ASEAN - POLITICAL-SECURITY

No. 180/2017 dated 29 September 2017

The Korea Crisis:Time for ASEAN To Play a Role

By Richard Javad Heydarian

Synopsis

Notwithstanding its institutional weaknesses, ASEAN is in a unique position to play a role in the brewing crisis in North Korea by bringing conflicting parties back to the negotiating table.

Commentary

ASEAN HAS often come under criticism for its supposed muted response to major crises in its own backyard. From the Rohingya humanitarian tragedy in Myanmar to the brewing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the regional body has struggled to muster a robust response.

Yet, the Korean Peninsula presents ASEAN a unique opportunity for redemption. As the purported driver of pan-regional integration in East Asia, the regional organisation provides a unique platform for reviving dialogue and peaceful negotiations among disputing parties.

An Indispensable Player

Crucially, the collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2009 has left the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the sole mechanism for institutionalised diplomatic interaction among all concerned parties, ranging from Seoul and Beijing to Washington, Tokyo and Pyongyang. By and large, North Korea has displayed an unusual commitment to engaging the world through the regional body by sending high-level delegation to ASEAN meetings.

In August, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho attended the ARF in Manila, where he held (broadly) constructive exchanges with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano, who oversaw the drafting of ASEAN statements on key regional security concerns.

The North Korean chief diplomat’s meeting with President Rodrigo Duterte, who is the current rotational chairman of ASEAN, was even warmer. After a long and friendly conversation, the Filipino president went so far as describing North Korea as “a good dialogue partner," encouraging sustained engagement between ASEAN and Pyongyang.

North Korea seems to appreciate the ASEAN as a largely neutral and sufficiently consequential regional actor. During the ASEAN summit in April, Pyongyang sent an unusually warm letter to the ASEAN chairman (Duterte), asking him to dissuade world powers, particularly the United States, from threatening North Korea lest the world suffer a “nuclear holocaust”.

Pyongyang also asked ASEAN to forward “a proper proposal” to prevent the crisis from further escalation. Shortly after, Duterte held extensive phone conversations with both President Donald Trump, his American counterpart, and President Xi Jinping of China, discussing prospects of diplomatic resolution to the crisis with the two superpowers.

South Korea’s Position

The Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea has also recognised ASEAN’s value as a potential partner for peace. In fact, Seoul has encouraged the regional body to play a more pro-active role in the Korean Peninsula crisis.

In late August, South Korea hosted the first-ever International Conference on ASEAN-Korea partnership. ASEAN secretary general Lê Lương Minh as well as the Philippines’ (as the rotational chairman) and South Korea’s foreign ministers were in attendance.

During the event, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha openly welcomed a more pro-active ASEAN role in the inter-Korean crisis. To underline its commitment to stronger ties with Southeast Asia, which now represents South Korea’s second largest trade and investment destination, Seoul also inaugurated a state-of-the-art structure to celebrate the cultural heritage of Southeast Asian countries.

The ASEAN Culture House’s inauguration 1 September 2017 saw the participation of senior officials from both Seoul and all key ASEAN members.

As an adviser of president Moon told me during a recent trip to Seoul, the South Korean government is eager to dampen Sino-American tensions over the issue, which, if mishandled, may once again engulf the Korean Peninsula in total war.

Middle Power Diplomacy

Middle powers such as ASEAN are seen as indispensable to reviving a diplomatic roadmap for peace, which is consistent with Mr. Moon’s vision of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Korean Peninsula by 2020.

To be fair, Southeast Asian countries have also displayed commendable unity and coherence vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s destabilising behaviour. In recent months, the regional body has unequivocally expressed its dismay by stating its “grave concern” over the reclusive regime’s ballistic missile tests.

Pyonyang’s subsequent nuclear test further strengthened Southeast Asian countries’ resolve to rein in North Korea’s provocative posture. Given their geographical and historical proximity to North Korea, Southeast Asian countries’ buy-in is crucial to the effective implementation of international sanctions against Pyongyang.

The Philippines, for instance, has entirely suspended its bilateral trade with North Korea. Other key regional players such as Kuala Lumpur have dramatically scaled back their strategic and economic relations with Pyongyang, especially since the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong-un, by suspected North Korean agents on Malaysian soil.

Vietnam and Myanmar, considered as North Korea’s longstanding strategic partners in Southeast Asia,

have also taken a tougher line and dramatically downgraded their defence ties with Pyongyang in recent years.

Will ASEAN Act?

Nonetheless, ASEAN has deftly maintained robust communication channels with North Korea, while deepening its strategic ties with South Korea, China, and Japan. This puts the regional body in a unique position to play a constructive and consequential role in the brewing conflict in Northeast Asia.

