CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II : ARREST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

BROWN VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 347 US 483 (1955)WARREN, C.J.Facts: This case is a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Several black children (through their legal representatives, Ps) sought admission to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. The plaintiffs alleged that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.In all but one case, a three judge federal district court cited Plessy v. Ferguson in denying relief under the separate but equal doctrine. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that segregated schools were not and could not be made equal and that they were therefore deprived of equal protection of the laws.Issue: Is the race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools constitutional?Held: No. The race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional.Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the physical facilities and other may be equal. Education in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in American life today. The separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place in the field of public education.Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they would receive in an integrated school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS BOARD OF TRANSPORATION, G.R. No. L-59234 | 1982-09-30MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power.HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:"For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board." In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable.Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizuresHeld:Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]Facts:The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

Issue:Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

Held:It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946FACTS: The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas in the petitioners house. The Petitioner further contends that the seized documents should be returned as it obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion, those are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders Association, which was proven to be an organization created for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights.ISSUES: Whether or not the seized documents are legal?Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the trial court?HELD. No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.RATIONALE:The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.EXCEPTION: Important exception to the necessity for a Search Warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things arrested with the crime as its fruits as the means by which it was committed.The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized documents, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion.COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATIONNot violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning their admission.PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searched and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative and judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.[G.R. No.L-32409. February 27, 1971.]

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V .Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.FACTS: Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Veras aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons application for search warrant and respondent Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant to petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.

Issue: WON the search warrant is valid

Held: No. The elements of valid search warrant are not present in this case, the requisites are: 1. It must be issued upon probable cause;

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself;

3. The determination of the existence of probable cause must be made after examination by the judge of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and

4. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainants application for search warrant and the witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr.Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judges chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified it.

The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."cralaw virtua1aw library

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Topic: Who may invoke the Right?

The Supreme Court made an explanation in this case regarding this right, as qouted:

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.

"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."Petitioner alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. aid petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari.

Respondents contended that (1) the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

Issue: WON the search warrant is validWON a corporation cannot invoke such right

Held:1) No. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws orTo uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.2) The Supreme Court held that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Alvarez vs. The Court of First Instance64 Phil. 33 (GR No. L-45358)January 29, 1937

J. ImperialFacts:On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.Issues:Whether or not there is a valid search warrantHeld:A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to thebasis principles of government.As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them. Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed.Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.Jose Burgos vs. Chief of StaffG.R. No L-64261December 26, 1984

Facts:Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.Issue:Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.Held:The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

People vs Molina19 February 2001 | Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Overview: SPO1 Paguidopon received a tip about drug pushers. He previously caught a glimpse of one of them, Mula, so he was able to point to him and his companion, Molina, to arresting officers when they were aboard a trisikad. Upon accosting them, the police were able to find marijuana in a bag carried by Molina, leading to their arrest. The court however held that they were illegally arrested because their case dont fall under the exception of an in flagrante delicto arrest, there being no outward indication that could justify their arrest.

Statement of the Case: This is for review of the decision of the RTC findingNasario Molina alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula alias "Boboy" guilty of violation of Sec. 8 of RA 6245, or the Dangerous Drugs Act, by possessing 946.9 grants of dried marijuana. Molina and Mula pleaded guilty upon arraingnment.

Statement of Facts: On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcylce who just passed by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest. In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's housee where they'll wait for the drug pushers will pass by. Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point, Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina. Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this." Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed.

Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial court still found them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved for the acquittal of the two.Issue and Held: Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless arrests? NO

Applicable Laws:Article III, Sec. 2Article III, Sec. 3

Rationale: The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests:(a) In flagrante delicto - when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense(b) Arrest effected in hot pursuit - when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.(c) Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the trial court found that the warrantless arrest and seizure were valid apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the prohibited drugs. But the question is: does the present case aptly fall within the exceptions to the warrant requirement? In in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify in flagrante delicto arrests. People vs Chua Ho San: The arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the person he is arresting has committed, is committing or is about to commit the offense. People vsAminnudin: The accused was just disembarking the vessel. He only became suspect when the informer pointed him to the officials. People vsMengote: eyes darting from side to side while holding one's abdomen, is not indicative of probable cause to suspect the accused of committing the offense. People vsEncinada: riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs is also not indicative of probable cause Malacatvs CA: "standing on the corner with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come nearer to them" is not an act evidencing that the accused is attempting to commit a crime. There was no ground to even believe that the accused was armed with a weapon since even a telltale bulge at the front waistline of the accused wouldn't be visible from the officers' view.

