assessing the impacts of the surface mining control and reclamation act

Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1989 VOl. 9, NO. 1, pp. 98-108

ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT

Uday Desai

INTRODUCTION

I t has been almost a dozen years since the passage of t he Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). Even after all these years, there is little agreement on how well i t has worked. Environmentalists have argued that the Act has not worked well since it has not been vigorously implemented by the coal states or by the U.S. Office of Surface Mining (OSM) (Branson, 1986; Brown, 1986; Groups Debate, 1987; Marx, 1987; National Wildlife Federation, 1985; Prominent Companies, 1986; Seiberling, 1986; Synar, 1986). The coal states and the coal industry, on the other hand, have generally found the Act to be working reasonably well in recent years (Dernbach, 1986; Report Says, 1987, p. 23; Jones, 1985; Mollohan, 1986). Assessing the impacts of any environmental policy is especially difficult since its impacts are long term and hard to measure. In addition, since many forces, natural and economic, shape the impact of environmental policy, i t is difficult to separate the impacts of the policy from those of the other forces.

An environmental policy rarely impacts the environment directly. The policy usually contains a series of procedural provisions dealing with matters such as permitting, inspection, citation of violations, penalties, etc. These provisions, when rigorously enforced, are expected to lead to changes in the practices of private parties, e.g., mine operators. SMCRA contains detailed environmental performance standards that coal mining operators must adhere to, and i ts extensive provisions are expected to reduce environmental consequences of surface coal mining. Essentially, these provisions govern permitting, inspection, violation citation, and penalty assessment and collection.

Of the twenty-four states that produce coal, about half produce under ten million tons of surface mined coal each year (Desai, 1988, Table 1). Six of the twelve major coal states (Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia in the east; Illinois in the midwest; and Montana and Wyoming in the west) contain over 80% of all surface mines, and they produced about 70% of all surfaced mined coal in the United States in 1983. Thus, assessment of SMCRA’s effectiveness in these six states provides a reasonable basis for assessing i t s overall effectiveness. Annual reviews of state regulatory programs for the past several years, conducted by OSM, have been used as the principal data source for each of the six states.

Assessing the Impact of SMCRA

SMCRA requires every commercial surface coal mining operation to obtain a mining permit from a s ta te regulatory authority. In addition to

98

Desai: Assesing the Impacts of the SMCRA 99

detailed maps and data on such things as boundaries, hydrology, topology, soil characteristics, and methods for preventing or controlling adverse environmental effects during mining, the permit application must contain detailed plans for reclaiming the land to required standards. This permitting process is designed to ensure tha t the mine will not have significant short- or long-term adverse environmental consequences, and thus, it is expected to protect the environment. SMCRA also requires appropriate bonding for the operator, to allow the regulatory authority to reclaim the land in case the operator fails to do so.

However, there is no guarantee that mine operators will carry out mining and reclamation according to the permit and regulations. A rigorous inspection and enforcement regime is still necessary. And where violations exist, i t is essential tha t appropriate and timely enforcement actions, such as cessation of mining and levying of fines, must be taken to stop the violations and punish the violators. Frequent and complete inspections, together with timely and appropriate enforcement actions, are expected to control and deter mine operators from polluting. Thus, the impacts of SMCRA can be assessed by evaluating effectiveness of permitting, inspection, and enforcement activities by the regulatory authority.

Assessing Permitting

State regulatory authorities are required to conduct administrative and technical reviews of each permit application. Administrative review concerns the adequacy of permit application forms in soliciting necessary information and t h e adequacy of adminis t ra t ive procedures of t h e regulatory authority. Technical review concerns the adequacy of technical information provided by the mining company in its permit application.

Bond amounts must be set high enough to cover the cost of reclamation, and adequate procedures for bond release are necessary to ensure that bond money is released only after proper evaluation of reclamation results.