Notwithstanding the inherent intuitional weaknesses of ASEAN, including its notoriously inefficient consensus-based decision-making principle, Southeast Asian countries can and should step up to the challenge. There is no room for strategic complacency.

A full-scale conflict in the Korean Peninsula would have unimaginably adverse impact on all regional states, including in Southeast Asia. Thus, it is high time for ASEAN to multilaterally (through the ARF) as well as bilaterally (through its members) facilitate North Korea’s return to the negotiating table along with other major players.

Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based academic, columnist and author of, among others, “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China, and The Struggle for Western Pacific” and “The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy”. A version of this commentary was published in The Straits Times.

O17083 | Strengthening ASEAN-US Relations: Korean Peninsula as Conduit?

Shawn Ho, Sarah TeoRSIS / Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Global / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security02 MAY 2017

Synopsis

Much attention has been paid to how the recently concluded 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila has dealt with the South China Sea disputes. Now is perhaps the time for ASEAN to strengthen its regional security credentials by paying more attention to the challenge on the Korean Peninsula.

Commentary

WHILE THE South China Sea issue remains undoubtedly important for ASEAN, it should not be seen as the association’s raison d’etre. ASEAN has a broad agenda that includes regional economic integration, promoting defence relations and socio-cultural cooperation, all of which are essential to its role as the central regional institution in Southeast Asia.

Considering the current salience of Korean Peninsular security to Beijing and Washington, if ASEAN is to do more to deal with the challenge on the Korean Peninsula, ASEAN’s relevance and importance to both major powers could be enhanced. This could also be particularly timely given the upcoming meeting between ASEAN foreign ministers and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in Washington DC this week on 4 May 2017.

Two Contrasting Approaches: South China Sea and North Korea

From the outset, ASEAN took starkly contrasting approaches to two of the most pressing regional security issues, namely the South China Sea disputes and the North Korean nuclear conundrum. This is unsurprising given the direct involvement of ASEAN countries in the regional territorial maritime disputes and the lack thereof in the Korean Peninsular.

At the recently-concluded ASEAN Summit in Manila, ASEAN countries were initially unable to come to a consensus over whether to include in the Chairman’s Statement references to “land reclamation and militarisation” activities in the disputed features of the South China Sea as well as the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling which had overwhelmingly favoured the Philippines against China. Eventually, neither topic was mentioned in the final version of the ASEAN Statement.

In contrast, ASEAN member states were able to come to an early consensus regarding the escalation of tensions in the Korean Peninsula. A day before the Summit, ASEAN foreign ministers had already issued a statement expressing “grave concern” over the situation in the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea’s two nuclear tests last year and subsequent ballistic missile launches. This “grave concern” was reiterated in the Chairman’s Statement.

In short, ASEAN leaders were able to easily and quickly agree on a common position regarding North Korea, but reaching a consensus on the South China Sea disputes appeared to be more challenging. Nevertheless, ASEAN countries were able to reconcile their differences and maintain a sense of unity in this milestone year which marks ASEAN’s 50th anniversary.

Stronger Support on North Korea

What do the outcomes of the 30th ASEAN Summit mean for the upcoming meeting between ASEAN foreign ministers and Secretary of State Tillerson? For ASEAN, this 4 May meeting in Washington is an opportunity to share with the US why ASEAN remains important to American interests in the region and the positive role that ASEAN centrality can play to promote dialogue and cooperation among regional stakeholders.

From the US perspective, given the likelihood of a sixth nuclear test by North Korea, the Korean Peninsula will likely be higher on the US’ agenda as compared to the South China Sea disputes. Tillerson will undoubtedly be pleased that ASEAN – of which many countries have good relations with North Korea – was able to decide on a clear and quick denunciation of North Korea’s provocative behaviour.

The US could view this upcoming meeting as an opportunity to obtain even stronger support from the ten ASEAN countries to apply their own pressures and signals towards North Korea to dissuade Pyongyang from continuing on this vicious cycle.

From the ASEAN perspective, given that China appears to also be increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s belligerence and rhetoric, this meeting could also be an opportune moment for ASEAN to express its common interest with both the US and China in trying to re-engage North Korea. ASEAN could step up its own efforts and play a more active role through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to get North Korea back on the path of negotiations over their nuclear and missile programmes.

This is especially so since the ARF remains the only multilateral meeting in the region that North Korea is a member of along with the other parties involved in the now-dormant Six Party Talks.

Regarding the South China Sea disputes however, it is unlikely that the US and ASEAN can come to a strong agreement over the next course of action vis-à-vis China. Firstly, the ten ASEAN countries are still divided in their responses towards China. Secondly, the US might also not wish to push too hard on the South China Sea issue against China given its need for China’s cooperation to rein in North Korea.

