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Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016, Supplementary Linked Document 1
ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
A. Sector Performance, Problems, and Opportunities
1. Sector Performance and Problems
1. Kazakhstan’s economic activities and wealth were unevenly spread over various regions and
scope for income redistribution was limited. In this context, transport planning had an important
complementary role to play. Efficient infrastructure and coherent policy and institutional measures
needed to combine toward an enabling environment for sustained broad-based social and economic
development.
2. Kazakhstan’s vast territory, low population density, mineral resources scattered across the
country, and location between Europe and Asia made it highly dependent on a cargo-intensive transport
system. With a relatively low density of railways and waterways, roads were the key element of the
transport system.1 However, much of the road network was in poor condition—about 60% of republican
roads needed major rehabilitation and proper maintenance. The feeder network serving the rural
population was not fully developed, in poor condition, and characterized by low service level, especially
during winter. This resulted in a high cost in transporting goods—the transport cost component of about
10% of cargo value was far above the average of about 4% in developed economies.
3. Kazakhstan’s three road networks were managed by different levels of government and their
road organizations: (i) republican roads were under the Ministry of Transport and Communications
(MOTC) and its Committee of Roads (COR), (ii) local or rural roads were under oblasts or provincial
governments, and (iii) urban roads were under municipality or city authorities. There were about 23,500
kilometers (km) of republican roads with only about 40% in asphalt-based surface; and about 70,116 km
of rural roads, of which 10% were asphalt-based.
4. Kazakhstan’s location at the center of transport flows between Europe and Asia created
significant transit potential and provided strategic arteries of emerging transcontinental routes. Few land
routes could avoid it when linking north to south or west to east. Trade between Asia and Europe,
amounting to $700 billion in 2009, was to reach $1 trillion by 2015, of which 20% was to go through
Kazakhstan. Transit traffic was to generate $1.1 billion in annual revenues.
5. Despite its strong potential, transit traffic fell short due to deteriorated infrastructure on the six
main CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) international corridors. Technical and
operational characteristics were below international standards, with traffic exceeding allowable loads.
The average speed along the Europe–Caucasus–Asia corridor was less than 20 km per hour. Cross-border
impediments were also a barrier to traffic and trade. Major constraints included (i) unreasonable delays
and complicated procedures for customs and frontier inspection, (ii) inconsistency between national
transport legislation and international standards, and (iii) lack of international agreements on transit and
traffic regulations.
6. The road sector had long-standing operational and institutional bottlenecks: (i) the network was
incomplete with some sections in bad condition; (ii) truck overloading was frequent, cutting into the
economic life of road assets; (iii) transit revenues were low, affecting cost recovery and reinvestment
capabilities; (iv) inefficient cross-border procedures increased the burden on trade and raised the cost of
1 Strong growth in Kazakhstan’s economy led to a rise in road freight transport (in ton-kilometers) of about 10% per year and the
number of vehicles by about 5% per year. The motorization level of 100 cars per 1,000 persons in 2015 was the highest in the
region, although still low by European standards.
2 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
doing business; (v) weak sector planning affected sound investment sequencing; and (vi) project
management shortcomings created inefficiencies.
7. Although road accidents had fallen by 7% per year, speeding and inadequate road design and
operations still caused many accidents and high fatality rate. Efficient road operations and traffic
management need reliable road network data. Complete road and traffic data was also crucial to efficient
planning. Advanced information systems could have included axle load monitoring and control, road
weather information systems, and traffic-recording equipment. Such systems would have provided data
to make the right maintenance decisions that ensure road restrictions were minimized and costs were
low.
2. Key Challenges and Opportunities
8. The road system faced challenges in respect to (i) network coverage, quality, and accessibility;
(ii) sector institutions; and (iii) funding maintenance and investments.
9. Coverage and accessibility. The republican road network offered reasonable coverage, albeit with
important missing links. Substantial investments were needed to make it complete and more effective.
Repair of provincial roads was also a priority. Parts of the network were impassable during winter. This
made access to rural areas, towns, and neighboring countries difficult.
10. Quality of assets. Major parts of the three road networks were in a poor state. MOTC wanted to
bring 86% of republican and 70% of rural roads into good condition.
11. Institutional and management gaps. Although the MOTC was becoming more efficient in
planning and monitoring, further reforms were needed. The oblast administrations were less capable and
needed technical backup. Unless addressed, the gap would affect rural and provincial road network
development. Institutional gaps were aggravated by lack of experience in outsourcing to the private
sector, and in project management skills and knowledge.
12. Road safety. In 2011, a total of 12,019 road accidents were recorded, with 2,707 fatalities and
14,000 injured. Speeding was a key contributor, but low quality construction, lack of security barriers,
lighting, and police oversight also were factors. Vehicle roadworthiness standards and supervision also
needed improvement.
13. Border crossing times. Cross-border time delays and costs became a burden on business, despite
improvements. Operators cited unreasonable delays, complicated procedures, too many inspections, and
lack of international agreements on transit and traffic regulation.
14. Road data and planning. Road and traffic data were out of date and incomplete. Planning
processes needed improvement. Existing road inspections and traffic surveys needed to be strengthened.
15. Funding. Maintenance was 7% of the sector budget and was underfunded. The issue was being
addressed with, private sector figuring more strongly in developing and maintaining assets, the
introduction of a road maintenance fund, a budget making larger and more predictable allocations, and
government tapping international financiers for capital expenditures. Domestic capital markets would be
tapped and public-private partnerships explored.
B. Government’s Sector Strategy
16. The 2020 Strategy for Economic Development and the State Program on Accelerated Industrial-
Innovative Development was adopted in 2010 to diversify the economy and promote balanced
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 3
development. Also relevant to the transport sector were the National Territorial Development Strategy,2
the Transport Sector Development Strategy for 2006–2015,3 and the Road Sector Development Program
for 2006–2012.4 Common to these was the goal of fostering sustainable development, improving living
standards, and increasing country competitiveness.
17. To support the 2020 Strategy, the Road Development Program for 2006–2012 was reformulated
(2010) into the Transport Infrastructure Development Program for 2010–2014. Under the Transport
Infrastructure Development Program, the government placed high priority on well-integrated
investments in international transit corridors and connecting roads. It focused on reconstructing corridors
and improving operation and maintenance systems to establish an efficient transport system.
18. Physical Investment. The Program would upgrade 5,311 kilometer (km) of national roads on the
6 international corridors passing through Kazakhstan during 2010–2014. Priority investments were
(i) reconstructing the Western Europe–Western China Corridor; (ii) reconstructing 12 road sections:
Shuchinsk–Kokshetau–Petropavlovsk–border with the Russian Federation, border with the Russian
Federation–Uralsk–Aktobe, Astana–Kostanai–Chelyabinsk, Zhetybay–border with Turkmenistan, Astana–
Karagandy, Almaty–Kapshagay, Taskesken–Bakhty, Usharal–Dostyk, Beyneu–Akzhigit–border with
Uzbekistan, Omsk–Pavlodar–Maikapshagai, Kurty–Burylbaytal, and Beineu–Aktau; and (iii) exploring
other potential transit routes on the west–east and north–south corridors. Some 9,673 km of local roads
were also to be constructed or rehabilitated. By 2020, 16,000 km of national roads were to be
constructed or reconstructed. About a quarter of the total construction cost and upgrading of road
infrastructure was to be met through external borrowing and a third through public-private partnership
concessions.
19. Nonphysical Investment. The Program was to improve strategic planning, promote market
reforms, enhance safety and maintenance standards, and strengthen private sector participation. It
focused on mitigating nonphysical barriers to cargo movement by addressing the limited coordination
among parties, inadequate technology at border crossings, and poor information management. A
competitive environment for transport services was planned to accelerate the integration of Kazakhstan’s
transport into the international transport system.
C. ADB Sector Strategy and Portfolio
20. According to the 2012–2016 Country Partnership Strategy, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
was to support the modernization of the country’s transport and logistics system. CAREC road and rail
corridors were priorities for investment in the sector. It was the lead international agency supporting
Kazakhstan’s transport, customs cooperation, and trade facilitation activities in the CAREC framework.
Expected results are detailed in Table 1.
21. The transport sector dominated ADB assistance with over half of the portfolio (52.5%). These
comprised nine loans and three technical assistance (TA) operations. Loans were funded through two
multitranche financing facility (MFFs), two stand-alone projects, and a $68 million co-financing from the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Table 2 provides details. Appendix 1 of the main text
shows details on the loans and TAs.
2 Government of Kazakhstan. 2006. Strategy of Territorial Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan up to 2015. Astana.
3 Government of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Transport and Communications. 2006. Transport Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Up to 2015. Astana.
4 Government of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Transport and Communications. 2006. Road Development Program for 2006–2012.
Astana.
4 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
22. One of three project preparatory TA was to prepare the Astana Sustainable Urban Transport
Project (Astana Light Rail Transit Project) for approval in 2012.5 It was delayed due to the redesign of the
original project after the country won the bid to host Expo 2017.
Table 1: ADB Sector Results Framework for Transport
Sector
Objectives
Sector Outcomes
and Indicators
Areas of
Intervention
Indicative Resource
Allocation and Thematic
Priorities
Develop an
efficient
transport and
logistics
system that is
integrated and
on a par with
the
international
system.
Increased and more efficient
movement of people and goods to
domestic and international markets
Transport cost in the final cost of
goods reduced to 5% by 2016 (2011
baseline: 10%)
Traffic increased to 3,500 vehicles per
day (vpd) on the Mangystau Oblast
section of CAREC Corridor 2 by 2016
(2009 baseline: 1,000 vpd)
Travel time between Aktau and Beineu
reduced to 4 hours by 2016 (2009
baseline: 12 hours)
National roads and
improvement of cross-
border infrastructure
Logistics improvement.
