Can Positive Duties be Derived from KantsCategorical Imperative?

Michael Yudanin

Accepted: 20 October 2014 /Published online: 28 October 2014# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Kants moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties thatprohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists onderiving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays atthe basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperativeand thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. Afteranswering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative,most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understandingthe relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.

Keywords Ethics .Kant .Deontology.Categorical imperative . Positive duties .Negativeduties

Traditionally, moral philosophy considers two types of duties: duties prohibiting certain actionsand duties commanding certain actions.1 Prohibitive duties alone might be seen as insufficient,as it is hard to imagine a morality that does not command to help the fellow human in need, forexample, or in general to take action rather than just refraining from certain actions. The firstcategory, that of negative duties, includes duties of omission, or narrowing duties2duties thatlimit the range of actions moral beings are allowed to undertake. Positive duties, or wideningduties of commission, are the duties of though shalt that compel us to do certain things.

Kants moral philosophy includes both types of duties. When laying out the preliminaryconcepts of the metaphysics of morals, Kant talks about commission and omission as duties.3

Later, in discussing the duties to oneself, he addresses positive and negative duties as duties ofvirtue,4 where positive duties are commanding, and negativeforbidding action. This

Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2015) 18:595614DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4

1Such are, for example, religious ethics, e.g., Bibles ten commandments, as well as Qurans behavior-prescribing duties. Kant also belongs to this tradition. Starting with the Groundwork and more so in the Doctrineof Virtue, he argues for the establishment of positive duties. It should be noted, though, that there is a continuousdiscussion regarding the status of positive duties see, for example, Lichtenberg, 20102The use of the terms narrow and wide in relation to negative and positive duties is consistent with Kants usein the Groundwork (see, for example, GMS, AA 04:454) and in the Metaphysics of Morals (see, for example,MS, AA 06:390), even though Kant might see them a more complicated3MS, AA 06:223.04-05. die Begehung oder Unterlassung als Pflicht4see, for example, MS, AA 06:419

M. Yudanin (*)University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USAe-mail: yudanin@gmail.com

distinction between different kinds of duties echoes the one introduced in the Groundworkafter discussing the fourth example, that of beneficence, where the narrow duties were opposedto the wide ones, and related respectively to the maxims that we cannot think withoutcontradiction and those we cannot will without contradiction.5

It is important to emphasize here that Kantian ethics is based solely on a formal, universaland a priori source.6 The moral law, according to Kant, must be formal:

all that remains of a law if one separates from it everything material, that is, every objectof the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law.7

As formal, the law is necessarily a priori, as it has to be cleansed from anything material,i.e., empirical. As formal and a priori, it is universal, or applicable to every possible situation.

Negative duties can be directly derived from formal universal laws given a specific capacityof moral beings. If the moral law is Kants Categorical Imperative in its first formulation, theFormula of Universal Law (FUL),

act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will thatit become a universal law8

then, given any specific human capability, the moral law can prohibit or permit its use inguiding behavior through proscribing specific maxims to which it gives rise.

The case of deceitful promise9 can serve as a paradigmatic example of FUL prohibitingcertain maxims. As humans, we are capable of understanding the connection between whatothers know and their behavior, at least in simple situations like loaning money. We are alsocapable of knowingly passing incorrect information to other human beings. Hence, we are ableto deceive: to deliver wrong information with an expectation to gain from the actions it willtrigger. The maxim behind such behavior would be: I will lie to others when it is to myadvantage; with an expectation, of course, that another will believe me and act on theinformation I am passing. If we make this maxim a universal law of nature, as FUL requires,then we will have a world in which everybody always lies when there is something to gainfrom it. However, this is self-contradictory: if everybody always lies when there is a prospectof personal gain, then the expectation of the recipients of the information is to be lied to, andhence their actions will not follow the course that is hoped for by the deceiverwhich is thewhole point of deception. If everybody lies, lying loses its meaning.

Can the Categorical Imperative also mandate having certain maxims? Can a law thatcertifies maxims brought before its judgment also mandate having specific maxims?10 Theonly way to do that, it seems, is to mandate the goal toward which the maxim is formedif theend is obligatory, then we will have to formulate behavioral principles to achieve this end, i.e.,maxims that would be mandatory as well; without an intended end there is no free action.11 Yet

5 GMS, AA 04:4246 See, for example, KrVA800/B828, AA 03:520; KpV, AA 05:20; GMS, AA 04:4087 KpV, AA 05:027.12-14. Nun bleibt von einem Gesetze, wenn man alle Materie, d. i. jeden Gegenstand desWillens, (als Bestimmungsgrund) davon absondert, nichts brig, als die bloe Form einer allgemeinenGesetzgebung.8 GMS, AA 04:421, 0708. [] handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dasie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde 9 See GMS, AA 04:42210 It can be claimed that positive duties can require merely a certain type of action rather than having a specificmaxim. However, the moral worth of any action, as Kant notes in the Groundwork, lies in its maxim (see GMA,AA 04:399): an action without an underlying maxim cannot be an outcome of conscious reasoning, and hencecannot be seen as undertaken freely by a moral agent.11 See MS, AA 06:380 and MS, AA 06:389

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the obligatory ends will have to be related both to the particular constitution of the moral beingsthat ought to have them and to the specifics of their environmentthese two will provide thematerial for forming the ends of actions. Hence, it seems that there would be a problem inderiving ends from FUL, a universal, formal a priori law that comes not from experience butfrom reason. Laws of reason apply to any content, and specifically to any maxim, to any end ofaction. These laws are formal and hence universal and precisely by virtue of this formality anduniversality they cannot single out any particular content or be a source of a particular content.A rule cannot demand from somebody to demonstrate behavior that is subject to that rule.Having a law of certifying behavioral maxims by examining whether they can be universalizedcannot mandate having any specific maxims, or, for that matter, having moral maxims at all.

Yet declaring positive duties to be part of his universal ethics through mandating ends isexactly what Kant does, first in theGroundworkwith the fourth example, that of beneficence,12

and then in the Doctrine of Virtue.13 In full accord with the metaphysical foundations of hissystem that have been referred to above, Kant connects the ends of actions with the categoricalimperative, and supports it with a short justification that relies on reductio ad absurdum.14

The thesis of this paper is that positive duties cannot be derived from Kants Formula ofUniversal Law. In order to examine the validity of this thesis, I will analyze Kants argumentsto determine whether they succeed in deriving positive duties from the first formulation of thecategorical imperative. The focus will be on the case for beneficence spelled out in theGroundwork, as there the derivation is stated most explicitly, yet I will also address thepossibility for the derivation of the ends of action in the Doctrine of Virtue. If the argumentfor the possibility of such derivation is found lacking, I will try to sketch out an alternativeview of the sources of positive duties and their relation to the universal moral law.

However, first it should be established that FUL can be seen as a source of positive dutieswithin the Kantian framework.

1 Why Positive Duties Should be Derivable from the Formula of Universal Law

Kants ethics sees the ground of morality in pure reason. The argument for this starts with theDoctrine of Method of the first Critique15 and reaches its highest point in the formulation of thecategorical imperative in the Groundwork.

