assignemnt 1 phil of science

8/7/2019 Assignemnt 1 Phil of Science

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Introductory Philosophy of Science Assignment 1

Christina Free February 13, 2009

1. The Deductive-Nomological Model was formulated by Carl Hempel and is a model that uses

logical processes to derive working scientific explanations for the purpose of predicting

deterministic events. Two major constituents make up the basis for this model, the explanandum

of that which must need an explanation, and explanans of phrases or statements which contain

the explanation for the explanandum. In addition to these, there are four conditions that must be

met in order to comprise a scientific explanation for any particular fact. The first is that the

explanations (explanans) must be valid in logical terms. This is the deductive portion of the

model, as the explanation must take on the form of a sound deductive argument where the

explanandum follows as a conclusion logically derived from the principles stated in the

explanans. Secondly the explanans must contain at least one law, to be specific, a general law

of nature. This is perhaps the most essential aspect of the D-N model, as the term nomological

refers directly to this trait, however, it is also the most problematic as I will explore later. The

third characteristic is that all explanans provided must be empirically testable. Observations

must be able to take place and definite consequences of these tests must be observable and

comparable. The reason for this is to limit the types of explanations provided to purely

scientific reasons. If an example given is not empirically testable, then it cannot be proven to

be true. The last condition of the D-N model is that the explanations orexplanans must be true.

This is intrinsically tied to the third condition, because only through empirical testing can an

explanan be proven true or false.

Many of these conditions required for Hempels model present limitations in their feasibility and

ability to be considered a means to arriving at true scientific explanations. I will consecutively

go through each of the four conditions and explore some of their inherent problems. The first

condition is the least problematic. It is simply the formulation of basic logical statements and itonly makes sense that the explanation for any argument must be logical in order to be relevant to

the question. This is, after all, the basis of what constitutes a deductive statement. However, this

first condition sets the stage for limiting scientific explanations to solely empiricist

methodologies. Philosophers believe that the concept of an explanation has an inherently

pragmatic dimension (pragmatism being the philosophical study considering practical or real


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effects/consequences to be essential components of meaning and the derivation of what is true).

The first condition that limits all explanans to being purely logically derived, in combination

with the other conditions, limits the D-N model as a whole to be completely devoid of

pragmatism. This, in tandem with the rest of the conditions only provide basic explanations that

only tell us whatsomething is, without really explaining to us why it is.

The second condition is where the D-N model finds its largest hurdle. The requirement that a

general law must be present in a scientific explanation is the most fundamental aspect of the D-N

model, however, at the same time it is the most problematic. The reason it is so problematic is

because there has been a long historical debate over what the essence of a law really is, and how

it can be differentiated from what Rosenberg calls accidental generalizations. Many conditions

for the definition of a law have been proposed, however, each of these conditions which will be

discussed in part 2 have their own problems associated as well. So not only is there a lack of a

definition for law, it is also difficult to determine whether or not the laws we are presented with

are true (for they cannot be tested in absolute certainty), but we also are faced with many law-

like generalizations that appear to explain even though they do not fulfill Hempels conditions

such as laws in political science or economics. Therefore, this condition of the D-N model is

fraught with ambiguity and discontent. This is only a quick summary, as the subject of laws will

be discussed at greater length in section 2.

The third condition of empirical testability is yet another requirement that presents limitations in

explanation. It is true that there is a need for way to measure the accuracy of an explanation, yet

just like the first condition, this limits explanations to examples that have to be a) material, b)

observable, and c) controllable. For example, in science, to test certain genes in order to observe

their outcomes is a task that in itself is both extremely difficult, but also hard to apply to real

world situations. Experiments often can only be conducted in controlled environments or be

tested with ceteris paribus. This may reveal meaningful results, but it is unknown whether these

same results apply in the real world. This condition also limits the possibility of examples that

may still support the initial questions, but are based on rationality. Many of the less scientific

sciences pose theories and reasoning that cannot be tested empirically. The science of human

behaviour has many theories on group behaviour and although they attempt to conduct scientific

experiments to aid in their development of theory, many assumptions have to be made,


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controlled situations have to be set up, and the issues of probability and what probability really

means are all obstacles that have to be overcome even though they are not necessarily

empirically testable. Not only that, but in modern day science, we are faced with a whole realm

that goes beyond the atomic level and enters the quantum world. We are faced with a world

where it is near impossible to conduct empirical tests on objects that we cannot even observe or

manipulate.