A careful review of OSM’s annual evaluation reports for 1984 through 1987 leads to the following overall assessment of permitting in the six selected states (Desai, 1988, pp. 9-21). Montana and Wyoming consistently required and received all necessary permitting information and conducted adequate administrative reviews, including interagency review, to ensure that permitted mining would comply with all regulations and result in environmentally safe mining and reclamation. The performance of the other four states was mixed to poor. Kentucky required adequate information but its interagency coordination needed improvement. By 1987, Ken- tucky had a new program in place. In West Virginia and Illinois, permit applications were inadequate in soliciting necessary technical information, and actions of their regulatory authorities were not adequately documented. Pennsylvania also lacked adequate documentation of its permitting decisions. West Virginia began using a new application form in 1987. Pennsylvania’s documentation still needed improvement in 1987.

In technical review of permit applications, Wyoming and Montana once again were most thorough. Both states adequately tracked and reviewed mine operators’ compliance with permit conditions and regulations. Ken- tucky and West Virginia, on the other end, performed poor technical review. There was little or no coordinated interagency review; technical informa-

100 Policy Studies Review, Autumn 1989, 9:l

tion required and received was inadequate and incomplete; and permitting decisions were poorly documented and were based on inadequate technical data. Reports from these states in 1987 show no improvement from previous years. In Pennsylvania, permits lacked adequate information on some important technical matters. Technical reviews were adequate where the necessary technical information was required, but interagency coordination was not adequate in some technical areas.

In Illinois, Incidental Boundary Revisions (IBRs) and Insignificant Per- mit Revisions (IPRs) were based on inadequate technical information in many cases and were not properly documented or tracked. Though not in violation of law or regulations, Illinois’s regulatory authority in 1986 permitted over 10,000 acres of mined prime farmland to be exempt from prime farmland regulations. Technical data and permit reviews were generally adequate in Illinois, except in one or two technical areas.

Wyoming, Montana, and West Virginia generally performed their bonding, bond forfeiture, and bond release functions adequately. They required an adequate level of bonding and did not release bonds or even forfeited bond money where proper reclamation was not accomplished by mine operators. In Pennsylvania and Illinois, records have been mixed. Pennsyl- vania had a large backlog of bond forfeiture appeals, creating serious poten- tial for environmental degradation on the still unreclaimed sites awaiting appeal. Pennsylvania’s practice of bond rollover is not consistent with approved program bond release provisions. Illinois’s bond money was often inadequate to completely reclaim forfeiture sites.

Kentucky had the worst record of the six states in bond setting, bond forfeiture, and bond release. I ts procedures for bond setting resulted in lower than necessary bond amounts. In many cases, i t released bond money without first determining that sites had been properly reclaimed. This resulted in serious environmental pollution. Timeliness of bond forfeiture and reclamation was also highly problematic in the state, often resulting in four to five years of delay in reclamation, even after bond forfeiture. Ken- tucky and OSM began a new program in 1986 to assure proper release of bonds. In addition, OSM undertook an extensive program to help states do a better job of bond setting, including development of a Bonding Handbook for use by the states.

Assessing Inspection and Enforcement

A rigorous inspection and enforcement regime is necessary to ensure that mine operators carry out mining and reclamation according to the permit and regulations. Assessment and collection of penalties are essential to the integrity of t he entire regulatory scheme. SMCRA and the s ta te programs set requirements for frequency of partial and complete inspections of each mine. In cases where violations are found, appropriate and timely enforcement actions, such as assessment of penalties, must be taken to stop or correct the violations as well as to punish the violators. Inspection and enforcement activities are assessed by reviewing: (1) frequency and completeness of inspection; (2) percentage of violations actually cited by state inspectors; (3) timeliness and appropriateness of enforcement actions; and (4) adequacy of assessment and collection of penalties.


Frequency and Completeness of Inspection

In 1987, Illinois and Montana met fully the frequency requirements for inspections. Wyoming came close, meeting the frequency requirements a t 96% of its mines. While Kentucky met the inspection frequency requirements for 87% of its permitted sites, i t conducted no inspection of dozens of coal exploration sites. OSM investigators found many of these to be small commercial coal removal sites, disguised as exploration sites.

