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Affirmative AT Skept 1 / 4TOC Juveniles 2010-2011

GENERIC

1. Extend ac framewr!" crs#l$

2. Extend #ermissi%ilit$ affirms.a. T&e state is currentl$ actin' %$ stri#-searc&in' s t&e 1ac is an missin.

%. A%sent a mrall$ relevant reasn fr distinctin" we u'&t t treat t&em t&e same" t&erwise it(s

tantamunt t discriminatin.

c. T&er$ stuff). T&e reslutin #re-su##ses mralit$ exists %$ as!in' a *uestin t&at is #redicated n t&e existence f

mralit$. T&e reslutin is as!in' w&at mralit$ wuld allw" nt w&et&er it exists.

4. +it&ut mralit$ t&ere is n %li'atin fr t&e ,ud'e t ne'ate" even if $u win t&is ar'ument.. t(s l'icall$ im#ssi%le t #rve an existential ne'ative %ecause t&e ran'e f #ssi%le 'rundin's fr

mralit$ is infinite. !e#tics can nl$ eliminate #articular 'rundin's fr mralit$" nt mralit$ in its

entiret$. T&e ne' can never meet t&eir %urden t #rve t&ere is n 'rundin' fr mralit$.. T&is allws fr t&in's li!e t&e &lcaust t %e ,ustified. +e are &umans %efre we are de%aters meanin' we

&ave an %li'atin t re,ect ar'uments t&at we !nw are false %ut can %e warranted in a de%ate rund.

. Just %ecause smet&in' desn(t ccur naturall$ desn(t mean it desn(t exist. a$in' t&at mralit$ desn(t

exist %ecause it is nt naturall$ ccurrin' is a!in t sa$in' t&e Eiffel Twer desn(t exist %ecause it wasn(tmade %$ t&e cluds.

A. Interpretation-Cs must %e sufficient fr t&e aff t win ff f.

3. Violation-winnin' s!e#ticism is nt sufficient t affirm %ecause t&e cnverse f mrals nt existin' is nt

reasn t affirm.

C. Standards

1. Reciprocal burdens- t&is s!ews 'rund %ecause m$ ##nent nl$ &as win ne #iece f ffense t win

t&e rund w&ile &ave t win 100 defense ,ust t even &ave a s&t f winnin' t&e rund. n s&rt" &ave t win t&e %t& AC and t&e C w&ile t&e$ can win eit&er. T&is creates a structural disadvanta'e

since &ave t win all #arts f t&e de%ate w&ile t&e$ &ave t win ,ust ne" w&ic& lin!s t fairness.

2. Advocacy shift-in t&e next s#eec& t&e$ will %e a%le t !ic! ut f an$ ffence t&at was #ut n t&eir case"

t&us turns are ta!en awa$ fr ant&er reasn. Turns are !e$ 'rund %ecause it is ne f t&e main t&e wa$swe can 'enerate ffence. f am denied ne f m$ main rutes t 'eneratin' ffence t&en am #ut at a

structural disadvanta'e w&ic& lin!s t fairness.

). (!R "#$%I&$E' 3t& frms f a%use are multi#lied extremel$ %$ t&e fact t&e$ &ave multi#lenecessar$ %ut insufficient standards %ecause t&ere are nw multi#le avenues &ave t meet w&ereas t&e$

still nl$ &ave t meet ne A5 t&e a%ilit$ t s&ift t&eir advcac$ increases mre as t&e$ &ave mre

avenues t ' fr meanin' it utwei'&s all t&er a%use.5. %he voter is fairness-

And s!e# desn(t #reclud t&eretical ar's a%ut settin' nrm as t&ese functin n a &i'&er levl utside f de%ate

re'ardin' w&at #ractices exist a necc #re rw fr t&e eexistence f ma!in' ar's a%ut s!e# in de%ate.

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Andrew Sepielli explains.[1]Andrew Sepielli. What to Do When You Dont Know What to Do Rutgers New Brunswick

You and I are imperfect beings. One consequence of this is thatwe must make our decisions under

uncertainty.There are two types of uncertainty with which we must contend. One isnonnormative uncertainty uncertainty aboutmatters of nonnormative fact. Non-normative facts may include everythin from the ae of the universe to the !"# of $ur%ina &aso to the

health effects of drin%in four allons of 'ountain "ew in one niht.The other isnormative uncertainty uncertaintyabout thereasons those facts give us.Someone miht( for example( be uncertain about whether the reasons to have an abortion outweihthe reasons not to have one( even she were certain about how the fetus develops( the %ind of life a child born to her would lead( and so on.Similarly( someone may be uncertain whether the reasons to support a tax increase outweih the reasons to oppose it( even if she is sure abouthe economic and social effects of the increase. A ood deal has been written on the issue of what we should do when we)re non-normativelyuncertain. To et a feel for the perceived importance of this issue( consider that nearly every ma*or ethical theory has been pilloried somewhereor other for failin to offer uidance to non-normatively uncertain aents. $y contrast( almost nothin has been written on the issue of what weshould do when we)re normatively uncertain.+ This is both unfortunate and surprisin( as normative uncertainty seems so clearly to pervade thelife of the reflective person.,n this paper( ,)ll ta%e some small steps towards rectifyin this nelect. , will suest that the riht thin to do undernormative uncertainty is iven by what ,)ll call a comparativist principle of rationality. The bad news is that the application of comparativistprinciples is impossible without first solvin a problem that , call the #roblem of /alue "ifference 0omparisons. , spend the ma*ority of the paper

