army aviation digest - oct 1966

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1966

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION , ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

BG Robert R . Williams

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COMMANDANT , U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

MG John J. Tolson, III

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

COL George W . Putnam, Jr .

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFF

CPT Frank A . Mariano, Editor -i n-ChiefRichard K. Tierney, EditorWilliam H . SmithDiana G . Williams

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORT

Harold G. Linn

Harry A. PickelDorothy L. CrowleyAngela A . Akin

DIRECTOR U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCH

COL Warren R. Williams

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIV

Pierce L. WigginWilliam E . CarterTed KontosCharles Mobius

T S RMY VI TION

1GESJOCTO ER 1966 VOLUME 12 NUMBER 1

LettersFM Emergency Frequency CPT John E. Marcus

and CPT Jose A. Chapa

12th Aviation Group COL Raymond G. JonesFlattop Delivery of Aircraft CPT James H.

Fitzgerald and CPT Charles O. Danielson

Cause Undetermined Clark C. BohannanArmed Hel icopters MAJ B. A. BrownOn The Way Wait LT Myron K. Nelson Jr.Helpful Hints on the M-5 Grenade

Launcher LTC Arien R. SuddabyMan In A Squeeze CPT Gary V. DennisonThe Professional NCO SGM Glenn E. Owens

U.S. Army Aviation Test ActivityMAJ Joseph E. KramerLieutenant by-the-Book

CPT Gilbert M. F. Brauch Jr.

Small Medium or Large?MAJ Richard A. Wittbecker

Cold Weather Sense MAJ Chester GoolrickAVCO-AWA Helicopter Heroism Award

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The Golden HawkModified Mohawk

Inside Back

Back

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATIO DIG ES T is to provide information o f an operationalfunctional nature concerning sa fety and aircraft accident prevention training maintenance opera tiresearch and development avia t ion medicine. and o th er related data.

The DI GEST is an official Department of the Army periodical pub lish ed monthly under the supervisiof the Commandant U. . Army Aviation choo . Views cxp res ed herein are not necessarily those ofDepartment of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. Photos are U. S. Army unless otherwspecified. Materia l may be reprinted provided credit is given t o th e DIGEST and t o th e anthor unotherwise i nd ica t ed .

Articl es, photos and items o f interes t on Army Aviation are invited. D irect communication i-f authi ed to: Editor.in.Chief U. S Army Aviation Digest F ort Ru cker ALabam a

Use o f funds for printing this publication has been ap p roved by Headquarters Department of theArmy 29 December 1964.

Active Army units r eceive dis tributi on under the pinpoint distribution system as ou tlin ed in AR 3120 March 62, and DA Circular 31057, 14 March 63. Complete DA F orm 124 and send directly to AG Publications Cent e r. 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimor e. Md. 21 2:0. For any change in distributionrequirem e nts. merely initiate a r evise d DA Form 12 4.

ational Guard and Army Reserve uni ts submit requirements through the i r state adjutan ts generalU. . Arm y Corps commanders r espec tiv e ly.

For those not eligible for official distribution or wh o desire personal copies of the DIGE T paidcr iptio n s. 54.50 domestic and S5.50 overseas are available from th e Superintendent of Do c ument s, U.Governm e nt Printing Olbce Washington D . C. 20402.


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: r ;: - .- - ~ E i i i i ~ ; = ; ~ ; ~ .

I N RECENT DA publication anarticle appeared concerning the addi-tives in aircraft engine oil. It appearedto be in conflict with an article pub-lished by the Digest in Aug 65 entitled

Are You Confused? Since the Digestarticle appeared, a study was made ofthese additives, rendering the materialcontained in the DIGEST to be in conflict with current procedures.

At this printing AVCOM is making achange to TB AVN-2 to be published inthe future. Meanwhile, oil containingcyclohexanone may be used for one timeuse or emergencies only, according to information received from AVCOM.

Editor -in-Chi efSir:

In reference to the article, SurvivalOnce Over Lightly , U.S. Army Aviati onDigest, June 1966, the following comments are submitted concerning thatportion pertaining to the treatment ofsnake bites:

a. The Surgeon General 's policy onfirst aid therapy of snake bites is thatincision at the site of the bite be pe rformed only by Medical Service personnel. This policy is appropriate because acertain amount of professional judgment(based on specialized training and ex

perience) and availability of the properequipment are essential to avoid bothunnecessary and improperly performedincision. This would have special importance under survival conditions whenanything restricting mobility or possiblypredisposing to subsequent infectionmight cause greater difficulty than theeffects of an unincised bite.

b. It should be noted that the valueof incision and suction is negligible un -less instituted within one hour after thebite and preferably within fifteen min-utes.

In consonance with the above citedp ~ l i c ythe Snake Bite Kit, Suction, FSN65469525325, was classified as obsoletefor the Army in the Federal SupplyCatalogue, DOD Section, Medical Materiel.

Sir:

LTC ROLAND H. SHAMBUREKChief, Aviation BranchOffice of the Surgeon General

In keeping with the recently stateddesire of the staff of the Digest to improve the publication in such a way that

OCTOBER 1966

a greater number of those in Army aviation could truly say with pride That 'sour magazine, I have a proposal tomake that mayor may not meet the approval of others.

For years , Approach, the Naval Aviation Magazine, has published what itcalls Anymouse reports, which areanonymous, informally written relationsof unsafe or hazardous situations andexperiences encountered by personnelthroughout all echelons of naval aviation, and which are similar to our

Share It reports. Each month, Anymousereports are selected with an eye towardgeneral interest and published for allto see. These reports have much moremeaning to the majority of readers thanthe pages of short accident descriptionsand dollar cost figures which permeatethe volumes of safety material in all theservices. We all realize that accidentsoccur whenever a large group of menfinds itself pu shing iron around the sky.But it would be nice to read the reportsand stories of mistakes others have~ a d e as well as why they made them,1 0 their own words, rather than fromthe standpoint of an investigating officerat some obscure Army airfield.

I feel that self -mailing forms for submitting these reports should be madereadily available to every Army aviator,crewchief, GCA controller, et aI, addressed to the DIGEST and/orUSABAAR, with the same encouragement given to submitting them that isgiven to the subject of brushing yourteeth after every meal. Maybe we couldchange the name of the system fromSHARE IT to ARMYMOUSE . . . orsomething.

SUGGESTIONMOUSE

Your proposal under considerationEDITORMOUSE

Sir:Reference Aviation Digest, July 1966,

the article Challenge the Assumption,by LTC Milton P. Cherne.

I indorse Colonel Cherne's idea of anannual examination of officers , as an aidto the officer, to show him where hisweak areas of knowledge lie. How oftenI have wondered if I am up to par inall areas in which my superiors or DAexpect me to be . What new AR or procedure has been published that I have

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not seen? The teaching packet wouldsettle such doubts. Here's hoping something comes of Colonel Cherne's idea,besides just another article in a magazine.

Sir:

CW2 GORDON E R. PRESTON6th Battalion, 27th ArtilleryAPO San Francisco 96307

The article titled Nonconcur appearing on pages 40 and 4 of the July1966 edition of your magazine containsmisleading statements and photographs.In fact, it has generated inquiries fromthe field about the proper installationof hardware in the U -6A tail-wheelpickup bracket.

The top photograph on page 41, labeled Correct Installation does notshow the necessary structural washerPIN CSP-5A beneath the nut PINAN310-5. The lower photograph labeled

Incorrect Installation appears to bethe correct installation. However, a degree of uncertainty remains since theflange of an improperly installed bushing P I N C2FS-I045 could be mistakenfor the structural washer.

When properly installed the flangeend of the bushing is inboard. At theoutboard end of the bushing are thestructural washer, an AN960C516 washer and the nut. Additional AN960C516washers may be used between the structural washer and nut as necessary prop-erly to align the cotter pin hole withthe nut slots.

A sketch showing the correct installation is inclosed .

COL EDWARD J. CHRYSLERU.S. Army Aviation Materiel

CommandSt Louis, Missouri

Unfortunately the photographs youreferred to were reversed when themagazine was printed.

To expedite publication of the correctinstaliattOn the sketch you furnishedwill be published in WEEKLY SUMMARY OF ARMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INCIDENTS FORCED LANDINGS AND PRECA UTIONARY LANDINGS. A copy of this issue will be forward ed to you. This item will also bepublished in the Crash Sense Department of the November issue of the U. SARMY AVIATION DIGEST.-Ed.


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The Need for an

M Emergency FrequencyCaptain John E Marcus and Captain Jose A Chapa

P U T YOURSELF in the bootsof an infantry soldier in afoxhole in Vietnam who is looking to his platoon leader for guidance in the following situation.

