assessment of community planning for mass transit: volume
TRANSCRIPT
Assessment of Community Planning forMass Transit: Volume 9—Seattle Case
Study
February 1976
NTIS order #PB-253687
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
Emilio Q. Daddario, Director
Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director
URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL
George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority
Walter J. BierwagenAmalgamated Transit Union
Robert A. BurcoOregon DOT
Jeanne J. FoxJoint Center forPolitical Studies
Lawrence A. GoldmuntzEconomics and Science Planning
Dorn McGrathGeorge Washington University
Bernard M. OliverHew/e/f-Packard Corporation
Simon ReichGibbs and Hill
Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.Princeton University
Frederick P. SalvucciMassachusetts DOT
Stewart F. TaylorSanders and Thomas, inc.
OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF
Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager
Mary E. Ames Larry L. JenneyV. Rodger Digilio Bev JohnsonThomas E. Hirsch, III Teri Miles
CONTRACTORS
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.
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PREFACE
This report on urban transportation planning in the Seattle,Washington metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by theOffice of Technology Assessment to provide an information base for anoverall assessment of community planning for mass transit.
The findings of the overall study are reported in the summarydocument, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms thefirst volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request ofthe Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of itsTransportation Subcommittee.
The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’sTransportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by theOTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owingsand Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for thestudy. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible pointsof view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
INTRODUCTION
This report assesses how one of nine majorUnited States metropolitan areas made its decisionsabout the development or modernization of railtransit.
The assessment of the nine cities attempts toidentify the factors that help communities, facingcritical technological choices, make wise decisionsthat are consistent with local and national goals fortransit. The study investigates the following issues:
● Are there major barriers to communicationand cooperation among governmentalagencies involved in transit planning andoperating? Do these barriers interfere withmaking sound decisions?
● Do transit decisions reflect the combinedinterests of all major public groups, in-cluding citizen organizations, trade unions,the business community, and others?
● Does the planning process provide enoughinformation about the advantages anddisadvantages of alternative courses ofaction to provide a solid basis for makingdecisions ?
• Does the availability or lack of financing, orthe conditions under which financing hasbeen provided, unnecessarily limit therange of options that are considered?
The ultimate purpose of the work has been tocast light on those prospective changes in nationaltransit policy and administrative programs whichmight improve, in different ways and to differentextents, the way communities plan mass transitsystems. The nine cities were selected to representthe full range of issues that arise at different stagesin the overall process of planning and developing atransit system.
San Francisco, for example, has the first regionalrail system built in decades, while Denver isplanning an automated system, and voters inSeattle have twice said “no” to rail transit fundingproposals.
The assessment of transit planning in each of thenine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into anevolving social process. Consequently, the studyresults more closely resemble historical analysisthan classical technology assessment.
This study employs a set of evaluation guidelinesto orient the investigation in the nine metropolitanareas and to provide the basis for comparativejudgments about them. The guidelines werederived from issues identified during preliminaryvisits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federalrequirements for transit planning, and an in-vestigation via the literature into the state-of-the-art in the field.
The evaluation guidelines cover major topicswhich were investigated during the case assess-ment process. They deal with the character of theinstitutional arrangements and the conduct of thetechnical planning process.
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Some of the most significant influences ontransit planning are exerted by the organizationsresponsible for conducting the planning andmaking the decisions. Three guidelines were usedto evaluate the institutional arrangements in thenine metropolitan areas:
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Agencies responsible for various aspects oftransit decisionmaking should cooperateeffectively in a clearly designated “forum”.
The participants in this forum should haveproperly designated decisionmakingauthority, and the public should haveformal channels for holding decision-makers accountable for their actions.
Citizens should participate in the transitplanning process from its beginning andshould have open lines of communicationwith decisionmakers.
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GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS
The technical planning process provides theinformation that public officials and their con-stituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.Four guidelines were used to assess the technicalplanning process in the nine metropolitan areas:
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Broad, explicit goals and objectives shouldguide technical planning and decision-making.
A range of realisticshould be developed.
alternative solutions
The evaluation of these alternatives shouldgive balanced consideration to a full rangeof goals and objectives.
A practical and flexible plan for financingand implementation should be developed.
During visits to each of the nine metropolitanareas, the study team interviewed the principal
representative of the transportation planninginstitution and other main participants in the localplanning process. The visits were supplemented byinterviews with UMTA officials in Washington.Pertinent documents—official plans, reports,studies, and other material—were reviewed in eachcase.
The information thus collected was used incompiling a history of the transit planning processin each case area, organized around key decisionssuch as the decision to study transit, the selection ofa particular transit system, and public ratificationof the decision to pay for and build the system. Themain political, institutional, financial and technicalcharacteristics affecting the conduct of the plan-ning process were then assessed in light of theevaluation guidelines.
The same set of guidelines used in assessing eachcase metropolitan area was employed in making ageneralized evaluation of the metropolitan experi-ence. The results of the generalized evaluation aresummarized in the report, An Assessment of Communi-ty Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report, issued bythe Office of Technology Assessment in February1976.
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .General Characteristics . . . . . . 0 . . . 00 . 0 . . . . . . 0000 . . 0 . . 0 ...0...0.Existing Passenger Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transportation Planning Institutions ● . . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . . . 0 . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 .
CRITICAL HISTORY OF RAPID TRANSIT PLANNING ANDDECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Early History of Transit in Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transportation Planning in the 1950’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Efforts to Achieve Metropolitan Governmentin the 1950’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transportation Planning Between 1960 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Creation of Forward Thrust . . . . . . . ● *..**** ..*...** . . . . . .The Forward Thrust Program and Voter Rejection
of Transit Bonding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Second Defeat of the Forward Thrust Transit
Program in 1970 . . . . . . .1972 Voter Acceptance of aCurrent Controversy Over
CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT
ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNINGPROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . .Technical Planning Process . . . . .
SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . .
● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎
Short-Range Bus Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . .the Long-Range Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PLANNING PROCESS . . . . . . .
AND DECISIONMAKING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Summary and Highlights
Bond Issues to build rail transit in Seattle failed twice before a short-termbus improvement program gained voter approval in 1972
● Proposals for rail transit systems inSeattle initially were conceived during aperiod of economic gain (1965-68). Theoptimistic growth estimates of this era,combined with the expectation of largeamounts of Federal funds and theperceived political necessity of providingrail transit service in several corridors,encouraged the design of extensivetransit systems.
● Rapid rail transit advocates in SeattIeemerged from two groups. Antifreewayforces joined the downtown businessinterests that had been principallyresponsible for creating a metropolitanumbrella organization called Municipalityof Metropolitan Seattle (Metro). AlthoughMetro was established in 1957, it was notempowered to plan transit until 1967.
● Forward Thrust was the most important ofa series of extra governmental com-mittees of businessmen and civic leadersthat dominated transit decisionmakinguntil 1970. Forward Thrust advocated railtransit as part of a plan to revitalize Seattlethrough a coordinated program of capitalimprovements that included parks,arterial highway improvements, a majorleague stadium, community facilities, andurban redevelopment proposals. Theorganization guided the preparation ofthe two rail transit plans taken to voters in1968 and 1970.
● The 1968 proposal for a 47-mile, $385million system received 51 percent of thevote in referendum that year but failed togain the 60 percent margin needed forpassage, partly because of its high cost
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with no assurance that the full Federalshare would be available.
●
. In 1970, a dismal economic situationcaused by massive layoffs at Boeing led tothe defeat of the second and even moreexpensive rail proposal (49 miles, $440million).
● Critics of Forward Thrust complained that ●
it was an elite organization not account-able to the voters and that its transitproposals favored downtown businessinterests.
● Since Forward Thrust disbanded in 1970,the forum for transit planning has beendominated by Metro and the Puget SoundCouncil of Governments (PSCOG). How-
ever, the city of Seattle continues to exertan important influence.
In 1972, under the threat of completecollapse of Seattle’s bus system, a tax tosupport an all-bus transit plan waspassed. This plan has received one of thelargest capital grants in UMTA’s historyfor an all-bus transit developmentprogram.
Since 1972, Metro and PSCOG havecompeted for major responsibilities inarea transit planning. Metro, moreoriented to the central city and directlyresponsible for transit operations, is mostconcerned with choice of technology.PSCOG, whose jurisdiction is a broader,four-county region, is concerned with therelationship of a transit system toregionwide land use.
Metropolitan Setting1
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Seattle is the largest metropolitan area inPacific Northwest. Its SMSA population1,421,869 in 1970 represents 41.7 percent of
theof
thetotal State population. The SMSA’s populationincreased 28 percent from 1960 to 1970. Thesuburban ring increased by 39 percent to 894,038,and of the city of Seattle decreased 4.7 percent to apopulation of 530,830 during the same period (seeFigure 2).
Seattle is a relatively low-density city comprisedlargely of single-family houses. Seattle’s more thanhalf-million population comprised some 37.3percent of the total SMSA population in 1970, incomparison to its SMSA share of 50.3 percent in1960. In 1970, with a center city density of 6,350people per square mile, Seattle ranked sixth amongthe case study areas in density. Employment in thecentral business district in 1970 was estimated to be60,000, constituting only 11 percent of the totalSMSA work force.
Although the Seattle CBD is the focal point ofthe region, several other centers to the south,north, and east have developed into significantemployment areas. The Duwamish Valley indus-trial area, several miles to the south, has almost asmany jobs as the CBD. To the north, the UniversityDistrict is the third largest employment center inthe Seattle area. To the east, across LakeWashington, the Bellevue CBD is developing into asizable employment center that is expected toincrease in significance as the area to the east of thelake continues to attract much of the Seattleregion’s population growth.
Seattle is the retail trade and office center of theNorthwest and a trading center serving Alaska andthe Orient. Although shipbuilding and forestproducts are important industries in the area, theleading employer is the Boeing Corporation, theworld’s largest producer of commercial jets. Theeconomy of Seattle has been heavily dependent on
Boeing, and it is sensitive to shifts in Boeing’semployment. Boeing’s work force totaled 60,000 in1966, a figure equal to the entire 1970 CBDemployment. It increased to 93,000 in 1967, andthen to a high of 101,000 in 1969 beforeplummeting to 46,800 by January 1971.2
The fluctuation in the aircraft manufacturingindustry accounts for the wide variations inpopulation forecasts for the area in the past 7 years.In 1967, when Boeing was experiencing veryimpressive growth, the population of King Countyalone was expected to reach 1,415,000 by 1975. Incurrent forecasts a 9 percent average growth inKing County is anticipated to project a populationof 1,522,100 in 1980, and 1,690,000 by 1990.
EXISTING PASSENGERTRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Existing growth patterns and transportationroutes have been strongly influenced by theregion’s geographic features. Central Seattle islocated on a series of hills rising from Elliott Bay,one of the metropolitan area’s three main waterbodies. For a long time, because Seattle wasconstrained on the east and west by water barriers,it grew primarily to the north and south. Expansionof the city to the east followed the construction oftwo floating bridges across Lake Washington. Uponcompletion of the first four-lane bridge in 1940,Mercer Island’s population increased to 21,000.Bellevue’s population grew in 10 years from 12,809to 61,102 after the Evergreen Point Floating TollBridge was completed in 1960.