defendin a solution to this problem and answerin ob*ections to this solution. #art ,1 The #henomenon of Normative 2ncertainty An agent

is normatively uncertain *ustin case a3her degrees of belief 4or credences( or sub*ective probabilities3aredivided between at least two mutually exclusive normative propositions( and b3 this division in her derees ofbelief is not entirely due to non-normative uncertainty.5 0onsider a 0ommander-in-0hief decidin whether to o to war. ,f he has somecredence in the proposition oin to war is better than not oin to war and some credence in the proposition not oin to war is better thanoin to war( and this is not fully explained by his uncertainty reardin the non-normative facts( then the 0ommander-in-0hief is normatively

uncertain. There are many different kinds of normative proposition. The ones , want to focus on are what , callpractical comparatives. A practical comparative is a proposition of one of these forms1 Action A is better than Action $6 Action A is worse thanAction $6 Action A is equal to Action $. These propositions are practical in that they are about what we ouht to do( rather than what ouht tobe( or how we ouht to be. They are comparative in that they)re about how actions compare to each other( rather than how they fareabsolutely.7 Other treatments of normative uncertainty have focused on uncertainty amon normative theories(rather than uncertainty amonpractical comparatives.8 Normativetheories include suchethical theories as utilitarianism, and! deontology( virtueethics( and all the rest( as well as theories about prudence( leality( and so on. 'y main reason for focusin on practical comparatives ratherthan on theories is that( while almost everyone has beliefs about the former which( aain( are simply beliefs about which actions are better orworse than which other actions very few people thin% in terms of comprehensive theories li%e utilitarianism. 9ven those who do have beliefsabout theories may have many beliefs about practical comparatives that are entirely independent of the deliverances of any of their theories.,nsofar as our oal is to offer an account of what actual people should do under normative uncertainty( it)d be better to shift the focus away frombeliefs that constitute such a small part of most people)s normative thin%in.: That said( , do thin% uncertainty reardin normative theories isan important topic( so at the end of the paper( ,)ll explain how the basic features of my approach to uncertainty about comparatives can becross-applied to uncertainty about theories. #art ,,1 ;esponses to Normative 2ncertainty. One way of puttin our animatin question is1 should) of rationality and the >should) of reasons.

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Affirmative AT Skept ) / 4TOC Juveniles 2010-2011

, have the hihest credence( , will drin% the coffee. $ut this seems li%e a bad call. A good chance of coffee isn(t worth such asignificant risk of death ) at least( not if ,@ve ot commonsense beliefs reardin the values of coffee and death. %imilarly,suppose I am deciding between actions A and *.There(ssome chance that A is better than $( and an ever so slihtlygreater chance that * is better than A., also believe that( if A is better than *, then A is saintly and * isabominable+ but if * is better than A, then * is slightly nasty and A is merely okay."espite the fact that mycredence is hiher that $ is better than A( it still seems like I ought to do A instead, since A(s normative

upside- is so much higher than *(s, and its normative downside- not nearly as low . ere( then( is amore promisin answer# I should perform the action with the highest expected value. $e get the expectedvalue of an action by multiplying the subective probability that some practical comparative is trueby the value of that action if it is true( doin the same for all of the other practical comparatives( and addin up the results.This stratey is sensitive not only to my credences in the various normative propositions( but also to the siBes of the upsides and downsides ofactions to which the hihest credence stratey was insensitive.

677778 f we acce#t t&at trut& and et&ics &ave n ntl'ical fundatins it desn(t mean we cannt &ave trut&"

rat&er" t&e 'al is t redefine trut& %ased n its #ra'matic im#licatins fr #articular scial lcatins9 :ar!

+arren writes9

;:ar! +arren litical >&ils#&$< >litical T&er$" ?l. 1) . 2 6:a$" 1@8" 1)-212.B

Trut& claims are inter#retive articulatins f t&e wrld t&at ma!e 'al-riented actins #ssi%le. T&usin iet=sc&eDs

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Our trut& claims d nt need t crres#nd t transcendent trut&s. nstead" t&e$ sim#l$ functin t meetur needs and t fulfill ur 'als in #ractical scietal interactins. nsfar as am #rvin' t&at m$ evaluative

framewr! serves a real scietal #ur#se" we can acce#t it as true.

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