BRARYLEA/FI?/IrnOTH.

111996KAN.UXO

)

MULTISER VICEPROCEDURES FOR

OPERATIONSIN AN

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCEEN VIRONMENT

FM 100-38MCRP 4-5.1

NWP TP 3-02.4.1ACCPAM 10-752

PACAFPAM 10-752USAFEPAM 10-752

JULY 1996

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approvedfor public release; distribution unlimited.

_Ivce ~9ci

----- -------------------------

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY COMBAT AIR FORCES

M UL TI E R VIC TA C T C S , T C H NIQ ES , N D ----------- ---

FM 100-38/MCRP 4-5.1 /NWP TP 3-02.4.1ACCPAM 1 0-752/PACAFPAM 1 0-752/USAFEPAM 10-752

COMBAT AIR FORCES AUTHORIZATION

The procedures in this publication are authorized for use throughout the Combat AirForces as indicated below.

Pacific Air Forces

JOHN G. LORBERGeneral, USAFCommander

BRIAN D. MILLERColonel, USAFDirector of Information Management

US Air Forces Europe

* OFFICIAL *RICHARD E. HAWLEYGeneral, USAFCommander

MICHAEL L. JONESColonel, USAFDirector of Information Management

Marine Corps: PCN 14400000500

PREFACE

1. Scope

This unclassified publication is forwarfighting personnel at the operational andtactical levels for use during wartimeoperations. It describes the unexplodedsubmunition hazards to land operations,addresses unexploded ordnance (UXO)planning considerations, and describes thearchitecture for the reporting and trackingof UXO hazard areas.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this publication is to assistcommanders operating in UXO richenvironments to achieve an optimum balancebetween force protection and operationalefficiency. The staff functions andresponsibilities for planning, tracking,reporting, and clearing UXO are identifiedto assist commanders and units in achievingmissions with minimal disturbance andcasualties.

3. Application

The tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) described in this publication apply toall elements of a joint force, from individualservice and component through the joint forcelevel. This publication uses approved andemerging joint doctrine and terminology asits foundation.The publication identifiesmethodologies to use existing servicecommand and control systems to report andtrack unexploded hazards in joint operationsareas (JOAs) from service and jointperspectives.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating service command offices ofprimary responsibility (OPRs) will reviewthis publication,-validate the information,and reference and incorporate it in servicemanuals, regulations, and curricula asfollows:

Army. The Army will incorporate theprocedures in this publication in US Armytraining and doctrinal publications asdirected by the commander,US -ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command. Distributionis in accordance with DA Form 12-11E.

Marine Corps. The marine Corps willincorporate the procedures in this publicationin US Marine Corps training and doctrinalpublications as directed by the commandinggeneral, US Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command. Distribution is inaccordance with MCPDS.

Navy. The Navy will incorporate theseprocedures in US Navy training and doctrinalpublications as directed by the commander,Naval Doctrine Command. Distribution isin accordance with MILSTRIP Desk Guideand NAVSOP Pub 409.

Combat Air Forces. The Air CombatCommand (ACC) will incorporate theprocedures in ACC training and doctrinalpublications as directed by the commander,ACC. PACAF and USAFE will validate andincorporate appropriate procedures inaccordance with applicable major commandand other governing directives. ACC,PACAF, and USAFE distribution symbolsare "F."

5. User Information

a. The TRADOC-MCCDC-NDC-ACCAir Land Sea Application (ALSA) Centerdeveloped this publication with the jointparticipation of the approving servicecommands. ALSA will review and updatethis publication as necessary.

b. We encourage recommended changesfor improving this publication. Key yourcomments to the specific page and paragraphand provide a rationale for eachrecommendation. Send comments andrecommendation directly to-

__ I I

c. This publication reflects current jointand service doctrine, command and controlorganizations, facilities, personnel, respon-sibilities, and procedures. Changes in service

protocol, appropriately reflected in joint andservice publications, will likewise beincorporated in revisions to this document.

FM 100-38MCRP 4-5.1

NWP TP 3-02.4.1ACCPAM 10-752

PACAFPAM 10-752USAFEPAM 10-752

FM 100-38

MCRP 4-5.1

US Army Training and Doctrine CommandFort Monroe, Virginia

Marine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

NWP TP 3-02.4.1

ACCPAM 10-752

PACAFPAM 10-752

USAFEPAM 10-752

Naval Doctrine CommandNorfolk, Virginia

Air Combat CommandLangley Air Force Base, Virginia

Pacific Air ForcesHickam Air Force Base, Hawaii

US Air Forces in EuropeRamstein Air Base, Germany

10 July 1996

UXOMultisenice Procedures

forOperations in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................ vii

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

SUBMUNITION UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) HAZARDSBackground ................................................... .............. 1-1Hazards .................................................... ................ 1-1UXO Impact on Forces ........................................ 1-2UXO Hazard Quantified ........................................ 1-3

JOINT FORCE OPERATIONSBackground ................................................. .............. I11IStaff Responsibilities ............................................. .......... I..IReporting .................................................................. 11-3Tracking.11-4Operations ................................................................. 11-4

CHAPTER III SERVICE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

Background .................................................................... Ill-1

Section A. ArmyGeneral ......................................................................... Ill1-1Staff Responsibilities..........................................................111-1Operations...................................................................... II1-2Reporting ....................................................................... 111I-3Tracking ........................................................................ 111-5

Section B. Marine CorpsGeneral ......................................................................... 111 -6Planning........................................................................111I-6Reporting ....................................................................... 111-7Tracking ........................................................................ 111-8

Section C. NavyGeneral ......................................................................... 111-8Planning........................................................................111I-8Reporting ....................................................................... 111I-9Tracking ........................................................................ 111-9

Section D. Air ForceGeneral ......................................................................... 111-9Planning........................................................................111I-9Reporting......................................................................111-10Tracking.......................................................................Ill-11

APPENDIX A UXO OBSTACLE NUMBERING ................................................ A-I

APPENDIX B UXO SPOT REPORT............................................................ B-I

APPENDIX C AIRCRAFT CBU LOADS ........................................................ C-I

APPENDIX D SUBMUNITIONS IN ARMY STOCKPILE...................................... D-1

APPENDIX E FOREIGN SUBMUNITIONS ..................................................... E-1

REFERENCES ............................................................................ References-I

GLOSSARY ................................................................................. Glossary-I

INDEX............................................................................................ Index-I

FIGURES I-1 Vehicle Mine Encounter Probability Versus Minefield Density.....1-41-2 Vehicle Submunition Encounter Probability Versus UXO Density..1-51-3 UXO Expected Damage/Casualities Versus DPICM UXO Hazard

Area Density ................................................................ I1-51-4 UXO Expected Damage/Casualities Versus BLU.97 UXO Hazard

Area Density ................................................................ 1-6

111-1 Theater Army Information Network .................................... I11-4111-2 STACCS-CTAPS Interface............................................... II1-5II1-3 USMC Information Network............................................. 111-8111-4 USAF Information Network ............................................ Ill-11

TABLES Il-1 Staff and Unit Primary Responsibilities.................................11I-3C-1 US Air Dispensed Submunitions ......................................... C-2D-1 US Army Submunition Ordance.......................................... D-1E-1 Foreign Air Dispensed Submunitions................................... E-1E-2 Foreign Surface Launched Submunitions ............................... E-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UXOMultiservice Procedures

forOperations in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment

Experience from Operation Desert Storm revealed that a battlefield strewn withunexploded ordnance (UXO) poses a twofold challenge for commanders at all levels: one, toreduce the potential for fratricide from UXO hazards and two, to minimize the impact thatUXO may have on the conduct of combat operations. Commanders must consider risks tojoint force personnel from all sources of UXO and integrate UXO into operational planningand execution. This tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) publication provides method-ologies for planning, implementing, and executing procedures to protect forces from unexplodedsubmunitions.

Submunition UXO Hazards

Chapter I defines the hazards and impacts on operations from air and surface deliveredsubmunition ordnance. While the risk appears low to armored and mechanized forces, theirpersonnel in dismounted operations and support elements face a much greater risk whenexposed to UXO. Commanders must be aware of the hazards and make an assessment of therisk to their operations if transiting UXO hazard areas.

Joint Force Operations

Chapter II discusses the joint force procedures for reducing UXO casualties andfratricide potential. Staff responsibilities and procedures for joint force planning, reporting,tracking, and disseminating UXO hazard area information are identified. This chapter alsoincludes recommended TTP for units transiting or operating within an UXO hazard area.Properly integrated, these procedures will save lives and reduce the impact of UXO onoperations.

Service Operations and Procedures,

Chapter III explains the individual service methodologies for planning, reporting,and tracking submunition ordnance. These methodologies include submunition ordnanceemployment and UXO found on the battlefield. Each of the service systems is discussed andprocedures are established to integrate UXO tracking and reporting into planning andoperations.

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

JointUS Atlantic Command, J723, Norfolk Naval Base, VA 23551-2448

Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

Am ryUS Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATDO-J, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATCD-SB, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

US Army Infantry School, ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5007

US Army Field Artillery School, ATSF-TW, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000

US Army Engineer School, ATSE-TD-D, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-5221

US Army Ordnance Center and School, ATSL-CD-CS, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5201

US Army Transportation School, ATSP-TDJ, Fort Eustis, VA 23511-3790

US Army Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-SWW, Fort Leavenworth, KS66027-5000

XVIII Abn Corps, AFZA-GT-B, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

4th Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, US Army Armor School, ATSB-SBD-D, Fort Knox, KY40121-5211

552 Ordnance Group (EOD), Fort Gilliam, GA 30049-5000

US Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, AMSEL-RD-NV-MN, Fort Belvoir, VA22060

US Army Materiel Command, AMCAM-PP, AMSAA, Alexanderia, VA 22333-0001

Marine CorpsMarine Corps Combat Development Command, Joint Doctrine Branch (C427), Quantico, VA 22134

NavyNaval Doctrine Command, N3, Norfolk Naval Base, VA 23511-2785

Air ForceAir Force Doctrine Center, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2792

Headquarters ACC/CEX, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2792

Headquarters ACC/XPJ, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2792

612 CPS/DOXP, Davis Monthan Air Force Base, AZ 85707-4922

USAF-Air Ground Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL 32544-5000

Chapter I

SUBMUNITION UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) HAZARDS

1. Background

a. Saturation of unexploded submu-nitions has become a characteristic of themodern battlefield. The potential forfratricide from UXO is increasing. It appliesthroughout the battlefield (e.g., specialoperations forces [SOFI) in deep operations,maneuver forces in close operations, and themovement of forces and support operationswithin the rear area). Commanders mustconsider risks to soldiers, sailors, airmen, andmarines from UXO and integrate UXO intotheir antifratricide planning. This tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) publicationprovides the methodologies for planning,implementing, and executing procedures toprotect forces from unexploded submunitions.

b. United States (US) or allied casualtiesproduced by friendly unexplodedsubmunitions may be classified as fratricide.Locations where unexploded submunitionshave been or may be encountered requireaccurate tracking to assist commanders inreducing the potential for fratricide.Currently no system exists to accuratelytrack unexploded submunitions to facilitatesurface movement and maneuver. Thispublication addresses the impact of UXO onoperations at the operational level and belowand describes TTP to assist leaders at alllevels in reducing the hazards of UXO. Thischapter establishes the scope of the UXOproblem and focuses on the potential effectsof UXO on all surface forces throughout thebattlefield (including SOF).

c. Joint Publication 1-02 definesunexploded explosive ordnance as "explosiveordnance which has been primed, fused, orotherwise prepared for action, and which hasbeen fired, dropped, launched, projected, orplaced in such a manner as to constitute ahazard to operations, installations, personnel

or material and remains unexploded eitherby malfunction or design or for any othercause." Although ground forces are concernedwith all unexploded ordnance, the greatestpotential for fratricide comes fromunexploded submunitions. For this reason,the scope of this publication focuses onunexploded submunition hazards. However,if the situation warrants, the tracking processdescribed in later chapters can be used totrack all potential UXO hazards. While USweapon system examples are used in thispublication, most foreign militaries possesssimilar systems. Appendices D-E list typesand quantities of US and foreignsubmunitions ordnance. Family ofscatterable mines (FASCAM) operations arebeyond the scope of this publication.

