ARTICLE XI: COMPLETE

CASES DIGESTS

Section 3: Impeachment

Proceedings

Francisco vs. De Venecia, G.R. 160261,

Nov. 10,2003

FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of

Representatives adopted a Resolution, which

directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct

an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the

manner of disbursements and expenditures by

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,

2003, former President Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint, which was dismissed,

against Chief Justice Davide and seven

Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the

Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and

other high crimes." A day after the dismissal, a

second impeachment complaint was filed against

the Chief Justice. Respondent House of

Representatives argues that the House

impeachment Rules do not violate the

Constitution (Sec. 3(5) of Art. XI), contending

that the term initiate does not mean to file.

ISSUE #1: When is an impeachment complaint

deemed initiated?

RULING: In cases where a Member of the

House files a verified complaint of impeachment

or a citizen files a verified complaint that is

endorsed by a Member of the House through a

resolution of endorsement against an

impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings

against such official are deemed initiated on the

day the Committee on Justice finds that the

verified complaint and/or resolution against such

official, as the case may be, is sufficient in

substance, or on the date the House votes to

overturn or affirm the finding of the said

Committee that the verified complaint and/or

resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient

in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed,

as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of

the Members of the House, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of

the filing of such verified complaint or

resolution of impeachment with the Secretary

General.

ISSUE #2: Are impeachment proceedings

outside the scope of judicial review?

RULING: No. Our Constitution, though vesting

in the House of Representatives the exclusive

power to initiate impeachment cases, provides

for several limitations to the exercise of such

power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and

(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include

the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,

and the one year bar on the impeachment of one

and the same official. The power of judicial

review as expressly provided for in the

Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,

and it was given an expanded definition to

include the power to correct any grave abuse of

discretion on the part of any government branch

or instrumentality. There exists no constitutional

basis for the contention that the exercise of

judicial review over impeachment proceedings

would upset the system of checks and balances.

The second impeachment complaint is

unconstitutional. Having concluded that the

initiation takes place by the act of filing of the

impeachment complaint and referral to the

House Committee on Justice, the initial action

taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of

Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment

complaint has been initiated in the foregoing

manner, another may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period following

Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment

complaint, was filed by former President Estrada

against Chief Justice Davide on June 2, 2003

and referred to the House Committee on Justice

on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment

complaint against the Chief Justice on October

23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition

against the initiation of impeachment

proceedings against the same impeachable

officer within a one-year period.

Gutierrez vs. House Com. on Justice,

G.R. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011

Facts: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas

Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for

certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of

September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of

Representatives Committee on Justice (public

respondent). Before the 15th Congress opened

its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth

Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15,

Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22,

2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-

Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and

Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXSticky NoteWhen does impeachment proceeding initiate?

At the time when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the committee on Justice for action.

Does a second impeachment proceeding in a year unconstitutional?

Yes. It is stated on Article Xi of the 1987 constitution that only 1 impeachment proceeding can be done on any official concerned to prevent the usage of impeachment as a form of harassment.

VALOREXSticky NoteSufficiency of the complaint of impeachment:

Mentioned on Art. XI section 2.

Impeachment rules be published?

No. It is with the discretion of the HOR / CONGRESS to make the rules of Impeachment. Art. X1 section 3 (8)

One impeachable complaint to one impeachable offense

It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon

the endorsement of Party-List Representatives

Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. A day after

the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27,

2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary

General of the House of Representatives,

transmitted the impeachment complaint to

House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by

Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the

Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of

Business.

Issue #1: Did the House Committee on Justice

fail to ascertain the sufficiency of form and

substance of the complaints on the basis of the

standards set by the Constitution and its own

Impeachment Rules?

Ruling: No. The Court said that the

determination of sufficiency of form and

substance of an impeachment complaint is an

exponent of the express constitutional grant of

rule-making powers of the House of

Representatives which committed such

determinative function to public respondent. In

the discharge of that power and in the exercise

of its discretion, the House has formulated

determinable standards as to the form and

substance of an impeachment

complaint. Prudential considerations behoove

the Court to respect the compliance by the

House of its duty to effectively carry out the

constitutional purpose, absent any contravention

of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for

comprehensible standards in determining the

sufficiency of form and substance, the

Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the

constitutional requirements and providing that

there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement

is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the

jurisdiction of the committee.

Issue #2: Should the Impeachment Rules be

published to be effective?

Ruling: No. It is within the discretion of

Congress to determine on how to promulgate its

Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that

the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to

promulgate a decision means to deliver the

decision to the clerk of court for filing and

publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-

equal branch of government how to

promulgate when the Constitution itself has not

prescribed a specific method of

promulgation. The Court is in no position to

dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the

dictates of the Constitution. Had the

Constitution intended to have the Impeachment

Rules published, it could have stated so as

categorically as it did in the case of the rules of

procedure in legislative inquiries. Other than

promulgate, there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately

refer to an issuance without need of it being

published.