Four major highway routes run north-south andtwo run east-west. The heaviest traffic volumes areon the north-south interstate highway routes, I-5and I-405. Running from Portland, Oreg., to theCanadian border, I-5 links Seattle to Washington’smost important western cities, including Olympia,Tacoma, Everett, and Bellingham. Route I-405branches off I-5 south of Seattle, runs parallel to I-5
I See Figure I, pages 14 and 15.
z Frank Colcord, Urban Transportation Decision-Making, Seattle CaseStudy, DOT-OS-30036, October 1974, pp. 11-12.
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LAND AREA (1970)( s q u a r e m i l e s }
Center City 8 3 . 6Suburban Ring 4 , 1 4 2 . 4
Entire SMSA 4 , 2 2 6
POPULATION
Suburban CenterRing C i t y
1960 550,126 557,087
1970 8 9 4 , 0 3 8 530,831
DENSITY(population/Square mile)
Suburban CenterRing C i t y
1960 132 6 , 6 6 4
POPULATIONPercent Change 1960-1970
+63%
SuburbanRing
1970 216 6 , 3 5 0
FIGURE 2: SEATTLE METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS
- 4 . 7 %Center
C i t y
Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners, andthe Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. , Inc. , 1974.
A Standard Metropolitan Statist ical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (orcit ies) , usually with a population of at least 50 10 0 0 , p l u s a d j a c e n t c o u n t i e sor o ther po l i t i ca l d iv i s ions tha t a re economica l ly and soc ia l ly in tegra tedwi th the cent ra l a rea .
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.
on the east shore of Lake Washington, then linksback up with I-5 north of Seattle. The other twonorth-south routes are State Highway 99, anelevated freeway along the western edge of theCBD, and State Highway 513, which serves thearea around the University of Washington. Thetwo major east-west routes which cross LakeWashington, the two floating bridges, are I-90 andState Highway 520. Proposals to increase thecapacity of the I-90 corridor, part of the originalinterstate program, are still embroiled in con-troversy. Several schemes are still under considera-tion for providing transitways for bus or rail on oneof the bridges, which would be reconstructed forthis purpose.
Seattle’s transit system dates from 1884, whenconstruction began on the first horse-drawn streetrailway. By 1900, Seattle had over 70 miles ofinterurban railway. The system had becomedilapidated by 1939, had a brief upsurge duringWorld War 11 as a result of gas rationing, butspiraled down after that through the 1970’s. TheSeattle Transit Commission reduced services andraised fares to avoid losses, but by the 1960’s thesystem required local and State subsidies. As aresult of the 1972 transit tax referendum, theoperation and planning of both the city andsuburban transit services were turned over toMetro in 1973. At that time, the city’s equipmentconsisted of 370 motor buses, about 19 years old onthe average, and 53 electric trolley buses averaging29.6 years old. Seattle is now buying modernequipment and is expanding its bus system to serveareas that recently have gained in population. Table1 shows total Federal grants to support Seattletransit prior to May 1975. Figure 3 shows transitridership and revenue patterns since 1960.
TABLE I.—Federal Assistance toSeattle Transit Programs From
F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975
Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs
Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $56,700,000 $139,137,000Technical Studies . . . . . . . . 3,562,000 6,521,000
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,262,000 145,658,000
park called Seattle Center. The monorail provides ashuttle service between the two termini but,because of its technological limitations, has receiv-ed little attention in the rapid transit planningprocess. Two additional transit demonstrationprograms, which have been highly successful,should be noted. In 1970, the “Blue Streak” expressbus service was initiated, in which passengers fromlocal bus routes are collected and then givenexpress bus service on the center lanes of I-5 withexclusive bus ramps into the CBD. In 1973, a free-fare system was instituted whereby passengerscould ride anywhere in the CBD free of charge.
Ferry service is provided across Elliott Bay andPuget Sound at Bremerton, Winslow, VashonIsland, and Kitsap County. In 1965, UMTAfinancial assistance was obtained to purchase fournew ferry boats.
In 1970,14.6 percent of the employed center cityresidents used the bus system, as compared to 2.9percent of the employed suburban ring residents.Also in 1970, 56 percent of the work trips by allmodes were to center city destinations, while 44percent were to suburban destinations (see Figure4).
TRANSPORTATION PLANNINGINSTITUTIONS
The principal institutions involved in transitplanning in the Seattle region are the Municipalityof Metropolitan Seattle (Metro), now the transitoperator, and the Puget Sound Council ofGovernments (PSCOG), until recently called thePuget Sound Governmental Conference (PSGC).The city and county governments and the StateHighway Commission also are active participantsin the planning process,
TABLE 2.—Federally RecognizedRegional Agencies
Designation Agency
A-95 Puget Sound Council of GovernmentsMPO Puget Sound Council of Governments
Source Urban Mass Transportation Adminstration
Municipality of MetropolitanSeattle (Metro)
A monorail system, built as part of the SeattleWorld’s Fair of 1962, links the CBD with theWorld’s Fair site, now an amusement and cultural
State legislation enacted in 1957 permittedWashington cities and counties in urban areas to
5
VEHICLE MILES OPERATED 1 5 . 1 1 3 . 5 14.1 1 4 . 0(millions of miles)
Peak Year =1960 (15.1 million miles)L0w Year= 1966 (13.5 million miles)
REVENUE PASSENGERS(millions of passengers)
Peak Year =1962 (43.6 million riders)Low Year =1972 (29.2 mill ion riders)
NET OPERATING REVENUE(mi l l ions o f do l lars )
Peak Year =1962 ($873,000)Low Year = 1 9 7 4 ( - $ 1 7 , 6 4 3 , 0 0 0 )
1974
FIGURE 3: SEATTLE-TRANSIT OPERATIONS 1960-1974
N O data on Seatt le transit operations were reported in 1973; no vehicle milesdata have been reported since 1972. The 1974 operating deficit was estimatedby an off icial of the Municipali ty of Metropolitan Seatt le in March 1975.Source: American Public Transit Association records for the Seattle TransitCommission and the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro).
6
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION
Center City to Suburban Ring
Suburban Ring to Center City
Beginning and Ending in Center City
Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring
WORK TRIP MODE
1960 1970
.,., . . .. .......:...::::.:.: ... ,:. ....0.?; Employed Residents Using Public Transportation:; :”..: , .,::,:,:::,: . . . . . . . . . . . .......:,,,,. ., ,,.,., : ;.,:.:,::.: ;: ”.;.., ,:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Employed Residents Using Autos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Suburban RingRemaining workers either walked to work,stayed at home or did not report mode. Center City
FIGURE4: SEATTLE SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners, and
the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assocaition of the U.S., Inc., 1974.A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (orcities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent countiesor other polit ical divisions that are economically and socially integratedwith the central area.
68-768 0 - 76 - 3
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establish metropolitan municipal corporations,modeled after Toronto’s, with authority over solidwaste disposal, parks and recreation, metropolitanplanning, water supply, and transportationmatters—subject to specific local approvals. In areferendum in 1958, Metro was established as asingle-function agency responsible for sewagecontrol and water-related functions. It is governedby a 36-member council comprised of key electedofficials of Seattle and King County, as well asrepresentatives of may of the other cities andunincorporated areas of King County.
Metro received approval from the Statelegislature to plan for transit in spring 1967. OnJune 12, 1967, it entered into an agreement withDeLeuw, Cather & Company for the provision ofconsulting services to supplement the transit studyalready underway for the Puget SoundGovernmental Conference. The October 1967study report recommended the rail plan that wasdefeated by the voters on February 13, 1968. Thevery similar plan that was defeated in 1970 wasprepared under the auspices of both Metro and thecity of Seattle. Not until 1972 did voters empowerMetro to levy a .3 percent sales tax to finance thepurchase of the city-owned transit system and aprivate suburban company, making Metro the soletransit operator in the area.
Puget Sound Council ofGovernments (PSCOG)
Originally created in 1957 as the Puget SoundGovernmental Conference (PSGC), PSCOG is aloose association of the local governments in theSeattle metropolitan region. PSCOG’s jurisdictionis much broader than Metro’s, encompassing thefour counties of King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish,and both the Seattle-Everett and the TacomaSMSA’s. It was established to undertake studiesand make recommendations to its member countiesand cities on a range of areawide concerns.
Since it shares the weakness of most COG’s ofnot having the power to tax, PSCOG depends onvoluntary contributions of loca l membergovernments and upon State and Federal grants. Itslimited strength has derived from a series ofFederal acts that have given it various review andcoordination responsibilities. In 1963, it became theregional 3-C agency with responsibility for carry-ing out the planning requirements of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962; and it recently was
designated the Metropolitan Planning Organiza-tion (MPO). 3 PSCOG also is the region’s A-95review agency.4
King County
In 1970, King county’s population of 1,156,633represented 81.3 percent of the SMSA population.The county encompasses all of the city of Seattleand most of the urbanized portion of the region.
In 1969, a new charter that concentratedauthority in the chief executive substantiallyincreased the county’s powers. Responsibility forcounty transportation planning is within the Long-Range Planning Division of the Department ofBudget and Program Planning. The county’sTransportation Planning Section is working withPSGC to update its highway plan, expanding it inaccordance with the PSGC 1990 plan. However,the county government has limited power inmunicipal parts of the county and has delegatedcertain powers to Metro.
City of Seattle
Although the city’s population declined only 4.7percent between 1960 and 1970, its position inrelation to the rest of the SMSA droppedsignificantly due to the large amount of growthelsewhere in the SMSA. Seattle is structurally a“weak mayor” form of city government with mostpowers resting in the nine-member City Council.
3 The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and theFederal Highway Administration require Governors todesignate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in eacharea to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportationplanning process . . . carried out cooperatively . . .“ (the “3-C”process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 andthe Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published inSeptember 1975, MPO’s must prepare or endorse (1) a long-range general transportation plan, including a separate plan forimprovements in management of the existing transportationsystem; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called theTransportation Improvement Program (TIP), to implementportions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planningprospectus supplemented by annual unified planning workprograms.
4 The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95requires one agency in each region to be empowered to reviewall proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region.Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which was created toimplement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities andMetropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301).
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The position of the chief executive has strengthen-ed in recent years due to Mayor James D. Braman’sskill in dealing with the Council during his term ofoffice in 1964-69, and due to 1967 State legislationremoving the budget-making power from theCouncil and placing it in the mayor’s office.
The city has responsibility for traffic, parking,and for developing and maintaining city streets. Italso has been involved in highway planning incooperation with the State. Starting in 1914, thecity had become increasingly involved in regulatingand later subsidizing services until 1973, when theSeattle transit system was turned over to Metro.
Washington State HighwayDepartment (WSHD)
The WSHD was established in 1951 under ahighway commission of five members who areappointed by the Governor for overlapping terms.The Commissioners, in turn, appoint the directorof the Washington State Highway Department.The WSHD has minimal responsibilities for publictransit, although its Seattle area studies haveincluded transit elements in major interstateprojects, notably I-5 and I-90. There has beenconsiderable pressure for some years to establish aState department of transportation.
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Critical History of Rapid TransitPlanning and Decisionmaking
Attempts by the city of Seattle to incorporate railrapid transit into pending highway plans began inthe 1950’s. But the concept of a regionwide railsystem developed in another forum as a componentpart of the business-led movement to regionalizemunicipal services and improve the physicalinfrastructure of the city.
Transit plans for the Seattle area were proposedin 1967, 1970, and 1972. The first two plans, whichwere financed by property tax bond issues, failed in1968 and 1970 to gain the 60 percent voter approvalrequired for adoption. The financing for a short-range bus plan involved the use of a new Stateexcise tax on automobiles matched by a local salestax. This plan, which required only a simplemajority approval, was adopted in 1972.