2. Hazards

Both surface and air-delivered ordnanceproduce unexploded submunitions. Severalfactors, such as the delivery technique, ageof submunition, ambient air temperature,and type of impact medium, influence thereliability of submunitions. The actualhazard area produced depends on the typeof ordnance and the density of the UXO.

a. Surface Delivery Systems. The Armyand Marine Corps employ a variety ofrockets, missiles, and cannon artillery. Eachsystem is capable of delivering improvedconventional munitions (ICMs) that containsubmunitions. A typical Army heavy divisionis equipped with 9 Multiple Launched RocketSystems (MLRSs) and 72 tubes of cannonartillery. Cannon artillery basic load isgenerally 60-70 percent dual-purpose,improved conventional munition (DPICM),while 100 percent of the MLRS and ArmyTactical Missile System (ATACMS) basicloads are submunitions. Thus every MLRSand ATACMS fire mission and over half ofthe fire missions executed by cannon artillery

produces UXO hazard areas. Additionally,the Tomahawk land attack missile, VersionD (TLAM-D), is the submunition version ofthe Tomahawk missile and has the potentialto produce similar UXO hazard areas.

(1) MLRS Unexploded SubmunitionHazards. MLRS submunition functionreliability requirement is no less than 95percent. With a 95 percent submunitionfunction reliability, 1 MLRS rocket (with 644submunitions) could produce up to 38unexploded submunitions. A typical firemission of 36 MLRS rockets could producean average of 1368 unexploded sub-munitions. The numbers of submunitionsthat fail to properly function and thesubmunitions' dispersion determine theactual density of the hazard area.

(2) Cannon Artillery. Cannonartillery employs the same submunitions asMLRS. The difference is the number ofsubmunitions per round. A battalion-2 (24cannon firing 2 rounds each for a total of 48rounds) with a 95 percent submunitionreliability produces, on average, 212unexploded submunitions.

b. Air Delivery Systems. There is no setair delivery mission profile. Most airframesare capable of delivering a variety ofsubmunitions. The UXO hazard areadepends on the submunition, mission profile,target type, and number of sorties. Air Forceand naval air power employ cluster bombunits (CBUs) containing submunitions thatproduce UXO hazard areas similar to MLRS/cannon artillery submunitions. Air deliveredcanisters contain varying amounts of CBUs(see Appendix C). One CBU-58 or three CBU-87/CBU-52 contain approximately the samenumber of submunitions as one MLRS rocket.A B-52 dropping a full load of 45 CBUs (eachCBU-58/CBU-71 contains 650 submunitions)may produce an UXO hazard area that issignificantly more dense than an MLRS UXOhazard area. A typical F-16 flying close airsupport (CAS) against a point target maydrop two CBUs per aircraft per run, thusproducing a very low-density UXO hazardarea. Again, the type and number of canisters

dropped will determine the density of theUXO hazard area.

3. UXO Impact on Forces

UXO affects operational and tacticalplanning and execution of operations. Typesof munitions employed, self-destruct times,and submunition densities must be evaluatedregarding the forces that deal with them.Variables affecting the degree of risk include,but not limited to, the types ofsubmunitionsemployed; protection available to USpersonnel (e.g., armored vehicles versusdismounted infantry); mission of the affectedforce; and terrain and climatic conditionswithin affected operational areas. Plannersmust consider the risks of UXO for anymission, regardless of the unit.

a. Operational Impacts ofUXO. Plannersneed to consider the types of submunitions,where they are/were employed, and theirpotential impact on future operations.Without careful planning, maintaining theoperational tempo will be difficult in an UXOenvironment. Planners must allocateadditional time for the operation if adeliberate breach or bypass of UXO hazardareas is required. Additionally, plannersshould consider-

(1) Tracking and reportingrequirements.

(2) Task organization/additional forcerequirements (e.g., requirement foradditional engineer or explosive ordnancedisposal assets).

(3) Reconnaissance requirements.

(4) Breaching requirements.

(5) Maneuver requirements (restric-tions on avenues/axis of attack).

(6) UXO hazard area markingrequirements.

(7) Civil-military operations require-ments (impact on civilian population).

b. Tactical Impacts ofUXO. UXO inhibitsmaneuver by potentially restricting use of

terrain, increasing reconnaissancerequirements, and reducing momentum(speed of maneuver and rates of march). UXOalso inhibits night movement, increases riskto combat support (CS)/combat servicesupport (CSS) elements, ties up engineers orother forces clearing/marking lanes, andreduces available firepower because ofincreased loss of personnel and equipment.

c. Armored/Mechanized Forces. Armoredand mechanized forces consist of tracked andwheeled vehicles. Commanders mustconsider the force as a whole when planningoperations. Chance of significant damage toarmored, light armored vehicles (LAV), andother wheeled armored vehicles is relativelylow. The primary damage occurs where thetrack or wheel contacts the submunition.Depending on the type of submunition, amobility kill could occur. There is littlepossibility of casualties from crossing UXOhazard areas as long as the crews staymounted. Armored and mechanizedcommanders must also consider the increasedrisk to their organic wheeled vehicles anddismounted forces when operating in UXOenvironments. High mobility multipurposewheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and other "softskin" vehicles accompanying and supportingcombat elements are at greater risk. Anytimecrews must dismount their vehicles, they areincreasing their risk.

d. Dismounted Forces. Dismounted forcesface the greatest danger of death or injuryfrom UXO. Unexploded ordnance is asignificant obstacle to dismounted forces.Dismounted forces require detailedknowledge of the types and locations ofsubmunitions employed.

e. Wheeled Vehicles. Personnel beingtransported by wheeled vehicles face nearlythe same risk to UXO as dismounted forces.The protection afforded by wheeled vehiclesis negligible. Wheeled vehicles are vulnerableto damage from UXO. Chance of catastrophicdestruction is slight; however, contact withUXO normally results in disabled wheeledvehicles. Maintenance evacuation may be

required depending on the type vehicle andwhere the damage occurred.

f. Air Assault and Aviation Forces. Airassault and aviation forces are also at riskto UXO. Aircraft in defilade, flying nap-of-the-earth, or in ground effect are vulnerableto submunitions. US Rockeye and SovietPTAB submunitions incorporate piezoelectriccrystals that can react to aircraft in groundeffect. Antipersonnel and antimateriel(APAM) and M42/M46 grenades are alsosensitive enough to function as a result ofrotor wash. It is imperative aviation unitsknow the location of employed submunitionsand conduct thorough reconnaissance of thearea before conducting operations oroccupying assembly areas and forwardarming refueling points (FARPs).

g. Amphibious Landing Craft. UXO hasthe potential to significantly damage certaintypes of landing craft and in some cases resultin casualties of embarked personnel.

4. UXO Hazard Quantified

This section compares the UXO hazardarea encounter probability with a minefieldencounter probability. The probability ofencounter is roughly equal for a minefieldand an UXO hazard area of equal density(Figures I-1 and I-2). The minefield is morelethal as every mine is designed to detonateby some action, where the unexplodedsubmunition results from a malfunction andmay or may not detonate upon contact. Theymay also detonate without contact becauseof climatic changes, corrosion, etc., FiguresI-3 and I-4 illustrate the expected damage/casualties for various densities of UXOhazard areas. Comparing Figure I-1 withFigures I-3 and I-4 gives a potential impacton the mission.

a. Figure I-2 illustrates the vehicleprobability of encountering a singleunexploded submunition versus the hazardarea UXO density. The UXO probability ofencounter is very similar to that of aminefield; however, the lethality of the UXOhazard area is lower.

b. Figures I-3 and I-4 show the expecteddamage and casualty rates for variousdensities of DPICM and bomb live unit(BLU) 97 UXO hazard areas. These chartsrepresent one vehicle/person passing througha one-half kilometer deep UXO hazard area.The probabilities shown are per vehicle/person. To calculate the expected number ofcasualties, multiply the number of vehicles/persons (or passage lanes) by the probabilityof encounter. The X-axis (mines per meterfront) is a linear density expression of theaverage number of mines within a 1 meterpath through the minefield's depth. Thevehicle and tank probabilities differ becauseof the differences in width and the area incontact with the ground (track versus tire

width). Each chart is based on Army MaterielSystems Analysis Activity Studies that show40 percent of the duds on the ground arehazardous and for each encounter with anunexploded submunition there is a 13 percentprobability of detonation. The probabilitylines within the graphs reflect 13 percentprobability of detonation per encounter.Thus, even though an unexplodedsubmunition is run over, kicked, stepped on,or otherwise disturbed, and did not detonate,it is not safe. Handling the unexplodedsubmunition may eventually result in armingand subsequent detonation. Troops movingthrough a hazard area must be fully familiarwith the hazards of the submunitions theywill encounter.

Figure I-1. Vehicle Mine Encounter Probability Versus Minefield Density

100

8060... ..... .................6:.

t- (APCs)

4 0 ... . . " .. ...... .......... ...... .. .. ........ ..... .... ....20

0 1 2 3 4

MINEREID DENSIHY (Mines per meter)

PRESSURE-RJSH MINES (COMBINED WIDiH OF 1RACKS OR WHEELS)

100- - - - .

IL 70 rSingle Dismounted Soldier

c 0 ------ Single HM MWV

50 ' - -Single Tank

2 2

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

UXO DENSITY (UXO per meter)

Source: US ArmyMateriel Systems Analysis Acti vity Study

Figure 1-2. Vehicle Submunition Encounter Probability Versus UXO Density

40-

E35-

0

25

~20

415

0)

0

05

U

0.