Sector-wide institutional
and governance reforms
Public-private partnerships
Knowledge support,
capacity development,
and policy dialogue
$605 million, 54% of
public sector resource
envelope for 2012–2014,
of which: economic
growth: 100%; private
sector development:
38%; regional
coordination and
integration: 100%.
Source: Independent Evaluation Department (IED).
Table 2: ADB Sovereign Assistance to Transport
Number Amount
($ Million) Loans TAs
Approved during 2012–2016 2 2 497.3
Approved before and Implemented during 2012–2016 7 1 1,258.6
Total 9 3 1,755.9
TA = technical assistance.
Sources: IED calculation based on ADB databases and mainframe. Data as of 31 December 2016.
D. Evaluation of ADB Sector Operations
1. Relevance
23. From a broad sector development perspective, the validation rates ADB’s support to the
subsector relevant. It agrees with the Country Partnership Strategy Final Review (CPSFR) that selection of
the transport sector in the country partnership strategy (CPS) was aligned with the government’s
development plan Kazakhstan 2020 that focused on infrastructure development and finance for economic
growth, diversification and industrialization. It also corresponded to the core area of ADB’s Strategy 2020
in infrastructure development and regional cooperation and integration.6
24. The CPSFR stated that infrastructure improvements were particularly important in rural and
remote areas where utilities and the transport network were inadequate. Investing in Kazakhstan’s road
system was a long standing priority to reduce the cost of transporting goods and people across a vast,
sparsely populated, and landlocked territory. The validation found that the CAREC corridor roads program
design was based on detailed sector assessments and road maps, so the approach taken to design was
justified.
25. All but one of the nine ADB-funded projects in the transport sector were closed by October 2016,
All four tranches of the CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast) program was financially closed in
5 ADB. 2011. TA 7865. Kazakhstan: Astana Light Rail Transit Project. Manila. A supplementary TA for $151,000 was approved in
May 2013.
6 ADB 2014. Midterm Review of Strategy 2020: Meeting the Challenges of a Transforming Asia and Pacific. Manila.
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 5
2015. The first three tranches were rated relevant by their respective project completion report (PCR).7
The CAREC Corridor 1 program was to contribute to improved transport connectivity in Zhambyl Oblast
and to boost regional connectivity and international trade. The PCRs concluded that all three tranches
were in line with government objectives and policies and strategies, plans and programs of ADB and the
CAREC program.
26. Project design for Tranche 1 addressed the need for improved safety, serviceability and
operational efficiency of the road network. But, one-third of the original loan amount was canceled due
to overestimation of civil works and consulting services costs and inclusion of excessive contingencies.
Minor design changes reflected actual conditions and needs of the local population.
27. The CPS final review flagged several design issues on Tranche 2 during its implementation. First,
a 20 km section of the road was realigned to put the transport corridor within Kazakhstan in response
to border security requirements of the Eurasian Economic Union. Second, it noted poor technical
specifications in all civil works contracts on road construction. Third, poor road maintenance depot
designs resulted in start-up delays. The design of Tranche 3 went unchanged from appraisal to
completion and was adequate to attain the intended outputs and objectives. Minor variations in works
contributed to improved road safety. Various stakeholders were involved during preparation,
implementation and completion of the project. The government showed a strong sense of project
ownership as the COR commissioned the project engineering design, monitored project implementation,
and inspected the project roads during defects notification period.
28. Tranche 4 of CAREC Corridor 1 is likely relevant, as it continued to support transport connectivity
in Zhambyl Oblast and boosting regional connectivity and international trade. Another four loans were
closed in 2016. These were Tranche 3 of Corridor 1, Tranche 1of CAREC Corridor 2, and the stand alone
loans for CAREC Corridor 3 and the Taraz Bypass in CAREC Corridor 1. These projects are also likely
relevant as they seek similar outcomes in terms of transport connectivity (e.g., Mangystau Oblast and
Shymkent-Tashkent sections) and regional connectivity and international trade. They are also in line with
government objectives and policies and strategies, plans and programs of ADB and the CAREC initiative.
29. The validation mission appreciates the strong developmental angles to the CAREC corridor roads
program.8 It noted that road design was driven by a commitment to achieve a level of service from
existing roads. The design of the MFF for CAREC Corridor 1 and the project under Tranche 1 used forecasts
from a feasibility study by the MOTC in 2007 (Report and Recommendation of the President, Appendix
14, Table A14.2). Based on this data, traffic volume seemed to have been overestimated. The design of
the MFF and Tranche 1 project of CAREC Corridor 2 (Mangystau Oblast) was not well established. It used
2007 traffic data and extrapolated this to 2010 using gross domestic product growth. During its round
trip drive on the Almaty to Taraz road (Wednesday and Thursday), the validation mission found traffic
very light in general with no vehicles for long stretches of the drive. Traffic on the Taraz Bypass was
almost non-existent.
7 ADB. 2014. Completion Report. CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-Western People’s
Republic of China International Transit Corridor] Investment Program (Project 1) in Kazakhstan. Manila; ADB. 2016. Completion
Report. CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-Western People’s Republic of China International
Transit Corridor] Investment Program (Tranche 2) (Kazakhstan). Manila; ADB. 2016. Completion Report. CAREC Transport
Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-Western People’s Republic of China International Transit Corridor]
Investment Program (Tranche 3) (Kazakhstan). Manila.
8 ADB. 2008. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. Proposed Multitranche Financing Facility
and Administration of Loan CAREC Transport Corridor I (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-Western People’s Republic of
China International Transit Corridor] Investment Program (Kazakhstan). Manila. (RRP).
6 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
2. Effectiveness
30. The overall achievement of outcomes in the transport sector is likely less than effective. Sector
outcome targets are not seen to have been met by 2016 while completed projects indicate mixed results
based on the available data.
31. According to the CPS results framework, the government goal in the transport sector was to
develop an efficient transport and logistics system that was integrated and on par with international
standards. Correspondingly, expected sector outcome was an increased and more efficient movement of
people and goods to domestic and international markets, to be measured by three indicators:
(i) transport cost in the final cost of goods reduced to 5% by 2016 (2011 baseline: 10%), (ii) traffic volume
increased to 3,500 vehicles per day (vpd) in Mangystau Oblast section of CAREC Corridor 2 by 2016 (2009
baseline: 1,000 vpd), and (iii) travel time between Aktau and Beineu reduced to 4 hours by 2016 (2009
baseline: 12 hours).
32. The CPSFR argued that the first indicator was only casually estimated by the COR of the Ministry
of Investment and Development because it was vague and difficult to measure, and therefore excluded
this target from the effectiveness rating. However, as the CPSFR pointed out, the country operations
business plan 2016–2018 reported 9% for this indicator in 2014 (CPSFR, footnote 38), a slow trend
unlikely to catch the target of reduction from 10% in 2011 to 5% in 2016. In addition, with the additional
information in the PCRs for the three completed projects under CAREC Corridor 1 (footnote 7), the
validation mission is of the view the target was unlikely met. The PCR for Tranche 1 reported that during
2010–2013 passenger fares and cargo charges increased along the project sections, and assessed the
target unlikely achieved. The PCRs for Tranche 2 and 3 showed a reduction in vehicle operating costs, but
both were silent whether the target cost reduction was met.
33. For the second indicator, the CPSFR stated that it was 2,287 vpd for 2014, an improvement over
the 2009 baseline value of 1,000 vpd, but significantly lower than the 2012 value of 3,283 vpd. The
CPSFR argued the target would be achieved after the ongoing constructions of Tranche 2 roads are
completed (scheduled for end 2017) and the economic recovery picks up. The validation finds this
argument unconvinced, given the traffic volume in 2014 was 2,287 vpd, a level far behind the target of
3,500 vpd in 2016. As road constructions were delayed, the second target could be considered unmet
by the CPS results framework.
34. With respect to the third indicator, travel time between Aktau and Beineu for 2014 was
7 hours. The CPSFR stated that it was unlikely that the 450 km distance could be covered within 4 hours
by 2016, given that construction will be ongoing throughout 2016. In the validation’s view, even without
the construction delay, the target is unlikely to be met because it will require an average speed of 112
km per hour, an unlikely high speed given road conditions and the maximum allowable speed limit.9
35. At the project level, all four tranches of the CAREC Corridor 1 for Zhambyl Oblast program were
financially closed by October 2015.10
Tranches 1–3 have a PCR while the PCR for Tranche 4 has yet to be
prepared. Tranche 1 project was rated effective by the PCR and less than effective by the PCR validation
report due to partial achievement of road operations and maintenance at completion, shortfall in traffic
volume, and unmet target outcome.11
Actual traffic in 2013 on both Taraz – Kulan and Blagoveschenka
– Korday roads were only 80% of their pre-project (2007) levels (Tranche 1, PCR, Appendix 9, Table A9.1).
9 A check with the Google Maps showed a travel time of 6 hours 5 minutes between Aktau and Beineu (accessed 10 February
2017).
10 The JBIC component of Tranche 3 CAREC Corridor 1 was closed on 1 August 2016.
11 IED. 2015. Validation Report. Kazakhstan: CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-Western
People’s Republic of China International Transit Corridor] Investment Program (Project 1). ADB: Manila.
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 7
36. Both Tranches 2 and 3 were rated effective by the PCR, but no validation has been prepared. In
this validation’s view, Tranche 2 is likely less than effective due to significant implementation delays and
partial completion of its four road maintenance depots. More importantly, traffic in the Merke –
Blagoveschenka section was lower than expected. Recalculated traffic growth for 2014–2020 was under
3% per year while volume was only two-thirds of appraisal estimates for 2020. Actual traffic in 2014 was
marginally higher than appraisal forecast, but thereafter forecasts at the PCR time were significantly
lower than appraisal estimates (Tranche 2, PCR, Appendix 11, Table A11.1). The achievement in reduced
transport cost for freight is not clear.