Issue #3: Should the impeachment against

Gutierrez be considered a prohibited second

impeachment proceedings initiated within one-

year?

Ruling: Contrary to petitioners asseveration that within one year from July 22, 2010, no

second impeachment complaint may be accepted

and referred to public respondent,

Francisco states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on

it. The initiation starts with the filing of the

complaint which must be accompanied with an

action to set the complaint moving. It refers to

the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled

with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House

on the complaint is the referral of the complaint

to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads

the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas,

S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on

Justice for action which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint

had already been referred. Bernas and

Regalado, who both acted as amici

curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of

initiating includes the act of taking initial action

on the complaint. From the records of the

Constitutional Commission, to the amicus

curiae briefs of two former Constitutional

Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the

term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the

impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'

taking initial action of said complaint. Having

concluded that the initiation takes place by the

act of filing and referral or endorsement of the

impeachment complaint to the House Committee

on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third

of the members of the House of Representatives

with the Secretary General of the House, the

meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes

clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been

initiated, another impeachment complaint may

not be filed against the same official within a

one year period.

Issue #4: Should an impeachment complaint

only allege one impeachable offense under the

one offense, one complaint rule of the Rules on Criminal Procedure?

Ruling: The Court says: without going into

the effectiveness of the suppletory application of

the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

the relevant constitutional provisions, which

prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress,

and without delving into the practicability of the

application of the one offense per

complaint rule, the initial determination of

which must be made by the House which has yet

to pass upon the question, the Court finds that

petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to

state that the Constitution allows the indictment

for multiple impeachment offenses, with each

charge representing an article of impeachment,

assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment. It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only

one impeachable offense.

Section 4: Sandiganbayan

Desierto vs. Carandang, G.R. no. 148076,

Jan. 11, 2011

Facts: Antonio Carandang is the general

manager if the television network RPN. In his

tenure, he was charged with grave misconduct

before the Ombudsman. The charge says that he

had entered into a contract with AT

Broadcasting Incorporated in which he had

financial and material interests. The said

transaction is tantamount to grave misconduct

under the Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

In this said petition, Carandang

challenges the jurisdiction over him of the of the

Ombudsman and of the Sandiganbayan on the

ground that he was being held to account for acts

committed while he was serving as general

manager and chief operating officer of Radio

Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not

a government-owned or -controlled corporation;

hence, he was not a public official or employee.

Issue: As general manager and chief operating

officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. does

the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over

Carandang?

Ruling: The Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan

have jurisdiction over administrative cases

committed exclusively by the officials and

employees if government owned and govt

controlled corporations(in which a government

directly or indirectly owns or controls at least

majority or 51% share of the capital stock.

Consequently, RPN is neither a government

owned or controlled corporation. The

government may have shares in RPNs capital

stock but it is only 32.4%. In conclusion, the

petition is meritorious and Carandang is correct

that the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan have

no jurisdiction over him for being an employee

of a private company.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 180122,

March 13, 2009

Facts: Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft

charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer

and chair of the National Housing

Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public

funds amounting to P230,000 to pay a Makati-

based construction company for a ghost

project(financing a project that is not part of a

plan) in Bacolod City.

Further, he was accused of conspiring

with fellow officers;namely, Josephine Angsico,

Virgilio Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine

Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the

allegation, and after a thorough investigation,

the court dismissed the charges of the alleged

conspirants for failure to prove participation, but

it retained Lazartes charge. Issue: As department manager of the NHA

(Salary Grade 26), does the Sandiganbayan have

jurisdiction over petitioner Lazarte?

Ruling: The Court sustains the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly

pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no

moment that petitioner does not occupy a

position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a

department manager of the NHA, a government-

owned or controlled corporation, at the time of

the commission of the offense, which position

falls within the scope of its jurisdiction.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal

and civil cases involving graft and corrupt

practices and such other offenses committed by

public officers and employees, including those

in government-owned or controlled

corporations, in relation to their office as may be

determined by law. NHA being part of that.

Further, the position of manager in a

government-owned or controlled corporation, as

in the case of Philhealth, is within the

jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the

position that petitioner holds, not her salary

grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan---- that which includes the

position held by Lazarte.

Section 6: Ombudsman as an

Independent Body

Ombudsman versus- CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007

Facts: The Court is called upon to settle once

again a controversy between two independent

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXSticky NoteJurisdiction of the Ombudsman over administrative cases

-officials and employees of the government and government owned or controlled corporations. Also if the government directly or indirectly owns or controls the majority of the share of the capital stock (51%)

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXSticky NoteJurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. NHA being part of that.