The purpose of the Groundwork, as Kant states in the Introduction, is to establish thesupreme principle of morality.16 This principle, in order to be a supreme universal rule andcommand absolutely, must be independent of anything empirical.17 It is important to empha-size here the continuity between Kants metaphysical epistemology of the first Critique and hismoral theory. The first Critique establishes the conception of the a priori as the only trueuniversality: only something which is prior to experience and has its residence in pure reasoncan be truly universal, i.e., apply to anything reason has access to. Proving this point isexplicitly stated as the goal of the first Critique in the Introduction,18 and the rest of theCritique of Pure Reason can be seen as carrying out the argument for it. Moreover, what is apriori and hence universal is also necessary: what is prior to experience has to apply to any

12 GMS, AA 04:42313 MS, AA 06:386387, 06:419, 06:387388, 06:401402, etc.14 MS, AA 06:38515 see, for example, KrV, AA 06:38516 GMS, AA 04:392.04. obersten Pricips der Moralitt17 KrV, AA 06:385; GMS, AA 04:407408, and elsewhere18 KrV, AA 02:027-028

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possible experience and cannot be connected to any specific experience; i.e., it has to applynecessarily.19 A priori can also appear under the name formal as in formal principle, whereformal means unrelated to any specific experiential content. Hence, for all our purposes theuniversality, necessity, and a priori nature of a certain concept or principle can be referred to asformality or universality interchangeably.

Applying the considerations of formality to Kants moral philosophy, we would arrive at theconclusion that to be universal, a moral principle must be a priori. Hence, if a motivation is to be atruly moral motivation, it has to come from pure reason, the only source of a priori principles(Baumann, 2001). What kind of moral principle would answer these criteria? A principle that isuniversality and hence necessity, or a principle that would be a direct translation of the terms offormality to the plane of practical reason. Such is Kants Categorical Imperative, and specifically itsfirst formulation, the Formula of Universal Law, quoted above, that has a double function of beingboth the supreme principle of morality and the test20 for behavioral maxims (Illies, 2007). It derivesthe specific formulation of the categorical imperative from its universality:

[] when I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, since theimperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity withthis law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left withwhich the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law as such.21

From here, for a behavioral principle behind an action, or a maxim,22 to be compliant withthemoral law, it has to be universalizable, that is, it has to be capable to be thought as a universallaw that binds everybody, everywhere, and at any point in time, without contradiction.

Since this is the supreme principle of morality, all secondary and intermediate moralprinciples, laws, duties, and rulesanything that bears upon the determination whether a certainmaxim of action is moralmust be derivable from it. This applies to the other formulations of thecategorical imperative present in the Groundwork: the Formula of Humanity,23 the Formula ofthe Kingdom of Ends,24 and the Formula of Autonomy.25 Kant links all these principles to the

19 For a similar discussion and response to some critique of Kants treatment of universality, necessity, and apriority, see Parkinson, 1960. For a different and much contested view of the relationship between a prioricity,universality, and necessity see Kripke, 198020 Kant explicitly refers to judging maxims by the criterion of universalization as a test (Probe) in the secondCritique: KpV, AA 05:69.0121 GMS, AA 04:420.26-28, 04:421.01-03. Denke ich mir [] einen kategorischen Imperativ, so wei ich sofort,was er enthalte. Denn da der Imperativ auer dem Gesetze nur die Nothwendigkeit der Maxime enthlt, diesemGesetze gem zu sein, das Gesetz aber keine Bedingung enthlt, auf die es eingeschrnkt war, so bleibt nichtsals die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes berhaupt brig, welchem die Maxime der Handlung gem sein soll22 For a definition of a maxim, see GMS, AA 04:421n. It is also important to emphasize that a maxim is aprinciple rather than a specific, single, spatio-temporally localizable mental state of a person (Fricke, 2008,p215), i.e., a maxim can be implemented in a number of situations. Kantian examples of deception, help, etc. canserve a demonstration for this. Therefore, the critique that it is always possible to localize any maxim, toformulate it in a way that it would be specific to unique situational circumstances and this way make it pass theFormula of Universal Law test, is unfounded.23 GMS, AA 04:429.10-12. So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of anyother, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means / Handle so, da du die Menschheit sowohlin deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals blo als Mittelbrauchst.24 GMS, AA 04:439.01-03. [] act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for amerely possible kingdom of ends / [] handle nach Maximen eines allgemein gesetzgebenden Gliedes zueinem blo mglichen Reiche der Zwecke See also GMS, AA 04:43825 GMS, AA 04:431.16-18. [] the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law /[] die Idee des Willens jedes vernnftigen Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzgebenden Willens. See alsoGMS, AA 04:432

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Formula of Universal Law and clearly states their equivalence to it.26 To clarify his intentionsfurther, he states that the three formulas are of one and the same law.27 The difference betweenthem, according to Kant, is only subjectively practical,28 i.e., is intended only to make the ideaof the law of reasonmore intuitive and accessible. To remove any doubt as to the primacy of theFormula of Universal Law, Kant writes:

[] one does better always to proceed in moral appraisal by the strict method and put asits basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative []29

In other words, whatever maxim we arrive at, with or without help of any other formula-tions, it is always subject to the form provided by FUL.

Another candidate for the source of moral duties is the Supreme Principle of the Doctrine ofVirtue from the Metaphysics of Morals:

[] act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyoneelse to have.30

Yet it seems that the difference between it and the Formula of Universal Law is the onebetween a universal principle and its application to a specific group of cases: while FUL talksabout all possible maxims notwithstanding their ends, the Supreme Principle of the Doctrine ofVirtue addresses the maxims of ends, i.e., the end that it is a duty to have; all the rest remainsthe same.

It can be argued, and has been argued, that the other formulas of the Categorical Imperativeare essentially different from FUL, notwithstanding Kants claims to the contrary. This mightbe so, yet it is clear that Kants intention was to have them as re-formulations of the one andthe same imperative. Hence, if we are to stick to what Kant meant, we should see the Formulaof Universal Law as the primary expression of the morality of pure reason, and our under-standing of the other formulations of the categorical imperative should be aligned with it. Thisis not to deny, of course, that an ethical system can be built based on one of the otherformulations of the imperative, and not to cast any doubt regarding the possibility of validityof any such system. However, the project of developing an approach to ethics based on, say,the Formula of Humanity of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, when these are understoodnot as re-formulations of the Formula of Universal Law but as independent principles, wouldbe outside of Kantian ethics and will require a separate justification for these principles as asource of morality.31

26 See GMS, AA 04:438 for the statement of the equivalence between FUL and the Formula of Humanity; thederivation of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends from FUL in GMS, AA 04:438; and for the direct connectionbetween FUL and the Formula of Autonomy see GMS, AA 04:43127 GMS, AA 04:436.09. [] nur so viele Formeln eben desselben Gesetzes28 GMS, AA 04:436.11. subjective [] praktisch29 GMS, AA 04:436.29-32. Man thut aber besser, wenn man in der sittlichen Beurtheilung immer nach derstrengen Methode verfhrt und die allgemeine Formel des kategorischen Imperativs zum Grunde legt []30 MS, AA 06:395.15-16. [] handle nach einer Maxime der Zwecke, die zu haben fr jedermann einallgemeines Gesetz sein kann.31 Guyer argues that the other formulations of the CI are not so much substitutes but necessary conditions for thereal possibility of the Categorical Imperative. This is similar to the way the requirement of non-contradictionsatisfies the logical possibility of an object but by no means its real possibility: the latter requires the object to beconceived in accordance with the categories and intuitions (Guyer, 1995, p361). While at the first glance Guyersargument undermines the primacy of the first formulation of the CI, I do not think it does. These are the otherformulations that enable FUL to be carried out, yet without FUL they would have no moral import. On the otherhand, FUL could become practical with other enabling factors, should there be any. However, further discussionon this subject exceeds the scope of this paper.