Moreover, the North Korea threat is certainly a more immediate concern for the US compared to the South China Sea disputes since the US’ own security might be affected should North Korea successfully develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities in the future. Therefore, ASEAN and the US are unlikely to reach any major breakthrough or agreement over the South China Sea disputes in their upcoming meeting beyond a generally-worded statement.

ASEAN Will Have to Press its Relevance to US

Interestingly, US President Donald Trump’s 100th day mark coincided with the 30th ASEAN Summit. Given Trump’s transactional foreign policy approach, ASEAN will need to do more to highlight its relevance to the US as well as how Washington can benefit from engaging with ASEAN.

US Vice President Mike Pence had said in his recent visit to Jakarta that Trump is committed to attending the US-ASEAN and East Asia summits in the Philippines as well as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Vietnam later this year. If ASEAN does not press or even prove its relevance to the US over the next several months, there is every possibility that Trump might renege on his promise of visiting Southeast Asia even in this highly significant 50th year of ASEAN’s founding.

Should this occur, ASEAN might need to seriously re-evaluate its relationship with the present US administration amid questions about the Trump administration’s commitment to the region.

About the Authors

Shawn Ho and Sarah Teo are Associate Research Fellows with the Regional Security Architecture Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Sarah Teo is also a PhD candidate at the Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney. This was first published as a Channel News Asia commentary on 1 May 2017.

ASEAN-China Relations: Key Junctures for Singapore as Country Coordinator

Shawn HoRSIS / Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / East Asia and Asia Pacific / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security / Southeast Asia and ASEAN09 MAY 2016

Synopsis

As the country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations for three years till mid 2018, Singapore is well placed as a non-claimant state to the South China Sea disputes to help reduce tensions and expedite realisation of the proposed Code of Conduct (COC).

Commentary

DESPITE THEIR multi-faceted nature, ASEAN-China dialogue relations – which Singapore will be coordinating for another two years – are set to be overshadowed by the worsening South China Sea disputes.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated on 23 April 2016 that China had reached a four-point ‘consensus’ with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on the South China Sea territorial disputes. They agreed that the disputes are “not an issue between China and ASEAN as a whole”. It is clear that this view is a reinforcement of China’s support for a bilateral approach as opposed to the ASEAN-China approach. Singapore, in its role as the current ASEAN-China dialogue relations country coordinator, could make important contributions to the building of consensus among the parties involved at three critical junctures this year, with the ultimate goal of formulating the proposed Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

Hague ruling on Philippines vs China case

The first key juncture is the final ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague on the case brought forth by the Philippines against China’s claims in the South China Sea. This ruling is expected within the next two months.

Regardless of which side the ruling favours, Singapore could get ASEAN to issue a joint statement after the Hague’s ruling to reflect a united ASEAN position. ASEAN cannot afford to have another episode of open disagreement such as the failure to issue a joint statement – for the first time in its history – at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) in Cambodia in 2012 with regards to the South China Sea disputes.

The discussions leading to the issuing of a joint statement by ASEAN would help other ASEAN member states understand the intentions of Brunei, Cambodia and Laos in striking such a consensus with China and allay any fears of a deeper split within the grouping. ASEAN solidarity is key at this juncture if any progress is to be achieved with China in the coming months.

ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with China

The second key juncture this year is the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with China (PMC) which is scheduled to take place in late July after the ruling at the Hague. As this is the next occasion where all 11 Foreign Ministers will get to meet together, it is an opportune moment for Singapore, as the country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations, to make a major contribution towards the easing of tensions between China and the claimant states of ASEAN by framing the South China Sea disputes as just one of many issues in the broader ASEAN-China relationship.

As Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in July 2015 of Singapore’s role as country coordinator: “We hope to try and find common ground among members of ASEAN and facilitate the discussion between ASEAN and China…We also hope to help ASEAN hammer out more cooperative projects with China…These projects need not all be economic ones, but could include cooperation in human resource development and education”.

By the time of the PMC, Singapore will have participated in the 10th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in May and the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) in late July (just prior to the PMC). These two meetings will have allowed Singapore to gain a sense of the latest positions and concerns of the various ASEAN member states on the South China Sea disputes. Therefore, the PMC would be a prime occasion to present the viewpoints of ASEAN member states, emphasise the commonalities with China’s position, and also “zoom out” to focus on the other positive and broader aspects of cooperation between ASEAN and China.

At this PMC, one of the concrete outcomes could be the adoption of a recent proposal by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan for ASEAN and China to “work together towards an enhanced Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to prevent miscalculations on the ground and at sea”.

ASEAN-China Commemorative Summit

The third key juncture is the ASEAN-China Commemorative Summit in September in Laos to mark 25 years of dialogue relations. All parties involved will wish to see the Summit conducted/concluded in a congenial manner with the issuance of a joint statement including the South China Sea (among other matters).

In the joint statement of the 14th ASEAN-China Summit to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations in 2011, Article Nine stated that the parties involved will “work towards the eventual adoption, on the basis of consensus, of a code of conduct in the South China Sea”.

The target for Singapore at this year’s Commemorative Summit could be to try its best to get the various parties together to work towards a stronger, more concrete, and landmark statement of action with regards to the COC. Singapore would be in an excellent position to push for the expedition of negotiations on formulating the COC especially since it is a non-claimant state and does not take sides in the disputes. Moreover, Singapore is a neutral party which not only has longstanding and close ties with China, but is also a country not bound by a formal security alliance with the United States (and the ensuing strategic considerations).

Singapore’s Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2018

Looking beyond 2016 – a year in which Singapore can seek to show ASEAN unity, reduce tensions in the region and expedite the negotiations on formulating the COC – it is noteworthy that Singapore’s final six months as country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations will overlap with its role as ASEAN Chair during the first half of 2018.

Being in the “driver’s seat” on both fronts for the first half of 2018 means that Singapore can make a final push to make further headway in COC negotiations between ASEAN and China (assuming they are yet to be finalised by then).

The next country coordinator – after Singapore finishes its term in mid 2018 – will be the Philippines. Given the tensions between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea disputes and the likelihood that there will not be much headway in the COC during the Philippines’ term, this year could be the start of a limited window available for a breakthrough. Singapore, as country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations, must make the best use of this rare chance to make a lasting contribution to peace and security in the region.

About the Author

Shawn Ho is an Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

CO17094 | North Korea Threat: How Should ASEAN Respond?

David Han Guo XiongRSIS / Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / East Asia and Asia Pacific / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security / Regionalism and Multilateralism / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

Synopsis

Although ASEAN should be concerned about the North Korean threat given the grave security implications to the wider Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN should be mindful of its actual raison d’etre to avoid distorting its credentials and relevance in relation to the Korean Peninsula crisis.

Commentary

IN RECENT months, rising tensions due to North Korean threat have aroused anxiety throughout the Asia-Pacific, including Southeast Asia. In a letter to the ASEAN Secretary General dated 23 March 2017, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho indicated his “expectations that ASEAN which attaches great importance to the regional peace and stability will make an issue of the US-South Korean joint military exercises at ASEAN conferences”. He added that ASEAN should take a “fair position and play an active role in safeguarding the peace and safety of Korean Peninsula”.

In April 2017, during the 30th ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, ASEAN expressed “grave concern” and urged North Korea to comply with UN Security Council resolutions on its nuclear programme. ASEAN’s firm yet measured response to North Korea not only reflects international consensus against North Korea’s actions. It is also a neutral posture that avoids siding with any party involved in the crisis, including China and the United States. Additionally, ASEAN’s position neither overestimates the organisation’s ability to contribute to the resolution of the crisis nor misconstrues its existing purpose as a platform for shaping regional security.

Korean Peninsula as Conduit for ASEAN-US Ties?

RSIS researchers Shawn Ho and Sarah Teo have written in an RSIS Commentary on 2 May 2017 (“Strengthening ASEAN-US Relations: Korean Peninsula as Conduit?”) that “ASEAN could strengthen its regional security credentials by paying more attention to the challenge on the Korean Peninsula”. The rationale is that given the “current salience of the Korean Peninsula’s security to Beijing and Washington, if ASEAN is to do more to deal with the challenge on the Korean Peninsula, ASEAN’s relevance and importance to both major powers could be enhanced”.

Understandably, this argument raises the importance for ASEAN to urge the US to continue engaging Southeast Asia. This the US could do through existing regional arrangements that have been shaped by ASEAN multilateralism, rather than circumventing such established structures in dealing with security and geopolitical issues.

However, this proposal could be problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is unclear how ASEAN would demonstrate its relevance to the US by dealing with the North Korean threat, when ASEAN already faces challenges in tackling geopolitical issues within the region. As ASEAN has faced difficulties in reaching consensus over a major geopolitical contention such as the South China Sea disputes, it is puzzling how ASEAN could be relevant to the US in tackling the Korean Peninsula crisis without first demonstrating its capacity to resolve Southeast Asia’s problematic maritime spats.