The platoon has been in theboondocks for a week trying to locate some elusive Cong and whencontact was made it was goodsolid con tact. Enemy mortar firenow is much too accurate and theentire platoon is pinned down.No help seems to be on the way.The platoon leader has lost communications with the company

commander since the batteries ofhis AN /PRC-25 have lost all theirpep and the Cong long ago cut allthe wire that the commo sergeanthad so painstakingly laid out. To

add a bit more spice to the situation the platoon s SOl is out ofdate. This was supposed to be atwo-day mission. Hal

Suddenly the familiar whup,whup, whup of a Huey is heardapproaching your position. Thiscould be your salvation but howto communicate? You know thathe has an AN/ARC-54 on board,

but what frequency is he using today? The futility of your problembecomes more apparent as thehelicopter disappears over thejungle. f you had known his operating frequency you could havereached him, even with your weakbatteries. Then he could have relayed information of your desperate situation back to battalionand help woul be on the way.N ow all you notice is that mortarfire is getting heavier.

Another day another situation .

Suddenly quad 50 slugs rip into

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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your Mohawk and soon the leftengine is burning brightly. Downcomes the face curtain and within three seconds Messrs. Martinand Baker are long loved members of the family and you andthat blessed canopy are fast ap

proaching the jungle. The nextmorning after successfully usingescape and evasion training toevade the Cong you see a rescuepatrol but are horrified to see awell concealed ambush waitingfor them. The AN jURC-l 0 survival radio in your hand willtransmit emergency frequency inthe UHF range but there is nohope of communicating with thepatrol leader to warn him of theimpending ambush.

This example is valid even ifyou are not a ground-fire casualty.Suppose you spotted the patrol onyour way out on a surveillancemission and the same ambushawaiting it. f you had any ideaof what the assigned frequency ofthe patrol was you could warnthem but chances are that youwould have no way of knowing.Either way you have a case oflives lost and a mission failure because of no communications eventhough the radios involved couldeasily net with each other.

You are flying along the New

Jersey coast getting your fourhours a month when you spot apleasure craft overturned withthe crew hanging on for dear life.A low pass over the boat confirmsyour fears that strong tides arepulling it toward the reefs andhelp must come quickly to avert atragedy but how to get help? You

CPT Chapa is an instructor Com-m.unications Branch, Special Sub-jects Division, Dept of Tactics,USAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala. Atthe time of writing, CPT Marcuswas the senior instructor, Com-munications Branch Special Sub-jects Division, Dept of Tactics,USAA VN S Ft Rucker, Ala.

OCTOBER 1966

are out of range of your towerand though you know the nearbyCoast Guard station has FM radios how can you net with themwithout knowing their operatingfrequency? With great sadness youread in the paper the next day

that all hands were lost. What is the common denomi

nator in all of these situationsboth military and civil thatdoomed them to failure? Youguessed i t - an FM emergency frequency.

For many years the need for aguard frequency in both VHF andUHF ranges has been recognized.Every aviator has memorized 121.5and 243.0 at the start of his career.

When an emergency occurs heknows that a broadcast in theblind will bring aid from any re


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n FM capability would enhance suroival chances

some of the rough spots in ourproposal so that we may realizeour goal. First of all, the Federal Communications Commissionwould have to set aside one particular frequency for the FMemergency channel.

For the emergency frequency tobe effective, it must be completelyreserved for that use only. Thiswould require official action, preferably of an international scope.Once convinced of the need, thereseems to be little doubt that allcontrol agencies would grant thisrequest.

We, acting on the advice of wellqualified Signal Corps technicians,

proposethe

use of 48.6 megacycles,since the existing UHF emergencychannel 243.0 is the fifth harmonic of this frequency, and inmany configurations would preclude the necessity for an additional antenna. Also, this frequency is well within the rangeof most military and civilian FMradio sets.

Since frequency allocation does

not at this time seem to presentany great problem, let's explorethose great military bugaboos thatsound the death knell to so muchotherwise fine equipment andmany ideas: size, weight, and cost.Since new FM radios have already been developed for bothground and airborne use, havebeen declared standard A, andare in production, it seems thatwe must approach equipmentneeds from the separate idea ofan auxiliary receiver. It is too lateto include this additional capability in the sets without extensivemodification.

Our skilled friends in the Signal

Corps Laboratoriesat Fort

Monmouth assure us that i f theneed for a single channel FM auxiliary receiver were proved, onecould be produced to be used wi thall existing military FM sets withthe following specifications: size,10 cubic inches; weight, Y pound;and cost, 100 or less This seemsto be a small price to pay in space,weight, and cost for such a valu-

able addition to the capability ofour FM communications network.

We should at this time considersome of the possible drawbacks ofan FM guard frequency. Criticsmight well argue that such awidely known frequency could

easily be jammed by the enemy.This is true, but quite unlikely.Emergency transmissions are usually short (requesting a listeningstation to come up on a given frequency) and tactically not of sufficient importance to merit jamming. The enemy has better usesfor its valuable and vulnerableECM (electronic countermeasures) equipment. The operatormight grumble that here is justanother black box that must bemaintained and accounted for.Let one save his squad or platoonand the tune will change.

The advantages of an FM emergency frequency should be emphasized. Any FM radio, both groundor air, would be given the capability of contacting any other, regardless of operating frequency.All Army towers would, in effect,be given the added facility ofbackup FM communications. Allvariable-frequency civil FM radioswould be able to intercommunicate without prior arrangementsthat are usually impossible inemergency situations. Survivalchances would be enhanced by theaddition of an FM capability (thishas already been advocated in aseparate Qualitative Materiel Requirement) .

Surely, if just one patrol weresaved because of an FM guardchannel and the equipment to op

erate it the money and effortwould have been well spent.

ED NOTE: The Federal Communications Commission, under Congress, controls all nonfederal government frequencies and therefore does not authorize the use of military frequencies. fthis recommendation was approved, theassignment of an FM emergency frequency would be the responsibility ofthe Office of the Chief of Communications-Electronics OCC-E).

4 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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12th VI TION

GROUPU NIQUE IS perhaps the mostaccurate description of the12th Aviation Group. Considera group headquarters exercisingcommand and con trol functionsover eight battalions with nearly10,000 aviation personnel spreadout over 66,000 square miles ofvarying terrain, supporting stabil-ity operations in Vietnam, coordi-nating a maintenance and supplysystem for nearly 1,500 aircraftand there you have the challenge.How is such an organizationformed? How does it operate, andhow does it figure in future ArmyAviation operations in Vietnam?

The offspring of three years ofairmobility testing, the 12th Avia-tion Group was formed in June1965 at Fort Benning, Ga. Aftera brief period of training andequipping the 12th deployed toVietnam in August 1965 as a com-mand element for the nonorganicArmy aviation units in the Re-public of Vietnam. Upon arrival,the 12th absorbed a provisionalgroup which had been organized

OCTOBER 1966

Colonel Raymond G Jones

in country to serve as an interimcommand headquarters for thefour existing aviation battalionsand one maintenance and supplybattalion. Earlier these units re-ported directly to the command-ing general of the U. S ArmySupport Command Vietnam.

Then as now, the group exer-cises command less operationalcontrol of its attached airmobileunits. This means that operation-al missions are performed in sup-port of AR VN, U.S. or third coun-try forces under direction of themajor supported unit command-ers. In these cases, the 12th Avia-tion Group monitors operationalperformance. Aviation units whichare employed on other than spe-cific tactical operations are allo-cated to agencies which requirethem.

The provisional group and laterthe 12th initially assumed com-mand and control of the 13th,14th, 52nd, and 145th AviationBattalions. The 13th provides sup-port for AR VN operations in the

vital Mekong Delta area and isArmy Aviation s Unit of the Year.Operations of the 14th coveredthe entire country, and also sup-ported the JUSMAG operation inThailand. The 52nd covers therugged highland terrain in the IICorps tactical area. The 145th, theArmy s original aviation battalionin Vietnam provided support toU.S. and AR VN forces in the IIICorps zone. l l addition the 765thMaintenance Battalion came un -der control of the 12th and pro-vided maintenance support to allfour aviation battalions.

With the anticipated buildupthe 12th began a series of studiesto determine suitable locationsand organizational structures toprovide the best possible supportto U.S. and AR VN forces. Beforeconstruction of airfields in theoutlying areas, units were placedin established areas generally nearthe large population centers. As

COL Jones was CO of the 2th Avi-ation Group APO San Francisco96307

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troops were deployed closer to VCstrongholds, aviation elementswere moved into the field. Minimum facilities were available foraircraft parking, maintenance, andunit billeting. Today, with wellorganized planning and ingenu

ity, these areas are now well established. si tes.New units arriving in country

concentrated on attaining an earlyoperational status. The initialperiod was used to conduct aviator orientations, operations withexperienced units and to improveworking and living conditions.

New aviators were taken in byolder units and were able to gettheir first taste of operationalflying with the veteran unit.Among the new unit arrivals inthe fall of 1965 were the 10th andl I th Aviation Battalions fromFort Benning, which were addedto the growing list of 12th Groupunits. The 10th, an airmobileUH-I battalion supports U.S. operations in the vast II Corps tactical areas, while the II th usesUH-I and CH-47 aircraft. A majorrole for the II th is in support ofthe 1st Infantry Division operations. Another new addi tion tothe 12th was the 14th Transportation Battalion which handlesmaintenance requirements in the

northern half of the country withthe 765th Transportation Battalion continuing to service thesouthern half.