While this short-range plan for an all-bus systemis now being implemented, debate continues overthe appropriate technology for the long-termdevelopment of transit in the Seattle region.
EARLY HISTORY OF TRANSITIN SEATTLE
Seattle is a relatively young city; the first settlersarrived in Seattle in 1852. By 1884, a horse-drawnstreet railway had been constructed, and the firstelectric cable car began operating in 1889. In thedecade that followed, Stone and Webster, a Bostonengineering firm and owner of the largest electricpower company in the Seattle area, began tointegrate the nearly 70 miles of track owned byseveral transit companies into a consolidatedinterurban rail system.
The city of Seattle became involved in transit in1914 when it began construction of two streetcarlines. During the First World War, problems withtransit operations led the city to initiatenegotiations to purchase the system, and in 1918the voters approved city purchase of all portions ofthe system within its border. The railway systemcontinued to have financial difficulties. A 1926proposal by the City Planning Commission to builda rail transit system was ignored.
In 1939, the three-member Seattle TransitCommission was created to operate and improvethe system, which had fallen into dilapidatedcondition and financial distress. As happenedelsewhere in the country, transit ridership in-creased during the World War II years but then felloff again.
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING INTHE 1950’s
The city made a number of unsuccessfulattempts during the 1950’s to incorporateprovisions for rail rapid transit into pendinghighway plans. To resolve the ensuing controver-sy, the city, county, and State agreed to conduct acomprehensive transportation study; and by theend of the decade they established the Puget SoundRegional Transportation Committee to define thescope of the study.
The subject of the first major debate in the early1950’s was the configuration of Seattle’s CentralFreeway, which the Washington State Toll BridgeAuthority was authorized to construct as a tollfacility in 1953. During the preliminary designstages, the Seattle Transit Commission suggestedincorporating a 50-foot median in the design toallow for the future development of rail rapidtransits This request was denied by the Toll BridgeAuthority in’ 1955.
In 1956, when the responsibility for the con-struction of the Central Freeway was transferredto the Washington State Highway Commission,the Transit Commission renewed its efforts tohave rail transit facilities incorporated in theCentral Freeway design, this time with the supportof the City of Seattle Planning Commission. Boththe transit commission and planning commissionissued reports in 1957 recommending that the
s Clifford Kurtzweg, Rapid Trnmft Dmdopmmt in Seat//e,unpublished paper prepared for the University of Washington,June 1966, p. 5.
11
freeway design should provide space for rail thatcould be used by express buses until the rail systemwas constructed.
In early 1957, because of the controversy overrapid transit on the Central Freeway, the Mayor ofSeattle appointed a committee to consider theproblem. The committee —consisting of the SeattleCity Engineer, the Director of Planning, the SeattleTransit General Manager, and representatives ofthe Chamber of Commerce, the Municipal Leagueof Seattle, and King County—concluded thatevidence of the need for rail transit was insufficientto merit a delay in freeway construction. b
Although rapid transit had lost the battle to gaina place in the freeway proposal, the controversymobilized public interest in a comprehensivetransportation study. In October 1957, the PugetSound Regional Transportation Committee wasformed, with representatives from the StateHighway Commission, the city of Seattle, KingCounty, and the Seattle Transit Commission. Oneyear later, the committee employed Parsons,Brinckerhoff, Hall and MacDonald to conduct asurvey to determine the scope and procedures forthe comprehensive transportation study. In 1960,as an outcome of this work, the Puget SoundRegional Transportation Study was formed.
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVEMETROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
IN THE 1950’s
Advocates of rail transit in Seattle emerged intwo different forums. Transit advocates wereinvolved with the antihighway forces during thefreeway debates. In addition, mass transit was acentral concern of those who worked to create anumbrella organization with authority throughoutthe Seattle metropolitan region. The momentumbehind this effort was led by James Ellis, a younglawyer who worked through the Municipal Leagueof Seattle in the early 1950’s. Ellis’ concern focusedon the inadequacy of weak and fragmented localgovernments to solve transportation problemsalong with other areawide problems involvingsewage disposal, air quality, and the adequacy ofrecreational and cultural facilities. Ellis gave up hisattempt to update the King County governmentafter unsuccessful efforts at reform. 7 The solution
Ellis proposed was a countywide metropolitancouncil modeled after Toronto’s Metro.
In 1956, the mayor of Seattle and the Board ofKing County Commissioners appointed theMetropolitan Problems Advisory Committee,chaired by Jim Ellis. This group recommended tothe State legislature that it pass enabling legislationto permit cities and counties in urban areas toestablish metropolitan councils. In 1957, thelegislature passed the Metropolitan MunicipalCorporation Act. The act stated that:
The people of the populous areas in theState . . . need to obtain . . . essential ser-vices not adequately provided by existingagencies of local government. The growthof urban populations and the movement ofpeople into suburban areas has createdproblems of sewage and garbage disposal,water supply, transportation, planning,parks and parkways which extend beyondthe boundaries of cities, counties, andspecial districts. For reasons of topography,location and movement of population, andland conditions and development, one ormore of these problems cannot be ade-quately met by the individual cities,counties, and districts of any metropolitanareas.
It is the purpose of this act to enable citiesand counties to act jointly to meet thesecommon problems in order that the propergrowth and development may be assuredand the health and welfare of the peopleresiding therein may be secured. 8
Pursuant to the State legislation, a majorpromotional campaign presenting the Metroconcept to the people was directed by a newcitizens’ organization, the Metropolitan CouncilAction Committee, again organized by Jim Ellis.The measure lost by only 16,000 votes (out of an187,000 vote total in the election of March 1958).9
Although it had gained voter approval within thecity of Seattle, the measure was defeated because itfailed to pass outside the city.
Finally, later in the same year, the votersapproved a stripped-down Metro as a specialpurpose agency responsible for sewage treatmentand water supply. Thus, the Municipality of
0 Ibid., p. 6.P Robert Gogerty and David Whitlow, An Analysis of Fonuard
Tkrust, unpublished paper, 1967, p. 5.8 Colcord, op. cit., pp. 70, 71.Q Gogerty and Whitlow, op. cit., p. 6,
12
Metropolitan Seattle was created which, with voterapproval, had the potential to take on other criticalareawide problems. This potential was reinforcedwhen Metro gained national as well as localrecognition for cleaning up Lake Washington.
While Metro was being created in 1957, so alsowas the Puget Sound Governmental Conference(PSGC). The PSGC was created by the electedofficials of King, Kitsap, Pierce, and Snohomishcounties to serve as a purely advisory organizationcharged with coordinating land use planning,undertaking studies of areawide problems, andmaking recommendations to member counties andcities.
TRANSPORTATION PLANNINGBETWEEN 1960 and 1966
While the genesis of rail transit plans and themovement toward metropolitan-scale im-provements occurred in the 1950’s, it was duringthe 1960’s that a regionwide rail transit system wasfirst planned, designed, and taken to the voters.
As noted previously, the principal metropolitantransportation planning agency in Seattle at thebeginning of this period was the Puget SoundRegional Transportation Study (PSRTS). Foundedin 1960 by the Washington State Highway Com-mission in cooperation with local governments inthe four-county Seattle metropolitan area, PSRTSwas one of the Nation’s first large-scalemetropolitan transportation and land use planningagencies; most large urban regions subsequentlyestablished such programs as a result of theFederal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and the com-prehensive planning assistance program ad-ministered by HUD (then HHFA). PSRTS wasresponsible for an examination of the existingtransit system to determine potential rail rapidtransit corridors and to estimate potentialpatronage and construction costs.10
John Mladinov became the director of the PugetSound Study in 1960. In an interview, he reportedthat immediately after his appointment a delega-tion of the Municipal League called upon him torequest that a rail rapid transit system be studied,and that it be considered a part of any basictransportation network. The League furtherrequested that any rail system be limited to the
boundaries established for Metro, which includedKing County and Seattle only. Mladinov refusedboth requests, insisting that the form and extent ofany rail proposal would have to be justified byPSRTS’ analysis.
In October 1961, another citizens’ committee,the Metropolitan Transportation Committee, wasappointed to determine the best means forproviding rapid transit in the metropolitan area.11
The committee, which included James Ellis, con-cluded that Metro was the appropriate agency toperform the transit function. As a result, inFebruary 1962 a promotional committee wasformed called the Citizens’ Committee for MetroTransit. The Citizens’ Committee sought to getapproval from Metro to prepare a rapid transit planand financial program to present to the voters. InSeptember 1962, despite an intense campaign, theeffort failed. This time the proposal was supportedby the suburbs but failed to get a majority of thecity’s votes.
City leaders, who were dissatisfied with PSRTS’automobile-oriented approach to transportationplanning, began a parallel planning activity for railrapid transit, initially through the auspices of theSeattle Transit Commission. The city stronglyfavored the eng ineer ing f irm of parsons,Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas (PBQD), one ofthe principal firms involved in planning the BARTsystem, However, the Puget Sound GovernmentalConference, which was to put up the money,decided it would select a consultant by competition.Although PBQD was among the four finalists, itlost its lead position, and DeLeuw, Cather &Company was selected. When DeLeuw, Cather wasauthorized to begin its study in June 1964, the areait considered was the same as that being consideredby PSRTS. Much of the data gathered by PSRTSwas used in the DeLeuw, Cather transit study.
During this period, the leading force for railtransit within City Hall was Ed Divine, anadministrative assistant to Mayor Gordon Clintonand then to Mayor James D. Braman, whosucceeded Clinton in 1964. Prior to becomingmayor, as a member of the City Council andchairman of its Finance Committee, Braman wasreported to oppose rail transit on the grounds thatit was too expensive. Ed Divine is given credit forpersuading Braman to change his position radically
IO Kurtzweg, op. cit., p. 11. I I Colcord, op. cit., p. 83.
13
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15
after he became mayor. Braman became a strong,open, and ardent advocate for rail transit.
Another event changed the national context formass transit. The Urban Mass Transportation Actof 1964 allowed two-thirds of capital financing oftransit projects to be allocated from Federal funds.(Prior to this, Federal grants had been available onlyfor transit demonstration projects.)
In November 1964, the first of DeLeuw, Cather’stwo interim reports was issued. The reportrecommended that the new I-90 Lake Washingtonbridge be designed to provide for future rail transitfacilities. This recommendation was adopted by thePSGC and transmitted to the Washington StateHighway Department.12 DeLeuw, Cather’s secondreport, the Interim Report to the Puget Sound GovernmentalConference on Feasibility of Rapid Transit Operation withinthe Seattle Area, was submitted in November 1965.The report strongly recommended the construc-tion of a two-line rail rapid transit facility connec-ting the central business district to the northeastportion of the city and to Bellevue. The planincluded a regional area transit plan to meet theSeattle area’s transit needs until 1985 and a stagedconstruction program.
A 13-member Rapid Transit Advisory Commit-tee headed by James Ellis, which was appointed byMayor Braman on October 18, 1965, endorsed theDeLeuw, Cather recommendations in a statementtransmitted to the Mayor on November 1, 1965.13
Several months after the publication of DeLeuw,Cather’s reports, the Puget Sound RegionalTransportation Study summary report was releas-ed. This report concluded that no strong recom-mendation could be made for rapid transit. Ananalysis of the reasons for the difference in thestudy findings was summarized by CliffordKurtzweg in a paper submitted to the University ofWashington in June 1966:
Several basic concepts account for thefailure of PSRTS to find rapid transitfeasible in the Seattle area. First the PSRTSanalysis assumes that the development ofrapid transit corridors does not significant-ly change land use patterns or densities.Second, the PSRTS study assumes thatincreasing the amenities of transit servicewould not greatly increase patronage.