Risk of Widening ASEAN Divide

Secondly, ASEAN risks becoming divided between China and the US. During the recent meeting on 4 May 2017 in Washington DC, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson conveyed to ASEAN foreign ministers that Washington intends to stay engaged in Southeast Asia; he commended ASEAN as an “essential partner” to the US. Furthermore, in view of the Korean Peninsula crisis, Secretary Tillerson urged ASEAN to pressure North Korea by reviewing Pyongyang’s relations with ASEAN and curbing the country’s revenue flows from Southeast Asia.

However, should ASEAN draw too close to the US to condemn North Korea’s actions, China could perceive this as an attempt by Washington to complicate the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula crisis of which ASEAN is not directly involved.

Furthermore, ASEAN’s internal unity could be affected negatively. There are already indications that some member states are more inclined towards China while others gravitate towards the US. If ASEAN chooses sides regarding the North Korean threat, this could widen the intra-ASEAN divide because of differing attitudes towards the two powers.

ASEAN-China relations have been strained in recent years due to the South China Sea disputes which is still far from being resolved. Even though ASEAN would welcome US intentions to stay engaged in Southeast Asia, ASEAN would probably not risk aligning itself too closely with the US on the North Korea issue to avoid upsetting China unnecessarily.

Realism for ASEAN’s Relevance

Thus, if ASEAN intends to show its relevance regarding the North Korean threat, it should be realistic about its own ability in offering viable solutions to the crisis, and avoid pandering to either China or the US. While ASEAN could do more by signalling to North Korea during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings to back down from Pyongyang’s provocative behaviour, beyond this there is not much that ASEAN could do to pressure North Korea to change its course.

In the past, ASEAN had issued similar statements on North Korea’s brinksmanship. But North Korea has disregarded such regional criticisms and has continued with its nuclearisation drive unabated.

This is not to downplay ASEAN’s importance as a regional organisation. Indeed, over the past few decades, ASEAN has played a key role in reducing the risk of conflict in the region through dialogue, consultation and consensus. It was even envisioned that ASEAN norms could have a wider influence on the security trajectory of the Asia-Pacific. The ARF was formed in 1994 for ASEAN and external stakeholders to discuss security issues and promote cooperative measures to enhance peace and stability in the region.

As the ARF is not meant to provide and enforce solutions to conflicts, ASEAN is limited in offering viable recommendations to both the US and China on the North Korean crisis. Nevertheless, in the long term, ASEAN should focus its efforts on developing the ASEAN Community to advance norm formulation and measures to promote peaceful consultation on security issues, and collective solutions to conflict prevention and resolution.

This would enhance ASEAN’s standing not only as Southeast Asia’s central regional institution capable of fronting peaceful and relevant alternatives to reduce tensions other than military tit-for-tat responses as witnessed in the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, what ASEAN should do, and has done, is to continue in its unequivocal insistence that North Korea step down from its aggressive actions, and that all parties involved are to avoid further irritating each other.

About the Author

David Han is a Research Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

CO16302 | Turning to ASEAN: Response to the Rakhine Crisis

Sangeetha YogendranNTS Centre / RSIS / Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / Global / Non-Traditional Security / Regionalism and Multilateralism / Southeast Asia and ASEAN14 DECEMBER 2016

Synopsis

Myanmar’s call for an emergency ASEAN meeting to discuss the crisis over the Rohingya issue on 19 December 2016, presents ASEAN member states the opportunity to discuss extending humanitarian assistance for the displaced, and also underlying tensions that led to the crisis.

Commentary

THE VIOLENCE in Rakhine has seen protesters take to the streets in the hundreds and thousands recently, in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Dhaka and Karachi. Concerned about allegations of killings and rape in a military crackdown on the Rohingya population in Rakhine state, some ASEAN members have been extremely vocal about the dire humanitarian situation. States with predominantly Muslim populations have seen the largest protests.

Malaysia’s Cabinet issued a statement condemning the violence, stating that “Malaysia … calls on the government of Myanmar to take all necessary actions to address the alleged ethnic cleansing”. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi flew to Naypyidaw on 6 December at State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s invitation to convey Indonesia’s strong concern and urge that humanitarian aid be allowed to reach those affected communities in Rakhine state.

Myanmar Turns to ASEAN

In an unprecedented turn of events, Aung San Suu Kyi has called for an ASEAN meeting to respond to regional concerns over Rakhine. The informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministries will be held on 19 December in Yangon to discuss these concerns. The call for the meeting was made recently at an informal gathering of senior ASEAN officials in Bali.

The meeting was scheduled to bring together officials to discuss the outlook for ASEAN in a changing global environment, but saw the deteriorating situation in Rakhine feature prominently in the discussions.

