armor, january-february 1996 edition

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

YVONNE M. HARRISONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 01089

That you are reading material relevant to your pro-fession right now speaks highly of you, no matter thelocation nor the aesthetics of your reading surround-ings. Maybe you are sitting in the dayroom waitingyour chance at the pool table; maybe you’re in theS3 shop waiting for those briefing slides to spit outof a too-slow laser printer; maybe you are just relax-ing for a few minutes at your home or under a de-sert shade; or maybe you’ve just returned from a pa-trol in a foreign land. It doesn’t matter where youare, because you are engaged in professionalthought and growing. This critical thinking businessis a skill that one must regularly practice, practice,practice. It’s one of those tools that the Chief of Ar-mor says should be in every one of our tool bags.There are no boundaries; if you have a few minutesto sit, you have a few minutes to get smarter. I be-lieve that there are a number of articles inside thisissue which afford you such training opportunities.

Judging from the amount of recent mail on the sub-ject, there is a great deal of angst at the companylevel regarding the look of future armored force op-erations. That distances between elements of ourdigitized formations will increase seems certain. Thatcommanders at levels above the company will knowmore about the threat facing them and their subordi-nate units than their ancestors ever did isn’t evendebatable. That the higher level commander will oneday know more about what is happening along thefront line trace, and beyond, than do the men occu-pying and scanning from the battle positions. . . whatof this?

In this issue, several contributors are thinking verymuch about what their piece of the battle space willlook like — how much they will be able to see —how much their superiors will see — how much their

superiors’ superiors will see. They wonder about theresulting effects on the chain of command, and justhow much help a future company commander willget. What is the right amount of help, and whendoes the help begin to degrade the freedom of ac-tion with which we historically have empowered ourjunior commanders? Captains Bateman, Brown, andPryor ask incisive questions that deserve answers.They posit a future that, if we didn’t know it was fea-sible, would have only a few years ago sounded likeit might have come straight off the pages of a sci-ence fiction journal. These leaders and critical think-ers want to know that doctrine and technology areadvancing hand in hand so the tactics, techniques,and procedures are right for the next time wesqueeze rounds off at targets that can shoot back. Itis a challenge for any bureaucracy to keep abreastof change, but it seems to me that this is happeningin the armored force; you need only read on to seeevidence of it.

There will soon be a new way for you to react tothis and other issues in ARMOR. We plan to select2-4 articles from a past issue that generated readerinterest, e.g., letters to the editor or e-mail to the edi-tor, and post them on the World Wide Web (WWW)at the Fort Knox home page site for all to read. Ifyou can browse to the Fort Knox home page, you’llbe able to access “Issues in Armor.” We will includeany letters we’ve received on the article plus createan e-mail feature in order that you can send in fur-ther comments which we will, in turn, post and up-date to the WWW site every week. Frankly, wearen’t sure how much more work this new featurewill entail, but we are very excited to give it a go.See page 12 for a fuller description on our vision for“Issues in Armor.”

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-1

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training lor all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

January-February 1996, Vol. CV No.1

Features

6 Regenerating Combat Power at the National Training Center by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D. Taylor, Major Tina Johnson, and Captain Clay Hatcher

12 Coming Soon ... The ARMOR Home Page

13 Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik by Captain Robert L. Bateman

16 M1A2s, Smart Ammunition, and Time and Space Theory by Captain Mike Pryor

20 The External Gun Turret: "Often a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride" by Don Loughlin

23 Training a Divisional Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other Than War by Captain John A. Nagl and Captain Tim Huening

25 Fishtanks or Kangaroos? by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton

26 A Cheval: Equitation as Sport and Training at the French School of Armor and Cavalry by Lieutenant Colonel John Moncure

29 The Armored Gun System (AGS) Autoloader by Lieutenant Colonel George E. Mauser

35 The HHC XO by Captain David A. Smith

37 Battle-Focused Training in the S4 Section by Captain James E. Moore, Jr.

39 Task Force Initiatives by Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Boyd

40 The Cav Hat by Major Mark Farrar

44 Trends in Israeli Tank Development by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Ret'd)

51 Book Essay - Closing with the Enemy

Back It's Dangerous to Wear SynthetiC Fiber Underwear Under a NOMEX Suit Cover

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 4 Commander's Hatch 5 Driver's Seat

52 Books

2

DIRECTORY - Points of Contact

ARMOR Editorial Offices

Editor-in-Chief LTC Terry A. Blakely 2249 E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249

Editorial Assistant Vivian Oertle 2610

Production Assistant Mary Hager 2610 E-Mail: [email protected]

Staff Illustrator Mr. Jody Harmon 2610

PHONE INFORMATION: Phone extensions for points of contact are listed at right of name. (Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN) prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-624-XXXX).

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR: ATTN: AlZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced in near-letter-quality printer mode. We also accept stories on 3\1, or 5\1.-inch floppy disks in MultiMate, WordStar, Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Ami Pro, XyWrite, Microsoft Word for Windows, and ASCII (please include a double-spaced printout). Please tape captions to any illustrations submitted.

SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one Army journal at a time.

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Susanne Lane, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox. KY 40121 or call (502) 942-8624, FAX (502) 942-6219.

UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Mary Hager. DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK.: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine. training, organizations. and equipment of the Armor Force.

u.s. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Commandant MG Lon E. Maggart

(ATZK-CG) 2121

E-Mail: [email protected]

Assistant Commandant COL Clayton E. Melton

(ATSB-AC) 7555


Diredor of the Armor School COL Paul E. Lenze

(ATSB-DAS) 1050


Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis 4952 E-Mail: [email protected]

Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Jeffery L. Richardson 5405 E-Mail: [email protected]

16th Cavalry Regiment COL Don Elder

(ATSB-SBZ) 7848


1st Armor Training Brigade COL Fred A. Treyz III

(ATSB-BAZ) 6843


Directorate of Force Development COL Edward A. Bryla

(ATZK-FD) 5050


NCO Academy CSM John E. Barnett

(ATZK-NC) 5150


Reserve Component Spt Div (ATZK-PTE) LTC Harold D. Lathrem 1351 E-Mail: [email protected]

TRADOC System Manager for Abrams and Armored Gun System COL John F. Kalb

(ATZK-TS) 7955


Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab COL G. Patrick Ritter

(ATZK-MW) 2139


Office, Mounted Battlespace Integration (ATZK-AR) COL Gary Krueger 7809 E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) COL Jerry L. Veach

(ATZK-SA) 1315


ARMOR - January-February 1996

mailto:[email protected]













Key to Improve Accuracy:Tighter Gun Tube Specs

Dear Sir:

Major Held’s article, “Zeroing In,” from theMay-June 1995 issue, has done a good jobof highlighting the issues the Armor com-munity must consider when selecting ormodifying tank gun calibration procedures.A key element of Total Quality Managementis continuous improvement, and improvinghitting probability certainly is a worthwhilegoal. This policy decision is ultimately oneto be made by the user, within the con-straints of cost and complexity, based onthe best information available.

The performance of the 120mm gun sys-tem during Desert Storm would appear toprovide a measure of effectiveness of thecurrent policy. There is always the question“Can we do better?” As Major Held sug-gests, to make rational decisions one mustknow the relative magnitude of the individ-ual error sources and the cost of correctingthat error.

Current calibration policy has its genesisin a pioneering series of user tests and ex-periments carried out by the Armor and En-gineer Board during the 1970s. The princi-pal investigators were (then) Captains JimBrown and Bob Kloecker with analyticalsupport by Dr. Charlie Leake. The effort be-gan with a complete analysis of variousboresighting schemes and progressedthrough the characterization of bore-sight/zero relationships.

These tests, and subsequent tests involv-ing the 120mm gun, clearly demonstratedthat the major source of tank-to-tank vari-ability is the gun tube. The variance is mostpronounced when firing the more energeticrounds. Two of the possible alternativesproposed by MAJ Held (Surrogate Zeroand Silent Zero) deal exclusively with gun-to-gun variabilities.

As an alternative to producing guns whichhave operationally significant variances inpoint of impact and requiring the user tocompensate, I would suggest that the vari-ances be addressed directly by the additionof an accuracy performance or acceptancespecification for the gun tube.

For a number of years, the procurementspecification for tank gun ammunition hasincluded a performance requirement interms of allowable round-to-round disper-sion. Each lot of ammunition is required todemonstrate that it meets this requirement.