37. Tranche 3 was likely to be effective in meeting intended outcomes at appraisal. According to the
PCR, long term traffic projections for the Otar – Blagoveschenka section is 28% above the appraisal target
for 2020. Average travel time on the Otar-Blagoveschenka-Kulan section was reduced to 6 hours in 2015
from 10 hours in 2009. The average annual daily traffic for the three road sections of Tranche 3 was
around 7,200 vpd in 2015 compared to about 4,000 vpd at appraisal. Cargo volume at the Karasu border
increased from around 393,000 tons in both directions in 2010 to around 911,000 in 2015. Vehicle
operating costs savings per km for freight vehicles realized at 16% in 2015 compared to 2010. The road
crash fatality rate fell by half to 0.16 per km in 2015 from 0.3 in 2015; and more than 20,000 people in
the project area benefited.
38. Tranche 1 under CAREC Corridor 2 (Mangystau Oblast) was financially closed in February 2016
while Tranche 2 projects are still under implementation. There is no data yet on both projects’ outcomes.
In the case of Tranche 1, the PCR has yet to be prepared but this validation noted that only 53.4% of the
original loan amount was disbursed at completion. While it is not possible to rate the effectiveness of
this MFF, this validation notes the target year is 2016 and as the MFF is not completed the outcome
targets could be considered unmet.
39. In addition to the two MFFs, two stand-alone road rehabilitation projects along CAREC Corridors
1 and 3 were approved. Both were financially closed by October 2016. The 65 km road rehabilitation of
the Taraz Bypass in Zhambyl Oblast under CAREC Corridor 1 was completed and was opened for
operation in 2015. Again there was no data on outcomes at this time but the validation mission observed
the very low traffic on the bypass, and is of the view the targeted traffic outcome of this project likely
not achieved. For CAREC Corridor 3, the validation mission found improvement of the 37 km road section
from Shymkent to Tashkent was then 80% complete with 25.2 km of new concrete paved road and three
out of seven underpasses completed. The validation also noted that only 64.5% of the original loan
amount was disbursed, indicating target outputs were likely under delivered. There were no data on
outcomes to rate the project’s effectiveness, but as the target year was 2015, they were not met as
expected. See a summary in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary Performance of ADB Transport Sector Operations
Indicator Performance Status
Sector-level outcome indicators
1. Transport cost reduced to 5% by 2016 (2011
baseline: 10%).
2. Traffic volume increased to 3,500 vpd in CAREC
Corridor 2 roads by 2016 (2009 baseline: 1,000
vpd).
3. Travel time from Aktau to Beineu reduced to 4
hours by 2016 (2009 baseline: 12 hours).
2016 data not available. But as of 2014, transport cost reduced to
9%. This slow trend unlikely to catch the target of reduction from
10% in 211 to 5% in 2016. The indicator is assessed unlikely met.
Traffic volume was 2,287 vpd in 2014. CAREC Corridor 2 projects
were not completed in 2016. The indicator is considered unmet.
Road constructions unfinished in 2016. Google Maps show the
travel time of more than 6 hours. The indicator is considered
unlikely met.
Completed road projects with PCR
CAREC Corridor 1, Tranche 1
8 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
Indicator Performance Status
CAREC Corridor 1, Tranche 2
CAREC Corridor 1, Tranche 3
The validation report assessed less than effective. Outcome targets
were not met in terms of traffic volume, travel time, transport cost,
and accident rate. Outputs were partially achieved in road
operations and maintenance components at completion.
This validation assessed likely less than effective due to traffic
volume being lower than appraisal estimate, and significant delays
and partial completion of road maintenance depots.
Completion delayed over 1.5 years. The tranche is considered likely
effective as outputs were delivered as envisaged and PCR data
show outcomes were met in travel time, traffic volume, travel time,
road accident rate. Transport cost is not clear though.
Other road projects
CAREC Corridor 1, Tranche 4
CAREC Corridor 2, Tranche 1
CAREC Corridor 2, Tranche 2
CAREC Corridor 3
Taraz Bypass (Zhambyl Oblast)
Completed. PCR to be prepared.
Completed with 53.3% of the loan disbursed.
Delayed and ongoing. Given the outputs were not delivered as
targeted in 2016, outcomes could be considered unmet.
As of 2016, 80% of project roads were completed as opposed to
the planned completion in 2015. Given the delays, outcomes could
be considered unmet as targeted for 2015.
Completed. PCR to be prepared.
Source: IED evaluation team.
3. Efficiency
40. Overall, the validation rates ADB’s transport sector operations likely efficient. The first three
tranches of CAREC Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast) are efficient. Their recalculated economic internal rates
of return (EIRR) ranged from 14.8%-23.3%, demonstrating the projects’ economic viability. The CPSFR
stated that some projects will be able to achieve higher outputs due to additional funds from cost savings
and, therefore, ongoing transport projects then were likely to be efficient. Process efficiency was
satisfactory with no major implementation issues on the other completed and ongoing projects.
41. The validation notes that at completion, the EIRRs show the strong variability in traffic demand.
Tranche 1 was 16.2% at project completion compared to 28.1% at appraisal mainly due to a lower than
expected traffic. The EIRR for Tranche 2 is 14.8%, slightly below appraisal of 16.4% due to lower than
forecast of average daily traffic growth beyond 2016, resulting from the economic slowdown in 2014
and slow recovery of the Kazakhstan and the regional economy primarily caused by drop in mineral prices
and slower economic growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For Tranche 3, the EIRR at
completion was 23.3%, higher than the 16.6% at appraisal. This change was due to higher observed
traffic using the road and with construction costs within budget.
42. The CPSFR noted that some projects had cost overruns while others had savings that were used
to expand their scope during implementation. In the validation’s view, delays in implementation and
changes in scope most likely did not affect outputs, outcomes or impacts of the projects. Savings, if
applied to the financing of other project components, may generate additional outputs, which, in turn,
may entail expenditures and benefits. However, in the absence of specific information and data on such
expenditures and benefit, an assessment of the incremental added net value and the EIRR is not possible.
43. The PCRs for Tranches 1, 2, and 3 of CAREC Corridor 1 found the MFF to have been implemented
smoothly without any major implementation issues. The validation mission’s discussions with ADB and
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 9
government staff confirmed that there were also no major implementation issues on the other completed
and ongoing projects. Therefore, process efficiency was satisfactory.
4. Sustainability
44. The validation assesses ADB’s assistance to the transport sector as likely sustainable.
45. Sector performance has been constrained by institutional and management gaps, weaknesses in
road data and planning, and road safety issues. As the country worked to improve the quality and
coverage of the road network, it faced chronic funding shortages for road maintenance. Although budget
allocation for maintenance reportedly increased over the years, actual funds made available have been
lower than requirements. Maintenance was only 7% of sector budget, hence underfunded with routine
maintenance reportedly being frequently applied to seriously deteriorated locations. This is also evident
in Tranche 1 of the CAREC Corridor 1 program which saw independent validation downgrade the original
PCR sustainability rating to less than sustainable.12
Further, the current financial and economic
uncertainty due to significantly reduced oil revenues and volatile exchange rates, have an effect on the
government budget.
46. Given the sector context, positive steps have been taken, albeit now at a nascent stage, to
improve sustainability. Institutional reforms are taking place to improve road maintenance and asset
management. KazAvtoZhol Joint Stock Company was established in 2013 with responsibility for
implementing government-funded road projects and maintaining the national highways. While the
institutional capacity and financial performance of KazAvtoZhol are yet to be seen, its ability to become
fully self-financing will likely relieve pressure on the state budget for funding maintenance and
investments.
47. In response to financial and economic uncertainty, the government introduced tolls on select
main road corridors to mobilize resources for maintenance. Annual toll collection from the CAREC
Corridor 1 roads alone is projected at $10,000 per km, and such revenue will be sufficient to maintain
tolled sections and contribute to maintenance on untolled national highways. Given that there are few
prospects for oil prices to rebound, government’s ability to diversify budgetary resource for road
maintenance is critical. The PCRs for Tranches 2 and 3 of the CAREC Corridor 1 program indicated that
both project roads are primary candidates to become toll roads. The plan is to increase the current length
of tolled roads from 211 km to 6,911 km of key national highways by 2022. The viability of a tolling
system, to augment existing revenues, remains to be seen because traffic on any other roads than urban
is not likely to make them self-financing.13
48. The COR and KazAvtoZhol is also continuing institutional reforms in road maintenance with a
performance-based maintenance project planned for implementation with ADB financial and
institutional support. A functioning road asset management system is also expected to be put in place
to help effectively monitor and plan road operations and maintenance.14
49. With an improved road network and coverage, a key sector concern is managing the number and
severity of accidents. Road safety is seen to improve through capacity building in road safety
management and engineering; data collection and analysis; traffic law enforcement; and road safety
advocacy and education. Road safety controls have been installed along Tranches 2 and 3 roads of CAREC
Corridor 1.
12
Key issues were: chronic funding shortage for maintenance of road systems; routine maintenance expenditure was lower than
needed for active projects during the CPS period; the toll system anticipated at project formulation did not materialize; and road
operations and maintenance component of the project was significantly delayed or partially completed.
13 The tolling of roads appears less likely in the near or medium-term future as traffic volumes are low on international and
republican roads. In the case of the Tranche 1 roads, the expected toll system anticipated at project formulation did not
materialize.
14 The results-based road maintenance system will monitor the status of roads and prioritize maintenance and vehicle weight and
axle load control.
10 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
50. New technologies have also reduced corruption and increased weight compliance. The Ministry
of Investment and Development strictly enforces the axle load regulation of 10 tons per vehicle and uses
special automated measuring devices and transport control post along CAREC Corridor 1. This should
reduce the deterioration in road assets.