Single Dismounted Soldier....------------------- -- Single HMMWV

8

Half Kilometer Deep Hazard Area

Figure 1-3. UXO Expected Damage/Casualties Versus DPICM UXO Hazard Area Density

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

UXO DENSITY (UXO per meter)

Source: US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity Study

S- Single Dismounted Soldier

------- ......Single HMMWV

- - Single Tank

/

4,

/

/I

0 1 2 3 4 5

UXO DENSITY (UXO per meter)

Source: US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity Study

6 7 8

Half Kilometer Deep Hazard Area

Figure 1-4. UXO Expected Damage/Casualties Versus BLU 97 UXO Hazard Area Density

I -

Chapter II

JOINT FORCE OPERATIONS

1. Background

a. This chapter addresses the jointforce command and control procedures forcoordinating use of submunition ordnanceand reporting all UXO encountered on thebattlefield. As such, it defines the commandand staff procedures for planning, reporting,and tracking UXO to minimize risk to jointforces.

b. Ensuring personnel safety andprecluding undue constraints on movementof forces and maneuver elements requireproper planning and coordination. AlthoughUXO is not a mine, UXO hazards poseproblems similar to mines concerning bothpersonnel safety and the movement andmaneuver of forces on the battlefield.Coordination and information flow are theintegral components that bind the planning,reporting, and tracking. Providing the properinformation, at the right time, to theresponsible authority is paramount.

2. Staff Responsibilities

Coordination between componentcommanders and the joint force commander(JFC) may be required before use ofsubmunitions by any delivery means. Toensure UXO does not occur in areas thatnegatively affect current and projectedoperations, coordination is conducted andguidance established before the use ofsubmunition ordnance. The following areasidentify the minimum responsibilities forjoint force UXO procedures. During planning,evaluate the impact of known UXO hazardareas on mission accomplishment from bothan offensive and defensive posture. Theemployment of submunitions must balancewith troop safety and missionaccomplishment. Table II-1 lists staff andunit primary responsibilities for UXOplanning, reporting, and tracking.

a. JFC. The commander addressesspecific considerations for employing ICMs/CBUs and their associated UXO hazardswhen providing intent and planningguidance. The JFC intent provides safetyguidance and establishes antifratricideprocedures within the joint operations area(JOA).

b. Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff(J-5). During the planning phase, the J-5incorporates commander's guidanceregarding joint force submunition reporting,tracking, and dissemination procedures intooperational plans. During the planformulation, emphasis is on minimizing theimpact of UXO. Using the special instructions(SPINS) section of the air tasking order(ATO) and coordinating instructions on theoperations plan (OPLAN), components arealerted not to employ submunitions inparticular areas or on certain targets becauseof the UXO danger to personnel or maneuver.The J-5 ensures planning includes adequatesafety of personnel and antifratricideprocedures. Planning considerations alsoinclude terrain management, the impact ofpotential UXO hazard areas on friendlyoperations, and any munitions' restrictions.Planning must address proper training andequipping of personnel and units for reducingand clearing UXO hazards.

(1) Other considerations include-

(a) Preplanning, deconflicting,and coordinating with other components.

(b) Impact of residual effects onfriendly operations.

" Planned use of currentenemy controlled terrain, including airfieldsand airstrips.

II-1

* Requirements for dis-mounted operations. (Security operations-patrolling, reconnaissance, etc.)

* Requirements for mountedoperations only.

* Availability of engineerand explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)support.

(c) Impact on terrain manage-ment.

. Friendly troops transiting oroccupying the area.

* Locations of proposed mainsupply route (MSR).

* Restricted areas-proposedlogistics base sites.

* Availability of engineersand EOD units.

(d) Communications require-ments.

* Availability of automationand communications equipment to rapidlydisseminate information.

" Information requirements.

" Information flow to informfriendly forces of expected UXO locations.

(e) Risk to noncombatants.

c. Operations Directorate of a JointStaff (J-3). The J-3 staff responsibilityincludes planning and executing thecommander's guidance and establishingprocedures to ensure subordinatecomponents receive: UXO hazard areasinformation. The J-3, in coordination with thejoint force engineer and EOD staffs,establishes joint force reporting requirementsand procedures.

d. Joint Rear Area Coordinator(JRAC). In the joint rear area (JRA), theJRAC plays a significant and critical role inUXO reporting. The JRAC must be part ofthe coordination and information networkdealing with UXO. The JRAC is responsiblefor creating a secure environment in the JRAto facilitate sustainment, host nation support(HNS), infrastructure development, and jointforce movements. The JRAC establishestracking and dissemination proceduresensuring personnel and units operating in theJRA are knowledgeable of UXO hazards.

e. Joint Force Engineer Function. Thejoint force engineer is the principal staffelement in the planning, reporting, andtracking of UXO hazard areas. Duringplanning, the engineer element includes UXOas part of the mission analysis and, incoordination with EOD, advises the JFC ontask organization and equipment required forclearing and breaching UXO hazards. Duringoperations, the joint force engineer receivesand consolidates reports, forwards reports toEOD, and incorporates UXO hazard areainformation into the engineer obstacleoverlay. The engineer overlay is the primarysource of UXO hazard areas classified asobstacles or barriers. The engineer staffmaintains reports on historical UXO hazardareas while the EOD element maintainsinformation on all UXO hazards.

f. Joint Force EOD Function. The jointforce EOD function provides technicalexpertise during the mission analysis byassessing hazards and risks from all sourcesof UXO, including US, allied, and threatmunitions. During the conduct of operations,EOD personnel provide technical assistancefor marking, breaching, and clearingoperations. EOD personnel coordinate withthe engineers to obtain information on allknown UXO hazards. The EOD functionnormally maintains UXO historical files thatinclude all unexploded munitions. Thishistorical file provides information for follow-on units and to civil-military units for post-conflict operations.

11-2

g. Units. Unit responsibilities includemarking, reporting, and tracking UXOhazards within their assigned AO. Unitsfollow guidance contained in FM 21-16/FMFM 13-8-1, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)Procedures, when required to conduct limitedbreaching and clearing operations or self-extract to reestablish operations in anotherlocation.

h. Joint Force Air, Land, and MaritimeComponent Commanders. Reportingrequirements established per joint forceguidance normally include antifratricideprocedures and component reportingarchitecture and requirements. Componentcommanders normally establish coordinationand reporting procedures with othercomponents. Each component consolidatesreports and maintains current and historicalrecords concerning UXO. For example, theland component engineer compiles theobstacle, barrier, and minefield reports whilethe EOD staffs compile reports tracking allUXO on the battlefield. The joint force aircomponent commander (JFACC) publishesand maintains UXO hazards based on theATO.

i. Risk Management. Risk manage-ment is the commander's decision. Manyfactors contribute to this decision; one ofwhich is the impact of submunitions on

current and future operations. The currentand future operations, level of protectionavailable to the committed force, the type andamount of engineer or EOD support, and timeavailable are factored into the commander'sdecision. This assessment results in thecommander's guidance on types of munitionsand areas of employment.

3. Reporting

Immediate reporting is essential. UXOhazard areas are lethal and unable todistinguish between friend and foe. Positivecontrol and a rapid and continuous flow ofinformation are necessary. Reactive andpredictive reportings are necessary to givethe commander the true picture of thehazards.

a. Land Forces. Land force units sendspot reports (Appendix B) relayinginformation on confirmed UXO locations andreporting locations of previously employedsubmunition ordnance.

(1) UXO Spot Report. The UXOSpot Report is the first-echelon report sentwhen encountering an UXO hazard area. Itis a detailed 2-way reporting system thatclarifies the UXO hazard area location,identifies clearance priority, and identifiesaffected units. The report also serves as arequest for assistance with an UXO hazard.

Table 11-1. Staff and Unit Primary Responsibilities

J3 JRAC Engineers EOD Units

Planning X X X X X

Reporting Establish Accept and compile Xprocedures reports

Tracking X X UXO as barrier or All UXO Xobstacle

Marking Establish procedures Technical Xassistance

Clearing Technicalassistance

Breaching X X

Disseminating X Via overlayHistorical Records X X

11-3

(2) Reported Locations. Land forceunits report UXO hazard areas according tothe JFC's guidance. Once reported, unitstreat UXO hazard areas as obstacles. Assuch, UXO information received requiresprocessing, plotting, and disseminating tohigher, lower, and adjacent units. Theengineer representative converts the UXOobstacle report into obstacle overlays fordissemination to subordinate units.

b. Air Units. Air units can reportsubmunition ordnance employment throughtheir battle damage assessment (BDA),munitions effectiveness assessmentreporting, and correlation with the ATOstandard conventional load for each missiontasking. Also, air units can use intelligencereports (INTREPs), in-flight reports(INFLTRPTs), or mission reports (MISREPs)for munitions reporting.

4. Tracking

The JFC establishes the required UXOtracking level. Tracking of every submunitionordnance may not be required. The JFCbases the tracking level on the location,amount of potential UXO, or other criteria.The J-3, coordinating with the IntelligenceDirectorate of the joint staff (J-2) andcomponent commanders' headquarters,tracks UXO hazard area information. TheJ-3 should maintain a historical database thatincludes type, quantity of ordnance dropped orobserved, location, and date dropped orobserved, of possible and known UXO hazardareas. Components update this database asrequired (frequency of update, ordnance type,and amount) by the JFC or J-3. The J-3disseminates UXO information affectingmaneuver, movement, and protection of landforces. Primary means of dissemination is byobstacle overlay. Alternate methods includeproviding location (aim point), delivery system,type and quantity of ordnance.

5. Operations

a. When setting up operational basesor work sites, units must consider the UXO

threat. Hard surface roads are the bestevacuation routes and easiest to clear. Unitsdevelop clearance plan procedures toreconnoiter and mark clear paths to otherunit positions and to the nearest hardsurfaced road or clear area. Extractionprocedures resemble in-stride breach orclearing operations.

b. Combat units that have the assetsto conduct an in-stride breach can do so. Theirbreach reduces the hazard and allows follow-on forces to continue in the original directionof the march. CS and CSS units must rely onalternate routes or breached lanes. Afterdiscovery of an UXO hazard, units takeimmediate actions to alert personnel, locatethe submunition or scatterable mines, andprovide protection for personnel andequipment. When dealing with an UXOhazard the following tactical factors shouldbe assessed:

(1) Effects of the delay on themission.

(2) Threat from direct and indirectfire. The risk of casualties from direct orindirect fire may be greater than that fromthe submunitions or scatterable mines.

(3) Terrain. The terrain deter-mines the effectiveness of submunitions orscatterable mines, their visibility, and,consequently, their ability to be detected,avoided, or neutralized.

(4) Alternate routes or positionsavailable.

(5) Degree of protection available.

(6) Specialized support, such asEOD or engineer teams and equipmentavailable.

c. After assessing the situation, threemain options are available-

(1) Accept the risk of casualtiesand continue with the assigned mission.

11-4

(2) Employ tactical breachingprocedures and extract to alternate routesor positions.

(3) Employ preplanned alternatetactical plans according to the currentOPORD.

d. Units bypass UXO hazard areas ifpossible. When bypassing is not feasible,units must try to neutralize the submunitionsand scatterable mines that preventmovement. There is no single device ortechnique that will neutralize everysubmunition or scatterable mine in everysituation. The differences in fusing, self-neutralization, terrain, and unit missionmean that multiple techniques must beconsidered. The following extractiontechniques should be considered in the orderlisted:

(1) Perform area reconnaissanceand mark a cleared route.

(2) Use engineer equipment toremove or neutralize items.

(3) Destroy items using explosivecharges.

(4)weapons.

(5)barricades.

(6)remotely.