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It also has been argued that FUL is not the best expression of the core of Kantian ethics, asit is not self-evident that FUL incorporates the value of mankind.32 Without such value,arguably, Kantian or any other ethics might make little sense. This might be the reason whysome Kantian scholars gravitate toward other formulations of the Categorical Imperative.33 Ibelieve, however, that the moral worth of humanity is presupposed by FUL when we conceiveof moral worth not as a set of moral principles inherent in our physiology but as an ability togenerate moral content susceptible to the judgment by universal moral criteria. We have moralworth not because we have an in-born tendency to help others or are in need of help, butbecause we are capable of framing life situations as moral dilemmas and choose how to behavein light of moral principles. I elaborate on this subject in the last section of this paper.

To summarize, if positive duties are to claim the status of commanding moral principles,they should be derivable from the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.34

2 Kants Argument for Positive Duties

Kants main arguments for positive duties are found in two works: the Groundwork and theMetaphysics of Morals, where the Groundwork attempts to derive the duty of beneficencedirectly from the Formula of Universal Law.

2.1 The Argument for the Duty of Beneficence

Beneficence is as an example of a positive duty in section I of the Groundwork,35 36 and is laterdiscussed in relative length as the fourth example in section II where it concerns the maxim of nothelping. The person in question holds it as a principle of his behavior not to offer help to fellowhumans in need,37 which might even be part of a worldview that prescribes neither offering norreceiving help. Kant admits that this maxim can be thought without a contradiction: it is possiblethat a universal law of nature could verywell subsist in accordancewith such amaxim.38 Indeed, nological contradiction would ensue if the maxim of not providing help to the needy isconsidered as a universal law, i.e., if every rational being will always hold it asprinciple of acting. The problem Kant sees here is not the problem of thinking, ofconsidering the maxim, but that of willing it: it is still impossible to will that such aprinciple hold everywhere as a law of nature.39 This is so, writes Kant, becausemany cases could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others

32 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer #1 for pointing out this issue as relevant to the discussion.33 Wood, for example, argues that the different formulas of the Categorical Imperative constitute stages ofprogressive development, the FUL being just the first step (Wood, 2008, pp66-84 and elsewhere). Yet thisinterpretation, however interesting, does not seem to cohere with either the letter or the spirit of Kants ethics.34 Similar position can be found at Baumann who sees it as a Content of the Moral Principle / Gehalt desMoralprinzips: The moral principle can consist only in the Categorical Imperative / Das Moralprinzip kann nurim kategorischen Imperativ bestehen. (Baumann, 2001, p3)35 GMS, AA 04:39836 On including the duty of beneficence in imperfect duties despite a degree of textual ambiguity see Seymour,200837 When, of course, it does not conform to the agents own inclinations. Yet in this case we cannot talk aboutoffering help but rather about the benefits to the other that are a by-product of satisfying ones inclinations.38 GMS, AA 04:423.28-29. []es mglich ist, da nach jener Maxime ein allgemeines Naturgesetz wohlbestehen knnte39 GMS, AA 04:423.30-31. []ist es doch unmglich, zu wollen, da ein solches Princip als Naturgesetzallenthalben gelte; see also Korsgaard, 1996, pp14-16

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and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himselfof all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself.40

The contradiction that is supposed to trigger the prohibition of the maxim by the Categor-ical Imperative, insofar as it comes from willing the maxim rather than merely conceiving it,creates a serious problem for positive duties within the Kantian framework. Based on theexample Kant provides and on the analysis of what would it mean to will something, it can beconcluded that the contradiction in willing is indeed of a logical nature: if I have a specificmaxim as an agent yet at the same time I do not want it to be applied when I am a patient, thenI cannot will it as a universal law. The main question here, though, is why I do not wish it to beapplied to me. If the reason is contingent, the argument falls apart, as in some cases it willcreate a contradiction in willing, while in others it would not, and hence beneficence will notbe able to claim the status of duty.

One possible way to answer the question why is raising the consideration of prudence.41

According to this argument, it is essentially far-sightedness on ones side to be beneficent, asany maxim according to which she behaves, turned into universal law, will apply to herso itwould be merely prudent not to bar yourself from the assistance you might need. While thisargument is based on the textual analysis of Kants fourth example in the Groundwork, it isproblematic for a number of reasons. The most obvious of these reasons is that it calls for acost-benefit analysis, which might not be in favor of beneficence. People with high risktolerance, personal values focused on the present, and considerable means to enjoy life canbe making a perfectly rational decision when they refuse themselves help in the hour of needwhich is yet to come, in favor of enjoying life right now. Moreover, the whole analysis ofprudence seems to turn the moral judgment around ones desires, notes Herman,42 which iscertainly not what Kants moral philosophy would endorse.

To cope with these issues, Herman develops an alternative argument, an argument from thelimitations and true needs of the human nature. Her premise is that moral considerations inKantian or any other feasible ethics always have to take human beings with their specificcircumstances into accountthe ethics is, after all, for us as we are, flesh and blood, not forabstract entities endowed with reason:

For Kant, the embeddedness of the person in the particular is the natural and necessarystarting point of moral judgment [] The Kantian moral agent, if the standard examplescan be taken as a guide, comes to need a procedure for moral judgment when he istempted to make an exception for himself from known moral precepts.43

Arguing from this premise, Herman maintains that the contradiction in willing is indeed thereason for rejecting the general policy of non-beneficence and specific maxims that follow fromit, yet this is not because of prudential considerations. The risks to ones well-being resultingfrom the potential lack of help she can hope for as a result of making her maxim of refusing helpa universal law will indeed differ from one person to another, yet the fact that all of us arepotentially dependent on the help from others is inherent in our human nature. The adequacy ofour abilities and resources to our needs is a function of not only, and in many casesnot somuchof our discipline and hard work as it is an outcome of the environment in which we are placedby the hand of fate. Moreoverthe circumstances might change without any possibility of

40 GMS, AA 04:423.3235. []manche erugnen knnen, wo er anderer Liebe und Theilnehmung Bedarf, undwo er durch ein solches aus seinem eigenen Willen entsprungenes Naturgesetz sich selbst alle Hoffnung desBeistandes, den er sich wnscht, rauben wrde41 See, for example, Glasgow, 2001 and Herman, 199342 Herman, 199343 Herman, 1993, 51; see also Schmidt, 2005

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control from our side. Hence, argues Herman, given this peculiarity of human nature thatcharacterizes all of us, it is irrational to rob ourselves from the help of others, no matter how weevaluate the bets. Differently from the prudential model where the analysis was essentiallycontinuous, with a possibility of more or less risk related to barring possible help in the future,Herman proposes and successfully defends a binary model: what matters is the fact that wemight need help, rather than its quantity or the associated degree of risk.

