ARTICLE TEMPLATE

Economic policy, “alternative data” and global agriculture: from the

trans-Atlantic slave trade to agroecology

M. Changa,∗, C.-H. Huangb,∗ and I.S. Mianc

aCentre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University, Priory Street, CoventryCV1 5FB, UK; bDepartment of Applied Mathematics, National Sun Yat-sen University,Taiwan; cDepartment of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street,London WC1E 6BT, UK

ARTICLE HISTORY

Compiled November 30, 2017

ABSTRACTWe use heterogeneous public datasets and information (re)sources to aid the taskof identifying technical, legal, financial, policy and other mechanisms capable ofserving the diverse needs of practitioners of agroecology (primarily small scale farm-ers) and advocates of food sovereignty. Disparate material in the public domainand open source software tools are utilised to tell a story of interest to audiencesranging from the general public to policy and decision makers. A variety of finan-cial and non-financial (“alternative”) datasets are employed to explore the past,present and future of agriculture. Historical macroeconomic data released by theBank of England in conjunction with other freely available data are utilised to painta broad brush strokes picture of the impacts of Britain on the lands, agricultures,and economies of peoples and regions across the globe over five centuries. The over-arching and interconnected topics considered are (a) the trans-Atlantic slave tradeand European Empires, (b) 21st century large-scale land acquisitions, and (c) tra-ditional farming systems, agricultural biodiversity, and climate change. The threesets of background notes and data-driven visualisations – cartograms and timelinesoverlaid with event data – are autonomous yet interlinked and complemenary. Byweaving together historical, geographical, political, economic, and social threads,this triptych illustrates how the Bank has been and remains integral to agricul-ture, nationally, regionally and globally. Finally, we discuss how data science couldcontribute to specific problems in three poorly-studied areas of agricultural policy,(a) whole food systems policy: the Community-led London Plan through the lensof food, (b) research and development policy: public funds allocated to basic andapplied studies in agroecology, and (c) small scale farmer-scientist collaborations.

KEYWORDSBank of England; Trans-Atlantic slave trade; European Empires; Global large-scaleland acquisitions; Agroecology; Whole Food Systems policy; Research andDevelopment Policy; Small scale farmer-scientist collaborations; Data science;

1. Introduction

Fiscal policy refers to government actions regarding taxation and spending whilstmonetary policy refers to central banking actions regarding the money supply andinterest rates. These two main strands of economic policy determine and influence

CONTACT M. Chang. Email: marina.chang@coventry.ac.uk; ∗ These authors contributed equally

agricultural policy: laws and activities relating to domestic agriculture and importsof foreign agricultural products. An increasingly important objective of policy makersand central bankers is preventing or mitigating the triggers of financial crises: greatermonetary and financial stablity (as embodied in issues such as income inequality) areemerging as much more prominent aspects of the work of the Bank of England and thecentral banks of other countries (Bank of England 2015a; Kumhof 2015; Monnin 2015).Since its establishment in 1694 (Luscombe n.d.) in the age of mercantilism through theindustrial revolution and beyond, the history of the Bank of England is intertwinedwith that of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Martin 2011; Eight museums in GreaterManchester n.d.d) and the British Empire (Walvin 2011), times when societies weretreated as parts of economies rather than economies being considered parts of societies.

In February 2015, the Bank of England launched its One Bank Research Agenda, awide-ranging and ambitious framework aimed at transforming and guiding its futureresearch and as part of a committment to forging closer ties between policy makers andresearchers, published a selection of its datasets (Bank of England 2015b). The Agendatheme “Central bank response to fundamental technological, institutional, societaland environmental change” posed the question “What is the role of central banks inaddressing risks from climate change?” (Bank of England 2015a). Seven months later,Bank of England Governor Mark Carney delivered a speech at Lloyd’s of London,an institution that was founded in 1688 at a time when “London’s importance asa trade centre led to an increasing demand for ship and cargo insurance” and that“develops the essential, complex and critical insurance needed to underwrite humanprogress” (Lloyd’s n.d.). He warned that “climate change is the tragedy of the horizon,”noting that insurers are “anticipating broader global impacts on property, migrationand political stability, as well as food and water security” (Carney 2015).

A June 2017 publication by the Bank of England states “Climate change, andsociety’s responses to it, present financial risks which impact upon the Banks objec-tives. These risks arise through two primary channels: the physical effects of climatechange and the impact of changes associated with the transition to a lower-carboneconomy.” (Scott, van Huizen, and Jung 2017) Given the Bank’s mission is to “de-liver monetary and financial stability for the British people” (Bank of England n.d.c),the economic health of whole food systems (Hawkes 2016) as well as the (re)buildingof rural and urban agricultural economies at home (Wright 2015) and abroad (Cen-tre for learning on sustainable agriculture (ILEIA) 2017a) – including across the At-lantic (Holt-Gimenez 2017) – are of more than passing interest.

Here, our specific aim is to illuminate the evolving relationship between fiscal policy,monetary policy and agricultural policy by painting a general picture of the impactsof Britain on the lands, agricultures and economies of peoples and regions across theglobe over five centuries. Our overall objective is to highlight “agroecology” as definedand described in the 2015 Report of the International Forum for Agroecology: notjust agriculture but the full diversity of food production, gathering and consumption– knowledge that is the outcome of diverse historical experiences and practices (Coor-dination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali (CNOP) et al. 2015; Ferranteet al. 2015). That is, a transdisciplinary, participatory applied science embedded ina social context (Altieri, Nicholls, and Montalba 2017; Centre for learning on sus-tainable agriculture (ILEIA) 2016a; Third World Network and SOCLA 2015; Méndezet al. 2015; LEISA (Low External Input Sustainable Agriculture) 2017a,b; Assessoria eServiços a Projetos em Agricultura Alternativa (AS-PTA) 2016; Agricultures Network2016; Revue sur l’Agriculture Durable à Faibles Apportes Externes (AGRIDAPE)2017; MELCA-Ethiopia 2016). Agroecology’s multiple benefits include ensuring food

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sovereignty (International Steering Committee 2007), sustaining and improving humanhealth (Suárez-Torres et al. 2017; O’Rourke, DeLonge, and Salvador 2017), providingmeaningful livelihoods (Coulibaly et al. 2015), sustaining resilient communities (Pesti-cide Action Network North America n.d.), mitigating the effects of climate change (Al-tieri and Nicholls 2017a; Milgroom, Florin, and GRAIN 2017; Centre for learning onsustainable agriculture (ILEIA) 2017b; Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns 2015),and promoting local and stable economies (Silici 2014; Agricultures Network n.d.).

We propose that agroecology (Ferrante et al. 2015; Altieri, Nicholls, and Montalba2017; Third World Network and SOCLA 2015; Centre for learning on sustainableagriculture (ILEIA) 2016b) – undergirded by food sovereignty (International SteeringCommittee 2007), land sovereignty (Franco et al. 2013), the right to water (Centre forlearning on sustainable agriculture (ILEIA) 2015), agricultural biodiversity (Mulvany2014), and environmental health (Conant and Fadem 2008) – provides a shared, directand cost-effective response to issues of concern to society writ large (Horton 2017)as well as the Bank of England: fundamental technological, institutional, societal andenvironmental change in general and climate change in particular (Bank of England2015a).

Although not our focus, trade, labour, accumulated wealth, and land were of con-cern domestically during the period we consider – notably the Scottish clearances andParliamentary Enclosures (Fairlie 2009). As elsewhere in the world, land and its own-ership remains a pressing issue: farms in England under 50 hectares are in danger ofvanishing by 2050 even though they “create greater diversity in food production andconservation, both of which shape rural heritage and rural economies” (Campaign toProtect Rural England 2017). In Britain, a policy of increasing access to land wouldsupport new entrants to farming (Land Workers’ Alliance 2017c). Indeed, a signifi-cant increase in the number of small agroecological market gardens (including thoseless than 5 hectares) could deliver environmental and social benefits such as reducingthe trade gap for fruit and vegetables, providing year-round employment and rejuve-nating communities (Land Workers’ Alliance 2017a). Clearly, agroecology- and wholefood systems-related policies and issues are critical today as well as tomorrow in thepost-Brexit era (Land Workers’ Alliance 2017b,d).