S., ovin

Destroy items using direct-fire

Contain the item by building

Move UXO out of the way

e. Using engineer equipment is thepreferred method of breaching smallsubmunitions and scatterable mines. Thisprocedure allows for the quickest clearanceof an evacuation route. Suitable equipmentincludes a bulldozer, combat engineer vehicle,and an armored combat engineer earth-mover. If an unarmored vehicle is used (suchas a bulldozer), the operator's cab requiresprotection against fragmentation. Threemajor disadvantages to heavy forcebreaching are-

(1) Equipment may be damaged oroperators injured. If either happens,extraction through the area will behampered.

(2) Equipment may only partiallyclear the area, requiring further clearanceprocedures.

(3) Equipment may bury somesubmunitions or scatterable mines, keepingthem from being detected while using theevacuation route.

f. Mine-clearing Line Charge(MICLIC). The MICLIC is a rocket-propelledexplosive line charge used to reduceminefields containing single-impulse,pressure-activated antitank (AT) mines andmechanically activated antipersonnel(APERS) mines. The MICLIC will explosivelyclear a path through an area. SeveralMICLICs may be required in the same areato ensure that a wide enough path is cleared.It has limited effectiveness againstmagnetically activated mines, includingscatterable mines and those containingmultiple-impulse or delay-time fuses. Threemajor disadvantages to using MICLICs are-

11-5

P

(1) The explosive charges may notbe close enough to the submunition orscatterable mine to cause destruction. Thiscan result in "kick outs" where submunitionsor scatterable mines are thrown away fromthe detonation, possibly towards yourposition.

(2) Further reconnaissance of thearea is required prior to using the route forevacuation in order to detect thosesubmunitions or scatterable mines that arestill in place after using MICLIC.

(3) MICLIC cannot be used ifdetonation of the submunitions or scatterablemines will cause unacceptable damage.

g. Hand-placed Explosive Charges.This is the most effective way to clear anevacuation route. Explosive charges shouldbe placed to counter charge the main charge.Four major disadvantages to using hand-placed charges are-

(1) They are very labor intensiveto use and expose personnel to greater risk,especially if the submunitions use magnetic,delay, or trip-wire fusing.

(2) Their use is very slow and timeconsuming, because all must be detected,marked, and destroyed individually.

(3) They cannot be used ifdetonation of the submunitions or scatterablemines will cause unacceptable damage to theoperational area and/or equipment.

(4) They should not be used inheavy concentrations of submunitions orscatterable mines. The detonations will cause"kick-outs."

h. Direct-fire Weapons. Submunitionsand scatterable mines can be destroyed orneutralized by the use of direct-fire serviceweapons. The goal of this procedure is toproduce a disabling reaction that rapidlyreduces or eliminates the designed fusefunctioning of the submunition or scatterable

mine. Service weapons such as the 5.56millimeter, the 7.62 millimeter, the .50caliber, and the 25 millimeter should producethe desired effect. Three major disadvantagesto direct-fire destruction are-

(1) It is very slow and timeconsuming. Each item must be individuallylocated, and each person can only engage onetarget at a time.

(2) Some submunitions are toosmall to engage effectively with direct-fireweapons from a distance of 25 meters.

(3) The terrain has a major effecton this procedure. Because submunitions andscatterable mines are so small, it does nottake very much vegetation or loose dirt tohide them.

i. Containment. By using engineerequipment, one or two items can be containedby building barricades or by placing loose filldirt on top of them. This procedure isrecommended for use only where equipmentmust be recovered and no other procedure isacceptable. Major disadvantages tocontainment are-

(1) Placing fill dirt on top of theUXO may cause a detonation that coulddamage the equipment or injure the operator.

(2) Building barricades is time andpersonnel intensive.

j. Remote Movement. If thesubmunition or scatterable mine must bemoved, it must be moved remotely usinggrapnel hooks, rope, or some other suitablematerial. Three major disadvantages toremote movement are-

(1) Movement of the item cancause detonation.

(2) Personnel must approach theitem in order to attach necessary materials.

(3) The UXO will be pulled towardthe person moving it.

11-6

Chapter IlI

SERVICE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

3. Staff Responsibilities

This chapter defines recommendedmethodologies for use by the services forplanning, reporting, and tracking to enhanceoperations in an UXO contaminatedenvironment. While the focus is on trackingUS and allied submunition ordnance, threatordnance poses an equal hazard and mustbe incorporated into planning, reporting andtracking where appropriate.

Section A. Army

2. General

Effective operations in an unexplodedordnance environment require integratedplanning, tracking, and reporting ofsubmunition employment. The fire supportcoordinator (FSCOORD) advises themaneuver commander and the operationsstaff officer (G-3) on fire support employment.This includes CAS and considerations forvarious field artillery munitions. Themaneuver commander must provideguidance on the use of submunitions(DPICM/CBU) after assessing the mission,the UXO risk to troops, intent to maneuver,and terrain management. The maneuvercommander does so after consultation withthe G-3 and FSCOORD. This does not meanthat the maneuver commander must approveindividual missions or weapon employment.Guidance concerning submunition employ-ment is disseminated through operations andfire support channels to higher, subordinate,and supporting forces. Only exceptions to thecommander's guidance (i.e., location ormunition use) must be individually approvedby the commander, G-3, or FSCOORD. Re-porting and tracking of DPICM/CBUmissions fired is an administrative task andmust not impede the responsive fire supportfor the maneuver commander.

a. G-2 (Intelligence). The G-2 includespotential UXO obstacles in the intelligencepreparation of the battlefield (IPB). Theresulting reconnaissance and surveillance(R&S) plan should include UXO detectionreporting and marking.

b. G-3 (Operations) Function. G-3function is the primary staff responsibilityfor planning and publishing operations orders(OPORDs). Using the battlefield framework,the G-3 considers the mission, thecommanders' intent, forces available, terrain,commander's risk tolerance, choice ofavailable weapons, branches to follow-onoperations, and terrain management. Withinthe OPORD, the coordinating instructionscould include commander's guidance on theemployment of UXO producing sub-munitions. Additionally, reporting of specialinformation on UXO locations could be partof the commander's critical informationrequirements (CCIR). The coordinatinginstructions can include guidance onreporting procedures, density levels, locationsrestricted, and no fire areas. The planningfactors addressed in this section are not allinclusive but illustrate some of therequirements necessary to minimize theimpact of UXO on operations. Submunitionplanning considerations include-

(1) Availability of nonsubmunitionproducing ordnance.

(2) Effectiveness ofnonsubmunitionordnance against anticipated targets.

(3) Availability of engineer and EOD

support.

(4) Impact on terrain management.

(5) Impact on friendlymovements or occupation of an area.

troop

'II-1

1. Background

(6) Impact on proposed main supplyroute (MSR).

(7) Restriction on areas-proposedlogistics bases, refuel-on-the-move (ROM),and forward arming and refueling point(FARP) sites.

(8) Requirements for communicationand automation equipment to rapidlydisseminate information.

(9) Requirements for UXO reporting.

(10) Information flow to informoperating forces of possible UXO locations.

(11) Preplanning, deconflicting,and coordinating with other components.

(12) Impact of UXO on operations.

(13) Future operational require-ments for current enemy controlled airfieldsor airstrips.

(14) Requirements for dismountedoperations in the area (security, patrolling,reconnaissance, etc.).

c. Fire Support Function. TheFSCOORD and fire support element (FSE)are the commander's link into fire supportchannels. The FSCOORD ensures thatcommanders and staffs are aware of thecapabilities and hazards associated with theuse of submunition ordnance, adherence tothe commander's guidance regarding use,and reporting to appropriate staff officers theexpenditure of submunition ordnance. TheFSCOORD conducts detailed planning of firesupport assets to support the commanders'intent. The supporting field artilleryheadquarters tracks the execution of allindirect fire missions and reports to higherand subordinate units.

d. Engineer Staff Function. Engineerstaff function is the primary staffresponsibility for obstacle planning. Theengineer staff officer, in coordination with the

FSCOORD, EOD, G-2, and G-3, conductsmission analysis on the impact of UXO.Responsibilities include breaching, reducing,recording, and marking UXO hazard areas.

e. EOD Staff Function. EODstafffunction advises maneuver and supportcommanders on all matters pertaining toEOD support; provides command and controlfor subordinate EOD units; and has primaryresponsibility for clearing UXO hazard areas.

4. Operations

a. Engineers. Engineers providemobility and survivability in support of theoperational plan. They conduct mine andcountermine operations and in-depth UXOobstacle breaching.

b. EOD. EOD eliminates or reduces thehazards of domestic or foreign conventional,nuclear, chemical, biological munitions, andimprovised explosive devices that threatenpersonnel, military operations, facilities, andmateriel. EOD personnel and units providetechnical assistance to units in conductingUXO obstacle breaching.

c. UXO hazard areas are potentialobstacles that must be considered whiledeveloping and wargaming courses of action.Commanders use the battlefield frameworkto assess the impact of submunition ordnanceand issue guidance on employment. Thisplanning guidance establishes submunitionemployment constraints and restraints andincludes recommendations for both surfaceand air delivered ordnance within currentand projected boundaries. Air deliveredsubmunition ordnance and the area outsidecurrent boundaries require coordination withthe JFC, functional component commanders(if designated) service components, andadjacent allied forces.

d. Close/Deep Operations. Primaryconcerns in deep and close operations arefratricide and casualty prevention andretaining freedom of maneuver. Carefulcoordination prevents UXO from restricting

111-2

or impeding maneuver space whiledecreasing fratricide.

(1) Detection. Submunitions andscatterable mines are very small in size andare difficult to detect in optimumcircumstances. In some terrain, such as densefoliage, tall grass, or uneven ground, manyof them will go undetected. During periodsof limited visibility or at night, detection isalmost impossible. Combat vehicle personneltraveling cross-county in a buttoned-upvehicle will be at a great disadvantage,because they will not be able to visuallydetect and avoid them.

(2) Reconnaissance. After detection,the characteristics and extent of UXO hazardareas must be determined using both groundand aerial reconnaissance and remoteimagery. The unit detecting a submunitionhazard area, scatterable minefield, or otherUXO must mark and report it and, if directed,clear lanes. All areas remain marked untilcleared.

(3) Clearing. Considering the factorsof mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and timeavailable (METT-T), clearance may be bybreaching (see FM 90-13-1) or routeclearance. Route clearance normally requiresthe deliberate sweep prior to opening a road.While there is no set time limits, an averageof 1 to 3 kilometers can be covered per hour(see FM 20-32). Once detected, mechanicaland explosive techniques are the preferredmethods for submunition neutralization.

e. Rear Operations. Planners mustcarefully consider use of submunitionordnance in rear operations due to thepotential for fratricide. Forces that may comeinto contact with UXO in the rear area arethe logistical sustainment forces, normallythe most vulnerable and difficult to replace.The potential for contact increases duringoffensive operations as logistical forces moveforward into areas of high density UXO.Employment of submunition ordnance or thediscovery of UXO hazards in the rear arearequire immediate reporting and dis-

semination. EOD forces normally clear UXOhazards within the rear areas. Engineerforces provide equipment support asrequired. Clearing techniques includemechanical, explosive, and manualoperations. Note: Only EOD is trained torender UXO safe without a high orderdetonation.

5. Reporting

The commander uses establishedreporting and tracking requirements forprotection of forces. UXO hazards arereported through appropriate channels andincorporated into intelligence data. Recordsare forwarded to the appropriateheadquarters, where they are maintained onfile. (See Figure III-i.)

a. Reports begin at the tactical leveland forwarded through the senior Armyheadquarters to the JFC. Units encounteringUXO hazard areas on the battlefield mustassess, mark, and report using the 9-line spotreport according to FM 21-16/FMFM 13-8-1.This report is forwarded to the force engineer.Friendly submunition management andreporting are the responsibility of FSE. Theengineer representative at each levelevaluates the reports and when appropriateintegrates the reports into the obstacleoverlay.

b. Dissemination. Forces receiveinformation on UXO hazard areas via theobstacle overlay passed through intelligenceand operations channels. The rear operationscenter (ROC) maintains UXO hazardinformation within the rear area.

c. Army/JFACC Interface. The battle-field coordination detachment (BCD) ensuresthe JFACC is aware of the Army forces(ARFOR) commander's intent, scheme ofmaneuver, and the constraints/restrictionson submunition use within the ARFOR AO.All wings and squadrons must be informedofARFOR submunition restrictions throughthe SPINS of the ATO. The BCD PlansSection provides additional information to

111-3

Figure II-1. Theater Army Information Network

the ARFOR commander on JFACC plannedsubmunition use within or near Armyboundaries by highlighting CBU scheduledmission on the ATO. During the ATOdevelopment, the BCD Plans Section ensuresthat JFACC planned submunition missionsconform to ARFOR policy. The Operations/Current Intelligence Section providesinformation of actual CBU employmentwithin Army boundaries by highlightingCBU-scheduled missions on the ATO. BCDautomation linkage is through the StandardTheater Army Command and Control System(STACCS), Contingency Theater AutomatedPlanning System (CTAPS), and AutomatedDeep Operations Coordination System(ADOCS).

d. STACCS-CTAPS Interface (FigureIII-2). STACCS cannot transfer directly toCTAPS. The ARFOR STACCS transferstarget nominations to the BCD STACCS. The

BCD Plans Section downloads the targetnominations onto a diskette and gives thediskette to the Combat Plans Section in theAOC. The Combat Plans Section enters thetarget nominations to the rapid applicationof airpower (RAAP) portion of CTAPS.Consolidated nominations are submitted forintegration into the joint integratedprioritized target list (JIPTL). The approvedJIPTL is used to build the master air attackplan (MAAP) and the ATO. The ATO ispassed to the BCD via CTAPS. The BCDthen provides the ATO to the ARFOR.

(1) The BCD compiles results of thecurrent ATO by correlating mission taskingwith MISREPS received from the flyingunits. The BCD also informs the ARFORcommander of any reroled, targets ofopportunity, or unexecuted missionsemploying CBUs.

111-4

ARFORBCD

CTAPS

COMBAT OPERATIONS

CTAPS

- Target management(nominations through BDA)- ATO/ACO/SPINS dissemination

Figure 11-2. STACCS-CTAPS Interface

(2) The air support operations center(ASOC) is another source of submunitioninformation. The ASOC can access the JAOCdatabase and provide submunitioninformation (munitions' effectivenessassessments and air combat assessmentsummaries) directly to corps FSE.

6. Tracking

a. Obstacle tracking is the traditionalresponsibility of the engineer element. Theengineer representative converts the UXOreports into obstacle overlays fordissemination to subordinate units. SeeAppendix A for UXO obstacle numberingsystem.

b. The Advanced Field ArtilleryTactical Data System (AFATDS) link toManeuver Control System (MCS) relaysinformation concerning field artillery

employment of submunition ordnance. Theprimary interface is at the division and corps

main command post (CP).

(1) ATCCS. ATCCS is an integrated,ground mobile, and fixed deployable networkof common hardware and software forechelons at corps and below. Its purpose isto assist commanders and their staffs toobtain a near real-time access to commandcritical information requirements (taskorganization, maneuver, engineer, nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC), signal, armyairspace command and control, fire support,air defense, intelligence and electronicwarfare (IEW), CSS, resources, and enemysituation) through a force level database. TheATCCS architecture includes five constituentbattlefield functions analysis systems. Twoof those systems, MCS and AFATDS, arecritical to reporting and tracking UXO.

I11-5

(2) MCS. MCS is the primaryautomated decision support/informationsystem supporting the tactical commanderand staff. The MCS provides the functionalapplications necessary to access andmanipulate the force level information (FLI)database to satisfy all stated CCIR for aspecific operation, to effect timely control ofcurrent combat operations (deep, close, andrear), and to effectively develop anddistribute plans and estimates.

(3) AFATDS. AFATDS providesautomated decision support for the firesupport function, including joint andcombined fires. AFATDS provides a fullyintegrated fire support (FS) command,control, communications (C3) system, givingthe FS coordinator automated support for theplanning, coordinating, controlling, andexecuting of close support, counterfire,interdiction, and suppression of air defensesystems. AFATDS performs all of the FSoperational functions, including automatedallocation and distribution of fires based ontarget value analysis.

c. Historical Records. Units forwardUXO hazard records through operationalchannels to Army component (ARFOR)headquarters. The ARFOR engineer elementmaintains the hazard reports on file. Thesehistorical files are available for planning, useby subordinate units, and for disseminationto follow-on forces/units or for use byappropriate agencies during postconflictoperations.

Section B. Marine Corps

7. General

Marine Corps units are task organizedinto Marine air-ground task forces(MAGTFs). MAGTF components are capableof delivering both air and artillerysubmunitions. The MAGTF commander(Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level),along with the force fires coordinator (FFC),is responsible for planning fires and reportingand tracking the use of submunitions as

appropriate. Submunitions managementand reporting are the responsibility of theforce fires coordination center (FFCC).Tracking of potential UXO locations is theresponsibility of the MAGTF engineer officer.Potential locations of UXO require trackingand integration into operations whendeveloping the scheme of maneuver.

8. Planning

The FFC advises the MAGTFcommander on employment of fires. Thisincludes considerations for air and artillerydelivered submunitions. Reporting use ofsubmunitions is an administrative task andnot intended to impede the responsivecoordination of fires for the MAGTFcommander.

a. Planning Factors. The following listprovides a base line of planning requirementsnecessary to minimize the impact of UXOson friendly operations. Primary responsibilityfor planning fires is the FFC. The FFC is thecommander's link into fire support channels.Using the battlefield framework, the FFCconsiders the mission, commanders' intent(higher commander included), forcesavailable, terrain, commander's risktolerance, choice of available weapons,branches and sequels to the operation, andterrain management. The coordinatinginstructions of the OPORD contain thecommander's guidance on the employmentof submunitions. The coordinatinginstructions also contain guidance onreporting procedures, density levels,locations, and no fire areas. Informationrelating to the use of UXO producingordnance is received and disseminatedthrough a variety of means. The MarineCorps Fire Support System (MCFSS) link tothe FFCC relays information concerningartillery employment of submunitions. Thisinformation is available to all MAGTFagencies concerned with tracking UXO;however, the actual delivery of the ordnanceand the time and place of delivery requiresconfirmation. The direct air support center(DASC) receives initial reports upon delivery

111-6

of the ordnance. The DASC forwardsinformation from these reports to the seniorFSCC, MAGTF FFCC, and tactical aircommand center (TACC) for furtherdissemination.

b. Deep Operations. Employing sub-munitions may be ideal in deep operations.Preparing to conduct deep operations, thecommander and FFC must consider futuremaneuver in the deep operations area.

c. Close Operations. The primaryprinciple when employing submunitions is toretain freedom of maneuver. The use ofsubmunitions in close operations requirescareful coordination. When used on flanks,coordination informs adjacent units of thepossible UXO.

d. Rear Operations. The use ofsubmunitions in the rear area also requirescareful consideration due to the potential forfratricide. Forces that may come into contactwith UXO in the rear area are the logisticalsustainment forces-the most vulnerable andthe hardest assets to replace. The divisionmain must immediately disseminateinformation concerning submunitionordnance employment within the rear areato all units.

9. Reporting

a. Artillery Reporting Format.

(1) MCFSS. Marine Corps artilleryunits and fires coordination agencies useMCFSS as a primary communicationssystem. The Ammunition and Fire UnitMission Fire Report (AFU;MFR) of theMCFSS informs all units of submunitionsdeployed in their AO. This message reportstarget information and ammunitionexpenditure after a mission execution. Thisreport contains vital information such astarget number, shells and fuses expended,and target locations. The MCFSS relaysmission fire reports (MFRs) to the groundcombat element (GCE) and to the senior firedirection center (FDC) as appropriate. The

division FSCC determines impact on futureoperations.

(2) How to Report (Figure 111-3).After mission execution, the artillerybattalion FDC sends this report to theregimental FSCC and artillery regimentalFDC. The artillery regiment FDC adds theMFR to the Message of Interest File fordistribution to other agencies. RegimentalFSCCs consolidate the MFRs periodically(based on operational tempo) and send theconsolidated reports to the division FSCC fortransfer to the historical file. The divisionengineer must maintain the consolidatedMFRs and historical file ofUXOs, minefields,and other obstacles. The division engineerthen forwards consolidated reports to theMAGTF FFCC. There are a number ofcommunication channels that are availableto send this consolidated report to the divisionFSCC. These include courier, mobilesubscriber equipment (MSE), and facsimile(FAX). The units' standing operatingprocedure will specify communicationchannel priority.

b. Offensive Air Support ReportingFormat.

(1) Initial Report. Rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft that conduct CAS, deep airsupport (DAS), and terminal control providethe DASC with BDA. BDA reports provideresults and munition expenditures after atarget is attacked. The DASC then providesBDA reports to the appropriate FSCC. Unitsmay obtain potential UXO hazard areainformation in their area of operation fromthese BDA reports.

(2) MISREP. The MISREP trans-mits results and amplifies an in-flight report.The MISREP message provides timelyreports of mission results and otherinformation obtained during postflightdebriefing. The MISREP is used toretransmit or amplify an in-flight report andis submitted to the tasking agency, therequesting unit/agency, and to otherinterested organizations.

111-7

Figure 111-3. USMC Information Network

10. Tracking

a. The Marine Corps employs theMCFSS to report and track artillerysubmunitions. The MCFSS providesautomated connectivity between agencies.The MCFSS can perform automatedallocation and distribution of fires based ontarget value analysis.

b. Potential Location of UXO, Plotting/Numbering. See Appendix A, UXO ObstacleNumbering.

Section C. Navy

11. General

Navy forces deliver submunitionordnance by either carrier-based strikeaircraft or TLAM-D. If a JFACC is designated

and an ATO is in use, both Navy aircraftsorties and TLAM missions are depicted onthe ATO. Each carrier air wing commander(CAG) is responsible for strike missionreporting. The Mission Distribution System(MDS) maintains and distributes, uponrequest, TLAM-D postmission reports. Allpostmission submunition ordnance deliveryinformation is available to the JFC.

12. Planning

a. Air Strike Planning. Navy strikeplanning is conducted by air wing striketeams led by designated strike leaders fromwithin the wing. Targets are selected byhigher authorities and the best aircraft,weapons, and tactics are chosen toaccomplish the assigned mission. If a JFACC

111-8

INFORMATION NETWORK

has been designated, the joint ATO de-lineates targets and normally specifies theweapon to accomplish the mission.Additionally, if the weapon load has beendepicted on the ATO and the strike leaderdisagrees with the selection, changes arecoordinated through liaison on the JFACCstaff.

b. TLAM-D Planning. The JFC throughthe JFACC, or through the Navy componentcommander if a JFACC has not beendesignated, determines targets appropriatefor TLAM-D strike and provides thatinformation to the TLAM strike coordinator.If a JFACC is designated, the type of TLAMused and its target appear on the ATO. Ifthere is no JFACC, the Navy's INDIGOmessage contains the TLAM type and itstarget. TLAM can be used as a stand-aloneweapon or with manned aircraft as part of astrike package. If used with strike aircraft,close coordination between the strike leaderand the TLAM strike coordinator is essential.

c. Planning Coordination. Landcomponents must identify concerns regardingsubmunition employment (by strike aircraftor TLAM-D) versus future operations to theappropriate planning commander (i.e.,JFACC or naval component commander).Naval commanders conducting initialplanning must consider the impacts ofsubmunition employment regarding poten-tial future use of airfields, ports, logistic sites,maneuver areas, etc.

13. Reporting

a. Air Strike Reporting. Aircrewsprovide postmission debriefs to the strikewarfare commander via each carrier airintelligence center (CVIC) that files the JointInteroperability of Tactical Command andControl Systems (JINTACCS) formattedMISREP. This report includes targetinformation and munitions used. Addition-ally, crews report the estimated location ofjettisoned submunition ordnance. Whenusing submunitions, REMARKS in theRESULT field should include observed

weapons effectiveness. CVIC will enter thesubmunition danger area into the JointMaritime Command Information System(JMCIS). The JFC is responsible for thecollection and dissemination of informationregarding submunition employment intheater. Therefore, it is imperative that theJFC is an addressee on all MISREPs.

b. TLAM-D Reporting. Combatantcommanders provide postmission reportsthrough the MDS. These reports give impactpoints and dispersion patterns. MDS iscurrently a component of the Afloat PlanningSystem and the Rapid Deployment Suite,whichever is available to the combatantcommander, naval component commander,and carrier battle group (CVBG) com-mander. CVIC enters TLAM-D dispersionpatterns into JMCIS from the MDS report.

14. Tracking

In addition to reports provided to theJFC, each CVIC enters and maintains Navytargets engaged/destroyed and submunitionemployment in the JMCIS historicaldatabase. Each CVBG provides historicalinformation to the naval componentcommander upon request.

Section D. Air Force

15. General

The joint air operations center (JAOC),primary command and control for all jointair assets, has overall responsibility forplanning the employment of munitions, toinclude CBUs. The intelligence section,within the Air Force AOC, tracks munitionemployment for BDA and munitionseffectiveness assessment (MEA). The BDAand MEA tracking procedures are keymechanisms for reporting the success of theplanned employment.

16. Planning

a. The JAOC selects targets from a jointlist of targets normally called the JIPTL. The

111-9

master air attack plan (MAAP) phase of theATO planning cycle is the mechanismsometimes used to assign weapons to targetsand develop mission profiles/packages. Thefinal phase of ATO production occurs withthe assignment of weapons to the aircraft.However, some selections are simply "bestavailable" and the individual wingsdetermine the final choice based on theirweapons availability. Mission profiles/packages dissemination to the employingunits is via the ATO. Units are responsibleto develop specific mission plans to supportthe ATO. Units select weapons type if theATO does not mandate a specific weapon.When the JAOC retargets or reroles aircraftbased upon current situation requirements,units report CBU information throughintelligence channels if so instructed. TheJAOC normally annotates CBU exclusionareas using restricted operating zones (ROZ)or restricted fire areas (RFA). Planningfactors to be considered before munitions/weapons selection to minimize the impact ofUXOs on operations include-

(1) Friendly troops transiting oroccupying the area.

(2) Locations of proposed mainsupply routes (MSRs).

(3) Locations of proposed logisticsbases, forward operating locations (FOLs),and forward arming and refueling points(FARPs).

(4) Future operational requirementsfor current enemy controlled airfields/airstrips.

(5) Dismounted operations requiredin the area (medical evacuation or specialoperations force landing zones, etc.).

b. The Engineer function provides fordamage assessment and recovery actionsassociated with UXO and the mitigation ofUXO effects. The EOD function maintains acapability to eliminate or reduce the hazards

of conventional, chemical, biologicalmunitions, and improvised explosive devicesthat threaten personnel, operations,facilities, and materiel in support of theateroperations. The engineer and EOD functionsdevelop plans to support air base recoveryactions and activities relating to theexploitation of forward areas such as FOLsand FARPs for Air Force forces (AFFOR).These activities include runway clearanceand repair for aircraft use or the employmentof techniques for air base denial.

17. Reporting

a. The pilot submits INFLTREP. TheINFLTREP is the initial report on targetlocation and ordnance effects. Upon landing,local intelligence representatives debriefaircrews and then file a MISREP. Wingintelligence forwards the MISREP to JAOCintelligence representatives, who extract thedata and provide essential mission results tooperations and plans using the air combatassessment summary. This report containsthe location, type, and amount of ordnancedropped. The JAOC operations sectionupdates the CTAPS database and submitsthe air combat assessment summary reportsto the joint force headquarters J-3 viaCTAPS. The JAOC provides informationcopies to the BCD (Figure 111-4). The BCDthen forwards this information to the ARFORG-3 current operations division.

b. ALO. If the air liaison officer (ALO)in the corps or division main coordinates thestrike, then the ALO reports the submunitioninformation (time, location, target number,and number of weapons/CBUs dropped) tothe FSE or FSCC.

c. Special Operations Liaison Element(SOLE). The SOLE at the JFACC's head-quarters reports submunition employmentinformation to the joint forces specialoperations component commander (JFSOCC)headquarters. This information is thendisseminated to the SOF components.

IIl-b

Figure llB-4. USAF Information Network

d. Units. At the main operating bases,units report UXO to the survival recoverycenter (SRC). Away from the main operatingbases (forward operating locations, FARPs,forward operating bases), units report usingthe standard 9-line spot report (Appendix B).

18. Tracking

Executed air mission tracking is byMISREPs. Intelligence accumulates MEA andBDA for combat assessment purposes.MISREPs originate at squadron level.Squadrons forward MISREP summaries to

the wing operations centers (WOCs). WOCsconsolidate reports and submit them to theJAOC. The JAOC updates the CTAPSdatabase and furnishes reports to the J-3and maintains copies for the historical file.The updated CTAPS database serves as thehistorical tracking system. JAOC operationssection personnel use locally generatedreports to sort and query the database. If itis not feasible to track CBUs due to too muchdata being generated, the JAOC mayannotate areas where high concentrationsof UXO may exist.

II-I1

INFORMATION NETWORK

AFFOR

AOC BCD

ATO

Woc GLO

ouU z

LU

SQDN

Appendix A

UXO OBSTACLE NUMBERING

UXO hazard areas are integrated into thestandard obstacle numbering system usingthe procedures described below. Army andMarine Corps use the same numberingsystem. Army units are used for exampleonly.

a. Obstacle Numbering from OtherEchelons. FM 90-7, Combined ArmsObstacle Integration, covers obstacleplanning (and numbering) from corpsthrough task force (TF) level. A theaterArmy (TA) or joint task force (JTF)headquarters (HQ) could give an obstacle tosubordinate units as specified tasks. Thesolution is to add other options for the unittype (Character 1) in the 12-characterobstacle number. In this case "7"' for TA or"J" for JTF. Thus, the number for a bridgedemolition (span) obstacle (planned)designated by 4th Army is T004-**A-BS01/.Additionally, other joint force HQ can usethis system (e.g., a MEF could use "l"). Inthis case, the use of a distinctive letterdesignator for an individual HQ is specifiedin the OPLAN/OPORD.

b. Encountered Obstacles. Frequently,units in combat environments encounter oridentify enemy obstacles, areas affected byUXO (caused by enemy or friendlysubmunitions), or possibly other things thatrequire tracking as an obstacle. The termencountered obstacle is used to describe thesetypes of obstacles. In these situations theobstacle numbering system can be used withminor modifications. These modifications aremade to the obstacle type abbreviation(Characters 8 and 9) and zone, belt, or groupdesignators (Characters 5, 6, and 7).

c. Obstacle Type Abbreviations.Currently the obstacle numbering systemhas six different letter prefixes (B=bridgedemolition, M=conventional minefields,

R=road crater, W=wire obstacles, S=scatter-able minefields, and A=miscellaneousconventional obstacles). This allows greatflexibility for identifying other areas or thingsthat serve as obstacles (i.e., encounteredobstacles such as UXO) but do not fit into thecategories described above.

(1) Obstacle Type Abbreviation forUXO. The obstacle type abbreviation "UX"is for UXO areas where the specific type isnot identified. Use "UL" as the prefix and useanother letter for the suffix to delineatebetween different types of UXO (e.g., UM forMLRS, UD for DPICM; see list at end ofsection).

(2) Obstacle Type Abbreviations forEnemy Obstacles. Enemy obstacles areidentified by an obstacle type with "E" asthe prefix (e.g., EM is an enemy minefield,and ED is an enemy antitank ditch).

(3) Obstacle Type Abbreviations forOther Situations. There may be otherapplications for modifications of the obstacletype abbreviation (e.g., chemically con-taminated areas or natural obstacles thatrequire special tracking).

d. Obstacle Type Abbreviation Detail.Although the letter codes seem to lack detail,the obstacle number is really nothing morethan an unique address that allows anobstacle to be identified in a database. Thisin turn allows database users (engineers,EOD, etc.) to determine the detailedinformation concerning a specific obstacle andaccurately track the employment ofsubmunitions throughout the depth of thebattlefield. The obstacle number is the startpoint to developing further informationconcerning the UXO (e.g., location, quantity,enemy, or friendly).

A-1

e. Zone, Belt, and Group Designators.The primary function of the zone, belt, andgroup designators for UXO tracking is toidentify geographical or relative locations ofUXO; moreover, it can further enhancesituation awareness and reduce fratricide onthe battlefield.

(1) Zone, Belt, and Group versusUnit Identification. A secondary function ofthe zone, belt, and group designator is toidentify the owning (or responsible) unit forthe obstacle control measure. The zone, belt,and group designators allow identification ofthe responsible unit down to company level.

(2) Zone Designators. When coupledwith the HQ designation (Characters 1through 4), the zone designator identifies theowning brigade (a single zone is theresponsibility of a single brigade). Thus, adivision can distinguish between obstaclesreported by its subordinate brigades. Note:Corps use the HQ designation to distinguishbetween obstacles reported by subordinatedivisions.

(3) Belt Designators. When coupledwith the HQ designation and the zonedesignator, the belt designator identifies theowning TF (a single belt is the responsibilityof a single TF). Thus a brigade candistinguish between obstacles reported by itssubordinate TFs.