Inspections conducted by Montana, Wyoming, and West Virginia were generally complete. In all three states, the s ta te inspectors satisfactorily checked the entire permit area, reviewed all the records, permit requirements, and performance standards, and generally kept proper documentation of their inspection findings.

Inspections in Illinois, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania were often incomplete and inadequately documented. In Illinois, more than 35% of inspection r epor t s failed to include discussion of all performance s tandards . Pennsylvania’s major shortcoming was its failure to review blasting and water monitoring records of mine operators. In 1987, 48% of inspections reviewed had substandard water sampling and review. Kentucky had, per- haps, the most serious problem with completeness of inspections. In about 70% of the oversight inspections where OSM found violations, those violations had existed during s ta te inspection but had not been cited by a s ta te inspector.

Citation of Violations

The citation of all violations by s ta te inspectors is a key provision of the Act. Citation is essential to ensure prompt correction and future compliance. The Act includes provisions for setting penalties for individual violations, for suspending and revoking permits based on a pattern of violations, and for denying permits to applicants with outstanding violations.

No uncited violations were observed in Montana by OSM during i ts complete statistical sample inspection in 1987. In Wyoming, on average, OSM found 0.8 uncited violations for every violation cited per complete inspection by the state. In West Virginia, OSM found an average of 4.31 uncited violations for every violation cited per complete inspection by the state. That s ta te failed to cite violations concerning water monitoring, temporary cessation of operations, and handling of toxic material. Illinois’ performance in citing violations was poor. I t cited 0.1115 violations per complete inspection, while OSM, on the other hand, found 0.4253 violations for each complete inspection (and this ratio of almost four to one was double that of 1985) (Office of Surface Mining, 1987b). Problems continued in 1987, with Illinois citing 0.1149 violations per complete inspection while OSM found 0.4545 violations per complete inspection. Clearly, Illinois’s performance in citing violations had deteriorated.

In 1986 OSM found 1.7 uncited violations for each violation cited by Pennsylvania’s regulatory authority in each complete inspection (Office of Surface Mining, 1987d). This was an improvement over 1985 when OSM found two to th ree uncited violations for each state-cited violation. Kentucky’s record on violation citation was the worst among the six states.

102 Policy Srudies Review, Autumn 1989, 9:l

Kentucky’s lack of enforcement may be described a s follows: If Kentucky and OSM were both to inspect the same 100 sites, OSM would take 37 enforcement actions citing violations of 120 performance standards, while Kentucky would take only 5 enforcement actions citing 8 violations (Office of Surface Mining, 1985). These uncited violations were often serious and resulted in off-site environmental damages. Review of the previous years’ records shows that there was a significant increase in violations in the field and that the state’s lack of enforcement action was the major factor in this increase.

Timeliness and Appropriateness of Enforcement Actions

After citing violations, i t is important to reinspect. In cases where violations have not been stopped and where adverse environmental or health conditions are observed, a cessation order must be issued to put an imme- diate end to such conditions.

There were no significant problems or delays in timeliness of enforcement actions in Wyoming and Montana. Enforcement actions in these states were also generally appropriate. Both s ta tes properly modified, terminated, and vacated notices.

Pennsylvania generally cited observed violations promptly on the same day in 85% of the cases. The s ta te also acted promptly in issuing cessation orders when adverse environmental or health conditions were observed. However, the state’s abatement reinspection record was mixed. In several instances, abatement dates were set beyond the maximum 35 days allowed by the regulations. The s ta te regulatory authority routinely extended abatement dates contrary to the regulations. This has changed in recent months and now the s ta te issues failure-to-abate cessation orders promptly. The 1987 s ta te report claims that problems with abatements have been alleviated (Office of Surface Mining, 1988b).

Kentucky was found to set reasonable deadlines and to be doing an adequate overall job of prescribing abatement measures and allowing a realistic time period for completing them. However, the s ta te failed to conduct timely reinspection in all but one case to ensure tha t the order/set- tlement agreed upon by the mine operator and the s ta te was being properly carried out (Office of Surface Mining, 1987a).