To constitute in flagrante delcito arrests, there are two requisites:1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the present case, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication to justify their arrest. Holding a bag, Molina saying "Boss, if possible we will settle this", which allegedly arouse the suspicion of the officers, are not constitutive of probable cause. Were it not for Paguidopon, the accused won't even be identified nor found suspicious. As to Mula and Molina's identity, Paguidopon said that he conducted a surveillance of Mula, and caught a glimpse of him on the road. However, he doesn't even know his name or address. As to Molina, he admits not seeing him before the arrest. With this, Pamplona's claim that he knew of the name of the accused is baseless. This case is different from People vsEncinada, because there the officers knew the identity of the person to be arrested. Nevertheless the arrest was still held illegal since the accused did not show any suspicious behavior.

It can't be said that the accused waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure just because they had an implied acquiescence to the search. This was mere passive conformity given the circumstance.

Judgment: Mula and Molina are acquitted. Both the arrest and the seizure are illegal.

People vs ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KOFACTS:A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.ISSUES:Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.HELD:Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.Microsoft corp. v. MaxicorpG.R No. 140946438 SCRA 224 MercantileLaw Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Probable Cause in Issuing Search WarrantFACTS:In 1996, DominadorSamiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that MicrosoftSoftwares(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (FelixbertoPante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that thesoftwarein the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorpand in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.HELD:No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeitsoftwarewere not only displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

Soliven v Makasiar Nov 14, 1988 G.R. No. 82585

(Topic on Warrant Issued by RTC)

Facts:Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC issued a warrant of arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause.

Held: NoRatio: In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't required to examine the complainant and the witnesses.

He shall only personallyevaluatethe report andsupportingdocuments submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probablecause andissue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and required the submission ofsupportingaffidavitsof witnesses toaidhim in arriving ata conclusionas to the existence of probable cause.

Otherwise, judges would be burdened with preliminary investigation instead ofhearingcases.

Lim vs Felix

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt,pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.HELD: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S.Felixof Branch 56, RegionalTrial Court ofMakati dated July5, 1990isdeclared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.RD: As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.The Prosecutorcanperformthesame functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessarydocumentsandareport supporting the Fiscal's bare certification.All of these should be before the Judge.WecannotdeterminebeforehandhowcursoryorexhaustivetheJudge's examination Should be. Usually,this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; afterall,thepersonal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to besure, the Judge mustgo beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), theLimspresenteddocumentsofrecantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determinationof a case andinthe grantingofanewtrialtherespondentJudgebeforeissuinghisownwarrantsofarrest should, at the very least, have gone overtherecordsofthepreliminary examination conducted earlier in the lightoftheevidencenowpresentedbytheconcernedwitnessesinviewofthe"politicalundertones"prevailinginthe cases.Inmakingtherequiredpersonaldetermination,aJudgeisnotprecludedfromrelyingontheevidenceealier gatheredbyresponsibleofficers.Theextentofthereliancedependsonthecircumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, theJudgeabusesthatdiscretionwhen having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5,1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

Panderanga vs DrilonREGALADO,J.:pIn this special civil action formandamusand prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then.In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas,alias"Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against herein petitioner.In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,1respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,2contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.3From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review4with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum,5and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,6attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein petitioner.On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 6487dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the instant petition formandamusand prohibition.Issues: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete; and (2) that there exists noprima facieevidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.Ruling: Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed.1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by reason of the fact that at the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was issued, there were still several incidents pending resolution such as the validity of the testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases for preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, and the clarificatory questions which were supposed to be propounded by petitioner's counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner likwise claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of April 25, 1989. These contentions are without merit.Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."122. Petitioner further submits that there is noprima facieevidence, or probable cause, or sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial, on the basis of the following grounds: the questioned resolution of respondent Gingoyon is full of factual misrepresentations or misapprehensions; respondent's reliance on the decision of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe Galarion suffers from constitutional and procedural infirmities considering that petitioner was not a party thereto, much less was he given any opportunity to comment on or rebut the prosecution evidence; reliance on Rogelio Hanopol's testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely hearsay in addition to the fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol at the time he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989, which is the only evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his affidavit of retraction dated June 20, 1990.A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.13The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wen grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.14We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there existsprima facieevidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.PADERANGA vs DRILONFACTS:Definition of Preliminary Examination Generally inquisitorial, often only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine wither or not a criminal case should be filed in Court.