1.1. Organisation of this paper

Section 2 provides an overview of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and European Empires.Section 3 considers 21st century large-scale land acquisitions and their consequences.Section 4 explores traditional farming systems, agricultural biodiversity, and climatechange. Each of these sections contains background notes and visualisations of hetero-geneous public datasets and information (re)sources. These visual surveys of diverse,freely available macroeconomic and alternative data are designed to highlight broadtrends and/or to illustrate points and/or themes raised in one or more of these threesections.

Section 5 identifies three under-investigated but critical aspects of agricultural pol-icy. It discusses how and when data science could contribute to addressing specificproblems (a) whole food systems policy: the Community-led London Plan through thelens of food (a grassroot efforts to transform the policy of a large and complex city), (b)research and development policy: public funds allocated to basic and applied studies inagroecology (the public infrastructure pertinent to the science, development, financing,and practice of agroecology), and (c) small scale farmer-scientist collaborations. We

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note that whether locally, nationally, regionally or internationally, evidence-informedpolicy for agrocology and whole food systems requires not just data but also ideasand arguments (the human element) (Pearce 2014). The rationale is that predictionsarising from the application of machine learning methods to data are necessary butnot sufficient when making decisions for policy problems: data have limits (Jasny andStone 2017) and the “era of blind faith in big data must end” (O’Neil 2017).

To facilitate reproduction of the data-driven component of this research – the vi-sualisations, Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C provide summaries of the Rcode and (processed) datasets needed to recreate the charts and cartograms as wellas instructions on how to download these files. Appendix D lists the R packages andlibraries used. The work described here is based on a discussion paper presented atData for Policy 2017. Government by Algorithm? (Data for Policy 2017).

1.1.1. Visualisations

The visualisations in this work should be viewed as qualitative – as opposed to quanti-tative – explorations of disparate agriculture-related factors in space (geography) andtime (history) using macroeconomics as the primary low power lens. That is, eachtimelines and events chart or cartogram is intended to enhance understanding ratherthan be interpreted, inspected and analysed in minute detail; macroeconomic mod-els and forecasts used by governments to assist in the development and evaluation of(agricultural) economic policy are beyond the scope of this work. A given chart probesthe relationship between two different factors (one plotted on the left vertical axis, theother on the right axis) over a period of time (horizontal axis) and in the context ofselected events during this period (points or intervals on the horizontal axis). Similarly,a given cartogram delves into the relationship between these and/or other factors overspace – individual countries as well as regions.

This journal’s publishing platform as well as community databases such as PubMedand PMC only permit indexing and syndication of still image files as figure elementsfor an article. Therefore, every Figure in the body of the text is a static representationof an interactive visualisation – the still image is an arbitrary snapshot of the corre-sponding interactive timelines and events chart or cartogram. The full functionalityof the dynamic version of a visualisation1 can be explored by downloading the corre-sponding HTML file and opening it in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A,Appendix B and Appendix C).

2. The trans-Atlantic slave trade and European Empires

2.1. Background notes

The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas (Wikipedia contributors n.d.l) and the 1529 Treaty ofZaragoza (Wikipedia contributors n.d.m) defined a pattern for exploration and con-quest of non-Christian worlds outside Europe by Iberian colonial interests. Whereasthe former treaty granted lands to the east and west of the Cape Verde Islands to Spain

1Main interactive features of a timelines and events chart: mouse over to highlight individual/per-series

values; click and drag to zoom in; double-click to zoom out; multiple charts synchronised so that zoom-ing/panning/selecting points on one chart will perform the same operation on the other; and a range selector

that allows a time interval to be defined (left and right handles) and used to roll through the time series (dragleft-right). Main interactive features of a cartogram: click on a country/regional feature/marker icon to display

a pop-up window containing additional information.

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and Portugal respectively (essentially the Americas and Africa), the latter employedthe Moluccan Islands as the basis for recognising Spain’s dominion over the Americasand most of the Pacific whilst solidifying Portugal’s claim to the Indian Ocean andall of Asia. Although other European maritime powers contested the commercial ar-rangement (Understanding Slavery Initiative n.d.c) in the “New World”, irrespectiveof whether the traders were British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Norwegian,Swedish or Danish in origin (Channel 4 News 2014), humans (Mathúna 1999) remainedthe most attractive commodity in trans-Atlantic trade crossings (Understanding Slav-ery Initiative n.d.b; Emory University et al. n.d.).

Europe, Africa and the Americas were the geographic pillars of the trans-Atlanticslave trade (Rice n.d.) that took place from the 16th through to the 19th century,a network of routes and an economic system lubricated by humans. Manufacturedand luxury goods such as textiles, guns, knives, copper kettles, mirrors and beadsfrom Europe were exported to the west African coast where they were exchanged forenslaved Africans. The slaves were sent forcibly to the New World where their labourunderpinned the production of agricultural commodities such as sugar, tobacco, rice,cotton, mahogony and indigo: raw goods whose import by Britain fuelled the country’sIndustrial Revolution (Eight museums in Greater Manchester n.d.b) and satisfied itslifestyle (Eight museums in Greater Manchester n.d.e). During 35,000 slave voyages,over 12 million Africans were transported forcibly to the Americas (Emory Universityet al. n.d.). More slaves were imported from Africa into Haiti (Saint Domingue) thaninto North America (The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation n.d.). By 1789, the latterwas producing 60% of Britain and France’s coffee and 75% of the world’s sugar – SaintDomingue owed its profitability entirely to slavery (Phillips 2009).

During the 16th and 17th centuries, financial, commercial, legal, and insurance in-stitutions emerged to buttress Britain’s overseas trade and imperial ambitions (Lus-combe n.d.). Banks and banking were essential in making capital available to andsecuring profits from the transnational business of enslavement (Pocock and Cook2011b) and empire (New World Encyclopedia n.d.). When set up in 1694, the Bankof England braced the entire system of commercial credit (Walvin 2011) needed forthe trans-Atlantic slave trade. Acknowledging the centrality of slave-grown cotton tothe economy of north west England (Eight museums in Greater Manchester n.d.f) andrecogising the importance of Manchester as a commercial centre, the Bank of Englandestablished a branch (Eight museums in Greater Manchester n.d.a) there in 1826. Theplantation slave economy – from slave-trading through slave-ownership to the ship-ping, trading, finance, and insurance of slave produce – contributed materially to thefoundations of 19th-century London (Draper 2007). In the early 19th century, cottonwas a commodity that determined the wealth of nations (Chengu 2015).

Governors of the Bank of England (Wikipedia contributors n.d.e) were well-placedto facilitate creation of the political and regulatory milieu necessary to (re)orientthe performance, structure, behaviour and decision-making of national, regional, andglobal economies. For instance, Sir John Houblon (1694 –1697) (Wikipedia contribu-tors n.d.f), Sir William Scawen (1697 – 1699) (Wikipedia contributors n.d.n), and SirFrancis Eyles (1707 – 1709) (Wikipedia contributors n.d.j) were also directors of theEast India Company (Wikipedia contributors n.d.c), a firm chartered in 1600 that roseto have a near monopoly of the world’s trade, particularly in agricultural commoditiessuch as cotton, silk, indigo dye, salt, saltpetre, tea, and opium (British Library n.d.).After the hundred year military and administrative rule of large swathes of the Indiansubcontinent by this corporation by the “original corporate raiders” (Dalgleish 2015),the British Crown assumed direct control of India in the mid-19th century. Gover-

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nors turned their gaze not only East but also West: Sir Humphrey Morice (1727 –1729) (Pocock and Cook 2011a) was both a trans-Atlantic slave trader and a Memberof Parliament.

