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TheLimitsofLegislativeHarmonizationTenYearsafterTobaccoAdvertising:HowtheCourt’sCaseLawhasbecomea“DraftingGuide”ByStephenWeatherill∗AbstractTenyearshaveelapsedsincethefirstTobaccoAdvertisingjudgment,inwhichtheCourtforthe first time concluded that the EU legislature had stepped beyond the limits of itscompetence toharmonizenational lawswhich is grantedby theTreaty.However, thosesubsequently seeking annulment of measures of harmonization have almost all beendisappointed.Thispapersurveys theaccumulatedcase lawand finds that the“limits”ofEU legislative competence, though of the highest constitutional significance in principle,are in practice imprecisely defined by the Treaty itself with the consequence that thelegislative institutions enjoywidediscretion. Thepattern has become circular: theCourtpresentsa formulawhichdefines theproper scopeofharmonizationandwhichsetsoutthe control exercised by the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, the EUlegislature duly adopts the approved but reliably vague vocabulary and, provided thedrafting is well‐chosen, the Court has no plausible basis on which to set aside thelegislativeact.CaselawdealingwiththelimitsofEUcompetencehasbeenconvertedintonomore thana “draftingguide.”Thepaper showshowmanyof thesedeficiencieshavebeenmaintaineduncriticallyafterthereformsmadebytheLisbonTreaty,eventhoughamajor part of the reform agenda initiated by the Laeken Declaration was inspired by“competence sensitivity.” Lisbon has instead put most of its reforming faith in a newrecruittocompetencemonitoring–thenationalparliamentsoftheMemberStates.Thesenewarrangementsarepoorlyshapedatthelevelofdetail,butthepaperconcludeswithalargelypositiveassessmentoftheintentionbehindthem.Inparticulartheyrevealaproperinsistence on the need to supplement judicial control, which has become largelyineffective,withfresherpoliticalsensitivitytotheperilsofover‐hastycentralization.

∗ Professor StephenWeatherill (MA Camb, MA Oxon, MSc Edin) is a Fellow and Jacques Delors Professor ofEuropeanLawatSomervilleCollege,UniversityofOxford.Email: [email protected].

[Vol.12No.03 828 G e rman L aw J o u r n a l

A.IntroductionTen years have elapsed since the first Tobacco Advertising judgment – more properly,Germany v. Parliament and Council1, in which the Court of Justice for the first timeconcludedthattheEuropeanUnion(EU)legislaturehadsteppedbeyondthelimitsofthecompetencetoharmonizenationallawswhichisgrantedbytheTreaty.Thatmomentousdecision was heralded as an important assertion of the Court’s constitutional role incontrollingpolitical infidelity to the principle that the EU’s scope for action is limited tothatmandated by the founding Treaties, which are now the Treaty on European Union(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioningof the EuropeanUnion (TFEU).However, thosesubsequentlyseekingannulmentofmeasuresoflegislativeharmonizationbeforetheCourthave almost all beendisappointed.Hownow, ten years later, shouldweassess the firstTobacco Advertising case? This paper begins with a summary of the groundbreakingTobaccoAdvertising ruling (B) beforeexpressingdoubt that the “limits”of EU legislativecompetenceinthenameofharmonizationarereliable(C),andreinforcesthatskepticismwithanalysisofthemorerecentcaselawoftheCourt(D).ThepaperfindsthattheTreatyrulesgoverningEUcompetence–both itsdefinitionandtheprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiaritythatgovernitsexercise–areill‐suited inpracticetogiverealmeaningtotheprinciplethattheEUhasonlylimitedcompetencegrantedbyitsTreaty(E).Thepatternis circular: the Court presents a formula which defines the proper scope of legislativeharmonizationandwhichsetsoutthecontrolexercisedbytheprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiarity,theEUlegislaturedulyadoptstheapprovedbutreliablyvaguevocabularyand,providedthedraftingiswell‐chosen,theCourthasnoplausiblebasisonwhichtosetaside the legislative act. Case law dealing with the limits of EU competence has beenconvertedintonomorethana“draftingguide”fortheEUlegislature.ThepaperaddsthatmuchoftheenergywhichhaspropelledthespreadofEUharmonizationisattributabletotheslipperycharacteroftheTreatyitself,andinthissensetherearereasonsdeeperthanmere institutional opportunism toexplainwhy theCourt has typically sidedwith the EUlegislature.ThepaperthenshowshowmanyofthesedeficiencieshavebeenmaintaineduncriticallyintherelevantTreatytextsafterthereformsmadebytheLisbonTreaty,eventhoughamajorpartofthereformagendainitiatedbytheLaekenDeclarationwasinspiredby “competence sensitivity.” Lisbonhas insteadputmostof its reforming faith in anewrecruit to competencemonitoring – the national parliaments of theMember States (F).Finding these adjustments poorly shaped at the level of detail, the paper neverthelessoffersalargelypositiveassessmentoftheintentionbehindthesenewarrangements(G).Inconclusion(H)thepaperfindsthattenyearsafterTobaccoAdvertisingtheCourt’scaselawhasbecomelittlemorethana“draftingguide”foralegislaturewhichfindsitalltooeasytoassertcompliancewithArticle5TreatyonEuropeanUnion’s(TEU)principlesofconferral,subsidiarity and proportionality in a manner which is unreviewable in practice. Beyondjudicial control, the need for fresher political sensitivity to the perils of over‐hastycentralizationisclear–anditisonethatafflictsallfederalandquasi‐federalarrangements. 1CaseC‐376/98,Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,2000E.C.R.I‐8419.

2011] 829TheLimitsofLegislativeHarmonizationTenYearsafterTobaccoAdvertising

B.CompetenceReview:TheFirstTobaccoAdvertisingCaseThefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcase’sconstitutionalsignificanceasthefirsteverannulmentofameasureoflegislativeharmonizationbytheCourtofJusticeisexplainedaboveintheIntroduction.Init,Directive98/43settingharmonizedrulesontheadvertisingoftobaccoproductswasannulledbytheCourtfor invalidrelianceonwhatwerethenArticles57(2),66and100aECandarenowinamendedformArticles53(2),62and114ofTheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU).The Directive was stated in its Preamble to be aimed at opening up the market forproductswhich serveas themedia for advertising and sponsorshipof tobaccoproducts.AlthoughtheCourtagreedthatobstaclestothefreemovementofgoodsorthefreedomtoprovideservicesaroseasaresultofdisparitiesbetweennationallawsontheadvertisingoftobaccoproducts, itwaspersuadedofthisonlywithregardtothelikelyemergenceofdiverse national rules on advertising tobacco products in periodicals, magazines andnewspapers.AccordinglyaDirectiveprohibitingtheadvertisingoftobaccoproductsinsuchmediacouldbeadoptedasavalidmeasureofharmonizationunderwhatwasthentheECTreaty,nowtheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,“withaviewtoensuringthe freemovement of press products.”2 Equally the Courtwas receptive to harmonizedprohibition of certain types of sponsorship by tobacco companies because variation inregulatorypracticeamongtheMemberStatesledto“sportseventsbeingrelocated,withconsiderable repercussionson the conditionsof competition forundertakings associatedwithsuchevents.”3ButtheDirectivewenttoofar.Itprohibitedadvertisingonposters,parasols,ashtraysandotherarticlesusedinhotels,restaurantsandcafés,andtheprohibitionofadvertisingspotsin cinemas. In the Court’s view these prohibitions did not help to facilitate trade in theproducts concerned. Furthermore the generality of the prohibition against sponsorshipwentbeyondthelimitsimposedbytheTreaty.The Court’s ruling is confined to finding trespass beyond the limits of (what are now)Article 114 TFEU and its cousins governing harmonization in pursuit freedom ofestablishmentandtheprovisionofservices,Articles53and62TFEU.Butbyimplication,ifnotexplicitly,itwasaccusingtheEUlegislatureofhavingusedthecoverofharmonizationtosmugglemeasuresofpublichealthpolicyintotheOfficialJournal.Atone level this judgmentwasnothingnew.TheTreatydoesnot confer, andneverhasconferred, a competence on the EU to harmonize laws tout court. They key provision –today Article 114 TFEU – ties legislative harmonization to the establishment and 2Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atpara.98.

3Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atpara.110.


functioningoftheinternalmarketasdefinedinArticle26TFEU.So,astheCourthasputit,thismeans that the Treaty does not authorize ameasurewhich has only the incidentaleffectofharmonizingmarketconditionswithintheUnion.4Putanotherway,theEUmayintervenetocurediversitybetweennationallawsonlywherethatdiversityisshowntobeharmful to the achievement of the EU’s internalmarket. This iswhyDirective 98/34 ontobaccoadvertising,whichdidnotcrossthatthreshold,wasannulled.Though the Tobacco Advertising judgment was in principle not novel, it was the firstinstance of annulment of this type of EU legislation on these grounds. In part this wasbecause until the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987 harmonizationlegislation was adopted by unanimity in Council or not all, with the result thatconstitutionallydubiousadventurismwastypicallyshieldedfromconstitutionalreviewbytheassemblyofpoliticalconsensus.5TheriseofqualifiedmajorityvotinginCouncilopenedupthepossibilityofMemberStatesrespondingtopoliticaldefeatinCouncilbyseekingtopersuade the Court that the disputed legislation did not fall within the EU’s Treatymandate.ThisispreciselythepatternofGermany’ssuccessfulapplicationtotheCourtinthecase.So the ruling isof landmark significanceasanexpressionof judicialdefenseofthelimitsofEUlegislativecompetenceagainstpoliticalpreferencetoslipfreeofthelimitsagreedandapprovedbynationalconstitutionalprocessatthetimetheTreatywasdraftedand subsequently revised. The Court’s reading of the Treaty, not a qualifiedmajority inCouncilalliedwithParliamentarysupport,decideswhattheEUmayandmaynotdo.SoTobaccoAdvertisingapplieswhatweknowtodayasthe“principleofconferral”totheparticular case of legislative harmonization. Article 5(2) TEU states that: “Under theprinciple of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competencesconferred upon it by theMember States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set outtherein”andadds(superfluously)that“CompetencesnotconferredupontheUnionintheTreaties remain with the Member States.” In precisely this vein the Court in TobaccoAdvertisinghadrefusedtotreatlegislativeharmonizationascreating“ageneralpowertoregulatethe internalmarket”becausethiswouldbe incompatiblewiththeprinciplethat“thepowersoftheCommunity[nowUnion]arelimitedtothosespecificallyconferredonit.”6

4E.g.CaseC‐155/91,Commissionv.Council,1993E.C.R.I‐939;CaseC‐209/97,Commissionv.Council,1999E.C.R.I‐8067.

5Privatelitigationbeforeanationalcourtpromptingapreliminaryreferenceraisingquestionsofvaliditywasinprinciple possible but dauntingly difficult given the absence of any case law suggesting the likelihood of areceptivehearinginLuxembourg.Eventheexpressionofacademicdisquietwasrare:foralonelyandthoughtfulvoice seeGeorge Close,The Legal Basis for the Consumer Protection Programme of the EEC and Priorities forAction,8EUROPEANLAWREVIEW8(1983).



C.Limits,whatLimits?Butwhatreallyarethe“limitsofthecompetencesconferred”upontheEUbytheMemberStates, as envisaged by Article 5 TEU? To grasp those limits onemust engage with thedetail of the Treaties and, in particular, one must map the cascade of legislativecompetences scattered throughout the text of the TFEU. Many of those provisions aresector‐specificandconferarelativelyclear‐cutandtightly‐definedcompetencetolegislateontheEU.Forexample,Article168TFEUpermitstheEUtoactinthefieldofpublichealthbut in its fifth paragraph it carefully excludes the harmonizationof such laws –which iswhy the ill‐fated Directive 98/43 on Tobacco Advertising was not adopted under it. BycontrastArticle114TFEUisnotofthisconfinedtype.Itisfunctionallydriven:anynationalmeasuremaybeharmonizedprovidedthatleadstoanimprovementinthefunctioningoftheinternalmarketenvisagedbyArticle26TFEU,andnothingisplacedofftheEU’slimits,exceptingonlythatArticle114(2)TFEUexcludesharmonizationoffiscalprovisions,thoserelating to freemovement of persons, and those relating to the rights and interests ofemployed persons. Fixing the limits of Article 114 TFEU – which was Article 95 EC andbefore that Article 100a EC/EEC ‐ has become the preoccupation of the Court as –inevitably – the annulment in the first Tobacco Advertising case has been followed byfurtherattemptstodeploylitigationtoattackEUlegislationthathassucceededinsecuringadequate political support to reach theOfficial Journal but which challenges (minority)Statepreferencesand/orprivatecommercialinterests.From the first Tobacco Advertising decision we know that a measure may be validlyadoptedon thebasisofArticle114TFEUprovided that itgenuinelyhasas itsobject theimprovement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internalmarket.Itmayaimtoeliminateanappreciabledistortionofcompetitionoritmayaimtoprevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifariousdevelopmentofnational lawswheretheemergenceofsuchobstaclesis likelyandwherethemeasureinquestionisdesignedtopreventthem.InTobaccoAdvertisingthesecriteriawerescatteredthroughoutthejudgmentinrelativelyunsystematicfashion7butlatelytheCourthasmovedtowardsamoreconsistentlyexpressedformula.InitsmostrecentrulingonthescopeofArticle114TFEU,Vodafone,O2etalv.SecretaryofState,itexplainedthat:“Accordingtoconsistentcase‐lawtheobjectofmeasuresadoptedonthebasisofArticle95(1) EC [now 114(1) TFEU] must genuinely be to improve the conditions for theestablishmentandfunctioningoftheinternalmarket....WhileamerefindingofdisparitiesbetweennationalrulesandtheabstractriskofinfringementsoffundamentalfreedomsordistortionofcompetitionisnotsufficienttojustifythechoiceofArticle95EC[114TFEU]asa legal basis, the Community [Union] legislature may have recourse to it in particularwhere there are differences between national rules which are such as to obstruct the

7Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atparas.84,106,86respectively.


fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internalmarket....Recoursetothatprovisionisalsopossibleiftheaimistopreventtheemergenceof such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent development of national laws.However, the emergence of such obstaclesmust be likely and themeasure in questionmustbedesignedtopreventthem....”8Thepoint–madeexplicitly in the firstTobaccoAdvertising case itself9– is thateffectivejudicialmonitoringof the limitsdictatedbytheTreatywouldbe impossiblewereamerefinding of disparities between national rules or of the abstract risk of obstacles to theexercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition enough to justifyrelianceonArticle114TFEU.TheCourtinsistsondefiningandpolicingathresholdforfearthatwithout one the powers of the EU legislature “would be practically unlimited.”10 InsimilarveintheCourtchosetoavoidjudgingthechallengedmeasurewithreferencetoitslegislative history. Themeasure had been re‐drafted onmore than one occasion by theCommission to assertmore strongly an internalmarket aim and to downplay the publichealth dimension which, one may readily suspect, was the driving motivation. ThisbackgroundwassomethingofwhichtheCourtwasmadefullyawareinthehearings.11Butit is certainly important that theCourt chosenot toplaceany relianceon the subjectiveviewsofthepoliticalinstitutionsindraftingandultimatelyadoptingthemeasure.Insteadit preferred its own objectively presented inquiry into the contribution made by theDirectivetothefunctioningoftheinternalmarket.Ononelevelthisseemstopromiseaconstitutionallyproperstandardofreview.Itseemsto wrest from the political institutions and into judicial hands the ultimate source ofauthoritativerulingonthelawfulscopeoftheTreatymandate.This,however,isdeceptive.The Court places enormousweight on slippery adjectives and adverbs in its attempt todefinethelimitsofArticle114TFEUinamoresophisticatedmannerthandoestheTreaty.The object of a measure must genuinely be to improve the conditions for theestablishment and functioning of the internal market. Conversely an abstract risk ofinfringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of competition is not sufficient tojustify reliance on Article 114 TFEU; differences must have a direct effect on thefunctioning of the internal market or cause an appreciable distortion of competition.Preventiveharmonization–targetedatobstaclestotraderesultingfromfuturedivergentdevelopmentofnationallaw–isallowedbutemergenceofsuchobstaclesmustbelikely.

8CaseC‐58/08,Vodafone,O2etalv.SecretaryofState,judgmentof8June2010,paras.32‐33.

9SeeespeciallyGermanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atparas.84&106.


11AnditisconsideredintheopinionofA.G.Fennelly,Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note1,atparas.14‐20,74‐77.


These words carry immense constitutional weight. Find that an effect on themarket isdirect, a distortion of competition appreciableor emergence of obstacles likely and thediversitybetweennationallawsisofsufficientmagnitudetoimpactonthefunctioningoftheinternalmarket:thematterfallswithinthelimitsofArticle114TFEUinparticularandof the EU generally. Take away that crucial quality of directness or appreciability orlikelihoodandthematter restswith theMemberStates, for it is legislativediversityofatypethatdoesnotharmtheEU’smarket‐makingproject.Buthowtomeasurethis?How–thinkingabouttheroleinpracticeoftheCourt–tocheckwhetherthecriteriaaretrulymetwhenthelegislature–asitsurelywill–conscientiouslyuses the vocabulary that the Court tells it is constitutionally necessary? “Preventiveharmonization,”forexample,ispermittedonlywheretheemergenceoffutureobstaclesislikely: but how in practice can a legislative claim to respond to such likelihood befalsified?12TheanxietyisthattheCourthasfailedtoaddresstheproblemandhasinsteadconcoctedasetofphraseswhichmerelyserveasa“draftingguide”whichreadilyenablesthelegislativeinstitutionstocomplywiththeprincipleofconferral.Theanxiety that the threshold is low isdeeplysensitivegiventhescopeofwhatmaybeachievedbythelegislatureonceitiscrossed.ProvidedthattheconditionsforrecoursetoArticle114TFEUarefulfilled,theUnion“legislaturecannotbepreventedfromrelyingonthat legal basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in thechoicestobemade.”13Logicallytoo,inthelightofthecommitmentofArticles114(3),12and168(1)TFEUtopublichealthandconsumerprotectionconcerns,theCourtconcludedthataharmonized rule “mayconsist in requiringall theMemberStates toauthorize themarketing of the product or products concerned, subjecting such an obligation ofauthorization to certain conditions, or even provisionally or definitively prohibiting themarketing of a product or products.”14 There is plainly no objection in principle to aharmonizedbanongoods–providedthatthegenerallyapplicablecriteriaforrelianceonArticle 114 aremet,whichwill typicallymean that the banmust form part of a regimedealingwithawidercategoryofproductsthansimplythosesubjectedtotheharmonizedban.SoalthoughtheTreaty is litteredwithsector‐specificbases for legislationwhicharecommonly drafted with circumspection, Article 114’s functionally broad mandate forlegislativeharmonizationgoesa longwaytosetasidesuchcautionin legislativepractice.There is no circumvention of Article 168(5)’s exclusion of harmonization in the field ofpublic health if the criteria of Article 114 are satisfied; similarly Article 169(2)(b) TFEU

12 Cf. Martin Seidel, Präventive Rechtsangleichumg im Bereich des gemiensamenMarktes, 41 EUROPARECHT 25(2006).

13CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,AllianceforNaturalHealthv.SecretaryofStateforHealth,2005E.C.R.I‐6451,atpara.30.

14CaseC‐210/03,SwedishMatch,2004E.C.R.I‐11893,atpara.34;CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,supra,note13,atpara.33;CaseC‐380/03,Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,2006E.C.R.I‐11573,atpara.43.


confinestheEUto“measureswhichsupport,supplementandmonitor”nationalconsumerlawbutharmonizationofconsumerlawpursuanttoArticle114readilyproceedsinsofaras divergences between national laws obstruct the functioning of the internal market.EquallytheopeningcautionofArticle114TFEUthatitshallapplyfortheachievementoftheinternalmarket“savewhereotherwiseprovidedintheTreaties”doesnotsubordinateit to provisions such Articles 168 or 169 because they are not dedicated to theachievementof the internalmarket.Accordinglyharmonization inpursuitof the internalmarket creates a discrete EU layer of regulation affecting the harmonized sector inquestion:environmentalprotection,consumerlaw,publichealthpolicy,culture,andsoonhave all acquired a legislative dimension contributed by the EU in the name ofmarket‐making.15 This is the true energy of Article 114. The EU legislature need not seek todisguise the re‐regulatory dimension of its harmonization initiatives. It needs only to tiethat re‐regulatory dimension sufficiently tightly to the market‐making function ofharmonization.Butthatisnotdifficulttoachieve,partlybecausetheCourtisgenerousinits interpretationofthescopeofthelegislativegrantbutmainlybecausetheTreaty,andtheconceptofinternalmarketinparticular,simplyisbroad.D.TheNatureoftheCourt’sInquirypursuedintheCaseLawThekeyquestioniswhatisitthattheCourtisobjectivelyreviewinginordertopatrolthelimitsoftheTreaty,and inparticularthoseofArticle114TFEU.Aclose inspectionofthecaselawisneeded.I.Directive2001/37:R.v.SecretaryofStateexparteBATandImperialTobaccoR.v.SecretaryofStateexparteBATandImperialTobaccoconcernedadifferentelementinthe EU’s (anti) tobacco policy from that at stake in the first Tobacco Advertising case.16Directive 2001/37 deals principally with labeling (in particular health warnings) and taryieldsratherthanadvertising.TheDirectivewasaimedatimprovingthefunctioningoftheinternal market for tobacco products, not media carrying advertisements for tobaccoproducts.TheDirectivewasbasedonArticles95and133EC.TheCourt,askedtodeliverapreliminaryrulingbyanEnglishcourtbeforewhichquestionsofvalidityhadbeenraisedinproceedings initiatedby tobacco companies,17 found thatuseofArticle 95ECwas valid,andthatalthoughtheadditionofArticle133waserroneous,thatdefectwaspurelyformal

15ForanintroductorysurveyseeSYBEDEVRIES,TENSIONSWITHINTHEINTERNALMARKET:THEFUNCTIONINGOFTHEINTERNALMARKETANDTHEDEVELOPMENTOFHORIZONTALANDFLANKINGPOLICIES274‐297(2006).

16CaseC‐491/01,Rv.SecretaryofStateexparteBATandImperialTobacco,2002E.C.R.I‐11543.

17Notsodauntingoncetheyhadthevocabulary:see,supra,note5.


and did not affect the overall validity of the measure. So the Directive survived thechallenge.In its ruling the Court considered that in view of public concern about the health riskscausedbyconsumingtobaccoproductsitwas“likely”thatobstaclestothefreemovementof suchproductswould arise asMember States adoptednewand stricter and, crucially,divergent rules.18 This was confirmed by the Court by virtue of a wholly uncriticalregurgitationofthecontentoftherecitalsinthepreambletotheDirectivewhich–asonewould have readily expected ‐ cited divergences and imminent divergences in nationalpractice.TheCourtwasalsosustainedinitsfavorableviewoftheDirective’svaliditybytheobservationssubmittedduringtheprocedurewhichconfirmednationalpractice.Thistoowashardlyasurprise.ThegovernmentsoftheUnitedKingdom,Belgium,Finland,France,Ireland,Italy,theNetherlandsandSweden,togetherwiththeParliament,theCouncilandtheCommission,hadtakentheviewthattheDirectivewasvalid,whereasonlytheGreekand the Luxembourg governments had taken the opposite view. Their portrayal oflegislative divergence and a consequent competence andneed toharmonizewas hardlypreparedonanimpartialfooting.TheCourt, findingthatthiswasavalidmeasureof legislativeharmonization,washeavilyinfluencedbytheviewsofthosewhohadparticipatedintheadoptionofthemeasure.Toanextentthisisunavoidable.Recital7toDirective2001/37statesthat:“several Member States have indicated that, if measures establishing maximum carbonmonoxideyields forcigarettesarenotadoptedatCommunity level, theywilladoptsuchmeasuresatnational level.Differences inrulesconcerningcarbonmonoxideare likely toconstitutebarrierstotradeandtoimpedethesmoothoperationoftheinternalmarket.”The Court embarks on an objective review of the impact of regulatory diversity in theinternal market but the subjective political preferences and declared intentions of theMemberStatesintimatelyaffectthatassessment.Still,thereweresignificantargumentstothe effect that the size required under the Directive for the health warning labelsprecludedatraderlabelingeffectivelyincompliancewiththe(multilingual)rulesofmorethanasmallnumberofMemberStates.Thispracticalobjection to theplausibilityof theclaim that thismeasurenot only aimed toprotect public healthbut also truly served toimprove the functioning of the internal market was pressed on the Court, but simplyignoredinitsjudgment.19

18R.v.SecretaryofState,supra,note16,atpara.67.

19 For a careful explanation seeDerrickWyatt,Community Competence to Regulate the InternalMarket, in 50YEARSOFTHEEUROPEANTREATIES:LOOKINGBACKANDTHINKINGFORWARD,93(MichaelDouganandSamanthaCurrieeds.,2009).


II.Directive2001/37:SwedishMatchSwedish Match, like ex parte BAT, involved an attack on Directive 2001/37, but itconcernedoneparticularprovisionofit,Article8.20Thisprovision,originallyintroducedinDirective92/41,providesthattheMemberStatesaretoprohibittheplacingonthemarketof tobacco fororaluse.This targetssnus,which is tobaccosold looseor insmall sachetsandintendedtobeconsumedbyplacingbetweenthegumandthelip.ThelitigationwasdrivenbyaSwedishproducerofsnusunabletoselltheproductanywhereintheEUexceptinSwedenitselfwhereaderogationcontainedintheSwedishactofaccessionprotecteditfromtheban.ApreliminaryreferencewasmadebyanEnglishcourt.Therewas,theCourtstated, evidence of legislative diversity. This the Court knew by reading the recitals toDirective 2001/37. Given the relatively large amount of inter‐State trade in thismarket,“those prohibitions of marketing contributed to a heterogeneous development of thatmarket and were therefore such as to constitute obstacles to the free movement ofgoods”;and itwas“likely”thatobstaclestothefreemovementofthoseproductswouldarise by reason of the adoption by theMember States of new rules reflecting growingpublicanxiety.21RelianceonArticle95EC–nowArticle114TFEU‐wasjustified.ThejudgmentinSwedishMatchisterseandunsatisfactory,yetrevealing.Indeclaringthatevenabanonaproductmayfallwithinthelegitimatescopeof legislativeharmonizationtheCourt citedDirective92/59ongeneralproduct safety.22ThatDirectivedemonstratesthat unsafe products may the subject of a harmonized ban in order to improve thefunctioning of themarket for safe products. Amore recent examplewould beDirective2005/29, which bans unfair business‐to‐consumer commercial practices in order toestablishacommonregimewithinwhichfairpracticesareallowed.23SoDirective2001/37wouldfitthismodelweresnusbannedasoneelementinaregulatoryschemecoveringabroaderrangeofpermittedtobaccoproducts.Theproblemisthatthereisnoexplanationof the existence of any such wider scheme in either the Directive or in the Court’sjudgment. This seems to be a free‐standing ban on snus – and to permit such a free‐standing ban seems to contradict the Court’s refusal to accept the suppression ofadvertisingonashtraysandparasolsinthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcase.24Analternativemore benevolent reading of SwedishMatch, and onewhichwould conform to TobaccoAdvertising,was that theCourt’s ruling, though regrettably compressed,25 views theban

20CaseC‐210/03,SwedishMatch,2004E.C.R.I‐11893.