51. Given the status of the macro-economy and oil revenues potential, the government is likely to
provide funding for its public road sector expenditures. During the CPS period 2012–2016, it has provided
substantial allocation for road maintenance or about $100 million during 2013–2015. This validation
agrees with a CPSFR rating of likely sustainable for the transport sector operations under the assumption
that efforts to improve funding and diversification of revenue sources is sustained, road network projects
are prioritized based on a road asset management system, and that reforms in sector management
continue.
5. Development Impact
52. The validation assessed development impacts in the transport sector as likely satisfactory. The
CAREC roads are international transit corridors. But the validation mission found that more time is needed
for transit traffic to evolve as originally envisaged. Current data mainly point to inclusive impacts on the
sparsely populated hinterlands within the road influence areas. There is little evidence on benefits to the
national economy and external trade, as expected in the design and monitoring framework. At the same
time, some unintended negative impacts were also noted.
53. Future performance of the corridor roads depends on progress made by current regional
cooperation initiatives and further investments in enabling and complementary infrastructure, policies
and institutions. But the prospect of a Kazakhstan economic recovery is a good sign for future traffic.
Additional information received from ADB’s Central and West Asia Department in March 2017 show
recent progress made on regional economic integration between Kazakhstan and other economies under
the CAREC Program. Shanghai Cooperation Organization road transport agreement and International
Roads Transport custom guarantee system became effective in January 2017. Taking these into account,
net benefits of ADB’s support in the transport sector could prevail in the next few years. Overall, the
validation considers the transport sector operations’ development impact likely satisfactory.
54. Local benefits. The CPSFR stated that rehabilitation of national roads mostly benefited the
surrounding population as the main users of the road. The validation agrees, and this is confirmed in
available PCRs for three of the four completed tranches under the CAREC Corridor 1 program. The projects
were reported to have reduced the local travel time, improved access to local markets and facilities, and
provided employment opportunities and income to local residents.15
Under Tranche 2, vehicles using the
Blagoveschenka–Merke road section, including commercial cargo and passenger vehicles, doubled from
2009 after completion of the road. A significantly shorter travel time increased access of local people to
regional markets and social services. From 2009 to 2013, unemployment in Zhambyl oblast fell from
6.0% to 5.1%. Most of those employed on the project were local people. The impact of the stand-alone
Taraz Bypass project is likely moderate based on the small traffic observed.
15
Local government authorities and residents informed the ADB PCR mission for Tranche 3 that the roads improved: (i) travel
convenience; (ii) access to markets, social service facilities, and business areas in Almaty, Korday, Merke, and Taraz; and
(iii) employment opportunities and income. In Turar Ryskulov raion in Kulan, residents said travel time in Otar–Blagoveschenka–
Kulan stretch had fallen from 10 hours to 6 hours and that road safety and environmental conditions improved in Kulan since
cargo trucks no longer travelled on village roads. Cafes, small shops, and fuel stations at both ends of the Kulan Bypass increased
employment opportunities and incomes. In Korday raion, a cafe and a fast food restaurant reportedly opened with the road
towards Karasu and the parking area trucks at the Karasu border crossing. Additional local businesses are expected. Along Otar–
Blagoveschenka road, drivers, and passengers noted increased travel comfort due to smoother pavement and the construction
of rest areas, bus stops, and gender-sensitive toilets.
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 11
55. Regional benefits. Being transit corridors, the CPSFR also stated benefits for interregional and
cross-border trade. The mission did not find this evident in the PCRs. The PCRs for Tranches 2 and 3
claimed that the improved corridors will lower the cost of trade and stimulate economic activity between
Kazakhstan and its neighbors. Both did not give support data, and achievement is pending on completion
of other future operations. There is limited evidence on corridor impacts to the national economy and
external trade. Current traffic volume on Tranches 1 and 2 roads is below expectation. In travelling back
and forth along the Almaty to Taraz project road, the mission noted traffic was very light generally and
with none for long stretches. Traffic on the Taraz Bypass was almost non-existent.
56. Kazakhstan has benefited from several regional TAs in building institutional and operational
capacity for regional cross-border transport.16
While the many of these initiatives are relatively new and
their effectiveness cannot be fully assessed at this time, the outlook is positive based on the project
roads’ potential as cited in the PCRs for Tranches 2 and 3: (i) the road being part of a national transit
corridor connecting the European Union, the Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan with the PRC;
(ii) establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015; (iii) development of the Center of International
Cooperation in Khorgos in line with the regional economic integration programs of Kazakhstan and the
PRC; and (iv) improvements at the Karasu border crossing with the Kyrgyz Republic
57. With lower than expected traffic for most of the improved roads, the validation mission is not
convinced about broad regional impacts (e.g., trade with the PRC, Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian
Federation, and Uzbekistan) as first envisaged from the CAREC Corridor 1 program. But it notes there
have been regional benefits associated with border crossings linked to the roads. For example, cargo
volume in both directions of the Karasu border crossing reportedly increased to 911,000 tons in 2015
from 393,000 tons in 2010. Bus and truck traffic run along the CAREC Corridor 3 road from Shymkent to
Tashkent.
58. Unintended impacts. The PCRs reported that some unintended negative impacts did occur. These
included a rise in road accidents and unintended environmental and safeguards issues along the project
roads: road accidents in Zhambyl Oblast increased by 31% in 2012 and this trend continued in 2013
(Tranche 1); increase in the land area and number of people affected by the project; (Tranche 1 and
Tranche 2), and road construction cut trees but reforestation works had not started (Tranche 2).
E. Other Assessments
59. ADB Performance. The validation agrees with the CPSFR assessment that ADB’s performance is
satisfactory. According to the completion reports of Tranches 1, 2 and 3 of the CAREC Transport Corridor
1 program, ADB’s performance was satisfactory. The project was administered from ADB headquarters
with active involvement of the Kazakhstan Resident Mission. ADB built a sound relationship and provided
substantial and timely support to the executing and implementing agencies (MOTC/Ministry of
Investment and Development, Committee of Roads)
60. ADB collaborated with the Ministry of Finance and MOTC to strengthen project readiness through
due diligence reports and safeguards and economic analysis. During implementation, ADB provided
timely guidance and support in approving advance actions; preparing and evaluating documents related
to procurement of civil works and consulting services by providing prompt and detailed feedback; and
holding close consultations for timely and practical resolution of safeguards, and financial and technical
issues. ADB’s close monitoring contributed to timely project completion. During the project, ADB and the
Islamic Development Bank did not coordinate their operations. Teamwork between ADB and Japan
International Cooperation Agency also facilitated effective project preparation, implementation, and
completion.
16 These support the Almaty-Bishkek economic corridor initiative, enhanced road safety, gender inclusive growth, private sector
trade facilitation, regional transit trade facilitation, alignment of customs trade facilitation measures with best practice, sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, and coordinated border management (para.79).
12 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
61. Borrower Performance. The validation agrees with the CPSFR assessment that borrower
performance is satisfactory. According to the completion reports for Tranches 1, 2, and 3 of the CAREC
Corridor 1 program, performance of the borrower, the executing agency, and the implementation agency
was satisfactory. The change of the executing agency from Ministry of Transport and Communication to
the Ministry of Investments and Development did not affect project implementation as the Committee
of Roads kept its role as implementing agency. The latter has been implementing ADB-funded projects
and other projects using international financing along CAREC Corridor 1, which provided the needed
experience in adequately managing externally funded projects. The implementing agency implemented
the project in accordance with ADB guidelines and policies, facilitated timely release of counterpart funds,
and complied with covenants. As this was the first project after reorganization of the executing agency,
guidance by and consultation with ADB was needed, particularly on safeguards, procurement, consultant
recruitment and contract administration because the executing agency lacked experience with ADB
guidelines.
F. Overall Rating
62. The validation rates the transport sector program successful on the borderline of score of 1.60,
with the ratings of relevant, less than effective, efficient, likely sustainable, and likely satisfactory
development impacts. Details are in Table 4.
Table 4: Transport Sector Rating
Criterion CPSFRa
CPSFR Validationb
Key Reasons for Difference
Relevance Relevant Relevant
Effectiveness Effective Less than effective Sector outcome targets are not expected to be met by
2016, the less than effective rating for CAREC Corridor 1
(Tranche 1), and the data to date pointing to a mixed
rating for the other projects.
Efficiency Likely efficient Efficient
Sustainability Likely sustainable Likely sustainable
Development
impacts
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Overall score 2.0 1.8
Overall rating Successful Successful
a ADB. 2016. Country Partnership Strategy Final Review: Kazakhstan, 2012–2016. Manila.
b Validation’s assessments.
Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
G. Lessons and Recommendations
63. Lessons. The PCR for Tranche 1 of CAREC Corridor 1 for Zhambyl Oblast identified three lessons.
First, the need for realistic cost estimates. Costs for civil works and consulting services were overestimated
at appraisal while contingencies were excessive. This resulted in cancellation of 34% of the loan amount.
Changes in scope and design were also needed to accommodate geological conditions and needs of the
local population. These were not identified at design stage. In validation’s view, the PCR was not clear
why costs were overestimated or which aspects of design changes could have been anticipated at
appraisal.
64. The design stage for ADB is the project preparatory technical assistance or feasibility study stage.
Objective of that stage is a rough (conceptual) estimate of designs and costs. Geological constraints
reveal themselves typically at the engineering stage of a project and could not have been captured by
the conceptual ADB design.
Supplementary Linked Document 1: Assessment of the Transport Sector 13
65. Second, the need for clear identification of the role of the project management consultant. The
expected role of the consultant was unclear as the original terms of reference did not properly define the
tasks and deliverables of each expert. This resulted in many refinements to the terms of reference during
implementation. These roles and responsibilities should be properly defined during project preparation.