The specification for the tank gun isstated only in terms of manufacturing re-quirements. Tolerances, hardness, and fin-ishes are specified, but there is no statedperformance requirement. More importantly,scientific relationships between manufactur-ing specifications and fall of shot are es-sentially unknowns.

A performance specification which re-quired all guns to shoot uniformly wouldensure that the user can continue to usethe simple and effective fleet zero policy.This sort of requirement places demandsfor uniformity of manufacturing on the pro-ducer. Given the number of years of U.S.120mm gun manufacturing, it is entirelyreasonable to expect that this level of proc-ess repeatability is achievable.

The following is offered as a strawmancriteria. “The gun in a fixed mount will beboresighted using the troop issue boresightat a target placed at 1000 meters. Afterboresighting any ammunition-unique cor-rections will be applied, i.e., superelevationand jump. Five rounds of service APFSDS(normally the most energetic round) fired atthe target shall demonstrate a mean centerof impact (MCI) not more than .35 milsfrom the expected point of impact.

MAJ Held has done real service to thecommunity by presenting the issues. Hope-fully, the Armor community and its devel-oper friends can work together to accom-plish continuous improvement.

RICHARD F. PELLCOL, Armor, Retired

A Few Thoughts About the Digital Battlefield

Dear Sir:

As the Army transitions into the 21st Cen-tury, there is an exponential increase in thesenior commander’s access to battlefieldinformation. In the 1st Cavalry Division, thedivision commander can locate every pla-toon leader using his Enhanced PositioningLocation Reporting System (EPLRS) situ-ational awareness terminal (SAT). ThePOSNAV system on the M1A2s in the 1stCavalry Division provides leaders the loca-tions of their tanks via Intervehicular Infor-mation System (IVIS). The availability ofGlobal Positioning System (GPS) devicesat the squad level enables leaders at thelowest levels to know their location withinten meters. Tactical Satellite Communica-tions (TACSAT), once found at the highestcommand levels or with Special Forcesunits, are now available for use by heavymaneuver brigade commanders. The seniorcommander’s ability to have almost imme-diate information on a unit’s whereaboutsand the enemy disposition facing them, im-plies that division commanders could beginvery shortly to control the tactical employ-ment of platoon-sized elements. Therefore,the question of “detailed control” versus “di-rective control” of forces becomes the cen-terpiece in the debate over how we mayuse this technology and fight in the nextcentury.

The British doctrinal term “directive con-trol” (often confused with the German con-cept of “Auftragstaktik,” means to give sub-ordinates a mission and allow them to de-termine the best way to synchronize battle-field operating systems. The advantage ofthis method is that the commander closestto the fight, with the most information, hasthe freedom to make decisions. Directivecontrol traces its development from infiltra-tion tactics in WWI, through WWII, to thewriting of the US Army’s FM 100-5, Opera-tions. The Army’s concept of giving subordi-nates the freedom to exercise initiative andmake decisions led to the often-usedmaxim, reinforced by lessons learned atthe National Training Center, that battlesare won at the platoon level.

“Detailed control” gives subordinates spe-cific instructions on what to do and how todo it. This type of command and control isusually associated with the former SovietRed Army. Although it ensures a unity ofcommand and effort, there is a minimalamount of tactical flexibility at the lower lev-els of command. The National TrainingCenter has also shown us that detailedcontrol often fails at the company and pla-toon level, where the fog of war is mostpervasive and a correct assessment of thesituation is difficult to determine until thebattle is over.

Potentially, senior leaders’ access to infor-mation provides them with a more com-plete picture of a particular tactical situationthan the platoon leader. The division com-mander will not only see where a particularplatoon leader’s tanks are on his SAT ter-minal, he can utilize the intelligence gainedthrough many other sources to see the en-emy disposition throughout the battlefield.This will enable him to literally see whomthe platoon leader is fighting, as well aswhom his AH-64 Apaches are attacking inthe deep fight. He will also see whom theTactical Combat Force (TCF) is fighting inthe rear from his command vehicle. The di-vision commander is able to dispatch com-mands via TACSAT, or send a message viaEPLRS almost instantaneously. Will digitalcapability make the division commanderless likely to allow the platoon leader to ex-ercise initiative? Has technology changedour doctrine already? How do we trainleaders to process all the information thatis available on the digital battlefield?

These questions and others confront theArmy as it continues to modernize at arapid pace. In fact, the Army is at a pointwhere the units of Force XXI have thesame or less of a digital and technologicalcapability than the two heavy contingencydivisions. While Force XXI units conducttesting to meet both the Army and contrac-tor test requirements, the two heavy contin-gency divisions must leverage digital tech-nology for today’s battlefield requirements.

ARMOR — January-February 1996 3

Continued on Page 48

Force XXI is causing us to reexaminethe tactical, technical, and leadershipabilities required of our warfighters tolead mounted soldiers and units intocombat and other operations. As the ar-chitect of mounted leader development,the Armor Center is working hard todefine what tools — both new and old— are needed in the future. While thisis no easy task, the quantity and qualityof our experimentation and develop-mental work with digitization, armor inOOTW, light armor and cavalry units,decisive operations concepts, and manyother efforts have given us a uniqueperspective on the future. This perspec-tive yields many insights into what the“tool bag” of the 21st Century mountedwarfighter might contain.

While the Armor Center continues todefine and refine leader skill require-ments, it is imperative that each of ourquality leaders and soldiers perform apersonal assessment or “inventory” oftheir professional skills, knowledge,and abilities. Only through a realisticassessment of our current abilities willwe be able to develop instructional andtraining programs to meet future chal-lenges.

The tool bag analogy is useful to de-scribe our challenge in this area. Frommy vantage point, it appears that wehave many tools that have worked well

in the past, continue to work in the pre-sent, and will most likely be useful inthe future. Most of our leadership skillsfall into this category. Based on recentwork in digital operations, new toolswill be required to maximize the effec-tiveness of these new capabilities.Technical knowledge, computer liter-acy, competence with information tech-nologies, and tactical communicationsskills will be prerequisites to success inthe future. In addition, some of ourtools may require modification to adaptto future battlefield requirements. Cur-rent planning skills and mental taskssuch as visualizing, conceptualizing,and synthesizing combat informationtake on new dimensions and impor-tance on an information-rich battlefield.

While the exact details of futureleader skill requirements are not fullyknown, important trends are emerging.It is within these trends that we allmust focus our efforts to prepare our-selves for tomorrow. These trends in-clude:

•• Leaders will perform a greater num-ber of tasks in the future than today.

•• Junior leaders will need higher or-der mental skills, such as visualiza-tion, memorization, and conceptu-alization.

•• Leaders will need creative and in-novative abilities.

•• Information management skills willbe paramount.

•• Communications with multimediasystems will be the norm.

•• Technical competence with infor-mation technologies has become acore requirement.

•• Alternative problem-solving skills,such as critical and inductive think-ing, will be needed.

Preparing ourselves for the future is aformidable challenge. Many of the po-tential future requirements are subjectsthat are currently not developed in for-mal instruction or unit training pro-grams. We must find innovative meth-ods to introduce and hone these skillsand capabilities in the great leaders thatoperate our mounted force. Onlythrough a complete effort within allthree pillars of leader development —institutional, unit training, and self-de-velopment — will we continue to excelas professional warfighters.

I encourage you to make time to re-inventory your professional tool bags.Lean forward, anticipate, and take ac-tion today to ready yourself for successin the future. Self-assessment is thecritical first step toward transition tothe future and Force XXI.

On the way!

COMMANDER’S HATCH

Time to Inventory Your Tool Bag

4 ARMOR — January-February 1996

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor and Cavalry in Transition —

If you are a gutsy, stellar performerthat faces challenges head-on and plansto climb to the top of the mountain,then I have got just three words for you— Excellence in Armor.

In this issue, I want to talk about aprogram that is near and dear to myheart. It is a program that exists tocatapult tankers and scouts who wantto get ahead, and who are not afraid towork hard to get there. Read on!

The purpose of the Excellence in Ar-mor program is to fill tank and cavalryvehicle commander’s hatches with ourbest, brightest, and most highly moti-vated soldiers, whose performance isconsistently outstanding. In essence,Excellence in Armor identifies and rec-ognizes those soldiers who are a meas-urable cut above the rest. Additionally,the program provides incentives to helpretain these quality soldiers.

First, some history. The Excellence inArmor program was initially proposedby the United States Army Armor Cen-ter, in May 1984, to the Department ofthe Army Deputy Chief of Staff forPersonnel. After much review, the pro-gram was approved for implementationin October 1987.