West Virginia took enforcement actions at the time violations were observed and conducted most follow-up inspections on time. However, the s ta te did not issue cessation orders for failure to abate in a timely manner. There were also problems with the appropriateness of the state’s enforcement actions. I t issued notices of violations instead of cessation orders for failure to comply with enforcement actions. I t also applied inappropriate remedial measures in some cases. For instance, instead of revoking or suspending permits of operators with identified patterns of violations, i t entered into consent orders with them (Office of Surface Mining, 1988a).

Illinois generally cited violations within one day. However, the abatement inspections were not done in a timely fashion in one-third of the cases. These delays affected timeliness of failure-to-abate cessation orders in several cases, Illinois also failed to adequately track violations. Termina- tions of violations, in some instances, were premature, resulting in repeated violations. Illinois’ record on appropriateness of abatement actions also


contains several deficiencies. I ts abatement times were too long in 19% of the cases. This is an important concern; the longer the violations are allowed to continue, the longer the environmental pollution continues. Generally, t he abatement measures ordered by the s ta te were appropriate, but in some cases they relieved the symptoms only temporarily, without dealing with the cause of the violations. Illinois’ record on modifications, vacations, and terminations was also inadequate in 22% of the cases.

Assessment and Collection of Penalties

SMCRA and s ta te regulations provide for civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act and regulations. Enforcement often takes the form of monetary penalties. While the law stipulates the penalties for some serious violations, s ta tes have considerable latitude in fixing penalty amounts and in adjusting and collecting these amounts. It should also be noted tha t the penalty assessed is often far more than the amount “imposed“ or charged t o the operator. And the amount imposed is usually higher than the amount actually collected by the regulatory authority.

Montana and Wyoming reviewed all violations for penalty assessment and determined penalty amounts consistently. There were no problems concerning penalty assessment or penalty amount determination in either state (Office of Surface Mining, 1987e, 19870. Illinois also reviewed all cited violations for penalty assessment. However, it had difficulties in generating accurate and consistent penalty amounts in cases with serious violations. There was a considerable variation in penalty amount within each violation category. The s ta te assessed lower penalties for most violations i t cited than for those cited by OSM. Also, the s ta te actually assessed penalties in only half a s many state-cited violations as OSM-cited violations. Clearly the state was less strict and less willing to assess penalties for violations i t cited itself than for those cited by OSM.

Pennsylvania reviewed 93% of the cited violations for penalty assessment in a timely fashion. I t also conducted required reviews, calculated penalties, and issued notices of proposed assessment in 92% of the cases requiring a mandatory penalty. Pennsylvania had an elaborate procedure for determining penalty amounts based on operators’ history of violations, the seriousness of the violations, negligence, and good faith. The s ta te generally conformed to i ts prescribed procedure, though it tended to fix penalty amounts in the lower range of the allowable spectrum.

Kentucky had the most problems in this area. The s ta te was not making the mandatory penalty assessment for each violation contained in failure- to-abate cessation orders. This resulted in substantially lower civil penalty assessments, sometimes as low as one-third the proper amount. The s ta te also refused to change i ts practice, even after OSM requested it to do so. In addition, t he s ta te often awarded “good faith” points to permittees for doing nothing more than what was required, and sometimes for partial compliance that actually left the violation uncorrected. The s ta te refused to change this practice even after OSM requested it do so.

West Virginia approved its first civil penalty system in late 1983. How- ever, a substantial number of violations cited were not considered for civil or criminal penalty assessment by the state. The state now has a new system. I t is too soon to evaluate its adequacy.


Pronouncement of punishment has little effect unless i t is actually carried out. Penalty determination has little value if the penalty is never collected. Failure to collect civil penalties has been a major criticism of OSM and s ta te regulatory authorities by Congressional oversight committees and environmentalists, By 1986, of t he $108 million in civil penalties due and owing to the federal government, only $8.6 million (8%) had been collected. For 1986 alone, only $57,772 of the total penalty amount of $8,002,786 (0.7%) was collected (U.S. House Committee on Government Operations, 1987).

Illinois imposed total penalties of $803,962 from 1983 through 1987. I t had collected 39% of this amount by June 30, 1987. I t had collected 88% of the notice-of-violation penalties, but only 15% of the cessation order penalties. Many of the cessation order pen.alties are pending against bankrupt operators and thus will be extremely difficult to collect. Pennsylvania imposed $2,203,704.50 in civil penalties and collected $518,404.50, leaving $685,300 (about 39%) uncollected.

West Virginia collected only 7% of the civil penalties it assessed in 1983. In 1987 West Virginia had five accounts ($645,000 total) tha t were referred to collection agencies. Montana and Wyoming had no problem collecting penalties they imposed. Kentucky collected $1,304,532 of the $23,376,857 in civil penalties i t assessed. This very low collection rate of 5.6% was an improvement over previous years. Clearly, the rate of collection among the six states has varied, ranging from 7% for West Virginia and 5.6% for Kentucky to 39% for Illinois and 100% for Wyoming and Montana.

To summarize performance in inspection and enforcement, the six states varied considerably. As was the case in permitting performance, Montana and Wyoming were consistently the most thorough and rigorous. They inspected the mines thoroughly and frequently and caught and punished violations rigorously. Kentucky performed its inspection and enforcement duties most poorly. I t caught only a small fraction of the violations, imposed light penalties, and failed to collect most of t he penalties it imposed. Illinois and Pennsylvania performed most of the inspection activities thoroughly and rigorously but were lax in catching violations and in imposing and collecting penalties. West Virginia was close to Kentucky in its failure to impose and collect penalties.

ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Even all these years after the passage of the Act, i ts impacts in terms of number of acres of land “correctly” mined and reclaimed is difficult to ascertain. Comprehensive aggregate data on the environmental impacts of SMCRA are limited and anecdotal. This section, based on limited data, discusses impacts of the Act on the ground.

In Illinois, restoration of prime farmland to i ts original productivity was one of the major objectives of the Act. In this respect the Act’s impact has been only marginal. By 1987, of the 25,817 acres of prime farmland dis- turbed by mining since the passage of the Act, only 5,475 acres (21%) had been restored. In 1986 alone, less than 7% of prime farmland permitted for mining was required to be restored (Office of Surface Mining, 1987b, p. 48). In 1987, Illinois showed some improvement, with 32% required to be res-


tored (Office of Surface Mining, 1 9 8 7 ~ ) p. 17). Nevertheless, large tracts of prime farmland continue to be lost to mining every year.

Another major objective of t he Act, improving the environmental conditions under which mining is carried out, has had more impact in Illinois. OSM's 1986 annual evaluation report pointed out that "increasing compliance (by operators) is resulting in improved environmental conditions in the field with fewer environmental violations observed" (Office of Surface Mining, 1987b, p. 7).

In Pennsylvania, data on the environmental impacts of mining are almost completely lacking since the s ta te regulatory authority's data management system does not collect data on program results. However, OSM's overall assessment of environmental impacts of the Act in Pennsylvania is that safe "environmental conditions have been generally maintained with the excep- tion of interim program and primacy bond forfeiture sites where adverse environmental conditions persist" (Office of Surface Mining, 198813, p. 3). The state's "inspection and compliance monitoring activities have contributed to sustaining or slightly increasing the level of compliance and maintaining environmental conditions a t mine sites" (Office of Surface Mining, 1988b, p. 3). There are two major exceptions to Pennsylvania's generally favorable record. First, on a few sites violations have gone uncorrected for years after the issuance of failure to abate cessation orders and thus continue to adversely affect surrounding land and water resources, Second, more than 10,300 acres from the interim program period remain abandoned and unreclaimed, so detrimental environmental impacts from these sites persist (Office of Surface Mining, 1988b, p. 4).

In Kentucky, the Act has had little, if any, impact. In 1985, OSM con- cluded tha t overall environmental conditions in Kentucky had deteriorated from the previous year (Office of Surface Mining, 1985a, p. 5). There was an increase in the number and seriousness of violations in 1985. A major contributor to environmental degradation in Kentucky mine fields was the state's failure to adequately inspect operations and to cite and penalize violators. In addition, proliferation of bogus two-acre site permits, which were exempted from most of the rigors of the regulations, contributed significantly to environmental degradation. Over half the sites permitted did not warrant the two-acre exemption. Not surprisingly, in May 1987, Congress repealed the two-acre exemption from SMCRA.

By the middle of 1987, Kentucky had improved its inspection and enforcement performance and had made "significant improvement in controlling exemptions to the regulatory program." These improvements resulted in "reducing the more serious and environmentally damaging impacts from mining operations" (Office of Surface Mining, 1987a, p. 5). But even so, the impact of SMCRA in protecting Kentucky's environment remains marginal.

There is little data on environmental impacts of the Act in West Virginia. However, i t is clear that the state's regulatory program has not been thoroughly and rigorously enforced in many areas (Office of Surface Mining, 1988a). In Montana and Wyoming the Act appears to be most effective. These two states had few problems with enforcement of the Act and regulations, and these were generally minor (Office of Surface Mining, 1987e, 19870. There were correspondingly few and isolated adverse environmental impacts of mining in the two states.


CONCLUSION

I t is difficult to assess the actual environmental impacts of SMCRA nationally. Like any other evaluation effort, this one faces a hardy perennial difficulty: namely, how can one disentangle the various factors that in- fluence outcomes and then ascribe specific outcomes to specific factors. In addition, inherent to the problem are the difficulties in identifying appropriate measure of such impacts and the lack of data. However, a number of tentative judgments are possible. There is wide variation in the impacts of the Act from state t o state. In some states, such as Montana and Wyom- ing, the impacts have been salutory and significant. In others, such as Illinois and Pennsylvania, there has been a gradual improvement in positive impacts of the Act. In still other states (for example, Kentucky), impacts of the Act have been negligible. Variations in the impacts are clearly related to effectiveness in permitting, inspection, and enforcement. Thorough permitting, frequent and complete inspections, and rigorous enforcement (violation citations and penalty collection) in Montana and Wyoming have prevented significant degradation of the environment and have resulted in sound land reclamation. Ineffective performance in all three areas (permitting, inspection, and enforcement), and particularly in citation of violations and collection of penalties, has meant few, if any, improvements in environmental conditions in the coal fields of Kentucky. Illinois and Pennsylvania fall between these two extremes.

It is not possible to make an unqualified overall national assessment, but the evidence presented here indicates that, in most (but by no means all) cases, surface coal mining is being carried out in environmentally less destructive ways than before the Act. However, accomplishment of its ultimate objective has fallen far short of the expectations of many. In addition, there has been serious deterioration in the situation on the ground in some states, such as Kentucky. Overall, then, the ultimate impact of the Act on the ground has been mixed, and it depends largely on how effectively the Act has been implemented and enforced.

The experiences of Wyoming and Montana suggest that the Act, if rigorously implemented at all stages, from permitting to collecting penalties, could be significant in preventing environmental degradation. How- ever, the Act is not a magic formula for reversing the historic leniency of some states toward the coal industry. It is simply a tool whose effectiveness lies in the will of the user.

The purpose of this paper has been to assess the impacts of SMCRA, not to provide explanations for the differences among states. However, some speculation may be in order. The two states with the most positive impacts, Montana and Wyoming, are also the states where most of the coal is mined on federal lands. This has meant joint federal-state responsibility for en- forcing the Act. In both these states federal involvement is extensive. This, along with a small workload due to a very few large mines and a strong commitment to protecting their fragile environment, could account for SMCRA’s significant impacts in these two states. On the other hand, in states such as Kentucky and West Virginia, with their historically poor records of controlling coal mining and its adverse environmental impacts, SMCRA has had marginal impacts. This is not surprising, since it is in these states that implementation has been most lax. But these are precisely the


states where SMCRA’s protection is most needed. In large industrial states, such as Illinois and Pennsylvania, where, historically, there is a powerful coal industry and a state regulatory authority sympathetic to the coal industry, SMCRA’s impacts have been mixed but are gradually improving.