With an ever increasing number of aircraft arriving (from 619in June 1965 to over 1,500 by

December 1965) a vigorous safetyprogram was initiated by the 12thGroup, using the resources ofthe USASC Safety Section andUSABAAR Technical AssistanceTeam. The 12th was assigned theaddi tional responsibili ty for theoverall safety program in Vietnamafter the formation of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam and carried out this task until January1966.

A great deal of stress was placedupon thorough in-country briefings which are given to all aviators whether they arrive individually or with units. The orientationincludes terrain, weather, survival, armor protective equipmentand unit operations. This orientation provides vital information 'to aviators to prepare them formissions in the republic.

Statistically, flying hours permonth increased from 34,799 inMay 1965 to 73,860 by December1965. The results of the accidentprevention program, aggressivelycarried out by the units, speak for

Initia lly facilities for parking mainte nance etc. were scarce

themselves. Throughout FY 1965,the accident rate for the entirecountry was 18.8 accidents per100,000 flying hours as comparedto the worldwide average of 21.9.In comparison wi th FY 1964, 50.4accidents per 100,000, the reduc

tion in accidents amounted to a7,800,000 savings to the taxpayers, or in terms of aircraft, theequivalent of two airmobile companies. Considering the numberof hours and the type of flyingperformed in Vietnam, this lowrate is a truly remarkable achievement.

With the amount of flyinghours accumulated in Vietnamunder the extreme weather conditions and wit,h variable hoursof operation, a great strain isplaced upon aircraft maintenanceand supply. Before formation ofthe 34th General Support Group(AM S) in December 1965, thetwo previously mentioned maintenance battalions assigned to the12th performed all major supportto keep nearly 1,500 aircraft intop condition. The success of theArmy Aviation effort here is ingreat measure due to the dedication and skill of maintenance personnel at all levels. Their task ismade doubly difficult as majordiscrepancies are often correctedat night under less than desirablelighting conditions, the addedharassment of un pred ic ta hIeweather, and an equally unpredictable enemy. Average aircraftavailability reflects their fine ef-forts as rates during the earlymonths of 1966 stood at 77 percent with some units maintaining

much higher levels.The 12th Aviation Group has

been closely concerned with theconstant evolution of tactics andarmament systems used by unitstoday.

The use of armed helicopters intactical operations existed only intheory and testing before employment of the armed UH- in Viet-

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nam. Early concepts concernedprimarily with reconnaissance andsecurity operations have evolvedinto heavy fire support systemswith weapons systems such as theM -6 XM 3 and the M -5 grenadelauncher. Flight tactics, out of

necessi ty, change on a missionbasis and are limited only by thecommander's imagination. A relatively new tactical concept introduced in Vietnam and used by the12th Group units is the nightinterdiction of river and canaltraffic with armed helicopters.This tactic requires the use of alocally fabricated helicopter illumination system (HIS), popularly called Lightning Bug. TheHIS is used with an OV-l aircraftto locate and destroy enemy rivertraffic and can be used in aircraftrecovery operations, fire supportroles, and airmobile operations.

The 12th also has been involvedin the operation and developmentof fixed wing employment, ranging from 0-1 observation and surveillance to OV-l reconnaissanceand CV-2 troop lift and logisticalsupport. Fixed wing elementshave compiled striking records in

Vietnam and have performed missions heretofore thought impossible .Examples include night shortstrip operations using minimumlighting from vehicles or crudelyfashioned flare pots to mark alanding area, regular supply ofremote Special Forces units by airlanding, paradrop or LOLEX.

Fixed wing aircraft elementsprovide flare drop support, coordinate TAC air missions, providemedical evacuation and courier

service.As the buildup progressed into

the early months of 1966, the spanof 12th Group control became excessive. On 1 March 1966 the 17thAviation Group assumed command of Army aviation elementsin the I and I I Corps tacticalzones in the north while the 12thcontinued with the same role inthe III and IV Corps areas. Both

OCTOBER 1966

An XM J/M 5 combination w s tried

groups now fall under control ofthe 1st Aviation Brigade. The34th General Support Group,

which now controls all nonorganicaircraft maintenance units, is tobe included in the brigade structure.

Also organized under the 12thGroup is a provisional battalionheadquarters which divides the

. transport fixed wing companieswith the 14th Aviation Battalionin the 17th Group . Each battalionnow coordinates operations overone-half of the country.

Army aircraft have to a greatextent replaced the ground vehicle and provided immediate response to ground commandersthrough firepower, command andcontrol, surveillance, intelligenceand logistical support. Aviationpersonnel in Vietnam enjoy a remarkable status, not only as aresult of operation success but because they continue to stress andexcel in the basic characteristicsof a ground combat soldier, i.e.,

esprit de corps, discipline, appearance, and attitude.The future is indeed bright for

the 12th Aviation Group with thecontinuing growth of Army aviation, evolution of tactics, uniformity of operating procedures, and avastly improving maintenance andsupply system all combining tofurther enhance the fortunes ofthe ground soldier .

The 12th today consists of the11th, 13th, and 145th, and theProvisional Aviation Battalion,Fixed Wing. With these units andother previously assigned battalions, the 12th has displayed itsversatility. With the emergenceof senior U.S. combat organizations of corps size, the group nowenters a new and more tacticallyoriented phase under the operational control of Field ForcesVictor II. This new unit discharges the duties formerly assigned to the III Corps SeniorAdvisor with respect to ARVNoperations. In addition it has operational command of all U.S.combat units in the corps tacticalzone. Command of the group willremain with the Aviation Brigade.

There remains the challengeposed by the ve One cannot tellfrom one day to the next whatreaction will come from the enemyas the United States moves toconfirm its resolution and demonstrates its commitment in Southeast .Asia. Every day sees changesin tactics and techniques as thecontinuous quest for better methods of defeating the VC goes on.The 12th Aviation Group is partof this effort and is proud of therole it has played. It looks to thefuture in the full realization thatits role will be even more challenging.

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Flattop Delivery of Aircraft

Captain James H Fitzgerald and Captain Charles O Danielson

W I T H DEVELOPMENT ofairmobile uni s and air as-sault techniques a means of de

livering this vast amount of mobile power to any trouble spot inthe world has become paramountin the minds of planners. Delivery by land by air, by sea, or anycombination of these three methods is possible.

Prime considerations and limitations in delivery by land are thelocation of the trouble and suchgeographic barriers as large bodies

8

of water or mountainous terrain.This method used in conjunctionwith either air or sea delivery is

a plausible solution.Deli very by air has been andwill continue t be a primarymeans of moving troops andequipment to meet any situationarising throughou t the world.Through the use of Air Forcetransport planes this method isfast and effective. However, it isnot wi thou t drawbacks. The mainone is that a secure, established air-

field must be available for landingand unloading. Another disadvantage for an airmobile unit is

the time consumed and technicalpersonnel required for disassembly to various degrees) and loading the helicopters and then un-

CPT Fitzgerald is assigned to theTactical Instrument Division 7Dept of Rotary Wing Training 7USAA VN S 7 Ft Rucker 7 Ala. CPTDanielson is assigned to Co. A

th Aviation Battalion 7 1st Cav-alry Division A irmobile).


_________________________________________________________________________________ --


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loading and assembling them atthe destination.

The third method of delivery isby sea, an age old means perhapsovershadowed by air transportation. Two different situations canbe dealt with in this type of delivery.

One situation that we are concerned with is moving troops andequipment to a port of disembarkation in a secure area. Thesecond . situation is launching anair assault from the aircraft carrier.

The first air assault unit (assuch) in Army history to be deployed by sea and commi tted directly from the carrier was a taskforce comprised of Company A,229th Assault Helicopter Battal

ion, and supporting elements fromthe th Air Assault Division,Fort Benning, Ga. The task forcewas deployed from Fort Benningto the Dominican Republic. Theunit moved by its own means tothe port of embarkation where itwas loaded onto an aircraft carrier, the USS Guadalcanal (See"Santa Domingo Operations,"Sept. 65 DIGEST.)

Movement by aircraft carrierproved to be an excellent method

of deployment for an airmobileunit. No special preparation wasrequired for the helicopters. Theywere flown aboard and simply tieddown. Disassembly is not requiredfor shipment on the carrier, evenif the aircraft are stowed in thelower hangar deck. Vehicles andother equipment were loaded withIi ttle preparation required forshipment. Disembarkation at Dominican Republic was likewisefast, easy and efficient.

Now let's take the same situation but consider the island hostile, without secure airfield orport. The answer: air assault Airassault- from a carrier that canaccommodate the airmobile unit.From a carrier lying off shore anairmobile unit could be carrieddeep behind enemy lines to strikea strategic objective, or, i desired,

OCTOBER 1966

to establish a beachhead to receive landing craft. Artillery canbe included in the assault operation. Artillery pieces can be carried ashore by external load (orinternal load in the larger typehelicopter).

After the troop wave has beenlanded, the helicopters can returnto the carrier and sling load andposition on shore all equipmentthat is TOE to an airmobile unit.This is using UH-IB, UH-ID,CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters. Acontinuous aerial resupply channel can be easily maintained aslong as required, delivery beingto wherever needed.