21SwedishMatch,supra,note20,atparas.38,39.

22O.J.1992L228/24,nowreplacedbyDirective2001/95O.J.2002L11/4.

23O.J.2005L149/22.

24SeepowerfullyinthisveinWyatt,supra,note19.

25SwedishMatch,supra,note20,paras.35‐42aretheculprits.


on oral tobacco products as an element in a wider regime establishing a harmonizedschemeforregulatingtobaccoproducts,involvingbansonsomeproductsandrestrictions(such as labeling requirements) on others. This interpretation finds some support in theOpinion of Advocate General Geelhoud, who took the view that a product ban couldimprovethefunctioningoftheinternalmarketbydiminishingenforcementcosts,includingthe costs of the enforcement of regulations applying to related products. So he did nottreat the ban on snus as free‐standing and, like the Court but according tomore subtlereasoning,heheldtheDirectivetobevalidlybasedonArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU.But even if one takes the interpretation that is most generous to judicial consistencySwedishMatchisstilltroubling.ThebenevolentreadingoftherulingholdsthattheCourttreatedthebanonsnusaspartofawiderregimededicatedtofreeingtradeinotherkindsof products which were regarded as less harmful by the legislature. This may fit withexisting case law and legislative practice, but it is still extraordinarily permissive oflegislative discretion. It invites strategic drafting. Worse: it encourages the drafting oflegislative measures that are broad not targeted. A régime that is meant to patrol thelimitsoftheEU’scompetencestendsinpracticetopushthemeverwiderincircumstanceswherejudicialcontrolisinpracticesorelylacking.III.Regulation1007/2009:InuitTapiriitKanatamietalv.ParliamentandCouncilAsimilaranxietyemergesfrominspectionofRegulation1007/2009. It isbasedonArticle95 EC and establishes harmonized rules concerning the placing on the market of sealproducts.26This ispermittedonlywherethesealproductsresult fromhunts traditionallyconductedbyInuitandotherindigenouscommunitiesandcontributetotheirsubsistence.With narrow exceptions,27 no other seal products are allowed on the EU market. TheRecitalstotheRegulationrefertotheEuropeanParliament’sresolutiononaCommunityactionplanontheProtectionandWelfareofAnimalsandtotheParliamentaryassemblyofthe Council of Europe’s recommendation to ban all cruel hunting methods, while alsoreferringtoexistingorintendeddiversenationalregulatoryresponsesintheEUtopublicconcernaboutanimalwelfare.Theinternalmarketthereforerequirescommonrules–andthey“takefullyintoaccountconsiderationsofthewelfareofanimals.”28AnapplicationforinterimmeasuressuspendingtheoperationofthemeasurewasrejectedbytheCourtforwantoftherequireddegreeofurgency,afterrecitationofthefamiliarprinciplesgoverningthescopeofArticle114TFEU.29ThematterseemslikelytobepursuedonlyatWTOlevel

26O.J.2009L286/36.

27Article4(2)Regulation1007/2009.

28Recital9totheRegulation.

29CaseT‐18/10R,InuitTapiriitKanatamietalv.ParliamentandCouncil,orderof30April2010.


(inproceedingsinitiatedbyCanadaagainsttheEC),30notwithintheEU.AsamatterofEUlaw theproblem for the challenger is that thismeasure, although shuttingdowna largepartofthemarketforsealproducts,seemsonceagaintofitthelogicofArticle114.Onebansunsafeproductsaspartofaschemetosecurefreemovementofsafeproducts:onebans seal products that are not the product of (in short) a traditional hunt in order tosecure free movement of seal products which are so sourced. There is nothing in thewordingofArticle114nor intheCourt’selaborationof itspre‐conditionswhichexcludessuchanapproach.Doubtlessthe“decisivefactor”inselectingthecontrolexercisedbytheRegulationwas animalwelfare combinedwith preservation of the “culture” of the Inuithunt,butthisisnoconstitutionalobjectiontouseofArticle114,providedthatanelementofmarket‐makingbeachieved.Toclosedownalargepartofthemarket(forsealproducts)toreleaseonlyasmallpartofitmightbethoughttoconstituteadisproportionateexerciseofthelegislativecompetenceconferredbyArticle114,but,aselaboratedbelowinSectionE.I,onewouldhavelittleexpectationofsuccessinpersuadingtheCourttointerveneinthename of proportionality once competence to legislate in the first place is successfullyestablished.IV.Directive2002/46:AllianceforNaturalHealthvSecretaryofStateforHealthInAllianceforNaturalHealthDirective2002/46onfoodsupplementswasheldvalid.31TheDirective, another Article 95 measure, harmonizes national rules governing foodscontaining concentrated sources of nutrients on the basis that legislative diversity atnationallevelharmsthefunctioningoftheinternalmarket.OnceagaintheCourtreliedontheDirective’sRecitalsandtheobservationsof theParliamentandtheCouncil in findingthat the claim to disruptive legislative diversity was made good. It also referred to “asubstantial number of complaints from economic operators” made to the Commissionabout such variation,32 though it does not appear to have looked at any of these. And,withoutmore,relianceonArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU,isaccepted.As was already observed in connection with ex parte BAT, the Court’s purportedlyobjectivereviewoftheimpactofregulatorydiversityintheinternalmarketisimmediatelyandunavoidablytiedtowhatMemberStatesdoandarelikelytodoandishereshowntobeconnected toapparentlyunverifiedprivatecomplaints.ThecompetenceconferredbyArticle 114 TFEU is not static, but rather dynamic, depending on regulatory practices,actual and likely, at national level and the reported impact on economic operators. Theeasy manipulation of these threshold criteria by those politically responsible for their

30DS400,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm.

31CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,AllianceforNaturalHealthv.SecretaryofStateforHealth,2005E.C.R.I‐6451.

32AllianceforNaturalHealth,supra,note31,atpara.37.


applicationstandsinstarkcontrasttothepracticaldifficultyfacedbytheCourtinfindingany means to find independent evidence for claimed appreciable distortions or likelyemergenceofnewobstacles.WhethertheCourtcanreallydomore,giventhebreadthandambiguityoftheguidingTreatyprovisions,willbeaddressedfurtherbelow,oncethecaselawhasbeenfullyconsidered.V.Directive2003/33:TobaccoAdvertisingIIAfter Directive 98/34 was annulled in the first Tobacco Advertising case the legislatureresponded by adopting Directive 2003/33 on the harmonization of laws relating toadvertisingandsponsorshipoftobaccoproducts.NotsurprisinglythiswaspreparedwithacloseeyeonwhattheCourtinitsearlierrulinghadindicatedwouldreceivethegreenlight.AccordinglyDirective2003/33wascarefullyconfinedtorulesaffectingtheadvertisingandpromotion of tobacco products in the press and other printed publications, radiobroadcasting, information society services and tobacco related sponsorship.33 Equallyunsurprisingly it survived judicial scrutiny. In Germany v. Parliament and Council – thesecondTobaccoAdvertisingcase–theCourtreferredtoitsearlierjudgment,therecitalstoDirective2003/33andtotheCommission’ssubmittedobservations,aswellasnotingthehigh levelofcross‐bordertrade intherelevantmarket,andconcludedthatuseofArticle95ECwasvalid.34Thejudgmentconfirmsafurtherexpansionistelementinthecaselaw.Onecomplaintwasthat aspects of the Directive affected media with no connection to the cross‐bordermarket.ButtheCourtdidnotinsistthat“anactuallinkwithfreemovementbetweentheMemberStatesineverysituationcoveredbythemeasure”bedemonstrated.35Thetestisthat the measure must actually be intended to improve the conditions for theestablishmentandfunctioningoftheinternalmarket.ProbablyitislogicalthatthepurelyinternalsituationisrareandbecomingrarerinanincreasinglyintegratedEU‐widemarketand that therefore an EU measure cannot sensibly be targeted at issues affecting onlycross‐border trade, for that category isnot static. In anyevent thevirtueof certaintyofapplicationmilitatesinfavorofanEUmeasurewhichexertsanimpactinsomeinstancesonsituations internal toaMemberState, rather thanbasing its reachonanunclearandshifting “inter‐State” criterion. But the consequentdynamic in favor of an EU regulatorycompetencethatisinprinciplelimitedbutinpracticetrulybroadisevident.Expansionism

33 The legislative impulse to go further (and toaddresse.g. ashtrays)wasnot abandonedbut recycled innon‐bindingform:seeCouncilRecommendationonthepreventionofsmokingandoninitiativestoimprovetobaccocontrol,O.J.2003L22/31,basedonArticle152(4)EC.

34CaseC‐380/03,Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,2006E.C.R.I‐11573.

35Germanyv.ParliamentandCouncil,supra,note34,atpara.80.SeealsoJoinedCasesC‐465/00,C‐138/01&C‐139/01,Rechnungshofv.ÖsterreichischerRundfunk,2003E.C.R.I‐4989,para.41.


is very much the key trend. The Court’s acceptance that legislative harmonization mayvalidly empower the Commission to take individualmeasures with respect to particularproducts,whichmayentailthecreationofanEU‐levelbodyresponsibleforcontributingtothe implementation of a process of harmonization,36 has further emphasized the widescopeofArticle114TFEU.VI.Directive2006/24:Irelandv.ParliamentandCouncil&Decision2004/496:Parliamentv.Council

Ireland v. Parliament and Council concerned Directive 2006/24 on data retention.37 TheCourt found it found to be validly adopted under Article 95 EC, for there is variationbetweennationalpractices, likely togrowmoreseriousover time. Ireland’sunsuccessfulapplicationwaslargelymotivatedbyaconcerntoshowthatthe“thirdpillar”shouldhavebeen used for ameasurewhich it arguedwas primarily ameasure to fight crime – thisdimensionofthecaseisnowovertakenbythereformsmadebytheTreatyofLisbon.38Butthedecision’s illuminationof therubberytextureofArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU,endures. The Court cited its familiar principles and then proceeded to refer to evidencesubmittedtoitaboutdivergentnationalpracticeinthematterofretentionofdatarelatingtoelectroniccommunicationsaspartofanti‐crimestrategies.MoreoveritwasforeseeablethatStateswithoutruleswouldintroducethem.Thisjustifiedtheadoptionofharmonizedrulesinordertosafeguardtheproperfunctioningoftheinternalmarket.Onceagain,theCourt’s inquiryhasawearyfeeland itscarcelyextendsbeyondtheperfunctory. Itdrawsontheevidenceofthosedirectlyandpartiallyimplicatedintheadoptionofthemeasureinthe firstplace– theCommission, theCouncil andStateswhohadvoted in favourof themeasure in Council, the Parliament, and the European Data Protection Supervisor. TheCourtskipslightlyoverthelegalthresholdandthefactualappraisal:theDirectiveisvalid.TheprincipalinterestintherulinginIrelandv.ParliamentandCouncilliesinitsdifferencefromthatinParliamentv.Council,whichisarareexampleoftheCourtrefusingtoacceptlegislativerelianceonArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU.39TheCourtannulledaCouncilDecision (2004/496)ontheconclusionofanagreementbetweentheECandtheUSAon

36CaseC‐359/92,Germanyv.Council,1994E.C.R.I‐3681;CaseC‐66/04,UKv.ParliamentandCouncil,2005E.C.R.I‐10553; Case C‐217/04,UK v. Parliament and Council, 2006 E.C.R. I‐3771 (annotated in this vein by VincenzoRandazzo,44COMMONMARKETLAWREVIEW155(2007).SeealsoRobertSchütze,FromRometoLisbon:“ExecutiveFederalism” in the (new) European Union, 47 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1385 especially 1394‐96, 1406‐08(2010).

37CaseC‐301/06,Irelandv.ParliamentandCouncil,2009E.C.R.I‐593.

38Onthisaspect(andothers)seeEsterHerlin‐Karnell,Annotation,46COMMONMARKETLAWREVIEW1667(2009).