Yet what about a person who is not committed to any particular end to the degree that willmake its abandonment undesirablethe wanton?44 Facing an option to adopt an end that, if itsmaxim is universalized, will require help from others, the wanton would rather relinquish theend. To cope with this situation, Herman calls forth the ends that cannot be given up, the trueneeds that are inseparable from our humanity. Insofar as one has ends at all, one has alreadywilled the continuous existence of ones agency as a rational being,45 writes Herman. Hence,according to Herman, there are ends that it is irrational to forego, and, since our capacities arelimited by our human nature, the maxim of non-beneficence is irrational, as willing a worldwhere this maxim is a universal law would go contrary to such ends.46

Hermans argument is certainly stronger than the prudential argument, and it seems muchcloser to the spirit of Kants ethics. Yet it shares with the prudential argument one feature thatrenders its support for the duty of beneficence highly problematic if we are to consider thederivability of the latter from Formula of Universal Law. The prudential argument pre-supposesa cost-benefit analysis of risks and rewards, while Herman bases her case on the limited natureand true needs of human beings. However, both rely on assertions about human nature as ithappens to be. Without seeing human beings as (a) prone to suffering and (b) considering it amatter that can be rectified by the help of others, neither the prudential argument nor Hermansone stand. Without (a) and (b), the duty of beneficence, of helping others in need, cannot bejustified by contradiction in willing: one can universalize the maxim of non-beneficence withno contradiction whatsoever if (a) and (b) are not assumed. Yet a principle with an empiricalantecedent would not have a universal import; that includes maxims, principles of volition.47

Kant follows through on this when he re-affirms, in the Critique of Practical Reason, that apractical principle that includes an empirical condition cannot be a law determining behavior.48

This argument sounds purely theoretical, and it can be claimed that a moral theory limited tohuman beings as we know them is good enough; other kinds of rational agents might well havedifferent duties. It can be further argued that we do not have to derive particular duties from theFormula ofUniversal Law alone: FUL and the human nature it works uponwould do. Yet this FUL+ x argument has a crucial problem. The power of Kantian morality is in its universality. By addingan empirical component, be it as general as something applicable to all human beings, yet still notuniversal, i.e., not applicable to human beings by virtue of us being rational, we are relinquishingsuch universalityand thus opening Kants ethical theory to assaults it will not be able to withstand.Kant notes in the secondCritique that conditional, non-universal ethics would fail to establish moralobligation49: it would no more be a law that applies to rational beings qua rational beings; rather,

44 Herman, 1993, 5445 Ibid., 5546 Another alternative to the prudential argument is what can be called the argument from happiness (see, forexample, Glasgow, 2001). The argument relies on Kants remark to Theorem IV in the second Critique, where hederives the duty to promote the happiness of others through the universalization of ones desire to promote herown happiness a desire that, per Kant, can be attributed to us as finite beings. While this approach differs fromHermans in terms of its specific focus happiness instead of the limitations of human nature it seems to giverise to similar problems, and the argument against it can be the same as the argument against Herman.47 GMS, AA 04:400, 02. []Princip des Wollens48 KpV, AA 05:3449 KpV, AA 05:33-34

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specific circumstances would be determining howmoral agents should act, thus giving different andpossibly opposing guidance to different individuals. Kant is mostly concerned here with desires andinclinations replacing the moral law in its true, universal form. One could argue that Hermanaddresses this concern by invoking aspects that apply to all humans as we know them. However,despite the general nature of Hermans human needs, the problem still persists: they appeal toempirics rather than to reason, and thus can be interpreted with equal coherency in ways that lead todifferent behaviors, failing to establish moral obligation.

Both of the pillars of Hermans argument, the necessity of the help of others and the existence oftrue needs, can be contested quite effectively. To do so, it is enough to change the hierarchy of valuesand to assign priority to the ends other than those that Herman, together with Kant, deems trueneeds. The willing of ones survival is included in willing an end only if one sees oneself as anindividual setting goals, rather than the goal being primary to and higher than oneself. apekssalamanders have no I but only we,50 even though each salamander is an individualand, beingcompletely rational, they would generate positive duties completely different from what Kant hasdescribed in the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals. Yet there is no need to rely on theimaginary properties of creatures of literary fancy, as striking and instructive as they may be: valuingcertain goals higher than the life of the individual is very common in human history, ancient as recent.There is no contradiction inwilling something and seeing it as higher than ones own life: a firefighteror a soldier sacrificing life for specific others or for abstract goals, or a scientist who endangers herselfwhile researching a cure for a dangerous disease can be seen as common examples. Westernphilosophy has startedwith yet another example of valuing principles higher than ones lifeSocrates.The same applies to the necessity of others help. Self-reliance can be seen as a goal so noble that anyhelp given by another human being on the ground of beneficence can be perceived as defiling it andhence as something that ought to be rejected. Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1917) and Ayn Rand (Rand,1992) can be brought up as examples of arguing for this sort of attitude. Herman addresses a similarcritique by claiming that the stoic, whose aim is to be independent, should see nothing irrational inallowing help as a possibility,51 e.g., in the case of failure. But it seems that she is missing the point.Not only the individual, her aims, and the social support network are at play herethe worldview ofthe individual, her interpretation of the situation as a natural order that has certain value structure,mattersmuchmore. Just as Herman sees the survival of the agent as included in the pursuit of his aim,one can see the value of the agent as a function of his compliance with the natural orderan order thatplaces success, in struggling with gods or in building railroads; or loyalty, to principles or to theemperorhigher than survival. As we will see, similar considerations apply to the maxim on non-beneficence: under certain belief configurations, the maxim of non-beneficence becomes perfectlyuniversalizable. Since we are talking about contingent matters, both views are legitimate.

There is another issue with the duty of beneficence as Kant derives it and Hermaninterprets. It seems that the dichotomy between giving help and not giving help is artificial,and there is a third option: not construing the situation as having a potential for beneficence,i.e., not seeing beneficence as a valid option. By resigning to a deterministic view of the world,for example, a completely rational human being can avoid getting into the dilemma of givingvs. not giving help: if everything is determined by, say, Moirae, or genetic makeup, or God,then giving help is futile. If the survival of the fittest is seen by a free rational being asnecessitated by the natural order of things, then it is completely irrational for him to will themaxim of beneficence, or to make helping others in need the principle of his action. Thecomponents of reasoning would then be:

50 *Capek, 198551 Herman, 1993, 54, note 13

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative? 603

(1) The survival of the fittest is the law of nature(2) I recognize a genuine need for help due to a deficiency in a fellow human being, and I

can offer such help without considerable costs to myself(3) I realize that I, as any other human being, might be in a similar situation sooner or later,

i.e., in need for the love and sympathy of others.52

If we only had (2) and (3), as Kant has in his explanation of the example of beneficence, notgiving help would be irrational given our limited nature and true needs. Yet with (1), giving helpis contradictory within the particular worldview. (1) can be also be replaced by other overarchingprinciples, for example, maximizing the overall happiness, as in Mills classical Utilitarianism53:

(1) I hold maximizing overall happiness, i.e., the increase of the total pleasure and thedecrease of the total pain, to be the supreme principle of morality

(2) I recognize a genuine need for help due to a deficiency in a fellow human being(3) I realize that I might be in a similar situation sooner or later and also(4) I know that the resources that will be devoted for helping this particular human might

bring a much higher reduction of pain if used for another purpose, e.g., providingvaccines for children in developing countries

In this case as well, it would not be rational to offer help. The duty of beneficence herebecomes irrational, and its place is taken by the utility calculator.