It is worth noting that this is the first time Myanmar has initiated a meeting with other ASEAN countries on this issue. If nothing more, it is an indication that if any solution is to be found, it can and should be found with multiple stakeholders, and Myanmar sees the value in doing so through ASEAN.

Substantive Response Long Overdue

A substantive response to address the protracted dire humanitarian situation and root causes of conflict in Rakhine, whether domestic, regional, or international, is long overdue. It is also crucial to resolve not

just the immediate violence but longer standing issues if regional countries, and ASEAN as a whole, do not want to contend with future boat refugees.

The region witnessed this in 2015 when thousands were stranded at sea, after the discovery of several dead bodies and gruesome trafficking camps along the Thai-Malaysia border. At its height, approximately 8,000 people were adrift in the Andaman Sea.

With Bangladesh closing its border to those fleeing from Rakhine, and the risks associated with undertaking that boat journey alone, it is foreseeable that people affected by this violence will flee into the Andaman Sea again. It is also foreseeable that people fleeing will seek the assistance of smugglers to bring them across borders, and this can easily lead to the resurgence of the brutal human trafficking camps witnessed last year. ASEAN was ill-prepared to handle the situation then and will be again if this repeats itself without substantive regional action, a likely scenario if conditions do not change in Rakhine.

An ASEAN Response

Malaysia and Indonesia’s vocal expressions of concern over the situation in Rakhine present a unique opportunity for ASEAN as a whole to not just provide humanitarian assistance but to support accountability efforts. The need for such action might be implicitly acknowledged by Myanmar’s call for an informal ASEAN meeting on the situation. As the Indonesian foreign minister said at the Bali meeting, ASEAN has an opportunity to urge Myanmar to facilitate flows of humanitarian aid to Rakhine state. This is especially crucial given that the state has been faced with a suspension of all food and medical aid in the weeks since the attacks on the police reportedly by Muslim militants.

An ASEAN-led response to the situation in Rakhine must include Bangladesh, currently hosting those who fled the violence in Rakhine across the border before it was closed by the government. The Bangladesh government has said that it is not its sole responsibility to give them refuge. For any joint response between ASEAN and Bangladesh to be effective, Dhaka must first keep its border with Myanmar open to allow those fleeing the violence safe passage.

This needs to take effect immediately, concurrent with Myanmar dealing with the situation domestically and with ASEAN member states. The shouldering of this burden on Bangladesh’s part can be eased by a commitment from ASEAN to assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance, especially for immediate needs like food, water, medical care and shelter. Fellow ASEAN members like Malaysia and Indonesia can take the lead in doing so.

Granted, this is a temporary solution; the larger questions of how long the displaced Rohingya population should stay in Bangladesh or if they should be allowed the right to seek asylum elsewhere remain unanswered. However, doing nothing will only cause a rise in the death toll of those people caught in the violence, those trying to flee by crossing borders, and those stranded or in hiding in Bangladesh. That is a horrific scenario that the regional community must avoid.

About the Author

Sangeetha Yogendran is a Senior Analyst with the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Programme, Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Beyond 50: ASEAN’s Role in the Evolving Regional Order By David Han & Shawn Ho4 September 2017

Synopsis

Given the flurry of activities surrounding ASEAN’s commemoration of its 50th anniversary last month, it is now timely to take a step back, reflect on ASEAN’s achievements and then look ahead to its future. Will the organisation’s flexibility in meeting future geo-political, security, social, and economic challenges ensure its centrality in the evolving regional order?

Commentary

8 AUGUST this year marked a significant milestone for ASEAN as the Association entered its 50th year of existence. As Southeast Asia’s, and to some degree the AsiaPacific’s, most viable multilateral institution, ASEAN has proven to be a cornerstone of peace and stability in the region for five decades. Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has performed a multitude of roles. This ranged from promoting peaceful co-existence and cooperation between ASEAN neighbours to keeping out great power rivalry from the region.

It has played a central role from the expansion of the original five founding members to its current ten members, as well as the formation of an ASEAN Community to further economic integration. ASEAN has achieved these goals through its time tested ASEAN Way of consultation and consensus building mechanisms. As the regional order continues to evolve, the challenges to ASEAN will be diverse and complex. ASEAN’s centrality and flexibility will enable it to cope with these emerging challenges if it can acknowledge its own weak spots and take early corrective measures.

ASEAN’s Centrality

ASEAN centrality is probably the only constant in an evolving regional order. This term has been used to denote ASEAN in the driver’s seat in the development of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. Such centrality enables ASEAN to be a neutral body that can convene annual institutionalised meetings which are of benefit to all the major powers in the region; all major countries have consistently reaffirmed the central role played by ASEAN in this region. Additionally, ASEAN’s centrality does not permit any major power(s) to dictate the way regional agendas are shaped or steered.