IZ KUrtZWe~, op. cit., p. 12.IJ Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
16
Third, the PSRTS study shows no definiteeconomic advantage to a rail transitsystem. DeLeuw, Cather and Company intheir analysis of rail transit feasibilityassumes that the improved system willattract 8 percent more passengers than thepresent bus system and that developmentwithin the rail transit corridor wouldincrease patronage by an additional 15.0percent. Further, DeLeuw, Cather, andCompany lists decreases in traffic conges-tion, reduction of air pollution, reductionof parking demand in the CBD, moreefficient use of right-of-way, and increasesin land values along the transit corridors asbeing benefits of rail transit instead ofdepending on strictly dollar-cost economicsfor justification. Basically the conflict ofthe two studies reduces to a conflictbetween highway-oriented values andtransit-oriented values.14
Seattle newspapers carried a number of articlesexpressing the views of PSRTS Director JohnMladinov. He criticized the DeLeuw, Cather planand charged that the study director, Israel Gilboa,was prejudiced in favor of rail transit and thatDeLeuw, Cather’s analyses and benefit-costevaluations were skewed to favor a rail plan. Thedisagreement between the two factions resulted inMladinov’s leaving the area, largely due to politicalpressure from the city government.
THE CREATION OFFORWARD THRUST
In the same month that the DeLeuw, Catherinterim report was published, James Ellis called forthe creation of “Forward Thrust.” Ellis, the forcebehind Metro and other metropolitan improve-ment organizations, called for a coordinatedprogram to finance areawide capital improvementsin a speech on November 3, 1965, to the SeattleRotary Club.15
Ellis suggested that there were three physicalconditions necessary for the center city to performits functions successfully: (1) it must have a highdensity of activities, (2) it must be attractive, with
14 Ibid., pp. 14, 1s.15 James R. Ellis, “Transportation and the Shape of the City,”
November 3, 1965, Selected Speeches on Forward Thrust and February
1 3 , 196$ ~iertion ~esults, 1965-68, p. 2 .
open plazas and easy pedestrian access to allfacilities, and (3) there must be the capacity to movelarge numbers of commuters during peak hours.16
Ellis predicted that “on-street” transportationwould not be able to meet the requirement ofSeattle’s core area:
The only pattern now known whichpermits both open space and densedevelopment while moving large peak-hour loads is the use of high-rise structuresand some form of grade separated publictransportation to supplement streets andhighways. Rapid transit is the essential linkin a balanced transportation system whichis missing in Seattle. 17
Ellis stressed that rapid transit is only part of abigger picture:
Transportation is only one of the physicalelements which shape a city. To achieve asatisfactory total design the relationshipbetween all of the shaping forces must berecognized. Transportation facilitiesbecome a more useful tool for urban designif they are integrated into the planning ofother public facilities and privatedevelopments.
By reducing parking requirements publictransportation may free downtown spacefor a plaza and this plaza in turn may beadditionally enjoyable if designed in con-junction with a transit station. Therelationship between public transit andarterial street requirements is both causaland complementary. Just as a system ofsewage disposal is necessary to the enjoy-ment of beaches or waterfront parks soeach of the basic sinews of the city has adirect relation to the more familiar projectsfor city beautification and human fulfill-ment. By the same token, the location ofother public facilities should complementand support the transportation system. Abig league stadium should be served byboth public transit and freeways. All publiccapital purposes in a city are closely in-terdependent. 18
To achieve these interdependent needs, Elliscalled for a joint effort, a forward thrust, by thearea’s several governments and all interestedprivate groups. He envisioned coordinating a seriesof capital improvements that had been con-templated by various groups and local governmentsinto a unified 10-year capital program including:
●
●
●
●
●
●
A basic rapid transit system;
A major league sports stadium;
Major arterial street improvements;
Sufficient parks, plazas, and greenbelts tosatisfy metropolitan needs and to per-manently eliminate urban sprawl;
A world trade center; and
Matching funds for urban redevelop-ment. 19
Ellis’ speech reflected a new approach to the goalof coordinating area wide improvement, with whichhe had been concerned for well over a decade. Theconcept gained the support of community leaders,and in March 1966, Seattle Mayor Braman andKing County Commissioner Scott Wallace ap-pointed a group to select the Forward ThrustCommittee.
The organizations represented by the membersof the committee covered a broad range of localgovernment and business interests. Senior officialsof large businesses formed the predominantelement; academics comprised about 10 percent ofthe committee, and the only “public interest”figures in the present sense of the word wereseveral conservationists. The composition of thecommittee was to influence its policies as well aspublic reactions as its work progressed.
THE FORWARD THRUST PROGRAMAND VOTER REJECTION OF TRANSIT
BONDING
Once the Committee of 200 was selected, theForward Thrust program began its work. Theprocess was organized into three phases. The first,which lasted from September to December 1966,was a factfinding period for developing a broadconsensus on areawide needs. It sought to identifythe total capital improvement needs for King
1~ Ibid., p. 5.IT Ibid., p. 6.18 Ibid., p. 7. IQ Ibid., p. 8.
17
County by pulling together all existing local studiesand proposals.
During the second phase, Forward Thrustsubcommittees examined financing methods andlocal agency authority for fulfilling Seattle’s needs,and presented 18 bills to the State legislature tocreate funding and the authority to administer thenecessary programs. One such bill, passed in 1967,permitted Metro to plan for a comprehensive publictransportation system.
Next, from April through October 1967, asystem of priorities was established relating theurgency of the various needs to financial capabil-ities. The legislative package, which both doubledthe county’s indebtedness limit and establishedState funding for various measures, enabledForward Thrust’s Economic Analysis Committee todetermine how much each of the other subcom-mittees could “spend” for their various proposals.Once a set of programs was recommended to localgovernments and agreed upon by them, ForwardThrust’s third-phase promotional campaign wasbegun.
In November 1967, Forward Thrust announcedits final recommendations. The program totaledsome $2 billion of improvements, with $819 millionto be raised locally by general obligation bonds. Ofthis local share, $385 million was for rapid transit—nearly half of the entire program.
Transit planning was going on simultaneouslyunder the auspices of PSGC. During November1965, the same month Jim Ellis introduced theconcept of Forward Thrust, PSGC adopted aregional transit plan as an element of a totalregional transportation system. The adoptedtransit plan, based on the DeLeuw, Cather study,recommended a two-line grade-separated railtransit system with local and express bus feederservices. In July 1966, the same month of the firstmeeting of the Forward Thrust Committee, asecond contract was signed between PSGC andDeLeuw, Cather to refine the transit plan.
The new study had two goals. First, the studywas to reexamine the 1965 two-line plan in the lightof the very large increase in population projecteddue to industrial expansion. These increasedgrowth projections suggested that the region’spopulation would grow from 1.6 to 3.1 millionbetween 1965 and 1990. The study’s other task wasto do detailed engineering design and to take intoconsideration architecture, urban design, and
18
economics as a basis for more detailed cost es-timates.
During this study, under contract first with thePSGC and then with Metro but under the guidanceof the Forward Thrust Transportation Committee,DeLeuw, Cather extended the transit plan to a 47-mile system with two new legs. One of the new legsheaded south to Renton and the other wentnorthwest to Ballard, supplementing the earlierplan’s northeast route and east route across LakeWashington to Bellevue. All four routes combinedinto a single line through the CBD. The 1985 planincluded the following major elements:
●
●
●
●
●
The
47 miles of dual-track, grade-separated railrapid transit routes with 32 stations.Automobile and bus-to-rail transferfacilities and parking were to be provided atappropriate stations;
A 3-mile, grade-separated busway to westSeattle. To be converted in the future torail rapid transit;
24 miles of grade-separated right-of-wayfor future rail rapid transit;
90 miles of express bus routes, whichwould operate on highways;
500 miles of local bus routes, which wouldoperate on major arterials and serve rapidtransit stations.
total capital cost required to acquire andconstruct the system was estimated at $1.155billion over a 17-year period (assuming an inflationrate of 4.5 percent per year). Annual operatingcosts of $29 million were to be covered by revenuesby 1990. One-third of capital costs, or $385 million,was to be raised through a general obligation bondrequiring 60 percent voter approval for authoriza-tion as part of the Forward Thrust program. Theremaining two thirds of the cost was to come fromUMTA.
In October 1967, the plan was reviewed by ablue-ribbon board of consultants: an architect,Pietro Belluschi; an engineer from Toronto, W.E.P.Duncan; and a planner/urban designer, HenryFagin. The board met in Seattle to review DeLeuw,Cather’s work and to receive presentations fromMayor Braman, Forward Thrust President JimEllis, and C. Carey Donworth, Chairman of theMetro Council, as well as key members of thedesign consultant team. A letter of endorsement
prepared by this board was included in the Octoberreport documenting the plan.
With the transit plan fully detailed, the next stepwas to achieve public support prior to the bondelection. Forward Thrust’s promotional campaignlasted 4 months and involved the work of morethan 3,000 volunteers.
In addition to having representatives of themedia on its Committee of 200, Forward Thrustemployed a professional advertising firm withpolitical campaign experience to carry out thepromotional effort. The effort involved the writingof editorials, a mass mailing, paid advertisements intelevision and the press, and “an army of thrustboosters” 20 who canvassed the final weekend of thecampaign. The theme of the campaign was topromise a better “way of life” for Seattle citizens.
In a survey conducted by Forward Thrust inSeptember, the first of the two done during thecampaign, transit ranked second in popularity with64 percent of the respondents in favor, 19 percentopposed, and 16 percent undecided. During follow-up telephone surveys in January, support fortransit had dropped to 49 percent of therespondents, with 23 percent opposed and 28percent undecided.
Opposition to the Forward Thrust program andto the rapid transit proposal in particular came fromseveral sources. The first formal opposition wasvoiced in the King County Democrat, the official organof the King County Democratic Party. An an-tagonistic editorial entitled “Government by theElite ??? ? ?“ questioned the methods employed byForward Thrust and called for more time to allowthe communities involved to study the desirabilityof the proposals. The editorial also raised questionsabout a possible conflict of interest involving Ellis,whose law firm specializes in handling bonding’ andis legal counsel to Metro. The editorial was theresponsibility of Jeanette K. Williams, who at thetime was the official spokesperson for the KingCounty Democratic Party and who currently is thechairperson of the PSGC Transportation PolicyAdvisory Committee. Three weeks after publica-tion of her editorial, she publicly apologized toEllis. 21
zo Robert E. Gogerty, Attitudes Affecting the Forward ThrustCampaign, unpublished paper, March 14, 1968, pp. 6, 7 o funnumbered pages.
ZI Gogerty and Whitlow, op. cit., pp. M, 45. Gogerty andWhitlow speculate that Williams’ apology may have been due topressure from Senators Magnuson and Jackson.