The examples above challenge Hermans argument.54 In both of them, the agent iscompletely rational, and might even hold Hermans view that there are genuine needs thateach humans being has, e.g., a need for help. Yet having a specific worldview leads agentsrationality to arrive at a maxim of non-beneficence.

The examples also demonstrate why the FUL + x configuration is problematicespecially for positive duties. With prohibitive, negative duties, any application of aspecific human capacity, e.g., the capacity to deceive, can be examined and eitherallowed or prohibited. No worldview can intervene, as we are talking here aboutscrutinizing abilities that include all possible instances of their application. For theability to deceive to pass the test of the Formula of Universal Law, it must bepresented as non-deceptionwhich is self-contradictory. Same applies to other negativeduties. For example, knowingly bringing oneself under such an influence of intoxi-cants that it takes away reasons ability to guide human behavior55 is self-contradictory no less than lying: here reason is used to undermine itself, which isirrational. Any other behavioral principle that would degrade the rational nature ofhumanity, undermine its exalted role, would fall under the same category: servility isone of those cases mentioned by Kant.56 The ultimate example, though, would bemurdering oneself or another being endowed with reason57: murder amounts topermanently taking away the ability to reason, so here reason undermines itself, eitherin the same person or in another, irreversibly.58

52 GMS, AA 04:423, 33. []anderer Liebe und Theilnehmung53 Mill, 189154 Herman, 1993; Glasgow, 2001; to an extent - Illies, 200755 MS, AA 06:42756 MS, AA 06:43443657 MS, AA 06:42242358 The discussion on cases of killing other than murder and possible differences between Kants texts and theprinciples of Kantian ethics goes beyond the scope of this paper.

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Yet with positive duties, duties that command actions, the worldview plays a crucial role, asit was shown above.59

The reason for the failure of the attempt to establish an argument for beneficence as a dutyis its reliance on particular interpretation of contingent facts about human nature. While aperson might will his own happiness or maintain the freedom of choice as a necessarycomponent of reason, the content of his understanding of happiness or his view of therealization of freedoms might go contrary to beneficence and yet be perfectly rational andhence universalizable. Human limitations, needs, and goals are contingent. Both Kantianmoralists and social Darwinists can see these as shaping morality, yet the conclusions in thesetwo cases will be diametrically opposed to each other. The value of ethics that has universalsource is precisely in avoiding this situation.

To summarize the analysis above, the duty of beneficence cannot be derived from theFormula of Universal Law: given certain worldviews, the maxim of non-beneficence can beuniversalized without contradiction, and the maxim of beneficence will be irrational.

2.2 The Arguments for Positive Duties in the Metaphysics of Morals

In theMetaphysics of Morals duty (Pflicht) makes its entrance in section IVof the Introductionas actions that are, [b]y categorical imperatives [] morally necessary, that is, obligatory.60

As with negative duty, positive duty has to command categorically, absolutely, to be anunconditional ought61in full accord with the requirements presented by Kant for an ethicalsystem throughout his writings.

Yet how can positive duty become necessary? Through its objectively necessary end, anend that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have62where the necessity isthat of reason, not of circumstance, and thus carries with it the same categorical character as theformal command of the Formula of Universal Law. To achieve that, the concept of duty willlead to ends.63 This would be akin to deriving duties from FUL: it is, as was noted above, thebasis for Kants moral theory, reasons foundation for any moral necessity; the duty must becategorically necessary, and hence deriving ends from the concept of necessity is identical inits meaning to deriving them from FUL.

Indeed, in section III of the Introduction to the doctrine of virtue (MS, AA 06:385) Kantestablishes pure practical reason as a context for setting ends. Every action of a conscious andaware rational being has an end. This end can be set only internally, and setting such an end isan act of freedom.64 As an act of freedom, it is subject to pure practical reason and not anoutcome determined by natural constraints. Hence, it is a categorical imperative of purepractical reason, and therefore an imperative which connects a concept of duty with that of anend in general.65 However, this only subjects the process of our end-setting to the scrutiny of

59 It can be argued that not only the worldview but also other factors, e.g., agents estimations of how otherindividuals are likely to act, play a crucial role in the case of positive duties. This discussion, however, exceedsthe scope of the current paper.60 MS, AA 06:221, 2328. kategorische (unbedingte) Imperativen [] nach denen gewisse Handlungen []moralisch nothwendig, d. i. verbindlich, sind, woraus dann fr jene der Begriff einer Pflicht entspringt See also06:222 and 22361 MS, AA 06:380, 18. unbedingte Sollen62 MS, AA 06:380, 2325. einen Zweck [] fr den Menschen als Pflicht, vorgestellt wird. See also MS, AA06:23963 MS, AA 06:382, 2425. wird [] der Pflichtbegriff auf Zwecke leiten64 See argument in MS, AA 06:38165 MS, AA 06:385, 0709. ist es ein kategorischer Imperativ der reinen praktischen Vernunft, mithin ein solcher,der einen Pflichtbegriff mit dem eines Zwecks berhaupt verbindet.

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative? 605

the Formula of Universal Law rather than necessitating certain specific ends; in other words,there is no necessity for the ends themselves to be determined by practical reason, andspecifically to be derived from FUL.

Kant is aware of this problem, and he immediately proceeds to argue for the existence ofnecessary ends. His proof is one of reductio.66 Since there are free actions, there must be endsat which such actions are directed. If there are no necessary ends, ends that are also duties, thenall ends are means to other ends. This, Kant concludes, will make categorical imperativeimpossible:

For were there no such ends, then all ends would hold for practical reason only as meansto other ends; and since there can be no action without an end, a categorical imperativewould be impossible.67

Yet the conclusion does not follow. For the Categorical Imperative in its original form, asFormula of Universal Law, all ends can be means to other ends without any contradictionwhatsoevertheir maxims will be still very much testable. Maxims are tested by FUL with noregard to the nature of their endsall what is scrutinized is whether the principle behind amaxim can be turned into a universal law. All Kants examples in the Groundwork, as well ascountless other cases, can be brought up to demonstrate this point. What will be impossible inthis case are ends that are also dutieshowever, since the existence of such ends is preciselywhat we are trying to prove, this result is acceptable.68

It is surprising that Kant is satisfied with a very brief treatment of this important issue. Andyet after devoting less than a page to it he immediately proceeds to the specific ends that arealso duties: ones own perfection and the happiness of others.69

Can the duties of ones own perfection and the happiness of others be derived from theFormula of Universal Law? It seems that they cannot, for the same reason the duty ofbeneficence cannot be derived from it, namely because of the mediating role of agentsworldview.