General Rule:Injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution

Exception (Brocka vs Enrile):1.Afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused2.Necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions3.When there is a prejudicial question4.When the acts of the officers are without or excess of authority5.Double jeopardy is clearly apparent6.When the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense7.A case of persecution rather than prosecution8.The charges are manifestly false and motivated by vengeance9.Clearly no Prima Facie case against the accused

The right of the accused to ask clarificatory questions is not ABSOLUTE.

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE required in preliminary investigation is such such evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the omission of a crime and respondents probable guilt.

Abdula vs guiani

FACTS:On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder, docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against herein petitioners and six (6) other persons[1]in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.[2]The complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid the six other respondents the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen.[3]

Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 1994[4], dismissed the charges of murder against herein petitioners and five other respondents on a finding that there was noprima faciecase for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of respondent Judge.In an Order dated 13 September 1994[5], respondent Judge ordered that the case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 2332, be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, respondent judge noted that although there were eight (8) respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only one (1) of the eight (8) respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the respondent judge reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama.Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of murder against herein petitioners and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a refiling of the murder charge and pursuant to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein.[6]On December 6, 1994, herein petitioners submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits.After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994,[7]found aprima faciecase for murder against herein petitioners and three (3) other respondents.[8]He thus recommended the filing of charges against herein petitioners Bai UnggieAbdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by inducement, and against the three (3) others, as principals by direct participation.Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son.[9]

On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994[10]was filed against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of respondent judge. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his inhibition.[11]

The following day, or on 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a warrant[12]for the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, petitioners filed on 4 January 1995 an UrgentEx-parteMotion[13]for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.A petition for review[14]was filed by the petitioners with the Department of Justice on 11 January 1995.[15]Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioners pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.

ISSUES:1. Whether the Second Information for murder filed is valid?2. Validity of the Warrant of Arrest issued against petitioners.HELD:Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition are Granted.RATIONALE:In order to disqualify a Judge on the basis of Prejudice, petitioner must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence.Rules of Court: No complaint or information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating Fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the Provincial or City Fiscal or Chief of State Prosecutor. A complaint or information can only be filed if it is approved or authorized by the Provincial or City Fiscal or Chief of State Prosecutor.Soliven vs Makasiar, In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause, the Judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.Ho vs People, In the case at bench, respondent admits that the issued Warrant is questionable as there was no reason for him to doubt the validity of the Certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a Preliminary Investigation was conducted and that Probable Cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed.DOCTRINE, the Judge shall:1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted byt the fiscal regarding the existence of Probable Cause and, on the basis , issue a warrant of arrest2. If, on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of Probable Cause.Ho vs People (Inting)1. DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE PROSECUTOR:Whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charge and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes on.Determination of Probable Cause by a Judge: Warrant of Arrest1. The Judge should decide independently, hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the Prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence of probable cause to issue an arrest order.

In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own.Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer.To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the respondents examination of the records should be.[42]The extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two different informations and resolutions charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutors determination of probable cause. The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondents own admission are circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty.Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

PEOPLE VS.BENHUR MAMARILG.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004

Facts: SPO2 ChitoEsmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the PNP station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the person who conducted the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.Appellant denied that he was residing at his parents house since he has been residing at a rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother, but on said search operation, his brother and family were out. He testified that he was at his parents house because he visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time during the trial and admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly search was his.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.

2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of the search.

3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence against the accused.

Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence an