asha bhosle

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KPPNair 1 CP 719/2002 a/w OLR NO. 188/14

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR'S REPORT NO. 188 OF 2014 WITH

OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR'S REPORT NO. 254 OF 2015 IN

COMPANY PETITION NO. 719 OF 2002

In the matter of Companies Act, 1956;

And

In the matter of M/s. Magnasound India Ltd.

Asha Bhosale …Petitioner

Mr. J.P. Sen, Senior Advocate i/b Mr. Rakesh Reddy, Advocate for the Official Liquidator.

Dr. Virendra V. Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Hiren Kamod and Mr. Nikhil Sharma i/b W.S. Kane & Co. for Magnasound Media Pvt. Ltd.

Mr. Chetan Kapadia, i/b Mr. Rahul Kadam for Mr. Shashi Gopal.

Mr. Amit Jamsandekar a/w Mr. Dhiraj Mhetre i/b Desai & Diwanji for Sony Music Entertainment India.

Mr. S. Ramakantha Official Liquidator present.

CORAM; S.J. KATHAWALLA, J.Judgment reserved on: 11 th June, 2015

Judgment pronounced on: 21 st October, 2015

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JUDGMENT

1. By the above reports, the Official Liquidator is seeking a declaration that

a Deed of Assignment dated 14.03.2012 executed by Mr. Shashi Gopal, an ex-

director of Magnasound India Ltd. (“MSIL”), the Company (In Liqn.), in

favour of one Magnasound Media Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter “MMPL”) is illegal

and void. The Official Liquidator is also seeking other consequential directions

including, inter-alia, a direction to MMPL and Sony Music Entertainment Pvt.

Ltd. (hereinafter “Sony Music”) to hand over the documents and assets which

were the subject matter of the purported Deed of Assignment and also for

directions to restrain MMPL and Sony Music from dealing with these assets.

2. It is the Official Liquidator’s case that Shashi Gopal, in purported

exercise of his rights as a Subrogee, has after the winding up order sold assets

belonging to the Company (In Liqn.) without the leave of this Court, without

valuation and without inviting public offers to a related party at a price

randomly fixed by the Assignor (Mr. Shashi Gopal) and the Assignee (MMPL).

It is submitted on this basis that the Assignment is void as contrary to Sections

536(2) and 537(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956.


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3. The Company in liquidation had sometime in the late 1990s, availed of

certain facilities from Union Bank of India (hereinafter “UBI”). In this

connection, the Company had executed Three Deeds of Hypothecation dated

12.8.1998, 30.7.1999 and 28.7.2000 in favour of UBI in respect of the copyright

in recordings containing the original music compositions rendered by various

artistes and which were owned by the Company. Each of the Deeds of

Hypothecation contained a clause which permitted the Lender, in the event of

the borrower committing default, to “sell all or any part of the hypothecated sound

recording copyrights in such manner as the bank shall think fit, but by giving 15 days

notice to the borrower and either by public auction, private Contract or tender…”

4. On 16.7.2002, the above Company Petition came to be filed by the

Petitioner Asha Bhosle for winding up the company on account of its failure to

discharge its payment obligations to the Petitioner. On 30.4.2003, the OL, High

Court, Bombay came to be appointed as the Provisional Liquidator of the

Company. Meanwhile, the Company also appears to have been in default of its

obligations to UBI as a result of which UBI filed OA No.186 of 2004 before the

DRT, Mumbai for recovery of their dues and enforcement of their securities


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including under the aforementioned deeds of Hypothecation.

5. On 23.4.2007, an order was passed by the DRT in terms of a compromise

Memo filed by UBI and the guarantors of the Company in Liquidation. The

compromise memo provided that the guarantors would submit to a decree on

admission in a sum of Rs. 8,56,33,265/- in favour of UBI. The said memo also

recorded an OTS offer that had been accepted by the Bank for payment of a

sum of Rs. 520.06 lacs before September, 2006 by the Guarantors on which the

claim of the Bank was to stand fully satisfied. The compromise memo further

recorded that the guarantors were in a position only to pay Rs. 281.02 lacs and

not the entire OTS amount. The guarantors were given an opportunity by the

compromise memo to revive the lapsed OTS for a further period of one year on

certain terms and conditions recorded in the compromise memo. The balance

OTS amount of Rs.239.04 lacs was to be paid, inter alia, by the sale of the

“Masters” belonging to the Company in Liquidation “after taking possession

from the Official Liquidator and obtaining permission from the DRT”. The

Masters were to be brought to sale through DRT, with the Guarantors to

arrange for buyers at a minimum price of Rs. 150 lakhs. In the event of there

being a surplus over and above Rs. 150 Lakhs, the surplus was to go to the bank,

while any shortfall was to be made good by the Guarantors.


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6. The Compromise Decree does not seem to have been fully complied with

as a result of which the Debt Recovery Tribunal directed issuance of a

Recovery Certificate on 21.1.2008 for the balance amount of Rs. 212 lacs which

remained unpaid. The Recovery Certificate in the sum of Rs.212 lacs was

thereafter issued on 30.4.2008.

7. On 15.5.2008, Shashi Gopal (an Ex Director of the Company in

Liquidation and a guarantor) filed a Misc. Application before the DRT, inter

alia, for purchase of the assets of the Company in Liquidation. The OL filed a

reply dated 27.5.2008 in this Misc. Application where he noted that the assets

may be sold by” public auction” only in one lot after publication of necessary

sale notice and not by way of private treaty at any cost. On 20.6.2008, the said

Shashi Gopal filed an application for withdrawal of his Misc. Application. The

Misc. Application was thereafter disposed of as withdrawn.

8. Meanwhile, on 24.3.2009, the DRT issued a Warrant of Attachment in

respect of the hypothecated assets of the Company in Liquidation. Thereafter,

Mr. Shashi Gopal appears to have entered into a bargain with UBI for payment


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of the balance dues of the bank. Accordingly, Shashi Gopal paid over to UBI

the sum of Rs. 212 lakhs then outstanding. On this payment being made, a

Deed of Subrogation dated 25.6.2009 was executed between UBI and Shashi

Gopal under which the Bank purported to subrogate to Shashi Gopal “complete

rights of Bank against MSIL in recovery of debt due under Consent Decree dated

23.4.2007 including enforcement and realization of mortgaged and hypothecated

properties”. The Deed of Subrogation also recorded, as it happens inaccurately,

that “there appears to be no workers’ claims lodged before the Official Liquidator

and hence there is no pari passu charge in respect of the assets of the MSIL mentioned

in the consent terms”.

9. On the same day, UBI served upon the OL an application for leave to

withdraw the recovery proceedings pending before the DRT. By his report

dated 26.6.2009, the OL recorded that he had no objection if leave was granted

to withdraw the recovery proceedings. The said proceedings were accordingly

withdrawn.

10. Thereafter, by a letter dated 28.7.2009, UBI informed the OL of the

Deed of Subrogation executed in favour of Shashi Gopal. The letter also


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recorded that the Bank had handed over possession of a Bungalow at Lonavala,

one of the secured assets, alongwith the hypothecated assets lying therein. The

letter also recorded that the Bank did not have any other claim with respect to

the assets of the Company in Liquidation. In July 2009, Shashi Gopal filed a

Misc. Application no.632 of 2009 before the DRT seeking a direction to the OL

to hand over the “Masters/Artists Agreements/Stocks and other assets of the

Defendant No.1 Company (now in Prov. Liqn) lying in various branches and which

are hypothecated to the Applicant Bank.” By his written submissions dated

4.8.2009, the OL recorded that he had no objection “if the properties in the

custody of UBI , the secured creditor, are handed over to Mr. Shashi Gopal and kept

under his custody” . Accordingly, an order came to be passed by the DRAT on

5.8.2009 directing that the hypothecated assets be handed over to Mr. Shashi

Gopal. Pursuant to the said order, these assets were handed over to Mr. Shashi

Gopal as recorded in two minutes dated 17.12.2009 and 18.1.2010.

11. Meanwhile, by a letter dated 6.1.2010 addressed to the OL, Mr. Shashi

Gopal in his capacity as a subrogee claimed that “all royalties if any payable by

music societies, Phonographic performance Ltd (PPL) and Indian Performing Rights

Society LTD (IPRS) are payable to me from 1996 onwards in respect of the use of


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Masters of Magnasound India Ltd if they have not already been paid.” By this

letter, Mr. Shashi Gopal sought a no objection letter from the OL in this regard.

By his reply dated 21.1.2010, the OL fixed a meeting on 25.1.2010 to discuss

Mr. Shashi Gopal’s role as a Subrogee and the issue regarding the collection of

any royalties payable, towards the use of the Masters of the Company in

Liquidation. By this letter, the Subrogee was expressly told to “maintain status

quo”. Mr. Shashi Gopal did not attend the meeting so fixed.

12. Consequently, the OL addressed another letter dated 28.1.2010 fixing a

meeting on 9.2.2010. On 10.2.2010 the said Mr. Shashi Gopal addressed a

letter to the OL noting that he wished to withdraw his letter dated 6.1.2010

along with a request that no meeting be fixed in this regard. On 9.7.2010, a

winding up order was passed in respect of the Company in Liquidation. It is the

case of Mr. Shashi Gopal that a letter dated 9.5.2011 was addressed by him to

the OL in which he informed the OL that he would sell/assign all the

copyrights in the sound recordings in the music/literary works and master and

“all the rights in audio, video and cinematograph films owned by the Company to

recover the monies paid by me to the UBI on account of the Company together with

interest thereon at 18% p.a with monthly rests.” It appears from the Inward


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Register maintained by the OL that the said letter dated 9.5.2011 was received

by the office of the OL on 10.5.2011. It appears, however, that the said letter

was overlooked by the Office of the Official Liquidator on account of it not

having been placed in the file pertaining to the Company in Liquidation and not

having been put up before the Deputy OL or OL for necessary action. The OL

asserts that it is in these circumstances that no reply was sent to the said letter.

13. On 21.5.2011, a public notice was issued by one MMPL Pvt Ltd in the

Free Press Journal and Navshakti in respect of its intention to acquire the entire

copyright in the repertoire of the Company in Liquidation. The said notice did

not come to the attention of the OL. Thereafter, a Deed of Assignment dated

14.3.2012 appears to have been entered into by the said Mr. Shashi Gopal and

MMPL, a related party, transferring the entire repertoire of the Company in

Liquidation. MMPL in turn appears immediately thereafter to have negotiated

with Sony Music Entertainment Private Limited (Sony Music) for a license to

be granted in favour of Sony in respect of a part of the repertoire of the

Company in Liquidation. The Notices issued by Sony Music appear to have

come to the attention of the Petitioner hereinabove who by a letter dated

13.4.2012 called upon the OL to file an objection in response to the aforesaid


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notice.

14. The OL, by a letter dated 20.4.2012 addressed to Sony Music recorded

that the assets of the Company in Liquidation vested in him and that any rights

in its repertoire could not be transferred or assigned without the permission of

this Court. The OL also sought a copy of the documents on the basis of which

the public notice had been issued. A meeting was thereafter held on 24.4.2012

in the office of the Deputy OL at which the representatives of Sony Music also

remained present. At this meeting, these representatives undertook “not to deal

with the proposed acquisition/ licence in respect of the assets mentioned in the public

notice dated 11.4.2012”.

15. This was followed, however, by an Advocates’ letter dated 2.5.2012

where Sony Music purported to claim that it was “satisfied beyond reasonable

doubt that the title of MMPL with respect to the assets mentioned in the public notice

including the repertoire is free, clear and marketable as well as free from all

encumbrances.” The letter went on to assert that the Company in Liquidation

was not the owner of the said repertoire and that the undertaking given by the

representatives of Sony Music at the meeting held on 24.4.2012 was “wrongly


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taken and therefore stood withdrawn”. By his reply dated 14.5.2012, the OL

recorded that the attempt being made by Sony Music to withdraw their

undertaking was ill conceived and called upon them to maintain status quo

until the rights, if any, of MMPL in the catalogue/repertoire of the Company in

Liquidation was ascertained.

16. By their Advocates’ reply dated 6.6.2012, Sony Music claimed that UBI

had disposed of the repertoire with the prior consent of the OL as recorded in

an order of the DRAT and that in view of the entire repertoire being disposed

of with prior consent as alleged, the Company in Liquidation was not the owner

of the said Repertoire. The letter further claimed that the OL had travelled

beyond his jurisdiction in taking an undertaking from Sony Music in relation to

the said Repertoire and that the undertaking was invalid and bad in law. The

letter also recorded that Sony Music had already entered into an agreement

with MMPL under which Sony Music had been granted an exclusive license for

the said Repertoire. By this letter however, Sony Music did not furnish to the

OL copies of the agreements executed by them.

17. It is only in the course of the hearing of the above report that Sony Music


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furnished to the OL four agreements, being an exclusive license agreement

dated 7.5.2012, an exclusive license agreement dated 15.6.2012, a

Memorandum of Agreement dated 7.11.2012 and an addendum dated 5.3.2015.

Under these agreements (which purport to create a license in respect of a part

of the repertoire of the company in liquidation for a limited period) MMPL is

entitled to payment of an aggregate minimum guaranteed amount of Rs.1.75

crores in addition to a share in revenue overflow. No material has been placed

on record by Sony Music regarding the revenue generated by them under the

said Agreements. It is significant, however that Sony Music entered into the

said Agreements with full notice of the OL’s claim.

18. On 18.7.2012, the Petitioner in the above company Petition filed

Company Application No, 498 of 2012, inter alia, impugning the purported

transfer by Shashi Gopal of the hypothecated assets in favour of MMPL.

Subsequently, however, the Petitioner having reached a settlement with Shashi

Gopal sought leave to withdraw the Company Application. This leave was

granted by an order dated 12.6.2014. By this order, the OL was permitted to

take out an independent application to challenge the legality of the purported

transfer. It is in these circumstances that the present report under


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consideration came to be filed.

19. In the course of his oral submissions, Mr. Sen, learned Senior Advocate

on behalf of the Official Liquidator, contended:

a) That while it has been contended on behalf of Mr. Shashi Gopal

that he is entitled to the benefit of the Compromise Memo filed

before the DRT, he cannot as a matter of law be so entitled. Any

reference in the Deed of Subrogation to his being so entitled is

clearly of no legal effect. This is on account of the fact that a Bank

cannot assign its debt to a non banking entity nor can it assign a

recovery certificate or the benefit of a consent decree to such an

entity. In this behalf, he relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Official Liquidator for APS

Star Industries Ltd.1 ;

b) That in the present case, UBI does not appear to have done so. It

has not assigned its debt, decretal or otherwise, to Mr. Shashi

Gopal but has merely transferred in his favour the benefit of the

securities held by them on account of his being a subrogee. This is

a benefit to which Mr. Shashi Gopal would have been even

1 (2010) 10 SCC 1 (paras 29, 30 to 40 and 41 to 44).


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otherwise entitled by operation of law on payment being made by

him in his capacity as a guarantor of amounts due from the

principal debtor to the secured creditor;

c) That Shashi Gopal is thus merely a Subrogee in respect of the

amounts paid by him to UBI. He is in that capacity entitled to the

benefit of any security that the bank held for recovery of the

money paid by him. The principal debtor being a Company in

liquidation, Mr Shashi Gopal is entitled as a subrogee only to the

sum actually paid by him and not to any interest on the said

amount unless there is an overflow after payment to all creditors.

This is on account of the fact that the dues of the secured creditors

and workers have to be determined as far as possible as on the date

of the winding up order. He relied in this connection on the

Judgment of this Court in Vishwanath Namdeo Patil v. Official

Liquidator of Swadeshi Mills & Ors.2, and the Judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Maharashtra v. Pandurang

Keshav Gorwadkar 3;.

d) That the Deeds of Hypothecation in the present case contain a

power of sale. However, the Company being in liquidation, the

2 (2013) 181 Com. Cas. 133, at 171 (paras 61-63) 3 2013 (3) ILR 119 (SC) (para 64)


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power of sale is qualified by the pari passu charge of the workmen

under Section 529-A. The Subrogee can therefore sell only in

association with the OL. The earlier law that a secured creditor

would be free to deal with his security without reference to the

Official Liquidator is no longer good law. He relied in this behalf

on the Judgments of this Court and of the Hon’ble Apex Court in

Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator4;

International Coach Builders Ltd. v. Karnataka State Financial

Corporation5; Rajasthan State Financial Corporation v. Official

Liquidator6; Bank of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Keshav Gorwadkar7;

Kingfisher Airlines v. SBI8;

e) That the secured creditor cannot arrogate to himself the power to

decide whether there are any workers’ claims. If workers’ claims

have not yet been adjudicated, he must apply to the company court

seeking directions for sale;

f ) That the fact that the OL has not objected to the subrogation in

favour of Shashi Gopal does not constitute an admission of

4 AIR 1993 Bom 392 (paras 18 to 20)5 (2003) 10 SCC 482 (paras 14-15, 24-25, 30, 32)6 (2005) 8 SCC 190 (para 17)7 2013 (3) ILR 119 (SC) (paras 62,63, 71, 72)8 2015 (1) Kar LJ 19 (paras 16-18)


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everything in the Deed of Subrogation particularly an incorrect

recital that no workers’ claims have been received. The OL has no

obligation to object to such a recital and the absence of such an

objection cannot, in any event, constitute a rejection of workers’

claims which have in fact been made. That being so, the subrogee

was not entitled to sell the hypothecated assets by private treaty

without reference to the Company Court;

g) That even otherwise, a hypothecatee or pledgee is in a fiduciary

position and is obligated to sell a security in such a manner as

would fetch the best possible price. In support of this proposition,

he relied on the Judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lallan

Prasad v. Rahmat Ali & Anr.9; Jaya Singh Dnyanu Mhoprekar &

Anr. v. Krishna Babaji Patil & Anr.10;

h) That the law requires him to adopt every precaution in this respect

including obtaining a valuation and selling the property by public

notice. In this connection, he placed reliance on the Judgments of

the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar & Ors.11;

FCS Software Solutions Ltd. v. LA Medical Devices Ltd. & Ors.12;

9 AIR 1967 SC 1322 (para 29)10 AIR 1985 SC 1646 (para 9)11 (2004) 7 SCC 151 (paras 12, 14)12 (2008) 10 SCC 440 (paras 33, 36)


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i) That any sale by a fiduciary to himself or a related party is in any

event clearly void. In support of this contention, he relied on the

Judgments of the Privy Council and the Apex Court in Achi

Thayar Ammal & Ors. v. Balkis Nachial13; L. Janakirama Iyer &

Ors. v. P.M. Nilkanta Iyer & Ors.14;

j) That any sale of the assets of a company in liquidation after the

commencement of liquidation is void under Sections 536(2) and

537(1)(b) of the Companies Act, whether by the company itself or

a third party. None of the Judgments cited by the subrogee raise

the issue as to whether a sale by a third party would fall within the

ambit of these sections. The plain language of the section would

indicate that they would. That is certainly within the mischief

sought to be remedied by the Sections;

k) That the sale in the present case of the hypothecated assets

(without a valuation, a public auction or the leave of the company

court) by private treaty at a price randomly fixed to a related party

is liable to be set aside; and

l)That the burden is on the person seeking to maintain a sale under

Sections 536(2) or 537(1)(b) to plead and prove that the sale was

13 AIR 1931 PC 68 (70, col. 1)14 AIR 1962 SC 633 (para 29)


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for the benefit of the company. He relies in this behalf on the

Judgments of this Court in BIFR v. M/s. Hindustan Transmission

Products Ltd.15; Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official Liquidator16. In the

present case, that burden has not been discharged.

20. Dr. Tulzapurkar, Learned Senior Advocate for MMPL, submitted in

reply:

a) That Section 536(2) of the Companies Act has no application to the sale

by a third party of the assets of the company in liquidation and applies

only to a sale by the company itself. He relied in this behalf on the

Judgments in Pankaj Mehra v. State of Maharashtra17; BNP Paribas v.

United Breweries Holdings Ltd.18; Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official

Liquidator19; Monark Enterprises v. Kishan Tulpule & Ors.20; & Bank of

Maharashtra v. Official Liquidator, Navjivan Trading Finance Pvt. Ltd.21.

He submitted that the word “disposition” in Section 536(2) must

necessarily refer to a voluntary disposition by the Company and that any

disposition of the Company’s assets was not within the mischief

15 Unreported Judgment dated 5.9.2012 in OL Report No. 145 of 201116 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 777 (para 17)17 (2000) 2 SCC 756 (para 18)18 ILR 2014 Kant. 779 (para 63)19 2014 (4) All MR 308 (para 10)20 (1992) 74 Com. Cas. 89 (Bom)21 (1999) 96 Com. Cas. 234 (Guj)


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intended to be remedied by the Section. On the Mischief Rule of

Interpretation and the meaning that ought to be attributed to the word

“disposition”, he relied on the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in The Commissioner of Gift Tax, Madras v. N. S. Getty Chettiar22; Empress

Mills, Nagpur v. Municipal Committee, Wardha23; Union of India v.

Sankalchand Himatlal Seth 24, & Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. &

Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors.25 ; the Judgment of the House of Lords in

Attorney General v. H.R.H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover26 and the

definition of the word “disposition” in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.

West 2009) and the New Oxford English Dictionary of English

(Clarendon Press 1998);

b) That a secured creditor is entitled to stand outside the winding up and to

enforce his security without the leave of the Company court. He relied

in this behalf on the Judgments in M.K. Ranganathan & Anr. v.

Government of Madras & Ors.27; MSFC v. Official Liquidator, Bombay28;

Iftex Oil & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of M/s. Dhake Dyes &

22 1971(2) SCC 741, 746 (para 18)23 AIR 1958 SC 341, 34824 AIR 1977 SC 2328, 2341 25 (1987) 3 SCC 279, 288-29026 [1957] 1 All E.R. 49, 53 27 [1955] SCR 374, 383-87, 390-9128 AIR 1993 Bom 392, paras 6-22


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Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.29, and SICOM v. MSFC30. Such a sale would not fall

foul of Sections 536(2) or 537(1)(b);

c) That Shashi Gopal as a subrogee was only required to issue a notice, of

his intention to sell the hypothecated securities, to the Official Liquidator

under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act which was done in the

present case;

d) That in the absence of an adjudication by the Official Liquidator of the

claims of the workmen, no pari passu charge in favour of the workmen

could be said to exist which would limit the right of Shashi Gopal as a

subrogee to stand outside the winding up and to sell the hypothecated

securities. He also contended that some of the persons who had filed

claims before the Official Liquidator performed managerial or

administrative functions and their dues which are yet to be adjudicated

are not entitled to priority or to a pari passu charge under Section 529-A

of the Companies Act;

e) That in any event, Sections 536(2) and 537(1)(b) are not an absolute bar

to a sale and protect any sale in the interest of the company. He relied on

the Judgments of the Apex Court and of various High Courts in Pankaj

29 [1999] 101(2) Bom. L.R. 3230 (1988) 64 Com. Cas. 102 (Bom)


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Mehra v. State of Maharashtra31; BNP Paribas v. United Breweries

(Holdings) Ltd.32 & Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official Liquidator & Ors.33.

The present sale by Shashi Gopal in exercise of his rights as a subrogee is

one such;

f ) That Shashi Gopal, as a subrogee, did not stand in a fiduciary position

qua the company and was only required to issue a notice to the Official

Liquidator prior to the sale of the hypothecated securities even by private

treaty without issuing a public notice;

g) That in any event, the Official Liquidator had alleged neither fraud nor an

undervaluation in the Reports filed by him and that in the absence of

either, the sale could not be held to be improper;

h) That his client was in any event willing to deposit a sum of Rs.

30,00,000/- to secure the pari passu share of the workmen (which is

alleged to be Rs. 25,77,000/-) in the sum of Rs. 1.5 crores which had been

received as consideration for the sale of the hypothecated securities by

Shashi Gopal to Magnasound. It was submitted that on the pari passu

claim of the workers in the said sum of Rs. 1.5 crores being fully secured,

the challenge to the sale by Shashi Gopal would no longer survive;

31 (2000) 2 SCC 756 (para 18)32 2014 (2) AKR 129 (para 63)33 2014 (4) ALL MR 308


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21. Mr. Chetan Kapadia, Learned Counsel on behalf of Shashi Gopal, while

adopting the arguments of Dr. Tulzapurkar, also contended, by way of written

submissions, that the condition of the master tapes and the cassette/CD photo

covers which were originally handed over to the Official Liquidator in good

condition, were received by the subrogee in a poor condition. He further

contended that the subrogee was therefore obliged to spend considerable time

and money to restore the master tapes and photo cards to render them usable.

He further contended that in any event, even if the hypothecated securities

were capable of fetching more than Rs. 1.5 crores and had been sold by UBI

under the consent decree in its favour, such overflow would have enured to the

benefit only of UBI and not the workmen.

22. Mr. Amit Jamsandekar, Learned Counsel for Sony Music, submitted that

his client had bonafide acquired rights from MMPL. He further urged that

after acquisition of the rights, Sony Music had invested “tremendous amount

of money, skills, labour and resources to commercially exploit the copyright”

acquired by them. On this basis, he contends that it would be inequitable to set

aside the Agreements executed by MMPL in their favour.


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23. Arguments in the above matter were concluded on 30th April, 2015.

Thereafter Advocates for the parties except Sony Music Entertainment India

filed their written submissions on 13th May, 2015 i.e. during court vacations.

Sony Music Entertainment India filed its written submissions on 11th June,

2015. I have considered the oral as well as written submissions made/filed by

the parties and the Judgments relied upon by them. The first issue that arises

for consideration is as to whether Shashi Gopal, in his capacity as a subrogee,

was entitled to sell any of the hypothecated securities without the leave of the

Company Court. The contention advanced on behalf of the Official Liquidator

that a recovery certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the benefit

of a Consent Decree passed by it is incapable of assignment to a non banking

entity reflects the true legal position. A non banking entity is not entitled

under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Act to file an Original

Application in the Debt Recovery Tribunal for recovery of any amounts due to

it. It follows that it would not be entitled to seek enforcement of a Recovery

Certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in favour of a bank or

financial institution on the purported basis that the same has been assigned to

it. Such an assignment appears to be legally impermissible.


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24. In any event, in the present case, on a fair reading of the Deed of

Subrogation dated 25.06.09, UBI does not appear to have assigned its debt,

decretal or otherwise, to Mr. Shashi Gopal but has merely transferred in his

favour the benefit of the securities held on account of his being a subrogee.

This is a benefit to which Mr. Shashi Gopal would have been even otherwise

entitled by operation of law on payment being made by him in his capacity as a

guarantor of amounts due from the principal debtor to the secured creditor.

That being so, Mr. Shashi Gopal can rely if at all only on the terms of the

Deeds of Hypothecation that had been executed by the Company in

Liquidation in favour of UBI. The Deeds of Hypothecation in the present case

do contain a power of sale. However, the Company being in Liqn, the power of

sale is qualified by the pari passu charge of the Workmen under Section 529-A

of the Companies Act, 1956. The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in MK Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras (supra) that a secured creditor is

entitled to stand outside the winding up and enforce his security by sale

without reference to the OL or the Company Court pre-dated the introduction

of Section 529A which places workers on par with secured creditors and is no

longer good law. This position has been recognized in the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in International Coach Builders (supra) and several


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judgments that follow it. As would be evident from the paragraphs reproduced

hereinbelow, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in International Coach Builders

(supra) has in no uncertain terms recognized that after introduction of Section

529A, a secured creditor would be entitled to enforce its security by sale only

with the consent of the OL and under the directions of the Company Court:

“14. It is contended on behalf of the SFCs that they are secured

creditors and as such entitled to exercise their rights under the mortgage

as also the statutory rights conferred on them by Section 29 of SFC Act

without interference of courts. Hence,it is urged that the SFCs can sell

the mortgaged and charged properties without reference to any court,

much less the Company Court. Reliance is placed on the judgement of

this Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras

and Ors.MANU/SC/0007/1955: [1955]2SCR374. That was a case

arising under Section 232 of the Companies Act, 1913. This Court was

required to consider the meaning of the provision “any sale held without

leave of the Court of any of the properties” used in Section 232(1) of the

Companies Act, 1913 which rendered such sales void. It was held that

these words refer only to sales held through the intervention of the court

and not to sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up

without intervention of the Court. This Court pointed out that the law

in England, and the provisions of the Companies Act in India, was the

name, namely, that the secured creditor had the right of realizing his

security by standing outside the winding up, in which case he was not


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required to seek intervention of the Court.

15. The decision in Ranganathan (supra) held the field for considerable

period, both under the Companies Act, 1913 and the Companies Act,

1956. However, by amending Act 35 of 1985, amendments were carried

out in Section 529 and a new Section 529A was enacted. These

developments, in our view, brought about a qualitative change in the

legal situation. It is important to notice that M.K. Ranganathan (supra)

was decided under the Companies Act, 1913 which did not have any

provision corresponding to the proviso to Section 529 or Section 529A of

the Companies Act, 1956. Obviously, therefore, Ranganathan could not

have considered the impact of these amendments on the provisions of

Section 232 of the Companies Act, 1913 (corresponding to Section 537 of

the Companies Act, 1956) was enacted. These developments, in our view,

brought about a qualitative change in the legal situation. It is important

to notice that M.K. Ranganathan (supra) was decided under the

Companies Act, 1913 which did not have any provision corresponding to

the proviso to Section 529 or Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956.

Obviously, therefore, Ranganathan could not have considered the impact

of these amendments on the provisions of Section 232 of the Companies

Act, 1913 (corresponding to Section 537 of the Companies Act, 1956).

16. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has considered in

detail the change in the legal situation brought about by these new legal

provisions in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Ballarpur

Industries Limited MANU/MH/0061/1993 : AIR1993Bom392.


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17. As a result of the proviso added in Section 529, the security of every

secured creditor is deemed to be subject to a 'pari passu' charge in favour

of the workmen to the extent of the workmen's dues (called 'workmen's

portion, as defined in Sub-section (3)(c) therein. It is further provided

that, where the secured creditor, instead of relinquishing its mortgage

and proving his debt, opts to stand outside the winding up proceedings

and realise his security, the Official Liquidator shall be entitled to

represent the workmen and enforce such charge and that any amount

realised by enforcement of such charge shall be applied ratably by the

Official Liquidator for the discharge of workmen's dues. It is true that

even the amended proviso does not give the Liquidator an independent

right of enforcing the charge by selling the security against which such

charge is created. Nonetheless, it creates a 'pari passu' charge in favour of

the workmen to the extent of their dues and makes the Liquidator the

representative of the workmen to enforce such a charge. By reason of

Clause (c) of the newly added proviso, so much of the debt due to the

secured creditor opting to realise security as could not be realized because

of the special created rights in favour of the workmen, or the amount of

the workmen's portion in the security, whichever is less, shall rank pari

passu with the workmen's dues under Section 529A. Section 529A

provides for overriding preferential payments of workmen's dues and

unrealised portion of the secured creditors dues, as provided in Clause (c)

of the proviso to Section 529.

19. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Maharashtra State


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Financial Corporation case (supra) gives weighty reasons as to why when

the company is under winding up the SFC to which the assets of the

company are charged cannot proceed to realise the security without

intervention of the Company Court. We have already noticed that as a

result of the amendment to Section 529 a pari passu charge to the extent

of the workmen's portion is created on the security of every secured

creditor when he opts to realize a security by standing outside winding

up. 'Pari Passu' means "with equal steps, equally, without preference"

(Jowitt's Dictionary, Vol.II, 1959 Edition 1294). Black's Law

Dictionary, 6th Edition, 115 defines it as "By an equal progress... Used

especially of creditors who, in marshalling assets, are entitled to receive

out of the same fund without any precedence over each other." It is also

defined as "With equal steps, that is to say, proceeding side by side at the

same place" (Prem's Judicial Dictionary, Volume III, 1964 Edition,

page 1217)

20. The rights of the pari passu charge holders would run equally,

temporally and potently, with the rights of the secured creditors.