39CasesC‐317/04&C‐318/04,Parliamentv.Council,2006E.C.R.I‐4721.


theprocessingandtransferofpassengerdatabyaircarrierstotheAmericanauthorities.TheDecisionwasbasedonaparentDirective(95/46)basedonArticle100a(subsequentlyArticle95EC,nowArticle114TFEU).TheCourtonceagaindidnotinvestigatebeyondtherecitals but on this occasion it found that they revealed that the transfer of data“constitutesprocessingoperationsconcerningpublicsecurityandtheactivitiesoftheStateinareasofcriminallaw.”40Decision2004/496concernedatransferofpersonaldatawithinaframeworkinstitutedbythepublicauthoritiesinordertoensurepublicsecurity,whereasDirective2006/24ondata retention, upheld in Ireland v. ParliamentandCouncil, coversthe activities of service providers in the internalmarket and does not contain any rulesgoverningtheactivitiesofpublicauthoritiesforlaw‐enforcementpurposes.SothelimitsofArticle114TFEUareglimpsed.Butthisisrare.VII.Regulation717/2007:Vodafone,O2etalv.SecretaryofState

Themost recent judgment in this vein isVodafone,O2etal v. Secretaryof State.41This,another challenge directed through English courts by a trader seeking to set aside EUregulatory intervention in the market, was an attack on the validity of the so‐called“RoamingRegulation,”Regulation717/2007.TheRegulationcapsthewholesaleandretailcharges terrestrialmobileoperatorsmaycharge for theprovisionof roamingservicesonpublicmobilenetworksforvoicecallsbetweenMemberStates.ItisbasedonArticle95EC.AdvocateGeneralMaduro’sOpinion is full of interesting ideas: andhedidnot think theCourt’s criteria for valid “preventive harmonization” were satisfied in the case. But bycontrasttheCourtfoundthecasenodifferentfrommostofthosesummarizedaboveanditheldthemeasurevalid.Themeasureappearedtobeaddressedatprivatepracticesunderanassumptionthatthemarket was malfunctioning because of intransparency leading to excessive prices thatwerenotcurtailedbytheexerciseofconsumerchoice.InshorttheRegulationseemedtobeanattempttocuretheuncompetitiveoperationof themarketby fixing (harmonized)prices.ThiswouldhaveseemedtobeaverysignificantstretchofArticle95(thoughnotawholly unprecedented one42). But the Court wrenched the matter back into themainstream. It declared that the Regulation had been adopted in response to thelikelihoodthatnationalpricecontrolmeasuresofdivergenttypewouldbeadoptedaiming

40Parliamentv.Council,supra,note39,atpara.56.

41CaseC‐58/08,Vodafone,O2etalv.SecretaryofState,judgmentof8June2010.

42Regulation2560/01oncross‐borderpayments ineuros,O.J.2001L344/13,basedonArticle95EC, requiresthatbankchargesforcross‐borderpaymentsineurobethesameaschargesforpaymentsmadeineurowithinaMemberState.Regulation2560/01isnowreplacedbyRegulation924/2009O.J.2009L266/11butitmaintainsthemodeloflegislativeharmonizationofprivatecommercialpractices.


toaddresstheproblemofthehighlevelofretailchargesforEU‐wideroamingservices.Sothiswastreatedasclassicpreventiveharmonizationaimedatimprovingtheconditionsforthefunctioningoftheinternalmarket. InsimilarlyevasiveveintheCourtdidnotaddressthe argument that national measures capping the cost of roaming were unlikely to beadoptedbecausetheywouldhavetheperverseeffectofharmingthecompetitivepositionof companies based on the regulator’s territory while protecting only out‐of‐stateconsumers.43 The conditions for resort to Article 114 TFEU are not met where diversenationalmeasuresareunlikelybecausenoproblemrequiringregulatory interventioncanbe identified; probably they are met where a problem requiring regulatory attention isidentifiedbutnationalmeasuresareunlikelybecauseofwantof incentivestoactand/orlack of aptitude to tackle the problem.44 In such circumstances there is, in short, adeficiencyintheinternalmarketforeseenbyArticle26TFEUwhichtheEUlegislaturemayremedy. The point is, however, novel, and such exploration of the limits of Article 114wouldhavebeen intriguing.Regrettably this twistwascompletely ignored ina judgmentwhichtakesatfacevaluetheclaimsoftheEUlegislature.The Court conspicuously reached its conclusions in Vodafone by reference only to theobservations presented by the EU’s own institutions and those found in the recitalsattachedtothemeasure. Itdrewonboththeexplanatorymemorandumtotheproposaland the impact assessment to substantiate the finding that there was a likelihood ofdivergentdevelopmentofnationallaws.TherecitalstatedtherewaspressureforMemberStates to take measures to address the problem of the high level of retail charges forroamingservices,andtheCourtaddsthatthiswasmoreoverconfirmedbytheCommissionatthehearing.45This isyetanotherMandyRice‐Daviesmoment:theCommission,havingpiloted the measure through the EU legislative process, then advises the Court it isconstitutionallyjustified–well,itwould,wouldn’tit.46TheCourtdidnotstandoutsidethelegislative choice that had been made. Instead it aligned itself uncritically with theinstitutionswhosechoiceswerebeingchallengedbytheapplicants.

43Cf.MartinBrennke,Annotation,47COMMONMARKETLAWREVIEW1793especiallyat1804‐06 (2010).Thesameauthor pursued this interesting inquiry well in advance of the judgment: Martin Brennke, The EU RoamingRegulation and its Non‐Compliance with Article 95, BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT HEFT 79(October2009),http://www2.jura.uni‐halle.de/INSTITUT/Heft_79.pdf,lastaccessed2March2011.

44ContraBrennkeid.,whotreatsArticle114asinadequateandarguesArticle352isthecorrectlegalbase.

45Vodafone,supra,note41,atpara.44.

46Thereferenceisspecifictoapoliticalscandalofthe1960sintheUKbutthephraseisaptnonethelesstopierceself‐serving attitudes more generally: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandy_Rice‐Davies, last accessed 2 March2011.


VIII.TenYearsLater:TheCaseLawas“DraftingGuide”There iscircularity.The legislative institutionsdrawontheCourt’scase lawasadraftingguidewhentheyagreethe legislationandrelyon itagainwhencalledupontodefend itbeforetheCourt.AndtheCourthasnowheretogotoinreviewingtheplausibilityoftheclaims. Placing a formal limit on the EU’s conferred competences is central to theconstitutionalcharacterofthewholeproject,buttheproblemlies inslippagewhich is inpractice conducive to the inflation of centralized authority. Article 114 TFEU is apredominant source of such slippage.47 In practice its limits are easilymet by intelligentdrafting.Evenwhenthedrafting isnotso intelligent–as inSwedishMatch48–theCourtgenerously findsanadequatecontributionto the functioningof the internalmarket.Tenyearson,thefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcaselookslikeananomaly.E.LegislativeDiscretion:TheLimitsofEUCompetenceinPrincipleandinPracticeI.LegislativeDiscretioninPrinciple:ChoiceofMethods,ProportionalityandSubsidiarityThechoiceofmeasureusedtoharmonizeinvolvesahighmeasureofdiscretiongrantedtothe legislative institutions.TheCourt consistently states thatTreaty intends toconferonthelegislatureadiscretioninselectingthemethodofharmonizationmostappropriateforachieving thedesiredresult, inparticular in fieldswithcomplex technical features.49Thisbroad legislative discretion extends also to some extent to the finding of basic facts.50Equally although the exercise of a competence that exists requires compliancewith theprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiarity,theapplicationofbothprinciplesinvolvesthegrantofdiscretion to the legislative institutions. InexparteBAT, forexample, theCourtinsisted that the legislature “mustbeallowedabroaddiscretion in anarea suchas thatinvolved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on itspart,andinwhichitiscalledupontoundertakecomplexassessments.”51Inconsequenceameasure must be manifestly inappropriate having regard to its objective before thelegislative choice will be regarded as disproportionate and therefore invalid.Proportionalitymayhavebitewhereadministrativedecisionsaffectingtheindividualareat

47 For a sustained critique, taking EU tobacco regulation as its principal case study, see, ALEXANDER SOMEK,INDIVIDUALISM:ANESSAYONTHEAUTHORITYOFTHEEUROPEANUNION(2008).

48CaseC‐210/03,supra,note20.

49E.g.CaseC‐66/04,supra,note36,atpara.45;CaseC‐217/04,supra,note36,para.43;CaseC‐380/03,supra,note34,atpara.42;CaseC‐58/08,supra,note41,atpara.35.

50CaseC‐343/09,AftonChemicalLimitedv.SecretaryofStateforTransport,judgmentof8July2010,atpara.33.

51CaseC‐491/01,supra,note16,atpara.123.


stakebutthebroaderthemeasure’sscope,thelesslikelythatproportionalitywilltripupthe legislature.52 Only legislative choices that verge on the absurd are likely to becondemnedasmanifestlyinappropriate.SoacleanbillofhealthwasawardedinexparteBAT and in all the other cases mentioned above. In Alliance for Natural Health theapplicantsattackedtheuseof“positivelists”–listsspecifyingexhaustivelywhichadditivesmay be used. It would be enough, they argued, to based the EU’s nutrients régime onnegativelists–stipulatinglessdictatoriallywhatmaynotbeincluded,ButfortheCourttheauthorsofDirective2002/46could“reasonablytaketheviewthatanappropriatewayofreconcilingtheobjectiveoftheinternalmarket,ontheonehand,withthatrelatingtotheprotection of human health, on the other, was” to opt for a positive list.53 Suchperfunctoryreviewistypical.54Subsidiaritytoohasbeenallbutneuteredasabasisforjudicialintervention.ExparteBATwasthefirstcaseinwhichtheCourtruledthatsubsidiarityevenappliestoArticle95:itdidso by finding that there is no exclusive competence at stake. But it then readily foundcompliance with the subsidiarity principle by observing that given that the Directive’sobjectivewastoeliminatethebarrierscausedby inter‐Stateregulatorydivergencewhilealso ensuring a high level of health protection, it followed that since such an objectivecouldnotbesufficientlyachievedbytheMemberStatesindividuallybutratherwasbetterachieved at EU level, the dictates of subsidiarity were satisfied.55 This approach hasbecometheCourt’snorm56anditentailsthatwhenevertheEUsetscommonrulesthenbydefinitionithascompliedwiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity.Principle–thatthesearerulesof constitutional significance which place reviewable limits on EU action ‐ differs frompractice.Accordinglyameasureofharmonizationhasneverbeenfoundtoviolatetheprincipleofproportionality or the principle of subsidiarity. The Court’s interpretation of theseprinciplesgoverning thepermittedexerciseofTreaty‐conferred legislativecompetence isimmenselyrespectfuloflegislativediscretion.It is notorious that the legislature frequently inserts a Recital into measures assertingcompliancewith these principleswithout the slightest elaboration ofwhy this is so. For

52OnthedifferentcontextsinwhichproportionalityisappliedseeTAKISTRIDIMAS,THEGENERALPRINCIPLESOFEULAWChapters3‐5(2006).

53CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,supra,note31,atpara.68.

54ForanegregiousexampleseeCaseC‐103/01,Commissionv.Germany,2003E.C.R.I‐5369para.48.

55CaseC‐491/01,supra,note16,atparas.181‐183.

56Cf.CaseC‐103/01,supra,note54,atpara.47;CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,supra,note31,atparas.104‐07.


example Recital 21 of Regulation 1007/2009 on seal products, mentioned above,57providesthat:“since the objective of this Regulation, namely the elimination of obstacles to thefunctioningof the internalmarketbyharmonizingnational bans concerning the trade insealproductsatCommunity level, cannotbesufficientlyachievedby theMemberStatesand can therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adoptmeasures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of theTreaty. Inaccordancewith theprincipleofproportionality,as setout in thatArticle, thisRegulationdoesnotgobeyondwhatisnecessaryinordertoachievethatobjective.”

This is assertion rather than demonstration. As with the existence of legislativecompetence, so too itsexercise: the legislature isevidently simplyusing theCourt’scaselawasadraftingguide.Suchmechanicalrecitationhasbecomecommonplace.58One could certainly encourage the Court to be more aggressive and to demand fullerelaboration of just why the legislature has concluded that the measure in question iscompatible with the dictates of proportionality and subsidiarity. In 1997 it held that an“express reference” to subsidiarity was not a necessary pre‐condition of a measure’svalidity.59 That decision pre‐dated the entry into force of the Protocol added by theAmsterdamTreaty,anditisprobablethatsince1999nosuchleniencywouldbeaccordedto acts that fail to includeexpress recognitionof theplaceof subsidiarity. Theproblem,however,ultimately lies in thenatureof theprinciples themselves,not in lenient judicialreview.Subsidiarityispotentiallyhelpfulinsofarasitdirectsanengagementwithrelevantlearningsuchas thatexploring theeconomicsof federalismasabasis forcalculating thevirtues and vicesof centralized rule‐making asopposed to local autonomy.60Nor should

57Supra,note26.

58 There are countless examples! Seee.g. Recital 12 of Directive 2006/7 on bathingwater quality,O.J. 2006 L64/37;Recitals6and10ofDirective2000/31onelectroniccommerceO.J.2000L178/1;Recital22ofRegulation924/2009, supra, note 42. It is not only binding acts which commonly attract unsubstantiated assertion ofcompliancewiththeprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiarity:seee.g.theCouncilConclusionsontheWorkPlanforCulture2011‐2014,O.J.2010C325/1;CouncilConclusionsontheroleofsportasasourceandadriverforactivesocialinclusion,O.J.2010C326/5.

59CaseC‐233/94GermanyvParliamentandCouncil[1997]ECRI‐2405para.28.