66. Third, the need for improvement of the executing agency’s project management capacity.
Inadequate knowledge in the MOTC and the Committee on Roads regarding safeguards and procurement
and a lack of staff with appropriate expertise were major factors affecting project implementation and
ultimately led to stakeholder complaints. Support for capacity and enhancing knowledge in the executing
agency and KazAvtoZhol are important, particularly for procurement, safeguards, and contract
administration.
67. Validation agrees with the second and third lessons and offers additional two lessons. First, it
was evident from the report and recommendation of the President and field observations that accurate
traffic assessments were not done causing a gross overestimation of benefits. The overestimation of the
traffic also likely had an effect on the proposed project design pointing to potential overinvestments. Use
of old traffic data and substandard techniques for forecasting should be avoided.
68. Second, expectations for tolling on some of Kazakhstan’s roads must be carefully evaluated for
viability. If traffic where tolling is proposed is light, like the Almaty-Taraz road as observed by the
validation mission, then tolls will not generate revenues rather reduce traffic.
69. This is a bold assumption. Tolls set at a high level may indeed deter traffic provided that the
traffic has alternative routes. In the case of the project roads, one would have to assess whether such
alternatives exist and at what toll level traffic would reroute. Both aspects are not assessed. In reality,
international transit traffic and long distance Kazak traffic has no such alternatives.
70. Recommendations. The completion reports for Tranches 1, 2 and 3 of the CAREC Corridor 1
program offered several recommendations. First, the executing agency should continue to conduct road
safety audits, raise road safety awareness, and increase police oversight. It must do monthly reviews of
the safety performance of project roads, including speed surveys and accident data to determine
necessary engineering and/or enforcement countermeasures.
71. Second, in the context of operational maintenance reforms wherein the completed road is
converted to a toll road, it is recommended to implement integrated road management, based on the
Intelligent Transport System solutions, to enable better traffic planning and control and improve road
safety and road asset management. The Government should continue also support KazAvtoZhol in
making a transition toward establishing more toll roads to fund overall road network maintenance. MOTC
will need to allocate more funding so that KazAvtoZhol is able to undertake road maintenance. The
government should monitor and follow up on these initiatives.
72. Third, the completion report recommended improvement in border crossing infrastructure. The
government should engage in dialogue with neighboring countries and take a unified approach to
enhance the project corridor’s operational reliability, user-friendliness, and sustainability.
73. Fourth, the completion report recommended private sector participation in the road sector. The
competence of the local construction industry should first be assessed and plans developed to strengthen
capacity. Alternative approaches to private sector participation in road operation and maintenance
should be assessed, i.e., funding modalities, institutional setup, operational mechanisms, and contractual
frameworks, including performance-based maintenance contracts.
74. Fifth, the completion report recommends that project schedules take account of (i) lengthy
government procedures to sign loan documents and initiate effectiveness, (ii) time and resources for
14 Kazakhstan: Country Partnership Strategy Final Review Validation, 2012–2016
archeological studies and other mandatory due diligence; and (iii) additional works from user
perspectives like crossing for cattle and agricultural machinery.
75. Validation concurs with the recommendations. It also recommends that implementation of a
project performance management system be closely monitored by ADB to ensure the quality of the
system and usefulness of data collected at project start and completion.
76. Traffic data of major roads should be routinely collected. This will enable more accurate
estimation of traffic levels to determine economic viability of road subsector investments, maintenance
needs, and the viability of policy proposals such as tolling of Kazakhstan’s roads.
15
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ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPORT SECTOR PORTFOLIO
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
`Loan 2503: CAREC
Transport Corridor
1 (Zhambyl Oblast
Section) [Western
Europe-Western
People's Republic of
China International
Transit Corridor]
Investment
Program - Tranche
1
Approval Date:
30 Dec 08
Closing Date: 20
Mar 14 (PCR –
June 2014)
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
340.0
Actual: 224.1
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
Impact (of the Overall Corridor Investment including the
Investment Program): Sustainable economic development.
Indicator 1: By 2020, GDP growth of 68% from 2010
baseline. GDPs of Kazakhstan’s economic partners will
increase by 43% for other Central Asian countries,a
4% for
Russian Federation, 6% for the PRC, and 4% for the EU.
Status at Completion: Likely to be achieved. In 2013,
Kazakhstan GDP increased by 51.88%, while that of the
Russian federation increased by 28.88% (as measured in
equivalent US dollars). The GDP of EU member countries
increased by 1.39 % on average.
Indicator 2: By 2020, increased values of external trade
reflected in the expansion of exports (by 32%) and imports
(by 33%). More particularly, exports to other Central Asian
countries increased by 50%, Russian Federation 25%, PRC
36%, and EU 28%. Conversely, imports from other Central
Asian countries increased by 48%, Russian Federation 27%,
PRC 37%, and EU 30%. Status at Completion: Likely to be
achieved. From 2010 to 2013, the value of exports to the
PRC and Russian Federation increased by 44% and 91%,
respectively, while the value of imports from the PRC and
Russian Federation increased by 348% and 82%,
respectively. Values of the export to the Central Asian
countries increased on average by 34% (2010–2013), while
trends in import value were mixed.b
Indicator 3: By 2020, outputs of transport sector increased
by 79% and distribution sector increased by 77%,
compared with 2010 baseline. Status at Completion: Less
likely to be achieved. No data have been collected
regarding the nationwide outputs achieved in the
transport sector by 2013; however, the government’s total
investment in the transport and trade sector increased by
46.10% from 2010 to 2013.
The impact indicators in both the RRP and PCR
were for the whole corridor and were expected to
be achieved in 2020. As a result, it is difficult to
attribute the initial achievements in the PCR
project framework to the project.
The CPSFR rates the project as less than effective
because there was no data on project outcomes
and only partial progress was made in the
establishment of road maintenance facilities at
four sites.
Indicator 1: Not assessed.
Indicator 2: Initial achievements:
PCR indicated that the project increased volume of
trade and diversified the number of entrepreneurs
in the trading and tourism industries.
Indicator 3: Not assessed.
Tranche 1 is relevant. Design
addressed improved safety,
serviceability and
operational efficiency of the
road. But still, one-third of
the original loan amount
was canceled due to
overestimation of civil works
and consulting services
costs and inclusion of
excessive contingencies.
The validation mission
appreciates the strong
developmental angle to the
CAREC corridor roads
program. Road design is
driven by a commitment to
achieve a level of service
from existing roads. This
likely led to an
overestimation of traffic and
overinvestment in the road.
Tranche 1 is less than
effective due to its lower
than expected road usage
and partial achievements on
road operations and
maintenance system at
completion. Validation of
the Tranche 1 completion
report by IED later
downgraded its rating to
less than effective because
of the mixed results on their
outcomes and outputs.
16 K
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Validation, 2012
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CPSFR Validation
Assessment
Outcome: Efficient transport system in Zhambyl Oblast.
Indicator 1: By 2015c
, increased average traffic volume
from 4,000 vpd in 2007 to 7,000 vpd.
Indicator 2: By 2015c
, reduced average travel time between
Zhambyl Oblast and the southern Kazakhstan border and
Otar from 10 hours to 6 hours.
Indicator 3: By 2015c
, reduced transport cost for freight
from 10% to 5% of the cargo value [baseline year not
given in DMF].
Indicator 4: By 2015c
, reduced accident rate from 0.3
fatality/km in 2006 to 0.1 fatality/km.
Note: The CPSFR used a different set of outcome
indicators compared with the DMF attached to the
PFR and the PCR. The CPSFR had only two
indicators compared to 4 in the DMF.
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to
2,000 vpd in 2014 from 1,000 vpd in 2007
Assessment (Note: Most of these sentences were
taken from the PCR.): AADT in 2012 was 4,298
vehicles for the Taraz-Kulan section, and 3,911
vehicles for the Blagoveschenka-Korday road
section.
The economic internal rate
of return for Tranche 1 was
16.2% at project completion
compared to 28.1% at
appraisal mainly due to a
lower traffic forecast. Given
the low volume of traffic
under CAREC Transport
Corridor 1 for Zhambyl
Oblast and the Taraz
Bypass, the EIRR for this
road is likely below the
threshold level of 12% real.
Overall, the project is rated
efficient.
Project sustainability is less
likely sustainable given the
chronic funding shortages
for road maintenance and
the inability for the
government to realize its
plan to introduce a toll
system to collect funds for
the maintenance. Sufficient
funding of road
maintenance will be an
issue in the longer term
especially when other road
projects are completed and
routine road maintenance
will be needed.
The validation [IED] assessed
development impacts in the
transport sector as likely less
satisfactory. It agrees with
the CPSFR that a
comprehensive analysis of
sector level impacts is
premature at this time, as
most projects are still
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time to 1 hour
in 2014 from 2 hours in 2007
Assessment: In 2013, the average travel time was
reduced to 6.5 hours between Almaty and Taraz
City. (PCR)
Passenger fares did not decrease as expected, but
increased sections (e.g., taxi and bus fares
between Taraz and Kulan increased about 33% in
2013 compared to 2010). Similar trends were
observed in cargo charges, and consequently, a
reduction in travel and freight cost was assessed
unlikely to be achieved.
Note: Indicators 3 and 4 were not presented in the
CPSFR. Indicator 3 was assessed as part of its
assessment for Indicator 2. Indicator 4 was not
assessed.
Output 1: Reconstructed highway sections in Zhambyl
Oblast
Indicator: 125-km road reconstructed on time, within
budget, and meeting technical specifications with IRI of
less than 3 m/km.
Output 2: Improved road operations and maintenance
system.
Indicator 1: Sustainable road maintenance and operation
system prepared and pilot projects formulated.
Indicator 2: ITS strategy developed.
