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AsiaOnlineAsiaOnlineAsiaOnlineAsiaOnline Flinders Asia Centre Occasional Paper 1, March 2010.

Affirmative Action in Indonesia: The Gender Quota System in the 2004 and 2009 Elections.

Novi Rusnarty Usu1

Abstract:

This paper explores the results of a gender quota system in Indonesia's post-authoritarian elections. Gender quota legislation was introduced in the 2003 Electoral Law and further expanded and strengthened in the 2008 Law. The legislation stipulates that each participating political party must include at least 30 per cent women in its candidate list. The paper discusses the implications of the gender quota system for women’s representation in parliament, focusing on the House of Representatives. It also considers the influence of electoral laws and systems on gender quotas, looking at 14 participating political parties in the 2004 and 2009 elections. These comprise the seven most successful parties in the 2004 election, with an additional seven new political parties which entered the 2009 elections.

Despite the increased participation of women in politics, their worldwide representation in parliaments and similar bodies of government is still lower than that of men. In response, many women activists and scholars along with international agencies, non-government organisations and governments have come forward with initiatives to boost women’s representation. This emerged as one of the central issues at the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing and was included in the Beijing Platform for Action. All 189 countries affiliated with the conference adopted this platform, indicating that they agreed to work on improving women’s representation in the political sphere (Sawer, Trembley, Trimble 2006). Since Beijing, affirmative action policies in the form of gender quota systems have been initiated in more than 100 countries worldwide.

Gender quota systems allocate a certain percentage or number of women as members of the body politic, either in candidate lists, a parliamentary assembly, other committees or government institutions (Dahlerup 2005). Although it is not possible to address the lack of women in parliament by a quota system alone, it is argued that quotas are effective in increasing women’s political involvement (see, for example, Parawansah 2002; Mar’iyah 2002). Furthermore, quotas are also considered by some to be a ‘fast track’ for achieving that (Dahlerup and Freindeval 2005, 27). In Nordic countries, for example, the introduction of quotas has increased women’s legislative representation (Freindeval et. al. 2006). In a very different geopolitical environment, Rwanda's gender quota achieved the highest share of women in parliament in the world.

1 Novi Rusnarty Usu lectures in the Faculty of Letters and Culture at the State University of Gorontalo, Indonesia. This article is an edited version of a minor thesis completed as part of her Master of Arts (Women's Studies) at Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia, in July 2009.


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In Indonesia, affirmative action in politics has also taken the form of a quota, with the minimum set at 30 per cent female. Indonesia has enshrined its legislative quota system in electoral law and political party rules. It was first introduced in Election Law 12/2003, which was used for the 2004 election. Under this law, affirmative action was accommodated in article 65 which recommended political parties considered a 30 per cent gender quota in nominating candidates in candidate lists. Affirmative action policy continued to be included in Election Law 10/2008 for the 2009 election, with some significant differences. In the 2008 law, the minimum quota of 30 per cent became a compulsory requirement for each participating political party. Moreover, gender quotas have also been adopted to impose a minimum of 30 per cent women on political parties’ boards.

Indonesia’s National Parliament is composed of a Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD - Regional Representative Council) as an ‘upper house with limited power’ (Parawansah 2005, 83) and a Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR - House of Representatives) or Lower House. The DPD consists of four elected members from each province. These candidates are self-nominated and independent of political parties. The DPR consists of members elected in general elections in which candidates are nominated by a political party. Imposing a quota on the DPR is designed to change the male culture of political candidacy; however, there is no requirement for the DPD to reach a gender quota, and it remains male dominated.

The changing nature of affirmative action in these electoral laws indicates a serious commitment to achieving gender equality in political life in Indonesia, which may lead to positive changes in other fields. Therefore, in this study I examine the extent to which affirmative action has been successfully implemented in Indonesia by exploring the provisions of the gender quota system in both the 2004 and 2009 elections. I also explore the implications of the policy on women’s representation in the House of Representatives, measuring its effectiveness and considering its limits.

The primary data for the 2004 elections is drawn from existing research, while data for the 2009 elections is sourced directly from the most recent data collected by the Indonesian Electoral Commission. Consideration of the data is limited to 14 political parties contesting the elections for the House of Representatives (DPR). Of these, seven participated in both the 2004 and 2009 elections, while the remaining seven were new political parties contesting for the first time in 2009. Thus, half of the sample parties have experience under the two sets of election laws. The seven new political parties were chosen to provide a comparative analysis. The Gender Quota System The gender quota system is a relatively new tool and has generated considerable debate, mainly with respect to the adoption of quotas and their impact on female political representation. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), for example, has conducted a range of studies in the field and has established a Quota Project database which functions as the primary monitor of global gender quotas and reserved seats (International IDEA 2008). Although gender quotas have provoked debates in Indonesia, there is little research into the results of quotas for participating political


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parties, demonstrating (as Dahlerup argues) that debates about quotas are mainly focused on the introduction of such systems, rather than their implementation (2002).

The term ‘quota’ does not appear in international equality documents such as the Beijing Platform, which uses ‘positive action’ to refer to equality measures (Dahlerup 2006, 5). Dahlerup points out that the dominant arguments against quotas are that they provide preferential treatment for women, and that this is against the principle of equal opportunity, that they create internal conflict within political parties, and that members of parliament should not be elected based on gender but on merit. Some women politicians have refused to support quota systems on the grounds that they should not win a seat simply for gender reasons (Dahlerup 2005). However, the notion that quota systems provide preferential treatment, and give women an unfair advantage, ignores the barriers that have prevented women gaining access in the first place. That is, there are fundamental inequalities of access and opportunity that prevent women participating. Furthermore, the notion that quotas provide preferential treatment for women rests on the assumption that women already have equal access and opportunity, which is clearly not the case. According to the Inter-Parliament Union (2009), women constitute only 18 per cent of the total seats in parliament worldwide, and this exclusion from politics validates the call for gender quotas in both the electoral process and the legislative body (Dahlerup 2005, 141). The notion that women are different from men in terms of their perspectives, experiences, concerns and needs also supports the need to promote women in political decision-making.

The introduction of a gender quota system is in many places the result of international resolutions and conventions which acknowledge the feminist agenda to improve women’s social, economic and political rights and status. Studies show that the Beijing Platform has provided legitimation for the international women’s movement to demand the adoption of electoral gender quota systems (Dahlerup 2006, 5). However, prior to the Beijing Conference, women had already led the way to pressure governments to create policies to ensure women’s representation in parliament. The history of Nordic countries shows that it took approximately 70 years, using an incremental model, to gain a 30 per cent quota of women in the parliament (Dahlerup 2006). Such a period of time is no longer acceptable, and the gender quota system has become a fast track mechanism to replace the incremental model of Nordic countries.