60Theliteratureisvast,theconceptscontested,therestraininginfluenceofsubsidiarity(ifany)controversial.ForhelpfulintroductionstothedebateinaEuropeancontext(notnecessarilyusingthelanguageofsubsidiarityexplicitly)seee.g.EmanuelaCarbonara,BarbaraLuppiandFrancescoParisi,Self‐DefeatingSubsidiarity,5/1REVIEWOFLAWANDECONOMICS742(2009);RogerVandenBerghandWolfgangKerber,MutualRecognitionRevisited:Misunderstandings,Inconsistencies,andaSuggestedReinterpretation,61/3KYKLOS447(2008);SimonDeakin,LegalDiversityandRegulatoryCompetition:WhichModelforEurope?,12EUROPEANLAWJOURNAL440(2006);JukkaSnell,Who’sGotthePower?FreeMovementandAllocationofCompetencesinECLaw,22YEARBOOKOFEUROPEANLAW323(2003);JacquesPelkmans,SubsidiaritybetweenLawandEconomics,1/2005Collegeof


suchsalientinquiryengageeconomicsalone:thereisevidentlyasensitiveandhistoricallydeep‐rootedculturalcontext to theEuropeandebateaboutuniformityversusdiversity.61Subsidiarity as antidote to blind pursuit of “more Europe” could serve a worthwhilepurpose.But this is remote from legal rulesof the typeapt to form thebasis of judicialreview of legislation. None of the economic or cultural literature serves up cast‐ironconclusionsonwhetherand,ifso,howtopursuecentralrules.Thereareinsteadmultiplerelevant factors, varying in weight sector by sector, marking out a broad terrain withinwhich political choices need to be made and priorities established. In this sense theprinciple of subsidiarity is to be understood as providing a framework within which todebate whether the EU should exercise a conferred competence and, if so (and inconjunctionwiththeprincipleofproportionality),thenhow.Theheartofsubsidiarity–inabroader sense than that in view in the confinedcontextof judicial review ‐ is an inquiryinto whether even if the EU’s objectives are advanced by and best achieved by theproposedmeasure, it is nevertheless important enough to override objections rooted intheworthofnationaldiversityandautonomy.62Thistypeofinquirycouldhardlybemoreimportant in exploringwhat sort of “Europe” is being created but these arematters ofpolitical judgment. One might quarrel with legislative choices made about whether topursueproblem‐solvingcollectivelyatEUlevelorinsteadtotoleratethecostsofunsolvedor inadequatelysolvedproblemswhileenjoyinggreaterscopefor localdiversity,but it ishard toseehowsuchadecisioncouldbe treatedaswrong in law.63Thisdoesnotmakesubsidiarity(orproportionality)uselessbutitdoespointtotheneedtomovebeyondtheCourt infavorofawiderandmorevibrant institutionalculture inwhichtheriskthattheEUoperatesinamannerthatisstructurallybiasedinfavorofcentralizationisconfrontedanditsimplicationsarecriticallydebated–especiallywheretherelevantlegalbasewhichimperils theoperationalutilityofArticle5TEU’sprincipleof conferral is the functionallybroad Article 114 TFEU. A heavier emphasis on procedural openness might usefully bedemandedbytheCourt,sothatmeasuresmustexplainmorefully justwhatcalculationsinform the conclusion that a conferred competence should be exercised in themannerselected – and one could at least expect the Court to invalidate acts that ignore the

EuropeResearchPapersinLaw,http://www.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/law/studyprog/pdf/ResearchPaper_1_2005_Pelkmans.pdf.

61Heretootheliteratureisrichand(appropriately!)diverse:forahelpfulstarting‐pointseee.g.PETERA.KRAUS,AUNIONOFDIVERSITY:LANGUAGE,IDENTITYANDPOLITY‐BUILDINGINEUROPE(2008).

62Convincinglyexaminedinthisvein,albeitexpectingtheCourttoexercisemorecontrollinginfluencethandoesthispaper,byGarethDavies,Subsidiarity:TheWrongIdea,intheWrongPlace,attheWrongTime,43COMMON

MARKETLAWREVIEW63(2006)andbyMatthiasKumm,ConstitutionalisingSubsidiarityinIntegratedMarkets:TheCaseofTobaccoRegulationintheEuropeanUnion,12EUROPEANLAWJOURNAL503(2006).SeealsoGerardConway,Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ, 11 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 966especiallyat988‐990(2010);andSOMEK,supra,note47,especiallyChapter8.

63Cf. emphasizing the political/ procedural character of subsidiarity ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROMDUAL TO COOPERATIVEFEDERALISM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW Chapter 5 (2009); Daniel Halberstam, Of Power andResponsibility:ThePoliticalMoralityofFederalSystems,90VIRGINIALAWREVIEW731,especially827‐832(2004).


expectations of consultation and reasoning set out in the Protocol on the principles ofsubsidiarityandproportionality.Butamoreaggressiveproceduralpushislikelytodolittlemorethaninducethelegislativeinstitutionstofindmoredecorativewaystosaywhattheysaynow–thatthepoliticaldecisiontoacthasbeentakeninanareaofcomplexchoices,thatithasbeenagreedthatitisbetterthatactionbetakenbytheEUthanbytheMemberStatesandthatthemeansusedare incompliancewithproportionality. Ifqualitativeandquantitative indicators favoring EU action are recited in a legislative act64 then, absentmanifest miscalculation or illogicality, it is hard to see how a court could or shouldintervene.Theconnectingthreadinthereticentcaselawdealingwithjudicialreviewinthenameofproportionalityand(especially)subsidiarityistheconcernoftheCourtnottotrespassontheexerciseoflegislativediscretion.Occasionallyjudgescomeclean.Inanaddressgivenin2002 the then President of the Court, Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, argued that“subsidiarity isaprincipleofanessentiallypoliticalnature”andheassertedaconcerntopurgetheCourt’sdietof“politicalhotpotatoes.”65Thatjobhasbeendone!Providedthematter fallswithin the Treatymandate conferred on the EU by theMember States, thelegislative act is immune from judicial invalidation in the name of subsidiarity orproportionalityunlessthelegislaturehascommittedamanifesterror.II.LegislativeDiscretioninPractice:ThePrincipleofConferralBy sharp contrastwith thediscretionadmittedwith regard to choiceofmethodused toharmonize,itisamatterofconstitutionalprinciplethattheidentificationofacompetenceto legislate in the first place isnot in the gift of the legislature. Here theremust be nodiscretion,but rathera firmconstitutionaldefenseof the limitsonwhichArticle5TEU’sprincipleofconferralinsists.Defenseoftheprincipleofconferralingeneralandthelimitsof legislative harmonization in particular is, as a matter of constitutional purity,foundationally important.TheEU’sformal legitimacyisrootedin itsTreaties,whichwereduly authorized by approved constitutional procedures in all the Member States. Thatauthorization was a limited grant of competence. The Court was doubtless correct toupdateitsearlyobservationthat“…theMemberStateshavelimitedtheirsovereignrights,albeitwithinlimitedfields”66toinsteadacceptthat“theStateshavelimitedtheirsovereignrights, in ever wider fields”67 but the existence of limits, even if now wider, remains 64Article5oftheProtocolontheApplicationofthePrinciplesofSubsidiarityandProportionalityattachedtotheTEUandtheTFEU.

65TheCourtofJustice,PrinciplesofECLaw,CourtReformandConstitutionalAdjudication,15EUROPEANBUSINESSLAWREVIEW1115,1117(2004).

66Case6/64,Costav.ENEL,1964E.C.R.585,Case26/62,VanGendenLoos,1963E.C.R.1.

67Opinion1/91,DraftTreatyontheestablishmentofaEuropeanEconomicArea,1991E.C.R.I‐6079.


constitutionallyinescapable.TheUnionmaynotextenditsowncompetences.Totrespassbeyond the Treaty‐defined limits is to destroy the foundations of the compact: it iscertainly not for the EU legislature to adjust those limits for reasons of politicalconvenience.Practicedoesnotcoincidewithprinciple.TheproblemisthattheTreatydeniestheCourtan operationally useful role in checking the limits of Article 114 TFEU. The problem isthereforethatthelegislatureinpracticeenjoysdiscretionheretoo.ItisabletoexploitthebroadandfuzzycontoursofArticle114TFEUtoconvertcompliancewiththeprincipleofconferral into littlemorethanadraftingexercise. In fact, thetwogotogether: theCourthasstriventoprovideamoreconcreteshapetothe limitsofArticle114TFEUthandoesthe terms of the Treaty, but in doing so it has simply offered up an invitation to thelegislaturetoenjoytheprotectionofitsslipstream.Thecaselawservesasadraftingguide.InthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcase,examinedaboveinSection(B),theannulledDirective98/43 purported to harmonize laws governing advertising or sponsorship of tobaccoproductsinordertoimprovethefunctioningoftheinternalmarketinproductsthatserveasmediaforsuchmessages.TheRecitalsclaimedaneedtocountercircumventionoftherules by covering all forms and means of advertising (apart from television advertisingwhichwasalreadycoveredbyDirective89/552)but,beyondthis,itofferednoexplanationofwhythematerialscopewassoextraordinarilybroad,banning“all formsofadvertisingand sponsorship” in the EU, according toArticle 3(1). It is in fact a very short legislativetext, occupying just four pages of the Official Journal. So the Court fixed on “static”advertisingmediasuchasposters,cinemaadvertisingandadvertisingviaparasolsandash‐trays,noneofwhichareexplicitlymentioned inthemeasureatall,andcommentedthattradebetweenMemberStateswasnotfacilitatedbytheban68whichappearstobebasedontheGermansubmissionthattradeis“practicallynon‐existentandhastodatenotbeensubjecttoanyrestrictions.”69BycontrastinexparteBAT70andSwedishMatch71(whichconcernthesamemeasure)andinAlliance for Natural Health72 the legislative explanation was much fuller. In Directive2002/46,themeasureatstakeinAllianceforNaturalHealth,therecitalsidentifya“direct”impactonthefunctioningofthe internalmarketasaresultof legislativediversity. Inthe

68CaseC‐376/98,supra,note1,atpara.99.

69Id.,para.16.



72CasesC‐154/04&C‐155/04,supra,note31.


second Tobacco Advertising case73 Directive 2003/33 was naturally more carefullypresented than its annulled predecessor: as explained, it was tied to the advertising oftobaccoproductsonamuchmorenarrowlydrawnrangeofmedia.Moreovertherecitalsto Directive 2003/33 dutifully claim there is an “appreciable” risk of distortion ofcompetition;“likely” increase infuturebarriers isasserted.Thelegislature learnstodraftmeasures with a good deal more care, relying heavily on the constitutionally approvedvocabularywithwhichtheCourtsupplieditinthefirstTobaccoAdvertisingcaseandthosethathavefollowed.And–crucially–thereisminimalscopefortheCourttodomorethanacceptthattheconstitutionalboxeshavebeenticked.The question now is whether the first Tobacco Advertising case was really aconstitutionally significant assertionof judicialpolicingof the limitsof EU lawor insteadsimplyaglimpseofamomentoflegislativelaziness.Allthatthelegislatureneededtohavedone in the annulled Directive 98/43was to assert the imminent emergence of diverserulesgoverningadvertisingonashtraysandparasols(andsoon),perhapsaddingreferenceto Member State regulatory intentions and/ or concerns expressed by traders, and toconnectthistoobstaclestofreemovementinsuchgoods.TheEUlegislatureknowsbetternow:thankstotheCourt’scase law, ithas itsdraftingguide.Legislativecompliancewiththeprinciplesofsubsidiarityandproportionalityisreadilyachievedbyfaithfulrepetitionofthe formulae approvedby theCourt: this is troubling, but reflects the intensely politicalcharacter of the assessments involved whichmilitate against intense judicial review. Bycontrast it is profoundly alarming that determining the limits of the EU’s conferredcompetence pursuant to Article 114 TFEU is also in practice subject to a high degree oflegislative discretion. The reality, surveyed supra, in Section D, is a proliferation ofgenerousjudicialapprovalofwide‐rangingregulatoryinterventionconductedbytheEUinthe(inpractice)unverifiablenameofmarket‐makingharmonization.F.Whatcanbedoneaboutthis?TheLisbonReformsThedebatesaboutEUcompetenceconductedoverthepastdecadelargelyassumethatamore effective review system is required. It is time to move beyond the orthodoxassumption that the political institutionswill take care of competence anxieties ex antewhiletheCourtwillstepinexpostfactoifneeded.74Competenceisbothapoliticalanda


74ForanalysiswithrichbibliographyseeArminvonBogdandy&JürgenBast,TheFederalOrderofCompetences,in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEANCONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 275 (ArminVonBogdandy& JürgenBast eds., 2010), noting thatpreoccupationwithmattersofcompetenceisarelativelyrecentphenomenoninEUscholarship.Forcommentonthe adjustments planned by the Treaty establishing a Constitution which were left largely unchanged insubsequent wrangling, see Paul Craig, Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration, 29EUROPEANLAWREVIEW323(2004);StephenWeatherill,BetterCompetenceMonitoring,30EUROPEANLAWREVIEW23(2005);MartinNettesheim,DieKompetenzordnungimVertragübereineVerfassungfürEuropa,39EUROPARECHT511(2004);VladConstantinesco,Lescompetencesetleprincipledesubsidiarité,41(2)REVUETRIMISTRIELLEDEDROIT


legal/constitutional issue. Taking it seriously demands attention to both text andinstitutionalcontext.The Lisbon Treaty has made some useful reforms. But they are badly judged in somerespects: this is explained below. Moreover, the need for greater scrutiny has becomemorepressingas ithasbecomestill clearerevenafter theentry into forceof theLisbonTreaty that the Court’s role is and will remain limited. In summary of the examinationpresentedaboveculminatinginthepost‐LisbonrulinginVodafone,75theCourt’scaselawdoesnotdiscloseaneffectivebasisforpolicingthelimitsofEUcompetenceingeneralandthosepertainingtoArticle114TFEUinparticular.Thecaselawisadraftingguideforthelegislature: the Court is empowering, not restraining, the legislative institutions.76 Andproportionality and subsidiarity too have become little more than labels which thelegislature attaches to adoptedmeasures in termswhich simplymimic the Court’s ownconstitutionalvocabulary.TheLisbonTreatyaimstoclarifymoreaggressivelythattheMemberStatesarethesourceof thecompetenceswhichareconferredon theUnion.This isvisible inArticle1(1)TEU.Moreover,theTreatybroadcaststhepointthatcompetencesnotconferredontheUnionrestwiththeMemberStates.ThisisvisibleinArticles4(1)and5(2)TEU.Theseprovisionsreflect a political desire to emphasize more powerfully the limited nature of the EU’spowersandfunctions.Butthisisnovelrhetoric:thereisnochangeofsubstance.SimilarlyTitleITFEUonCategoriesandAreasofUnioncompetence(Articles2‐6TFEU)isagooddealmore transparent in its portrayal of the scope, nature and effect of Union legislativecompetence thananything tobe found in theprofoundlymessypre‐LisbonTreaty texts.This may well help to improve the quality of the debate about the nature of the EU’scompetence.Butinsubstancelittlechanges.And,forpresentpurposes,itisimportantthattextualadjustmentsmadetowhatarenowArticles26and114TFEUandtotheprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiarityarecosmetic:noattempthasbeenmadetore‐drafttherelevantprovisionsinawaythatbetterservestolimitEUaction.Onemust readily admit that the Lisbon reformshave a conservative taste.More radicalproposed alterations were not accepted.77 So, for example, the idea of a “hard list”

EUROPÉEN 305 (2005). On aspects of the debate even in advance of the Treaty establishing a Constitution seeIngolfPernice,RethinkingthemethodsofDividingandControllingtheCompetencesoftheUnion,inTHETREATYOFNICEANDBEYOND:ENLARGEMENTANDCONSTITUTIONALREFORM,121(MadsAndenasandJohnUshereds.,2003).