The armed helicopters can perform their normal fire support

role and the OH-13 its normalcommand, observation, radio-relayand liaison role. As soon as a fieldstrip can be established, other aircraft can land with additionaltroops, supplies and equipmentfrom more distant bases.

Consideration should also begiven to using the carrier as ahelicopter base. For example, amobile base such as this may beparticularly effective off the coastof Vietnam or any of the Pacificislands. A carrier base would virtually be safe from the guerrillaactivity, terrorist movements, and

he carrier is safe from guerrilla attack

acts of sabotage that pose a problem to a land base. It is also saferfrom nuclear attack. Use of thecarrier's excellent navigationalfacilities would provide an allweather capability to the assaultunit. Facilities such as these wouldnot normally be available on theinitial assault. The carrier wouldalso provide excellent maintenance facilities and working conditions plus good quarters andaccommodations.

Once the ground units had advanced so far inland that carrieroperations became out of range,the helicopter uni t could debarkand use their operation techniques. These mobile bases couldbe used as a supplement to the

ground based uni ts in a timewhen reinforcements are necessary to meet a particular crisis.Movement of this base could bedone with a high degree of secrecybecause it could remain well outto sea during any displacement.This also brings out the questionof what type troops would beused for the assault force. Armytroops, of course Why not?

For future conflicts air assaultfrom a carrier could well becomea major tactical method of deployment. Let's think of the future-NOW


12/52

Cause Undetermined

C APTAIN Joe Hampton avia-tion medica l officer s ighedwith weariness and frustration ashe kicked off his dusty boots andstarted unbuttoning his sweatstained fatigue jacket in prepara-tion for a shower. It has been along hard day a hot one andmostly unproductive.

So far the cause of the accidenthad not been established. The air-craft accident investigation boardaccompanied by representatives of

1

Clark C ohannan

USABAAR A VCOM and the air-craft manufacturer had spent theentire day at the scene of the acci-dent. They had searched the areadiscussed possible effects of windand terrain looked for additionalwitnesses and asked detail ed ques-tions of witnesses who had beenpreviously interviewed. Late inthe afternoon before the groupleft the accident site the boardpresident had called a conferencein the shade of a big tree. None

present could offer any informa-tion picked up during the daywhich would pinpoint or shed anylight on the one factor which hadinitiated the chain of events lead-ing to the tragedy.

As he continued to undress andlater while jets of warm waterfrom the showerhead washed away

Mr. Bohannan s a retired masteraviator and has been aviationsafety officer for HeadquartersEighth U. S Army since 1961.



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the dust and sweat and even re-lieved him of a portion of his bur-den of fatigue Joe Hampton re-viewed in his mind the accidentand the course of the investiga-tion. He mentally weighed everyitem of information every pos-

sibility and every conjecturesearching for the key factor thehuman act or omission environ-mental influence or mechanicalfailure which may have triggeredthe accident.

The call had come in at 1730five days previously. I t had comefrom the commander of a groundunit located 5 miles east where ahighway ran along the flat halfmile wide floor of a valley flankedon both sides by steep ridges. Anobservation helicopter had crashednearby. Destruction of the aircraftwas total and the pilot had diedinstantaneously. Members of theaircraft accident investigationboard including Captain Hampton flight surgeon assigned to theinvestigation had reached thescene within an hour of the crash.

Then began the painstakingprocess of interviewing witnessesto establish the accident sequenceand search ing for assemblingand examining piece by piece thebroken fragments of the aircraft.The investigation had been thor-ough though inconclusive in itsresults.

Flying at an estimated 500 feetabove the valley floor the heli-copter had come into the valleyfrom the east. Its path and speedhad appeared normal; maybe alittle fast according to one wit-ness. But winds in the valley have

a lot to do with the apparentspeed of passing aircraft and it ishard for the uninitiated witness tojudge either airspeed or groundspeed while observing from theground.

Many helicopters passed overthe compound every day when theweather was good and some wit-nesses had paid little notice until

OCTOBER 1966

ts p th and speed appeared n ormal to witnesses

their attention was attracted byan unusual noise and some un-natural maneuvers as the aircraftwent out of control. With the aidof a hand-held model of a heli-copter witnesses who had ob-served the entire sequence coulddemonstrate the motions of the

aircraft from the time its courseand attitude deviated from straightand level flight until it struck theground.

The helicopter had fishtailedabruptly rolled righted itself androlled again this time past thevertical. Forces imposed in the


14/52

he c pt in h d demonstr ted more th n ver ge proficiency

roll had snapped the rotor mast,an the fuselage had descendedin a free fall, with the main rotorsystem spinning to earth 150 yardsaway.

Until the second extreme roll,the engine had sounded normal.I t faltered as the rotor mast broke,

then rose to a high pitched whineas the helicopter descended. Witness accounts varied in respect tothe engine s behavior; but therewas no doubt that it was runningand delivering power at the beginning of the accident sequence.The Hight control system was ac-counted for, as were main and tailrotor systems and basic airframe.

t had been impossible to determine that any particular failurehad been the cause of the accident- ra ther than one of the results.

I t had been a windy day withmoderate turbulence predicted bythe weather forecaster. Undoubtedly, there had been turbulencein the valley. Still, other pilotshad flown through, some wi thina few minutes of the accident.None had any particular difficultywith rough air.

An autopsy revealed nothing ofsignificance. The body was thatof a normal, healthy young manwho had died from multiple injuries. The personal and socialhabits of Captain Jerry Wilson,the pilot, were very similar tothose of the other aviators in the

unit. There was no indicationthat any factor of a medical nature could have been present toimpair his performance.

Here young Doctor Hampton sinterest became more than professional; for Jerry Wilson had beena high school friend. Already hehad written letters to jerry s wifeand mother. He recalled now thathe had promised to wri te againwhen the cause of the accidenthad been found.

But what information could hegive? The pilot returning soloafter the completion of a normalmission; no manifestation of orreason for personal problems; nosignificant weather factor; an aircraft that was, as far as could bedetermined, airworthy up untilthe time the accident occurred.Then there had been a failure, a

breakage somewhere; but whathad broken-and why?

As he began to dress, Joe Hampton pondered his early associationwith the dead pilot. A popularkid in high school, smart and active, well liked; an athlete, captain of the football team in hissenior year and a real driver onthe football field; a real driveron the road too-man, how thatJerry Wilson did drive-shouldhave been a race driver. t hadbeen a little rough on his oldman, though. He had had to shellout for more than one speedingticket; and jerry s disregard forthe performance and structurallimitations of an automobile hadresulted in many a repair bill.

Hampton sat upright, shoe inhand. Now-run that by again.Could this be the key to the accident? Because Jerry Wilson hadon more than one occasion goadedan automobile to the point ofdamage and danger, could itreasonably be conjectured that hewould disregard airspeed and rpmred lines on an aircraft and deliberately operate in the zonewhere the manufacturer cautionedthat failure may occur?

Joe Hampton knew enoughabout the aircraft operated by theunit to know that red-line airspeeds could easily be exceeded inthe new type helicopters recentlyassigned. The airframe was basically the same as that of the oldermodels bu t the engine would deliver almost 25 percent more power. This had been hailed as afeature which would materiallyincrease operational safety. Itwould permit the helicopter tohover out of ground effect atmaximum gross weight in justabout any density altitude condition likely to be encountered inthe area, and would allow it tooperate under normal sea levelconditions with a respectable reserve of power. But this samepower reserve could be a hazardif i t were mishandled. Like a big



15/52

souped-up engine in a light racing car, it could drive the helicopter far faster than its red-linedairspeed, particularly at low altitude and with a light load.

Had Jerry Wilson, headingback to the field in a lightly

loaded helicopter at the end ofthe duty day, become impatientwi th recommended airspeeds andwrapped in an excess of that reserve power? Had he allowed theairspeed indicator t swing righton past the red line, reassuredand easy in the thought I t won'thappen, not this time, and notto me ?

He realized this might prove tobe a blind lead just as so manyother possibilities had been investigated and eliminated, but itwould have to be checked out.Wearily, he pulled on a pair ofslacks and headed for the pilots'lounge. Likely, he would find oneor more of the instructor pilots orthe standardization pilot there.He could start with them.

Interviews with IPs and thestandardization pilot were not enlightening. Captain Jerry Wilsondemonstrated more than average

proficiency in his standardizationtraining and on his checkrides.There was no question that hecould handle the aircraft as wellas or better than other aviatorswith comparable experience. No,he had not failed to observe thelimitations of the aircraft; rather,he had followed approved procedures more closely than the average aviator. But, thought CaptainHampton, he had also observedspeed limits on the highway when

under supervision of some kindor if he suspected a patrol car ormotorcycle cop might be lying inwai t He had scared the hell ou tof Joe Hampton a time or twounder other circumstances however.

Discussion with other officersand men who had worked andflown wi th Jerry Wilson revealeda little more. It had been noted

OCTOBER 1966

that the airspeed indicator occasionally swung past the red linewhen he was flying. In one instance another aviator riding as apassenger had asked him to slowdown. The most significant reportcame from a warrant officer who

had followed Captain Wilsonhome on a 50 mile flight whenboth were flying solo. He had notbeen able to keep up at normalcruising speed, and Wilson's helicopter was soon out of sight aheadof him.

Hampton presented his factsand opinions to the board at thenext meeting. The other membersweighed the information he hadgathered and considered it possible that the accident might havebeen due to excessive airspeed atthe moment the helicopter enteredan area of turbulence. But theywere not convinced. They felt

that Captain Wilson would havematured since his high school daysand were reluctant to concludethat he had deliberate ly flown thehelicopter over the red-lined speed.

So i t was that Captain JoeHampton, Flight Surgeon, signed

his name to a report which listedthe cause of the accident as undetermined. However, in his partof the report he had stated hisopinion that there was a strongpossibility that excessive airspeedwas the cause. In his own mind,he considered it most probable.

He reflected as he left that lastmeeting of the aircraft accidentinvestigation board that quite possibly many aircraft accidents listedas cause undetermined were dueto disregard of those warning redlines placed in the instrumentpanel by the manufacturers ofthe aircraft.

It s a smooth road, but don t forget the instruments

13


16/52

RMED HELICOPTERS

MAGINE WHAT difficultiesour ground forces in Vietnam

would experience without armedhelicopters to provide protectiveescort for vertical envelopmentforces airlifted by cargo helicopters. Without regard to time orplace whenever the need arisesthe use of airmobile forces hasenabled our armed forces to in-

14

Major B A. rown

troduce a deterrent force whenever and wherever needed.

Four years ago when Vietnamwas just another Southeast Asiancountry with problems that werelittle known and little mentionedthe true birth and acceptance ofarmed helicopters was takingplace. At that time afte r severalyears of struggling to sell the con-

cept of the air cavalry troop andthe associated use of machinegunsand rockets on helicopters theideal ground on which to try theseconcepts presented itself in asmall war torn coun try.

The first helicopter units to seeaction in Vietnam soon realizedthat effective protection againstsmall arms fire was not being pro-



17/52

vided for their helicopters. Fasterfixed wing aircraft could accomplish certain escort missions, andprestrike of landing zones in as-sault missions was accomplishedup to a point. But from thatpoint, the slow flying CH-21 was

left an easy target for any guerrilla smart enough to stay downin his hole and wai t ou t thearrival of the cargo flight inthe landing zone. To counter this,machineguns were mounted inthe doors of CH-21s, and on thenose of some of the aircraft, to allow the formerly defenseless helicopter to fight back when fired on.

This was found to be less thansatisfactory for several reasons.The landing formations had aperiod after the prestrike was overand before their arrival in thelanding zone during which theViet Cong could move in andplace fire on the helicopters. TheCH-21 was not versatile, fast ormaneuverable enough for an es-cort mission even when armedwith rockets and machineguns.

The first armed helicopter unitorganized and assigned the mission of escorting cargo helicopters

in Vietnam was the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company, which was moved to Vietnam in 1962. The U T T Helicopter Company (now the 197th Airmobile Company) was providedUH-IA helicopters armed withXM-2 machineguns. By late 1962the UH-IA was replaced by theUH-IB armed with XM-6 quadmachineguns and 16 jury-rigged2.75 inch aerial rockets.

Throughou t 1963 the U T T wasused as a test unit for the Armyto determine the effectiveness ofarmed helicopters. It was demonstrated that armed helicopters employing the tactics and techniquesdeveloped by the U T T could pro-

MAJ Brown is Rotary WingBranch Chief with the Employ-ment Division Dept of TacticsUSAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala.

OCTOBER 1966

vide adequate protection for airmobile operations against an insurgent force. The one armed unitwas soon providing cover and protection on a daily basis. It was sosuccessful that other cargo helicopter units arriving in Vietnam

were organized wi th one armedplatoon to perform their own es-cort duties. The number of armedhelicopter platoons has increasedfrom the original three platoonsin the UTT. The role of theart:led helicopters has rapidly expanded as the United States commitment in Vietnam has grownfrom several hundred troops in]961 to over 300,000 in 1966.

As improved weapons systemsand changing tactics have allowedan ever greater part to be playedby helicopters in the fight againstthe Viet Cong, the mission of thearmed helicopter has changed.With emphasis on vertical envelopment in the limited war situation, mobili ty and firepower provided by the armed helicopterpromises to play an instrumental

part in the overall objectives ofthe U. S Army in Vietnam. Although some heavy armored vehicles have been used in fighting inVietnam, conditions there appearto ' de-emphasize active use of armor in a small, limited action war.

If however, the enemy shouldacquire this type weapon as partof the threat against our troops,air-to-ground missiles such as theM-22 rocket system and, in thefuture, use of the TO W as partof the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System should remove theseas a serious threat to our airlanded forces.

FUTURE WARS ANDLIMITED ACTIONS

What is the military significance of winning at all coststhrough an all-out war versus amore realistic trend to attain thegoal through meeting over theconference table after havingfought a long drawn out, limitedaction war? Doesn t the seemingtrend indicate that the overall ob-

Initially CH 21 s carried the lo dbut lacked the needed versatility

15


18/52

jectives of the Communist powersare more likely to be attemptedthrough fighting limited actionwars? f this is the case, if we areto be prepared to meet a newenemy on anyone of many different fronts, the lessons learned

from the past few years in Vietnam point up a definite requirement for more and better armedhelicopters.

In the development of tactics,hardware and logistics supportpractices, is a real trend set orestablished in I 10 or even 20years? After World War II, theapproach was to develop weaponswith more speed, bigger bombs(100 megaton H bomb), heavier

armament, and more lethal wea

pons as a deterrent to anotherwar and as an answer to fight anyor all wars if this step had to betaken. This could have been a

hard rut to get out of, had notthe lessons learned in Vietnampointed out the fallacy of thisapproach.

Against conventional targets ina limited war where no frontexists for more than a few hours,older weapons systems have provedin many cases to be more effectiveand much cheaper than manymodern weapons systems.

Slower speeds required to accomplish the escort mission of airmobile forces have necessitatedthe makeshift arming of some aircraft never intended for that pur-pose. Now in development, the

Army proposes to adopt the Advanced Aerial Fire Support Sys-tem, better known as AAFSS.This will meet foreseeable requirements to escort airmobileforces and otherwise provide anexcellent deterrent against any

fu ture limi ted actions such as wehave in Vietnam today.

FUTURE USE OFARMED HELICOPTERS

Large, long, drawn out warswith many countries involved maybe a thing of the past. In today'sworld, involvement of the UnitedStates is basically in the protectorate sense, to halt or prevent thetakeover of a country by Communist powers.

If however, an outbreak shouldescalate and involve the use oftactical nuclear weapons it willbecome essential to commit smaller tactical units, on short noticeby aerial delivery means. This inturn calls for additional use of aprotective force to cover this airmobile type offense-defense. Establishment of a static front or defensive situation will be highlyunlikely in this nuclear environment.

This is the only unfavorabletype action in which limited useof armed helicopters in a reararea defense role will not materially effect the balance of forces orwin battles. I t will, however, makepossible the establishment of asmall-sized counterattack force

which can cover a large area effectively, day or night. In a highly fluid battlefront in which afast moving retrograde action or arapid movement during exploitation and pursuit is undertaken,armed helicopters in support of

ground units in close contact withthe enemy can favorably influencethe balance of forces. This is possible through the greater varietyof weapons systems available andtheir ability to provide protectionto the vulnerable rear and flanksof extensively scattered friendlyunits.

Anyone who doesn't believethat the armed helicopter can survive in a sophisticated weaponsenvironment will shoot this lineof thought full of holes. The answer is that tactics can be developed which will allow the armedhelicopter to live when ground-toair radar guided missiles are present. In a fluid battlefront area,radar installations will be difficultif not impossible for the enemy todeploy well forward near theFEBA. In addition the helicoptercan stay below most of the acquisition radar and will be a difficultand questionable target at best. Inany future war or engagement,the ready availability of this typeweapons system, the armed helicopter will make the job of ourArmy easier, safer and faster.That job is to take and holdground or deny its use to theenemy.

New tactics and equipment are evolving



19/52

ON TH WAY WAITLieutenant Myron K. Nelson Jr.

ARTILLERY CAN be adjusted

from almost any aerial platform, but where should this platform be? This question hasbothered many aviators and artillerymen. To try to find the answer, two positions were evaluatedto see where the aerial platformshould be located while adjustingartillery. These two positionswere: close to the front lines under the trajectory) , and behind theartillery position.

Two fixed-wingstudents who

had just completed artillery instruction at Fort Rucker wereused in the experiment. Studentpilots with no previous artilleryexperience were used to determineif they could remain orien tedwhile going through evasive maneuvers. A UH-IA was first flownunder the trajectory and 2,000meters in fron t of the artilleryposition.

From this position, it was neces

sary to fire the artillery at thecommand of the pilot. The pilotreceived a time of flight for 2,000meters as well c: s a time of flightto the target. This informationenabled him to wait until the projectile passed overhead beforestarting a climb to altitude. Also,he was able to judge when theround would hit the objectivearea. Therefore the pilot couldplan to be at the required altitudeto observe when the rounds hit inthe vicinity of the target. Afterthe observer saw the round hit,the pilot went immediately intoautorotation. This kept the aircraft exposed to the enemy a minimum amount of time. At thistime the observer would send hissubsequent fire request.