The number of countries adopting a quota system for women has increased significantly over the past three decades. Only four countries had established quotas prior to 1985, but this increased to 21 countries between 1985-1995, and in the following decade 1995-2005, more than 55 countries had some form of quota. This increased to more than 84 countries in 2006 (Tripp and Kang 2008, 339), and by 2008 the Quota Project database noted that 100 countries had a form of gender quota (International IDEA 2008).

Larserud and Taphorn (2007) divide gender quotas into two categories. The first is a legal quota system, which is recognised in the Constitution of a country (constitutional quotas) and thus also in election law or political party rules (legislative quotas). The second refers to voluntary party quotas which are applied voluntarily by a political party as internal party policy. Constitutional and legislative quota systems are usually compulsory as they have legal backing, and sanctions are applied to those who do not comply. In voluntary party quotas, penalties are not necessarily applied. In addition, quota systems are different


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in their application; quotas may be applied during the nomination process or after the election process – in which case a number of seats are reserved for women.

The term ‘candidate quota’ is often used to refer to constitutional, legislative and voluntary quotas, signifying that a participating political party – compulsorily or voluntarily – includes a certain percentage of women in their candidate lists (Dahlerup 2005, 142; Larserud and Taphorn 2007, 28). In contrast ‘reserved seats’ require a number of seats in a parliament to be reserved for women. Reserved seats are commonly applied after the electoral process, but in Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania, this has been implemented during the election process, by providing seats which are specifically competed for by women and voted for by women (Dahlerup 2005, 142; Tripp and Kang 2008).

Voluntary party quota systems have been adopted in 61 countries, while the constitutional or legislative quota systems have been adopted in 28, and reserved seat systems in 12 (Tripp and Kang 2008). Moreover, data from the Quota Project Database (cited in Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, 33-34) shows that countries such as Argentina, France, Rwanda and Uganda have adopted gender quota systems in both constitutional and electoral law. More than 50 out of 100 nations have surpassed the critical minority of 20 per cent of women in parliament. However, as Shevedova (2005) points out, women still face external and internal obstacles, including political, socio-economic, ideological and psychological factors, which prevent them participating in politics. For example, in the Arab regions, cultural stereotypes and ‘religious dogma’ limit women’s opportunities to participate in politics, and this has negatively affected the implementation of gender quota systems there (Abou-Zeid 2006, 186).

Electoral systems also play an important role in determining which candidates are elected (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). Research by Matland (2005) suggests that a list Proportional Representation system (list PR) is more effective in increasing women’s representation than any other system. Further, a study by Larserud and Taphorn (2007) shows that the list Proportional Representative (list PR) and Party Block Vote (PBV) systems are most effective in achieving gender quotas.

The list PR and the PBV systems are useful because both require multiple members in electoral districts. In list PR and PBV systems, electors vote for the party, rather than the candidate. In list PR, the parties receive seats based on the proportion of overall votes, while in PBV, the party which gains the majority of votes wins the election. Ensuring electoral districts provide a range of candidates presents an opportunity to include a 30 per cent quota for women in a candidate list. However, in list PR, voting patterns can change if the lists are open, and this is something that differentiates list PR from the PBV system. In open list systems, electors can vote for a specific candidate, because the individual candidates nominated to represent the party are listed on the ballot papers. In a closed list, only the party is listed, and voters do not know the names of the candidates seeking election.

It is suggested by some that a PR system with a closed list combined with regulation ensuring that women make up 30 per cent of elected candidates is the most effective electoral system for implementing a gender quota system (Htun 2004). Currently, Indonesia’s quota system simply requires that women comprise 30 per cent of candidates and party boards. This seems to imply that there has been positive progress in supporting


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women to take part in politics. It also shows that the awareness among political parties about the need to promote gender equality has increased. Women in Indonesian Politics Throughout its history, Indonesia has experienced dramatic political power transformations which have influenced women's political participation, both formally and informally. For example, several regions of the nation we now call Indonesia were ruled by female leaders, and women warriors were prominent in the struggle for freedom from colonial occupation (Parawansah 2002; Davies 2005; Martyn 2005). In modern history, women have mainly exercised political roles through their involvement in women’s organisations, particularly since the nationalist movement period of the early 20th century.

The women’s movement emerged alongside the nationalist movement, and early women’s organisations were based on ‘religion, ethnicity and region’ (Wieringa 2005, 63). Examples include Poetri Mardika, a women’s organisation which was affiliated with the nationalist organisation Boedi Oetomo, and Aisyiyah, the woman’s wing of the Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah (Martyn 2005). As a majority Muslim country, Islamic values are a major influence, and women’s activities within Islamic organisations in the early period were mainly limited to non-political or social roles. The main concerns of the early women’s movements were access to education for girls, the problems of child marriage, and polygamy (Bessel 2004; Blackburn 2004; Martyn 2005). In 1928, women started to organize nationally through the first National Women’s Congress, although continued to focus on women’s issues. Women’s organisations in this period identified themselves as ‘non-political, social and nationalist’ (Martyn 2005, 40-41). This meant that they saw their function as political, but focused their efforts on social activities based on women’s roles as mothers. Blackburn argues that the activities of the women’s organisations were ‘apolitical’ in the sense that the activities mostly focused on education and marriage reform for girls and were less concerned with women’s suffrage issues (2005, 86). However, women’s organisations also supported the nationalist struggle for independence, which was principally a political movement.

In 1935, the second National Women’s Congress was held, and at this time women’s interests mainly related to the nationalist movement for independence (Bessel 2004; Martyn 2004; Blackburn 2008). It was understood that women’s support would ensure that their interests would be part of development agendas in a newly independent Indonesia (Bessel 2004). At the same time, the issue of women’s suffrage gathered interest within women’s organisations, and women began campaigning for suffrage and other rights (Blackburn 2004)

During this period (prior to 1942) Indonesia was still occupied by the Dutch; and then by Japan (1942-1945); therefore, issues of gender equality took a back seat relative to more urgent issues associated with colonial and enemy occupation. In the period of Japanese occupation, women’s organisations were prohibited from engaging in political action. Following the Proclamation of Independence in 1945, the National Constitution granted women citizenship rights equal to men. Chief among these gains was the right to vote. However, women could not yet exercise their voting rights because political instability delayed elections. Some women were assigned to political office, but in general, women’s organisations had no defined roles in the political system. In addition, Dutch


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aggression to re-establish their colonial power shifted the women’s political agenda from a focus on female rights to the need to strengthen Indonesian independence (Martyn 2005).

By 1950, the independent Indonesia had established a system of parliamentary democracy, and the political agenda of Indonesian women was ‘nations and state-building, developing a sense of nationalism and citizenship and democratisation’ (Martyn 2005, 15). In this new era, women were actively involved in politics. Most women’s groups were affiliated with or acted as divisions of political parties with variously nationalist, socialist and Islamic ideologies. Their affiliation with political parties functioned not only as an avenue to gain election to parliament, but also to advance women’s interests in general. Establishing a women’s wing in the party structures was considered important to gain women’s votes. Gerwani (Indonesia’s Women’s Movement), for example, encouraged their members to vote for Indonesia’s Communist Party (PKI) (Martyn 2005).

In 1955, the first general election was held and for the first time, Indonesian women as well as men exercised their right to vote. Although 60 per cent of total voters were women, the number of women elected was small (Bessel 2004). Only 19 women were elected to the House of Representatives (DPR - the Lower House) from a total 271 members, and 33 women were elected among the 520 members in the Constitutional Assembly (Konstituante - the Upper House) (Martyn 2005). These numbers were small, given that Indonesian women numbered 40 million at that time.

In 1958, President Sukarno changed the parliamentary democracy system to ‘Guided Democracy’ to strengthen his authority. Throughout this period (1958-1965), no elections were held, and Blackburn (2004, 24) argues that the women’s movement started to lose its power and voice. The women's organisation affiliated with the Communist Party, Gerwani, became dominant and had a close relationship with President Sukarno (Blackburn 2004; Wieringa 2005). When Sukarno was eventually brought down in 1965, Gerwani was banned, and members were arrested, many imprisoned without trial. Gerwani's ideological position, in which women were to act as ‘militant mothers’ was part of the struggle for women’s rights, both in the private and public sphere (Wieringa 2005). This ideology supported women's active roles in the public sphere, including politics, but also maintained their kodrat (inherent nature) as mothers responsible for domestic duties (Wieringa 2005).

After 1965, Indonesia entered the New Order era, with President Suharto in power for 32 years. Official recognition of women during this period included the establishment of the Ministry for the Role of Women in 1978 as a response to the United Nations’ declaration of the Decade for Women (Parawansah 2002). According to Blackburn (2004), this innovation was designed only to show the international community that government was serious in considering women’s issues and interests. In fact, the Ministry did not have any real power because it depended on other bodies such as the health and education departments to implement its policies. As Bessel argues, the Ministry was used to preserve New Order policies which limited roles for women to those of mothers and wives (2004).

At this time, the government also ratified the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women (Law 68/1968); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Law 7/1984); and endorsed the Declarations of international conferences such the World Conference on Women in Beijing (Parwansah 2002). Nevertheless, women were less empowered than men not only in the public sphere


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but also in the domestic sphere, while government development programs mostly provided benefits to men (Parwansah 2002).

In terms of their participation in the formal political process, the proportion of women remained relatively low. No specific law was enacted to improve women’s legislative representation. In general elections from 1971 to 1997, the number of women in the House of Representatives (the Lower House) remained below 15 per cent. The highest proportion of women was 13 per cent in 1987. Similarly low proportions were evident in the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - MPR, the Upper House) (Robinson 2009). Parawansah argues that ‘women in parliament were basically appointed as the result of their connection with prominent men, therefore they failed to represent women’s needs and interests’ (2005, 72). In the New Order era, both men and women ran for parliament based on internal party decisions, which may have privileged certain elites within parties, or people with close connections to party leaders. Under the ruling regime, women’s political roles were limited and controlled by the state, and their main role in politics was confined to voting.

Bessel (2004) points out that the barriers preventing women’s representation in parliament were a combination of the New Order gender ideology, religious values and women’s stereotypes. The notion of ‘state ibuism’ explains the prevailing gender ideology of the New Order (Blackburn 2004, 25).2 The New Order regime reinforced Indonesian women’s duties ‘as wife, as mother, as protector, as financial manager of the household and as a member of society’ (Davies 2005, 233). Therefore, state ibuism refers to the state’s promotion of the nuclear family and of mothers whose role was to serve their ‘husband, family and the state’ (Blackburn 2004, 25). This ideology was perpetuated through two organisations established by the New Order regime Dharma Wanita (literally 'women's duty', an association of wives of civil servants) and the Family Welfare Movement (PKK, Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga - a mass organisation which educated women about family welfare). These organisations were used to control women and preserve the regime’s power (Oey-Gardiner 2005; Davies 2005). However, this era also saw the establishment of women’s non-government organisations during the 1980s which functioned to counter the state-based organisations (Robinson 2009). Meanwhile, Muslim women’s organisations continued to exist and focus on social and religious work, with the aim of preserving Islamic teaching (Blackburn 2004).

Post-Suharto reform era governments began to seriously consider women’s lack of participation in parliament, and women’s groups have played an important role in the adoption of this policy. Although the first general election of the new democratic period, held in 1999, did not show a significant impact on women’s representation, and in fact the number of women elected to the DPR declined to only 9 per cent (Robinson 2009), women began making gains in politics. A symbolic milestone for Indonesian women emerged in 2001 when Megawati Sukarno Putri was elected as the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia. Although Megawati herself opposed a gender quota system, women were more active in demanding increased participation in parliament and political office, and affirmative action policy came to light as a strategy to improve female political representation (Davies 2005).

2 The term ‘ibuism’ comes from the word ‘ibu’ which means mother.


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Affirmative Action Policy in Indonesian Politics Prior to the 2004 election, there was a quota system of sorts operating in Indonesia, though its aims and ends were not political equality. Instead, the system reserved seats for appointed members of the People’s Consultative Assembly, the Upper House (MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), whose duties included electing the President. During the guided democracy period, reserved seats were available for the military. This was extended during the New Order period, when the practice ‘violated the democratic principle on the composition of parliament, where all seats should be contested’ (Ziegehain 2008, 75). Seats were also reserved for regional and group representatives, some of whom were women (Ziegenhain 2008). However, this was not intended to increase women’s representation, or that of other “minority” groups, but was a tool to maintain the authority of the regime in power by appointing members who could be counted on to do the President’s bidding. The Suharto regime used this system to maintain its hold on power for 32 years.

A women's quota system was first adopted for the 2004 Indonesian general elections. The new policy responded to Indonesia’s commitment to implementing the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action. The adoption of the gender quota came only after years of hard struggle and pressure from women’s groups, and women’s parliamentary caucuses, and was supported by the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment (Bessel 2004; Parawansah 2005; Siregar 2006; Robinson 2009). As in other countries, the introduction of a gender quota system has provoked debate, not only related to their desirability, but also about how, and to what extent, quotas should be applied (Bessel 2004). One opponent of the gender quota system was President Megawati Sukarno Putri, who argued that quotas are ‘counterproductive and undermine the dignity of women’, and that merit alone should determine electoral candidates and parliamentary members (Bessel 2004, 12).

A quota of 30 per cent for women was finally adopted under Election Law 12/2003, and was addressed to participating political parties in the general election of 2004. Article 65 (1) of the Election Law states that ‘each political party in the election may propose candidates for members of the national, provincial and local parliaments for each electoral district with consideration for at least 30 per cent of women’s representation’ (Siregar 2006, 6). However, there were no sanctions for non-compliance. Political parties were obliged only to ‘consider’ the inclusion of 30 per cent women candidates in their electoral candidate lists, and the decision to implement a quota system relied on political parties’ goodwill. On the one hand, women gained the opportunity for increased representation in parliament, but on the other hand, they were dependent on men who dominate political party structures for the system to be adopted.

Later, in 2008, new electoral laws and political party rules were created, enacting significant changes to the original law. Political Party Law 2/2008 required every political party to ensure a 30 per cent quota of women representatives in both the process of establishment and in board structures (Anugrah 2008). Moreover, the quota was described in more detail. Article 8 (1-d) states that a political party could participate in the 2009 general elections if there were at least 30 per cent women on the party’s board. Article 53 proposes 30 per cent female candidates in electoral lists, while a further clarification exists in article 55 (2), which states that at least one of three candidates in the list must be a


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woman. Further, Article 61 (6) ensures transparency in the political process by requiring the quota be announced to the public.

Article 57 declares that the electoral commission must verify documents to ensure that the party has fulfilled the quota in its candidate lists. The procedure for non-compliance is detailed in Article 58 (1-2), which states that the Electoral Commission will return documents of political parties which have not fulfilled the requirements, and that the parties will be given the opportunity to redress the imbalance. However, there is no real penalty for non-compliance. Nowhere is it stated that a party unable to fulfil the quota requirements will be unable to stand for election; rather, the candidate lists are simply returned to the party. Nevertheless, these changes suggested that positive progress for women could be achieved in the 2009 general election. While there were no rules to ensure women were candidates in winnable seats, women now had greater opportunities to participate.

In tandem with the gender quota system’s aims and processes, the electoral system itself is an important factor in determining how women’s parliamentary participation might be increased. Krook (2007, 5) argues that it is important to ‘fit quota measures and existing institutional framework’ such as electoral systems and rules. Bessel (2004, 13) suggests that ‘a woman-friendly electoral system’ is one strategy to advocate for women’s legislative representation. Since the first general election in 1955, Indonesia has adopted a Proportional Representation (PR) system. Although this is favourable for increasing women’s representation in comparison to other electoral systems (Reynolds and Reilly 1997; Matland 2005), Siregar (2006) argues that in the Indonesian experience the system was ineffective. From 1955 to 1999, Indonesia used a closed-list proportional representation system, which allowed voters to vote for the party only, not for individual candidates. Because the parties decided which candidates were nominated for election, women had difficulty competing with their male counterparts within the party.

In the 2004 election, Indonesia applied the semi-open proportional representation system or limited-open list system, enshrined in Election Law 12/2003 article 6 (1) (Parawansah 2005; Siregar 2006). The Indonesian electoral system is non-preferential - that is, voters do not rank parties or candidates. Rather they must vote for one party. However the limited-open list system allows voters to nominate a single preferred candidate running on the selected party’s list. Elected candidates are those who achieved the Vote Division Number (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilu, BPP), that is, total valid votes gained by all political parties in one district divided by the number of seats available in that district. Where a candidate did not achieve this required proportion, selection depended on candidates’ rank on the candidate list (Electoral Commission 2009). In the semi-open list, even if candidates received a majority of votes, if they were not in a winnable position on the candidate list they could not be elected. Conversely, even if a candidate did not receive a majority of votes, they could be elected if placed in a winnable position on the candidate list.

The problem of this system is that the BPP was difficult to achieve, and in fact only two of all candidates for the National Parliament achieved the BPP in the 2004 election (Siregar 2006). This was unfair not only to candidates, but also to voters because of the possibility that elected Members of Parliament were not the preferred candidates of voters. Moreover, many women candidates were placed low on the candidate lists. Siregar (2006) points out that winnable seats were often occupied by political party elites who are mainly


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male, and therefore female candidates were disadvantaged. The semi-open PR list system therefore contributed to Indonesia’s failure to achieve a 30 per cent gender quota in parliament.

The 2009 general election adopted an open PR system (Election Law 10/2008, article 5 (1)), in which voters had three options - they could select either a party, a candidate, or both the party and a preferred candidate on their ballot paper. Further, elected candidates were required to achieve the significantly lower target of at least 30 per cent of the BPP. Being in a winnable position on the candidate list was initially important because if no candidate on a party’s list achieved 30 per cent of BPP, the candidate at the top of the list would be elected. However, this provision was annulled by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that a successful candidate is the one who gains the majority of votes. Thus, from 2009, position on the candidate list was less important, although Siregar (2008) argues that the court’s decision hindered affirmative action, because an open-list PR system disadvantages women in a patriarchal society such as Indonesia where it still widely believed that politics is not a proper field for women. Gender Quotas in the 2004 and 2009 Elections The seven political parties in the 2004 legislative election considered in this study are:

� PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - United Development Party), an Islamic Party which was one of three parties founded in the New Order era; � PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional - National Mandate Party), an Islamic-nationalist party which was established by the leader of Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest Islamic organisations in Indonesia; � PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa - National Awakening Party) another Islamic-nationalist party which was established by activists of Nahdlatul Ulama, a large Islamic organisation in Indonesia; � PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan - Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), a nationalist party whose leader is Megawati Sukarno Putri, the first woman president of Indonesia; � PD (Partai Demokrat - Democratic Party), a nationalist party which elevated Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the Presidency; � PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera - Prosperity and Justice Party), an Islamic party which was established by university students involved in the Tarbiyah (education) movement; and � Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya - Functional Group Party), a nationalist party which was the ruling party during the New Order era.

The data presented by Subiyantoro (Table 1 in Siregar 2006, 6), shows that of the seven political parties that reached the 3 per cent electoral threshold in the 2004 elections, only three parties (PKS, PKB, PAN) fulfilled the 30 per cent quota for women in their candidate lists. PKS had the highest share with 40.3 per cent women from a total of 446 candidates. PKB followed at 37.6 per cent women, and PAN had 35 per cent from 451 and 520 candidates respectively. Meanwhile PDIP and Golkar, which gained the majority of votes, did not fulfil the 30 per cent quota, along with PPP and PD. An analysis of the electoral districts shows that no party fulfilled the 30 per cent quota in all 69 districts. However, PKS


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once again had the highest percentage with more than 30 per cent women candidates in 65 electoral districts, which means that they failed to reach the 30 per cent quota in only four districts. Golkar, the winning party, was the worst performer with only 24 electoral districts meeting the quota.

Table 1

Numbers of Men and Women Candidates for the National Parliament, 2004 Election

Political Party

Total Candidates

Men and Women Candidates Electoral Districts with 30%

Women Candidate Men % Women % No of Districts % Districts

Electoral with 30% with 30%

Districts Women Women

Candidates Candidates PPP 497 386 77.6 111 22.3 69 30 43.4

PAN 520 338 65.0 182 35.0 69 45 65.2

PKB 451 281 62.3 170 37.6 69 45 65.2

PDIP 558 400 71.6 158 28.3 69 31 44.9

PD 433 316 72.9 117 27.0 69 31 44.9

PKS 446 266 59.6 180 40.3 69 65 94.2

Golkar 652 467 71.6 185 27.0 69 24 34.7

Source: Subiyantoro (cited in Siregar 2006, 6).


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Table 2 Numbers of Men and Women Candidates for the National Parliament, 2009 Election

Political Total

Men and Women Candidates

Electoral Districts with 30%

Party Candidates Women Candidates

Men % Women % No of Districts % Districts

Electoral with 30% with 30%

Districts Women Women

Candidates Candidates PPP 469 341 72.71 128 27.29 77 32 41.56

PAN 592 413 69.76 179 30.24 77 38 49.35

PKB 392 258 65.82 134 34.18 77 50 64.94

PDIP 628 409 65.13 219 34.87 77 73 94.81

PD 666 444 66.67 222 33.33 77 47 61.04

PKS 579 364 62.87 215 37.13 77 76 98.70

Golkar 639 447 69.95 192 30.05 77 38 49.35

Data Source: Indonesian Electoral Commission 2009, tabulation by author. Amendments to the gender quota system in the 2008 Election Laws were intended to significantly improve outcomes for women. Table 2 shows the outcome of the quota system for the seven political parties which contested both the 2004 and 2009 elections. The number of women candidates in the seven parties did not increase overall. PKS maintained the highest percentage with women comprising 37.13 per cent of its total 579 candidates. Although this figure decreased 3.17 per cent from 40.3 per cent in 2004, the number of women candidates increased from 180 candidates in 2004 to 215 candidates in 2009. The same trend is indicated in figures for PKB and PAN, where the proportion of women has decreased to 34.18 per cent from 37.6 per cent and 30.24 per cent from 35 per cent respectively. However, in these parties there has also been a decrease in the number of women candidates. Women candidates in PKB dropped by 36, while male candidates decreased from 281 to 258. PAN’s women candidates only decreased by three, but their male candidates increased by 75. Figures from Golkar, PDIP and PD indicate these parties have made significant progress in reaching the 30 per cent quota. PPP still has not fulfilled its quota overall, although it has increased from 22.3 per cent in 2004 to 27.29 per cent.

The number of electoral districts for the National Parliament was increased to 77 for the 2009 elections, and none of the political parties fulfilled the 30 per cent target in all districts. PKS demonstrated a commitment to implementing the gender quota system by ensuring 76 districts achieved the target. PDIP showed a significant increase with 73 districts fulfilling the quota. PDIP is headed by a woman, and this may have some bearing on increasing women’s participation in the party. However, it is worth recalling that Megawati, PDIP’s leader and former president of Indonesia, has expressed opposition to the gender quota system.


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Table 3

Numbers of Men and Women Candidates for the National Parliament, 2009 Seven New Political Parties

Political Total

Men and Women Candidates

Electoral Districts with 30%

Party Candidates Women Candidates

Men % Women % No of No of % Districts

Electoral Electoral with 30%

Districts Districts Women

with 30% Candidates

Women

Candidates Hanura 599 413 68.95 186 31.05 77 37 32.46

PKPB 144 87 60.42 57 39.58 77 46 37.40

PPRN 288 212 73.61 76 26.39 77 31 28.70

Gerindra 386 275 71.24 111 28.76 77 33 30.00

PBN 275 173 62.91 102 37.09 77 52 40.31

PDP 401 238 59.35 163 40.65 77 62 44.60

PKNU 292 194 66.44 98 33.56 77 42 35.29

Data Source: Indonesian Electoral Commission 2009, tabulation by author. In the 2009 election, eighteen new political parties sought election, and this study considers the seven which performed best (see Table 3). They are: � Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat - People's Conscience Party); � PKPB (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa - National Worker's Party); � PPRN (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional - National People’s Party); � Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya - Greater Indonesia Movement Party); � PBN (Partai Barisan Nasional - National Front Party); � PDP (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan - Democratic Reform Party); and � PKNU (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama - Islamic Scholar's National Awakening

Party). Each of these parties won significant voter support in the 2009 election, although only two new parties (Hanura and Gerindra) achieved the 2.5 per cent parliamentary threshold, thus gaining seats in the national parliament (Indonesian Electoral Commission, 2009a). In terms of gender quota implementation, only two parties (PPRN and Gerindra) did not reach the required 30 per cent. PDP had the highest proportion of women, who made up 40.65 per cent of its total 401 candidates. PDP met the quota in 62 out of 77 electoral districts, the highest proportion of all new parties contesting the 2009 elections.

In light of the data above, it can be argued that the voluntary gender quota system applied in the 2004 election did not achieve the desired result. Only three parties


14

voluntarily implemented the 30 per cent quota; moreover, these parties were least successful overall, gaining (on average) below 10 per cent of the total vote. The most successful parties overall (Golkar with 21.58 per cent and PDIP with 18.53 per cent of the overall vote), did not fulfil the 30 per cent quota. It might be concluded that the inclusion of women candidates was merely symbolic since most women candidates were not placed in winnable positions on parties’ candidate lists. Nevertheless, in the 2009 election, in which the new Election Law was applied, significant progress in women's participation is evident, despite some parties not reaching the 30 per cent quota. Non-compliance with the quota is surprising given that the new quota system was created with the particular aim of ensuring that all participating political parties would fulfil the 30 per cent quota, and because the quota is no longer voluntary. However, three parties (PPP, PPRN and Gerindra) were able to stand for election even though they did not achieve the quota. Clearly, as long as the provisions are not enforced, their impact is likely to be limited.

In more than 30 countries around the world, the number of women in parliament increased to more than 30 per cent following the implementation of a gender quota system (Quota Project Database, 2009). In Indonesia, however, results of the 2004 and 2009 elections show that there were only small increases in women’s participation in parliament. In 1999, women comprised only 8 per cent of the 500 members of the Lower House (Inter-Parliament Union, December 2003). Following the 2004 election, the proportion of women increased only slightly to 11.3 per cent of 550 members. In the 2009 election, the number of women increased again to comprise 16.79 per cent of a total 560 members (Indonesian Electoral Commission, 2009a). Thus, even though the proportion of women in the DPR has doubled in the last ten years, the result is well short of the 30 per cent expected.

This statistic indicates other barriers that prevent women being elected. It has been argued that in the 2004 election, the disappointing result for women candidates was due partly to various technicalities of the Indonesian electoral system, including women’s positions on party lists and the number of voters in electoral districts (Siregar 2006). Women candidates needed to be ranked first or second in candidate lists to have a realistic chance of being elected. However, as the data in Table 4 shows, of a total of 1103 women candidates in seven political parties contesting the 2004 election, only 49 were in the first position and 84 in the second position (Siregar 2006). Even if all women candidates in these positions had been elected, they would still comprise less than 20 per cent of the total of 550 members of House of Representative. This limits the quota system’s effectiveness in increasing women’s election to parliament.