The Association of Teamsters in Washingtonalso opposed Forward Thrust. Through its officialpaper, The Washington Teamster, with a circulation of33,000 in King County and 50,000 statewide, itvoiced strong criticism of Forward Thrust.22 E dDonohoe, the managing editor, ran a series ofcartoons and editorials attacking Forward Thrustfor causing unnecessary increased taxation, per-sonally attacking Jim Ellis for his alleged conflict ofinterest, and attacking the rapid transit proposalwhich, said Donohoe, “won’t be rapid, won’t haulthe people they claim . . . (these rail systems) won’tpay their way and they’re no damned good for thenorth end, south end, or east end,”23
A third opposition group was called Citizens forSensible Transit. It criticized the support given byPacific Northwest Bell, which had given ForwardThrust its billing lists as source material forcanvassing. This group claimed that the companywas not a private organization and therefore couldnot discriminate in its giving. 24 They contacted theFederal Communications Commission and askedfor equal time to televise their answer to the pro-Forward Thrust editorials, which they weregranted by the three major stations. Gogerty statesthat:
(T)he time authorized was based on all pro-Thrust editorials, even though oppositionwas primarily concerned with the transitproposal. The last week of the campaign,the opponents were in possession ofextensive media time, and used it effective-ly. The major theme, ironically, was thatForward Thrust through rapid transit wastrying to take away or alter the “way oflife” in the Pacific Northwest.25
The special election was held on February 13,1968. Twelve tax propositions were placed beforethe voters of Seattle and King County. Under Statelaw, each proposition required a 60 percent “yes”vote to pass as well as a 40 percent turnout of thosewho had voted in the past general election in theState. The Forward Thrust campaign elicited amuch larger turnout than the 160,000 votersexpected for the special election. A record-breaking267,597 people voted, some 48 percent of theregistered King County voters and a greaternumber than the 214,690 voter turnout of the
zz Ibid., p. 46.
23 Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
ZJ Gogerty, op. cit., p. 20.~~ Ibid., p. 20.
19
previous general election. Seven of thepropositions, totaling $333.9 million, received thenecessary 60 percent or more support. While theother five failed, they each received at least a 50percent majority approval. The transit proposal,which was the most costly item, won support fromapproximately 51 percent of the voters, but thismargin was not enough for approval. Since transitwas considered by Forward Thrust to be the key toits effort, there was a feeling of defeat among theleaders of the campaign.
Robert Gogerty forwards several reasons for thedefeat that involve the way the campaign was run.He points out that the campaign was not geared toshow the low-income voter how the transit projectwould benefit him. In addition, Robert Gogertyindicated that many of the voters perceived theproposed arterial highway improvements as a lessexpensive and more desirable alternative to thetransit proposal as a solution to the county’stransportation problem. This involved a mis-understanding of Forward Thrust’s concept thatthe arterial improvements were a part of an overallbalanced transportation plan.
But in the last analysis, Gogerty attributes thedefeat to a policy decision taken by Forward Thrustcampaign officials:
Campaign officials admit that theSeptember survey lulled them into think-ing transit was safe and that by the timethey realized that there was trouble it wasquestionable whether it could be saved.(The decision to give the stadium priorityat that time pretty well settled thematter. ) 26
SECOND DEFEAT OF THE FORWARDTHRUST TRANSIT PROGRAM IN 1970
In March 1968, with the support of the mayor ofSeattle, the chairman of the Board of King CountyCommissioners, and several civic organizations,the Forward Thrust Committee began a secondeffort to secure approval of the entire capitalimprovement program. Although the originalintention had been that Forward Thrust shoulddisperse after the February election, the resultswere sufficiently encouraging to keep the programalive. Starting in
20 Gogerty, Op. cit.
20
April 1968, more than 100 new
members were added to the Forward ThrustCommittee and additional private financing wasobtained.
During September through December of 1969,background surveys were again conducted; thelegislative program lasted from January 1968 toFebruary 1970. The only bill relating to the transitproposal in the 1968 session allowed anymunicipality which operated a public transporta-tion system to levy a 1 percent motor vehicle excisetax.27 The tax would replace one-half of the alreadyexisting 2 percent State motor vehicle excise tax.The tax proceeds so designated for transit wouldhave to be matched by other locally levied tax fundsalso to be spent on transit. The bill also gave Metroauthority (which local governments already had) tolevy household utility excise taxes.
Once again, DeLeuw, Cather was retained forthe transit studies, this time under a joint contractsigned by the city of Seattle and Metro. Again, ateam of engineers, architects, urban designers, andeconomists was assembled. By March 1969, theteam had completed a comparative analysis ofalternative transportation systems and concludedthat a bus-rail concept was best for the Seattlemetropolitan area.
The analysis examined four alternative transitsystems: buses in mixed traffic, all-bus systemswith metered freeways, all-bus systems withbusways, and the bus-rail plan as modified from the1967 plan. The first alternative was discarded as along-range solution because it caused serioustraffic congestion and minimal travel time im-provement. 28 For the two remaining all-busalternatives, it was assumed that grade-separatedright-of-way would have to be provided to servefive major activity centers—downtown Seattle, theUniversity District, Bellevue, the Duwamishindustrial area, and Renton—in order to avoidserious conflicts with other transportation modes.As a result, the capital costs
. . . were quite comparable, but theoperating deficit of each of the two all-bussystems was four times greater than thebus-rail system, on an annual basis. Thiscan be explained largely by the fact that,with automatic train operation, a rapidtransit train with a single attendant cancarry more than 600 passengers, while
ZT f-lB 641, Chapter 255, Laws of 1969.25 DeLeuw, Cather & Co., op. cit., p. 40..
each bus with driver carries only about 47passengers, fully loaded. This total payloadfactor is significant because about 80percent of the total operating cost of a bustransit system is in the wages paid tovehicle operators. 29
With equal or better patronage forecast for the bus-rail system, the consultants concluded that it was a
superior alternative, considering the higheroperating costs of the all-bus system. This findingwas supported by the Technical Advisory Commit-tee of key agency personnel from Metro, PSGC,and the State Highway Department.
An additional analysis of alternatives wasconducted by a voluntary group from Boeing. ABoeing executive who chaired the Forward ThrustTransit Committee got together a group oftechnicians to review DeLeuw, Cather’s study ofalternatives during the 1970 program. This groupworked on a voluntary off-hours basis, in-vestigating alternative types of technology toanswer a concern that the system had beenoverdesigned and was more costly than necessary.They suggested the use of smaller vehicles andcorrespondingly less expensive track and suppor-ting structures. Their studies showed a possibilityfor reducing the costs by as much as 25 percent,even if the number of miles to be tunneled,depressed, or elevated were kept constant. Thetechnicians presented their findings to theTechnical Advisory Committee and to the consul-tant. DeLeuw, Cather took a stand againstconsidering unconventional technologies. ForwardThrust was opposed to public discussion of thesealternatives before the election for politicalreasons, although it indicated analysis of lower-cost technologies could be resurrected after thebond issue.
During the autum of 1969, a series of communitymeetings was held to broaden the citizen participa-tion effort.
Meanwhile, alinement studies and patronageprojections had been conducted, estimates ofcapital cost were updated, and an initial bus systemdeveloped in more detail than had been done in the1967 plan.
On February 19,1970, a report was published byDeLeuw, Cather documenting the “new” plan (seeFigure 5). It included a letter of endorsement from anew blue-ribbon review board, this time consisting
ZO Ibid., p. SO.
of William Boucher III, Executive Director, GreaterBaltimore Commission; Guy Blain, Director of theTransportation Department of the MontrealTransportation Commission; Charles E. Shumate,Chief Engineer of the State of Colorado Depart-ment of Highways; F. Norman Hill, GeneralManager of the San Antonio Transit System; andBoris Pushkarev, Planning Director of the RegionalPlan Association of New York City.
The 1970 plan differed from its 1967 predecessorin the following ways:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
There were 49 miles of rail this timeinstead of 47, still grade-separated. Therewere alinement shifts on all lines, a cutbackof the northwest line, an extension of thenortheast line, and a short extension of theeast line.
The mileage of local bus routes wasexpanded to 740 miles in comparison to the500 miles included in the previous system.
A plan for immediate improvement of theexisting bus system was this t imedeveloped in greater detail than it had beenin the first plan, with descriptions ofservice improvements to each of thecommunity areas throughout the region.
Instead of the 32 rail stations suggestedpreviously, the new plan called for 34stations, a number of them in new ormodified locations.
In addition to those in the earlier plan, 800local bus shelters were to be provided, 32community and neighborhood b u sstations, and 9 park-and-ride bus stations.
There were only 8 miles of right-of-wayreserved for future rail route extensions ascompared to 24 miles reserved in theprevious system.
The total cost had risen from $1.155 billionto $1.321 billion, primarily due to inflation.The increase in total cost increased thelocal share from $385 to $440 million. 30
On may 19, 1970, 3 months after the Februarypublication of the Metro transit plan, anotherspecial election was held. This time only fourpropositions were presented to the voters. Thetotal cost was $615.5 million: as in 1968, the transitplan, costing $440 million, was the most expensive
JO D e Leuw, Cather & C O . , The R a p i d Transit Plan for fhcMcfropolitan Sea/t/e Area, February 19, 1970, p. 39.
21
\ Renton 1I \: 1
- * - - - - -
FIGURE 5: SEATTLE-RECOMMENDED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEM FOR 1985
Rail Rapid Transit Express Bus
nReserved for Future Rapid
/////1-90 Corridor
Transit
Bus Rapid Transit.-*\
Local Bus Network Not Shown
SOURCE: Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Seattle MetropolitanAre a Recommended Public Transportation Plan, February 1970.
22
single item by far. Again a 60 percent majority ofreferendum voters was necessary. A worseninglocal economic situation, whose decline picked upmomentum in late spring and did not bottom outuntil 1971, may have been the key factor in thedefeat of the second transit proposal. This time thetransit plan was supported by only 46 percent of thevoters, and, in keeping with its original mandate,this time the Forward Thrust organization wasdisbanded.
1972 VOTER ACCEPTANCE OFA SHORT-RANGE BUS PLAN
After the second transit bond issue was rejectedin 1970, transit advocates turned from a regionalbus-rail system to a short-range bus plan forseveral reasons. Economic conditions in the Seattlearea continued to be poor, which would makevoters wary of an expensive transit system. A bussystem would require no bonded indebtedness andtherefore only a 50 percent voter approval for itsfinancing. And, given UMTA’s warm reception ofbus approaches, Federal funding seemed likely.
By far the most important element in the decisionto formulate a bus system in 1972 was the threat ofa complete collapse of the Seattle Transit Systemand suburban private bus operators. During thisperiod the Puget Sound Government Conference(PSGO, with Metro’s concurrence, hired a newconsultant with bus transit planning experience toprepare a short-term bus plan. Daniel, Mann,
Johnson & Mendenhall in 1972 proposed a 650-milesystem of express bus routes serving four activitycenters (the Seattle and Bellevue CBD’s, theDuwamish industrial area, and the UniversityDistrict) from a series of transfer pointsthroughout the region. The transfer points were tobe served by local buses and many would have park-and-ride facilities.
The new system was estimated to cost $95.19million, with new buses, park-and-ride facilities,and freeway bus stops being the largest budgetitems. Fares would be low to encourage patronage,and revenues were not expected to meet operatingcosts. Fare box revenues were to be supplementedby a 0.3 percent local retail sales tax plus matchingState funds from a motor vehicle excise tax asprovided for by the 1969 legislation. In addition,Federal and State gas tax funds were to be used forhighway-related facilities in the plan, and UMTAcapital grants were to be a source for buses andother facilities not covered by the highway-relatedfunds.