76 See Wyatt, supra, note 19, finding the case law to disclose both competence‐restricting and competence‐enhancingelements,thelattersteadilyerodingtheformer.

77On the several ideas aired and largely rejected in thedebate over the last decade, see StephenWeatherill,Competence Creep and Competence Control, 23 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 1 (2004); George Bermann,CompetencesoftheUnion,inEUROPEANUNIONLAWFORTHE21STCENTURY,VOLUME1,65,(TakisTridimasandPaolisa


governingcompetence,settinganexhaustiveandtightly‐definedagendafortheEUand/orplacing areas off‐limits the Union and therefore remaining within the exclusivecompetenceof theMemberStates,was rejected.ThedeletionofArticles95and/or308(now 114 and 352) as the principal problem cases in the corrosive trajectory of“competence creep”78 was rejected. Equipping national Parliaments with a veto, a redcard, was rejected. More aggressive judicial control of adopted or even proposedlegislation,perhapsinvolvingafreshlyminted“courtofcompetence”comprisingmembersdrawnfromnotonlytheEUbutalsonationaljudiciaries,wasrejected.Thedebateswereheatedandinsomerespectssophisticated,butthebasicaim,whicheverparticularmodelamong the radical alternatives was promoted, is to block “competence creep” and toconfinetheEUtoanagendawhichcanbereliablyidentifiedinadvance;andtoensurethewhistlecanbeblownquicklyanduncontroversiallyiftheboundaryiscrossed.Theproblemis that thiswill imposesignificant costsmeasured in inflexibility. Itwilldiminish theEU’scapacitytoacteffectivelyinordertoaddress(thewiderangeof)objectivesassignedtoitby its Treaties.More broadly, attempting to demarcate EU from State activity suggest aseparation that is not only not conducive to flexible problem‐solving, it also feeds thepernicious assumption that “Brussels” is an arena divorced from and alien to nationalpolitical culture. The Treaty revision process was doubtless anchored by a degree ofinertia,protectiveofEUbusiness‐as‐usual,buttherewerealsogoodreasonforopposinginjectionsofrigidity,andtheywontheday.Internalmarketlawisapowerfulexampleofhow areas of truly exclusive State competence are few and, were it otherwise, theachievement of the core economic objectives of the Treatywould be gravely imperiled.Andtheestablishmentofanewcompetence‐specific judicial tribunalwouldsetuptensejurisdictionaldemarcationdisputes.TobaccoAdvertising79wouldgothere.WouldexparteWatts80orVikingLine81orMangold?82TheonlyadjustmentmadebytheLisbonTreatytothepatternofjudicialcontrolconcernsstanding.Article8of theProtocolon theapplicationof theprinciplesof subsidiarityandproportionality refers to the existing jurisdiction of the Court under Article 263 TFEU tocheckalegislativeact’scompliancewiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity.ItthenaddsthattheCommitteeoftheRegionsmaybringanactionagainstlegislativeactsfortheadoptionof

Nebbiaeds.,2004).Forpioneeringanxieties,seeJosephWeiler,TheEuropeanUnionbelongstoitsCitizens:ThreeImmodestProposals,22EUROPEANLAWREVIEW150(1997).

78 Cf.Mark Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 14 JOURNAL OFPUBLICPOLICY95(1994);Weatherill,supra,note77.


80CaseC‐372/042006E.C.R.I‐4325.

81CaseC‐438/052007E.C.R.I‐10779.

82CaseC‐144/042005E.C.R.I‐9981.


whichtheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionprovidesthatitbeconsulted;and,ofpresentrelevance,thatapplicationsmaybebroughtbyMemberStatesor“notifiedby them in accordancewith their legal orderonbehalf of their national Parliamentor achamberthereof.”Thisispeculiar.Itseemsthatthisdoesnomorethanstatethecurrentposition!PerhapstheintentistoconferanobligationonaMemberStatetopursuesuchanapplicationwhereitsnationalParliamentorachamberthereofsoresolves:butthis iscertainlynottheinevitableinterpretationofthisobscurephrasing.MoreoverthisrouteisofnopracticalvalueiftheCourtadherestoitscautiousapproachtojudicialreviewinthenameofsubsidiarity(explainedsupra,inSectionE.I).ThedominantassumptionthroughouttheprocessofreviewinitiatedattheConventiononthe Future of Europe and concluded in December 2009 on the entry into force of theLisbonTreatywasthattheCourt’sreviewfunctionshouldnotbeadjusted–thoughrarelywas itsactualcontenteverconsidered‐butthat itneededtobesupplementedbyotherpolitical controls. In particular, a more questioning political culture was needed, and itshouldinfecttheexanteprocess.Inthisvein,forallitsconservativetendencies,theLisbonTreatyhasachievedinstitutionalreform.ForthefirsttimenationalParliamentsareformallygrantedadirectinvolvementinthe EU lawmaking process. Whereas hitherto the assumption was that their interestswouldbereflectedintheCounciland,inturn,thattheywouldholdtheirrepresentativesinCouncil to account, thismodel has been treated as inadequate. Executive power, ratherthanParliamentarycontrol,hastoooftenbeentherealityofCouncilpractice.This isonereasonwhy EU legislative competencehas crept outwards.National Parliaments are theprincipal losers and giving them a voice is an attractive way to re‐balance the EUlawmakingdebateinthedirectionofamorecriticaltone.MuchofthiswasacceptedattheConvention on the Future of Europe. Its proposals were incorporated in the Treatyestablishing a Constitution and then with some small adjustment transplanted to theTreatyofLisbon.AnewArticle12TEU,locatedinTitleIIonProvisionsonDemocraticPrinciples,dealswiththeroleofnationalParliaments.Theyshall“contributeactivelytothegoodfunctioningoftheUnion.”Competence control is part of this, and is of direct relevance to the currentinquiry.83 TheProtocol on the role of national Parliaments dealswith thedistribution tonationalParliamentsofinformationconcerninginteraliaplannedlegislativeinitiatives;thesubmission of a reasoned opinion in cases of suspected violation of the subsidiarityprinciple by a draft legislative act; an eight week (this is extended from the six weekwindowprovidedforintheTreatyestablishingaConstitution)standstillperioddesignedtogive national Parliaments a real practical opportunity to intervene, applicable in all buturgentcases. 83 On this, and more generally, see Martin Gennart, Les Parlements Nationaux dans le Traité de Lisbonne:EvolutionouRévolution,46/1–2CAHIERSDEDROITEUROPEEN17(2010).


TheProtocolonsubsidiarityandproportionalityabsorbsthisprocedureinArticle6.TheninArticle7 itputsfleshonthebones.Wherereasonedopinionsonnon‐compliancewithsubsidiarityrepresentatleastonethirdofallthevotesallocatedtonationalParliaments,the draft legislative act must be reviewed. This is the so‐called yellow card. TheCommission may then maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, giving reasons for this.Wherereasonedopinionsonnon‐compliancewithsubsidiarityrepresentasimplemajorityofvotescastbynationalparliaments,thentheCommissionmustreviewtheproposaland,if it decides tomaintain it, itmust itself present a reasonedopinion settingout its viewwhytheproposalcomplieswiththesubsidiarityprinciple.Itis,then,notaredcard–aveto‐butratherithascometobeknownasanorangecard.ItwasnotenvisagedbytheTreatyestablishingaConstitution,sointhisrespecttheLisbonTreaty,bysteppingbeyondamereyellowcard,hasstrengthenedthecontrol.TheseopinionsarethenmadeavailabletotheUnion legislator and shall be considered in the manner set out in Article 7(3) of theProtocol, which provides for consideration before the conclusion of the first reading ofcompliancewithsubsidiaritycoupledtospecialvotingrulesallowingCouncilorParliamentto terminate the proposal. The procedure is applicable not only to subsidiarity concernsarising under any Treaty provision authorizing legislative action: it applies mutatismutandis to any legislative proposal adopted under Article 352 TFEU, where objectionsneednotbeconfinedtoperceivedviolationofthesubsidiarityprinciple.Thereisnoredcardbutobjectionsonascalesufficienttobrandishayellowcardand,allthemore so, anorange cardwill doubtless constitute real political pressure thatwill bedamaging, if not necessarily fatal, to the proposed measure’s vitality. It is moreoverpossiblethatuseofthenewexantemonitoringsystemwillprovidethebasisforaslightlymore intensiveexpost controlby theCourt: inparticularonemightenvisage that if theobjections of several national Parliaments were swept aside with contemptuously thinreasoning the Court might be inclined to find the measure invalid. The Court couldplausibly effect a shift in presumption: the Commissionwould need to show somethingapproachingamanifest errorof appraisal in theobjectionsbefore it couldproceedwiththeproposal, onpainof annulment.84 The threatof suchexpost controlmighthelpfullyinduce political actors at EU level to take seriously ex ante critical input by nationalParliaments.ThebasicaimistomaximizetheopportunityfordialogueaboutEUlegislativepracticeandforthevoiceofthenationalParliamentstobeheardmoreeffectively.TheProtocolhasthepotential to serve as a framework which national Parliaments will need actively tocompleteinordertoensuretheproceduredoesnotbecomeadeadletter.85Itishowever

84SeeDerrickWyatt,CouldaYellowCardforNationalParliamentsstrengthenJudicialaswellasPoliticalPolicingofSubsidiarity?,2CROATIANYEARBOOKOFEUROPEANLAWANDPOLICY1(2006):thisconcernsproceduresforeseenbytheTreatyestablishingaConstitutionbutappliesmutatismutandistothefinallyagreedversion.

85Cf.Gennart,supra,note83,especiallyatp.46.


likelythattheprincipalroleofnationalParliamentswillremainthatofholdingexecutivesto account in the context of national political debate – and it is probable that that isentirelyproperand,inparticular,sharpeningupscrutinyatEUlevelshouldbeinadditionto,andnotattheexpenseof,domesticcontrol.86G.Lisbon:ItcouldhavebeenBetterThe Lisbon reforms are shaped according to an assumption that straining the EU’scompetence is damaging to its legitimacy: under‐explained centralization aggravatesmistrust. Their relatively conservative character also suggests an anxiety to avoid over‐hastyabandonmentofwhatusedtobeknownas“Communitymethod.”Judgedaccordingto the durability of the method of competence allocation and its ex ante and ex postapplicationinordertoforestalltheslippageofauthorityfromconstituentelementstothecentre theEU’sorthodoxarrangementsscorebadlywhencomparedwith (other) federalarrangements.87Thisisnotsosurprising.TheEUisrelativelyyoung,anditbeganlifewithnothing. The debate of the current decade can be viewed optimistically as a sign ofmaturity,withinwhichamorebalancedassessmentmaybemadeabout thevirtuesandvicesofcentralizationandlocalautonomyinEurope.ItisalsotobereadasarejectionofmoreaggressivedesiretoswingthewholedebateagainstthepossibilityofcentralizationintheEU.The principal place for addressing the problems of “competence creep”must lie in theinstitutional culture of the EU, nourishedby input fromnational political culture. In factthere is a mix of constitutionally distinct phenomena at stake in this debate aboutcompetence.Itcoversfixingthescopeoflegislativecompetence“proper”(whichisArticle5(2)TEU);thedirectionsgivenbythesubsidiarityandproportionalityprinciplesonwhenalegislative competence should be exercised (Articles 5(3) and 5(4) TFEU); and, morebroadly, the exhortations to regulate “better,” which embrace concern for clarity,simplification,andsoon.There iscompetencecreep; legislativecreep;andthere ispoorquality legislating. The ambition to produce “Better Lawmaking” in the EU and, moregenerally, “Better Regulation” and latterly “Smarter Regulation” reflects these several

86AnnePeters,EuropeanDemocracyafterthe2003Convention,41COMMONMARKETLAWREVIEW37,especiallyat62 (2004). See on this and more generally Adam Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments in the EU’s NewConstitutionalOrder, in EUROPEANUNION LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, VOLUME 1, 153, (Takis Tridimas and PaolisaNebbia eds., 2004); AdamCygan,TheParliamentarisation of EUDecision‐Making? The Impact of the Treaty ofLisbononNationalParliaments,36EUROPEANLAWREVIEW(forthcoming,2012).