Since 1987, enrollment has increasedto well over 3,080 active duty and 821Reserve soldiers. As more soldiers seethe benefits of the program — that is,see their contemporaries advance — Iexpect it to grow even further.

The program is open to Career Man-agement Field 19, private through ser-geant first class. Enrolling is quite sim-ple. Meeting the standards for enroll-ment is not!

Soldiers can either be enrolled duringOne Station Unit Training (OSUT) orby their unit. However, let me point outnow that once in, failure to maintainExcellence in Armor standards willcause you to be disenrolled. Once youhave been disenrolled, you cannot bere-enrolled. Later, you will see whysoldiers benefit by staying in the Excel-lence in Armor program.

The OSUT selection process beginswith the drill sergeant recommending asoldier in the 10th week of training. Hebases his decision on the performance,motivation, and leadership potentialdisplayed by the soldier. The soldieralso appears before a battalion orsquadron level board to confirm hisnomination.

During OSUT, Excellence in Armorsoldiers receive more than 50 addi-tional hours of training in Skill Level’sOne and Two.

Before graduation from OSUT, thesoldier is formally enrolled into Excel-lence in Armor, provided he meets thefollowing minimum standards:

APFT Score 230

Weapons Qualification Sharpshooter

End of Block Tests Pass All

Armor Crewman Test Passed All With (ACT I, II, III) or Scout No More Than OneGunnery Skills Test NO-GO Per Test

Armor Stakes Pass All

High School Diploma (Waiverable by or Equivalent Bn/Sqdn Cdr)

Once enrolled, his DA Form 2-1 isannotated on line 19 with Excellence inArmor and the enrollment date. Uponassignment to his first permanent dutystation, his orders will indicate that he

is an Excellence in Armor soldier. Healso hand-carries a letter to the gainingcommander informing him of his Ex-cellence in Armor status.

Excellence in Armor enrollment atunit level occurs when a soldier is rec-ommended by his commander and hasmet the following minimum standards:

•• Satisfy unit commander’s evaluationof technical proficiency and poten-tial for leadership. This is the mostimportant element.

•• Achieve an APFT score of 260points or higher.

•• Pass the Common Tasks Test(CTT).

•• Pass the Tank Commander Certifi-cation Test Level I.

The test by assigned vehicle is:

M1 Series Tank FM 17-12-1-2 TCGST

M3 Bradley FM 21-1 GST

M998 (HMMWV) FM 17-12-8 GST

•• Qualify Sharpshooter on assignedindividual weapon.

NOTE: Soldiers enrolled duringOSUT have one year to meet the abovestandards once permanently assigned toa unit, or they face disenrollment.

Commanders who have a soldier notmeeting one of the above standardsmay request a waiver under certain cir-cumstances. One example might be asoldier who consistently scores high onthe APFT, has a temporary profile, andcannot take the APFT. Once a soldier

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Excellence In Armor



The Nightmare: Combat PowerHas Slipped Away

The Armor task force executive officer(XO), “Earthquake 5,” stood at thebase of the Arrowhead in the middle ofhis Unit Maintenance Collection Point(UMCP) shaking his head. The combatpower of his task force — his M1/2/3fleet — had just dropped to 58% afterthe move from force-on-force to livefire at the National Training Center(NTC). He had received his 0500 com-bat power update from his BattalionMaintenance Officer (BMO) that morn-ing and was shocked at the 22% de-crease. Before the move, his combatpower had been 80%, but now he had24 non-mission capable (NMC) M1and M2/3 armor combat systems. Hereflected on the past six days to try toidentify what had gone wrong.

The combat power of Earthquake 5’stask force had degraded slowly at first.He was down 8 to 10 combat systemsper battle since the move-out day. Themaintenance teams had repaired morethan six vehicles each day, but the rug-ged terrain of the NTC consumed anequal number of vehicles daily. Arrivalof parts was slow, and his BMO hadnot set up the UMCP in one place longenough to completely diagnose all thesystems reported NMC. Now the situ-ation had become much worse. Afterperforming the fire control checks re-quired prior to shooting ammunitionduring NTC live-fire training, it waspainfully obvious that the crews’ Pre-ventive Maintenance Checks and Serv-ices (PMCS) during the force-on-forcetraining had not included M1/2/3 tur-rets.

Although the XO was shocked at thesteep fall-off in his combat power, hispredicament occurs all too often at theNTC. His battalion’s combat powerhad shrunk because of several seriousbut addressable problems in his mainte-nance and repair parts distribution op-erations. For the past 12 months, the

Forward Support Battalion (FSB) logis-tics trainers, called the Goldminers,have worked with maneuver task forcetrainers to document systemic mainte-nance failures of the rotational units, aswell as a number of crucial activitiesthat lead to higher combat poweracross a rotation.

We begin this article with an overallview of the Army’s maintenance and

repair parts distribution “process” inthe deployed, austere environment ofthe National Training Center. We thenpresent recent data on how well, on av-erage, units have made this processperform to provide combat power.Throughout, we provide examples ofproven techniques and procedures thatwill lead to significant improvementsin maintenance and repair parts distri-bution at the NTC. Key among thesetechniques is the preparation for an ef-fective Brigade Combat Team (BCT)maintenance meeting, which we ad-dress in some detail. The payoff for im-plementing these suggestions is in-creased combat power, and more fully

mission capable M1s and M2/3s cross-ing the Line of Departure (LD) in eachbattle.

Maintenance and DistributionProcess: The Big Picture

Figure 1 represents the brigade main-tenance process. (The illustration is ge-neric — particular units may have vari-

ations on this basic scheme.) This proc-ess starts when the crew performs Pre-ventive Maintenance Checks and Serv-ices (PMCS) and identifies a NMCfault. This fault is noted on the mainte-nance forms 2404/5988E. The mainte-nance process ends when the fault isrepaired or a part is applied to the com-bat system to render it FMC. Althoughthis appears simple at first glance, theprocess has many substeps that canstrongly affect the time it takes to re-generate combat power at the NTC.

Based on a 12-month analysis ofavailable data at the NTC, it takes anaverage of 6.7 days from when a com-


Regenerating Combat Power at the National Training Center

by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D. Taylor, Major Tina Johnson, and Captain Clay Hatcher

bat system is observed NMC until it isobserved FMC. This time breaks downinto three measurable segments: NMCto the document number (2.1 days),document number to release for issue(RFI) (1.7 days), and RFI to FMC (2.9days). This analysis is based on a sam-ple of 50 randomly selected, high-pri-ority repair part requisitions from eachof the past 12 NTC rotations. For arequisition to be included in the sam-ple, the requested repair part had to beon hand at the FSB or MSB. Thus, inthis average of 6.7 days, we have notincluded backorders, shipments from arotational unit’s home station, or depot-to-NTC deliveries.

A system that performs at this level,supporting vehicles operating in a rug-ged environment like the NTC, has amajor impact on combat power in thecourse of a 14-day NTC rotation. Fig-ures 2 and 3 show the average M1 andM2/3 combat power, based again on 12NTC rotations. Note the dip in combatpower at training days 6 and 7, whenthe change to live-fire training nor-mally occurs. This is where we left astunned “Earthquake 5” contemplatinghis situation.

By studying the maintenance proc-esses of 12 units at the NTC, we havedocumented a number of key problemsthat lead to poor performance andgrouped them into four categories:

• Poor or no initial maintenance plan-ning.

• Poor adherence to unit SOPs inpreparation and communication of

maintenance information via 2404/5988E (PMCS reporting).

• Poor visibility over Class IX repairparts flow.

• Poor synchronization and manage-ment of maintenance activities, in-cluding ineffective BCT maintenancemeetings.

We will address these general activi-ties as we work through the differentsegments of the maintenance pipelinepictured in Figure 1. Along the way, wewill not only discuss how the systemshould function, we will also discussthe errors made by Earthquake 5’s taskforce, and specifically what actionscould have minimized the loss of com-bat power. We will end with a sum-mary of the ways in which mainte-nance operations at the NTC can be de-cidedly more effective — which meansmore vehicles FMC, and thus morecombat power.

Critical Points in the Army’s Maintenance System at the NTC

Our segmentation of the maintenanceprocess at the NTC is based on thecritical points where the Goldminerscan make observations and collecthard, reliable data. These observationpoints also mirror the SOPs of virtuallyevery rotational unit. Below, we exam-ine each of the three segments.

