St Laurent

T1200

T1100

Pow

erK

W

Bunkers Km³

T1100

T1200

St Laurent

AOPS2

AOPS2River ?

Gulf

?

AOPS1

AOPS1

Naval Bias Against Fuel Capacity

Class St. Laurent T1200 T1100 AOPS V2

Displacem’t 11,345 t 6,097 3,809 5,730

Bunkers* 3500 m³ 2,200 785 690

Ratio (D) .31 m³/t .36 .21 V2 = .120 V1 = .117

Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded.

Halifax-class frigates: ratio = .10 per tonne of displacement

CCGS Radisson refuelling HMCS Toronto, Operation Nanook, 2008

Image: Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 7, No.4 (Winter 2012): 18.

CCG Fuel Consumption

Class St. Laurent T1200 T1100

Endurance 205 days 192 120

Bunkers 3500 m³ 2,200 785

‘Min.’ Rate* 15.4 m³/day 10.3 5.9

‘Normal’ Rate 30 m³/day e 20.0 10 e

‘High’ Rate 75 m³/day e[+/-1000 m³/day]

50.0 25 e

Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded.

Source: Mr. N. Hawksworth – C. Eng. CCG, Atlantic Region

RCN Sustainment of CCG Operations

Class T1200 Gain T1100 Gain

Bunkers 2,200 m³ 9.1% 785 25.5

Min. Rate 10.3 m³/day 19.4 days 5.9 33.9

‘Normal’ Rate 20.0 m³/day 10 days 11.8 e 16.9

‘High’ Rate 50.0 m³/day 4 days 29.5 e 6.8

Assumes approximately 200 cubic metres of fuel (one-third of AOPS’s useable

fuel capacity of 620 cubic metres) is available for transfer to CCG ship.

Estimated gain for St. Laurent is 5.7% of total bunker capacity, and 13 days (min., 15.4 cum/day), 6.5 days (normal, 30.8 cum/day) or 2.6 days (high, 77 cum/day) of operation (using same equating rate from T1200 class).

Note: e = estimated equating rate increase from T1200 class.

A RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (I)• Assuming 10-knot transit speed and 6 hours for

reloading, 1XAOPS could deliver 200 tonnes of fuel at a distance of:

- 3,800 nm to a T1100 CCG icebreaker operating a ‘low’ rate;

- 1,170 nm to a T1200 CCG icebreaker operating at a ‘normal’ rate; or

- 280 nm to CCG Louis St. Laurent operating at a ‘high’ rate of fuel consumption.

• Adding a second AOPS doubles the rate of delivery or the range at which they can sustain a CCG ship.

RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (II)• A ‘cold weather capable’ RCN sustainment ship

(AOR), could deliver approximately 7,000 m³ of fuel to the ice-edge or a suitable anchorage near the ice-edge.

• The AOR could:- act as a ‘station tanker’;- replenish shore or barge tanks; or- employ AOPSs (or CCG ships) as ‘shuttles’.

Comment from CCG Chief Engineer, CCGS Louis St. Laurent:

“This could change everything.”Image: BMT Aegir 18R-class commercial AOR

Question #5

How will the relationship between the RCN and the CCG evolve in arctic

patrolling operations?

Read More Here• Canadian Naval Review at:

http://www.navalreview.ca/

• The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship: A Mandate-Based Typology, J. Matthew Gillis, CFPS 2010 at: http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/Gillis-OutputsAndProducts.pdf

• “Broadsides,” the on-line discussion forum of Canadian Naval Review, at: http://www.navalreview.ca/broadsides-discussion-forum/