Indicator 3: Investment plan for ITS agreed for
implementation under the subsequent projects.
Output 1: Achieved. 125 km road reconstruction
completed (79 km and 46 km) and open to traffic.
Roughness of project sections was reduced from 5-
7 on the IRI to 1.1.
Output 2, Indicator 1: Partly achieved. The road
maintenance and operation system was proposed
and considered in the newly adopted national
transport program, but no pilot projects were
formulated.
Output 2, Indicator 2: Achieved. An ITS strategy
was proposed and considered in the new national
transport program.
Output 2, Indicator 3: Partly achieved. Facilities for
the ITS were not implemented, although
budgetary resources were allocated.
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PCR rated the project effective in achieving its
expected outputs and outcomes.
ongoing. The project road is
an international transit
corridor and simply not
meant to impact sparsely
populated in the
hinterlands. But recent
observations by the
evaluation mission point
only to project impacts on
populations in the
immediate area with little
evidence on its impact on
the national economy and
external trade, as envisaged
in the design and
monitoring framework.
Efficiency: EIRR was 16.2%, higher than the ADB
benchmark of 12%, but lower than the 28.1%
expected at appraisal. PCR rated the project
efficient.
Sustainability: PCR rated the project likely
sustainable. The PCR indicated funds would be
sufficient to maintain the project as the
government would introduce a toll system.
Loan 2562: CAREC
Transport Corridor
1 (Zhambyl Oblast
Section) [Western
Europe-Western
People's Republic of
China International
Transit Corridor]
Investment
Program - Tranche
2
Approval Date: 7
Oct 09
Closing Date: 22
Oct 15
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
187.0
Actual: 184.7
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
Impact: Sustainable economic development. By 2020,
Kazakhstan's
(i) GDP growth by 60% from the 2010 level.
(ii) Export and import growth by 30% from the 2010 level.
Not assessed.
Tranche 2 is relevant with
several design issues during
implementation.
Tranche 2 generally met its
intended outcomes and
outputs. The project roads
with their reduced
roughness resulted in
reduced travel time and
vehicle operating costs,
improved road safety, and
comfortable conditions for
long distance passenger and
commercial travelers.
Reduction in transit time
and vehicle operating costs
stimulated transport along
the corridor. Overall,
Tranche 2 is likely less than
effective due to the partial
completion of its 4 road
maintenance depots and a
lower than expected traffic
growth along the Merke –
Blagoveschenka section.
Outcome: Development of an efficient transport system in
Zhambyl Oblast. By 2015 c
:
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to 7,000 vpd
from 4,000 vpd in 2007.
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time between Zhambyl
Oblast and South Kazakhstan border and Otar to 6 hours
from 10 hours [Note: baseline year not given in DMF].
Indicator 3: Reduced transport cost for freight to 5% of the
cargo value from 10% in 2008.
Indicator 4: Reduced road accident rate to 0.1 fatality/km
from 0.3 fatality/km in 2006.
Indicator 5: Tranche 2 benefitting about 10,000 people in
the project area.
Note: The CPSFR used only 2 outcome indicators,
with a different set of targets compared with
those presented in the DMF attached to the PFR.
The CPSFR used the following:
Indicator 1: increased average traffic volume to
4,000 vpd in 2014 from 2,500 vpd in 2007
Assessment: All road sections are open to traffic.
Road users benefit from the completed road
sections. No data on achievement of outcome
indicators.
Indicator 2: reduced average travel time between
Zhambyl Oblast and south Kazakhstan border and
Otar to 1.5 hours in 2014 from 3 hours in 2007
Assessment: All road sections are open to traffic.
Road users benefit from the completed road
sections. No data on achievement of outcome
indicators.
Indicators 3-5 were not assessed.
Output 1: About 79 kilometers of reconstructed highway
section in Zhambyl Oblast.
Note: In addition to the output and indicator given
in the DMF that was attached to the PFR, the
CPSFR had one more output with one indicator,
and an additional indicator for output 1.
18 K
azakhstan: Country P
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Validation, 2012
–2016
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
Indicator 1: By 2013, highway section km 310.5–km 389.4
in Zhambyl Oblast reconstructed with IRI of less than 3
m/km.
Additional indicator (from CPSFR):
Indicator 2: Reconstructed 59 km of the Zhambyl Border-
Taraz road sections (km 536-593) on time, within budget
and with pavement IRI < 3 m/km by 2013
Additional Output and Indicator (from CPSFR):
Output 2: Road maintenance facilities constructed and
operational in 4 sites
Indicator: Constructed 4 road maintenance facilities in
Otar, Merke, Akyrtobe, Korday; and operational by 2013
Output 1, Indicator 1: Achieved. Road section km
358.6-389: 4 reconstruction completed ahead of
schedule in December 2012 and now open to
traffic. Road section km310.5-358.6:
reconstruction completed in August 2013 and now
open to traffic.
Tranche 2 is rated efficient.
The EIRR for Tranche 2 is
14.8% or slightly below
appraisal of 16.4% due to
lower than forecast of
average daily traffic growth
beyond 2016.
ADB’s program of assistance
to the transport sector as
likely sustainable.
Government has steadily
increased funding for road
sector expenditures on
public roads. The COR and
KazAvtoZhol is continuing
institutional reforms in road
maintenance with a
performance-based
maintenance project
planned for implementation
with ADB financial and
institutional support. But
still, adequate funding for
road maintenance is a long
term issue that depends on
the government budget
performance and equally
affects all projects in the
road sector. Further, even as
institutional capacity is
improving, there is still no
functioning road asset
management system in
place to help monitor and
plan effective road
operation and maintenance.
The validation [IED] assessed
development impacts in the
transport sector as likely less
satisfactory. It agrees with
Output 1, Indicator 2: Reconstruction of the road
section km 536-593 commenced in March 2010,
completed in January 2013, and now open to
traffic.
Output 2: As of original closing date of 30 June
2015, partially completed. Progress is: Korday
(85%), Otar (53%), Akyrtobe (63%) and Merke
(100%).
Project is likely to be rated less than effective.
Sustainability: Road maintenance facilities
construction in 4 sites along the corridor need to
be completed and operational. Government has
chronic funding shortage for road maintenance.
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the CPSFR that a
comprehensive analysis of
sector level impacts is
premature at this time, as
most projects are only
recently completed. The
project road is an
international transit corridor
and simply not meant to
impact sparsely populated
in the hinterlands. But
current observations by the
evaluation mission point
only to project impacts on
populations in the
immediate area with little
evidence on its impact on
the national economy and
external trade, as envisaged
in the design and
monitoring framework.
Loan 8251: CAREC
Transport Corridor
1 Investment
Program - Tranche
3
Approval Date:
31 May 10
Closing Date: 1
Aug 16
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
68.0
Actual: 68.3
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
This loan is related to Loan 2697-KAZ: CAREC Transport
Corridor 1 (Zhambyl Oblast Section) [Western Europe-
Western People's Republic of China International Transit
Corridor] Investment Program - Tranche 3. Thus, there was
no separate assessment done for this loan.
Loan 2697: CAREC
Transport Corridor
1 (Zhambyl Oblast
Section) [Western
Impact: To contribute to sustainable economic
development by promoting international trade and
regional cooperation. By 2020 [2010 baseline],
Kazakhstan’s
Not assessed. Tranche 3 is relevant . The
design of went unchanged
from appraisal to
completion and was
20 K
azakhstan: Country P
artnership Strategy F
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Validation, 2012
–2016
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
Europe-Western
People's Republic of
China International
Transit Corridor]
Investment
Program - Tranche
3
Approval Date:
15 Nov 10
Closing Date: 22
Apr 15
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
173.0
Actual: 164.7
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
(i) GDP growth by 60%.
(ii) Export and import growth increased by 30%.
adequate to attain the
intended outputs and
objectives. Minor variations
in works contributed to
improved road safety.
Tranche 3 was likely
effective in achieving
intended outcomes and
outputs at appraisal.
Reestimated traffic growth
are well above appraisal
Other benefits observed
were an increase in cargo
volume at the Karasu border
crossing and more
businesses such as gas
stations, cafes and shops
along the project road.
Tranche 3 is rated efficient.
The EIRR at completion was
23.3% as compared to
16.6% at appraisal. This
change was due to higher
observed traffic using the
road and with construction
costs within budget.
ADB’s program of assistance
to the transport sector as
likely sustainable.
Government has steadily
increased funding for road
sector expenditures on
public roads. The COR and
KazAvtoZhol is continuing
institutional reforms in road
maintenance with a
performance-based
maintenance project
planned for implementation
with ADB financial and
Outcome: Efficient connectivity, improved road safety, and
institutional effectiveness. By 2015:
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to 7,000 vpd
from 4,000 vpd in 2007.
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time through Zhambyl
Oblast between the southern Kazakhstan border and Otar
to 6 hours from 10 hours in 2009.
Indicator 3: Reduced transport cost for freight to 5% of the
cargo value from 10% in 2008;
Indicator 4: Reduced road accident rate to 0.1 fatality/km
from 0.3 fatality/km in 2006; and
Indicator 5: Project 3 benefitting about 8,000 people in the
project area.
Note: The CPSFR had only 2 outcome indicators
with different targets compared to those used in
the DMF that was attached to the PFR. The CPSFR
used the following:
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to
2,500 vpd in 2015 from 1,000 vpd in 2009
Assessment: Works in all road sections were
completed and roads were open to traffic. Traffic
volume increased by 300% as initially observed.
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time through
Zhambyl Oblast between the southern Kazakhstan
border and Otar to 3 hours by 2015 from 5 hrs in
2009
Assessment: Works in all road sections were
completed and roads were open to traffic. An
average of 50% time savings is initially observed.
Achievement of outcome indicators still being
monitored.
Indicators 3-5 were not assessed.