British slave-ownership was instrumental in transmitting the fruits of colonialslavery (Jones 2013) to metropolitan Britain, shaping the country and bequethinga commercial, cultural, historical, imperial, physical, social, economic and politicallegacy (Understanding Slavery Initiative n.d.a; Centre for the Study of the Legacies ofBritish Slave-ownership (LBS) n.d.) that reaches into the present (Walth 2004; NewStatesman 2014). The latter part of the 18th century saw the rise of abolitionist or-ganisations such as the “Sons of Africa” (Thomas 2015; The Schomberg Center forResearch in Black Culture. The New York Public Library n.d.). Although Parliamentfinally abolished slavery in the British Caribbean, Mauritius and the Cape in 1833, “inplace of slavery the negotiated settlement established a system of apprenticeship, tyingthe newly freed men and women into another form of unfree labour for fixed terms.It also granted £20 million in compensation, to be paid by British taxpayers to theformer slave-owners” (Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slave-ownership(LBS) n.d.). That sum constituted 40% of the British state’s expenditure in 1834 –the modern equivalent of £17 billion (Olusoga 2015), the largest government pay-outprior to the bailout of the banks in 2009. The recipients of compensation, clusteredoverwhelmingly in the southern strongholds of high society, included 100 Membersof Parliament (over and above the West India lobby) and 150 Anglican clergymen– “thus did mammon assert its priority over humanity and religion” (Thorne 2012).Whereas British taxpayers subsidised the British Empire’s scheme for abolition, theslaves in Saint Domingue who emancipated themselves from the French were forced tocompensate their former slave owners: payments in service of the Independence Debtimposed by France on Haiti in 1825 continued until 1947 – an amount estimated tobe $21 billion (Phillips 2009; Thorne 2012; Duval 2017).

Consider the Neave Baronetcy (Wikipedia contributors n.d.i) created in 1795 forRichard Neave (Legacies of British Slave-ownership n.d.f), a London Jamaica merchantwhose wife, seven children (such as son Sir Thomas Neave (Legacies of British Slave-ownership n.d.g) and daughter Harriet Trevelyn (Legacies of British Slave-ownershipn.d.b)) and their descendants were claimants and/or financial beneficaries of slaveownership. Sir Richard Neave was a Director of the Bank of England for 48 yearsas well as its Governor (1783 – 1785), a position held later by his son-in-law BeestonLong (1806 – 1808) (Wikipedia contributors n.d.a) and grandson Sheffield Neave (1857– 1859) (Legacies of British Slave-ownership n.d.e), the latter also a Director for 27years. Assisted by representatives of the colonial assemblies, the London Society ofWest India Planters and Merchants (whose chairmen included Sir Richard Neave andBeeston Long) formed the West India Interests which “through publications, deposi-tions before parliament, and direct lobbying of government ministers . . . defended theirself-proclaimed right to import African slaves based on constitutional precedent and aright to enjoy the fruits of their fixed property in the colonies” (Ryden 2015). Foundedin 1735, “ten out of fifteen members of one of the most important committees of the So-ciety of Planters and Merchants held seats in the English Parliament” (Williams 1944,page 94). Today, the Society exists as the West India Committee (The West IndiaCommittee n.d.), a registered charity promoting agriculture, trade and manufacturingin the Caribbean and providing services to corporations, institutions, government andother organisations.

Two other examples illustrate the transmission of the benefits of slave ownershipacross generations. Established six years before the Bank of England, “when Lloyd’s

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was a coffee house and nothing more, many advertisements in the London Gazetteabout runaway slaves listed Lloyd’s as the place where they should be returned.. . . Lloyd’s, like other insurance companies, insured slaves and slave ships, and wasvitally interested in legal decisions as to what constituted ‘natural death’ and ‘perilsof the sea.’ . . . One of the most distinguished chairmen of Lloyd’s in its long historywas Joseph Marryat, a West Indian planter, who successfully and brilliantly foughtto maintain Lloyd’s monopoly of maritime insurance against a rival company in theHouse of Commons in 1810” (Williams 1944, page 121). Joseph Marryat (1757 – 1824)was a member of the House of Commons (1808 – 1824), chairman of Lloyd’s (1811– 1824), an Agent for Trinidad (1805 – 1812), an Agent for Grenada (1815 – 1824),and an important figure in the defence of slavery (Thorne 1986; Legacies of BritishSlave-ownership n.d.d). Likewise, his son Joseph Marryat II (1790 – 1876) was a mem-ber of the House of Commons (1826 – 1834), an Agent for Grenada (1831 – 1851),and an individual who resisted moves towards emancipation (Fisher 1986; Legacies ofBritish Slave-ownership n.d.c). Yet, a major recipient of compensation by the Britishtaxpayer was Joseph Marryat & Co, a firm whose partners were Joseph Marryat IIand his brother Charles Marryat (1803 – 1884) (Legacies of British Slave-ownershipn.d.a). The ancestors of David Cameron, U.K. Prime Minister (2010 – 2016), “wereamong the wealthy families who received generous reparation payments that would beworth millions of pounds in today’s money” (Manning 2013).

The system of plantations pioneered by the Spanish, perfected by the Dutch andadopted eagerly by the English were key to the internationally integrated trading net-work encouraged, approved, regulated and monitored by Parliament and lubricatedby the Bank for England. Amongst those that thrived within this legal and financialinfrastructure were the City of London’s Corporation, Lloyd’s, a host of banking facil-ities, and (domestic) industries which provided goods for exchange in Africa, equippedthe slave plantations of the Americas, and processed and sold the imported slave grownproduce (House of Commons 2016). Many of the financial, arts, cultural, religious, ed-ucational and other institutions in London (Greater London Authority n.d.), GreaterManchester (Eight museums in Greater Manchester n.d.c), Oxford (Blackburn 2011),and elsewhere were founded on the wealth gained from the trans-Atlantic slave trade.That profits trickled back to all levels and sections of British society – government,companies and households – is illustrated by “Dividend Day at the Bank of Eng-land” (Hicks n.d.), an 1859 painting depicting investors from a broad range of socialclasses receiving their dividends. In contemporary life, the Empire’s legacy is evidentin social structures, public monuments, and art (Tate Britain n.d.). Echoing Britain,“the slave-based economy generated the profits that allowed the US to industrialize,and also enabled these processes to happen much quicker and much more extensivelythan could have been done without slavery. The factories and industrial-related em-ployment provided allowed the US to absorb the millions of people immigrating fromespecially Europe in the late 1800s-early 1900s. Without this capability, emigrationfrom Europe would have been much more limited” (Scipes 2017).

The late 16th and early 17th century settlement of islands and regions in theCarribean and North American mainland formed the basis of the British Em-pire (Wikipedia contributors n.d.b). By 1922, this “empire on which the sun neversets” (Wikipedia contributors n.d.k) held sway over one-fifth of the world’s popula-tion and covered almost a quarter of the Earth’s total land area. In the mid 20th, thecollapse of the formal British empire gave birth to a financial empire where the U.K.managed to retain a significant degree of influence over global flows of money (Shaxson2011; Ramsay 2016). “Britain structured its economy not around manufacturing and

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productive sectors, but around finance. City of London banks provided the financingfor the Empire and the colonies would pay interest to the City. Britain would createtrade agreements with its colonies that would allow them to export a certain amountof their goods to the UK, thus enabling them to pay the interest on their loans. TheEmpire allowed the financial sector in the UK to take on a role and importance, whichfinancial sectors did not have in other countries” (Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten2017). The movement of wealth that has been illegally earned, transferred, or usedacross borders (illicit financial flows) has been called “the ugliest chapter in globaleconomic affairs since slavery” (Baker 2007).

2.2. Visualisations

For the visualisations discussed below, our first goal is to provide a spatiotemporalsense of the nature and scale of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Our second goal isto provide some measure of how the people and places involved, in conjunction withthose that were part of the British Empire, contributed to the economic well beingof the UK not only at that time, but laid the foundations for the UK’s prosperity insubsequent decades and centuries.

2.2.1. Public datasets and information (re)sources utilised

The charts and cartogram make use of the following freely available material.

• A broad set of macroeconomic data spanning almost a millennium released bythe Bank of England (Bank of England n.d.a). We utilised (1) the contributionof different parts of the industrial and agricultural sectors to Gross DomesticProduct (GDP), and (2) the population of England and Britain (for details, seeAppendix A.1).

• A collection of geographic, imputed voyage and other data drawn from librariesand archives around the Atlantic world on the trans-Atlantic slave trade (EmoryUniversity et al. n.d.). We utilised (1) major sites in the Atlantic rim from whereslaves embarked and disembarked, and (2) estimates of the number of captivestransported between these regions (for details, see Appendix A.2).