Thus far, ASEAN has done well in providing numerous platforms for regional and extra-regional players to engage in dialogue and consensus building. Taken in this context, ASEAN centrality is not so much about leadership, but about ASEAN’s ability to be the central magnet that brings in the great powers to discuss the critical issues of the day. A case in point would be the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which

remains the only ongoing multilateral setting where North Korea and other members of the stalled Six Party Talks (i.e., US, China, South Korea, Russia, Japan) are seated at the same table. The value of dialogue and multilateralism to manage disputes and reduce tensions has once again come to the fore following North Korea’s 6th nuclear test yesterday and the ensuing diplomatic crisis.

However, if centrality implies ASEAN playing a major leadership role in shaping the regional order, then perhaps this is still an aspiration that has yet to be fulfilled due to certain key challenges. For instance, it is unclear if the major powers will allow ASEAN to actively shape the regional order although it was instrumental in creating the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum. This is especially uncertain given the numerous issues in which the major powers have a strong interest in managing by themselves.

Moreover, the Asia-Pacific regional order is undergoing complex changes that may be beyond the mandate and capability of ASEAN to play a leading role in. To navigate this uncertain future, ASEAN will need to be even more strategic in its thinking and adaptive in the years ahead.

ASEAN’s Flexibility

ASEAN’s centrality also needs to be coupled with flexibility. While ASEAN in its current shape and form is unable to resolve all disputes even within its own backyard, ASEAN has a large array of multilateral platforms that has been put to good use such as the ARF, APT, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM), ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM), ADMM-Plus.

These diplomatic platforms enable ASEAN to at least manage almost all kinds of disputes. While solving a dispute should be the ideal outcome, being able to manage it via the ASEAN Way at least prevents situations from spiralling out of control.

Looking ahead, there is much work that still needs to be done by ASEAN. Indeed, perhaps it is only when ASEAN becomes a united Community that ASEAN can take the next leap forward and potentially be seen as a prominent global leader such as the US, China or the EU should ASEAN wish to do so. If ASEAN wants to achieve this next step in its evolution, ASEAN needs to be forward looking, remain flexible and responsive to the inevitable shifts in the region’s geo-political plates in the coming years and decades.

Onwards to ASEAN’s 51st Birthday and Beyond

While this Golden Jubilee year was a celebratory occasion for ASEAN and relevant parties have so far avoided major contentious issues, such matters could resurface in the years ahead. Particularly, if the South China Sea disputes continue to sharply divide ASEAN member states and hinder the Association’s ability to reach a consensus on this issue, questions will surely be asked whether ASEAN can continue to play a central role in the regional architecture.

Indeed, the rising Chinese assertiveness and the divisive nature of maritime disputes have been used by detractors to criticise ASEAN’s lack of unity and inability to resolves such disputes.

That being said, ASEAN’s toolkit goes well beyond trying to manage maritime disputes and great power politics. While the media’s focus on such issues may make for sensationalised journalism, it fails to pay attention to other less discussed but equally important issues in the region. For example, ASEAN has, through the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, displayed greater unity and skill in dealing with non-traditional

security (NTS) issues such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and terrorism. To be fair to ASEAN, critics of ASEAN’s centrality also need to assess ASEAN’s performance in these areas that could affect regional peace.

While ASEAN is not perfect, it is the best option available in this region and there has yet to emerge a better alternative. Change is a constant and how ASEAN manages to adapt to meet any emerging challenges will determine whether ASEAN is able to scale greater heights in the years ahead.

David Han is a Senior Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Shawn Ho is an Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme at RSIS. Nanyang Technolo

WHAT PRICE ASEAN UNITY?

By Dylan Loh - 5 August 2016

Synopsis

Apparent disagreements within ASEAN over the South China Sea question has highlighted cleavages in the grouping and how its unity is coming under severe stress. What can be done to prevent further disunity? Is it time to reform ASEAN’s consensus-forging mechanism?

Commentary

ON 24 JULY 2016, the Joint Communiqué of the 49thASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane, Laos was released. The statement, remarkably, omit any reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s legal ruling on the South China Sea arbitration case initiated by the Philippines. The statement came after a period of deadlock, played out publicly through the media, where ASEAN could not move the statement forward as it emerged that Cambodia prevented any reference to the tribunal’s legal award.

The Chinese saw this as a diplomatic victory and thanked Cambodia publicly after the issuance of the statement. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, noted that the ASEAN statement “was not against China”.

What Happened to ASEAN Unity?