87E.g.LoriThorlakson,BuildingFirewallsorFloodgates?ConstitutionalDesignfortheEuropeanUnion,44JOURNALOF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 139 (2006); Wifried Swenden, Is the European Union in need of a CompetenceCatalogue?InsightsfromComparativeFederalism,42JOURNALOFCOMMONMARKETSTUDIES371(2004).ForgeneralEU/US comparisons, seeKALYPSONICOLAÏDIS ANDROBERTHOWSE (EDS), THE FEDERALVISION: LEGITIMACYAND LEVELSOFGOVERNANCEINTHEUNITEDSTATESANDTHEEUROPEANUNION(2001).


concernsthattheEUidentifyitsallocatedtask(s)withmoreprecisionanddischargethemwithmore care.88 The stakes are high, forwhere anxietiesmount that local preferenceswillbediscounted,fearofandalienationfromcentralizationiscorrespondinglygreater.89TheEU’slegitimacyisatstake.90UndertheTreatyascurrentlystructured,theCourthasandcanhaveonlyalimitedroleinpolicing these rules. Enhancing respect for the constitutional fundamentals among thepolitical institutions is the real prize, and the Lisbon involvement of the nationalParliamentshasatleastsomepotentialforpromotingthat.Thereare,however,reasonstobeskepticalaboutthevirtuesoftheLisbonarrangements.TheLisbonTreatycountsinpartasamissedopportunity.Therearetwounfortunateerrorsinparticular:thedecouplingofArticles352and114andthedecouplingofsubsidiarityandproportionality.I.TheDecouplingofArticles114and352TFEUTheLaekenDeclarationofDecember2001,whichsetinmotiontheprocessthatledtotheConventionontheFutureofEurope,pickedoutexplicitlytwoTreatyprovisionsasripeforreview because of their tendency to generate “competence creep.” The spotlight wasturnedonArticles95and308EC,whicharenowArticles114and352TFEU,andnootherprovisions. But only Article 308 EC, which is now Article 352 TFEU, is picked out in the“reasonedopinion”procedureinvolvingnationalParliamentaryoversight.SocontroloftheTreaty‐conferred competence to harmonize pursuant to Article 95 EC, now Article 114TFEU,remainsfocusedonjudicialcontrol–noextrapoliticaldimensionhasbeeninjected.This is regrettable. The linkage made at Laeken appears to have been broken at theConventionontheFutureofEuropesimplybecauseofthedistributionofmattersamong

88 For relevant documentation see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better‐regulation/index_en.htm, lastaccessed 2March 2011. The Commission publishes an annual report on “Better Lawmaking” pursuant to theProtocolontheapplicationoftheprinciplesofsubsidiarityandproportionality.Thereporton2006wasthelasttocover not only subsidiarity and proportionality but also improving the quality of the regulatory environment:“BetterLawmaking2006,”COM(2007)286,6June2007.Beginningin2007thecoveragehasbeensplitbetweena“ReportonSubsidiarityandProportionality,”e.g.thereportcovering2009isCOM(2010)547,8October2010,and a separate strategic review of Better Regulation, now to be transformed into Smart Regulation: seeCommission Communication “Smart Regulation in the European Union” (COM (2010) 543, 8 October 2010).“Intelligent”wouldbeamoreelegantwordinEnglishandisindeedthechosenwordintheFrenchandGermantexts ‐ “smart” betrays a strong backgroundAmerican influence. See generally STEPHENWEATHERILL (ED.), BETTERREGULATION(2007);CLAUDIORADAELLIANDFABRIZIODEFRANCESCO,REGULATORYQUALITYINEUROPE:CONCEPTS,MEASURES,ANDPOLICYPROCESSES(2007).

89Cf.thesustainedcritiqueinthisveinofferedbySOMEK,supra,note47.

90SeeStephenWeatherill,CompetenceandLegitimacy,inTHEOUTERLIMITSOFEUROPEANUNIONLAW,17,(CatherineBarnardandOkeogheneOdudueds.,2009).


the severalWorkingGroups, rather thanbyany consciousdesign.91And the linkagewasnever re‐established.So theTreatyestablishingaConstitutionplannedspecial treatmentforwhatisnowArticle352TFEUaloneandtheLisbonTreatyretainedthatnarrowfocus.Itis most unfortunate. Both Article 114 and Article 352 are twinned in the LaekenDeclarationasproblemcasesfromtheperspectiveof“competencecreep”andtheyshouldhave remained twinned in the new procedure involving political oversight by nationalParliaments.If anything, Article 114 is more of a danger than Article 352: at least, its creepingtendenciesaretoolittleappreciated.Asexplainedabove,energeticusehasbeenmadeofArticle114TFEUtoshapetheEU’sharmonizedprogrammeinfieldssuchaspublichealthandconsumerpolicy,wheretherelevantsector‐specific legalbases,Articles168and169respectively,arenarrowlydrawnandconsequently littleused.ThebreadthofArticle114in this respect is especially striking when one recalls that the Court has not been sogenerous in its readingofArticle352.ThatTreatyprovision is commonlydamnedas theprincipalthreattothe“limits”oftheTreaty,butitmaynotbeusedwhereasector‐specificlegal base is available: the specific excludes the general. This hasbeen theCourt’s long‐standing approach92 and its limiting effect on the role of Article 352 was of sufficientpoliticalsignificanceforoneparticularapplicationofittobeinsertedbythereformsmadebytheLisbonTreaty:thisisnowArticle352(3)whichprovidesthatuseofArticle352shallnotentailharmonizationofMemberStates’lawsorregulationsincaseswheretheTreatiesexcludesuchharmonization.Article114isnotsolimited.PerhapsthisreflectstheneedforArticle114asafunctionallybroadprovisionthatisapttoensurethelegislativedynamismnecessaryfortheconstructionofaninternalmarket.Perhaps,too,itrevealsacertainlackofappreciationofthebiteofArticle114.ItisnotonlythoseengagedindraftingwhatultimatelyemergedastheLisbonTreatywhofailed toheed the LaekenDeclaration’swise insistence that (what arenow)Articles 114and352TFEUshouldbecoupledinappreciationoftheperilsof“competencecreep.”TheGerman Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) has gathered areputationasaconcernedobserverofthetendencyoftheEUtoplayfastandloosewiththeconstitutionallyfundamentalprincipleofconferral,nowlocatedinArticle5TEU.Inits1993Maastricht ruling it asserted a power of review of EU acts to check they remainwithin the limits mandated by the Treaty: transgression would deprive the measure oflegallybindingeffect inGermany.93 In its2009 Lisbon ruling it insistedontheprimacyof

91OntheprogressofthematterattheConventionseeWeatherill,supra,note74.

92E.g.Cases8/73,HauptzollamtBremerhavenv.Massey‐Ferguson,1973E.C.R.897;Case45/86,Commissionv.Council,1987E.C.R.1493;CaseC‐350/92,Spainv.Council,1995E.C.R.I‐1985.

93 Judgmentof12October1993,2BvR2134/92,2BvR2159/92,BVerfGE89,144 (Brunner v. EuropeanUnionTreaty).


the principle of conferral as a buffer against the EU asserting Kompetenz‐Kompetenz orviolatingaState’sconstitutionalidentity.94Theserulingsdisclosehungerforpredictabilityin the scope of EU competence as an essential element in practical supervision of theprinciple of conferral. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has not found an EU act to havecommittedthetransgressionitdeemedimpermissibleinMaastricht;andinLisbonitfoundthe Treaty met its demands and so Germany could and did ratify it. But even absentexecution, the threatofnational judicial refusal toapplyanEUact that it treatsas lyingbeyondtheTreatymandateprovidesa lurkinganxiety in thebackgroundtotheCourtofJustice’s self‐awarded exclusive jurisdiction to police the limits to EU legislative activity.Andyet forall the skeptical tendenciesof theBundesverfassungericht itsLisbon ruling isoddly short‐sighted. The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s suspicion of all those actors andinstitutionsengagedinpropellingaperceivedextravagantuseof(whatisnow)Article352TFEUinawaythatmayunderminetheprincipleofconferralpromptedittomakeGermanratificationoftheLisbonTreatyconditionalondomesticpoliticalreformdesigned(inshort)toenhance thebrakingpowerexercisableby theLänder.Thiswillundoubtedlydiminish,perhaps even halt, EU lawmaking activities pursuant to Article 352.95 But it had nothingcomparable to say about the perils of Article 114 TFEU as a threat in practice to theprinciple of conferral. The Lisbon judgment takes some account of the reliability of thetextual limits placed on the harmonization of criminal law but even in this respect itsobservationsarestrikinglycomplacentinassumingthetextuallimitationsintheTreatycanbe reliably monitored and maintained.96 Harmonization of laws is treated by theBundesverfassungsgerichtasaminorthreat,ifathreatatall,totheprincipleofconferral.Thepracticespeaksotherwise.II.TheDecouplingofSubsidiarityandProportionalityArticle 352’s ill‐considered divorce from Article 114 counts as a deficiency in thearrangements introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. A further regrettable dimension of thearrangements introduced by the Lisbon Treaty concerns the focus of nationalParliamentary scrutiny on subsidiarity to the exclusion of proportionality. The twoprinciplesarecloselyrelatedandinsomerespectstheyoverlap.Thisismostobviouswhenone considers the intensity of an EUmeasure: does it go beyond what is necessary toachieve the end in view? This engages both proportionality and subsidiarity. So forexampletherulinginexparteBATconfirmscompliancewiththesubsidiarityprincipleby

94JudgmentoftheSecondSenateof30June2009–2BvE2/08.

95Cf.PhilipKiiver,TheLisbonJudgmentoftheGermanConstitutionalCourt:ACourt‐OrderedStrengtheningoftheNationalLegislatureintheEU,16EUROPEANLAWJOURNAL578(2010).

96Seeespecially,butnotonly,para.362.


simplycross‐referringtotheparagraphsofthejudgmentwhichdealwithproportionality.97InVodafonetheCourtwasfacedwiththeargumentthatRegulationNo717/2007infringedtheprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiaritybycoveringnotonlywholesalebutalsoretail charges. It resisted on the basis that – in short – there is an interdependencebetweenthetwolevelsinthechainwhichmakestheregulationofonebutnottheotherill‐suited to the task at hand. But although the treatment of proportionality is lengthierthan that pertaining to subsidiarity the core of the analysis is just the same. Even theProtocolontheprinciplesofsubsidiarityandproportionalityfailsinArticle5toachieveanyclearseparationbetweenthetwoprinciples.AccordinglytoincludesubsidiaritybutnotproportionalityinthereviewprocessconductedbynationalParliamentsriskstriggeringunhelpfuldemarcationdisputes.Largely,itseems,as a result of accident not design,98 the Treaty establishing a Constitution made thismistake,and,leftuncorrected,itisrepeatedintheLisbonTreaty.III.ThePressingNeedforFreshThinkingandConstructiveDebatesThese are to some extent technical “lawyer’s objections.” In practice perhaps nationalParliamentswillbeableto initiateconstructivedebateswithoutconcernfortighttextualdemarcation of the scope of the “reasoned opinion” procedure. In October 2010 theConference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of theEuropeanUnion(COSAC)encouragednationalParliamentsto“monitortheapplicationoftheprinciplesof subsidiarityandproportionalityaccording to theproceduresoutlined inProtcol2annexedtotheTreaties”;and,moreover,to“continuethepoliticaldialoguewiththeEuropeanCommissionnotonlylimitedtolegislativeproposalsandgoingwellbeyondthe issue of subsidiarity.”99 This plainly evidences a desire to slip free of the formalrestraints set out in the Treaty and its Protocols. And it is possible that nationalParliaments will find the Commission receptive to such practical extension in theirinvolvement. But focusonArticle352TFEUandonsubsidiarity,andexclusionofArticle114 TFEU and proportionality, is ill‐advised and needlessly increases the risk of theprocedure being treated in a narrow formalmanner thatwill generate political tensionsandriskitbeingsidelinedasineffective.Itcouldhavebeenbetter.Themain issuewill, however, be the extent towhich constructive dialogue can truly bepromoted. Pre‐existing problems such as sheer lack of time to turn the gaze away fromdomestic politics to Brussels cannot be solved by creating a procedure on paper. And

97CaseC‐491/01,supra,note16:paragraph184cross‐referstoparagraphs122to141.

98OnthecompositionandprogressoftheWorkingGroupsseeWeatherill,supra,note74.

99O.J.2010C340/9,atpara4.4.


nationalexecutivesdominateParliamentsmostofthetimeinmostoftheMemberStates.Sooneneedstobecareful in identifyingwhatfreshcritical thinkingnationalParliamentsmaybeablerealistically tocontribute,andwhattheymaynot.100ButasaminimumthisagendapointstothethematicconcernoftheLisbonTreatytoraisetheprofileofnational‐level political processes and controls, and tomake thinner the apparent dividebetween“Brussels”andnationalpoliticallife.Thisistobeapplauded–loudly.It isabsolutelycriticaltothesuccessofthenewarrangementsthatavocabularyisfoundthat goes beyond the very narrow reading of subsidiarity which the Court uses for thepurposesof (avoiding) judicial reviewof adoptedacts. If national Parliamentaryprotestsadvanced in the name of subsidiarity are dealt with by formal recourse to the judicialmantrathatonlytheEUcandelivercommonrulesthennothingusefulwillemerge:infactthis may generate new and thoroughly unhelpful antagonisms. But at the same timesubsidiarityreviewcannotbeallowedtocollapseintoageneralrancorouscrybygrumpynational politicians to “keep Brussels out.” So a wider, more sophisticated and morequestioningversionofsubsidiarityisrequired–onewhichallowsthedialoguetoaddressin an informed sector‐specific context whether an EU initiative, though coherent evencompellingwhenviewedfromtheperspectiveoftheachievementoftheobjectivesoftheEU, is nonetheless sufficiently detrimental to national or local values or interests todeserverejection.TheremaybesomesmallscopefortheCourttoimprovethequalityofthis debate by insisting more sternly on transparency and reason‐giving in support oflegislative choices made. Acts bare of any serious attempt to explain why a conferredcompetencehasbeenexercisedinthemannerselecteddeserveannulment:sotoothosethatfailtodescribetheprocessofandinfluenceexertedbyconsultation.TheCourtdoesnotdemandpiouslegislativeadherencetoanexanteCommissionimpactassessment:butit correctly requires that anydeparturebeproperly explained.101 The yellowandorangecards introduced by the Lisbon Treaty offer the Court further opportunities to promotedialogue about the nature and purpose of EU laws by withholding validity from an actadopted in the absence of serious engagement with objections raised by nationalParliaments.102 Such review, however, remains predominantly procedural. The Courtproperly seeks topush the legislative institutions toadopta fullerandmore transparentapproach to the question ‘why legislate?’ but answers given are not apt for judicialinvalidation, unless manifestly absurd. As elaborated supra, in Section E.1, the widerpolitical(social,cultural)assessmentofwhetherornottoadoptcentralizedrulesintheEU

100 For a helpfully nuanced discussion see Katrin Auel, Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments:RedefiningtheImpactofParliamentaryScrutinyinEUAffairs,13EUROPEANLAWJOURNAL487(2007).ForaskepticalviewofthevalueofnationalParliaments inthisareaseePHILIPKIIVER,THENATIONALPARLIAMENTS INTHEEUROPEANUNION–ACRITICALVIEWONEUCONSTITUTION‐BUILDING(2006).

101CaseC‐343/09,supra,note50(wheretherewassuchdeparture,adequatelyexplained);CaseC‐58/08,supra,note41(wheretherewasnodeparture).

102Cf.Wyatt,supra,note84.


isnotofatypethatservesasabasisforjudicialreviewofthesubstanceofadoptedacts.Accordingly itmustbe loadedmoreeffectively intothedeliberationsof theCommission,Council and Parliament. In this regard it is worth repeating that national Parliaments’primary,ifnolongerexclusive,meansofaccesstotheEUlawmakingprocessisbyholdingtheirrepresentativesinCounciltoaccount,notleastwhereunder‐explainedcentralizationis favored. Generally the point of greater involvement by national Parliaments is not toinject radical changebut rather to nudge thepolitical system in thedirectionof amorecriticalapproachtoEUlawmaking.Itisworthtrying.103H.ConclusionThe title of this article was made in Washington. The accusation that lenient judicialcontrol becomes no more than a “drafting guide” which enables easy legislativecompliance with the principle of conferral is extracted from the Opinion of Sandra DayO’ConnorintheUSSupremeCourt’s2005rulinginGonzalezv.Raich.104Thisconcernedachallenge to the constitutionality of a federal law adopted under the US “CommerceClause,” which has close functional similarities to Article 114 TFEU. The federal law inquestion, theControlledSubstancesActenacted in1970,placedcontrolledsubstances–drugs, in short ‐ into fivecategoriesanddefinedexhaustivelyhow, if atall, theymaybemanufactured,suppliedorpossessed.Ofparticularrelevancetothelitigationinthecase,whichhademergedfromCalifornia,thefederalactprohibitedintra‐Statenon‐commercialcultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes. Was this withinCongress’s legislative power? The Supreme Court held that it was. Regulating purelyintrastate or local activitywas justified for fear that permitting it would “undercut” thewider interstate régime: that is, the very notion of purely local trade was treated asimprobable in a market that is economically integrated. And Congress had a “rationalbasis”105 both to find the need to curtail such undercutting and to place the particulartargeted ban at stake within the wider scheme of a national regime devoted to drugsgenerally.Bringingevensuchlocalactivitieswithintheregimewastreatedasvalid.Tocheckthis,themajoritywenttotheintroductorysectionsoftheActitself–andweresatisfiedwithwhat

103Onemergentpracticeevenpre‐LisbonseeCommissionReportonBetterLawmaking2006,COM(2007)286,6June 2007, pages 8‐9; see also the (short) report of the Conference of Community and European AffairsCommittees of Parliaments of the EuropeanUnion (COSAC),O.J. 2007OJ C 206/7, section 2. The CommissionReportonSubsidiarityandProportionalitycovering2009(COM(2010)547,8October2010)alsocontainsbriefmentionofpre‐Lisbonpractice (para.3.2)andpromisesanoverviewofpost‐Lisbonco‐operationwithnationalParliamentsinthefollowingyear’sreport(para.5).

104545U.S.1(2005).

105545U.S.1,supra,note104,MajorityOpinionpages16,19,24,28,30.


wasthereevenintheabsenceofany“particularizedfindings”concerningthiselementofthe wider regime.106 The ruling has much in common with several of those consideredabove, perhaps most evidently of all Alliance for Natural Health107 and, on the“benevolent” reading provided supra, in Section D.II, Swedish Match108: a wide regimewithinwhichparticularniche/targetedprohibitionsareembeddedistreatedasvalidwithreference to the preferences of the lawmaker, which is plainly a very soft standard ofreview. Given how low the threshold is for finding the required commercial impact oninter‐statetrade,thisisnotsosurprising.Thesimilaritiesareevidentthroughout:Gonzalezv. Raich and previous case law establishes that Congress has the power to regulateactivities that substantially affect interstate commerce, which immediately evokes theLuxembourg Court’s concern to find some notional threshold to prevent Article 114becomingaclaimtogeneralregulatorycompetence.Themajoritymakesnothingofhowto quantify that element of substantiality (though Judge Scalia, in a separate OpinionapprovingtheAct,expresslymakesclearitservestoplacelimitsonfederalpower):itisalegislativetask,itseems.ItseemshighlyprobabletheCourtofJusticewouldsimilarlyupholdthevalidityofsuchameasurewereitintroducedintheEUasameasureofharmonizationadoptedpursuanttoArticle114TFEU.OncethisisconceivedasabanonXinordertoopenupthemarketforY,then the threshold for invocation of Article 114 TFEU is crossed. The question as towhethertoexercisesuchacompetenceispolitical–butthere is legalcompetencetodoso. The Court has plainly produced a drafting guide for Article 114 TFEU and the likelyoutcome is that in practice a great deal of autonomy from constitutional review isconferredonthelegislativeinstitutions.TheUSandtheEUconfrontsimilarproblemsand,atleastforthetimebeing,theirleadingcourtshaveadoptedcomparablesolutions.Veryoccasionally the limitsofArticle114TFEUare found tobebreached:as in the firstTobacco Advertising case. Recent Supreme Court decisions where federal laws adoptedunder the Commerce Clause have fallen foul of constitutional review notably includeLopez109 concerning possession of a firearm in a school zone andMorison concerningviolence against women.110 These were much narrow measures, lacking thecomprehensive scheme of regulation at stake inGonzalez v. Raich. Again, the troublingintimationisthatthesmart/intelligentlegislatureshoulddraftawideregime,inwhichtheprohibition is packaged as simply one element of a broad regulatory framework. So the

106545U.S.1,supra,note104,pages17‐18.

107Supra,note31.

108Supra,note20.

109514U.S.549(1995).

110529U.S.598(2000).


principleoflimitstolegislativeactivityisinpracticewhollyturnedonitshead!TheerrorinLopezandinMorison,asinTobaccoAdvertising,wassimplynottobebolder.AndthiswasexactlytheprotestmadebyJusticeDayO’ConnorinherdissentingOpinioninGonzalezv.Raich.ShecomplainedthattheCongresshasa“perverseincentive”tolegislatebroadly rather than with precision, and she protested that themajority’s receptivity tosuch “packaging” allowed Congress “to set the terms of the constitutional debate.” Interms strikingly reminiscent of the European debate she viewed this as “tantamount toremoving meaningful limits” on the scope of the relevant power, granted by theCommerce Clause. The case law has become a mere “drafting guide.”111 She thereforeprefersmuchmorevigorousreview.Shefinds“objectivemarkers”112whichcastsufficientdoubt on Congress’s largely unexplained preference to lump everything, including suchlocalactivity, intoonestatuteforhertorefusetoapprovetheActasaproperuseoftheCommerceClause.The“baredeclarations”andthe“abstractassertions”intheControlledSubstancesActdonotpersuade.113Shewantsmoreprecision.ThemajorityinWashington,liketheCourtinLuxembourg,doesnot.ThepurposeofthisarticleisnotatalltoembarkonacomparisonofEUandUSpracticeinthis area. That is a quite different, though intriguing, project. I confine myself to twoobservations. First, that the SupremeCourt split 6‐3 on this apparently simple question.TheUnitedStateshasbeentacklingthesekindofquestionsformorethantwocenturiesandstillithasnofinality.Thissuggeststhatfederalquestionsofthisnatureareincapableofuncontroversialresolution,butratherthattheyarecyclical.TheEUisatanearlystageinits evolution. Second, Justice Day O’Connor was dissenting. The majority wasconstitutionally comfortablewithcase lawwhich she lambastedasa legislative “draftingguide.”SotheSupremeCourt,liketheCourtofJustice,isexposedtothecriticismthatitisa poor guardianof “states’ rights.”114 The implication is that thepolitical process shouldtake the strain: indeed themajority Opinion inGonzalez v. Raich concludes by handingresponsibilityforchangetothedemocraticprocess.Similarly in the EU the practical consequence of the Court’s approach is to entrust thelegislaturewithahighlevelofdiscretioninchoosingwhetherandhowtoharmonizelaws.Once can easily criticize the Luxembourg Court for lax standards of review and for

111529U.S.598,supra,note110,thequotesarefrompages2,4,4,4&6,and5respectively.

112529U.S.598,supra,note110,page6.

113529U.S.598,supra,note110,pages13and17respectively.

114InnocentEuropeansshouldbeawarethatalthoughthephrase“states’rights”seemstocaptureratherwelltheintentbehindcontrollingthelimitsofthecompetenceofthecentralauthorities(federalorEU),forAmericansitcarriesechoesofthestrugglebySouthernstatestoprotectslaveryand,later,racialsegregationinthenameofstateautonomy.


inventingwords–appreciable, likely–whichcarrythehighestconstitutionalsignificance,for they define the limits of EU legislative competence, yet the lowest degree ofoperational precision (supra, Section C). But the fundamental and inescapable problemhereisnotprimarilytheCourtbutthewordingofArticle114TFEUandofArticle26TFEUtowhichArticle114isexplicitlyconnected.Thisisaclassicinstanceoftheneedtoconferflexible powers on the EU so that it can effectively perform its broad and ill‐definedmission:tightlywrittencontrolswouldmilitateagainsteffectivedischargeoftasks.AndyetthisimmediatelychallengestheprincipleofconferralinArticle5TEU.Pureinprinciple,inpractice it is taintedbythefunctionalbreadthofthetwoprincipal“problemprovisions,”Articles114and352.This, indeed, iswherewe came in. AdvocateGeneral Fennelly in hisOpinion in the firstTobaccoAdvertisingcaseobserved:The Community’s internal market competence is not limited, a priori, by any reserveddomainofMemberStatepower. It isahorizontalcompetence,whoseexercisedisplacesnational regulatory competence in the field addressed. Judicial reviewof theexerciseofsuchacompetenceisadelicateandcomplexmatter.Ontheonehand,undulyrestrainedjudicial review might permit the Community institutions to enjoy, in effect, general orunlimited legislative power, contrary to the principle that the Community only enjoysthose limited competences, however extensive,which have been conferred on it by theTreaty with a view to the attainment of specified objectives. This could permit theCommunitytoencroachimpermissiblyonthepowersoftheMemberStates.Ontheotherhand,theCourtcannot,inprinciple,restrictthelegitimateperformancebytheCommunitylegislatorofitstaskofremovingbarriersanddistortionstotradeingoodsandservices.Itisthe task of the Court, as the repository of the trust and confidence of the Communityinstitutions, the Member States and the citizens of the Union, to perform this difficultfunctionofupholding theconstitutionaldivisionofpowersbetween theCommunityandtheMemberStatesonthebasisofobjectivecriteria.It is indeeda“difficultfunction”!ThecircularpatternwherebytheCourt’sanalysisoftheproper scope of legislative harmonization and the requirements of the principles ofproportionality and subsidiarity is conveniently recycled into the explanations routinelypresentedtosupportEUmeasuresoflegislativerevealshowinpractice“theconstitutionaldivisionofpowers”betweentheUnionanditsMemberStatesisunreliablypoliced.Placinga formal limit on conferred competences is central to the constitutional strategy forpreserving diversity and local autonomy in the EU but the problem is the inflation ofcentralizedauthorityinpractice.TheEU’slegitimacyistherebyimperiled.Thisiswhysuchhope is invested in the Lisbon reforms: the fresh if in some respects poorly framedinvolvementofnationalParliaments in critically reviewingproposals for compliancewithsubsidiarity (but regrettably not proportionality) and with the scope of Article 352 (butregrettablynotArticle114).And,moregenerally,thereispressingneedforallactorsandinstitutions to engagewith the crucial assessments of howmuch centralization isworth


pursuing where it will damage local autonomy. Centralization versus local autonomy inEurope:thegeneralproblemsandtensionsassociatedwithcompetencedistributionshownoinclinationtosubside.

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