The last condition that all explanans must be true is problematic mainly because of the problem

of defining what is, or is not true. First, the D-N model states that every explanation must include

a law, and a law by definition has to be true at all time, anywhere and everywhere. This means

that they would have had to be true in the distant past and in the far future. However, at this time,

science does not have the ability to access every possible time and place to test these laws to see

whether they are actually in fact true in all circumstances. Therefore, it is impossible to firmly

state that all laws are decisively true when they are no more than very good hypotheses. So, if we

cannot establish whether the law provided in the explanation is true, it is also impossible to

establish whether all explanans are true as well. Even if our examples fulfill requirement number

3 and are empirically testable, these examples, just like the laws, cannot be tested in every

circumstance to be proven true.

2. The Deductive-Nomological Model is, at its very core, dependent on the notion of a law to

provide validity to all explanans. The inclusion of a law at the foundation of an explanation is

essential to any explanation according to Hempel, as it is the only regularity that we can provide

in an explanation alongside specific instances or examples. The idea of a law as its features can

be traced to the logical empiricists, a school of philosophy during the first half of the 20th

century

whose aim was to combine empiricism, advances in logic and epistemology in an attempt to

create an idyllic standard of explanation for scientific questions. A law being universal in form

(Rosenberg define this in the format of all as are bs or if a occurs then b will follow), is the first

defining feature of what is generally considered a law.

Where the issue in understanding what a law of nature truly is arises in trying to understand the

differences between accidental generalizations and what we call universal laws. On the most

basic level, it seems easy enough to differentiate the two. An accidental generalization could be

that Every Prime Minister of Canada has been of Caucasian descent. Although it is true, it is


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not a law because we cannot predict whether the next Prime Minister will also be Caucasian. A

law is something like All gasses expand when heated under constant pressure. We know that

this has always been, and will continue to be.

In order to overcome this, there is an attempt to recognize that universal statements are true by

articulating them as if-then conditional statements. This reflects the logical structure of the

sentence where the ifis the antecedent and the then is the consequent where the then must be

logically derived from the if. By applying statements not only in a universal form (where

accidental generalizations can still be confused with real laws) into if-then statements it helps in

differentiating generalizations from laws.

This is still not quite enough to define a law, because non-scientific claims can be made in

general if-then statements such as If I knew that this assignment was going to take 6 hours to

complete, then I would have started it 6 hours ago. To remedy this, laws must be able to support

counter-factual conditions. Only law-like statements are able to support such claims where all the

clauses of a statement are false, however, the claim itself is true. The clauses may never have

occurred, and they may never occur, but if a claim can still be made on these clauses that is

reasonable, then it is a law-like statement. For example, this sheet of paper has never been torn,

however, ifenough torsion is applied on this sheet of paper, then it will tear, even though this has

never occurred, nor is it currently occurring on this sheet.

However, there are many other inherent problems in terms of what we call a law. Oftentimes,

what we call laws are not actually true at all, for example, today we know that Newtons F=ma

law is false and is could only ever be true in a situation there was zero friction, air resistance, and

a thousand other hypothetical conditions. Currently laws that we hold are also no more than

excellent hypotheses, but they are nothing more, because in order to prove their validity, the laws

would have to apply in every circumstance at every time there has ever been, and since we

cannot test laws currently in future time, we cannot be sure that they will still stand. Not onlythis, but once we begin to diverge into sciences such as psychology, biology and the social

sciences we are faced with many laws that seem to fail at what many believe the traditional

definition of a law to be. In economics, the law of supply and demand is full of

generalizations, and is a ceteris paribus law, yet it still plays an explanatory role.