PSGC took a more active role in leading this thirdround of the transit planning process. For the 1972plan, PSGC supplied population, employment, andland use forecasts, and calculated the trip genera-tion and distribution data. The data developed byPSGC indicate a much slower growth in the region.Two alternative bus systems were tested, oneCBD-focused and one multicentered. The mul-ticentered alternative that was chosen, although it
Seattle’s transit system includes priority treatment for buses
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does not give the highest quality service to theCBD, achieves the highest ridership overall. Incomparison, previous plans sought to achieve thepolitical goal serving the CBD.
This time, with only a 50 percent vote required,the transit scheme won approval. Financingrequired to implement the short-term bus transitimprovement program was approved in publicreferendum, and Metro was authorized to developand operate the region’s public transit system.
CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVERTHE LONG-RANGE PLAN
Since 1972, differences in opinion have resultedin rivalries between PSGC and Metro over thefuture of rail transit in the Seattle region. TheMetro leaders still consider the bus plan to be aninterim measure, designed to take advantage ofUMTA’s willingness to finance bus systems. ThePSGC, which has an advantage over Metro in thatit is charged with receiving and dispersing DOTfunds, neither recommends nor specifically ex-cludes rail transit.
Since 1972, Metro and PSGC have competed formajor roles in mass transit planning. The agenciesagree that the Seattle region can best be served by arange of technologies to be implementedincrementally and designed to meet specific transitneeds in specific parts of the region. But theirdifferent orientations have led them to focus ondifferent issues in their attempts to define theirrespective roles.
Metro, as the present transit operator, believesthe main issue concerns the types of transittechnology most appropriate for Seattle’s long-term transit needs. Metro leaders consider the 1972bus plan to be an interim measure designed to takeadvantage of UMTA’s willingness to finance bussystems. They argue that in the long run someform of automated transit technology will beneeded to diminish the bus system’s high operatingcosts. Metro favors the provision of a range oftechnologies to meet different service needsthroughout the region. It now has a study of transittechnology systems underway whose goal is todevelop a general plan, with strategies on how toachieve it incrementally.
The Puget Sound Council of Governments(PSCOG) 31 is most concerned with the broader
JI The puget Sound Government] Conference recently came
to be known as the Puget Sound Conference of Governments.
2 4
issues such as how the capacity, speed, and locationof a transit system are linked to land developmentintensity and timing issues. PSCOG’s current long-range transportation plan calls for exclusive buslanes on both highways and arteries, although itdoes not rule out fixed-guideway systems. Thelong-range plan is basically an extension of thepolicies in the adopted short-range transportationplan, which deals with the 1972-80 period. Inaddition to this conventional system, PSCOG staffhave given serious attention to such newtechnology concepts as an automated small-vehicleCBD distribution network that would move peopleand goods and perhaps double as the solid wastecollection system.
In the past year, this jurisdictional dispute hasbeen overridden by the issue of how to use thefunds allocated for the construction of InterstateHighway 90. The decision to include some kind ofexclusive transitway in the proposed I-90 freewayis several years old, PSCOG initiated acceleratedstudies on several options, including variations onthe Highway Department’s transit-freewayscheme. One proposal endorsed by Seattle’s MayorWes Uhlman involves electrified buses operating intunnels under a pedestrian mall on either Third ofFourth Street in the CBD. The downtown tunnelwould be linked by a busway to I-90. Other optionsthat include constructing I-90 call for including railin the freeway design and for including transitlanes in both Lake Washington bridges, with only amodest expansion of highway capacity compared tothe original WSHD scheme done in the early1950’s. Options that include no highway or buswayimprovements in the I-90 corridor stress fixed-guideway transit alternatives such as trolley or rail.
The amount of money at stake—$500 million—means that the decision on what to do with I-90funds will be very important in shaping the long-run future of transit in Seattle. It seems unlikelythat a decision not to build I-90 in any form will betaken.
Since the potential of massive amounts offunding was infused into the transit debate, thesituation in the Seattle region has become veryfluid. At best, this new potential has catalyzed freshthought and has returned rail transit to the front ofpeople’s minds. At worst, the pressure to come upwith a plan quickly could mean that the region willcommit itself to a plan or a technology that has notbeen adequately thought through.
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process
1884
1889
1892
1901
1918
1939
1952
1953
1955
1956
The first horse-drawn street railwaywas constructed.
The first cable car line was placed inoperation and electrification of transitbegun.
By this year over 70 miles of track inSeattle and West Seattle were operatingunder management of over a dozendifferent companies.
Stone and Webster, a Boston engineer-ing firm and owner of the largest electricpower company in Seattle area, receivedpermission to acquire all transit com-panies in the area and create a monopoly.
The city of Seattle purchased theportions of the transit system within itsborders from Stone and Webster.
Seattle’s three-man Transit Commis-sion was established to operate theSeattle system.
James Ellis led a campaign to restructureKing County to provide for home ruleand authority for metropolitanwideimprovements. The proposal wasdefeated.
The Washington State Toll BridgeAuthority was authorized to constructthe Central Freeway as a toll facility.
The Seattle Transit Commission’s re-quest for inclusion of rapid transitfacilities in the median of the proposedCentral Freeway was denied by the TollAuthority.
Following passage of the Federal-AidHighway Act, responsibility for con-struction of the Central Freeway wastransferred to the Washington StateHighway Department.
The Metropolitan Problems AdvisoryCommittee, chaired by Jim Ellis, was
appointed by the mayor of Seattle andthe Board of King County Com-missioners.
1957 In January, the Seattle Planning Com-mission issued a report recommendingtransit on the Central Freeway.
In February, Seattle Mayor GordonClinton appointed a committee to con-sider rapid transit operation on theCentral Freeway.
In April, the Transit Commissionpublished a report recommendingfuture rail provisions on the CentralFreeway with interim use by expressbus.
In June, in response to recommendationsof the Metropolitan Problems AdvisoryCommittee, the State legislature passedthe Metropolitan Municipal Corpora-tion Act, which enabled the establish-ment of corporations for solvingmetropolitanwide problems.
In October, the Puget Sound RegionalTransportation Committee was formedto determine the scope and proceduresfor a regional comprehensive transpor-tation study.
In November, pursuant to the Stateenabling legislation, a new citizens’organization chaired by Jim Ellis, theMetropolitan Council Action Commit-tee, began a major promotional cam-paign supporting creation of a municipalcorporation for the Seattle area.
The Puget Sound Governmental Con-ference was created by the electedofficials of King, Kitsap, Pierce, andSnohomish Counties to serve as thea r e a ’ s V o l u n t a r y C o u n c i l o fGovernments.
1958 In March, the Metro concept, coveringsewage disposal, public transportation,and comprehensive planning, was
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presented to the voters. It failed to passby a small margin of 16,000 votes out of187,000 votes cast.
In September, voters approved astripped-down Metro as a single-function agency responsible for sewagedisposal.
In October, the Puget Sound RegionalTransportation Committee employedParsons, Brinkerhoff, Hall and Mac-Donald to determine the scope andprocedures of the proposed comprehen-sive transportation study.
1959 In April, the final report of Parsons,Brinkerhoff, Hall and MacDonald wassubmitted.
1960 In July, the prospectus of the proposedstudy was approved by the TechnicalCommittee of the Puget Sound RegionalTransportation Committee.
Later that year, John Mladinov becamedirector of the Puget Sound RegionalTransportation Study (PSRTS). Adelegation of civic groups requested thatMladinov consider rail rapid transit aspar t o f the basic transportationnetwork, Mladinov was not cooperative.
1961 In October, the Metropolitan Transpor-tation Committee, including Jim Ellis,was created to determine the best meansto provide rapid transit for the Seattlearea.
1962 In February, in response to theMetropolitan Transportation Com-mittee’s recommendation that Metroshould perform the transit function, apromotional committee was formedcalled Citizens’ Committee for MetroTransit.
In September, despite an intensivecampaign, a measure to include publictransportation as a function of Metrowas again defeated by the voters.
1964 In June, after the city leaders’ dissatisfac-tion with the PSRTS transit efforts,PSGC authorized DeLeuw, Cather &Company to undertake a transit studyand recommend a regional transit plan.
In November, DeLeuw issued its firstinterim report, recommending thatrapid transit facilities be incorporatedinto a Lake Washington bridge (the I-90Bridge).
1965 In November, DeLeuw, Cather issuedits second interim report on the feasibili-ty of rapid transit operation in theSeattle area. It recommended a two-linetransit system connecting the CBD tothe northeast portion of the city and toBellevue. A Rapid Transit AdvisoryCommittee, appointed by , MayorBraman and headed by Jim Ellis, en-dorsed the plan, and PSGC adopted it asan element of a total regional transpor-tation plan.
Also in November, Jim Ellis spoke beforethe Seattle Rotary Club and called forthe creation of Forward Thrust tocoordinate the finance of neededmetropolitanwide c a p i t a l i m -provements. Rapid transit, a sportsstadium, arterial street improvements,parks and open space, and urbanredevelopment were suggested to beconsidered as part of a unified 10-yearcapital program.
1966 In March, Mayor James D. Braman andKing County Commissioner ScottWallace appointed a committee to selecta Forward Thrust Committee.
In April, the PSRTS summary reportwas issued. The report concluded thatno strong recommendation could bemade for rapid transit.
In July, the newly appointed ForwardThrust Committee of 200 was calledtogether for its first meeting. Duringthe same month PSGC contracted withDeLeuw, Cather to refine the transitplan and determine if additional routeswould be required.
From September to December, meetingsof the Forward Thrust Committee wereheld to conduct background surveys ofcapital needs of the metropolitan area.
1967 Between January and April, ForwardThrust sponsored legislation necessaryto carry out its programs. Eighteen bills
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were passed, including one permittingMetro to do planning for a comprehen-sive public transportation system.
From April to October, Forward Thrustanalyzed previously recommended im-provement programs in relation tofunding availability and establishedpriorities.
In June, DeLeuw, Cather was contractedby Metro to conduct a number ofdetailed studies on the transit plan andto broaden the scope of its study to takeinto consideration architecture, urbandesign, economic, and other factors notpreviously covered.
In October, after an endorsement by ablue-ribbon consultant review board,DeLeuw, Cather published the transitplan.
In November, Forward Thrust began itspromotional campaign for its 12 bondissues. The rapid transit proposal wasthe biggest cost-item—$385 million outof the $819 million total.
1968 On February 13, 7 of the 12 ForwardThrust bond issues received voterapproval. Although transit receivedsupport of 51 percent of the voters, itfailed to get the 60 percent approvalrequired for it to pass.
In March, the Forward Thrust Commit-tee began a second effort to secureapproval of the entire program.
From September through December,background surveys were again con-ducted to reassess capital improvementsneeds.
1969 Between January and March, eight Statebills sponsored by Forward Thrust werepassed. One provided Metro and Statefinancial assistance for mass transit.
In March, DeLeuw, Cather & Company,this time retained under a contractsigned by the city of Seattle and Metro,completed a comparative analysis ofalternative transportation systems andagain recommended the bus-rail con-cept.
1970 Between January and February,Forward Thrust successfully sponsoredfive pieces of State legislation.
On February 19, a report was publishedby DeLeuw, Cather documenting themodified 1967 transit plan.
On May 19, four Forward Thrustpropositions totaling $615.5 millionwere presented to the voters, withtransit at a cost of $440 million being thelargest. All four proposals were defeateddue largely to poor local economicconditions resulting from huge layoffsat Boeing. Transit received a supportingvote of only 46 percent. After theelection, the Forward Thrust organiza-tion was disbanded.