NMC to Document Number

The first segment for analysis is thepiece of the process that begins when acombat system is observed NMC andends when a document number is pro-duced in the Unit Level Logistics Sys-tem (ULLS) box and the ordering proc-ess is initiated. This segment is ex-panded in Figure 4. On average, com-bat systems at the NTC take 2.1 days


Figure 1. The maintenance and distribution process at the NTC.

Figure 2. M1 Operational Readiness and Combat Power as a Per-centage of Mission Capable Vehicles (“Combat Power” includesboth FMC and “Circle X” vehicles).

Figure 3. M2 Operational Readiness and Combat Power as a Per-centage of Mission Capable Vehicles (again, “Combat Power” in-cludes both FMC and “Circle X” vehicles).

from the time they are observed NMCby trainers until a Class IX requisitiondocument number is produced in theULLS box. The 2.1 days are furthersubdivided into 1.4 days for the combatsystems to gain visibility on the taskforce DA Form 2406 (deadline report)and 0.7 day for fault diagnosis, trou-bleshooting, and inputting a Class IXrequisition document number to theULLS computer.

Several factors contribute to the 2.1-day time. First, battalion XOs andBMOs at the NTC routinely do notknow how many 2404/5988Es are re-quired per day, per combat system.Their SOPs usually specify one perday; however, there are no systems inplace to check the efficiency or per-formance of this turn-in requirement.Our experience is that units turn in anaverage of 60% of the required2404/5988Es per day. Of those turnedin, only 63% are “to standard,” that is,containing the information required toget the part successfully ordered. Com-mon shortfalls include no NationalStock Numbers (NSNs), missingbumper numbers, operator faults withno action taken, and no fault verifica-tion and NSN identification by me-chanics. Not only do units not enforcereporting standards, (both frequencyand completeness), task force opera-tions orders never establish a specifiedtime to perform PMCS.

This reporting is the foundation of themaintenance process. Missing or in-complete PMCS or 2404s add unneces-sary time to the repair cycle, and ob-scure the visibility of combat power tohigher echelons.

Also contributing to the problemswith reporting and diagnosing faults

are decisions about the movement ofthe UMCP. On average, the UMCPmoves every other day. This does notallow adequate time for mechanics totroubleshoot and diagnose NMC com-bat systems. It appears that XOs andBMOs choose to move the UMCP thisfrequently because they are not effec-tively planning and carrying out for-ward recovery of vehicles. The price ofsuch frequent UMCP movement is aless stable and less effective mainte-nance operation.

Another area for improvement bycrews is to focus better on preventivemaintenance as part of the PMCS proc-ess. If a part that is beginning to failcan be detected and reported, a replace-ment part can often be enroute to thevehicle before the fault deteriorates tothe point where the vehicle becomesinoperable. Repairs can then be madewithout a long wait for parts to arrive,

and in some cases this could also avoidthe need to recover the vehicle to theUMCP.

Finally, there are substantial inaccura-cies between what the Goldminer train-ers observe as combat power and whatis reported to the brigade maintenancemanagers. When trainers compare whatthe task force reports NMC at the Bri-gade Combat Team (BCT) maintenancemeeting, there are, on average, eightcombat systems inaccurately reportedby each task force. Poor reporting andfailure to conduct continuous updates(verbal or hard copy 2406s) to FSBmaintenance managers hinder theirvisibility of the necessary Class IX re-pair parts requirements. Such reportinginaccuracies also result in an inaccuratereport of combat power to the maneu-ver commanders.

In sum, problems with reportingfaults and requesting parts in this seg-ment of the process fall into the follow-ing categories:

• Poor planning for and enforcement ofaccurate and timely reporting offaults.Fix: Specify a time in the operationsorder for PMCS and establish a qual-ity-control system that systematicallytracks the quality and reliability of2404 turn-ins.

• Too-frequent movement of theUMCP to allow maximum diagnosisand repair time.Fix: Move the UMCP only whenforward recovery and FM communi-cations are beyond their capacities.


Figure 4. Maintenance process segment from report of fault to requisition.

• Not identifying and reporting prob-lems before the vehicle becomesNMC.Fix: Ensure that soldiers are properlytrained in accordance with the “-10”manuals, and enforce key “leader-ship” involvement by section ser-geant, platoon sergeant, platoonleader, company commander.

Once a part is on order, the next seg-ment of the process begins. The requi-sition passes from the ULLS computerto the FSB or MSB, and the part is re-leased for issue.

Document Number to Releasefor Issue: Moving Information

The next performance measure is thetime it takes to move information fromthe UMCP to the final source of sup-ply. Figure 5 represents this segment ofthe process. On average, this segmenttakes 1.7 days from the initiation of theULLS requisition document numberuntil there is an RFI at the FSB orMSB.

The primary system failures that leadto 1.7 days for this segment are:

• low numbers of ULLS supply diskturn-ins.

• no reconciliations of parts receivedfrom the units, FSB, and MSB auto-mation sites.

The NTC average over a year is that52% of the required ULLS supplydisks are turned in to FSB Tech Supplyeach day. Command emphasis at thebrigade and task force level has a dra-matic impact on a higher percentage ofdisks turned in. A recent rotation hadan 85% turn-in rate of ULLS supplydisks when senior commanders recog-nized the importance of ordering parts.Many BCTs have no mechanism inplace to check the performance of thistask. The SOPs of a typical rotationalunit direct the turn-in of two disks perday, per ULLS box. Compliance withthe SOP is a critical action to synchro-nize efforts to build combat power.However, brigade maintenance manag-ers seldom have a mechanism in placeto check daily disk turn-in perform-ance.

Delays also often occur when PLLclerks drop off ULLS disks but do notstay and verify that their Class IX req-uisitions are 100% downloaded to the

Standard Army Retail Supply System(SARSS) box. By not waiting, theymiss the first step in the Class IX rec-onciliation process. Without this initialcheck, the requisitions not processed atthe FSB SARSS box will not be recon-ciled until 24 hours later, when theULLS status disk is processed backinto the ULLS box. In addition, thePLL clerks receive a hard copyDMMC-generated C110 report, whichreconciles the previous day’s requisi-tions with the document control regis-ter (DCR). Additionally, this automatedstatus, downloaded from SARSS, up-dates the ULLS DCR, the ULLS com-mander’s NMC report, and eventuallythe SAMS2 C026, which is the BCTconsolidated maintenance document.

More frequent movement of requisi-tions from FSB to MSB can also helpspeed this segment of the process. Wehave observed that units who use com-munications technology (i.e., tacticalFAX machines, FM, and EPLARS) tosend information between the FSB andMSB tend to have faster movement ofrepair parts.

Without this critical step, many partsare not posted via the automation sys-tem. Observers found that only 41% ofparts had status posted by automation,which forces the FSB SPT OPS tomanage this critical Class IX status“offline.” Manual status managementslows down the Class IX process andbreeds distrust and frustration with theautomated systems.


Figure 5. Maintenance process segment from requisition to when the part isreleased for issue at the first available source of supply.

Figure 6. Maintenance process segment from issue of the repair part to installation on the ve-hicle and FMC status.

Improved performancein the document-number-to-RFI segment of theprocess includes address-ing the following prob-lems:

• Low ULLS supply diskturn-ins.Fix: Establish, track,and enforce require-ments for daily ULLSdisk turn-ins.

• No reconciliations ofparts requests receivedfrom the units, FSB,and MSB automation sites.Fix: Require and enforce verificationof ULLS downloads to SARSS atTech Supply.

• Infrequent movement of requisitionsfrom FSB to MSB.Fix: Use electronic data transfer formultiple “forward-to-main” SARSStransfers per day.

RFI to FMC: Moving the Part For-ward and Completing the Repair

The final segment of the process isfrom RFI to FMC: getting the partpicked, packed, shipped, received, andinstalled. This segment, as shown inFigure 6, involves the movement of in-formation, the physical movement ofClass IX repair parts, and the final re-pair activities.

The NTC trend over the past yearshows that this is the most time-con-suming segment in the process. It takes2.9 days from RFI until the combatsystem is rendered FMC. The primarysystem failures are:

• Poor visibility over forward flow ofrepair parts.

• Poorly planned synchronization ofautomation for batch processing andinformation movement.

• Poor management of UMCP and bri-gade maintenance operations.

Transportation and manifesting of re-pair parts are critical for the visibilityof combat power regeneration. TheDMMC maintenance managers, FSBSPT OPS maintenance managers, andthe task force BMOs must gain visibil-ity of the critical Class IX parts and ex-pedite them to those who will repairNMC vehicles. Manifests often do notaccompany the parts during movement,

and the FSB has no visibility of theirmovement forward from the MSB.