• Various entries in Wikipedia related to British and other European colonialpowers. We utilised (1) possessions and colonies of European countries, and (2)the year a former colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain (fordetails, see Appendix A.3 and Appendix A.4).

2.2.2. Timelines and events charts: British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and twodistinct labour forces

The left vertical axis of a chart shows one of the following,

• Population of England (1086 – 1870) and Great Britain (1700 – 1870): a proxyfor the internal workforce; the values shown are overestimates of this labourforce because the numbers include more than working age individuals (Figure 1,Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5).

• Estimate of the number of captives transported between major sites in the At-lantic rim (1501 – 1866): a proxy for the external workforce; the values shownare underestimates of this labour force because the numbers exclude people fromthe dominions, colonies, protectorates, mandates and other territories ruled or

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Figure 1. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “internal” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) English and British agricultural production (arable crops): total output of wheat, rye, barley, oats,and pulses (million bushels). (b) English and British population (millions). (c) The year a colony or dominion

gained its independence from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and open

the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A.5).

administered by Britain (Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10).

The right vertical axis of a chart shows one of the following

• British agricultural production (arable crops): wheat, rye, barley, oats, and pulses(1270 – 1870) (Figure 1 and Figure 6).

• British agricultural production (livestock products): milk, beef, veal, mutton,pork, wool, hides, hay (1270 – 1870) (Figure 2 and Figure 7).

• British industrial production (key industries): tin, iron, coal, wool/textiles,leather, foodstuffs, construction and printed books (1270 – 1870) (Figure 3 andFigure 8).

• British GDP(O) (real GDP): agriculture, industry, services and GDP (1270 –1870) (Figure 4 and Figure 9).

• Regional trade (export/import of goods to/from regions): Europe, Africa, Asia,North America including West Indies to 1972, South and Central America, andAustralia (1665 – 2015) (Figure 5 and Figure 10).

The events shown along the horizontal axis of a chart are the year a colony ordominion gained its independence from Britain.

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English_British_population_and_English_British_agricultural_crops.html

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showing (a) English and British agricultural production (livestock products): total output of milk (million

gals), beef (million lb), veal (million lb), mutton (million lb), pork (million lb), wool (million lb), hides (millionlb) and hay (milllion tons). (b) English and British population (millions). (c) The year a colony or dominion

gained its independence from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and openthe HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A.6).

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English_British_population_and_English_British_agricultural_livestock.html

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Figure 3. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “internal” workforce. Timelines and events chartshowing (a) English and British industrial production (key industries): output of tin, iron, coal, wool/textiles,

leather, foodstuffs, construction and printed books. (b) English and British population (millions). (c) The yeara colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart,

click here and open the HTML file in a web broswer (for details, see Appendix A.7).

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English_British_population_and_English_British_industrial.html

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Figure 4. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “internal” workforce. Timelines and events chartshowing (a) English and British GDP(O) (real GDP): agriculture, industry, services, and GDP. (b) English

and British population (millions). (c) The year a colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain.To view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for

details, see Appendix A.8).

12

English_British_population_and_English_British_GDPO.html

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Figure 5. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “internal” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) Regional trade: the export of goods (top) and the import of goods (bottom) from Europe, Africa,Asia, North America including West Indies to 1972, South and Central America, and Australia. (b) English

and British population (millions). (c) The year a colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain.

To view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (fordetails, see Appendix A.9).

13

English_British_population_and_regional_trade.html

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Figure 6. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “external” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) English and British agricultural production (arable crops): total output of wheat, rye, barley,

oats, and pulses (million bushels). (b) Estimates of the number of captives embarked and disembarked atmajor sites in the Atlantic rim. (c) The year a colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain. To

view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and open the file in a web browser (for details, seeAppendix A.10).

14

Number_captives_transported_and_English_British_agricultural_crops.html

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Figure 7. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “external” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) English and British agricultural production (livestock products): total output of milk (milliongals), beef (million lb), veal (million lb), mutton (million lb), pork (million lb), wool (million lb), hides (million

lb) and hay (milllion tons). (b) Estimates of the number of captives embarked and disembarked at major sitesin the Atlantic rim. (c) The year a colony or dominion gained its independence from Britain. To view the

interactive version of this static chart, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, seeAppendix A.11).

15

Number_captives_transported_and_English_British_agricultural_livestock.html

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Figure 8. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “external” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) English and British industrial production (key industries): output of tin, iron, coal, wool/textiles,

leather, foodstuffs, construction and printed books. (b) Estimates of the number of captives embarked anddisembarked at major sites in the Atlantic rim. (c) The year a colony or dominion gained its independence

from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart, click here and open the HTML file in a webbrowser (for details, see Appendix A.12).

16

Number_captives_transported_and_English_British_industrial.html

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Figure 9. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “external” workforce. Timelines and events chartshowing (a) English and British GDP(O) (real GDP): agriculture, industry, services, and GDP. (b) Estimates

of the number of captives embarked and disembarked at major sites in the Atlantic rim. (c) The year a colonyor dominion gained its independence from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart, click

here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A.13).

17

Number_captives_transported_and_English_British_GDPO.html

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Indies to 1972 South and Central America Australia

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USA NZLRSAAFGEGYCAN IRLIRQAUSJORIND PAKISR MYASRI

SUDGHA MASCYP NGRKUW SLETAN

JAM TRIUGAKENMAW MLTZAM

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YEMMRI NRUSQZ

FIJ TGABHR QATUAEBAHGRNSEYDMA SOL

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TUVKIR LCA

VINVAN ZIMBIZANTSKNBRUHKG

Figure 10. British economic growth (1270 – 1870) and the “external” workforce. Timelines and events chart

showing (a) Regional trade: the export of goods (top) and the import of goods (bottom) from Europe, Africa,Asia, North America including West Indies to 1972, South and Central America, and Australia. (b) Estimates

of the number of captives embarked and disembarked at major sites in the Atlantic rim. (c) The year a colony

or dominion gained its independence from Britain. To view the interactive version of this static chart, clickhere and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A.14).

18

Number_captives_transported_and_regional_trade.html

2.2.3. Cartogram: The trans-Atlantic slave trade and European empires

The cartogram shows the geographic extent of the major coastal regions involvedin the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the global reach of European colonial powers(Figure 11).

3. 21st century large-scale land acquisitions and their consequences

3.1. Background notes

Since the turn of the century, estimates of the land acquired globally by interna-tional entities range from ∼ 48 million (Davis, Rulli, and O’Odorico 2015) to ∼ 67million (Cotula 2012) hectares – concentrated mostly in middle and low income coun-tries. Concommitant to the land, this massive and growing phenomenon appropri-ates the freshwater (Franco et al. 2014; Rulli, Saviori, and D’Odorico 2013) availabletherein plus any associated soil, mineral, and hydrocarbon resources (Evans-Pritchard2010). The appropriation of green water (precipitation stored in soils and consumed byplants through evapotranspiration) and blue water (water extracted from rivers, lakes,aquifers, and dams) poses socioenvironmental and political challenges (Johansson et al.2016). Two major events in 2005 contributed to this global land rush: launch of the Eu-ropean Union Emissions Trading System (carbon trading or “cap and trade”) (Reyes2014) and passage of the U.S.A. Energy Policy Act that contained provisions promot-ing biofuels and setting targets (Davis, Rulli, and O’Odorico 2015).

“21st century colonialism” (Smith 2013) and “land grabbing” (Wikipedia contrib-utors n.d.g) are terms that have been applied to the transfer of the right to ownor use the land from local communities to foreign investors through large-scale landacquisitions intended primarily, though not exclusively, for agriculture, forestry, con-servation, biofuels and tourism (Land Matrix n.d.a; GRAIN n.d.; Lay and Nolte 2017).Although enabled by investment de-regulation and trade liberalisation of the present,particularly international free trade agreements and laws (Cotula 2013), the corporateland rush is bolstered by history (Franco et al. 2014), notably the seizures of landsby colonial rulers. In essence, today’s economic dispossessions are co-mingled with theforced dispossessions of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and European empires.