Student pilots were able to firethe missions without becoming

OCTOBER 1966

disoriented. A normal mISSIOntook between 6-10 minutes adjusting between 5-7 rounds. Thehelicopter remained exposed toenemy fire not more than 20 seconds for each round fired. Thiswould not give the enemy muchtime to react, aim, and fire atthe Huey.

This position gives the commanders quick, positive results ofaction requested. Also, the airobserver will have direct liaisonwith front line commanders andcan immediately report any observations that would normallyneed to be relayed through theartillery unit.

However, this position has disadvantages. The main one is thatthe aircraft is vulnerable to heatseeking rockets and other antiaircraft weapons. Another disadvantage is that constant coordination must be kept with the groundforces to prevent the aerial plat

form from being shot down byfriendly forces.

For the second evaluation theHuey was flown behind the artillery positions, at a range of 8,000meters from the target area. Thepilot hovered the Huey at 1,500feet, which enabled the observerto use field glasses while adjustingthe fire. f the observer had usedglasses while the helicopter was inmotion he would have becomenauseated in a short time. Adjusting artillery from this posi tion isthe same as adjusting from amountain observation post exceptfor the added advantage of maneuverability.

Main advantage of this positionis that because of the distancefrom the front lines, the enemywill not be able to use his antiaircraft weapons effectively. From

this position, the air observer willbe able to furnish a more constantobservation of the enemy. However, because of the distance involved, the observer would not beable to see as much and wouldhave to use field glasses.

After the experiment was completed and the advantages and disadvantages of each position evaluated use of the aerial platformclose to the front lines was chosenas the more desirable of the twopositions. However, if antiaircraftfire has been developed by the

enemy to the point where anaerial observer cannot remain inproximity to the front lines, theobserver will need to shift to theother position, behind the artillery posi tion.

Today because of highly developed antiaircraft weapons, slowaircraft cannot remain at high altitudes close enough to the frontlines to be effective. Now, coordination will have to be establishedwi th infan try and artillery uni tsso that observation aircraft canfly with a certain amount of safety, under the trajectory of artillery and in proximity to the infantry.

T Nelson was with the SpecialSubjects Branch Special Sub-jects Division Dept of TacticsUSAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala. whenthis article was written.

17


20/52

Helpful Hints on theLieutenant Colonel rien R Suddaby

T HE 40 MM GRENADE launcher has provedto be an effective weapon in Vietnam due tothe extensive fragmentation of the M384 projectileand the number of rounds that can be carriedaboard the armed helicopter. Of course there are afew shortcomings, such as the low muzzle velocityof the launcher and absence of a tracer/markingprojectile, but these will soon be corrected.

A major problem manifests itself when making a

gun run in the face of Viet Cong fire and the 40 mmgrenade launcher fails to fire. At this crucial mo-ment the normal operator outcry has been, This

system won't workl Actually, in thevast majority of cases, the malfunction was tracedto improper maintenance or operation of theweapon. Units in Vietnam have achieved virtuallytrouble free operation once they discovered the do sand don'ts of maintaining and operating the sub-system.

As it is impossible to correct many subsystemmalfunctions while airborne, the following helpfulhints are submitted so you won't find yourself look-ing down the muzzle of a VC machinegun withnothing at the end of your trigger finger but ametalli c click.

Starting from the front of the aircraft (photo 1 ,it is common practice to depress the muzzle of thelauncher when the aircraft is on the ground. Thisis a sound precaution, as in this position the pro-jectile will not detonate if inadvertently fired. How-ever, the muzzle should be elevated to the levelposition during preflight to keep i t from contactingthe ground during takeoff. A launcher muzzle fullof mud has very Ii ttle effect on the ve.

Inkeeping

with Murphy's Law, the front en-closure of the turret assembly can be fastened im-properly (photo 2). When this occurs, the lateraltraverse of the launcher is limited to a very fewdegrees. Therefore, during preflight} move the muz-zle by hand to ensure full lateral and verticaltraverse

Moving inside the helicopter, you may find thata cover has not been provided for the ammunitionfeed chuting. his chuting must be covered with

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/52

5 renade LauncherLTC Suddaby was the Employment Division Chieftor the Dept of Tactics USAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala.when this article was written and has since left for

an Verseas assignment.

canvas or green t ape as shel l casings and ammunit ionlinks from the door gunner's M-60 machinegunbecome lodged between the sides of the chutingand the M384 projectile (photo 3). Correction ofthis stoppage is difficult and time consuming.

The most frequent cause of subsystem malfunction is ammunition handling (photo 4 . Size andweight of the cartridge coupled with the fact thatthe link must be easily stripped from the projectileproduces a situation where improper ammunitionhandling can easily produce long or short roundsthat jam in the ammunit ion feed chute assembly.

During early field tests of the M-5 subsystem, afew stoppages were attributed to improper factorylinking of the cartridges. Therefore, units began tolayout the 50-round belt and inspect each cartridgebefore loading. This practice proved disastrous asthe resultant excessive ammunition handling morethan tripled the number of malfunctions previouslyencountered.

Units subsequently discovered that the best solution was to load the ammanition chute and ammunition box directly from the packing case, makinga visual inspection of each cartridge for properlinkage. Since then, quality control at the factoryhas improved and eliminated the requirement for aclose visual inspection of each cartridge (photo 5 .

Assuming that the ammunition handling problem was solved, we turned our attention to otherareas only to find that malfunctions were still occurring. The cause, again, was excessive ammunition handling, but fortunately the solution wassimple. Operators were attempting to load ammunition directly from the packing case but were open

ing the wrong end of the packing case about 50percent of the time. When this occurred, theywould remove the belt from the box, switch ends,then begin to load. The resu l t was long or shortrounds due to excessive handling. Solution: whenloading the ammunition chute open the top of thepacking case; when loading the ammunition boxopen the bottom of the packing case.

Finally, use of the issued linker-delinker wasfound to be time consuming, and it was often difficult to properly position the cartridge with this tool.

OCTOBER 1966

One efficient crewchief dis covered the solution-useneedle-nose pliers. By using pliers, he could quicklyfasten or unfasten links and it became unnecessaryto delink any of the cartridges from the belt.

This article does not pertain to all aviators, willnot revolutionize armed warfare, and t is not a cureall for the M-5 subsystem. t is submitted for thefew who ly with the 40 mm grenade launcher andknow that continual functioning of the weapon isa prerequisite to longevity.


22/52

an

T HE ARMY Aviator today isa man squeezed between tra ining requirements and safety regulations. He barely has room toturn around and his only real relief is the freedom of a combatzone where he trades his old problems for the more basic ones involving life and death and thesuccessful support of a combatmission.

Army aviation is growing at aphenomenal rate. Tactical sup-

2

In Squeezeaptain Gary V Dennison

port is no longer a textbook idealbut a practical reality. Where weonce had lip service we now haveactual tactical flying, and Bozothe Clown acts have been replacedby nap-of-the-earth training.

Aviators, for the most parthave responded to this change enthusiastically. First, because t issomething they were taught inflight training and were seldomable to do because of local restrictions, and second, and most

important they realize that itmore nearly parallels the type offlying they will do in combat.

This sounds good, so where sthe rub? What is happening? Why,in some cases, is this tactical training kept to a minimum?

The answer is simple and con-

CPT Dennison s with the Avi-ation Company 3d ACR APONew York 09034

U. S . ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

sists of two parts: one, the intentof training regulations is beingrestricted by field commanders inan effort to hold down aircraftaccidents; two, aviators are beingpunished as a means of accidentprevention, i.e., a positive ap

proach t accident prevention hastaken a negative slant.One regulation issued in J anu

ary 1965 by an overseas command,for example, prohibits helicoptersfrom landing at ANY locationthat has not been previouslymarked by aviation ground personnel. No battalion commandercan, therefore, fly to visit any ofhis units in the field unless theaviation section commander firstsends his crewchiefs to the company location by vehicle andmarks a pad. In a fast moving tactical problem this soon becomesimpossible.

The aviator is then put intothe position of saying, Yes, sir,that's A Company but I can'tland there. Most officers facedwith this problem say to blazeswith it and, after the proper recon, land anyway. The point isthat a regulation, right or wrong,has been violated, and shouldsomething unfortunate happenthis officer will pay the penalty.

The second part of the squeezecomes when aviators are suspendedautomatically any time an accident or incident occurs. One Armyarea now makes this mandatoryin all cases. f the accident/incident in any way involves supervisory error, poor judgment, orviolation of any regulation, theaviator is then exposed to a sep

arate investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6. During thistime, and it has no connection inany way with the accident board,the aviator remains grounded,bearing a stigma which he mayormay not deserve. The separate investigation, once completed andapproved, will result in his possible return to flight status, with orwithout loss of flight pay, depend-

OCTOBER 1966

oor regul tions can hurt tr ining

ing upon how it is written or itmay result in a flight evaluationboard. In the meantime he andhis fellow aviators live in dreadwondering who will be next, andthe unit is short another aviatorwhich it can ill afford.

Before receipt of this grounding directive, one aviation company was well known for its ag-gressive, fast moving training record. I twas rou tine to shoot powerapproaches to the sod adjacent tothe hard surface runway at thehome field. Helicopter pilots invariably terminated their flightswith power recovery autorota

tions. A dry-run helicopter gunnery course was set up next to theairfield, and pilots asked the unitIP to run through the course wi ththem many times, particularly ondays when weather precludedcross-country missions. Barrierswere set up for fixed wing aviators, and even the night lightingset was dragged out and set up onthe small sod runway once inawhile.

In short, the unit was doing

andings on the sod are practiced

tactical training every chance itgot. Then, all at once, regulationsissued by a higher headquartersmade the helicopter, in effect, nomore useful than a fixed wing aircraft. It was decided that if yourdestination wasn't listed in theJeppesen then you just didn't go.A few weeks later they were toldthat grounding was automatic incase of an incident unless it wasclearly an act of God or an obvious materiel failure.

They looked around, unbelievingly, and watched aviator afteraviator get his wings clipped.Then it happened to them. The

commander's power of suspensionturned into a disciplinary actionresulting in a loss of flight pay.Their attitude abruptly changed.

Play it Safe and We might aswell forget about trying to support anyone became commonsubjects of talk. Two waveringcareer types decided to try theirlot wi th the civilian end of flying.The safety officer became disgusted and then discouraged ashe saw attitudes crumble and non-

21


24/52

Safety Training and Common Sense mediate action through commandchannels to make our superiorsaware that they have, perhaps unintentionally created impossible,or at least impractical, situations.

rated personnel point accusingfingers at his once enthused, eageraviators.

Changes to the regulations were

discussed, bu t there was no realaction and aviators were told thatthe accident rate was too high andmore restrictions would certainlyfollow. In a few weeks new pilotsin the unit never having done atouchdown autorotation becauseof safety requirements were flyinglow level missions in an areanoted for its bad weather . Theytoo, felt the frustration present inthe unit. The unit went to pot. Ina situation like this, what can be

done? How can one aviator, oreven a group of aviators, correctthese problems?

The answer is not a simpleone. Much is involved and a greatdeal of understanding and maturity is required. First, we haveto remind ourselves that regulations are not just dreamed up bybored staff officers on rainy days.Much thinking planning andstaffing take place before restrictions are applied to aviation, andthese restrictions usually occur

ow level flights re pr cticed frequently

22

after abuses have been observed.Statistics are a fact of life we

have to live with in a moderncomplex Army, and statistically

Army aviation has not alwayscome out looking well. By the increased cost of aircraft accidentswe have created a situation wherein nonrated personnel have beenforced into taking corrective ac-tion, though they themselves realized it would be better for aviation matters to be solved by aviation personnel.

What would you do as a seniorofficer when all normal efforts toreduce accidents have failed? By

necessity you would resort to abnormal or drastic measures. Thisis understandable. We must doeverything in our power at thelowest levels to reduce accidents;and if restrictions come, weshould try to understand the reasons they come and do the bestjob we can within the newly es-tablished rules.

When normal mission supportor increased training requirementsare hampered severely by restrictive regulations we must take im-

In case of the unit just mentioned, the officers concerned

gathered data and presented factsto their immediate, nonratedcommander. He saw the problemand went to bat for them. Becausethe facts were correct, action wasinitiated which eventually paperwork is slow-no one can denythat) led t rescinding a particularly binding aviation regulation.In the meantime he instructedhis aviators to follow regulationsto the letter even though he, too,felt that restrictions were not appropriate to good aviation support.

When this commander discussedthese problems in an open meeting with all aviators a cohesiveness that had been slipping awayagain became apparent. Stepswere initiated to train under tactical conditions with a maximumof safety and common sense.Those areas where restrictive regulations applied were carefullyscrutinized and substitute training, if appropriate was done.Education of the supported troopswas begun and everyone, oncethey realized the problems, wasbehind their aviation unit 100percent.

A serious problem of moralebecame a slight source of irritation and in time was almost forgotten. The end result was interest, alertness and attention toregulations, higher motivationand surprisingly, the realizationthat more problems would sooncome. For aviation is a growingvital element of our expandingArmy. There will be problems inthe maturing process, but by foreseeing areas of possible contentionand by doing something aboutthem as they occur we can growwith fewer pains. . . . .



25/52

The rofessional N OOR MORE THAN 21 years,our country has been on con

tinuous alert, prepared for an at

tack that may come at any moment. This state of semi-emergency is magnified many times inthe Republic of Vietnam.

The United States Army, andparticularly Army aviation, hasno place for a noncommissionedofficer who is self-centered, apathetic, or incompetent. We cannotafford second-rate leaders. f weare needed in a hurry, ourreac-tion time as individuals and asunits becomes of paramount importance.

As noncommissioned officers wehave two major duties: the morale, welfare, and safety of thosesoldiers under 11r supervision;and an absolute, unquestionedloyalty to our superiors.

When we were appointed toour present grade, we became enlisted commanders by written order, a leader by implication. Youare not, and cannot be, appointed

a leader by wri tten order. No onecan make you a leader of men ex-cept yourself There is a vast gapbetween command and leadership.Command is a legal status thatmay be conferred upon anyone.The official who grants the rightto command may also take itaway. In either case, all that isneeded is a paper composed as thelaw requires and bearing the appropriate signature. Battles havebeen won by troops who were

well commanded although poorlyled, but no such army ever wona war.

No law, title, star, or chevroncan create a leader. Leadershipgrows and develops wi thin theman only by constant effort on hispart. It is a quality that may befound in a private or a general.No army has ever been victorious

OCTOBER 1966

that did not possess noncommissioned officers who were skilledand courageous leaders. No mat

ter how brilliant the officer, hecannot but fail in the end i f themen who work and fight for himare not led by competent noncommissioned officers.

In the history book that tellsof wars and battles, few noncommissioned officers are mentionedby name, and public glory goesto the generals. But these samegenerals are the first to credit victories and success to the noncommissioned officers who were lead

ers on the battlefield. Napoleonbecame an emperor; yet the titlehe most proudly bore was oneconferred by his men: The Li ttleCorporal.

The manner in which an orderis given marks the difference between a noncommissioned officerwho leads and one who merelycommands. The latter wants tocover up his own shortcomings bybeing needlessly gruff and arbitrary, and every order he gives hasan unspoken do it or else tackedon it. He may also be a nice guyand slightly apologetic when hetells his men to do something.This individual is afraid he won'tbe liked.

A noncommissioned officer'smanner must at all times be firmand impartial. His instructionsmust be clear, concise, and directly to the point, and it will neverbe necessary to remind his soldiers

that his orders must be carriedout. However, he must never passup the opportunity to explain indetail why a given task is necessary.

The American soldier obeysmore willingly if he knows whyan order is given. The noncommissioned officer will get a muchbetter response if he explains whythe order is necessary rather than

SGM Glenn E wens

avoiding responsibility by passingit off as it's not my idea orusing words to that effect.

fhe

isto enjoy the privilegesto which he is entitled, a leader

must establish his position as oneof firmness and impartiality. Hemust also live up to those responsibilities inherent to his position.He must establish and maintainpersonal contact with his subordinates, and make them feelthat he is available at all times toassist in any way possible. In thisway, and this way only, can heassure himself that all complaints

and gripes reach him first.A sergeant should be available

at any time, day or night, to themen placed under his supervision,and should always leave no stoneunturned to assist his men in anyway possible. However, he shouldnever deny any man the right tosee his commander, i f the individual requests to do so.

Remember, when you were promoted to your present rank youwere also promoted in your responsibility. You will never gowrong by seeing the other man'spoint of view, or listening to hisproblem, and assisting him in anyway possible.

Each leader of men should become completely familiar withtwo words: compass ion and

humility. Always endeavor tomake them more than just words;make them a part of your personality.

Keep your men informed at alltimes. Tell them the why as wellas the how. Support and protectthem, and they will do the samefor you. The measure of an effective leader is the result of theunit's performance.

SCM Owens is the Chief Instruc-tor with the Dept of Maintenance USAAVNS Ft Rucker Ala

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U S Army

AviationTest ctivity

aior oseph E Kramer

4

.

A t the time he wrote the articleMAl Kramer was Plans and Op-erations Officer U S Army TestActivity Edwards AFB Calif.

U S ARMY VI TION DIGEST


27/52

OCTOBER 1966

W HEN IT BECAME necessary to establish an engim ~ r i n gtest center for the AirForce, Edwards AFB in Californiawas selected because of its location. It was close to many of thebig aircraft manufacturers andoffered a variety of terrain andenvironmental features importantin testing aircraft.

Gradually, large hangars andexpensive test equipment havebeen built at the base, lesseningthe dependency on natural features. Today Edwards is one ofthe most important aeronauticalt st centers in the United States.