Many factors other than the effective implementation of SMCRA in- fluence the environmental impacts of surface coal mining. For instance, since 1981, the price of coal has remained low due to slack demand, nationally. This has tended to drive the small, marginal operators out of business. These small operators are often the ones who fail to employ sound environmental practices. Decline in their numbers is likely to reduce environmental damage, irrespective of effectiveness of SMCRA’s implementation. A rigorous and systematic study to identify factors and explain the differences in impacts of SMCRA in various states must be high on the future research agenda of SMCRA.

REFERENCES

Branson, B.A. (1986). Is there life after strip mining? Natural History, 32,

Brown, F. (1986, September/October). The miners’ watchdog doesn’t bite. Sierra, 28-32.

Dernbach, J. (1986, Summer). Pennsylvania’s implementation of the Sur- face Mining Control and Reclamation Act. An assessment of how coopera- tive federalism can make state regulatory programs more effective. Journal o f Law Reform, 194.

Desai, U. (1988). Assessing the impacts of an environmental policy: Ten years of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Paper presented at the Southwestern Political Science Association Meeting, Houston, Texas. March.

Groups Debate Effectiveness of Mine Reclamation. (1987, August). Coal Age, 17.

Jones, G.E. (1985, September). Environmental group finds reclamation successes. American Mining Congress Journal, 71, 13.

Marx, W. (1987, March). Can strip mining clean up its act? Reader’s Digest,

Mollohan, A.B. (1987, August). Is the Surface Mining Reclamation Law working? American Mining Congress, 73, 12.

National Wildlife Federation. (1985). Failed oversight: A report on the failure of the Office of Surface Mining to enforce the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Washington, DC: National Wildlife Federa- tion.

Office of Surface Mining. (1985). Annual Evaluation Report: Kentucky Per- manent Program. Lexington: Lexington Field Office.

Office of Surface Mining. (1987a). Fifth Annual Report: Kentucky Permanent Program. Lexington: Lexington Field Office.

Office of Surface Mining. (1987b). Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Evaluation Report, State of Illinois. Springfield: Author.

Office of Surface Mining. (1987~). Fiscal Year 1987 Annual Evaluation Report, State of Illinois. Springfield: Author.

Office of Surface Mining. (19878. Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Evaluation Report, State of Pennsylvania. Harrisburg: Author.

31-36.

121-25.


Office of Surface Mining. (1987e). Annual Report: Montana Permanent Pro- gram. Casper, WY: Author.

Office of Surface Mining. (19870. Annual Report: Wyoming Permanent Pro- gram for the Period May 1, 1984 to April 30, 1985. Cheyenne: Author.

Office of Surface Mining. (1988a). Annual Evaluation Report: West Virginia Permanent Program. Charleston: Author.

Office of Surface Mining. (1988b). Fiscal Year 1987 Annual Evaluation Report, State of Pennsylvania. Harrisburg: Author.

Prominent Companies Have Abused the 2-Acre Exemption. (1986, August). Coal Age, 15.

Report Says Mine Reclamation Efforts Are Succeeding. (1987, November). Coal Age, 23.

Seiberling, J.F. 1986. How effective is the federal strip mining law? West Virginia Law Review, 88(3) , 587-625.

Synar, M. (1986, August). Is the Surface Mining Reclamation Law working? American Mining Congress, 73, 12.

U. S. House, Committee on Government Operations. (1987). Surface mining law: A promise yet to be fulfilled. Eleventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

assessing the impacts of the surface mining control and reclamation act

Documents