22. Since the Official Liquidator is in the position of a co-mortgage,

the SFCs cannot act independently or by ignoring him for enforcing the

security. It is established law that in case of co-mortgages, all of them

should join in the suit for enforcing the security, but if some of them

refuse to join, they have to be included as defendants, not merely as

performa parties, but as necessary parties inasmuch as the mortgage

right vests in them along with the plaintiffs-mortgagees. (See in this

connection the judgment of the Privy Council in Sunitibala


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Debi v.Dharae Sundari Debi AIR 1919 PC 24. The same principle

would be substantially true and applicable in the case of a mortgagee and

a pari passu charge-holder over the same security for realising the

security. The realization of the security can only be done by both the

charge-holders joining and realising the security simultaneously. If a sale

takes place, it can only be simultaneously for recovery of the claim of

all pari passu charge-holders and sale proceeds are required to be divided

proportionately in the same proportion as their dues.

23. In support of their respective contentions, parties have referred to

and relied upon judgments of different High Courts. The view taken by

the Bombay High Court commends itself to us. The Division Bench of

the said High Court pointed out that, like a secured creditor, the official

liquidator as a pari passu charge holder cannot independently bring the

security to sale ignoring the secured creditor. He must, therefore, either

obtain concurrence of the secured creditor for sale and take the Court's

sanction, or he can apply for sanction of the Court after notice to the

secured creditor. In either event, the Court while granting sanction may

impose appropriate condition and give directions regarding the conduct of

the sale, the fixing of the reserve bid, acceptance of the bid, confirmation

of sale and distribution of sale proceeds.

24. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that every creditor is interested

in realizing the security only for his benefit and to the extent necessary

for recovery of his outstanding. Prior to 1985 it might have been possible

for a secured creditor under Section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956, or

its predecessor, Section 232 of the Companies Act, 1913 as interpreted by


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this Court in M.K. Ranganathan case (supra), to opt to stand outside the

winding up and realise the security by bringing it to sale. This was

possible because the secured creditor had unrestricted right of standing

outside the winding up and proceeding against the property mortgaged to

him.

25. Of course, even in such a situation, if the same property was

mortgaged to more than one secured creditor, they had to either come to

an agreement, or in the event of disagreement, there had to be a suit in

which the dissenting mortgagee had to be sued as a necessary party

defendant. No doubt Section 29 of the SFC Act was intended to place the

SFCs on a better footing. But, in our view, this better footing is available

only so long as the debtor is not a company or is a going company. The

moment a winding up order is made in respect of a debtor company, the

provisions of Section 529 and 529a come into play and whatever superior

rights had been ensured to SFCs under the provision of the SFC Act are

now subjected to and operate only in conjunction with the special rights

given to the workmen, who as pari passu charge-holders are represented

by the official liquidator. We are, therefore, of the view that the

unhindered right hitherto available to the SFCs to realise their security,

without recourse to the Court, no longer holds true as the right vested in

the official liquidator is a statutory impediment to such exercise and has

to be reckoned with. And since the official liquidator can do nothing

without the leave or concurrence of the Court, all necessary applications

must, therefore, come to the Company Court.

32. We, therefore, hold as under:


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1. The right unilaterally exercisable under Section 29 of the SFC Act is

available against a debtor, if a company, only so long as there is no order

of winding up;

2. The SFCs cannot unilaterally act to realise the mortgaged properties

without the consent of the official liquidator representing workmen for

the pari passu charge in their favour under the proviso to Section 529 of

the Companies Act, 1956.

3. If the official liquidator does not consent, the SFCs have to move the

Company court for appropriate directions to the official liquidator who is

the pari passu charge holder on behalf of the workmen. In any event, the

official liquidator cannot act without seeking directions from the

Company Court and under its supervision.”

25. Thus, after the introduction of Section 529-A which gave workers a pari

passu charge along with secured creditors in mortgaged or hypothecated

securities in a winding up, it is no longer open for a secured creditor to contend

that it is entitled to enforce its securities without reference to or the leave of the

Company Court.

26. It was then contended on behalf of MMPL that the Official Liquidator

having failed to adjudicate the claims of the workmen, no pari passu charge in

their favour could be said to exist which would limit the right of the subrogee to

deal with the hypothecated securities. This argument is clearly misconceived.


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The mere fact that the Official Liquidator has not yet adjudicated the claims of

workmen would not disentitle them to a pari passu charge or leave a secured

creditor free to deal with a security as he chooses.

27. In the present case, there is some controversy as to whether some of the

employees of the company who have filed claims with the Official Liquidator

are workmen entitled to priority under Section 529-A of the Companies Act.

The Official Liquidator has furnished a list of persons who have filed claims as

workmen. Their claims aggregate to Rs. 1,09,86,378.95/-. It has been argued

on behalf of MMPL that “almost 50%” of these Claimants were employed in a

managerial or administrative capacity and therefore are not workmen entitled to

priority under Section 529-A. They have also contended that “almost 20%” of

the claims are unsupported by any documentary evidence. These are issues to

be determined by the Official Liquidator in the course of adjudication of the

claims. However, there does not appear to be the slightest doubt that atleast

some of the claims made before the Official Liquidator are by workmen of the

Company in Liquidation and that these claims are outstanding. That being so,

the ratio of the Judgment in International Coach Builders (supra) squarely

applies and the subrogee was obliged to seek directions from this Court with


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regard to the sale of the hypothecated securities.

28. It was then contended on behalf of Magnasound that the OL not having

objected to the recital in the Deed of Subrogation that no workers’ claims had

been received, Shashi Gopal was then free to deal with the hypothecated assets

as he chose. This contention is misconceived. The secured creditor cannot

arrogate to himself the right to decide whether there are any workers’ claims. If

workers’ claims have been received and have not been adjudicated, he must

perforce apply to the Company Court seeking directions for sale. The fact that

the OL has not objected to the subrogation in favour of Shashi Gopal does not

constitute an admission of everything in the Deed of Subrogation particularly

an incorrect recital that no workers’ claims have been received. The OL has no

obligation to object to such a recital and the absence of such an objection

cannot, in any event, constitute a rejection of the workers’ claims which have in

fact been made. That being so, the Subrogee was not entitled to sell the

hypothecated assets by private treaty without reference to the Company Court.