(4) Group Designators. Whencoupled with the HQ designation, the zonedesignator and the belt designator, the groupdesignator identifies the owning company (asingle group is the responsibility of a singlecompany). Thus a TF can distinguishbetween obstacles reported by its subordinatecompanies.

f. Unit Identification. One cannot lookat an obstacle number at all levels andimmediately identify the responsible unit.However, one can immediately identify theexact unit at least one level down (e.g., 12IDwill know that it assigned obstacle Zone A to1st Brigade). Once a unit receives obstacle

plans from subordinate units (down to theappropriate level), it will be able to identifyunits to the same level. Most importantly,the obstacle number is, after all, just anaddress to detailed data in a database. Forexample, a minefield fix is emplaced/ownedby A/2-2/1/12ID. A second minefield fix isemplaced/owned by B/3-3/1/12ID. The twoindividual obstacles will have completelyunique addresses (obstacle numbers) in thecorps obstacle database.

g. Zone, Belt, and Group Designation forProtective Obstacle Numbering. FM 90-7describes obstacle numbering for protectiveobstacles using the following procedure:Units assign default obstacle zone, belt, andgroup designators for protective obstacles.For example, 77th ID assigns W, X, Y, and Z(it is unlikely that the division will ever haveenough actual obstacle zones to require theseletters) as default obstacle zone designatorsfor subordinate units as follows: W - 1stBrigade, X - 2d Brigade, Y - 3d Brigade, andZ - Division Rear. The 1st Brigade assignsdefault obstacle belts W1, W2, and W3 to TF1-2, TF 2-3, and TF 3-4 respectively. TF 1-2then assigns default obstacle groupdesignators WlA, WlB, WiC, and WlD toits four company/teams (TM B, TM C, CO C,and TM E). Protective obstacles can now belinked directly to specific companies/teams.The first protective minefield that TM B, TF1-2 emplaces has the obstacle number I077-W1A-MP01X.

h. Zone, Belt, and Group Designation forEncountered Obstacles. The same defaultzones, belts, and groups used for protectiveobstacles are used for encountered obstacles.These zone, belt, and group designators donot have a geographical location-insteadthey identify units. They could, in fact, bedesignated by SOP or could be designatedusing different letters/numbers for eachoperation. What really distinguishes aprotective obstacle from an enemy obstacleor from an UXO is the prefix for the obstacletype abbreviation. The following is anexample of the use of default zone, belt, andgroup designators: 7 Armor Division assigns

A-2

1st Brigade Zone W. 1st Brigade assigns TFStrike Belt W5. TF Strike assigns CompanyA Group W5A. Company A, TF Strike, 1stBrigade, 7 Armor Division identifies an areawith unknown UXO. This is the first sucharea identified by the company and isassigned obstacle number A007-W5A-UX01X. The first enemy minefield that thiscompany encounters is A007-W5A-EM01X.

i. Obstacle Status Symbols. Currentsymbols can show status for planned, beingprepared, prepared but not executed, andexecuted. Other situations may call for othersymbols.

(1) Obstacle Status Symbol forBreached Obstacles. Indicating breachedobstacles is very simple. The only differenceis the substitution of the status symbol "="for other status symbols. The "=" indicatesthat the obstacle is breached. For example,the first completed standard turningminefield in obstacle group A007-A1A has theobstacle number A007-A1A-MT01X. If thisminefield is breached, the obstacle numberis changed to A007-A1A-MT01=. As anotherexample, if Company A, TF Strike breachesthe minefield discussed above, the obstaclenumber is changed to A007-W5A-EM01=.

(2) Obstacle Status Symbol for OtherSituations. The following list showsexamples of other status symbols. Inaddition, units may specify other syrhbologyin OPLANs/OPORDs.

(a) Suffixes for UXO ObstacleType Abbreviations:

* Bomb (Air) ......................... B

* CBU(Air) ........................ C

* DPICM ............................... D

* MLRS ................................. M

* General ........................... X

(b) Suffixes for Enemy ObstacleType Abbreviations:

* Abatis ..................... .... T

* Antitank Ditch .................. D

* Bridge Demolition ............. B

" Log Obstacle .......... L....

* Minefield ......................... M

* Nonstandard ................... N

* Road Crater ...................... R

* Rubble Obstacle ....... E.........

* Scatterable Mines ......... S..S

* Wire Obstacle .................... W

(c) Obstacle Status Symbol forOther Situations:

* Breached ............................=

* Unknown ......................?

* Being Cleared .................. #

A-3

Appendix B

UXO SPOT REPORT

1. Background

The UXO Spot Report is a detailed2-way reporting system that clarifies UXOhazard area locations, identifies clearancepriority, and identifies affected units. Thereport is used to request help in handing anUXO hazard that influences an unit's missionand is beyond the unit's ability to handle.This report helps commanders set prioritiesbased on the battlefield situation.

2. First-echelon Report

The UXO Spot Report is the first-echelon report that is sent when an UXO isencountered. The report consists of 9 linesand is sent by the fastest means available.

Line 1. Date-Time Group (DTG):DTG item was discovered.

Line 2. Unit and Location: Re-porting activity (unit identification code[UIC]) and location (grid of UXO).

Line 3. Contact Method: Radiofrequency, call sign, point of contact (POC),and telephone number.

Line 4. Type of Ordnance: Dropped,projected, placed, or thrown. If available,supply the subgroup. Give the size of thehazard area.

Line 5. NBC Contamination: Beas specific as possible.

Line 6. Resources Threatened:Report any equipment, facilities, or otherassets that are threatened.

Line 7. Impact on Mission: Thisdescribes current tactical situation and howthe presence of UXO impacts mission.

Line 8. Protective Measures:Describe any measures you have taken toprotect personnel and equipment.

Line 9. Recommended Priority:Recommend a priority for response by EODor engineers:

Priority

Immediate

Indirect

Minor

No Threat

Basis

Stops the unit's ma-neuver and missioncapability or threatenscritical assets vital tothe mission.

Slows the unit'smaneuver and missioncapability or threatenscritical assets im-portant to the mission.

Reduces the unit's ma-neuver and missioncapability or threatensnoncritical assets ofvalue.

Has little or no effect onthe unit's capabilitiesor assets.

B-1

Appendix C

AIRCRAFT CBU LOADS

This appendix lists the maximum CBU canister loads per airframe and the type andamount of submunitions per canister. Consult the ATO for specific aircraft loads.

Type of CBU

CBU-52CBU-58CBU-71CBU-87CBU-89MK-20

CBU-87CBU-89CBU-97

F-16 CBU-52,58,71CBU-87,89MK20

Maximum Load

45 (27 int, 18 ext)45 (27 int, 18 ext)45 (27 int, 18 ext)24 (6 int, 18 ext)24 (6 int, 18 ext)18 external

(4 with wing tanks)(4 with wing tanks)(4 with wing tanks)

CBU-52,59,71CBU-87,89MK-20BL-755

CBU-52,58,71CBU-87,89MK-20BL-755

CBU-52,59,71CBU-87,89MK-20

CBU-52,58,71CBU-87,89MK-20BL-755

CBU MK-20,99,100CBU-78

CBU-87,89

CBU MK-20,92,100CBU-78

CBU MK-20,99, 100CBU-78

(6 with wing tanks)(6 with wing tanks)

(4 - 6 standard load)(4 - 6 standard load)(4 - 6 standard load)(4 - 6 standard load)

C-1

Aivrft

B-52

B-1B

F-ill

F-4G

F-15E

A-10

F/A-18

F-14

A-6

AV-8

Table C-I. US Air Dispensed Submunitions

Weapon Submunition I SubmunitionCBU-7/A BLU-18 1200

CBU-12/A BLU-171B 213

CBU-24fB BLU-261B 670CBU-25/A BLU-241B 132

CBU-291B BLU-36fB 670CBU-46/A BLU-661B 444

CBU-49fB BLU-591B 670

CBU-521B BLU-61AJB 217

CBU-55fB BLU-73JB 3

CBU-581B BLU-63fB 650

CBU-59fB BLU-77/B 717CBU-60/A BLU-24/B 264

CBU-631B M40 2025CBU-701B BLU-851B 79

CBU-711B BLU-861B 650

CBU-721B BLUJ-73AJB 3CBU-75/E BLU-631B 1800

CBUT-75A/B BLU-63&86 1420 & 355

CBU-76/B BLU-61AIB 290

CBU-77fB BLU-63fB 790

CBU-781B BLU-9lfB&921B 45 & 15

CBU-8t1A BLU-49A/B 45

CBUT-871B BLU-971B 202

CBU-89fB BLU-911B 92CBU-891B BLU-921B 92

CBU-97 BLU-1081B 10CBU-98 HB-876LE 24

MK15 M40 2020

MK2O MK118 247MK22 M38 2020

Source: US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency

C-2

Appendix D

SUBMUNITIONS IN ARMY STOCKPILE

This appendix lists the submunition ordnance currently in the US Army stockpile. Withthe exception of the M80 submunition, the current generation of these submunitions do nothave self-destruct fuses.

Table D-1. US Army Submunition Ordnance

Type I SuhnmrnitionSstem J rqectile I Suhnunition Quantit

155mm M449 ICM M43A1 60M449A1 ICM M43A1 60M864 DPICM M42/M46 72

M483A1 DPICM M42/M46 64/248 inch M404 ICM M43 104

M509A1 DPICM M42/M46 180105mm M444 ICM M39 18

M915/M916 DPICM M80* 42MLRS M26 M77 644

M26A1 M77 518ATACMS M74 1000

HYDRA 70 M261 MPSM M73 9Source: US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Aeny

*Self-destruct Fuse

D-1

Appendix E

FOREIGN SUBMUNITIONS

The following tables show typical foreign air and surface launched submunitionordnance. It is not intended to be all inclusive but for information only.