On September 8, the “Blue-Streak”demonstration express bus service wentinto service. It utilized priority freewayaccess and was well received.
1971 In September, UMTA approved a $447, -000 study requested by the PSGC.PSGC employed Daniel, Mann, Johnson& Mendenhall to prepare a short-termbus plan that would not require bondedindebtedness.
1972 On September 19, voters approved an0.3 percent sales tax that provided fundsfor Metro to take over the SeattleTransit System, to buy out the suburbanMetropolitan Transit Corporation, andto provide improvements in service andequipment as spelled out in the PSGCplan.
1973 On January 1, Metro began operatingthe transit system.
In September, Metro introduced a freedowntown area zone stimulating intra-CBD travel.
1974 PSGC and Metro signed a cooperationagreement spelling out their respective
● roles. However, rivalries and competi-tion between the two agencies con-tinued.
Metro put out a request for proposals todevelop an incremental approach tolong-term transit planning.
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1975 After much difficulty in trying to obtain planning in the Seattle area. Still at issuePSGC approval, Metro initiated its long- is whether or not to build the highwayterm transit planning approach. facility and whether or not to provide
new transit service across the lake. AlsoControversy over the I-90 Lake at issue is what kind of transit is to beWashington crossing continued to provided (if any), and how its entrancehighlight the battles over transportation into the CBD is to be handled.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Until the past several years, the transit decision-making process in Seattle was unique among thenine cases because it took place outside the officialchannels of government. The preeminent role ofForward Thrust, an organization composed of civicand business leaders, raised questions of account-ability even though the participants represented abroad range of Seattle’s interest groups and publicspokesmen. With the disbandment of ForwardThrust in 1970 and the successful short-range busproposal in 1972, transit planning responsibilitiespassed to the more conventional forum provided bythe transit agency Metro and the regional council ofgovernments. However, that forum has beentroubled by conflict over decisionmakingprerogatives. Recent events demonstrate that thecity still exerts a major influence over regionaldecisionmaking, and that the Governor may bebecoming a more important participant.
Forum for Decisionmaking
The history of transit planning and decision-making in Seattle has been played out within thecontext of movements for civic improvements,primarily due to the influence of Jim Ellis. Ellis,although he has never held office in any majorofficial position, was the creative force behind twoof the three organizations that have provided theforum for transit decisionmaking in Seattle. (Hewas involved with Metro and Forward Thrust; lessso with the Puget Sound Governmental Con-ference.)
Improved public transportation was one of Ellis’original goals by the time of the first referendumvote on Metro in 1957. Although voters gaveMetro power over water treatment, they refused togrant transit authority. Subsequently, as the StateHighway Commission and the Puget SoundRegional Transportation Study continued to stressauto transportation, a series of citizens’ committeeswas developed to provide more suitable forums fortransit advocacy. After another attempt to em-power Metro to deal with transit failed in 1962,
Assessment of the Planning andDecisionmaking Process
transit advocates turned to the city of Seattle andPSGC. The new transit forces flexed their muscleswhen the DeLeuw, Cather transit plan they hadinfluenced the city to commission, met thehighway-oriented Puget Sound R e g i o n a lTransportation Study (PSRTS) with the result thatthe head of the PSRTS left the Seattle area undercity pressure.
In calling for the establishment of ForwardThrust in 1965, Ellis once again surfaced as amoving force in creating a new institutionalmechanism (as he had done in Metro). Althoughthese two institutions differed vastly in form,purpose, and authority, they were alike in that theyboth were designed to achieve the momentumnecessary to effect Ellis’ goals (although neitheractually has the authority to do so directly). By1968, Forward Thrust, which considered transitthe key to its effort, was making the basic transitdecisions in the Seattle area.
Over a period of time the Puget SoundGovernmental Conference (PSGC) began to seek astronger role. There were several structuralproblems with the PSGC. Its four-county jurisdic-tion was too broad and contained too many diverseinterests to reflect any concrete power base, and itlacked the ability to tax. Its strength was derivedfrom Federal acts that gave it the responsibility forreview, regionwide coordination, preparation of acomprehensive plan, 3-C transportation planning
responsibilities, and A-95 responsibility for review-ing funding applications.
Although PSGC (now PSCOG) has been gainingrecognition as a forum, it was Metro that gainedthe support of Seattle’s political leadership as thekey transit organization after the termination ofForward Thrust. Metro has certain structuraladvantages over PSCOG. It has the means to carryout plans, once approved, and a membershi p morecohesive than PSCOG’s because it is limited to themore immediate Seattle metropolitan area (KingCounty). As of 1973, it became the sole transitoperator in the Seattle area, with the power and thetax base to implement transit improvements.
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Although the PSGC and Metro signed acooperative agreement that attempted to spell outtheir respective roles in 1974, rivalry between thetwo agencies continues, especially in the area oflong-range transit system planning. PSCOG claimsa lead role in long-range planning because it wantsto strengthen the relationship between transit andland use planning (which is its responsibility);Metro claims a lead role because it wants long-range plans to reflect technological considerations(because they affect transit operations and cost,which are at the center of Metro’s concerns).
Evidence that PSGC is not an agreed-upon forumis provided by the fact that it became necessary toestablish a new mechanism for allocation of FederalUrban Systems highway funds. PSGC wanted amajor role in the allocation of these funds. Metrodid not seek the basic role but proposed a specialboard. The Urban Systems Board, for which PSGCprovided the staff, was accepted by the HighwayCommission on the condition that it be advisory.The mayor, the King County executive, and othermajor elected officials participate on the board, andit seems to be working well: about 50 percent of theUrban Systems money for the area is now beingallocated to transit projects.
The recent proposal to package a downtown bussubway in a revised plan for Interstate 90 reflectsanother level of conflict, this one involving thecenter city interests on the one hand, and the ruraland suburban interests on the other hand. Theconflict had been implicit in the earlierdevelopments in Seattle’s transit planning. The twoplans developed under the leadership of ForwardThrust emphasized the importance of downtownrevitalization, and they were strongly backed bySeattle’s political leadership. In contrast, the planapproved in 1972 was developed under theguidance from the Puget Sound GovernmentalConference and proposed relatively higher levels ofservice to rural and suburban areas (and less thanmaximum service to the CBD). The I-90 plandiffers from these earlier plans because it is morelimited and CBD-oriented in scope. Inasmuch asthe plan would directly affect regional transporta-tion, however, it can be considered a regional issue.Nevertheless, the plan was shaped behind closeddoors by the mayor and the Governor. PSCOG, thefederally designated forum for transportationplanning, was not informed of the project until theproposal had been developed.
Accountability of Decisionmakers
For a long time, Seattle businessmen andcommunity leaders dominated transit planningthrough quasi-governmental channels. There waslittle direct accountability to voters. Accountabilityto decisionmakers increased when Metro andPSGC became the dominant forces in transitplanning after 1970, although the city has con-tinued to exert an important influence.
Forward Thrust, the most long-lived of thequasi-governmental groups of civic activists andbusinessmen, has been termed a vigilantegovernment—a perhaps overly pejorative termconsidering that it worked largely in the open,made attempts to include all major opinion-shapersand established interest groups and generallycarried on its work through high mindedvolunteers who saw themselves as working in thepublic interest. Nonetheless, Forward Thrust wasbasically an elite group performing functions andmaking decisions that are normally considered theresponsibility of government.
One question of accountability arose over theissue of whom Forward Thrust represented. Anexamination of the membership of the ForwardThrust Committee of 200 shows that a majority ofthe participants were from the downtown businesscommunity. Labor, the university community, andvarious conservative groups all at some timeopposed what some considered “an organization oforganization men.” Forward Thrust’s proposalstended to give priority to CBD routes most vital todowntown business.
Today the two organizations that compete fordecisionmaking authority (Metro and PSCOG) aremore accountable to the voter because they aregoverned primarily by elected officials, becausetheir meetings are open and publicized, and becausetheir decisionmaking processes are governed byrules that assure a formal opportunity for publicinvolvement (e.g., public hearings). Metro isgoverned by a 37-member council, composed of theKing County executive and the nine countycommissioners, the mayor of Seattle and the ninecity councilmen, another official of the city, sixrepresentatives of cities over 15,000 in population,six persons from unincorporated areas of KingCounty, one representative from cities in thecounty with populations of less than 15,000, onedelegate from Metro’s component sewer districts,and a chairman elected by other members of the
30
Metro council.32 The PSCOG has an executiveboard comprised of the conference chairman, thevice chairman, and not fewer than one representa-tive from each member county, one from eachmember central city, and two representatives fromthe combined membership. 33
Metro is more representative, more closelyapproximating the one-man one-vote concept,while PSCOG’s votes are distributed fairly evenlyto each member unit of government. Metro isdominated by the city, and, because its concern hasalways been with the city, it tends to supporttransit plans that provide greater service to the corearea.
The PSCOG board, also composed of electedofficials, gives more voice to areas outside the city.Therefore it is not surprising to find that it tends tomove in the direction of a bus system more suitablefor large, fairly low-density areas than a rail transitsystem.
A final issue of accountability of the transitplanning process in the past has been the tendencyto enlarge proposed new systems to provide serviceto all voters. The plans presented in the 1968 and1970 referenda proposed extensive transit systemsin an attempt to lure the vote in all corridors of thecity and suburban areas. However, analysis of thevote shows that many suburban areas did notsupport the transit proposals because they felt theywere getting less than their share of service.
Public Involvement
Community participation programs have becomeincreasingly concerned with involving citizensfrom the beginning in the early stages of theplanning process.
During the campaign before the 1968 referen-dum, Forward Thrust kept in touch with citizensthrough telephone surveys, doorbelling, andpresentations to local groups. The strength of the1968 program was its intensity. It was easy to getaccess to information about the Thrust Proposals.Its drawback was that it was not a true communityinvolvement approach but an attempt to “sell” anidea to a passive public.
During the second (1970) campaign, ForwardThrust held meetings in 16 separate communities.The two important points resulting from these
32 Co]cord, op. cit., 71.33 Ibid., p. 72.
meetings both had to do with short-term transitimprovements. Citizens stressed the need toprovide adequate transportation service in areasthat would not be served by rail. They also stressedthe importance of providing immediate bus serviceimprovements while the regional rail system wasunder construction. While the plan presented tovoters in 1970 reflected these recommendations—it included short-term bus improvements and moreextensive bus coverage than had been proposed in1968—it nevertheless went too far in the oppositedirection—with a proposal for an expensive railsystem—to win the necessary votes.
The drawback of the 1970 program was thatcitizen input into the planning process wasprimarily limited to refining the rail plan. Thisindicates a major weakness of the Forward Thrustapproach generally, when viewed from the stand-point of current standards. Forward Thrust wasnot an unbiased funnel for citizen input. It was aprivate organization with a well-defined goal ofproviding Seattle with a rail transit system.
Following the rejections of the rail plan in 1968and 1970, the consultants preparing the 1972 plancarried out an extensive effort to get communityparticipation into the process. The Metro TransitLiaison Committee, composed of appointed publicofficials, transportation agency personnel, andrepresentatives of areawide citizen and civicgroups, advised policy makers at their semimonthlypublic meetings. This committee, which metthroughout the study, was supplemented byadditional citizen participation through communitymeetings held in each of 10 areas of the county.These attempted to involve citizens in the planningprocess from the beginning. Community input wasenlisted in five phases of the planning process: goalformulation, alternative system selection, tentativerecommended plan, the recommended plans andthe recommended financial plan, and phasing. Theeffort paid off when voters approved the plan in the1972 referendum.