29. The fact that the Official Liquidator did not reply to the letter dated

9.5.2011 by which Shashi Gopal purported to inform the OL that he intended to

exercise a power of sale in respect of the hypothecated securities is also of no


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consequence. The Official Liquidator has adverted to the circumstances in

which his Office failed to reply to the said letter. Even otherwise, a secured

creditor is not entitled to rely on the silence of the Official Liquidator to

exercise a unilateral right of sale without reference to the Company Court. The

Official Liquidator is merely an officer of the Court and acts under its

directions. If the letter dated 9.5.2011 had come to his notice at the time of its

receipt, he would have had little choice but to place the matter before the

Company Court by means of a report for further directions. On such a report

being placed, this Court would have had the opportunity to consider the

question and to issue appropriate directions to safeguard the interests of the

workers and other creditors of the Company. In the absence of any response

from the Official Liquidator, Shashi Gopal as the subrogee was duty bound to

move this Court for appropriate directions in the matter of sale of the

hypothecated securities. He certainly was not entitled to assume that he was

free to deal with the securities in any manner that he pleased.

30. The argument urged on behalf of MMPL that Shashi Gopal as a subrogee

was merely required to issue notice under Section 176 of the Contract Act to the

Official Liquidator, prior to a sale in any manner of his choosing, is entirely


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devoid of merit. At the very outset, it is doubtful whether Section 176 of the

Contract Act which governs the rights of a pledgee would have any application

to the facts of the present case where the securities were hypothecated, not

pledged. Even otherwise, the argument is misconceived for more reasons than

one. The OL is not the owner of the hypothecated securities. He is merely a

custodian of it as an officer of the Court. Further, it is clear from the law laid

down in International Coach Builders (supra) that once a company is in winding

up and the workers have a pari passu charge on the secured assets, no secured

creditor would be entitled to exercise a unilateral right of sale without reference

to the Company Court by merely issuing a notice of such proposed action to the

OL.

31. Even otherwise, the manner in which the hypothecated assets were sold

by Mr. Shashi Gopal leaves much to be desired. It was argued by Shashi Gopal

and MMPL that a subrogee does not stand in a fiduciary position towards the

principal debtor. This proposition is over broad. It appears to me clear from

the Judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lallan Prasad (supra) and Jaya

Singh Dnyanu Mhoprekar (supra) that a pledgee or hypothecate would stand in a

fiduciary position qua the principal debtor to the limited extent that he has a


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duty to secure the best possible price while enforcing a security. It is on this

account that the Apex Court in Gajraj Jain (supra) and FCS Software Solutions

(supra) mandates that a secured creditor exercising a unilateral power of sale

shall adopt every reasonable precaution including obtaining a valuation of the

asset proposed to be sold and inviting offers by public notice. Further, any sale

by a secured creditor would be open to scrutiny to determine whether the

transaction is at arms length or with a related party. In a transaction of this

nature, every suspicion of a secret profit must be dispelled. In the present case,

it is an admitted position that there has been no valuation prior to sale nor were

offers invited from the public. The sale was effected, without the leave of the

Company Court, by private treaty in favour of a company which appears to

belong to the same group as the Company in Liquidation. Mr. P.M. Sudheer, a

director of MMPL who has sworn affidavits on its behalf, appears to have been

employed as the Manager (Accounts) of the Company in Liquidation. He has

in fact made a claim before the OL in that capacity for his outstanding dues.

Given these facts, even if no leave were required to be obtained by the subrogee

prior to the sale of the hypothecated securities, the sale in the present case was

infirm and open to challenge by the OL.


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32. The question then arises as to whether the sale is liable to be set aside

under Section 536(2) or 537(1)(b) of the Companies Act. It has been contended

on behalf of Mr. Shashi Gopal and MMPL that any sale of the assets of a

Company in Liquidation by a third party would not fall within the ambit of

Section 536(2) and that the section would apply only to cases of sale of its assets

by the company itself after the commencement of winding up. However, none

of the judgments cited in this behalf by the Subrogee involve cases where a third

party sought to sell the assets of the company and the question arose as to

whether such a sale would fall foul of Section 536(2). Any observations in these

judgments have to be viewed in that context. The plain language of the Section

would in fact indicate that even sales sought to be effected by third parties of

the assets of a Company in Liquidation would fall within the prohibitive ambit

of that section. A sale by a third party would certainly be within the mischief

sought to be remedied by the Section, namely, the prevention of any

interference with the assets of a company in liquidation, their sale in a manner

to ensure the best possible price and the orderly distribution of the sale

proceeds. The Judgments cited on behalf of the subrogee in respect of what is

commonly referred to as the “mischief rule” in the interpretation of statutes

would appear to support the construction of Section 536(2) canvassed on behalf


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of the Official Liquidator.

33. Even otherwise, this issue appears to me of limited relevance insofar as a

sale by a third party would in any event fall within the ambit of Section 537(1)

(b). The fact that the report of the OL has not made a reference to Section

537(1)(b) would by itself be of no consequence. If a secured creditor is required

to obtain the leave of the Company Court to enforce a security by sale as held in

International Coach Builders (supra) then it would necessarily follow that a sale

effected without leave would be void under Sections 536(2) and/or 537(1) (b).

In the present case, the Subrogee has made no application seeking the leave of

this Court, even ex post facto, for the sale of the said asset. The sale would

therefore be liable to be set aside.

34. In any event, the burden clearly lies on the person seeking to maintain a

sale (which is not in the ordinary course of business) under Sections 536(2) and

537 (1) (b) to prove that the sale was for the benefit of the Company. This Court

has so held on several occasions including in its Judgments in Hindustan

Transmissions Ltd. (supra) and Sunita Vasudeo Warke (supra). In the present

case, neither Shashi Gopal nor MMPL have made any attempt to discharge that


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burden. In view of the burden being cast upon the person seeking leave to

validate a transaction that is otherwise void, the contention advanced on behalf

of Mr. Shashi Gopal that the OL has not alleged undervaluation in the sale is

entirely misconceived. The burden does not lie upon the OL to do so. In any

event, it is self evident that the assets have been undervalued. The agreements

between MMPL and Sony Music belatedly disclosed in the course of the

hearing would themselves show that the assets were undervalued. While the

sale by Shashi Gopal in favour of MMPL of the entire repertoire was for a sum

of Rs. 1.5 crores, the agreements executed by MMPL in favour of Sony Music

for part of the repertoire for a limited period is for a sum of Rs. 1.75 crores

without even taking into account any revenue overflow in which MMPL was

entitled to share.

35. It has been urged on behalf of Shashi Gopal in his Written Submissions

(though not on affidavit) that the Master tapes were handed over to the OL in

good condition when he took over the assets of the Company in Liquidation

while their condition was very poor when they were handed over to Shashi

Gopal pursuant to directions of the DRT. He further claims that he was

constrained to devote considerable time and money to repairing/reconstructing


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the Master tapes. Similarly, Sony Media has claimed to have expended

considerable resources on rendering the Master tapes usable. Apart from the

fact that the claims made by the two parties are somewhat at odds, no material

or particulars in support of these allegations including the amounts alleged to

have been expended have been furnished by either party.

36. Shashi Gopal has also contended, in support of his submission that the

sale ought not to be set aside, that if the hypothecated securities had been sold

by the DRT under the Consent Decree in favour of UBI, any overflow would

have been appropriated by the bank and would not have enured to the benefit of

the workers. This argument loses sight of the fact that the hypothecated

securities were in fact not sold under the Consent Decree, but by the subrogee

arrogating to himself illegally a unilateral power of sale.

37. In the course of the hearing, an offer was made by MMPL to secure an

amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- by way of workers’ claims pending adjudication

thereof by the Official Liquidator. This was on the basis that the total of the

workmens’ claims was Rs. 1,09,86,378.95/-. If the claim were to be allowed in

its entirety (which MMPL contends for various reasons is unlikely) it is claimed


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that the pari passu charge of the workmen would be to the extent of Rs.

25,77,000/- insofar as the total dues of Shashi Gopal as a secured

creditor/subrogee is Rs. 5,29,54,857.99/-. It was contended that on such

security being offered, the challenge to the sale must necessarily fail. The offer,

however, proceeds on the premise that Rs. 1.5 crores is a fair price for the

hypothecated securities. As I have already noted, Shashi Gopal and

Magnasound have failed to discharge their burden of demonstrating that the

consideration of Rs. 1.5 crores was in fact a fair value for the hypothecated

securities. In the present case, there is some controversy as to the amount that

Shashi Gopal would be entitled to recover from the Company in liquidation in

his capacity as a subrogee. He would no doubt be entitled to recover such

amounts as he has himself paid to UBI. These will require verification by the

OL. These amounts having been paid after the commencement of winding up,

he would not be entitled to any interest thereon unless there were a surplus

after all creditors of the company were paid off. Apart from these

considerations which make the offer unacceptable, it is also curious that the

offer proceeds from MMPL rather than the subrogee. If anything, this itself is a

tacit admission that the amount of Rs. 1.5 crores that was paid by MMPL for

the hypothecated securities was an undervaluation.


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38. That apart, the duty of the Official Liquidator and the Company Court is

to ensure that the interest of all stakeholders including the workers and

creditors, both secured and unsecured, are protected. Further, the Deed of

Subrogation would appear to indicate that apart from the hypothecated

securities, there are other securities as well including a bungalow at Lonavala

which have been handed over to Shashi Gopal in his capacity as a subrogee. It

is entirely conceivable that the amount to which the subrogee is entitled would

not exceed the value of all of these securities. It is therefore imperative that

each security fetch the best possible price. The manner in which the repertoire

of the company in liquidation has been sold by the subrogee was however not

designed to secure this outcome.

39. The circumstances of the present case leave little doubt that the sale

itself, without the leave of the court and given the manner in which it was

effected, was unlawful. However, this leaves open the question as to what order

would meet the ends of justice in the present case. The Official Liquidator not

having in his possession the masters or the agreements or indeed any

documents in respect of the repertoire which constitutes the hypothecated


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security, a valuation exercise to determine what ought to have been the fair

value of the hypothecated security at the time of its sale by Shashi Gopal

appears impracticable. However, MMPL ought not to be permitted to profit

from a sale that is clearly void. To the extent that the transaction between

MMPL and Sony Music is at arms length, the two being unrelated, the

consideration fixed in the Agreements between MMPL and Sony Music can be

taken to represent the true market value of the rights transacted. The sale of

the hypothecated securities by Shashi Gopal to MMPL being void, the

consideration paid/payable by Sony Music ought to enure to the benefit of the

Company in Liquidation and its various stakeholders including workers and

creditors. In these circumstances, I pass the following Order which in my view

would meet the ends of justice:

a) The Deed of Assignment dated 14.03.2012 between Shashi Gopal and

MMPL in respect of the hypothecated securities is set aside as illegal

and void.

b) MMPL shall on or before 2nd December,2015, deposit a sum of Rs. 25

lakhs with the Official Liquidator, being the difference between the

amount already received by MMPL from Sony Music (Rs. 1.75 crores)

and the amount paid by MMPL to Shashi Gopal (Rs. 1.5 crores).


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c) The Official Liquidator shall complete the adjudication of the claims of

the workmen of the Company in Liquidation within a period of

sixteen weeks from today. In doing so, the Official Liquidator shall

also consider whether the claims are in fact by persons who are

entitled to priority as workmen under Section 529-A of the

Companies Act. He shall also verify the amounts paid by Shashi

Gopal to UBI to which he is entitled to credit as a subrogee.

d) On such adjudication and verification, the Official Liquidator shall

place a report before this Court for a distribution pari passu of the

amount so far generated from the hypothecated securities, i.e., Rs.

1.75 crores, between the workers and Shashi Gopal as subrogee. In

that report, this Court shall consider the amount, if any, that Shashi

Gopal would be liable to bring in to meet the amounts due to the

workmen in such a distribution.

e) Sony Music shall render accounts to the Official Liquidator of the

revenue generated by it from the exploitation of the rights which are

the subject matter of the Agreements in its favour. Any overflow

which was payable to MMPL under the terms of the said Agreements

shall be distributed pari passu among Shashi Gopal as a subrogee and


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the workmen of the Company in liquidation.

f) On expiry of the tenure of the Agreements in favour of Sony Music;

MMPL, Shashi Gopal and Sony Music shall hand over forthwith to

the Official Liquidator all material and documents in respect of the

repertoire which constitutes the hypothecated securities including but

not limited to Masters, Link Agreements and publicity material. The

Official Liquidator shall thereafter take steps under the directions and

supervision of this Court to sell and/or license the rights which

constitute the hypothecated securities. Any revenue generated by

such sale/exploitation shall be distributed pari passu among Shashi

Gopal and the workers of the company in liquidation. Any overflow

shall be distributed in accordance with the Companies Act and the

Company Court Rules.

The OL Reports are accordingly disposed of with costs.

(S.J. KATHAWALLA, J.)


asha bhosle

Documents

company petition

shashi gopal

sony music entertainment

official liquidators

bombay high courtkppnair

senior advocate ib

magnasound media

original music compositions