The necessity to cultivate ones own perfection, formulated as Cultivate your powers of mind and body so that they are fit to realize any ends youmight encounter70

Comes to make sure that we can follow on our moral determinations, i.e., are capable to dothe right thing given strong temptations to the contrary. This way, the command is essentiallyto develop moral fortitude.71

Yet the problem here is exactly the same we had with the duty of beneficence. Ones view ofones own moral status and of the ways to improve it, if the improvement is at all perceived asneeded, will have a decisive effect here and lead to radically different conclusions. Examplessimilar to the ones brought up in the discussion of the duty of beneficence can be applied hereas well. If one is convinced that everything is determined by genetic makeup, or that the

66 as provided in MS, AA 06:38567 MS, AA 06:385, 1417. Denn gbe es keine [gleichen Zwecken], so wrden, weil doch keine Handlungzwecklos sein kann, alle Zwecke fr die praktische Vernunft immer nur als Mittel zu andern Zwecken gelten, undein kategorischer Imperativ wre unmglich68 It can be argued that this consideration casts doubt on the whole of practical reason. However, discussing suchargument is out of the scope of this paper.69 MS, AA 06:385, 32. Eigene Vollkommenheit - fremde Glckseligkeit70 MS, AA 06:392, 1619. Gesetz []fr die Maxime der Handlungen [] Baue deine Gemths undLeibeskrfte zur Tauglichkeit fr alle Zwecke an, die dir aufstoen knnen71 aka virtue see MS, AA 06:380 and also MS, AA 06:394

606 M. Yudanin

inclinations we are endowed with by nature are part of the natural order of things, the maximof not intervening with what we have in terms of mind and body can be perfectlyuniversalizable, while the duty of self-perfectionirrational.

In the section of the Metaphysics of Morals that addresses the duty to promote thehappiness of others72 there is little discussion about the happiness of others yet a strongargument, anthropological in nature, is made for not taking it as a duty to promote ones ownhappiness. The argument that can be discerned mostly from the last few sentences of sectionV.B of the Introduction to the doctrine of virtue states that by warding off poverty insofar asthis is a great temptation to vice we can help others to focus on self-perfection. As such, it issusceptible to the critique brought up in the last paragraph against the argument for seeingones own perfection as a duty. Later (MS, AA 06:393) Kant returns to this subject andprovides a different argument that is close to the one given in the fourth example in theGroundwork. Here Kant discusses us making ourselves, through self-love, which is essentiallythe need to be helped when necessary by others, an end to others: when universalized, thisneed applies to all other human beings as well (Ibid.). However, despite the differences informulation, the essence of the argument is the same as in the Groundwork: an argument fromthe need to be helped, or self-love that is inseparable from the need to be loved, and itsuniversalization. Hence, all what has been said regarding the fourth example, namely theinsurmountable problem introduced by agents worldview, applies here as well.

Thus, Kants arguments for necessary ends in the Metaphysics of Morals fail to establishtheir derivability from the Formula of Universal Law, for the reasons similar to those discussedin the context of the duty of beneficence in the Groundwork.

3 The problem with Kants Argument: Why Negative Duties can be Derivedfrom the Formula of Universal Law Yet Positive Duties Cannot

It seems that the issue with deriving positive duties from the Formula of Universal Law is notspecific to this particular formulation of the Categorical Imperativeon the contrary, it is aprincipal issue that touches the core of Kants moral theory.

The foundation of Kantian ethics is pure reason rather than anthropology. The CategoricalImperative is pure reason formulated in a way that is comprehensible to the acting agentsendowed with it. It is the very expression of the two main, defining features of pure reasonuniversality and formality. Requiring every maxim of behavior to be capable of becoming auniversal law, a law applying not only to the particular situation with its specific players forwhich it was formulated but to any possible situation that involves a thinking self and offerssimilar behavioral options, is testing its compatibility with reasonthe universal framework ofour existence, the outer reach of our capacities. As such, reason must be formal, as it shouldencompass any possible accidental.73

In a sense, we can, if not must, conceptualize Kantian ethics as an ethics of rules. Allpossible rules have to agree with reason. If they do not, we will not be able to follow them. Inaddition, to be morally valid, rulesconsidered as maximshave to pass the test of theCategorical Imperative. This pertains to the rules of any game we play, chess as interpersonalbehavior. And indeed, most rules we know and hold valid would pass such a test: they areuniversal and treat all players/participants equally. For example, state laws that are widelyconsidered valid do not discriminate between individuals based on aspects irrelevant to the

72 MS, AA 06:38738873 Using Wittgensteins term; see Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922/2003), 2.012

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative? 607

subject matter; neither do rules of hockey. Discriminative laws are usually considered invalidon the grounds of universalityas being contrary to reason, in our terms. This way, reason putsconstraints on rules, and rules put constraints on specific interactions; these interactions aredefined by their rules and in turn define the rules by being conducted according to them: rulesand interactions are bound to each other this way.74 As a specific instance of this general claim,behavior defines its maxims, and maxims are the principles of behavior: it does not matterwhether the maxim of behavior was formulated prior to acting or was not formulated at all, itcan always be discerned.75 Yet all maxims, as rules, have to agree with reason. For maxims ofbehavior, the test for such agreement is the Formula of Universal Law.

As noted above, negative duties arise when our capabilities are subjected to thescrutiny of reason. First and foremost, we are capable of breaking the rules of thegames we are engaged inand since any interaction is defined by its rules, this breaksthe meaning of the interaction. For any kind of deception, for example, rules areessential: if forgery is to succeed, it is necessary that the rule is to pay with genuinecoin. The same applies to cheating in a game: if there are no rules that are expectedto be followed and are generally followed, cheating would never work. Moreoverthepretense of following the rule is crucial, as otherwise the cheated party will not bedeceived and will not act as the cheater expects. This way, deception essentiallymeans playing by the rules while breaking themwhich is a contradiction, and hencecannot be certified by reason. In terms of the Formula of Universal Law, it is notuniversalizable: if breaking the rules of the game while playing it is permitted, therewould be no game. Hence the negative duty, a duty that makes sense only forcreatures capable of deception: not to deceive. All other discernible negative dutiesare variations of the same theme: breaking the rules while playing by them. Lets taketheft as an example. Classical Kantian analysis in the case of theft would go asfollows: if theft becomes universal law, it loses its meaning, as everything always willbe up for grabsand hence the term theft, which refers to taking the property ofanother without permission while the general rule and the expectation is that propertyrights are upheld, would be meaningless. In our terms, we can say that theft isbreaking the rules of the property gameand since the rules are bound with thisgame, then the game will lose its meaning in the case of theft. Of course,relinquishing reason, as it happens with intoxication or murder, would be the ultimateviolation of the rules of the game of rationality, throwing away the chessboard uponwhich the game of life is being played.

Yet no maxims, not to mention duties, can appear ex nihilo from the formal-logicalprinciple of non-contradiction.76 Reason is formal and cannot beget content; content isspecific by definition, but formal rules are universal. The fact that we can formulatecertain rule in agreement with reason does not mean that we will, since being able to dosomething does not mean that we will do it. There are possible games the rules of whichwill never be formulated, as well as games the rules of which will be formulated yet thatwill never be played. There are maxims that we can formulate yet never will, andbehaviors we can engage in but will never pursue. The fact that we can formulate certainmaximmeaning, that our reason allows thatcannot lead to us actually formulating it.

74 See Wittgensteins language gamesPhilosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 2009), 7ff75 It can be claimed that multiple maxims can be ascribed to the same action. Yet this would not preclude theapplication of the Categorical Imperative to each of them, neither will it diminish its force. This discussion,however, exceeds the current scope.76 Geiger, 2008, 138

608 M. Yudanin

4 Moral Form and Moral Content: Possible Source of Positive Duties

While the purpose of this paper is to examine the derivability of positive duties from the firstformulation of Kants categorical imperative, I find it beneficial to sketch a rough outline of thealternative to Kants approach to positive duties, an approach that will accord with the Kantianethics of pure reason.