Output: 118 km of road section in Zhambyl Oblast of the
CAREC Transport Corridor 1 reconstructed.
By 2013, road section from km 383–404, km 162–260,
approach to Kyrgyz border reconstructed with IRI of less
than 3 m/km.
Output: Achieved. Road construction of 20 km at
road section Km 383-404 was completed in
October 2013, and the road was open to traffic
(JICA funded). Construction at road sections km
162-260 and Korday-KGZ border were
substantially completed in November 2014.
Sustainability: Based on RRP of the investment
program, government would increase budget
allocation and introduce toll system for road
maintenance. However, government has chronic
funding shortage for road maintenance.
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Assessment
institutional support. But
still, adequate funding for
road maintenance is a long
term issue that depends on
the government budget
performance and equally
affects all projects in the
road sector. Further, even as
institutional capacity is
improving, there is still no
functioning road asset
management system in
place to help monitor and
plan effective road
operation and maintenance.
The validation [IED] assessed
development impacts in the
transport sector as likely less
satisfactory. It agrees with
the CPSFR that a
comprehensive analysis of
sector level impacts is
premature at this time, as
most projects are still
ongoing. The project road is
an international transit
corridor and simply not
meant to impact sparsely
populated in the
hinterlands. But recent
observations by the
evaluation mission point
only to project impacts on
populations in the
immediate area with little
evidence on its impact on
the national economy and
external trade, as envisaged
in the design and
monitoring framework.
Loan 2735: CAREC
Transport Corridor
Impact: To contribute to sustainable economic
development. By 2020 [2010 baseline], Kazakhstan’s
Not assessed. No PCR has been prepared
for Tranche 4 of the MFF
22 K
azakhstan: Country P
artnership Strategy F
inal Review
Validation, 2012
–2016
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
1 (Zhambyl Oblast
Section) [Western
Europe-Western
People's Republic of
China International
Transit Corridor]
Investment
Program - Tranche
4
Approval Date:
21 Feb 11
Closing Date: 27
Apr 15
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
112.0
Actual: 104.2
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
(i) GDP growth by 60%.
(ii) export and import growth increased by 30%
after its completion in 2015.
Although project outputs
were achieved, there was no
data on project outcomes
and the CPSFR could not
rate the effectiveness of this
project.
Outcome: Development of an efficient transport network
in Zhambyl Oblast. By 2015:
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to 7,000 vpd
from 4,000 vpd in 2007.
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time through Zhambyl
Oblast between the southern Kazakhstan border and Otar
to 6 hours from 10 hours in 2009.
Indicator 3: Reduced transport cost for freight to 5% of the
cargo value from 10% in 2008.
Indicator 4: Reduced road accident rate to 0.1 fatality/km
from 0.3 fatality/km in 2006.
Indicator 5: Project 4 benefitting about 8,000 people in the
project area.
Note: The CPSFR had only 2 outcome indicators
with different targets compared to those used in
the DMF attached to the PFR. The CPSFR used the
following:
Indicator 1: Increased average traffic volume to
2,000 vpd in 2015 from 1,000 vpd in 2007
Assessment: Road construction was completed in
May 2014, and road section was open to traffic.
Outcome indicators are being monitored.
Indicator 2: Reduced average travel time through
Almaty-Korday-Blagoveshchenka-Merke-Tashkent-
Terment road section to 2 hours in 2015 from 4
hours in 2009
Assessment: Road construction was completed in
May 2014, and road section was open to traffic.
Outcome indicators are being monitored.
Indicators 3-5 were not assessed.
Output: 49 kilometers of road section in the Zhambyl
Oblast upgraded from category II to category IB.
Indicator: By 2013, road section from km 260.5–km 310.5
reconstructed with IRI of less than 3 m/km.
Note: The CPSFR had a different output statement
and indicator compared to the DMF attached to
the PFR: The CPSFR used the following:
Output: Almaty-Korday-Blagoveshchenka-Merke-
Tashkent-Terment road section improved and open
to traffic.
Indicator: Reconstructed 49 km of the road section
on time, within budget and with pavement IRI < 3
m/km by 2014
Assessment: All concrete pavement works for 49
km were completed on time. The road section is
open to traffic.
Sustainability: Government increased budget for
road maintenance. Among EA initiatives include:
(i) installation of a comprehensive and unified road
asset management system, including automated
weighing facilities and traffic count data system;
and (ii) integration of road safety audit activities
into regular road operation.
Project likely to be sustainable.
Loan 2824: CAREC
Corridor 1 ( Taraz
Bypass)
Impact: Increased trade in Kazakhstan.
Indicator: By 2020, Kazakhstan’s trade volume increased by
10% from 2011.
Not assessed. The 65 kilometer road
rehabilitation of the Taraz
Bypass in Zhambyl Oblast
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Approval Date: 7
Dec 11
Closing Date: 28
Apr 16
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
85.0
Actual: 82.3
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
Outcome: Better connectivity for the Zhambyl Oblast
section of the CAREC Transport Corridor 1. By 2015:
Indicator 1: Average travel time through Zhambyl Oblast—
between the southern Kazakhstan border and Otar—
reduced to 7 hours, from 10 hours in 2009.
Indicator 2: average traffic volume along the project road
increased to 7,000 vpd, from 4,000 vpd in 2007.
Indicator 3 (Added in CPSFR): By 2015, reduced accident
rate on the project road to 0.1 fatality/km from 0.3
fatality/km in 2006.
Note: The CPSFR used a different target for
indicator 1 (compared with the one presented in
the DMF attached to the RRP), and had an
additional indicator.
Indicator 1: By 2015: reduced average travel time
through Zhambyl Oblast between the southern
Kazakhstan border and Otar to 6 hours from 10
hours in 2009
Assessment: Road construction is complete.
Outcome indicators are currently being monitored.
under CAREC Corridor 1 is
complete and was opened
in 2015 for operation.
There was no data on
outcomes but the validation
mission did observe the very
low volume of traffic using
the bypass (i.e. traffic was
light in general and there
were no vehicles for long
stretches of the road; traffic
on the Taraz Bypass was
almost non-existent).
Therefore, the validation
rates the outcome of the
project to be less than
effective.
Given the low traffic on the
road, the expected quantity
of economic benefits to be
generated by the project
will likely not be realized in
the near to medium term.
Therefore, the EIRR for this
road will likely be below the
threshold level of 12% real.
Indicators 2-3 Assessment: Road construction is
complete. Outcome indicator is currently being
monitored
Output 1: Approximately 7.7 km upgraded road, from
category-II to category-IB with four lanes.
Output 2: Approximately 57.4 km of new category-II
bypass road.
Indicator for Outputs 1 and 2: By 2015, works on the
project road from km 483 to km 536 completed with IRI of
less than 3 m/km.
Note: The CPSFR had some modifications in terms
of the output statement, and an additional
indicator.
Output: A 65 km road section (Taraz bypass)
reconstructed
Indicator 1: By 2015, road section from km 483–
km 536 reconstructed with IRI of less than 3 m/km
Indicator 2: By 2015, a 65 km road section (Taraz
bypass) reconstructed:
- an approximate 7.7 km upgraded road, from
category-II to category-IB with four lanes
- an approximate 57.4 km new category-II bypass
road (According to the CPSFR, these are indicators
in the RRP).
Output Assessment: The road works for the 65-km
Taraz Bypass Road was substantially completed in
December 2015.
Efficiency: Rating is likely to be less than efficient
due to implementation delays (the loan was
supposed to close on 31 Dec 2015)
Project status: On track in terms of actual contract
awards and disbursements, although contract
awards and disbursement are 90% and 88%,
respectively. Should be 100% by Dec 2015. Closing
date extended from 30 Jun to 31 Dec 2015 due to
implementation delays.
Loan 2728: CAREC
Corridor 2
Impact: To contribute to sustainable economic
development and regional cooperation under CAREC.
Not assessed. The rationale for the MFF
and its Tranche 1 project
24 K
azakhstan: Country P
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inal Review
Validation, 2012
–2016
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
(Mangystau Oblast
Sections)
Investment
Program - Tranche
1
Approval Date:
20 Dec 10
Closing Date: 29
Feb 16
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
283.0
Actual: 151.1
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads under
MOTC
Indicator: By 2020, increased Kazakhstan GDP to $300
billion from about $114 billion (2009).
was poorly developed in the
RRP. The need for the road
in terms of demand was not
well established. The RRP
also used 2007 traffic data
and extrapolated it to 2010
based on GDP growth.
Given the validation
mission’s observations of
traffic on the Almaty-Taraz
road, this likely led to an
overestimation of traffic on
the project road because of
the sparse population and
economic activity in the
oblast.
At the time of IED
validation, there is no data
yet on the project’s
outcomes and outputs. The
PCR has yet to be prepared.
However, IED noted that
only 53.3% of the original
loan amount was disbursed
at completion. While it is
not possible to rate the
effectiveness of this MFF,
this validation notes the
target year is 2016 and as
the MFF is not completed
the outcome targets are
likely not to be met.
Outcome: Increased transport connectivity and efficiency
and institutional effectiveness. By 2016:
Indicator 1: Increased traffic volume to 3,500 vpd from
about 1,000 vpd in 2009.
Indicator 2: Reduced travel time between Aktau and
Beineu to 4 hours from 12 hours in 2009.
Indicator 3: National road safety improvement strategy
with action plans prepared and implemented.
Indicator 4: Reduced road user costs to $0.43/vehicle-km
from $0.64/vehicle-km (2010).
Indicator 5: Average processing time per truck at border
crossing points reduced to 30 minutes per truck from 1.5
hours.
Indicator 6: Number of accidents per year on the corridor
reduced to 140 from 152 in 2009.
Note: The CPSFR used a different output statement
and indicators compared with the DMF attached
to the PFR: The DMF had 5 indicators, while the
CPSFR had 2. The CPSFR used the following:
Outcome: Efficient transport network connecting
Aktau to Manasha
Indicator 1: Increased traffic volume to 1,000 vpd
in 2015 from 500 vpd in 2010
Assessment: Outcome indicators are currently
being monitored after completing road
construction in December 2014.
Indicator 2: Reduced travel time between Aktau
and Manasha to 2 hours in 2015 from 3 hours in
2010
Assessment: Outcome indicators are currently
being monitored after completing road
construction in December 2014.
Indicators 3-5 were not assessed.
Output 1: Two road sections (km 372.6–km 514.3 and km
574–km 632.3) reconstructed.
Indicator 1: About 200-km road sections constructed with
pavement IRI of less than 4m/km by 2013.
Indicator 2: HIV and human trafficking awareness program
implemented by 2011.
Output 2: MOTC’s capacity for project and asset
management strengthened.
Indicator 1: Program management unit effectively
functioning
Indicator 2: Computerized road management system
implemented by 2016
Indicator 3: Timely submission of subsequent tranche
projects to ADB
Indicator 4: Road asset management system implemented
for programming.
Indicator 5: Performance-based contract for routine
maintenance piloted by 2015.
Note: The CPSFR had (i) only 2 outputs, (ii)
different targeted dates for output 1 indicators,
and (iii) only two indicators for output 2, (using a
different target date for one of the indicators)
compared with those in the DMF, which was
attached to the PFR.
Output 1, Indicator 1: 200-km road sections (km
372.6-km 514.3 and km 574-km 632.3)
reconstructed on time, within budget and with
pavement IRI < 4m/km by 2014
Assessment: Construction in 200-km road sections
(Km 372.6 – 514.4 and Km 574 – 632.3) was
substantially completed in December 2014. All
roads are open to traffic.
Output 1, Indicator 2: HIV and human trafficking
awareness program implemented by 2012
Assessment: HIV and human trafficking awareness
program developed and implemented at the
beginning of 2014. Hence, a delay from the
original target year of 2012.
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Indicator 6: Tranche 3 project prepared and implemented
by MOTC, with less consultant input.
Output 3: Cross-border infrastructure and facilities
improved
Indicator 1: By 2016, facilities and infrastructure at border
crossing between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan modernized.
Indicator 2: training of officials working at border with
Uzbekistan completed by 2016.
Output 2, Indicator 1: Program management unit
effectively functioning by 2015
Assessment: Program management unit is
effectively functioning since May 2013, when PMC
was on board.
Output 2, Indicator 2: Computerized road asset
management system implemented by 2015
Assessment: With the recent organizational
changes and introduction of Kazavtozhol for the
asset management, this indicator may have to be
reformulated.
Output 2, Indicators 3-6 were not assessed.
Output 3 was not assessed.
Efficiency: EIRR for the entire 430 km road (project
1 & 2) was computed at 16.1% at appraisal.
Project is on track in terms of contract awards and
disbursements.
Likely efficient (although with delays)
Loan 2967: Central
Asia Regional
Economic
Cooperation
Impact: To contribute to sustainable economic
development and regional cooperation under CAREC.
Indicator: By 2020, increased GDP of Kazakhstan to $300
billion from $114 billion in 2009.
Not assessed. Projects under Tranche 2 are
still being implemented.
Therefore, it is not possible
to rate the effectiveness of
26 K
azakhstan: Country P
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–2016
Basic Project
Information Expected Impact, Outcome and Output CPSFR Assessment
CPSFR Validation
Assessment
Corridor 2
(Mangystau Oblast
Section) Investment
Program - Tranche
2
Approval: Date:
13 Dec 12
Closing: Date: 31
Oct 17
Amount ($, M)
Approved:
371.3
Actual: na
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: Committee
of Roads in
Mangystau
Oblast
Outcome: Increased transport connectivity and efficiency in
the Mangystau region.
By 2017:
Indicator 1: increased traffic volume to 1,700 vpd from
1,200 vpd in 2012 on section between Shetpe and
Zhetibay.
Indicator 2: increased traffic volume to 5,600 vpd from
1,200 vpd in 2012 on section between Aktau and Zhetibay.
Indicator 3: reduced road-user costs to $0.43/vehicle-km
from $0.64/vehicle-km in 2010.
Indicator 4: number of accidents per year on the two
sections reduced to 45 from 68 in 2009.
Indicator 5: reduced travel time between Aktau and Shetpe
to 2 hours from 3.5 hours in 2012.
Additional outcome indicators in CPSFR but not in the DMF
attached to the PFR:
Indicator 6: By 2018, increased traffic volume to 14,332
vpd from 11,780 vpd in 2013 on section between Zhetybay
and Zhanaozen.
Indicator 7: By 2018, reduced travel time between
Zhetybay and Zhanaozen to 1 hour from 1.5 hours in
2013.
Note: The CPSFR used 2018 as its targeted year in
terms of the outcome indicators, while the DMF
attached to the PFR used 2017.
Indicators 1-7: Outcome indicators will be
measured after completing road construction.
the MFF for CAREC
Transport Corridor 2 for
Mangystau Oblast.
Given the low level of
economic activity and
sparse population for the
Mangystau Oblast projects,
validation’s view is that the
EIRR for these road projects
will also likely be below the
threshold level.
Output: Mangystau Oblast road section from Shetpe to
Zhetibay (Km 632.3 to Km 719) and Zhetibay to Aktau (Km
719 to Km 802) of CAREC Corridor 2 reconstructed.
Indicator 1: 86.7-km road section from Shetpe to Zhetibay.
Indicator 2: an 83-km road section from Zhetibay to Aktau
reconstructed to roughness index of 3, from an average of
6.
Additional Output (from CPSFR): Output 2: Zhetybay-
Zhanaozen road section reconstructed.
Indicator: By 2017: 73-km road section from Zhetybay to
Zhanaozen (Km 0 - 73) reconstructed to roughness index
of 3, from an average of 6 in 2013.
Note: There was no timeline given for the output
indicators in the DMF attached to the PFR. In the
CPSFR, a timeline was given (2017).
Indicators 1-2: Works ongoing.
Indicator for Output 2: Works ongoing.
Efficiency: As of 4Q 2015,Project is on track in
terms of contract awards and disbursements
Likely efficient (but with delays).
Loan 2916: CAREC
Corridor 3
(Shymkent-
Tashkent Section)
[Link to the
Impact: Closer regional cooperation and increased trade
along the CAREC corridor 3.
Indicator: By 2018, volume of regional trade along CAREC
Corridor 3 increased to $350 million from $150 million in
2012.
Not assessed. Improvement of the 37 km
road section from Shymkent
to Tashkent was 80%
complete with 25.2 km of
new concrete paved road
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Western Europe-
Western People's
Republic of China
International
Transit Corridor]
Road Improvement
Project
Approval
Date: 05 Oct 12
Closing
Date: 31 Oct 16
Amount
($, M)
Approved:
125.0
Actual:
80.7
EA/IA
EA: MOTC
IA: South
Kazakhstan
Committee of
Roads
Outcome: Efficient transport network in the South
Kazakhstan section of CAREC Corridor 3. By 2015 [2011
baseline]:
Indicator 1: Average traffic volume from Shymkent to
Tashkent increased to 2,000 vpd from 1,000 vpd.
Indicator 2: Travel speed improved by 20 km/hour from 60
km/hour.
Indicators 1-2 will be measured after completing
road construction.
and three out of seven
underpasses completed.
There is no data on
outcomes and outputs to
rate the project’s
effectiveness but as the
target year was 2015, they
were clearly not met as
expected. Moreover,
validation [IED] did note
that only 64.5% of the
original loan amount was
disbursed.
Given the similarity of the
CAREC Transport Corridor 3
for Mangystau Oblast
projects on the low level of
economic activity in the
region and its sparse
population, validation’s
view is that the EIRR for
these road projects will also
likely be below the
threshold level.
Output: A 37-km (km 705 to km 742) rehabilitated road
section from Shymkent toward Tashkent. By 2015:
Indicator 1: The project road section rehabilitated with an
IRI of less than 3 m/km from current IRI of 5 m/km.
Indicator 2: Seven million people will benefit from the
project.
Indicator 1: Overall works progress is at 81.3%.
About 32-km concrete pavement, and 6 (out of 7)
underpasses completed.
Indicator 2: Not assessed.
Efficiency: As of 4Q 2015, Project is on track in
terms of contract awards and disbursements.
Rating to be likely efficient, but with delays.
AADT = annual average daily traffic, ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAREC = Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, CPSFR = country partnership strategy final review, DMF
= design and monitoring framework, EIRR = economic internal rate of return, GDP = gross domestic product, IA = implementing agency, IED = Independent Evaluation Department,
IRI = international roughness index, ITS = intelligent transport system, KAZ = Kazakhstan, KGZ = Kyrgyz, km = kilometer, M = million, m = meter, MOTC = Ministry of Transport and
Communications, na = not applicable, PCR = project completion report, PFR = periodic financing request, PMC = project management consultant, PRC = People’s Republic of China,
RRP = report and recommendation of the President, T = tenge, vpd = vehicles per day,
a Central Asian countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
b The values of import to Kazakhstan increased in 2010–2013 from most of the Central Asian countries, for example, 1,855% from Turkmenistan and 422% from Tajikistan, while the
imports from Azerbaijan declined.
c The outcome indicators were designed for the investment program at appraisal. Hence, the achievement of the indicators is expected to be measured after the investment program’s
completion.
Sources: Report and Recommendation of the President, Periodic Financing Request Reports, Design and Monitoring Frameworks, Project Completion Reports, Draft Country Partnership
Strategy Final Review for Kazakhstan (2012-2016), ADB’s Loan Financial Information System, and IED’s database.