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3. Empiricism is a theory of knowledge that is based on experience, mainly that of sensory

perception. It emphasizes the role of evidence, and the experiences of our senses, rather than

reasoning or intuition as the basis of knowledge. Empiricist thought has become the foundation

of modern science, as scientific knowledge comes from the process whereby theories or

hypotheses are tested against observations in the natural world (experiments).

Logic is the study concerned with the structure and development of statements and arguments

into formal systems using natural language. Philosophical logic in particular is primarily

concerned with formal descriptions of natural language and the connections between how to

communicate logic in this natural language. It is the study of necessary truths and of systematic

methods for expressing said truths. If we conjoin these two definitions into one two-term name,

we can begin to approach an understanding what exactly Logical-Empiricism is.

Logical-Empiricism is a branch of empiricist thought which emerged in the 1920s in Vienna and

Berlin. Among some of its most important members are Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Otto

Neurath. Its aim was to combine empiricism alongside new advances in logic (mainly those of

mathematical relation) to prove that philosophical problems could be solved linguistically and by

an analysis of explication. Logical-empiricists held the ideology that every meaningful statement

about the world makes a claim about what experiences we can expect to see and we can affirm

whether these claims are true by actually observing these predictions coming to fruition. They

believed that every true (or false) statement can only be verified by empirical evidence.

In addition to this, logical-empiricists added a strong reliance on the use of mathematical logic

which was traditionally problematic for empiricists because it presented truths that were

necessary rather than contingent (a statement whose truth is based on how things actually are in

nature rather). Necessary truths are statements whose truths are not dependent on contingency

but whose truths reflect the only way things could be arranged, for example, that 9 is an odd

number is a necessary truth. Therefore, necessary truths end up simply resembling definitions,where decisions about how we use symbols or numbers are arbitrarily given meaning. Logical-

empiricists believed that since philosophy, unlike science, does not discover by experimentation

or observation, therefore they saw that they could make the greatest progression by limiting

themselves to definitions and their meanings, much like mathematics and mathematical logic.


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As a result of this, logical-empiricists avoided the use of causality as a method for explanation,

and also avoided abstract philosophy such as metaphysics. Firstly, why was there an aversion

to cause? In the previous paragraph, I explored the use of necessary rather than contingent

truths in logical-empiricism. Because these necessary truths were basically definitions, they

would only be able to explore the currentsituation, and predictfuture consequences of a

something. The initial cause of whatever instigated an event is can neither be explained by

definitions, nor can it be observed. In the second section, I defined the function of laws in the

logical-empiricist inspired D-N model. The crux of the problem of laws came down to the debate

about whether there are real necessities in nature, for if there are none, it is difficult to see what

explanatory content laws hold above accidental generalizations. If there are real necessities in

nature, then they are not openly or easily recognizable. Because of this dilemma, many turned

away from laws as a basis of explanation as in the D-N model to its opposite, cause. In the D-N

model, there was an aversion to cause because it seemed that there was no place for laws to

explain causality, but also because it seemed that the notion of causality limited the key elements

of logic, as cause as the foundation for explanations cannot be properly observed or predicted.

Not only did the logical-empiricists stand opposite of explanation by causality, but there was also

an aversion to all branches and forms of emotivism. That being subjects and ideas related to

metaphysics, art, religion and ethics. There arose a sort of anti-metaphysics stance in logical

empiricism because they held that all propositions whose truths cannot be established by logic or

empirical observation are not meaningful. These types of propositions were rejected on the

basis that since they are not analytic, that science would not have to deal with them. This

aversion was not only limited to scientific though, but philosophical though as well. Logical-

empiricists believed that the importance of analysis should apply to philosophy, as they held that

philosophy that is done in a constructive or scientific manner is much more valuable, and that

philosophy that relies on logical analysis will get rid of the unimportant problems that arise in

metaphysics and thus philosophers and scientists alike can focus on logical problems that canactually be answered or solved.

assignemnt 1 phil of science

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