Table E-1. -Foreign Air Dispensed Submunitions

Type SubmumitikmCou__________n Suhunitiont

Russia 500kg AT 15Russia 500kg APERS 108Russia 500kg AT 268Russia 500kg FAI 2Russia 500kg CP* 12China 500kg FAE 3Poland 500kg APERS 265

ISouim Fmeigxi Science arnd Tec dogyk Center Briefing at HQ TRADOC oii 21 Apr 93

*onret piercing or cmatering

E-1

Table E-2. Foreign Surface Launched Submunitions

SubmunitionQuantity

Submunitionvpe

Brazil Rocket 180mm 20 DPICMBrazil Rocket 300mm 64 DPICM

Bulgaria Artillery 122mm 15 DPICMChina Mortor 120mm 18 DPICMChina Artillery 122mm 30 DPICMChina Artillery 130mm 35 DPICMChina Artillery 152mm 63 DPICMChina Artillery 155mm 63 DPICMChina Artillery 203mm 100 DPICMChina Rocket 122mm 39 DPICMChina Rocket 273mm 320 DPICMCIS Artillery 152mm 42 DPICMCIS Rocket 220mm 30 APERS/AMCIS Rocket 300mm 72 APERS/AMCIS Rocket FROG-7 42 APERS/AM

Egypt Rocket 122mm 98 DPICMFrance Artillery 155mm 63 DPICM

Germany Artillery 155mm 63 DPICMGermany Artillery 155mm 49 DPICM

Greece Artillery 105mm 24 DPICMGreece Mortar 4.2 in 20 DPICMGreece Artillery 155mm 49 DPICMIsrael Artillery 105mm 15 DPICMIsrael Mortar 120mm 24 DPICMIsrael Artillery 155mm 63 DPICMIsrael Artillery 175mm 81 DPICMIsrael Artillery 203mm 120 DPICMIsrael Rocket 160mm 104 DPICMItaly Rocket 122mm 77 DPICM

Pakistan Artillery 155mm 88 DPICMSlovakia Artillery 152mm 42 DPICMSlovakia Rocket 122mm 63 DPICMS. Africa Artillery 155mm 56 DPICMS. Korea Artillery 105mm 20 DPICMS. Korea Artillery 105mm 18 APERS

Spain Mortar 120mm 15 DPICMSpain Mortar 120mm 21 DPICM

Yugoslavia Artillery 152mm 63 DPICMYugoslavia Rocket 128mm 40 DPICMYugoslavia Rocket 262mm 288 DPICM

Soure Forei Science and Technol Center Brie at H TRADOC on 21 Apr 93

ICountry Delivery System

I.1

E-2

REFERENCES

Joint

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 Mar 94

Joint Publication 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare, 30 Jun 93

Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, Version 3.0

Multiservice

FM 21-16/FMFM 13-8-1, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, 30 Aug 94

Army

FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, 30 Sep 92

FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 Sep 94

FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, 28 Feb 91

FM 100-5, Operations, Jun 93

Chapter 1, Hazards Information, US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity UXO Study,undated

White Paper, Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (DTTP) for Clearance of IndirectFires, undated

Marine Corps

FMFM 5-41, Close Air Support, Oct 92

FMFM 6-6-14, Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery, Dec 93

FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination, 27 Mar 92

FMFM 6-18-1, Procedures for the Marine Corps Fire Support System, Oct 94

FMFM 13, MAGTF Engineer Operations, 10 Feb 92

FMFM 13-8, MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Dec 93

Navy

NWP 10-1-13 (REV A) (Supp 6), Joint Reporting System (Commonly used Messages), May 94

References-1

Glossary

PART I-ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCACEACOADAMADOCSADEAFATDSAFU;MFRAFFORALOAMAOAOCAPAMAPERSARFORARTYASOCASPATATACMSATCCSATOATP

BCDBDABDEBLUBN

C2C3CAGCASCBUCCIRCISCPCSCSS

Air Combat Commandaviation combat elementairspace control orderarea denial artillery munitionautomated deep operations coordination systemassistant division engineeradvanced field artillery tactical data systemammunition and fire unit mission fire reportAir Force forcesair liaison officerantimaterielarea of operationsair operations centerantipersonnel antimaterielantipersonnelArmy forcesartilleryair support operations centerammunition supply pointantitankArmy Tactical Missile SystemArmy Tactical Command and Control Systemair tasking orderammunition transfer point

battlefield coordination detachmentbattle damage assessmentbrigadebomb live unitbattalion

command and controlcommand, control, and communicationscarrier air wing commanderclose air supportcluster bomb unitcommander's critical information requirementsCommonwealth of Independent Statescommand post; concrete piercing or crateringcombat supportcombat service support

Glossary-1

CSSECTAPSCVBGCVICCVW

DADASDASCdivDIVARTYDPICMDTG

e.g.

ENEODETAC

combat service support elementcontingency theater automated planning systemcarrier battle groupcarrier air intelligence centercarrier air wing

Department of the Armydirect air support; deep air supportdirect air support centerdivisiondivision artillerydual-purpose improved conventional munitiondate time group

for exampleengineerexplosive ordnance disposalenlisted tactical air controller

FAFAEFAIFARPFASCAMFAXFDCFFCFFCCFLIFLIRFMFMFM

FOLFSFSCLFSCCFSCOORDFSEFSO

G-2

field artilleryfuel air explosivefuel air incendiaryforward arming refueling pointfamily of scatterable minesfacsimilefire direction centerforce fires coordinatorforce fires coordination centerforce level informationforward looking infraredField Manual (USA)Fleet Marine Force Manual

forward operating locationfire supportfire support coordination linefire support coordination centerfire support coordinatorfire support elementfire support officer

Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff officer (Armydivision or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff)

Glossary-2

Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer (Armydivision or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff)

ground combat elementground liaison officergeneral support

HMMWVHNSHQ

ICMi.e.IEWINFLTREPINTREPIPB

J-3J-5JAOCJFACCJFCJFSOCCJINTACCSJIPTLJMCISJOAJRACJTCBJTF

kg

LAVLCC

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehiclehost nation supportheadquarters

improved conventional munitionthat isintelligence and electronic warfarein-flight reportintelligence reportintelligence preparation of the battlespace

Operations Directorate of a joint staffPlans Directorate of a joint staffjoint air operations centerjoint force air component commanderjoint force commanderjoint forces special operations component commanderJoint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systemsjoint integrated prioritized target listJoint Maritime Command Information Systemjoint operations areajoint rear area coordinatorjoint targeting coordination boardjoint task force

kilogram

light armored vehicleland component commander

master air attack planMarine air ground task forceMarine forces

GCEGLOGS

MAAPMAGTFMARFOR

Glossary-3

MCCDCMCFSSMCRPMCSMDSMEAMEDEVACMEFMETT-T

MFRMISREPMICLICMLRSmm

MSEMSR

NBCNDCNFAnomsNWP TP

Marine Corps Combat Development CommandMarine Corps Fire Support SystemMarine Corps Reference Publicationmaneuver control systemMission Distribution Systemmunitions effectiveness assessmentmedical evacuationMarine expeditionary forcemission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,

time availablemission fire reportmission reportmine-clearing line chargemultiple launch rocket systemmillimetermobile subscriber equipmentmain supply route

nuclear, biological and chemicalNaval Doctrine Commandno fire areanominationsNaval Warfare Publication Test Publication

O&IOASOPLANOPORDOPTEMPOOTC

PACPACAFPAMPOC

R&SRAAMRAAPRAOCREGTRFA

operations and intelligenceoffensive air supportoperation planoperation orderoperational tempoofficer in tactical command

Pacific Air ForcesPacific Air Forces Pamphletpoint of contact

reconnaissance and surveillanceremote antiarmor minerapid application of airpowerrear area operations centerregimentrestrictive fire area

Glossary-4

ROCROEROMROZ

TATACCTACFIRETADCTAOCTARPSTFTLAMTLAM-DTOCTTP

UICUSUSAFUSAFEUXO

viavs

Theater Armytactical air command centertactical fire direction systemtactical air direction centertactical air operations centerTactical Air Reconnaissance Pod Systemtask forceTomahawk land attack missileTomahawk land attack missile, version Dtactical operations centertactics, techniques, and procedures

unit identification codeUnited StatesUnited States Air ForceUnited States Air Forces Europeunexploded ordnance

by way ofversus

wing operations centerWing Command and Control System

WOCWCCS

rear operations centerrules of engagementrefuel on the moverestricted operating zone

battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; MarineCorps battalion or regiment)

special operations forcesspecial operations liaison elementstanding operating proceduresspecial instructionssurvival recovery centerstandard theater army command and control systemsquadron

S3

SOFSOLESOPSPINSSRCSTACCSSQDN

Glossary-5

PART II -TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

mine. 1. In land mine warfare, an explosive or other material, normally encased, designedto destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, orotherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action of its victim, by thepassage of time, or by controlled means. 2. In naval mine warfare, an explosive device laidin the water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping formentering an area. The term does not include devices attached to the bottoms of ships or toharbor installations by personnel operating underwater, nor does it include devices whichexplode immediately of expiration of a predetermined time after laying. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unexploded explosive ordnance. Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, orotherwise prepared for action and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected orplaced in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel ormaterial and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.

Glossary-6

Index

A

air tasking order (See ATO)ARFOR 111-3, 111-4, 111-6, 111-10'Army forces (See ARFOR)ATO lI-i, 11-3, 11-4, 111-3, 111-4, 111-8, 111-9,

C

CBU 1-2, I-i, III-1, 111-4, 111-9, 111-10,

clearing ii, 1-3, 11-i, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 111-2,111-3

cluster bomb unit (See CBU)

E

engineer equipment 11-5, 11-6engineer forces 1-2, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, III-i,

111-2, 111-3, 111-4, 111-10, A-i, B-iexplosive ordnance disposal (See EOD)EOD 1-2, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 111-i, 111-2,

111-3, 111-10, A-i, B-i

F

FARP 111-2forward arming refueling point (See FARP)fratricide vii, I-i, 111-2, 111-3, 111-7, A-2,

J

J-3 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 111-10, III-1iJ-5 Il-ijoint force air component commander (See

JFACC)JFACC 11-3, 111-3, 111-4, 111-8, 111-9, 111-10JFC vii, II-1JOA Il-i

joint force commander (See JFC)joint operations area (See JOA)Joint Rear Area Coordinator (See JRAC)JRAC 11-2, 11-3

M

marking 1-2, 1-3, 11-2, 11-3, IIl-i, 111-2MICLIC 11-5, 11-6mine-clearing line charge (See MICLIC)MLRS I-i, I-2% A-i, A-3multiple launched rocket system (See

MLRS)

operation order (See OPORD)operational impacts 1-2operations ii, vii, I-i, 1-2, 1-3, lI-i, 11-2,

11-3, 11-4, 11-5, Ill-i, 111-2, 111-3, 111-4,111-5, 111-6, 111-7, 111-9, 111-10, III-i1

Operations Directorate of a joint staff (SeeJ-3)

operations plan (See OPLAN)OPLAN II-1, A-iOPORD 11-5, III-1, 111-6, A-i

planning ii, vii, I-i, 1-2, 1-3, 11-i, 11-2, 11-3,Ill-i, 111-2, 111-4, 111-6, 111-8-111-10,A-i

Plans Directorate of a joint staff (See J-5)predictive reporting 11-3

R

reporting ii, vii, 1-2, Il-i, 11-2, 11-3,11-4, Ill-1, 111-2, 111-3, 111-5, 111-6, 111-7,111-8, 111-9, 111-10, B-i

Index-1

risk vii, 1-2, 1-3, II-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-6,III-i, 111-6

S

safety II-1$OF I-1, III-10special instructions (See SPINS)SPINS II-1, 111-3special operations forces (See SOF)

T

tactical impacts 1-2

U

unexploded ordnance (See UXO)unexploded submunitions vii, I-1, 1-2UXO ii, vii, I-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5,--1-6, -

lI-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, Ill-1,111-2, 111-3, 111-5, 111-6, 111-7, 111-8,III-10, III-11, A-1, A-2, A-3, B-i

Index-2

FM 100-38MCRP 4-5.1

NWP TP 3-02.12ACCPAM 10.752

PACAFPAM 10-752USAFEPAM 10-752

10 JULY 1996

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army01998

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11IE,requirements for FM 100-38, (UXO) Multiservice Procedures for Operations in anUnexploded Ordnance Environment. (Qty rqr block no. 5422)

'U.S. Government Printing Office: 1996 - 728-027/40118