It seems that to have a moral system comprised of both positive and negativeduties we need two components. The first would be behavioral principles that will bereliably generated by the neurophysiology of human species, i.e., will come to mindfor all mentally capable humansspecific maxims that will be similar enough acrossindividuals. The second will be a universal principle that will determine whetherparticular maxims, both common to all people and specific to this or that person,are permissible. The role of the latter can be played by the Categorical Imperative,and specifically its first formulation, thanks to its formality. The former, as it has beenshown, cannot be derived from it. Hence, we will need to look for another source ofpositive moral content that suggests specific behavioral options.

In order to talk about positive moral content, we should consider attributescommon to the whole of the human racecertain features that will make us thinkabout specific behaviors, conceptualize situations in a certain way. There should besomething in us that will make us focus on the particular aspects of interaction withour environment, single out certain elements of this interaction, consider particularends, and finally generate defined maxims. This something might well be rooted inour physiology.

As an example lets consider beneficence. To think about beneficence, it is notenough for us to feel a need for help, to see ourselves as limited and potentiallyneedy. Its first pre-requisite is viewing each and every human being as an individualwith a clear boundary and her own mind, feelings, etc. While this seems the mostnatural thing to do, such a view uniquely characterizes the human speciesa view, Imust say, that has been contested in the twentieth century by a number of totalitarianideologies that saw humans as expendable elements of a larger structure that has itsown reality, e.g., a nation or a social class. In addition to that, we should be able toconnect in some way to another persons pain, to feel it. This ability seems to have aclear neurophysiological basis in the form of empathy rooted in mirror neurons thatwill fire when we see another creature in pain (Iacoboni, 2005; Schulte-Rther,Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007). However, these two components are not suffi-cient to beget maxims that will submit to the judgment of the Categorical Imperative:we need to allow them to become the basis of action. One can feel the pain ofanother yet convince oneself that this is an animism that should be suppressed for thegreater good which requires anothers suffering. Only when we conceptualize a naturalinterest as worthy of pursuing can we talk about formulating proper maximsnotbecause they are somehow derived from the Formula of Universal Law but becausethey are part of our nature.

Admittedly, the term duty here might be too strong, as no rationally determinablenecessity is involved, merely natural impulse processed by cognition. Instead of an absoluteimperative that commands categorically, we have here moral contents that are subject to thejudgment of the universal principles, maxims that are to be either permitted or rejected. Weshare their source, the neurophysiology common to all homines sapientes, yet this alone cannotaccord them the status of moral duty. No derivation of positive duties from these contentsalone is possible.

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative? 609

It can be argued that Kants mentioning of the aesthetic preconditions of the mindsreceptivity to concepts of duty as such77 constitutes an acknowledgement that positive dutieshave psychological origins and makes his view close to what I am suggesting as an alternativemodel for positive moral content. Guyer (Guyer, 2010) argues that in the Metaphysics ofMorals Kant presents a model where feelings, empirically discernible tendencies that charac-terize us as embodied beings, play a causal role in moral action. However, there is a crucialdifference. Kants moral feeling, conscience, and respect78 do not generate maxims butrather make humans susceptible to the call of duty.79 Love for fellow human beings,80 on theother hand, should not be mixed with the duty of beneficence.81 In the framework I amproposing, the natural feelings, rather than merely making us receptive to duty, i.e., to theconsiderations of pure reason, consistently focus us on certain aspects of human relations andgenerate maxims of beneficence.

Based on this analysis, the proposed structure of morality will consist of two radicallydifferent elements. The first is the universal component of moral form, a component sobrilliantly established by Kantthe component of pure reason. It serves as a boundary forany possible morality, just as reason serves as a form for all we can meaningfully think, say, ordo. Specifically, this would be the Categorical Imperative in its first formulation that will standguard against moral transgression that is contrary to reason. Yet this component alone is notsufficient to bring about a viable ethics: the whole of morality, as Haddock notes, cannot residein the coerciveness of logical consistency,82 it must provide some moral content as well, as ithas been expounded earlier. Hence, the second component will be the physiologically enabledcomponent of moral content: persistent focus on some particular aspects of human interaction,stable interests that will make us generate specific maxims, e.g., those of helping others inneed. Due to the constitution of our life form, then, these interests are permanent and essentialto being a moral agent83human moral agent, that is. It has to be noted that the particular lifeform we possess also makes us generate other maxims, e.g., those of deception and theft. It isthe application of the moral form, or employing the test of the Formula of Universal Law, thatwill permit certain maxims and prohibit othersa sort of physiology checked by reason.84

Instead of reason-necessitated positive duties, then, we will have natural tendencies that arecommon to all members of our life form and permitted by the Categorical Imperative. Thisparadigm preserves the privileged position of the Categorical Imperative and indeed thestructure of Kantian ethics yet acknowledges that the content cannot be generated by theform.85

The approach outlined above can be also seen as an alternative to the view that pure reasoncannot play any substantial part in defining morality, and moral laws have to come from othersources (see, for example, Foot, 1992 or Geiger, 2008). As I attempted to establish, while theanthropological component of persistent natural tendencies is necessary for formulatingmaxims, whenever the form of law can be given to it, it is done by pure reason.

77 Guyers translation for MS, AA 06:399.0203. sthetische Vorbegriffe der Empfnglichkeit des Gemths frPflichtbegriffe berhaupt in Guyer, 201078 MS, AA 06:399.18. Das moralische Gefhl; Ibid., 400.22. Gewissen; Ibid., 402.28. Achtung79 See MS, AA 06:39940380 MS, AA 06:402.23. Menschenliebe81 Ibid., 40140282 Haddock Seigfried, 2001, p9883 Hill, 2010, p24584 The cultural factors will, of course, play here an important role as well, by giving the basic neurophysiologicaltendencies certain form, or way of expression.85 See similar thoughts in Hill, 2010

610 M. Yudanin

How does this approach that mentions interests essential to human agents differ fromHermans that centers around a similarly sounding notion? To answer this question, we need tostart with looking at Kantian ethics in terms of moral form and moral content. In light of thepreceding discussion, the former would be the universality of the moral law, and the latterthemaxims of behavior over which the moral law ranges. Yet how are these two connected?Providing a specification of their necessary relation is crucial for any approach to Kantianethics, as without it morality will be accidental. Moreover, such connection, if it is to align withthe core of Kants ethics, cannot depend upon anything contingent, e.g., any sort of naturalneeds of human beings as we happen to be.

Arguably, morality is about the behavior of agents who are capable of choosing betweenalternative courses of action: we cannot attribute any morality to creatures not endowed withfree choice, e.g., lower animals whose behavior is determined by instincts alone, or entities thefunctioning of which is determined solely by their physical environment or externally pro-duced set of instructions.86 Unfree entities would not bear any responsibility for their actionsby virtue of being externally determined: in a sense, unfree action is merely a function, like thatof a piece of colored surface reflecting a certain wavelength of light by virtue of its physicalstructure. It is this freedom of choice, Kants Freiheit der Willkr, which connects moral formand content. Behavioral maxims and rationalitys universal law are connected under the orderof free choice, where this order is necessary to make sense of the notion of moral agency asopposed to determinacy of response. This order of freedom also helps to understand Kantsnotion of good will in the first section of the Groundwork87: in light of this interpretation, thegood will (guter Wille) would amount to using the capacity for free choice (Willkr) to opt foracting in accordance with the law of reason.88

It is this ability to connect the universal law with particular moral content under the order offree choice, to harness freedom to serve reason, to haveWillkr opting for guter Wille, that willgive moral worth to creatures endowed with reason, ability to generate behavioral maxims, andfree choice. The value of humankind thus is present implicitly in FUL: as an expression ofreason, it is a necessary part of the triad. It is also present in our ability to generate maxims ofbehavior, either explicit and understood as moral dilemmas, or implicit in our behavioralchoices. This value comes to light in our free choice that can opt for the moral good.

Given this sort of connection between moral form and moral content, the approach I amsuggesting here is radically different from Hermans proposal that has been discussed previ-ously. No contingent human needs, be they as inherent in our nature as they may, play any rolein the analysis of universalization but as materials to be presented for the examination of theCategorical Imperative. Our physiology, together with our physical, cultural, social, and otherenvironments, provide the building blocks for maxims, blocks that are by no means universal.The maxims constitute moral content over which the verdicts of the CI would rule. However,no specific content of a maxim plays any role in connecting moral form and moral content, andthus in determining agents moral worth. Any agent capable of choosing according to theuniversal moral law has moral worth, no matter what are the specific maxims it generates.

This approach might also suggest a possible solution to the problem of understanding theconnection between the first and the second formulations of the Categorical Imperative. TheFormula of Universal Law comes directly from the notion of the universality of reason, or, to

86 see Kant on freedom in KrV, AA 362363 (A531-534/B559-562); GMS, AA 04:458; MS, AA 06:226 andspecifically the discussion on the freedom of the will (Die Freiheit der Willkr). For the review of thedevelopment of the concept of freedom as choice see Woody, 199887 GMS, AA 04:493.060788 see discussion in MS, AA 06:226 for textual support

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative? 611

be more precise, re-states it in terms of moral imperative. The Formula of Humanity focuses onthe moral worth of agents which consists, as I have argued, in humans ability to choose freelybetween moral contents generated by them in light of the universal law. As such, humanitycannot be used merely as a means to an endthis would always be a contradiction according toFUL, since this way reason will undermine its own supreme authority. Further discussion onthis subject, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.

In addition, the interpretation proposed here can contribute to reconciling the universality ofethics with the problem of the socio-historical context. One might claim that what would havecounted ethical few hundred years ago may not be moral today, and vice versa. This seeminglycontradicts the universal pretense of Kantian ethics. However, if we take into consideration thecontingency of moral contents, we can see how this puzzle can be solved. The context thatprovided the food for ethical thought in a different historical period certainly led moral agentsto generate maxims different from the ones we would come up with today. Applying theCategorical Imperative to those options naturally led to different resultsnot because theuniversal law differed somehow, but simply because the materials with which it had to worksuggested for its consideration options that differed from the ones we would think of today.Having Siddhartha contributing his fortune for financing free psychiatric treatment was not anoption, as the same behavioral phenomena that are seen today as disease were not conceived ofas such in his time. Thus, Siddhartha chose not to do it not because he was less moral butsimply because this option would have never occurred to him as a possible course of action.

Is the approach I am suggesting consistent with Kants ethics? Probably not in letter,especially if we consider his Metaphysics of Morals with its discussion of specific positiveduties. However, I believe that it is most consistent with Kantian morality in spirit. Thesuggested approach allows to conceive of the Categorical Imperative as truly universal bydivorcing it from any specific content and thus making applicable to any maxim that has apotential to guide human behavior, and at the same time relate it structurally to any possiblemoral content.

5 Conclusion: Ethics of Justice and Mercy

As I have tried to demonstrate, we cannot discern any possible metaphysical sources forpositive duties, or the doctrine of virtuedifferently from the negative duties that can be tracedback to a formal origin. The most likely source of what is usually addressed as the realm ofpositive duties is nature, more specificallyour physiology. The moral feeling that Kantdeemed so useful for the teaching of virtue yet incapable to establish it89 seems to be ashortcut for this natural source of our feelings of kindness, mercy, and sympathy. Bounded andformed by the formal and universal moral law, the moral feeling directs our ethical gaze andfills the form of moral law with content.

Kants ethics of the Categorical Imperative is founded on the basis of reasona basisliterally as solid as we can think. It constitutes the morality of rules that are universal andformal, which can be provisionally labeled, without committing to all the nuances of the termsused, the ethics of justice. Yet as such it is also empty of content, specific and particularcontent. No viable ethical theory can survive if it has only formal rules in its store: mercy,kindness, beneficence have always been necessary components of human morality. It seemsthat Kant felt the need to bring these considerations into his ethical theory and thus wrote the

89 See, for example, MS, AA 06:376

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Doctrine of Virtue many years after discovering the Categorical Imperative. Yet he attemptedthe impossible: necessitating the specific by the universal, content by form. It seems that amore reliable picture would be the one of unshakeable boundaries set by the formal rules ofreason, while the contents within these boundaries come from psychophysiological sources.The particular maxims that are formulated as a result are mediated by worldviews and henceare specific to the groups of people in question, to their historical surrounding, etc.evershifting and developing. These maxims, as characteristic as they may be of the humankind atthis or that stage of its development, are by no means universal duties; they can be moreaccurately described as ethical moves that have some positive, action-guiding content. Withoutthe boundaries, our specific positive ethical moves would be unmanageable and impossible toimplement coherently, similarly to games without rules. Yet without content the rules of reasonwould be meaningless. Just like it is the case with thoughts and intuitions,90 justice withoutmercy is empty, yet mercy without justice is blind.

One might think that this is a shaky basis for establishing sound morality: after all, it couldhave been quite different in its positive aspect if our life form were not as it is; it also mightand willchange as our species develops. Indeed, the type of content of our morality seems tobe unique to humans. It has also been changing throughout history. While certain limitsremaindeception, for example, has never been considered praiseworthy or even morally-neutral, the contents have been changing: including animals in the sphere of morality canserve as an example. Yet the universal moral boundaries, together with our common consti-tution, should be a solid enough barrier against moral relativism, as solid as the developingnature of human beings can erect:

This conclusionmay [] appear dangerous and subversive of morality.We are apt to panic atthe thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop caring about the things we do careabout [] But it is interesting that the people of Leningrad were not similarly struck by thethought that only the contingent fact that other citizens shared their loyalty and devotion to thecity stood between them and the Germans during the terrible years of the siege. Perhaps weshould be less troubled than we are by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps weshould even have less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves as volunteers bandedtogether to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression.91

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Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative?AbstractWhy Positive Duties Should be Derivable from the Formula of Universal LawKants Argument for Positive DutiesThe Argument for the Duty of BeneficenceThe Arguments for Positive Duties in the Metaphysics of Morals

The problem with Kants Argument: Why Negative Duties can be Derived from the Formula of Universal Law Yet Positive Duties CannotMoral Form and Moral Content: Possible Source of Positive DutiesConclusion: Ethics of Justice and MercyReferencesKants worksGerman originalKants worksEnglish translationSecondary literature