The concentration of lands under increasingly larger holdings controlled by fewerpeople is affecting adversely the lives and livelihoods of small scale farmers and com-munities in Africa, Asia and Latin America (The Oakland Institute n.d.b) as well asin Europe (European Coordination Via Campesina (ECVC) and Hands-Off The Land(HOTL) Alliance 2013). Analysis of the geospatial and socio-ecological contexts of139 transnational land acquisitions (>200 hectare per deal) in the Global South foundthat 35% of the deals targetted densely populated and easily accessible croplands, 34%remote forests with lower populations, and 26% moderately populated and accessibleshrub- or grasslands (Messerli et al. 2014). In the 28 countries most affected by theglobal land rush from 2000 to 2014, one potential impact of transactions involvingagricultural areas is loss of income and employment opportunities for over 12 millionpeople in rural communities (Davis, D’Odorico, and Rulli 2014).

Green grabbing (Interview with Melissa Leach 2012) is land appropriation for envi-ronmental purposes such as carbon trading initiatives. Acquisition of forests and landsto establish forestry plantations intended to offset carbon emissions elsewhere in theworld can take away local communities’ access to land (The Oakland Institute n.d.c)and hurt Africa’s rural poor (Lyons and Westoby 2015). Small scale farmers every-

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slave_map.pdf

Figure 11. The trans-Atlantic slave trade and European empires. Cartogram showing (a) Major sites inthe Atlantic Rim from which captives embarked and disembarked; the size of the circle indicates the number

of slaves transported. (b) The countries and territories ruled or administered formerly by Belgium, France,Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, UK, or another country. The colour of a region indicates the lastcolonial ruler, for example, Guyana is shown as a former British Colony even though it was colonised first by

the Netherlands. Like other visualisations, this cartogram is for illustrative purposes only and is by no means

a definitive history of European colonialism and imperialism. To view the interactive version of this staticcartogram, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix A.15).

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slave_map.html

where face the serious challenges of land ownership, access to land, and water rights:from Africa (Dalrymple 2015) (particularly the sub-Saharan region (White 2014))through Haiti (Haiti Grassroots Watch 2013) to India (La Via Campesina 2015) andEurope (Access to Land n.d.).

Particularly since the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, farmland has come to be seenas a safe investment, a precious global commodity: “like gold with yield” (Fairbairn2014). It is an attractive alternative economic asset (Cotula 2012) for (global) in-vestors (Global AgInvesting n.d.) casting around for greater returns with low risk ina time of volatile markets for publicly traded securities and in a near zero interestrate environment for money-market and cash investments. Many investors have diver-sified their portfolios by reducing their exposure to equities whilst reallocating fundsto “real” or “hard” assets overseas such as farmland (Humphreys, Solomon, and Tu-musiime 2013). The “financialisation of farmland” means that decisions to buy or sellthis “fictitious capital” is governed as much by the wider financial environment asby the agricultural use value of land: the appeal of land as a financial asset is highlydependent on interest rates (Fairbairn 2014).

Central banks use the interest rate to shape monetary policy, control the country’seconomy. Perhaps the most influential lever the Bank of England (Bank of Englandn.d.b) and the Federal Reserve System (Wikipedia contributors n.d.d) have undertheir control, shifting this crucial rate has a drastic effect on the building blocks ofmacroeconomics, including the behaviour of investors in the U.K. and U.S.A. withrespect to land internationally, regionally, and domestically. As Britain’s farmlandbecomes a tax haven (Heatherington 2015), prices outstripping even prime centralLondon real estate (Shirley 2016), an increasing proportion of land purchases arebeing undertaken by lifestyle buyers rather than farmers (Agrimoney 2015). Privateinvestors view (English) farms both as safe assets in which to store wealth and highly-prized places to live (Fiddes 2017). Increases in the Bank of England base rate placepressure on farmers reliant on loans (Black 2015), especially those used to supportcash flow.

Marrying transnational commodity chains and global circuits of capital with agri-culture and medicine is vital for understanding the financial and physical well-being ofhumans and communities as well as disease emergence in plants and animals. The fieldof Structural One Health (Wallace et al. 2015) integrates the global political economyand multispecies biology (notably wildlife, livestock, crop, and human ecology) leadingto, for example, propositions such as neoliberal economics and land use providing thebroader context in which Ebola emerged in West Africa (Wallace et al. 2016).

3.2. Visualisations

For the visualisation discussed below, our first goal is to illuminate the increasing roleplayed by financial actors, institutions, markets, and motives in the operation of in-ternational and domestic economies by highlighting the connection between monetarypolicy (banks’ lending practices) and the financialisation of land and agriculture – forexample, the interest rates of central banks (The Economist 2017) and rich investorstend to target (poorer) economies with abundant land and water resources (Lay andNolte 2017).

Our second goal is to highlight how the growing interlinkages between the finan-cial and agrifood sectors are shaping the latter in areas ranging from food retail toland ownership (Vander Stichele 2015). For example, “private equity players and as-

21

set managers that acquire land or corporate farms, do not see food production as acomplex ecological process, do not consider starvation, obesity and malnutrition aschallenges that they have to address and, more importantly, do not recognize the roleand existence of small scale farmers. On the contrary, they see food production as anyother industrial operation, based on efficiency and satisfaction of the global demand,a matter of competition on the global market rather than a matter of socially andculturally embedded practices that can satisfy the needs and rights of the commu-nities. Massive amounts of resources have thus been invested, and will be invested,in production and distribution of food not on the basis of what is ecological, sociallyacceptable, healthy or capable of guaranteeing the long-term resilience of land and theecosystem.” (Ferrando 2017)

3.2.1. Public datasets and information (re)sources utilised

The chart and cartogram make use of the following freely available material.

• Interest rates set by the central bank of the U.K. (Bank of England) (Bank ofEngland n.d.a) (1694 – 2016) and the U.S.A. (Federal Reserve System) (FederalReserve n.d.) (1954 – 2017) (for details, see Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2).

• The economic contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP of countries thatare major targets of large-scale land acquistion (1980 – 2010) (Davis, D’Odorico,and Rulli 2014) (for details, see Appendix B.3).

• Multilateral free trade agreements in operation (Wikipedia contributors n.d.h)and international agreement arising from the Asian-African Conference of Ban-dung (29 countries from Africa and Asia meeting at the Bandung (Indonesia)International Conference 1955) (for details, see Appendix B.4).

• The land acquired in a country and the countries targetted by investors fromBritain and the U.S.A. (as of October 2017) (Land Matrix n.d.b,n,n,n,n) (fordetails, see Appendix B.5).

• Natural products being created using synthetic biology and countries where tra-ditional livelihoods and biodiversity may be adversely affected as these syntheticbiology substitutes of food, flavour, cosmetic and fragrance ingredients enter themarket (ETC Group 2016) (for details, see Appendix B.6).

3.2.2. Timelines and events chart: central bank interest rates and agriculturalproduction in targets of global land acquisitions

The chart shows interest rates set by the U.K.’s Bank of England and the U.S.A’sFederal Reserve (left vertical axis) and the agricultural sector’s contribution to theGDP of 28 significantly grabbed countries (right vertical axis) in the context of tradeagreements (horizontal axis) (Figure 12).

3.2.3. Cartogram: global large-scale land acquisitions and countries threatened bythe replacement of natural products by compounds manufactured usingsynthetic biology

The map highlights some of the challenges faced by small scale farmers, notable theappropriation of land and water by international entities and emerging technologies(Figure 13).

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U.K

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Figure 12. Central bank interest rates and agricultural production in targets of global land acquisitions.

Chart showing (a) Interest rates from the Bank of England (1694 – present) and the Federal Reserve System

(1919 – present). (b) The economic contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP (average percent) for 28countries that have been the targets of significant large-scale land acquisitions and all other countries (1980 –

2010). The significantly grabbed countries are Angola, Argentia, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo,

DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique,Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Sudan, Tanzania,

Uganda, and Uruguay. (c) Multilateral free trade agreements in operation and international agreement arising

from the Asian-African Conference of Bandung. The agreements shown are Bandung (Asian-African Con-ference of Bandung), EUCU (European Union Customs Union), EFTA (European Free Trade Association),

AC (Andean Community), APTA (Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement), SADCFTA (Southern African Develop-

ment Community Free Trade Area), GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Mar-ket), CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), SICA (Central

American Integration System), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EEA (Euro-pean Economic Area), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), G-3 (G-3 Free Trade Agreement),

IGA (International Grains Agreement), GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area), DR-CAFTA (DominicanRepublic-Central America Free Trade Agreement), SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area), EAC (East AfricanCommunity), AANZFTA (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area), CISFTA (Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States Free Trade Area), PAFTA (Pacific Alliance Free Trade Area), RCEP (Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership), and TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). To view the interactive version of this staticchart, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix B.7).

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Central_bank_interest_rates_agricultural_production_targets_land_acquisition.html

+-

PercentTargetted0%-0.05%0.05%-0.31%0.31%-1.3%1.3%-17.2%

Leaflet | Map tiles by Stamen Design, CC BY 3.0 — Map data © OpenStreetMap,Map Legend

Figure 13. Global large-scale land acquisitions and countries threatened by the replacement of natural

products by compounds manufactured using synthetic biology. Cartogram showing (a) Countries that are

targets of the land grabbing phenomenon. The shading is proportional to the percent of the land area of acountry that has been acquired in transnational deals. (b) Countries where investors from the U.S.A. and the

U.K. have acquired land. These countries are marked using a flag icon (Union Jack, Stars and Stripe). As of

October 2017, the top two investor countries involved in transnational land acquisitions in terms of the numberof deals are the U.S.A. (143 deals) and the U.K. (129 deals); the top investor country in terms of the area

of land acquired is the U.S.A. (9,979,713). (c) Countries where the traditional livelihoods of farmers, growers,pickers, harvesters and others as well as biodiversity are under threat because of the replacement of 13 naturalproducts by compounds produced using synthetic biology. These countries are marked using a plant icon and

the natural food, flavour, cosmetic and fragrance ingredients considered are agarwood, ambergris/Clary Sage,artemisinin, ginseng, patchouli, rose oil, saffron, sandalwood, shea, cocoa butter and CBEs, squalenes (olives),

stevia, vanilla and vetiver. To view the interactive version of this static cartogram, click here and open the

HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix B.8).

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landgrab_map.html

4. Traditional farming systems, agricultural biodiversity and climatechange

4.1. Background notes

In 2015, representatives of diverse constituencies from all continents that produce∼70% of the food consumed by humanity issued the Declaration of the InternationalForum for Agroecology (Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali(CNOP) et al. 2015; Ferrante et al. 2015). This joint vision of peasants, fish har-vesters, fish workers, mobile indigenous peoples, and many others across the world (LaVia Campesina n.d.c; Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali(CNOP) n.d.; Movimiento Agroecológico de América Latina y el Caribe (MAELA)n.d.; Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest(ROPPA) n.d.; World Forum of Fish Harvesters & Fishworkers (WFF) n.d.; WorldForum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP) n.d.; World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous Peoples(WAMIP) n.d.; More and Better (MaB) n.d.) identified land and territories as wellas collective rights and access to the Commons as a fundamental pillar of agroecol-ogy. Agrarian reform is a common struggle for small scale farmers (La Via Campesinan.d.a), a group who produce most of the world’s food with less than a quarter ofall farmland, a paltry share that is shrinking (GRAIN 2014). Despite the legaciesof slavery and colonialism, threats to indigenous peoples’ livelihoods from emerg-ing technologies (Berne Declaration et al. 2015; Greenaway 2017), attempts to re-place natural products with products containing synthetic biology ingredients (ETCGroup 2016; Kidd 2017), disruptions caused by erratic weather patterns, and othermany challenges, small scale farmers in the Southern U.S.A. (Gray 2015; Federationof Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund n.d.), Haiti (Metzker 2013; Remyand Tramel 2017; Araujo 2014), Honduras (Gray 2015; US Food Sovereignty Alliance2015; La Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña (OFRANEH) n.d.), Zimbabwe (USFood Sovereignty Alliance 2017; Zimbabwe Smallholder Organic Farmers Forum (ZIM-SOFF) n.d.), the Andean region (Suárez-Torres et al. 2017), Brazil (Brazil–Holland Ur-ban Agriculture Alliance n.d.), Mexico (Penniman 2015; Conant 2013), Peru (O Shea2014), Pakistan (Lok Sanjh: an organisation that promotes strategies for socially andenvironmentally sound agriculture through focused research, policy advice and advo-cacy n.d.), India (Moss 2017; Thapa 2014), the Philippines (Magsasaka at Siyentipikopara sa Pag-unlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG) n.d.), Tanzania (Sustainable Agri-culture Tanzania (SAT) n.d.), California (Burgess n.d.), and elsewhere (ETC Group2017) are feeding, healing, clothing, and fueling many parts of the world. Numeroussuccess stories and multiple case studies (The Oakland Institute n.d.a) demonstratethe capacity of agroecological agriculture to mitigate the effects of climate change andaddress hunger and poverty whilst respecting farmers and the environment (US FoodSovereignty Alliance n.d.; Altieri, Funes-Monzote, and Petersen 2012; Altieri, Nicholls,and Montalba 2017; Agricultures Network n.d.).

Building on ancestral production systems developed over many millenia, the Decla-ration (Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali (CNOP) et al.2015; Ferrante et al. 2015) emphasized food sovereignty (International Steering Com-mittee 2007) as the framework offering a collective path forward from today’s food,public health, climate, environmental, and other crises. Given the intimate connectionbetween the ability to cope with (even prepare for) extreme climatic events and highlevels of on-farm biodiversity, traditional farming systems and agroecological strategies– particularly biodiversification, soil management and water harvesting – represent the

25

“only viable and robust path to increase the productivity, sustainability and resilienceof peasant-based agricultural production under predicted climate scenarios” (Altieriand Nicholls 2017b).

Agroecology has two interacting and complementary pillars (Third World Networkand SOCLA 2015): soil quality (enhancing organic matter and biological activity)and plant health (enhancing the habitat for beneficial biota) – that is, improvingbelow-ground as well as above-ground community biodiversity and function. Agro-cological practices such as building soil, recycling nutrients, dynamically managingbiodiversity, and conserving energy at all scales both lessen the adverse impacts offood systems on the climate (adaptation) and reduce green house gas emissions (mit-igation). Innovations created and/or employed by small scale farmers include onesthat provide effective control of pests and diseases (Nicholls, Altieri, and Vazquez2016; Chaboussou 1985; Nicholls and Altieri 2004), produce carbon-rich soil throughsustainable grazing by ruminant animals (Idel 2011), improve air quality through re-duced nitrogen pollution (Science for Environment Policy, European Commission’sDirectorate-General Environment 2013), enhance livelihoods through sustainable foodand fibre production (Lok Sanjh: an organisation that promotes strategies for sociallyand environmentally sound agriculture through focused research, policy advice andadvocacy n.d.), increase knowledge through farmer training (Sustainable AgricultureTanzania (SAT) n.d.), develop cultivars/breeds from traditional varieties and stockthrough farmer-scientist collaborative research (Magsasaka at Siyentipiko para sa Pag-unlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG) n.d.), and explore the design and implementationof closed-loop plant-based indigo production systems (Wenner and Forkin 2017).

The key attributes of the ideal food system are “offers adequate nutrition andhealth”, “creates biodiversity and avoids negative ecological and environmental im-pacts”, and “ensures livelihood for farmers, diverse landscapes, equitable access toland, water, seeds, and other inputs” (Dwivedi et al. 2017). Whilst the relation-ship between soil fertility and the health of humans and animals has been knownfor decades if not millenia (Koohafkan and Altieri 2011; Food and Agriculture Or-ganisation n.d.; Paull 2011, 2006; Albrecht 1958), recent efforts in pursuit of yieldmay have compromised biodiversity and nutritional quality, one culprit being soil de-pletion. For example, analysis of historical data on the nutrient content of food inthe U.K. (1940 – 2002) (Thomas 2007; Public Health England 2015) and in the U.S.(1950 – 1999) (Davis, Epp, and Riordan 2004) revealed declines during the periodsstudied (Davis 2009). Possible reasons for this downward trend include changes invarieties/cultivars, farming practices, the environment, soil minerals and microbes,(whole) food systems, and the acquistion and/or evaluation of food composition data.Across a wide range of plant species – including food crops, elevated concentrations ofatmospheric carbon dioxide appear to reduce the concentrations of vital minerals andelements such as nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, calcium, sulphur, iron, zinc, copper,and manganese in the plant (Weigel 2014). One protective response of a range of foodcrops to extreme weather such as drought conditions and increases in temperature isthe synthesis of specific chemical compounds that could be harmful to human andanimal health if consumed for a prolonged period of time (United Nations Environ-ment Programe (UNEP) 2016). Finally, external farming inputs such as fertilisers andpesticides affect the microbial communities in and around plants (Pagano et al. 2017),an important issue given that the dynamic and reciprocal interactions at the soil-rootinterface influence root function and ultimately plant growth, production, and quality.

Agroecology is a way to design climate change-resilient farming systems (Altieriet al. 2015) whose social, cultural, economic and environmental benefits include the

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provision of plant crops for human and/or animal consumption that meet consumerdemand for nutritional quality and density. One explanation is that agroecologicalpractices embody an understanding that each plant growing in field conditions is nota single individual but a community: the myriad connections between a plant andits (a)biotic environments are critical for meeting the challenges of food, fuel andfibre production. That is, the cornucopia of aerial- and soil-based associations andinteractions amongst and between plants and microbes exert a strong influence oncrop yield and economic viability (Ishaq 2017) as well as nutrient value.

A keystone of agroecological practices is improving the well-being of the cornucopiaof beneficial micro- and macro-organisms that reside in, on, and in the vicinity ofplants and animals in general and crops and livestock in particular. The phyllosphereis the above-ground portions of plants inhabited by commensal and other microor-ganisms (Theis et al. 2016). The rhizosphere is the narrow regions around a rootwhere microorganisms and processes important for plant growth and health are lo-cated (McNear 2013) and whose functions include helping plants to acquire nutrientsfrom the environment (notably nitrogen, minerals and elements), improving wateruse efficiency, and protecting against pathogens (de Vries and Wallenstein 2017). Acommon mychorrhizal network is the system of fungal hyphae that link together theroots of most land plants (Field 2014). Plants use this underground network to warnneighbouring plants of imminent attack from diseases and pests and to communicateunfavourable conditions such as drought whilst the services performed by the fungiinclude uptake of phosphate and mineral nutrients (Thompson 2017; Johnson andGilbert 2015). Collectively, the phyllosphere, rhizosphere and common mycorrhizalnetwork are key mediators and determinants of the dynamic, reciprocal, multifacetedand intimate relationship between agroecosystem health (crops as well as livestock)and human health.

In addition to food, feed, and medicines, tangible products of agroecosystems in-clude fibre and dye plants and animals (Lok Sanjh Foundation (LSF) 2016; Fibershedn.d.a,n; Cultural Heritage Preservation and Natural Dyes Laboratory n.d.; Land Work-ers’ Alliance n.d.). For materials such as cotton (“white gold”), new global and localperspectives on the entire value supply chain and the complete cycle of production,processing, consumption, and recycling include “From Farm to Fashion” (Lok SanjhFoundation (LSF), Oxfam-Novib, and Rural Business Development Centre (RBDC)2015) and “soil to soil” (Fibershed n.d.). Regenerative and sustainable agriculturesand community-driven textile systems consider issues ranging from classical plantbreeding methods with hierloom naturally coloured cotton varieties (Vreseis n.d.)through indigo cultivation and processing (Fibershed n.d.c) and community supportedcloth (Fibershed n.d.a) to garment design and construction (Fibershed n.d.b) – localfibres, local dyes, and local labour.

These and other agroecological approaches to and economic frameworks for perhapsthe most important natural fibre crop worldwide stand in stark contrast to those thatexisted during the trans-Atlantic slave trade and British colonialism (Wallace 2013).At the turn of 1800, the lives and communities of skilled middle-class weavers andtextile artisans in the English counties of Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire and Lancashirewere being upended by low-skilled low-wage labourers toiling in dismal factories (Coren2017). Between 1811 and 1813, a group of cotton and wool workers rebelled by smash-ing machines which were destroying their trades, undercutting wages and forcing theminto unemployment and destitution. These “Luddites” resisting destruction of liveli-hoods by industrialisation were opposed only to technology “hurtful to Commonality”,that is, whilst sceptics about the dogma of technology as progress, they did not deny

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the real benefits of some technologies (Luddites200 Organising Forum n.d.; Breakingthe Frame n.d.). However, the “expansion of cotton manufacturing in Great Britaindepended on violence across the Atlantic” (Scipes 2017) – the expansion of cottonproduction overseas.

“What distinguishes the United States from virtually every other cotton-growingarea in the world was planters’ command of nearly unlimited supplies of land, labor andcapital, and their unparalleled political power . . . The coercion and violence requiredto mobilize slave labor was matched only by the demands of an expansionist waragainst indigenous peoples” (Beckert 2015). Plantation owners in the Southern statesmelded agricultural science and labour management to alter, simplify and (re)organisehumans and nature to meet the needs of capital (Rosenthal 2015). Indeed, “most of thecotton picked by Valley slaves was Petit Gulf (Gossypium barbadense), a hybrid straindeveloped in Rodney, Mississippi, patented in 1820, and prized for its ‘pickability.’ Thehegemony of this single plant over the landscape of the Cotton Kingdom producedboth a radical simplification of nature and a radical simplification of human being:the reduction of landscape to cotton plantation and of human being to ‘hand.’ Cottonmono-cropping stripped the land of vegetation, leached out its fertility, and renderedone of the richest agricultural regions of the earth dependent on upriver trade forfood” (Johnson 2013). Many of the four million black slaves tilling fields in 1860 wereboth workers and human capital: the commodities produced for sale by the Americanslave-breeding industry included not only agricultural items such as tobacco, rice,sugar, and cotton but also people (Harris 2016). Today, some prison industries have“ancestral roots in the black chattel slavery of the South” (Benns 2015) where, forinstance, “much of the work on the 18,000-acre former slave plantation consists ofbackbreaking labor in the cotton, corn, and soybean fields, presided over by armedguards on horseback” (Cohen 2013).

The Bank of England’s new research agenda states “fundamental changes in the en-vironment could affect economic and financial stability and the safety and soundnessof financial firms, with clear potential implications for central banks” (Bank of Eng-land 2015a). Thus, the formulation and implementation of Bank policies that directlyand/or indirectly strengthen small scale farmers and build rural and urban agroecologyprovide a simple, shared, and cost-effective way to tackle one of the major challengesfaced by today’s national, regional, and global economies: systemic environmental riskssuch as climate change (Milgroom, Florin, and GRAIN 2017). In part, this is becausefood sovereignty helps to weather economic crises plus the established link betweenpublic health and the economy (Lang and Rayner 2012) – the long term financialbenefits of reduced mortality and morbidity flow to the state.

Agrocology-based strategies for addressing serious economic and financial risks in-clude increasing the capacity of local communities to experiment, evaluate and scale-up innovations (Altieri and Toledo 2012) through farmer-to-farmer and field-basedresearch and education, nationally, regionally and internationally (La Via Campesinan.d.b; L’Atelier Paysan n.d.; Soil Association n.d.), and where “innovation” and “tech-nology” are not necessarily synonyms. Crucial factors in the success of such endeav-ours are land sovereignty (Franco et al. 2013) (the “right of working peoples to haveeffective access to, use of, and control over, land and the benefits of its use and oc-cupation, where land is understood as resource, territory, and landscape”), the rightto water (International People’s Health University (IPHU) n.d.) (including in Eu-rope (Right2Water n.d.)), and world’s biodiversity for food and agriculture (Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations 2017). Ultimately, “we need to addressthe agricultural research agenda if it is to serve the interests of farmers, consumers

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and society as a whole, rather than narrow but powerful economic interests” (Weiner2017).

4.2. Visualisations

For the visualisations described below, our first goal is to illuminate some of theweather- and climate-related conditions faced by the social, biological, economic, andpolitical components of national, regional and global whole food systems in generaland small scale food producers in particular.

Our second goal is to highlight the global distribution of agroecosystems (heritageand current farming systems) rich in agricultural biodiversity and associated wildlifethat are also repositories of indigenous knowledge and culture – especially materiadietetica and materia medica. Critical engagement with local and indigenous knowledgesystems (Nakashima 2015) provides a better understanding of the challenges posed byclimate change and how to respond to it, agroecology being one example (Mazzocchi2006; Rivera-Ferre and Ortega-Cerdà 2011).

4.2.1. Public datasets and information (re)sources utilised

The chart and cartogram make use of the following freely available material.

• Atmospheric oxygen and carbon dioxide levels measured at nine locations aroundthe world (Scripps Institution of Oceanography n.d.) (for details, see Ap-pendix C.1).

• The warm (El Niño) and cold (La Niña) phases of complex weather patterns (Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) n.d.) (1950 – present).These episodes result from fluctuations in temperature between the ocean andatmosphere in the east-central Equatorial Pacific and can last between 9 monthsto 2 years. El Niño produces below-average rains and high temperatures resultingin, for instance, reduced Asian monsoons and triggering potentially prolongeddroughts (for details, see Appendix C.2).

• Organisations of small scale farmers and fisher folks around the world that helpedto formulate the Declaration of the International Forum for Agroecology (Co-ordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali (CNOP) et al. 2015;Ferrante et al. 2015) (for details, see Appendix C.3).

• Diverse, complex, locally adapted agricultural systems developed over centuriesand generations (Food and Agriculture Organisation n.d.) (for details, see Ap-pendix C.4).

• Centres of agricultural biodiversity, crops and livestock (for details, see Ap-pendix C.5).

4.2.2. Timelines and events chart: Average global oxygen and carbon dioxide levelsand El Niño/Niña episodes

The chart illustrates global weather patterns and conditions since the mid-20th century(Figure14).

4.2.3. Cartogram: Small scale food producers and agricultural biodiversity

The map highlights groups representing peasants and fisher folk producing the major-ity of food consumed by humanity, globally important agricultural heritage systems

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Figure 14. Average global oxygen and carbon dioxide levels and El Niño/Niña episodes. Chart showing (a)Global atmospheric O2 and CO2 levels based on measurements from nine different stations around the world

(1989 – 2016; parts per million, ppm). The values are the averages of O2 and CO2 levels monitored at Alert,

Canada; Cold Bay, Alaska; Cape Kumukahi, Hawaii; La Jolla Pier, California; Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii;American Samoa; Cape Grim, Australia; Palmer Station, Antarctica; and the South Pole (Scripps Institution

of Oceanography n.d.). (b) El Niño (warm; region highlighted in red) and La Niña (cold; blue) episodes of theEl Niño-Southern Oscillation cycle (1950 – present). To view the interactive version of this static chart, click

here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix C.6).

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Average_global_oxygen_carbon_dioxide_and_ElNino_ElNina.html

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Leaflet | Map tiles by Stamen Design, CC BY 3.0 — Map data © OpenStreetMap,Map Legend

Figure 15. Small scale food producers and agricultural biodiversity. Cartogram showing (a) Members of

La Via Campesina (LVC), an international movement which brings together over 200 million small scale pro-

ducers (La Via Campesina n.d.c) – peasant small and medium-size farmers, landless people, women farmers,indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers from around the world (including Europe (European

Coordination Via Campesina n.d.)). (b) Members of the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers

(WFF), an international body encompassing small scale fishers’ organisations (World Forum of Fish Harvesters& Fishworkers (WFF) n.d.). (c) Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS), sites that have

been created, shaped and maintained by generations of farmers and herders, are based on diverse natural re-sources, and use locally adapted management practices (Food and Agriculture Organisation n.d.). (d) Centres

of diversity of agricultural crops and livestock – geographical areas where groups of organisms, either domesti-

cated or wild, first developed their distinctive properties (Damania et al. 1998). To view the interactive versionof this static cartogram, click here and open the HTML file in a web browser (for details, see Appendix C.6.1).

and landscapes, and centres of agricultural biodiversity (Figure 15).

5. Data science and agricultural policy

5.1. Whole food systems policy: Community-led London Plan throughthe lens of food

Over the centuries, London-based financial, commercial, legal, insurance and otherinstitutions buttressed Britain’s overseas trade and imperial ambitions. One legacyof these entities and their actions is today’s global agriculture. That is, whole foodsystems are strategic sites for understanding everyday finance, law, economics, ethics,equity, ecosystems, environment, society, politics and history. Food integrates place,people and pedagogy across multiple time scales and levels of organisation. Since itplay critical roles in diverse areas, food falls under the remit of disparate local, regional,

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agro_map.html

national and international bodies and departments – transport, housing, public health,education, environent, employment, local economy and so on.

As the top-tier administrative body, the Greater London Authority (GLA) is re-sponsible for co-ordinating land use planning in the 1579 km2 (610 square miles) thatmake up Greater London, England. The individual London Borough Councils arebound legally to comply with the strategic plan, the “London Plan”, produced by theMayor of London. Just Space is “a network of local and London-wide metropolitangroups campaigning on planning issues – housing, transport, services, environment,rights of minorities but especially of working class and low-income groups. Activistsand groups support each other in influencing formal plans and policies at scales rang-ing from metropolitan, through municipal to local” (Just Space n.d.). Its main work is“developing ideas about what a London Plan would be like if it were to prioritise – orat least protect – the interests of its citizens, its environment and the real economiesin which we meet each others needs.” That is, to shape research and policy develop-ment by the GLA planning teams working on the London Plan and the Mayor’s otherstrategies.

In August 2016, Just Space and its member groups released the document Towardsa community-led London Plan: policy directions and proposals (Just Space 2016) anda year later additional material (Just Space 2017). Inspired by the increasing inter-est in developing urban food policy around the world (International Panel of Expertson Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food) 2017), the main aims of the newly pro-posed project, Community-led London Plan through the lens of food, are to increasehuman and environmental health and wellbeing (Northern Alliance for Sustainability(ANPED) 2012), support fundamental and applied studies which result in innova-tions that are not “hurtful to commonality” (Luddites200 Organising Forum n.d.),and reflect a genuine “people’s control of the research agenda, objectives and method-ology” (Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali (CNOP) et al.2015; Ferrante et al. 2015). This new project provides a vehicle for grass-roots andunderrepresented groups such as the working class, universities and policy makers totransform the whole food system of a large and complex city whenever and whereverpossible: to chart a roadmap for London to agroecology and food sovereignty.

Like other evidence-informed policy areas (Pearce 2014), ideas, arguments and dataare three sources of useful information for creating policies for whole food systems. Animportant challenge for the Just Space Network and its collaborators – individuals ororganisations at different levels in the planning hierarchy (neighbourhood, borough,city, government) – is identifying (possibly generating) and analysing heterogenouspublic data to support the decision making process, enable the development of guide-lines and facilitate the formulation of policies for the roadmap. However, it is worthbearing in mind the limits of using Big Data for prediction and addressing policyproblems (Jasny and Stone 2017; O’Neil 2017).

5.2. Research and development policy: public funds allocated to basicand applied studies in agroecology

A poorly investigated but critical aspect of agricultural policy is the public infras-tructure pertinent to the science, development, financing, and practice of agroecology.One type investment made by governments has particularly long term consequences:research projects supported by awards from national, supranational and/or interna-tional agencies in the U.K., E.U. and U.S.A. Public data on successful research propos-

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als could be used to study the allocation of public funds for research in agroecologywithin and between countries and regions as well as the social, cultural, economic,and political factors producing such text corpora. Statistical analysis of awards fromU.S. agencies (National Institutes of Health (NIH) et al. n.d.) (for example, (Talleyet al. 2011; DeLonge, Miles, and Carlisle 2016; Miles, DeLonge, and Carlisle 2017)),U.K. research councils (Research Councils UK (RCUK) n.d.), the European ResearchCouncil (European Research Council n.d.), and other organisations using tools andtechniques from natural language processing and machine learning provide a founda-tion for domain experts to elucidate, enumerate, compare, contrast, and understandthe research and development landscapes and priorities of public agencies in the globalnorth. The insights gained from such investigations will be of interest to parties prepar-ing a report on The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture for theSixteenth Regular Session (2017) of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations 2017). These approa