VALOREXHighlight

VALOREXHighlight

constitutional bodies and delineate the limits of

their respective powers. In the exercise of its

mandate, this Court reaffirms its commitment to

constitutionalism and the rule of law. The

controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman

Simeon V. Marcelos letter dated July 28, 2003 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

requesting the approval of the amendment of

qualification standards for Director II positions

in the Central Administrative Service and

Finance and Management Service of the Office

of the Ombudsman. Acting thereon, the CSC

issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 dated January

23, 2004 disapproving the request.

Issue: What is the extent of CSCs power of the personnel organization, staffing and

qualification over the employees of the

Ombudsman?

Ruling: Under the Constitution, the Office of

the Ombudsman is an independent body. As a

guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman

has the power to appoint all officials and

employees of the Office of the Ombudsman,

except his deputies. This power necessarily

includes the power of setting, prescribing and

administering the standards for the officials and

personnel of the Office. To further ensure its

independence, the Ombudsman has been vested

with the power of administrative control and

supervision of the Office. This includes the

authority to organize such directorates for

administration and allied services as may be

necessary for the effective discharge of the

functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe

and approve its position structure and staffing

pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the

authority to determine and establish the

qualifications, duties, functions and

responsibilities of the various directorates and

allied services of the Office. This must be so if

the constitutional intent to establish an

independent Office of the Ombudsman is to

remain meaningful and significant. Since the

responsibility for the establishment,

administration and maintenance of qualification

standards lies with the concerned department or

agency, the role of the CSC is limited to

assisting the department or agency with respect

to these qualification standards and approving

them. The CSC cannot substitute its own

standards for those of the department or agency,

especially in a case like this in which an

independent constitutional body is involved.

Section 13: Ombudsmans Powers

Boncalon vs. Ombudsman, G.R. 171812,

Dec. 28, 2008

Facts: On November 25, 1997, Loida C.

Arabelo, the State Auditor II of Bago City,

Negros Occidental, conducted an audit on the

cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV

at Bago City Treasurers Office. The audit

revealed a cash shortage of P1,023,829.56. The

state auditor also discovered, upon verification

from the depository bank, that the entry in

Boncalons cashbook pertaining to the deposit of

P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 was false. D

eposits totaling said amountwere made only on

November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997, in

the amounts of P200,000.00 and P819,535.21,

respectively. In view of the audit findings,

Boncalon was administratively charged with

dishonesty before the Office of the Ombudsman

(Visayas)

.Issue: Is the Ombudsman limited only to the

power to recommend, but not to impose, the

penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,

censure, or prosecution of a public officer or

employee?

Ruling: Ombudsman has the power to directly

impose the penalty of removal, suspension,

demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an

erring public official, other than a member of

Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise

of its administrative disciplinary authority as

provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the

1987Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic

Act No. 6770. While Section 15(3) of RA 6770

states that the Ombudsman has the power to

recommend, removal, suspension, demotion

of government officials and employees, the same

Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in

the alternative may enforce its disciplinary

authority as provided in Section 21of RA 6770.

The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase

enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in

Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this

alternative power. Section 21 of RA 6770 states

that, the power of disciplinary authority over all

elective and appointive officials of the

Government, except impeachable officers,

members of Congress, and the Judiciary vests in

the ombudsman. And under Section 25 of RA

6770, the Ombudsman may impose in

administrative proceedings the

penalty ranging from suspension without pay for

one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits

or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,

illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of

the ombudsman.

Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, G.R. no.

175573, Oct. 5, 2010

Facts: This is a resolution of the second motion

for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner

Office of the Ombudsman to our decision dated

September 11, 2008, particularly a

pronouncement with respect to the stay of the

decision of the Ombudsman during the

pendency of an appeal:

Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,

the court held that the mere filing by respondent

of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the

joint decision against him. Respondents prayer

for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary

injunction (for purposes of staying the execution

of the decision against him) was therefore a

superfluity. The execution of petitioners joint

decision against respondent should be stayed

during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

Issue: Is the Ombudsmans decision imposing

the penalty of suspension for one year

immediately executor pending appeal?

Ruling: Yes. The court ruled, The decision of

the Ombudsman is immediately executory

pending appeal and may not be stayed by the

filing of the appeal or the issuance of an

injunctive writ. An appeal shall not stop the

decision from being executory. In case the

penalty is suspension or removal and the

respondent wins such appeal, he shall be

considered as having been under preventive

suspension and shall be paid the salary and such

other emoluments that he did not receive by

reason of the suspension or removal. The

Ombudsmans decision imposing the penalty of

suspension for one year is immediately

executory pending appeal. Moreover, Section

13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes

the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its

own rules of procedure. In this connection,

Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of

1989 also provide that the Office of the

Ombudsman has the power to promulgate its

rules of procedure for the effective exercise or

performance of its powers, functions and duties

and to amend or modify its rules as the interest

of justice may require. For the CA to issue a

preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty

imposed by the Ombudsman in an

administrative case would be to encroach on the

rule-making powers of the Office of the

Ombudsman.

Section 15: Ill-gotten Wealth and

Prescription

Republic vs Cojuangco, GR No. 166859,

April 12, 2011

Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., served as a

public officer during the Marcos administration.

During the period of his incumbency as a public

officer, he acquired assets, funds, and other

property grossly and manifestly disproportionate

to his salaries, lawful income and income from

legitimately acquired property. . Having fully

established himself as the undisputed coconut king with unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, the stage was now set for

Cojuangco to launch his predatory forays into

almost all aspects of Philippine economic

activity namely: softdrinks, agribusiness, oil

mills, shipping, cement manufacturing, and

textile.

Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking undue

advantage of his association, influence and

connection, acting in unlawful concert with

Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.

Marcos, and the individual defendants,

embarked upon devices, schemes and

stratagems, including the use of defendant

corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich

themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the

Filipino people, such as when he misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the

outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel

Corporation in order to control the largest agri-

business, foods and beverage company in the

Philippines.

Issues: (1) What is the concept and concurring

elements of ill-gotten wealth? (2) Were

Cojuangcos SMC illegally acquired with

coconut levy-funds?

Ruling (1): In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering

Co., Inc., this Court described ill-gotten wealth as follows: Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or

illegal use of or the conversion of funds

belonging to the Government or any of its

branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or

financial institutions, or by taking undue

advantage of official position, authority,

relationship, connection or influence, resulting

in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and

grave damage and prejudice to the State. And

this, too, is the sense in which the term is

commonly understood in other jurisdiction. The two concurring elements to be

present before assets or properties were

considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they

must have originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by

former President Marcos, his immediate family,

relatives, and close associates by illegal means.

Ruling (2): No. The Republic did not discharge

its burden as the plaintiff to establish by

preponderance of evidence that the respondents

SMC shares were illegally acquired with

coconut-levy funds. The Court finds its evidence

insufficient to prove that the source of funds

used to purchase SMC shares indeed came from

coconut levy funds. Its evidence do not suffice

to prove the material allegations in the complaint

that Cojuangco took advantage of his positions

in UCPB and PCA in order to acquire the said

shares.

Republic vs. Cojuangco, G.R. no. 139930,

June 26, 2012

Facts: This case, which involves another

attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten

wealth acquired during the Marcos era, resolves

the issue of prescription.

On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro

D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes,

Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma

incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.

(UNICOM), with an authorized capital stock

of P100 million divided into one million shares

with a par value of P100 per share. On

September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM

directors approved another amendment to

UNICOMs capitalization. About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against

respondents, before the Presidential Commission

on Good Government (PCGG). About nine years

later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the

Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a

Memorandum, stating that although it found

sufficient basis to indict respondents for

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action

has already prescribed. In a

Memorandum, dated May 14,

1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved

the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. The OSG filed a motion for

reconsideration on the Office of the

Ombudsmans action but the latter denied the same; hence, this petition.

Issue: May the prosecution of offenses arising

from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-

gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15,

Article XI of the 1987 Constitution be barred by

prescription?

Ruling: Yes. The court already settled

in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee

on Behest Loans v. Desierto that Section 15,

Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only

to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,

not to criminal cases such as the complaint

against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus,

the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating

or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth

contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the

1987 Constitution may be barred by

prescription. Prescription of actions is a valued

rule in all civilized states from the beginning of

organized society. It is a rule of fairness since,

without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of

his action to the point of depriving the

defendant, through the passage of time, of access

to defense witnesses who would have died or

left to live elsewhere, or to documents that

would have been discarded or could no longer

be located. Moreover, the memories of

witnesses are eroded by time. There is an

absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar

actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to

file in court

Section 17: SALN

Re: request for copy of 2008 statement of

assets, liabilities and networth [saln] and

personal data sheet or curriculum vitae of

the justices of the supreme court and

officers and employees of the judiciary,

A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012

Facts: In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena

C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine

Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ),

sought copies of the Statement of Assets,

Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices

of this Court for the year 2008. She also

requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet

(PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the

Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating

their database of information on government

officials. Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer

also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of

the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court

of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated

purpose. Since then, several requests for copies

of the SALN and other personal documents of

the Justices of this Court, the CA and the

Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed.

Issue: Are the information contained in the

SALN matters of public concern necessitating

public disclosure?

Ruling: Yes. While public concern like public interest eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad spectrum of

subjects which the public may want to know,

either because such matters directly affect their

lives, or simply because such matters naturally

arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, the

Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI,

has classified the information disclosed in the

SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.

In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter

is a permission.