Citizen involvement in the transit planningprocess today is more widespread but also morediffuse, since each major participating agency orunit of government —Metro, PSCOG, City ofSeattle, WSHD, and King County—has its owncitizen involvement program. However, since theforum for transit decisionmaking is not welldefined and competition among many of these
31
agencies continues, it is difficult to say how orwhen a participation program will be incorporatedinto decisionmaking.
TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS
Goals and Objectives
Forward Thrust lent to Seattle’s transit move-ment a vision of the goal to be achieved throughmass transit. It sought to provide a high capacitytransit system as one of the means to improve theregion’s business and cultural center. In the wordsof James Ellis, “Transportation facilities . . . (are) auseful tool for urban design."34 Ellis was explicitabout the nature of the environment he sought toachieve: a pattern “which permits both open spaceand dense development . . . (a pattern) of high-risestructures and . . . grade-separated . . . transporta-tion.” 35 The interest in transit Ellis gave to ForwardThrust stemmed from a well-defined vision of thecity.
By 1970, Forward Thrust’s vision was badly inneed of repair. Huge layoffs at Boeing had turnedSeattle from a prosperous city into one of near-depression. Yet Forward Thrust’s transit program,instead of economizing, got a little larger and moreexpensive. One of the strongest arguments thatForward Thrust’s opponents voiced during the1970 campaign was that the transit plan was basedon overly optimistic growth projections.
Some aspects of controversy over ForwardThrust’s goals centered on the strongly impliedassumption that what was good for the downtownbusiness community was good for Seattle. The tworail plans had provided priority rail service to CBD-oriented trips; public transportation for most othertrips was not to be improved. In the 1972 plan, thisbias disappeared as the goal of serving thedowntown business community lost itspreeminence.
Development and Evaluationof Alternatives
The evaluation of alternatives in Seattle’s twomajor rail transit planning studies assumed overlyoptimistic population projections, especially for theCBD. This fact, coupled with lack of seriousconsideration of low-capital bus alternatives, led tooverly extensive, CBD-focused rail proposals,
The predictions of rapid growth for the Seattlearea, based on the projected employment of theBoeing Company, were reasonable when they firstwere used in 1967. However, the Boeing workforce, which grew from 60,000 in 1966 to 93,000 in1967 and 101,000 in 1969, plummeted in January1971 to 46,800. 36 One of the mandates of the 1970DeLeuw, Cather plan was to take into account thispopulation growth. It is ironic that by the time thiscontract was let, the decline had begun. Theoverblown population forecasts were much beratedby critics of the 1970 transit plan. However, theseoutdated projections were used to project densitiesheavy enough to justify rail routes, a practice thatled to an overly extensive system designed to beattractive to the suburbs. By 1972, the PSGCdeveloped data that indicated a much slowergrowth in the region.
In the first two studies, the growth forecastsfavored systems that offered service to the CBD. Itwas an explicit goal of the 1967 study to design atransit system that would serve the CBD, and thestudy assumed a large percentage of the region’strips would be oriented to the CBD. The 1970 plan,although it proposed 240 more miles of busway, didnot substantially change this focus on the CBD.
A group of professors at the University ofWashington questioned this orientation, arguingthat the projections assumed too high a concentra-tion of employment, particularly in the downtown,and that the system would primarily benefitdowntown landowners and higher-income com-muters from distant suburbs, who would be usingthe system to get to work downtown.
Another shortcoming of the first two studies wastheir failure to seriously consider low-cost busalternatives to the rail systems. Alternativesanalysis was in many aspects limited to a com-parison of the automobile as the alternative to rail,with no mention of a bus option. When all threemodes were compared, the bus system used forcomparison was essentially the existing system,with no major improvements. The bus system wasjudged preferable to the rail system from a coststandpoint but was considered unacceptable inother ways. The report pictured buses hampered bydowntown congestion unless exclusive bus laneswere provided and then never mentioned thepossibility of bus lanes again. This stood out in
SJ Ellis, op. cit., p. 5.35 Ibid., p. 6.
32
M Co[cord, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
sharp contrast to the optimistic estimates of ridersattracted by comfortable and fast rail service.
DeLeuw, Cather’s 1970 plan included a longdiscussion of alternatives. After mentioning manypossible systems, the report settled on four forfurther analysis: buses in mixed traffic, all-bussystem with metered freeways, all-bus system withbusways, and combined bus and rail rapid transit.However, all the less costly solutions were discard-ed, and it was assumed, without apparent justifica-tion, that the only feasible bus solution wouldrequire grade-separated rights-of-way in the fivemajor activity centers in order to avoid seriousconflicts with other transportation modes. Thisskyrocketed the cost of a bus system to over $350million more than the rail system.
The capital costs were assumed to be the same forthe busrail system and the all-busway system, butoperating costs were higher for the busway (thiswas partially due to the assumption that labor costswere expected to inflate at a greater rate than othercosts).
O t h e r t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h ethoroughness of the 1970 analysis of rail alter-natives were raised by analysis done by volunteertechnicians under guidance from a Boeing ex-ecutive. Their studies showed the possibility ofreducing the costs of a rail system as much as 25percent if alternative lighter vehicle types oftechnology were used. This information wouldhave carried far greater weight had it been part ofthe material made available by Forward Thrust; asit was, Forward Thrust opposed public discussionof the issue. This reluctance reflects poorly on thequality of work on evaluation of alternatives.
The 1972 study examined only bus alternativesbecause it was felt that only a bus system could getthe required voter approval for its funding. Thelimitation of the study to relatively low-capitalalternatives did not imply a permanent rejection ofmore costly fixed-guideways alternatives—thisstudy was clearly defined as a short-range transitimprovement plan. But for the short-term, two bussystems were examined: a CBD-oriented systemand a multicenter concept. The first system wasable to generate more transit trips to the CBD(52,891 versus 52,164) but the multicenter systemgenerated more transit trips to almost every otherlocation and generated a much larger total numberof transit trips (190,376 versus 245,250). The CBD-focused system generated much more revenue andhad a much smaller operating deficit but cost
almost $29 million more in capital costs (parkingspaces, freeway stops, more bus lanes, and anadditional CBD terminal). The multicenter conceptwas chosen as a result of this thoroughly compe-tent analysis.
A final characteristic of each of the alternativesanalyses in Seattle was their lack of breadth. As wascustomary for analysis in its time, there was noevaluation of environmental impacts and little ofthe economic impact of the proposed transitsystems. The bulk of the analysis concerned transitridership figures or costs.
Financing and Implementation
The expection of Federal funds probably hasinfluenced Seattle’s transit planners to design moreexpensive systems than they would haveotherwise. The necessity of providing localmatching funds through bond issues on sales taxalso has influenced the transit system design.
Seattle’s two proposals for rail systems (in 1968and 1970) were formulated in the expectation thatUMTA would provide two-thirds of the cost, withlocal funding providing the other third. A numberof critics, among them the group of professors fromthe University of Washington who had opposed the1970 rail system proposal, claimed that the promiseof UMTA money encouraged planners to designoverly expensive transit systems. The expectationof Federal money has also been a dominant factor inthe design of rapid transit systems since 1970. In1972, it was a conscious policy to propose a bussystem instead of a rail system because UMTA wasenthusiastic about bus systems. (This strategy wasproven effective when UMTA reacted by ap-proving the largest bus system improvement grantin its history. ) The availability of Federal moneycontinues to be a dominant influence on masstransit in the Seattle region: the current flurry ofalternative transit schemes is a direct result of thepotential of using Federal highway money (from I-90) for transit purposes.
In Seattle, the issue of Federal funds has until1972 been academic because of the planners’inability to raise local matching funds throughbonding. Local financing considerations have hadas much or more influence on the extent and modeof proposed transit systems as has Federal action.
The need for 60 percent of the voters to approvebonding to finance the local matching funds for therapid rail transit proposals of 1968 and 1970
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influenced the design of the proposals. One of the The proposed bus improvement plan of 1972reasons for enlarging the two-line system original- won nearly 60 percent of the voters (although onlyly proposed in 1965 was to attract voters who 50 percent was needed). The vote showed that aotherwise would not have been served. This plan short-term plan designed to meet an immediatebackfired when the extensive system presented to need was more effective in attracting support thanvoters was opposed because it was too expensive. an extensive long-term system had been.
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Summary Case Assessment
The purpose of this section is to summarize thetransit planning decisionmaking process in theSeattle region in light of the guidelines listed in theIntroduction to the case assessments. The sum-mary, therefore, divided into two parts: (1)Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)Assessment of the Technical Planning Work.
1. ASSESSMENT OF THEINSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
. Forum for Decisionmaking.—During thelate 1960’s, Forward Thrust made the basicpolicy decisions in mass transit planningfor Seattle. Since 1970, Metro and thePuget Sound Council of Governments(PSCOG) have competed for major respon-
sibilities in transit planning. However, thecity of Seattle continues to exert a stronginfluence.
. Accountability of Decisionmakers.—Inthe late 1960’s transit planning wasdominated by a quasi-governmental elite ofbusinessmen and civic leaders who,although they attempted to involve allpublic interests, were not directly accoun-table to the public. Today, the two domi-nant forces in transit planning—Metro andPSCOG—are composed of officials whoare elected for local positions. They can beheld accountable to the public for theiractions as they affect each locality, but theyare not accountable for regional decisions.Metro, whose board reflects the one-man,one-vote principle, is more representativeof the region’s interests than PSCOG,whose board gives equal representation tolightly populated rural towns as to the cityof Seattle.
. Public Involvement.—The public has beeninvolved in Seattle transit decisionsthroughout the 15-year period of recenthistory, at least in the sense that financingdepended on voter approval. There hasbeen less public involvement in the ongo-
ing planning process. While ForwardThrust conducted community meetings,many basic decisions had already been fixedby an elite leadership group of downtowninterests. The 1972 planning process,following a broader citizen participationeffort, achieved support for the idea ofimproving the rapidly deteriorating ex-isting transit system. Although agencieshave improved avenues for citizen involve-ment today, the confusion over planningresponsibilities makes it difficult to knowwhich channels for participation will bemost effective.
2. ASSESSMENT OF THETECHNICAL PROCESS
● Goals and Objectives.—Transit proposalsin Seattle have been part of a comprehen-sive program of municipal improvementsbased on explicit goals for the city. Theprogram’s goals were based on veryoptimistic estimates of Seattle’s growth,estimates that began to divorce goals fromreality as layoffs at Boeing created a near-depression in the Seattle area.
. D e v e l o p m e n t a n d Evaluation ofAlternatives.— A rail rapid transit concepthad been chosen as a matter of policy bydowntown-oriented civic leaders in theearly 1960’s. Subsequent planning wascarried out to prove the feasibility of CBD-oriented rail transit and show its superiori-ty in relation to other alternatives. Afterdefeat of the rail plans in 1968 and 1970, abus scheme was sought and rail was notconsidered an alternative, since bondedindebtedness was to be avoided. Currently,a variety of technological alternatives areunder consideration as part of a flexible,incremental planning approach.
. Financing and Implementation.—Transitplanning was strongly influenced by the
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nature of the available financing, which interest in transit, a plan that backfiredwas dependent on UMTA support and when voters rejected the expensivevoter approval. The early transit systems proposals. More recent proposals havewere made large in order to provide a stressed immediate short-term transitmaximum number of voters with a direct needs, with more success.
o
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