To be sure, Cambodia has traditionally been very close to China. In July this year, China agreed to give 3.6 billion yuan (about US$550 million) in aid to Cambodia to support its ‘election infrastructure, education and health’. What is worrying for ASEAN is that China seems able to successfully leverage on its economic support for some countries in exchange for indirect influence on ASEAN decision-making.

Equally worrying is that some ASEAN countries are seemingly nonchalant towards peer pressure and criticism from within ASEAN.

It should also cause ASEAN increasing discomfort that this was not an isolated incident. One recalls the failure of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July 2012 to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN history with observers noting the ‘spoiler role’ that certain ASEAN countries played then.

Fast forward four years later, while not an exact repeat, the echo is clear: There are some countries, such as Cambodia, that has proven itself willing to forego both ASEAN centrality and sacrifice its own and ASEAN’s reputation to cooperate with China. This should be extremely disturbing to ASEAN leaders, especially since these recalcitrant members have shown little flexibility.

A month before the 49thASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane, a somewhat similar incident took place during a special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kunming, China. A statement that was strongly worded on the South China Sea issue was initially released by Malaysia. However, barely three hours later it was retracted as a result of Laos and Cambodia blocking it, as reported in the media.

In short, ASEAN’s unity – and by extension its centrality and international reputation - will continue to come under strain due to the opposing interests and postures of one or two parties. Furthermore, this could be the start of what ASEAN has strenuously and assiduously avoided thus far: ASEAN as pawns in great power competition.

A Chance for Reform?

After the issuance of the joint statement from 49th Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the attendant disquiet over Cambodia’s behaviour, there were emerging voices calling for its expulsion from ASEAN. While not a politically or diplomatically viable solution, it is worth looking at what the ASEAN Charter says or does not say about it.

Article 5 of the ASEAN Charter states that “In case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to Article 20”. What does Article 20 say? It reaffirms the consensus decision-making nature of ASEAN and notes that “In case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision”. What this paradoxically means is that the expulsion of any ASEAN member would need that country’s consent to its own expulsion.

On the other hand, one could consider whether ASEAN could allow Cambodia to leave ‘voluntarily’. There is no ‘exit’ or withdrawal provision in the ASEAN Charter akin to the one in the European Union (EU). Still Cambodia could, theoretically, not turn up for any ASEAN meeting or cease to provide its budgetary share to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. The wording of the ASEAN Charter is ambiguous enough that one can almost always argue against having committed a ‘serious breach’.

But beyond the extreme, perhaps this presents ASEAN with an important opportunity to update and reform its modus operandi. The much vaunted consultative and ‘consensus decision-making’ character of ASEAN has now seemingly morphed into an ever-tightening rope binding ASEAN’s hands. In practical terms, essentially all 10 members have a veto card. While most of them use this responsibly, some have shown a predilection to wielding it for purely selfish purpose without a modicum of respect for the long-term interest of the grouping.

Learning From Others

Other intergovernmental organisations have much clearer rules with regard to penalties, discipline and enforcement mechanisms towards errant members. For instance, within the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon (which amends the two ‘founding Treaties of the EU) contains an exit clause for members who wish to withdraw from the Union and this negotiation ought to be conducted two years after notification of withdrawal.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the EU Treaty allows for the suspension of certain rights, including voting rights, if there is repeated violation of core EU norms and values such as rule of law, human rights and liberal democracy. While it is sometimes unfair to compare ASEAN to the EU as they are very different creatures, it certainly should not prevent ASEAN drawing lessons and inspiration from the EU (and vice versa).

To loosen its hands, ASEAN could consider incrementally revising its decisionmaking model. This could be done by introducing a voting system (where a consensus from 9 out of 10 members is sufficient to get things going) or by allowing joint statements to be issued with dissension and abstention recorded.

Also, beyond media criticism, further thought could be given into clearer penalty mechanisms. Admittedly, what constitutes ‘wayward’ as a basis for penalty could prove difficult but difficulty should not be an excuse for inaction. Also, while it is unfair for individual countries to bend to the will of ASEAN, surely, it is also equally unfair for ASEAN to be held hostage by one or two countries?

It is important to remember that a lot of political, diplomatic and economic capital have been invested into ASEAN. It is also true that ASEAN should not be defined entirely on how it deals with the South China Sea question. Nevertheless, the political reality is such that it is widely judged in and through this lens. How much political goodwill it has lost and how seriously ASEAN will be taken after these events is debatable but recent events, particularly over the South China Sea issue, have certainly not increased ASEAN’s stature. It is time for ASEAN to act to regain its standing.

Dylan Loh is a PhD student and Graduate Research Fellow at the Centre for Rising Powers, Cambridge University. He is also a faculty member at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and previously a research analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU.