ASSIGNMENT 11

JAYSON ABABA

G.R. No. 175910               July 30, 2009

ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABAvs.FE VDA. DE TE

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Fe Vda. deTe, represented by Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against Atty. Sarsaba, Sereno,Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City. Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Petitioner Sarsaba alleged that that there was no showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing by Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spouses Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction.

Atty. Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue. It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. deTe, died on April 12, 2005. Respondent, through her lawyer, argues that respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the pendency has legal effect. RULING: When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased.Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16,Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to

due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein. In this case, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who succeeded her. However, such failure of counsel would not lead to invalidate the proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC. The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.

G.R. No. 169454               December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIOvs.HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO

REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante were the registered owners of a parcel of land located. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato. Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation". No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993.

This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of anew TCT No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners’ predecessors. On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the impairment of legitimeshould be threshed out in a special proceeding, not in civil action forreconveyance and damages.

RULING: Petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-18148             February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDOvs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS: Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died; thereafter, a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. The properties in the will of testator Eusebio was disposed to his wife Hermogena and his cousins. The wife died and was substituted by her collateral relatives, upon executor Bernardo’s petition. Petitioner-executor filed his project of partition, but was opposed by collateral relatives claiming that ½ of the properties disposed of in the will are part of the spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court heard evidence. Petitioner contended that it was donated by the wife to the husband so it was not part of CPG and that the oppositors cannot question the validity of the donation in the probate proceedings.

Oppositors rebutted that since it was donated during marriage, it was void; hence, the husband did not own it and cannot dispose it by will. Probate court ordered the donation voided and that executor submit another project of partition. Petitioner filed Motion for New trial on the ground that probate court had no jurisdiction, but was denied. Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also denied. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether a probate court can determine a question of ownership over property during distribution.

RULING: In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," except where one of

the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced.

In the case, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

G.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETAvs.CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

As ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria,

while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of distribution may still be annulled.

RULING: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.  Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, afinal decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.[27] For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,[28] and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.[29]

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State ofMaryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof.

G.R. No. 144320             April 26, 2006

NATIVIDAD ARIAGA VDA. DE GURREAvs.ENRIQUE SUPLICO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: A complaint for annulment of title with prayer for preliminary injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal by Rosalina Gurrea in her capacity as attorney-in-

fact of the heirs of Ricardo Gurrea against Atty. Enrique Suplico. Atty. Suplico represents Ricardo Gurrea who agreed to pay him a property located at San Juan as attorney’s fees and an additional commission of 5% of the sale of another property. When Ricardo Gurrea died, his heirs filed for the settlement of his estate. Included in the inventory was the lot in San Juan. Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorney’s fees; however, all were dismissed with finality. The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA maintained the lower court’s ruling that the plaintiffs-appellants failed to present clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant defrauded and exerted undue influence on Ricardo in the latter’s execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest and in consequently transferring his ownership of the San Juan lot in his favor; and that based on the evidence, the San Juan lot may be considered as reasonable attorney’s fees for defendant-appellant.

ISSUE: (1) Whether, assuming without admitting, that the ‘transfer of rights and interests’ was duly executed by Ricardo Gurrea, the same violates article 1491 of the new civil code and, therefore, null and void; and, (2) Whether the supposed contract for attorney’s fees in the form of the ‘manifestation’ providing for the payment of attorney’s fees out of the properties in litigation, is valid.

RULING: The Court finds the trial court’s inference to be without sufficient basis. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.In the present case, there is no proof to show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the probate court had issued an order granting the Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond. Since the judge has yet to act on the above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject property which is the subject matter of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation, that is Special Proceedings No. 7185.

Since at the time of execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina, and there being no evidence to show that material possession of the property was given to Ricardo, the probate proceedings concerning Adelina’s estate cannot be deemed to have been closed and terminated and the subject property still the object of litigation.

Having been established that the subject property was still the object of litigation at the time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment of rights and interest over the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for being violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

Article 1409 of the same Code provides, among others, that contracts which are expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered inexistent and void from the beginning.

It follows that respondent’s title over the subject property should be cancelled and the property reconveyed to the estate of Ricardo, the same to be distributed to the latter’s heirs. This is

without prejudice, however, to respondent’s right to claim his attorney’s fees from the estate of Ricardo, it being undisputed that he rendered legal services for the latter.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ prayer for the grant of attorney’s fees in an amount as the Court may determine. The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;1avvphil.net

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

The Court finds that the present case does not fall under any of the enumerated exceptions. It is settled that even if a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

In the present case, even granting that petitioners were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interests, attorney’s fees may not be awarded in their favor because there is no sufficient showing that respondent acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy their

claim, in view of his erroneous belief and judgment that he has lawfully acquired the subject property.

G.R. No. L-15445             April 29, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOLvs.JOSE CANO

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS: The intestate Mercedes Cano died, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. He then filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. FilemonCajator, also an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the government. Judge EdilbertoBarot, then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951

The court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a subdivision. Upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate.

Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and he presented a motion, which he modified ina subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.

The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of Jose Cano.

ISSUE: Whether a probate court, has jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease, and whether these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction.

RULING: In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified

applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.) .

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.

The lessee cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court. The appellant claims that his rights as lessee would be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a corresponding reduction in the rentals would be a matter to be litigate between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact of the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.

The contention of the appellant that since the project of partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision is without merit The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.

But all arguments are squarely laid to naught by the declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as is needed in the course of administration.

G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs.JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA  

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS: Jacinta Limson was married to Alejandro Lopez. They had no children. Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. Petitioner was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro.

After adopting legally Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs. In a project of partition the right of petitioner to inherit from Jacinta and two lots were adjudicated in her name. Petitioner then filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud.

Executor Lopez claims that, by virtue of the order which approved the project of partition submitted by himself and Juanita and directed that the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, and the order which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone terminate the probate proceeding.

RULING: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding . As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed.

The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.

Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.

In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

G.R. No. 178933               September 16, 2009

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: After death Beatriz Silverio, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.

 During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.

 The RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

 Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court

The RTC then issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.

 On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. 

Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 2007with the CA.

 The CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the fresh rule period enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank. Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.

ISSUE: Whether the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court thus, null and void.

RULING: The alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.

 Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

 In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at  No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.

G.R. No. L-852             March 19, 1949

LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTAvs.ISAAC BONILLA and SILVINA ORDAÑEZ

TUASON, J.:

FACTS: Casimiro Evangelista was married to Leonida Mari plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 at Rizal Nueva Ecija and during their marriage and while living together as spouses they begot two children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista all surnamed Evangelista;

Casimiro Evangelista died intestate on or about 1938 at Platero, Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija;

The property in litigation was acquired on January 23, 1935 as per original certificate of title No. 49055 homestead patent;

On January 10, 1944 Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista executed a declaration of heirship and sold on the same date the property in question to the defendants spouses, Isaac Bonilla and SilvinaOrdañez

After the said sale on January 10, 1944 original certificate of title No. 4905 was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued in the spouses Isaac Bonilla and SilvinaOrdañez;

After the sale the defendant assumed possession of the lands and the harvest for the year 1944-1945

That the defendant did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother of Deogracias Evangelista at the time when he bought the land as Deogracias Evangelista was living with his grandfather, Matias Evangelista and that Caridad Evangelista was living with her mother Leonida Mari;

An action was brought to recover plaintiff's combined 3/4 share in a parcel of land sold to defendant by Deogracias Evangelista plaintiff co-owner.

ISSUE: (a) Whether the reliance of the defendants on the court order adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate can be used as defense to avail of the remedy of buyers in good faith; and, (b) Whether judicial partition in probate proceeding is final and conclusive as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share.

RULING: Appellants citation do not fit into the facts of the present case. Good faith affords protection only to purchaser for value from the registered owner. Deogracias Evangelista, defendants grantor is not a registered owner. The land was and still is registered in the name of Casimiro Evangelista. In no way does the certificate of title state that Deogracias owned the land: consequently defendant cannot summon to their aid the theory of indefeasibility of Torrens title. There is nothing in the certificate and in the circumstances of the transaction which them in supposing that they needed not looked beyond the title. If anything it should have put them on their guard cautioned them to ascertain and verify that vendor was the only heir of his father that there was no debt and that the latter was the sole owner of the parcel.

If as is probably the case defendants relied on the court order adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate in the distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court their innocence avails them less as against the true owners of the land. That was a summary settlement made on the faith and strength of the distributes self-serving affidavit; section 4 of the above-

mentioned rule provides that, "If it shall appear at anything within two year after the settlement and distribution of an estate . . . that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of satisfying such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule under which it was made gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. "A judicial partition in probate proceeding does not bind the heir who were not parties thereon. No partition judicial or extrajudicial could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owner may convey to the other more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceeding is not final and conclusive and not being of such definitive as to stop all mean of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share such co-heir may still within the prescriptive period bring an action for reivindicacion in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspective of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition judicial or extrajudicial has been had."

G.R. No. L-23915 September 28, 1970

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ vs.DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ

FACTS: Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased, filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez,represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributees. trial court issued the following order:

Taking into consideration the petition of Dahlia Lopez and Roy Lopez represented by their mother and natural guardian Lolita B. Bachar, dated April 13, 1964 and the opposition to the said motion to re-open filed by attorneys for SaturninaVda. de Lopez dated May 6, 1964, the Court finds that the said petition to reopen is not in order. The said proceeding was already ordered closed and that the property was divided to their respective heirs. In the opinion of the Court, under the law, reopening is not the proper remedy (Tomias, et al. vs. Tomias, et al., G.R. No. L-3004, May 30, 1951). In view thereof, the said petition to reopen is hereby denied for lack of merit.

The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late.

RULING: The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

Finally, in the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this Court, thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.

LUISA LYON NUÑALvs.THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This suit originated from a case for partition and accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and William James. Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares. The CFI rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting.

The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals so the case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition and a subsequent order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued.

Thereafter, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right,

ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo.

On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of the three commissioners and in lieu thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of the fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she could therefore be construed as one of the heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then sought. The lower court issued an order directing the counsel of Emma Lyon de Leon to furnish the court within five days from receipt thereof all the names the of heirs entitled to share in the partitio of the subject property.

The petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the court issue an order directing the partition of the property in consonance with its previous decision dated December 17, 1974 and order dated May 28, 1986. Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board of Commissioners to immediately partition the said property

But the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property and finding that Mary now Mary Lyon Martin is one of the legitimate children of Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property.

RULING: NO. Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."

Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

G.R. No. L-3342             April 18, 1951

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASANvs.ANG CHIA

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, Capiz, and damages. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the intestate estate of LeeLiong.

In view thereof, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia. In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings averified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. On June 21, 1948, the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the appointment of a co-administrator. On August 4, 1948, the court issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator and as regards the petition not to close the intestate proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided, the court stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners.

The court however took cognizance ofthe pendency of said civil case No. V-331. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirshadalready entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners objected, whereupon the court issued on July 15, 1949, an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by the petitioners-appellees.

RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator".

What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the

estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. (Guzman vs.Anog and Anog, supra).

These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted.

If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.

G.R. No. L-43082             June 18, 1937

PABLO LORENZOvs.JUAN POSADAS, JR.

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.

Hanley’s will provide among others that the real estate owned by him will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley ten years after his death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the CFI of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate until he resigned and plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.

During the incumbency of the Lorenzo as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years.

Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount. Posadas counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax

and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzo’s claim for refund against Posadas. Both parties appealed to this court.ISSUE: Whether or not there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax.

RULING: YES. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both instances.

The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent’s property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code:

(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if judicial testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator before delivering to each beneficiary his share.

There are here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the subsection, the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to Moore as trustee. This contention is well taken and is sustained. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust.

 The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word “trust” is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust. The words “trust” and “trustee”, though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created. ” To constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three circumstances:

(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;

(2) a definite subject;

(3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing.”

 There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointmening a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will

 As the existence of the trust was already proven, it results that the estate which plaintiff represents has been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and surcharge provided by law in such cases.

The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore became trustee. On that date trust estate vested in him. The interest due should be computed from that date.

G.R. No. L-33669 March 31, 1977

HEIRS OF D. TUAZON, INC. vs.HON. SIMEON GOPENGCO.

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Francisco Callejon Salinas – former resident of the Philippines, died in Spain on May 31, 1911 (no record when he left the Phils) In 1900 – Salinas appointed TeodosioPintado y Fernandez as his attorney in fact to administer his properties in the Philippines, with express authority to delegate his powers as such attorney or to appoint his successor.

Fernandez appointed Jose Moreno Lahaba as attorney in fact or agent for Salinas. Lahaba administered the properties and rendered accounts until 1911, the death of his principal. He had not, however, rendered any report of his administration in spiteinquiries made by the heirs of his principal from July, 1911 up to the time of his death in 1920. Among the properties administered were the 2 parcels of land in question.

Before the death of Lahaba, the Spanish Consul in the Philippines, at the request of the heirs of Salinas, made inquiries from Lahaba about the properties administered by him. He said he had only P2,500 in his possession belonging to his principal, which he was ready to deliver upon the production of written authority from the heirs for the consul to receive the same. Pending thereceipt of said authority, Lahaba died. The consul presented a claim for P2,500 to the intestate proceedings of Lahaba which was allowed and paid and delivered to the heirs of Salinas. After the receipt of the said amount, the heirs of Salinas requested the Spanish Consul to make further inquiries about the other properties.

It was discovered that Lahaba had sold in the name of Salinas the 2 parcels of land to Tomas Luis for P30,000, on installment. Five days after the sale, the vendee executed a mortgage on said lands in favor of Lahaba for P25,000 to secure the unpaid balance of the price (P5,000 paid already). When Lahaba died, a balance of P20,000 was still unpaid. The said amount was entered in the inventory of his estate as conjugal property and passed to the heirs of Lahaba. Trial court concluded that the heirs are entitled to recover the said sum of P30,000 after deducting the expenses incurred by Lahaba for the survey and registration of said lands and for attorney’s fees and taxes. Both parties appealed. Among the issues include: the court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the claim constitutes res judicata, and the action has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct in deciding in favor of the heirs of Salinas.

RULING: YES. As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. A trustee, however, may acquire the trust estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust and this fact is known to the cestui que trust. The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal. In that case the statute will commence to run from and after said repudiation and the knowledge thereof by the cestui. Furthermore, prescription in order to be available as a defense, the trustee must prove that there was a direct repudiation of the trust and that the cestui que trust or beneficiary had knowledge thereof.

Under the facts hereinbefore stated, the defense of prescription is not available to the defendants. There was no open, clear and unequivocal repudiation of the trust by Jose Moreno Lahaba. Neither was there any knowledge on the part of Callejon Salinas and his heirs of any such repudiation. On the contrary, there was concealment and misappropriation on the part of Moreno Lahaba of the property entrusted to his administration and care.

The claim .of the defendants-appellants that the action constitutes res judicata, and it has prescribed are sufficiently answered by the foregoing arguments and the facts above stated.

GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA, SR. vs.MONICA PALANOG

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against spouses Saligumba. In the complaint, spouses Palanog alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land. The spouses Saligumba allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. During trial, only the counsel for Spouses Palanog appeared. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba died. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba.

After a lapse of more than two years, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog the lawful owners of the subject land. No motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. After 10 years, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the said decision. She further requested that the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants. Petitioners thus question the decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, is extinguished upon death of the party.

RULING:  No. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is

not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs

G.R. No. 167321             July 31, 2006

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR.vs.JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein.  Upon Loreto’s death, a petition for the probate of will was filed by Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino. While the petition for the probate of the will was pending, the devisee Oscar Casa died intestate. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda& Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative.

The probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his rep-resentative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.

Aquino filed a pleading entitled “Appointment of Administrator” signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested the same.

ISSUE: Whether a person nominated as “administrator” by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will under probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that such administrator is not the court-appointed administrator of the estate of the devisee or legatee.

RULING: After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.