Mass party support was also crucial in determining women’s chances of being elected. In an electoral system that privileges candidates in certain positions, party support is essential to any candidate’s success. A woman candidate might be placed first or second on a party list, but if she were running in a district where the party did not have sufficient support, her chances of success remain low (Siregar 2006). It can be argued that most political parties did not have a strong commitment to support even their own women candidates.


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Table 4 Number and Percentage of Women Candidates in the First and Second position on Candidate

Lists, 2004

Party No of female candidates

Total No in 1st and 2nd

positions on the party list

Total in 1st and 2nd

position

% in 1st and 2nd positions of total candidates

% of women in 1st and 2nd

positions of total female candidates

candidates

1st 2nd PPP 111 497 6 8 14 2.80 12.6 PD 117 433 8 12 20 4.60 17.1 PAN 182 520 9 12 21 4.00 11.5 PKB 170 451 8 16 24 5.30 14.2 PKS 180 446 6 14 20 4.50 11.1 PDIP 158 558 6 11 17 3.10 10.8 Golkar 185 652 6 11 17 2.60 9.2 Total 1103 3557 49 84 133 Average 3.84 12.36

Source: Subiyantoro (in Siregar 2006, 10). Improving the Effectiveness of Indonesia's Gender Q uota Indonesia’s implementation of a gender quota system remains unsatisfactory. However, it cannot be considered completely fruitless and ineffective. Some of the limitations apparent in the adoption of gender quotas may be easily remedied, or at least minimised, while others may be more intractable. In what follows, I will identify three factors which might be relatively easily implemented in order to improve results, along with the cluster of challenges likely to remain troublesome.

The first factor concerns electoral laws as the legal umbrella for implementing this system in Indonesia. It is undeniable that the enshrinement of gender quota provisions in the election laws has provided opportunities to women to be involved in politics, as well as having provided an avenue of special intervention to reverse discrimination against women. However, in both the 2003 and 2008 Election Laws, the obvious problem is weak sanctions, by which parties could not be forced to fully implement the quota. As noted already, in the 2003 Election Law, the gender quota was non-compulsory and although in the 2008 Law, sanctions of a kind were imposed, these were very weak, and consisted only of the documents being returned to the party. If parties still were not able to fulfil the requirements, they were asked to submit a written rationale and place women candidates in winnable positions on the candidate lists, followed by an announcement in the media. Despite this, in some electoral districts, several parties had no women candidates. Moreover, the Democrat Party gained a majority of votes and won the election, even thought it did not reach the 30 per cent quota for women in 30 electoral districts. Stricter


16

sanctions or punishments are crucial in future elections if the gender quota is to work effectively.

The second issue concerns the type of electoral systems and electoral lists which have been applied. It has been argued that the closed list system is better as long as there is a ‘placement mandate’ regulation imposed to ensure that political parties place women in winnable positions on the candidate lists (Htun 2004, 338). This can be seen in Argentina’s and Costa Rica’s experience, where the proportion of women in parliament jumped significantly after the placement mandate rule was imposed (Htun 2004). It is necessary for Indonesia to impose a placement mandate rule to ensure women are placed in a certain percentage of winnable positions. Because no such rule has been applied, women’s chances of being elected have been negatively affected.

Although in 2009, a candidate’s position on the lists was no longer as important, women faced a range of difficulties in being able to win the highest number of votes. It remained difficult for women to compete equally against men who have more experience in politics, more resources, and more opportunities to develop a popular public profile. Competition between women is also influenced by the fact that some women candidates may have connections with party leaders, and receive more financial support (Seda 2004; Venny 2009).

A crucial problem to address is Indonesia's cultural framework. As Seda (2004) argues, patriarchy negatively impacts on women’s participation in politics. Indonesian culture assigns women roles in the domestic sphere as mothers and wives, and in turn, voters may internalise the idea that politics is not a suitable occupation or environment for women. Such a gender ideology was strongly maintained in the New Order era, and continues to influence women’s lack of participation in parliament (Bessel 2004). Because of this, women feel ‘psychologically unprepared for participation in politics’ (Seda 2004, 2). Further, political parties, which are mostly dominated by men, are unsupportive of including women in institutional structures or providing political education for women and society (Seda 2004). This influences voter confidence in women candidates. According to surveys held for the 2004 election, only 21 per cent of all constituents would vote for women, while 33 per cent of female constituents indicated they would not vote for women (Bylesjo and Seda 2006). Political parties, therefore, tend not to include women on their candidate lists, because this is unlikely to increase their overall vote share. The circular nature of the problem makes this a difficult issue to solve.

However, the changing trends in quota implementation from 2004 to 2009 may reflect slowly changing attitudes towards women’s roles in Indonesia. More parties have implemented a gender quota, showing that what Araujo and Garcia call the 'contagion effect' (2006, 90) may succeed in Indonesia. Women politicians, activists, political parties, government and voters in general can learn from women’s experience in the past two elections. Conclusion Gender quotas in Indonesia can be classified as legislative quotas as well as voluntary party quotas: they are outlined in Election Law, but the law does not require political parties to implement them. Nor is there a penalty for failing to do so. Gender quotas have not yet offered a ‘fast track’ ticket to increase Indonesian women’s representation in parliament,


17

and demonstrate that affirmative action without strict sanctions does not offer an effective means to achieve equality for women in politics. However, the adoption of a gender quota has introduced a new phase of democracy in Indonesia. It has increased community awareness of the absence of women, and the need to seriously remedy this with special action is more accepted, indicating a shift in attitudes towards women in politics. To accelerate this process, political education both for women and for constituents should be conducted by political parties, women’s organisations, non-government organisations, and the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment as part of the state apparatus. The role of religious and customary law leaders is also significant to support the widespread inclusion of women in politics in the primarily Muslim Indonesia.

Instead of seeking simply to increase the number of women in parliament, attention should move towards the kinds of interventions which might challenge the male-bias of Indonesian culture and politics. Therefore, further research also may focus on political education of what and how Indonesians learn about politics, and particularly how women are represented in various aspects of political education. Political education can be integrated into school curricula, to create awareness of the importance of politics for women, as well as the importance of women in politics. This may eliminate cultural stereotypes, make women more accustomed to political life, and change both men’s and women’s mindsets about the suitability of politics for women.

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Araujo, C and Garcia AI, 2006, ‘Latin America: the experience and the impact of quotas in Latin America', in Dahlerup, D (ed), Women, quotas and politics, Routledge, Oxon, pp. 83-111.

Bessel, S 2004, ‘Women in parliament in Indonesia’, Discussion paper in Policy and governance, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University. http://www.apseg.anu.edu.au, viewed 15 March 2009.

Blackburn, S 2004, 'Women’s suffrage and democracy in Indonesia', in Edwards, L and Roces, M (ed), Women’s suffrage in Asia: Gender, nationalism and democracy, RoutledgeCurzon, New York, pp. 79-105.

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Dahlerup D and Freidenvall L 2005, ‘Quota as a ‘fast track’ to equal representation for women’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(1), pp. 26-48.

Dahlerup, D 2005, ‘Increasing women’s political representation: New trends in gender quotas’ in Ballington, J and Karram, A (ed), Women in parliament beyond numbers, IDEA, Stockholm, pp. 141-153.

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Mar’iyah, C. 2002. ‘The political representation of women in Indonesia: How can it be achieved?’, in International IDEA The implementation of quotas: Asian experiences, Quota Workshop Report Series no. 1, Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 62–5. http://www.idea.int/publications, viewed 1 April 2009,

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Oey-Gardiner, M 2002, ‘And the winner is ... Indonesian women in public life’ in Bessel, S and Robinson, K (ed), Women in Indonesia gender equity and development, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp.100-112.

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Appendix 1: List of Women and Men candidates for National Parliament, 2009 Election (Seven Old Political Parties) No Electoral

Districts Old Political Parties

PPP PAN PKB PDIP PD PKS Golkar W M W M W M W M W M W M W M

1 Bali 0 6 2 1 1 6 3 7 4 6 4 5 3 8 2 Banten I 2 4 2 5 2 2 2 4 3 4 2 4 2 5 3 Bangka Belitung 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 4 Banten II 1 4 2 5 1 2 2 4 2 5 2 4 1 5 5 Banten III 2 10 2 10 3 3 3 7 4 8 4 7 4 8 6 Bengkulu 1 4 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 2 3 7 DKI I 2 4 2 5 3 2 2 5 3 4 2 4 2 5 8 DKI II 3 4 2 6 3 4 3 5 3 5 3 5 2 6 9 DKI III 5 4 2 8 4 2 3 7 4 6 3 6 2 7

10 Jawa Barat I 2 6 1 7 0 2 3 5 5 3 3 5 1 6 11 Jawa Barat II 2 5 3 8 2 1 5 7 5 7 4 8 4 8 12 Jawa Barat III 3 7 3 8 2 3 4 7 4 7 3 7 2 8 13 Jawa Barat IV 1 4 2 4 0 1 2 5 2 5 2 4 2 4 14 Jawa Barat V 2 6 3 8 2 1 3 7 3 8 3 7 3 7 15 Jawa Barat VI 1 6 3 4 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 4 2 5 16 Jawa Barat VII 3 7 4 8 3 3 4 8 3 8 4 8 4 8 17 Jawa Barat VIII 2 5 4 6 2 2 3 7 3 8 3 7 3 8 18 Jawa Barat IX 1 4 3 6 2 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 19 Jawa Barat X 0 5 1 7 1 2 3 5 3 5 3 5 2 6 20 Jawa Barat XI 4 6 3 9 2 6 4 8 4 8 4 8 3 7 21 Jambi 1 4 2 5 2 4 3 5 2 6 2 3 3 5 22 Jawa Tengah I 4 4 1 8 0 4 3 7 3 7 3 7 2 7 23 Jawa Tengah II 3 4 2 5 1 4 3 5 2 6 3 5 2 6 24 Jawa Tengah III 3 3 1 7 2 4 4 6 3 8 5 4 2 8 25 Jawa Tengah IV 2 3 3 5 1 3 3 5 3 5 4 5 1 7 26 Jawa Tengah V 2 2 1 8 1 4 4 6 3 7 3 6 3 7 27 Jawa Tengah VI 1 4 3 6 1 3 3 7 3 7 3 5 3 7

28 Jawa Tengah VII 2 5 3 5 1 2 3 5 2 6 4 3 2 6

29 Jawa Tengah VIII 2 2 1 8 1 3 3 7 3 6 3 5 2 6

30 Jawa Tengah IX 3 5 2 5 2 4 3 7 3 7 3 4 1 7 31 Jawa Tengah X 0 5 3 5 2 4 3 5 2 6 3 6 1 6 32 Jawa Timur I 2 6 4 6 3 7 4 8 4 8 4 8 3 7 33 Jawa Timur II 2 3 1 6 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 6 3 5 34 Jawa Timur III 2 5 2 3 3 5 3 5 2 6 3 5 3 4 35 Jawa Timur IV 2 5 1 5 3 6 3 6 4 6 3 5 4 4 36 Jawa Timur V 2 3 4 5 2 6 3 6 3 7 3 5 2 5 37 Jawa Timur VI 1 4 2 7 2 8 4 7 4 7 3 3 2 6 38 Jawa Timur VII 3 2 5 3 2 5 3 7 3 7 3 5 3 6 39 Jawa Timur VIII 2 2 2 6 3 7 4 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 40 Jawa Timur IX 1 4 2 3 1 5 3 4 2 5 3 4 2 3 41 Jawa Timur X 2 5 3 4 2 5 3 4 2 5 2 4 2 5 42 Jawa Timur XI 3 7 3 3 2 6 3 4 3 6 3 5 3 5

43 Kalimantan Barat 1 9 3 6 3 4 3 8 4 7 3 5 4 8


21

44 Kalimantan Selatan I 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 2 5 2 4 3 4

45 Kalimantan Selatan II 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4

46 Kalimantan Tengah 3 4 3 4 0 3 3 4 2 5 2 4 2 5

47 Kalimantan Timur 1 6 2 7 2 1 3 7 4 6 3 3 4 6

48 Kepulauan Riau 0 4 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 49 Lampung I 2 5 5 6 5 2 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 50 Lampung II 2 5 3 8 3 5 3 6 3 8 3 7 3 8 51 NAD I 0 6 1 7 2 4 3 5 2 6 3 5 2 5 52 NAD II 2 4 2 5 1 3 2 4 2 5 3 4 2 5 53 NTB 0 7 4 8 2 3 4 4 5 7 4 5 4 8 54 NTT I 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 4 2 5 1 2 2 5 55 NTT II 2 2 1 2 0 4 3 5 2 6 1 2 3 5 56 Riau I 1 6 2 5 1 5 2 4 2 5 2 4 3 4 57 Riau II 0 5 0 5 1 4 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 4 58 Sulut 0 2 3 1 0 1 2 4 4 3 3 4 2 5 59 Sumbar I 3 7 2 8 1 3 3 5 4 6 3 6 3 7 60 Sumbar II 1 6 0 6 1 2 2 4 2 5 3 4 2 5 61 Sumsel I 2 7 3 7 0 5 3 5 3 7 3 6 3 7 62 Sumsel II 2 5 5 6 2 4 3 6 3 8 3 7 3 8 63 Sumut I 2 7 4 6 2 1 4 7 4 8 4 5 3 9 64 Sumut II 0 5 1 11 2 3 4 8 3 7 2 4 4 8 65 Sumut III 2 8 4 7 1 2 4 8 4 8 3 3 3 9 66 Yogyakarta 1 1 3 7 2 5 3 7 4 6 3 5 4 6 67 Gorontalo 0 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 68 Maluku Utara 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 69 Sulawesi Barat 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 70 Sulawesi

Tengah 1 3 2 5 3 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 2 5 71 Sulawesi

Tenggara 1 5 2 4 2 3 2 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 72 Sulawesi Selatan

I 2 5 3 4 1 3 4 5 3 7 3 6 3 7 73 Sulawesi Selatan

II 1 3 4 6 2 2 2 5 3 7 4 7 3 8 74 Sulawesi Selatan

III 3 3 1 7 3 4 3 4 2 6 4 3 3 5 75 Maluku 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 4 1 3 1 4 76 Papua 0 3 2 5 3 6 4 8 5 7 4 5 3 6 77 Papua Barat 1 2 0 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 3

Source: Indonesian Electoral Commission 2009.


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Appendix 2: List of Women and Men candidates for National Parliament, 2009 Elections (Seven New Political Parties) No Electoral

Districts New Political Parties

Hanura PKPB PPRN Gerindra PBN PDP PKNU W M W M W M W M W M W M W M

1 Bali 1 4 1 1 2 5 1 5 3 6 4 4 0 1 2 Banten I 2 4 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 0 1 3 Bangka Belitung 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 Banten II 3 4 1 1 4 1 5 1 2 2 4 2 2 5 Banten III 3 9 1 1 2 4 2 5 1 3 3 5 0 2 6 Bengkulu 2 3 2 0 1 3 1 4 2 0 1 1 2 1 7 DKI I 2 5 1 2 2 5 2 6 2 4 2 2 1 4 8 DKI II 3 5 1 2 2 6 1 2 2 3 5 0 1 3 9 DKI III 5 4 1 1 3 7 3 4 1 3 3 5 1 2

10 Jawa Barat I 3 5 1 2 1 5 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 11 Jawa Barat II 7 5 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 3 4 4 1 4 12 Jawa Barat III 4 7 1 2 1 2 2 4 1 3 3 3 0 3 13 Jawa Barat IV 3 4 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 14 Jawa Barat V 2 8 3 6 1 3 2 6 1 2 4 5 2 3 15 Jawa Barat VI 2 5 2 0 0 6 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 16 Jawa Barat VII 3 9 2 2 1 3 4 3 2 3 2 4 1 4 17 Jawa Barat VIII 4 5 1 1 0 5 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 18 Jawa Barat IX 2 8 2 3 0 4 1 4 0 2 2 5 1 3 19 Jawa Barat X 3 5 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 0 3 20 Jawa Barat XI 3 7 1 1 1 2 0 4 2 2 3 4 1 3 21 Jambi 2 5 1 2 2 5 1 3 1 3 3 2 2 1 22 Jawa Tengah I 3 7 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 5 0 3 23 Jawa Tengah II 2 3 1 2 0 1 2 4 2 3 2 4 2 2 24 Jawa Tengah III 2 8 1 1 0 1 2 5 3 2 3 5 1 3 25 Jawa Tengah IV 4 4 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 26 Jawa Tengah V 2 8 0 0 1 1 2 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 27 Jawa Tengah VI 2 6 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 1 4

28 Jawa Tengah VII 2 5 1 0 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 3

29 Jawa Tengah VIII 3 6 0 1 0 2 3 4 1 1 5 4 2 4

30 Jawa Tengah IX 2 5 0 1 0 2 1 2 1 3 4 5 2 5 31 Jawa Tengah X 3 5 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 1 1 4 2 4 32 Jawa Timur I 5 7 1 0 2 5 3 3 1 2 4 6 2 4 33 Jawa Timur II 2 4 0 1 0 1 1 7 1 3 2 3 2 4 34 Jawa Timur III 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 35 Jawa Timur IV 3 5 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 36 Jawa Timur V 3 6 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 37 Jawa Timur VI 3 8 0 1 1 1 1 4 1 3 2 3 2 3 38 Jawa Timur VII 2 6 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 1 4 2 2 2 39 Jawa Timur VIII 2 7 0 0 0 4 1 4 1 3 3 2 3 2 40 Jawa Timur IX 2 3 0 1 0 3 2 1 0 2 2 1 3 3 41 Jawa Timur X 1 5 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 2 1 4 2 4 42 Jawa Timur XI 2 6 0 1 0 2 1 4 1 3 1 1 2 5

43 Kalimantan Barat 2 9 1 1 0 2 3 5 7 4 4 6 3 2


23

44 Kalimantan Selatan I 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 3 1 3

45 Kalimantan Selatan II 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 3

46 Kalimantan Tengah 1 4 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 3 2 4 0 1

47 Kalimantan Timur 3 3 1 0 0 3 1 8 1 2 2 2 2 2

48 Kepulauan Riau 1 2 0 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 49 Lampung I 2 9 2 1 2 1 1 3 0 1 2 4 1 5 50 Lampung II 5 5 1 2 1 3 2 5 1 1 2 3 1 4 51 NAD I 1 5 0 1 1 2 2 6 1 2 2 4 1 3 52 NAD II 1 5 0 1 1 3 1 4 1 2 2 2 3 3 53 NTB 3 6 1 2 2 4 1 5 2 2 1 3 2 5 54 NTT I 1 6 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 2 2 5 0 1 55 NTT II 2 6 1 2 1 4 2 6 0 2 2 4 0 1 56 Riau I 2 5 0 1 1 2 0 4 2 4 1 2 1 2 57 Riau II 1 5 0 1 0 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 58 Sulut 3 4 2 0 1 1 3 3 2 2 3 4 1 1 59 Sumbar I 4 5 0 1 1 0 1 4 1 1 3 4 0 1 60 Sumbar II 2 5 2 0 0 1 1 5 0 2 0 2 1 1 61 Sumsel I 3 7 0 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 0 2 3 4 62 Sumsel II 3 7 1 2 0 1 2 5 1 4 2 2 2 4 63 Sumut I 2 9 1 0 4 8 1 6 1 2 4 4 2 2 64 Sumut II 3 9 0 1 4 8 3 7 2 3 2 4 1 2 65 Sumut III 3 8 1 1 4 8 2 7 4 4 2 2 2 1 66 Yogyakarta 5 4 1 1 1 3 3 4 2 3 1 4 1 5 67 Gorontalo 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 3 1 1 1 68 Maluku Utara 1 2 0 1 1 3 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 69 Sulawesi Barat 1 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 70 Sulawesi

Tengah 4 2 0 1 2 2 2 3 1 0 2 2 1 2

71 Sulawesi Tenggara

1 4 0 1 1 4 0 2 1 3 3 2 1 1

72 Sulawesi Selatan I

1 6 2 2 2 2 1 4 1 2 2 5 0 2

73 Sulawesi Selatan II

2 6 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 2 4 1 3

74 Sulawesi Selatan III

2 6 1 2 2 2 0 5 1 2 2 6 1 3

75 Maluku 2 3 1 2 1 2 0 4 1 3 1 2 0 1 76 Papua 3 9 1 2 0 1 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 77 Papua Barat 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 3 1 2 0 1

Source: Indonesian Electoral Commission 2009.

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