For a long time the Air Force

or Navy tested all of the Army saircraft. Originally most Armyaircraft were light liaison typesand off-the-shelf models, and theArmy s airc raft needs were fewand simple. But when new typeaircraft especially designed forairmobile concepts came into being, the workload on the otherforces became too heavy and the

Army had to establish its owntest activity.

Ed wards was selected as thehome for this new test unit because the Army also wanted theterrain and location features available there. In addition the Armycould use much of the Air Force sequipment thus saving the taxpayer money.

The U. S Army Aviation TestActivity (USAAVNTA) is doingall of the Army s aviation engineering testing. All air items proposed for Army use receive engineering tests to make sure theycan do what the Army wishes.Performing these tests is the mainmission of USAA VNT A.

In addition the activity alsoconducts t ests needed to accumulatf> handbook data used in -lOs.Some of this information is gathered while engineering tests arebeing run but often it is necessary to make special tests.

Sometimes the activity producesthe handbook data in its entirety;at other times the contractor does

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The leep s inspected before test flight

the work. When it s done by thecontractor, USAA VNT A information is used as a check.

In testing aircraft for handbookinformation all tests are conducted within a controlled environment i.e., no-wind conditions,specific altitudes, measured grossweights, and center of gravity extremes. The data is converted tostandard altitude and temperatureconditions and forwarded to thecontractor for review. It is nextsent to the U. S Army AviationMateriel Command for publication.

The most important tests aretakeoff and landing distances atvarious airport elevations, fuelflow at various speeds, altitudesand gross weights, service ceilings,

26

optimum climb and cruise speeds,maximum airspeeds, and hoveringcapabilities. Also important aretests to determine the stabilityand controllability of the primaryand trim controls, both in thesteady state and maneuveringflight.

Each test aircraft is highly instrumented with sensitive precision instruments which transmitthe data obtained to oscillographor photo panel recorders. By usingthis method the human-error factors and pilot opinions are markedly reduced, although pilot comments are not disregarded and doaffect the even tual ou tcome of thefinal repo rt.

Four new aircraft are currentlyunder test. The XC-I42, X-I9, and

X-22 are tilt-wings under the TriService V jSTOL test team, a special group set up to handle thesetype aircraft for the Army, Navy,and Air Force. The other aircraftunder test is the XV-5A-an allArmy V jSTOL effort.

Other USAA VNT A projects include testing of the new model540 rotor system on an armedUR-IB and a test of an unarmedUR-IB with the 540 rotor forhandbook data.

Two OR-6s are currently undertest. One is being used in a deserttest and the other to gather handbook data.

Later this year more aircraft areslated to arrive for testing. One isa UR-lD with standard rotors butequipped with the new T53-L-131,400 hp engine. Another will bea UR-IB with the L-13 engineand model 540 rotors. A production model of the OR-6 will soonbe delivered to undergo six different tests and an XV-SA Fleepis expected momentarily to startits tests.

Aircraft that can be expectedsometime in the near future arethe Advanced Aerial Fire Support

System (AAFSS), high grossweight CR-47, and the counterinsurgency aircraft (COIN).

USAAVNTA test pilots aregraduates of either the Navy orAir Force test pilot schools. Theyreceive instruction in all phasesof engineering flight tests for bothfixed and rotary wings, conventional and jet propulsion. One ofthe test pilots is a graduate of theEmpire Test Pilot School of England.

Flight test engineers are graduate aeronautical engineers and arerecruited from aircraft contractorsor engineering colleges.

Maintenance and instrumentation personnel are authorized toperform limi ted third echelonmaintenance and are capable ofmaking modifications when needed in installing instruments.



29/52

LIEUTEN NTBY TNE BOo.

Captain Gilbert M F Brauch Jr

T WAS A beautiful day forflying as Lieutenant By-the

Book looked out the window ofhis BOQ room. He wonderedwhat kind of mission the operations officer would dream up forhim today. Immediately he resigned himself to the strong probability that he would get theweekly milk run to Fort Out-inthe-Sticks instead of that glamorous VIP flight to Metropolis.

OCTOBER 1966

Since he has been accustomed todoing things by the book sinceflight school he was careful to eata good breakfast before reportingin for his mission of the day.

As the lieutenant suspected hewas assigned the routine missionto Fort Out-in-the-Sticks. Undismayed he began flight planning.Even though he had flown theroute many times he was still care-

ful to plot his course figure thewinds accurately compute theweight and balance and carry outall of the items included in thorough preflight planning. Preflightinspection of his favorite shipU-IA 583 was a sight to put fearinto the hearts of both his crewchief and the maintenance officer.He poked his nose into everynook and cranny of the aircraft

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30/52

?

A nylon letdown

thoroughly inspecti ng every detailof the ship to ensure proper operation and functioning.

The crewchief stood by withbaited breath awaiting the inevitable question, Are you sure thatyou drained the breather box?"After relieving the crewchief's tensions with a cheery OK, let'slight the fire " Lieutenant By-theBook climbed into his UGLY-1 ALPHA pulled out his checklist, and began the prestart checkoff.

As can easily be imagined fromthe description of his previous activities, Lieutenant By-the-Book's

28

procedures for takeoff and climbout were a model of professionalism to make his flight instructor'schest swell with pride. He was nota mechanical pilot, nor did hehave the innate ability to strap onan aircraft and make it sit up andspeak. But he was careful and extremely proficient.

He knew his emergency procedures with flawless precisionand was generally considered thesafest pilot in the detachment.Consequently, when his propellersuddenly went into uncontroll-

able overspeed condition he knewinstinctively that paragraph 4-19,section III, chapter 4 of TM55-1510-205-10 (June 1965) statesthat:

I f propeller failure is due tooil supply breakdown proceed as

follows:a. Propeller lever - RETARDb. Throttle - ADJUST TO

REDUCE AIRSPEED TO 60KNOTS IAS

c Wing flaps - TAKEOFFd. Oil pressure gauge

CHECK CONSTANTLYe. Land - AS SOON AS

PRACTICABLEAfter following these instruc

tions, our hapless lieutenant wasextremely dismayed to note thathis oil pressure began to drop, oiltemperature began to rise steadily,cylinder head temperature startedto climb out of sight, and othergeneral indications that his engine was steadily losing its oil andwas about to burn up. To makematters worse, forced landings inthis area were next to impossible,so he trimmed up the aircraft andelected t make a nylon letdown.

When the aircraft was found

several days later, it was determined that the accident had beencaused by failure of the oil supplyline to carry oil from the propeller governor to the propeller.Further investigation revealedthat the by-the-book actions of thelieutenant had unwittingly aggravated the situation by allowingthe governor to pump the remaining oil supply overboard. I f thepropeller lever had been advancedto the full increase rpm positioninstead of being retarded to thefull decrease rpm posi tion, thepilot valve in the governor wouldhave seated and cut off the flow of

. oil through the failed line.

CPT Brauch was with the Inter-mediate Maintenance DivisionDept of Maintenance USAAVNSFt Rucker} Ala.} when he wrotethis article.



31/52

To what should this accidentbe credited? Pilot error? Not inthe usual sense, since our friendhad strictly and correctly ?) followed the procedures outlined inthe emergency section of the -10.The pilot error which occurred in

this instance must be sharedequally by all aviators qualifiedin U-IA aircraft.

The error occurs in the quotedparagraph from the -10. Construction of the Hamilton Standard hydromatic propeller andthe Woodward governor as installed on the U-IA is such thatthe propeller lever must be movedto the full increase rpm positionto keep the governor from pumping the aircraft s entire oil supplyoverboard in event the oil supplyline fails.

Loss of an aircraft is an expensive way to discover that an errorhas been made in the manual.This problem is not confined toU-IA aircraft, or even to fixedwing aircraft in general, but can

occur in all manuals. A review of-10 manuals for all aircraft couldexpose many errors, some seemingly minor in detail but nonetheless errors, which could mislead and confuse an aviator andthus inadvertently bring about an

accident.What can be done to help correct these situations which mayoccur? A more thorough reviewof information at the U.S. ArmyMateriel Command (USAMC)before manuals are issued wouldhelp. Also a more thorough review by flight instructors involvedin transition training in the particular type and model aircraftwould help to catch even moreerrors. But there is a step beyondthis which touches on the responsibility of all aviators qualified ineach particular type and modelaircraft. Chapter 1, section II,paragraph 1-8 (d) of most -10manuals includes the followingparagraph:

The direct reporting of errors,

omISSIons and recommendationsfor improving this manual by theindividu l user is authorized andencouraged. DA Form 2028 willbe used for reporting these improvements. This form may becompleted using pen, pencil, or

typewriter. DA Form 2028 will becompleted by the individu l usingthis m nu l and forwarded directly to: Commanding General,U. S. Army Aviation MaterielCommand, P.O. Box 209, MainOffice, St. Louis, Missouri 63166.

It is the responsibility of eachaviator, when he notes an errorin a -10 manual, to submit a DAForm 2028 as outlined above tohave this error corrected. Howmany times have you noticed adiscrepancy in the manual andbegan cursing those % ?$GS-99s for not knowing up fromdown. Cursing about it does notget the error corrected, but a 2028does. When was the last time yousubmitted one?

If y u detect an error inthe -10, send it in

army aviation digest - oct 1966

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