Once the transportation carrying therepair parts and manifests from theMSB to the FSB arrives, the Tech Sup-ply often does not reconcile the partsphysically shipped against the manifestdocument. Rarely do we see mainte-nance managers at the FSB receive ad-vance copies of the manifest via FM,EPLARS, MCS, or MSE tactical fax. Aknowledge of what critical repair partsare on their way allows the FSB man-agers to be proactive in planning howto move the part to the appropriateUMCP as quickly as possible. Thismight include having unit personneland transportation meet the shipment atthe FSB to move the part as quickly aspossible to the NMC vehicle.

Optimal procedures for transportationand manifesting 02 PD parts include:

• Fax advance copies of manifests tothe FSB.

• Report back to the DMMC mani-fested 02 PD parts not received forresearch.

• Notify BMO of 02 PD requisition ar-rivals.

These steps are often attempted butrarely conducted to standard. Failure tocommunicate “ahead of the part’s arri-val” forces maintenance managers tospend an exorbitant amount of timelooking for 02 PD parts for combatsystems; often they bypass the FSB andgo to the MSB to expedite the partsflow.

Movement of the parts is a large por-tion of the 2.9 days of RFI to FMC.We do not have access to accurate datato break out the exact times spent inmovement and repair; however, apply-ing the part to the combat system and

UMCP maintenancemanagement both playcritical roles in the RFIto FMC time. We haveobserved that BMOs arenot well trained to an-ticipate and manage thelarge quantity of NMCcombat systems gener-ated by the OPTEMPOand rugged terrain atNTC.

Organizing UMCP pri-orities of work becomesan essential task for

BMOs. This organization could takethe following form:

• Conduct daily maintenance meetingsthat address:

- Organization of workload (whichmechanic or maintenance team istasked to repair each combat sys-tem).

- Analysis of cross-leveling/control-led substitution.

- Determination of parts on hand(what parts are available to repairwhich combat systems the mostquickly).

• Develop FM reporting system be-tween company maintenance teamsand the UMCP.

• Perform 2404/5988E tracking andquality assurance.

• Using ULLS automation to build thetask force 2406 report.

Poor ability to provide this manage-ment is a major weakness in UMCPoperations.

Improving this final segment of themaintenance process involves solvingseveral important problems:

• Poor transportation and manifesttracking of the critical 02 priorityrequisitions.Fix: Ensure that manifests accom-pany parts from MSB to FSB tomaintain visibility of parts flow.

• No visibility of what is coming for-ward to the SPT OPS managers.Fix: Use electronic communications(Tactical FAX, FM, and EPLARS) tosend advance copies of manifestsfrom MSB to FSB to allow prepara-tion for expedited onward-movementof critical parts.

• No visibility of what arrived at theFSB Tech Supply.


Fix: When parts arrive, reconcile themanifest against parts shipped andreport discrepancies to the DMMC.

• Units not notified of available partsat Tech Supply.Fix: When advance copies of mani-fests are received from the MSB,SPT OPS should notify units of an-ticipated parts and arrival times.

• BMO’s UMCP maintenance opera-tions unfocused.Fix: Conduct an effective internalUMCP daily maintenance meeting tocoordinate activities and prioritizework.

Daily Maintenance Meetings: Balancing Needs and Resources

BCT maintenance meetings are the“battlesight zero” for maintenance

managers to regenerate combat power.All levels of maintenance managersgather to share information and ensureall are aware of repair parts status andmaintenance posture. The meeting’sprimary purpose is to get a clear under-standing of what vehicles are NMCand who has the resources to make therepairs. The effectiveness of a mainte-nance meeting depends strongly uponthe “homework” done by its partici-pants. The homework completed byBMOs, SPT OPS officers, brigade S4s,and DMMC/brigade maintenance man-agers provides the necessary mainte-nance management information fromtheir respective areas. Table 1 showsthe suggested participants and thehomework that each should bring dailyto the maintenance meeting.

The ability to shave NMC time offcombat systems also depends upon the

maintenance managers’ ability to syn-chronize assets with resources to regen-erate combat power. Critical for thissynchronization is a well-thought-outplan for coordinating batches of infor-mation and materiel. An example is toensure that the pulling of repair parts atthe MSB is timed to be completedshortly before a convoy leaves theMSB for the FSB. Such attention tocoordinating batches can save hours,and sometimes days, of NMC time forthe weapon system awaiting parts.

Strong Maintenance PracticesDeliver Increased Combat Power

Earthquake 5 glanced back at hisUMCP: there were still 24 NMC com-bat systems. This wasn’t a bad dream.The embarrassment of having to report58% combat power to his higher head-quarters was extremely irritating andcertainly not the kind of visibility heneeded from the brigade and divisioncommanders. The unexpected drop incombat power forced him to acceptthat he had been managing in a vac-uum and wasn’t sure where his mainte-nance team had failed. He recognizedthat he had no daily maintenance indi-cators that would allow him to catchand forestall problems before they hadturned into a catastrophe like the onehe was facing. He would now have toimmediately focus the task force on itsmaintenance posture and develop sys-tems to regenerate combat powerquickly. Because of poor planning andfollow-up, Earthquake 5 had a verylong, exhausting eight days of rotationstill to go...

If Earthquake 5’s task force effec-tively had planned and executed itsmaintenance activities, it would havestood a far greater chance of being ahigh-performing unit at the NTC. TheOPFOR is always tough to beat, but itis certainly even tougher to beat if youare only at 75% combat strength be-cause of the poor performance of yourmaintenance systems. Units should ag-gressively pursue improved mainte-nance planning and practices beforetheir NTC rotation, and they shouldpractice these maintenance activities aspart of their home station training:

• Carefully plan for maintenance ac-tivities and explicitly allocate time tocarry them out.


Task ForceManagers

FSBManagers

BrigadeManagers

DMMCManagers

WHO: Task ForceBMOs & XOs,Separate COsXOs, FSB BMO& XO

FSB CDR &SPT OPS, TechSupply, ShopOffice

S4, MaintenanceManager

Bderepresentative,CL IXrepresentative

MaintenanceManagementReporting Information

ULLS CDRNMC reportTask Force 2406 - Updated - Status

C026/2406 report - Updated - Status

C026/2406report - Track combat system status

C026/2406report - Updated - Status

Parts Status Information

02 part status - C110 recon- ciliation - Face-to- face recon- ciliation - Total due- out recon- ciliation

02 partinformation: - AMDF of each 02 - Trans/status TCMD

02 partinformation: - ILAP of each 02 - Trans status/ TCMD

RecoverableStatus

Reconciledrecoverables

Reconciledrecoverables,provide Unmatched Recoverable list

UnmatchedRecoverablelist

Disk Turn-inMonitoring

Daily disk turn-in records for: - Maintenance disks - Supply disks

Daily disk turn-in records for: - Maintenance disks - Supply disks

AOAPMonitoring

AOAP turn-in record

AOAP turn-inrecord

AOAP turn-inrecord

AOAP turn-inrecord

PartsAvailability

PLL status list Forward ASL list

Main ASL list

AutomationStatus

ULLS boxoperationalstatus

SARSS & SAMSstatus

Table 1. Daily Homework Needed For Effective, Efficient Maintenance Meetings

• Establish standards and enforce adherence to them for preparing and communicating maintenance information via 2404/5988E.

• Synchronize maintenance management.

• Prepare for and utilize daily maintenance meetings as the "battle sight zero."

Commanders demand maximum combat power for each mission if they are to defeat the opposing forces at the NTe. Maintenance managers and soldiers are currently using the full 24 hours of the day to regenerate combat power but continue to struggle with operating their systems and continue to achieve less than satisfactory performance. Units must find techniques and procedures to shave time off the 6.7 days by working smarter, not harder. The problems and solutions we have outlined are areas to start the search for the highest combat power available for battles at the NTC and ultimately prepare task forces for future deployments. Success in maintenance is not measured in wins or losses, but in the time it takes for units to regenerate combat power.

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Taylor is attending the Industrial College of Armed Forces. He has served in various logistics command, training, and staff positions including senior logistiC trainer, NTC; commander. Support Squadron. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Germany, EVCOM, J4 joint logistic staff officer. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and completed the Army Comptroller Program.

Major Tina G. Johnson is the executive officer of the Support Squadron. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ft. Irwin, Calif. She previously served as the FSB. support operations trainer, NTC, and the support operations officer, 123rd Main Support Battalion, :1 st Armored Division, Germany. She has a bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University, N.J.

Captain Clay B. Hatcher is currently the Maintenance/Class IX Trainer for the Forward Support Battalion at the NTC. He was the 199th FSB support operations officer, 1 st Infantry Division, Germany. He has commanded B Company, 203rd and B Company, 47th FSB, 3rd Infantry Division, Germany. He graduated from Northwest Missouri State UniverSity.

The authors would like to thank the following members of RAND's Arroyo Center (Army Reserach Division) for their help with the preparation of this paper: Dr. Matthew Lewis, Dr. Jerry Sollinger, a retired U.S. Army colonel, and David Oaks, a captain in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Coming Soon ...

12

The ARMOR Home Page This spring, the Armor Branch professional journal will begin publishing "Issues in Armor" at the Fort Knox Home Page on the Internet. Here's how it will work:

Each edition of "Issues in Armor" will focus on several recent stories that appeared in ARMOR magazine and stimulated discussion.

The stories that triggered a significant reaction will be republished in electronic form, along with rebuttals, letters to the editor, and other comments received after the story was first published.

Once a browser has had a chance to read the original story and the subsequent comments and replies, there will be an opportunity for further comment. Browsers will be able to access an e-mail formatted reply to add their comments and reactions.

If the Home Page editor decides that these e-mailed comments add to the discussion, they will be added to the package for further debate. This back-and-forth

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"Issues in Armor" will also include reference information, like a roster of contact points at USAARMS with phone numbers and e-mail addresses, important calendar items, and previews of stories due to be published in future issues.

ARMOR - January-February 1996

What are the leadership implicationsof the current military technical revolu-tion? Organizational and doctrinalchanges are in store for the Army ofthe twenty-first century, but where dothe leaders fit into the developingscheme of things? We must analyze to-day what the effects of these changesmay be on our leaders and how theylead, before we are surprised by theunanticipated effects of our decisions.This paper addresses the issue of infor-mation processing and the possible re-sults of the explosion in available in-formation upon leaders and leader de-velopment in Force XXI.

“In my own mind, we are at thebeginning of a revolution in theway we will command soldiersand tactical units in battle.”

LTG Frederick Franks

Force XXI and the digitization of thebattlefield can give maneuver com-manders at the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels an unprecedented abil-ity to “see themselves.” Concurrentwith this development is the continu-ation of an ongoing effort to breakopen the information “stovepipes”which allow us to see the enemy. Thesechanges may allow friendly informa-tion and data on the enemy situation tobe seen and known by all with the cor-rect hardware configuration and com-munications assets.

As postulated by the Tofflers in theirbooks, The Third Wave and War Anti-War, we are at the edge of a new typeof society, and by extension a new typeof warfare. This information-based so-ciety and method of war dependslargely upon complete saturation ofcommunications technology within thetarget element. However, unless greatcare is taken to avoid it, this informa-tion explosion may result in the devalu-

ation of at least one level of command,and the eventual weakening of the veryfabric of our leadership development.The endstate where we may find our-selves is not the anticipated dynamic,decisive, and lethal leader-informationcombination, but a crippled force withindecisive leaders overwhelmed by in-formation they have not been trained toassimilate.

“In the term ‘Maneuver Warfare,’ ma-neuver refers to an entire style of war-fare, one characterized not only bymoving in relation to the enemy to gainpositional advantage, but also — ANDEVEN MORE — to moving faster thanthe enemy, to defeating him through su-perior tempo.”1

“The Tenets of Battle Command: Acommander’s success on and off thebattlefield depends on his ability to op-erate in accordance with nine basictenets: initiative, agility, depth, integra-tion, versatility, flexibility, judgment, in-tuition, and empathy.”2

“Auftragstaktik is composed of fouressential elements — obedience, profi-ciency, independence of action, andself-esteem. In order for auftragstaktikto exist, all four elements must be pre-sent.”3

Executing mission orders (auftrag-staktik) requires a mind-set and an im-bedded system of values which supportthe independent thinker, the decisivecommander and risk-taker. Auftragstak-tik has been heralded as the key to suc-cessful maneuver-based warfare sincethe publication of Rommel’s Attacks in1937. This linkage, between a systemof warfare (maneuver vs. attritional)and the command process required tosuccessfully execute it (mission tacticsvs. orders tactics) is well establishedand supported by historical evidence.4

In the industrial age of warfare, therehas never been a technological solutionthat allows commanders to “see” better

when they operate farther from thefront lines. In the era of mechanization,the decisive point for the maneuvercommander has always been forward,preferably in a position from which hecan personally observe and thereby is-sue commands which may influencethe course of the battle. Communica-tions advances have freed the com-mander from static locations andplaced him on the battlefield with themeans to issue orders to geographicallyseparated units, allowing him to bringthem or their effects to the decisivepoint on the battlefield. The ultimateexample of this style of warfare andleadership within the American Armymay have been embodied by MajorGeneral “P” Wood, commander of the4th Armored Division during the break-out and exploitation phases followingthe Normandy Campaign and Opera-tion Cobra. General Wood’s personalleadership style and forward locationare hallmarks of the maneuver com-mander in the Second World War.5

Auftragstaktik was a needed doctrinalleadership development to execute ma-neuver warfare for one great reason —it was assumed, and is generally true,that the commander forward knowsmore about the current situation thanany higher commander not on thescene. This implies that orders are writ-ten with full understanding that, shouldthe situation not meet expectations, thecommander on the ground has the ulti-mate authority to modify the plan as hesees fit in order to accomplish thehigher commander’s intent. Missionand commander’s intent are the over-riding considerations; everything else isa means to an end. The empowermentof the junior leader and the relianceupon that leader’s judgment are para-mount, because it is assumed that onlyat the lowest levels can a leader seethrough the “fog of war,” if only for ashort distance. The assumption is thatthe lower the commander, the better he


Force XXI and the Deathof Auftragstaktik

by Captain Robert L. Bateman

can “see himself” and know his imme-diate threat; therefore, he is betterequipped to make decisions. If a highercommander wanted to influence thebattle, then he also must move forwardto where he can personally observe theoperations and the results of those op-erations. But what happens when thathigher commander is provided themeans to “see” both himself and theenemy over the proverbial hill betterthan the commander who is on theground in the most forward position?

Digitization and the Emasculationof the Subordinate Commander

Force XXI and the theory of informa-tional warfare rely heavily upon theconcept of “breaking down the stove-pipe information structures.”6 Trans-lated, that means that informationwhich traditionally flowed verticallyfrom one echelon to the next, due tosystem hardware or organizationalprocesses, may now be accessed by agreater number of users spread hori-zontally across an organization withoutthe requirement for formal distributionat each level. Any “user” who needs in-formation can access this informationfrom any other echelon, providing thedata is somewhere in the system. Con-ceptually, this may greatly increase theeffectiveness of our corps, division, bri-gade, and battalion staffs, both in garri-son and the field. No longer will thebattalion S3 wait impatiently for infor-mation on the upcoming operation. Assoon as the divisional graphics are cre-ated, they are available to all clientswithin the net.

Parallel planning may begin immedi-ately at both the brigade and battalionlevels, even as the division staff worksto complete the plan. Brigade plannersmay also have instant information re-garding the status of their subordinateunits as they work to create a tentativeplan and select what element is bestsuited to be the main effort. Reportingof location, strength, and equipmentstatus is available at the touch of a but-ton for staffs and commanders toevaluate (“see”) themselves. Planningcells, operating from digitally linkedbattle command vehicles (C2Vs) maylook up to a 30-inch monitor and viewan accurate map that shows the super-imposed locations of all vehicles withinthe command. Intelligence officers may“look up” to access strategic and na-tional reconnaissance assets to “see the

enemy,” greatly enhancing the speedand accuracy of their SITTEMPs.Then, with another toggle, they may“look down and receive digital photosfrom scouts and units on the front line,which may refine their SITTEMP evenmore. Finally, the battalion and brigadecommanders of this digital force mayenter their command vehicles, person-ally process the visual (and audial?) in-formation available from the screensand their staffs, and make a decision.This is, after all, what commanders aretrained to do. But what about that mostforward of commanders — the one in aturret, the one on the front line whodoes not have multiple large-screenmonitors and a staff to help analyze thereams of information potentially avail-able to him. What about that lowlycompany commander?

In his cramped hatch, he looks outover the battlefield from his position.To his eyes, the battlefield looks thesame as it might have during WWII —largely deserted, potentially dangerous,and definitely lonely. He may have ac-cess to most of the information avail-able to the staff and commanders abovehim, but to see it, he’s going to have tosquint. His little 12-inch screen, tuckedin under the deck of his turret, can onlyaccess one piece of information at atime, providing that it works, is notsplattered with mud or washed out bysunlight. Given a minute, he can easilyaccess the same digital map, whichshows the actual location of his team’svehicles on a map with the latestgraphics. But, due to the size of hismonitor, expanding the view beyondthe scale of his company/team is notpractical. The map gets too big and thepieces too small without that largescreen. Of course, he may “scroll” thescreen wherever he likes, but he thenloses the big picture. His problem isnot information overload, but not beingable to access enough information si-multaneously. For the first time in his-tory, the front line commander actuallyknows less about what is going on inhis immediate area than does his highercommander.

This may not be all bad. After all, it isonly at the battalion level where anysynchronization begins to occur. Thefront line commanders receive theirmissions, move out, and draw fire.Theirs is the mission of closing withand destroying, and they may operateusing auftragstaktik as their guidingprincipal. After all, when the operation

kicks off, their plan becomes a guide,and the commander on the front line,who will see the situation in real-time,is expected to react as he sees fit to ac-complish his commander’s overall in-tent. But wait, what about that highercommander at battalion and brigade(and division?). In our industrial agearmy, that commander’s place has al-ways been up front, so that he too cansee what his company commanders seeand mentally orient himself on the en-emy, decide on a course of action, andact. But in the information-based ForceXXI, the best place to see the battle-field may be from within the commandpost vehicle. Now that battalion or bri-gade commander, if he wants access toall information, has been tied to a C2

vehicle, that is, if he wants to stayahead in the OODA (observe, orient,decide, act) cycle. Not only that, butbecause he does have better informa-tion, faster than his own subordinatecommanders, he may end up tellingthem how to maneuver their subordi-nate units!

Imagine the scenario: A battalionequivalent task force moves forwardfrom its tactical assembly area into ameeting engagement. The battalioncommander, in his BCV, simultane-ously surveys three large screens dis-playing the entire area of operations,with graphics and actual vehicle loca-tions, confirmed enemy locations, andcritical logistical information in a user-friendly format. His company com-manders, bouncing across the terrain,have little time to look at their owndisplays unless one of their lieutenantswanders off into the mist again. In-stead, they rely upon their senses andvoice commands. Of course, theirsenses are degraded, not physically, butdue to the increased area which thenew digital force covers. Companieswhich once could only spread out overa mile now cover several miles; theywill not get lost or separated since theyare digitally “aware” of each other.Suddenly, in the BCV, the battalioncommander observes a new icon on thescreen — enemy tanks have just startedtheir engines and been detected by oneof the UAVs through thermal emis-sions. The enemy tanks are on the im-mediate flank of one of his company’splatoons; he immediately broadcaststhe warning directly to that platoonleader (who is himself separated bymiles from his company commanderduring the approach movement), de-


scribing the threat and the immediateactions he must take. The lieutenantdoes not question his battalion com-mander, nor is there time to confirmwith his company commander; heACTS. It is only after the threat isavoided and the action well under waythat the company commander has timeto look at his display, rewind to seewhat happened, and mentally confirmthat the battalion commander gave thecorrect orders to one of his platoons.

Still, the task force moves forward.Again in the BCV, the battalion com-mander sees what his commanders onthe front line cannot. As the breach isinitiated and supporting fires lay asmoke screen for the engineers, thecommander notices another downlink,this time from a JSTARS platform. Theenemy reserve has not been pinned ordelayed by the FASCAM fired on theirlocation, and are in fact moving for-ward from their concealed positionsalong an unexpected route. Again, thecommander has beaten the enemy inthe OODA cycle; he orders his own re-serve to move forward and occupy aposition on a shelf which is over thenext hill from their current location.The reserve company commander pro-tests. What shelf?, he asks. On hismonitor the resolution cannot pick outthe gap in the contour intervals and heis leery of placing his command in anexposed forward slope position againstwhat to him is an unknown force.

The battalion commander knows bet-ter and repeats his orders. He has seenthis ground through the UAV and con-firmed that it is an ideal location tomeet the attempted flanking counterat-tack. From his swivel chair he turnsand directs the FSO to place fires inthe grid where he has placed his cursor.The cursor becomes a fire mission evenas the enemy counterattack arrives. Thebreach is successful and the task forcerolls on. The battalion commander haslearned that information is power, andhe has certainly acted upon that infor-mation with lethal effects. But back tothose other commanders, the dirty onesin the turrets. What of them? Theyhave learned a lesson as well — obeyorders from on high. Higher does knowbetter. The information stovepipe mayhave been broken open, but they do nothave a large enough bucket to catch allthe information flowing out to them.They have seen their platoons issueddirect orders by a higher level and theyhave themselves been forced to execute

missions which, based upon their per-sonal observations, appeared irrational,but were in fact the best in a givensituation. Their commander knew asmuch about each of them as they them-selves knew... and knew it at the sametime. While moving, they had littletime to look down, manipulate theircomputer interfaces, and access thesame information sequentially that theircommander could see simultaneously.Most importantly, they rarely got thechance to make an independent deci-sion regarding the employment of theirown command.

Implications for the Future of Force XXI

In the scenario described above, thedecisive force on the battlefield was thebattalion commander. Battle CommandDraft 2.1 states that technology has thepotential to revolutionize the way wecommand in battle by becoming “thetool that will allow the commander tomove freely about the battlefield towhere he can best influence the actionwithout separating himself from hisstaff and other sources of information,communications, and control.” To thatmight be added the realization that, onthe digital/information battlefield,“moving freely about the battlefield”might not literally mean physicalmovement of the commander. Instead,he moves only his “eyes” (the UAVand various downlinks and uplinksfrom other assets) to where they canbest see for him. He himself has be-come tied to the information node fromwhich he will command. Another ex-ample to illustrate the point might bean experiment of sorts. Place a battal-ion commander in the Training Analy-sis Facility (TAF) at the National Train-ing Center. Allow him full communica-tions with his battalion, and observehow his command becomes centralizedaround him. This may not be all bad,by the way. It almost certainly is an ef-fective method to increase our own de-cision cycle speed beyond that of anypotential enemy and, therefore, it maysave lives.

The Army currently has enough lead-ers with the proper characteristics toassimilate vast amounts of informationrapidly and make timely decisions; af-ter all, this is what we have been teach-ing our leaders for years. But whatkind of commanders will those officerswho “grow up” under this system

make? They have learned NOT toquestion orders and operate accordingto their own assessment of the situationto accomplish their commander’s in-tent. Instead, they will have developedunder a system in which control is cen-tral and higher knows better. Theircompany “commands” were really glo-rified platoon leader positions, whilethe battalion or brigade micromanagedtheir actions in an effort to increasespeed, bypassing the company as an in-dependent element. Auftragstaktik willhave died with the last non-digitalcompany command.

In the original definition of the term,auftragstaktik had four components:obedience, proficiency, independenceof action, and self-esteem. However, ifany one of these components was con-sidered paramount, it was the traditionof independence of action. This tradi-tion cannot survive on the digital bat-tlefield. And neither will AUFTRAG-STAKTIK.

Notes

1Lind, William, “The Theory and Practice ofManeuver Warfare,” Maneuver Warfare: AnAnthology (New York: Doubleday) 1994.

2Battle Command, Draft 2.1, Department ofthe Army, Battle Command Battle Lab, Ft.Leavenworth, Kan., April 1994.

3Bashista, Ronald, “Auftragstaktik: It’s MoreThan Just a Word,” ARMOR, November-De-cember 1994.

4Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David, “Cyber-war Is Coming,” Comparative Strategy, April-June 1993.

5Tiger Jack (Ballantine Books, Inc.), 1976edn.

6Sullivan, Gordon R., GEN, “Force XXI:Digitizing the Battlefield,” Army RD&A Bulle-tin, November-December 1994.


Captain Robert L. Batemanis currently the commander ofHHC/2-7 Cavalry, 1st CavalryDivision. He has previouslyserved as BMO, 2-7 Cav, S3(Air), and platoon leader 4-87Inf(L). He is a graduate of In-fantry Officer Basic Course,Airborne, Air Assault, andRanger Courses as well as Ar-mor Officer Advance Course.

As if simply reading about digitalcommand and control (C2) enhance-ments was not enough excitement forone tanker to stand, along comes MajorBruce Held’s March-April 1995 AR-MOR article on future smart munitions.Like a fish stuck on a trout line, Isnapped at his call to explore tacticalramifications of the new ammunition’suse. The result is this article’s bottomline: a digital tank platoon in the de-fense, using Smart, Target Activated,Fire and Forget (STAFF) ammunition,can destroy an attacking motorized riflebattalion (MRB). Read that as an11.5:1 kill ratio. Further, the digital pla-toon can do so with less than one basicload of ammunition and still retain atleast 1800 meters of standoff distancefrom the lead enemy element. Givensome assumptions, this theory can beproved both in time and space.

Assumptions

Using the acronym METT-T as ourguide, here are the assumptions neces-sary to set the scene that makes theabove theory possible:

Mission. A digital tank platoon mustdefend a battle position to allow nopenetration of the phase line to theirrear by the first MRB to enter theirsector.

Enemy:

• The attacking MRB is BMP and T-72equipped, is at 100% strength andexecutes standard Threat doctrine.

• The MRB is in battle formation withmotorized rifle companies (MRCs) inpre-battle formations, two MRCs for-ward and one back.

• MRB elements move at a constantspeed of 20 kilometers per hour (or20,000 meters every 3600 seconds).

• The MRB maintains maximum doc-trinal intervals (50 meters betweenvehicles, 300 meters between platooncolumns and 800 meters betweenMRC formations).

• For purposes of this article, enemyair is not introduced.

Time (and Space):

• All tanks in the digital platoon fire ata constant rate of one round everynine seconds.

• We want to spread out our platoon asfar as possible so that the flank tanksbegin engagements four kilometersfrom the lead, flank vehicle of thefar, opposite MRC. (See Figure 1.)

• Do not let any enemy vehicles closerthan 1800 meters.

Troops and Equipment:

• We lead an M1A2 tank platoon at100% strength.

• Each tank has a combat load of 40STAFF rounds.

• All tanks have a proper boresight.• No tanks experience a weapon sys-

tem malfunction.• No tanks in the platoon are lost to

enemy fire during the engagement.• We will engage lead MRCs by sec-

tion with a cross pattern of fire and

the trail MRC by platoon frontal pat-tern of fire.

• STAFF rounds kill with a constant40% probability of kill (.4 Pk) overany distance out to 4000 meters.

• Enemy locations are initially reportedby intelligence assets forward of ourplatoon and downloaded onto ourIVIS.

Terrain. The enemy avenue of ap-proach is approximately four kilome-ters wide, allowing the enemy to main-tain formations.

Doing the Math

Looking at Figure 1, several factorsbecome obvious. First, the MRB is de-ployed with two MRC’s forward andone back. There are 800 meters be-tween the inside flanks of the leadMRCs and the same distance from therear of those MRCs to the front of thetrail one (per above assumptions).

Second, straight-line distance fromour digital platoon to the nearest MRCis 2900 meters when we open the en-gagement. Defensive placement, how-ever, is designed for engagement bytank section in a cross pattern of fire,with a goal of spreading out as far aspossible for force preservation. Sinceengagement range must be within 4000meters, the outside (flank) tank in eachsection must be able to range 4000 me-ters to the outside flank of the oppositeMRC; the inside wingman must beable to fire no farther than 4000 metersto the MRC’s center mass. Our platoon


M1A2s,Smart Ammunition, And Time and Space Theory(Or, Why I Would Not Want To Be the Threat)

by Captain Mike Pryor

battle position (BP) enjoys a frontageof 3000 meters, a depth of 800 metersand 1000 meters between tanks! Pres-ently, we do not use this as doctrine.But with an open mind, you can dis-cern the following:

• Platoon tanks will still ‘see’ eachother via their Commander’s Inte-grated Display.

• This is an excellent example of massas defined at the head of “Direct FirePlanning” (ARMOR, November-De-cember 1993). “Massing of fires isnot all 14 vehicles destroying onetarget. True massing of fires is 14 ve-hicles destroying 14 different tar-gets....”

• So dispersed, our platoon is a verydemanding artillery target, increasingforce protection (nearly impossible totake out without precision weaponsor using MRLS-type systems).

But what about time and space? Toprove the hypothesis, we must answerthis key question:

An MRC with a tank platoon forwardhas 15 combat vehicles moving onekilometer every three minutes (or 1000meters every 180 seconds). If we firetwo STAFF rounds every nine secondswith a .4 Pk, how long will it take todestroy the MRC and how close will itget to our BP?

This problem is not as daunting if wetake it one bite at a time. First, wemust determine how many rounds ittakes to destroy the MRC:

[X (rounds)] [.4 (Pk)] = 15 (kills)

X = 15/.4

X = 37.5 (or 38 for safety’s sake)

This tells us how many rounds ittakes to destroy the MRC, and weknow we can fire two rounds everynine seconds with our method of en-gagement. Next, we must determinehow long it will take to destroy theMRC:

38 rounds2 rounds/9 seconds =

38 rounds X 9 seconds2 rounds =

342 rounds/seconds2 rounds = 171 seconds

(or 2 minutes, 51 seconds)

With the time to destruction known,we can calculate how far the MRC ad-vances in that amount of time:

20,000 meters = X meters 3600 seconds 171 seconds =

3,420,000 meters seconds3600 seconds = X

X = 950 meters

So, we have the following answer toour question: at an expenditure of 19rounds per tank, a digital platoon candestroy an MRC in 2 minutes, 51 sec-onds and not allow them to advancemore than 950 meters. Simple subtrac-


Fig. 1

tion then tells us the closest any of thelead MRC’s vehicles will come to ourplatoon is 1950 meters.

But what about the trail MRC? Afterdestruction of the lead MRCs, the trailMRC has advanced to within 3100 me-ters of our platoon. We would then

change our method of fire distributionto a platoon frontal pattern. With fourtanks firing on this MRC, its destruc-tion occurs twice as fast as that ofeither lead MRC. For an additional 10rounds per tank, in 1 minute, 26 sec-onds and within 475 meters, this MRCis eliminated 2625 meters from our BP.

All told, the entire MRB is destroyedin less than 41⁄2 minutes with 29STAFF rounds per tank. (See Figure 2- destruction of the MRB is indicatedby shaded boxes.) But does this holdfor other formations?

MRB in a Column,MRCs in Pre-Battle

Here, our platoon’s task is easier. Ifthe enemy remains in column, an MRC

is destroyed every 86 seconds/475 me-ters. (The MRB dies in 4 minutes, 20seconds.) But surely, no one is that ig-norant. So, if each trail MRC deploysaround an opposite flank of the lead,dead MRC, we have our original ex-ample in reverse. The lead MRC ex-pires in 86 seconds/475 meters, and the

remaining two in an addi-tional 2 minutes, 51 sec-onds/950 meters. (If weopen the engagement at4000 meters with our pla-toon on line, the enemynever gets closer than 2575meters.)

If the MRB commanderdeploys his two remainingMRCs around the sameflank of the lead MRC, wehave the same type of en-gagement as if he re-mained in a column ofMRCs, except that wemust shift our platoon’sfires.

The above examples im-ply that the greater thedepth of the enemy forma-tion, the easier our task be-comes. So what happens ifthe MRB chooses the for-mation with the leastdepth?

MRB with MRCs On Line in Pre-Battle

This would be our pla-toon’s most difficult task. If we main-tain a cross pattern of fire, this meansour flank tanks initially engage oppo-site MRCs by themselves, while theirinside wingmen concurrently engagethe center MRC. (See Figure 3.) To en-gage in this method, our BP frontageshrinks to 1000 meters, with a depth of100 meters and 325 meters betweentanks. Engaging the enemy as ex-pressed above yields their destructionin the following manner:

We open the engagement with the en-emy lead element at a three kilometerstraight line distance from our flanktanks. After 2 minutes, 51 seconds/950meters, the center MRC is destroyedwith 19 rounds per inside tank. Ourflank tanks have destroyed seven en-emy vehicles each with 19 rounds

within the same 950 meters. The insidetanks now shift to a cross pattern offires by section and complete destruc-tion of the flank MRCs with 10 morerounds per tank in 90 seconds/500 me-ters. In a total of 4 minutes, 21 sec-onds/1450 meters, the MRB is de-stroyed for 29 rounds per tank.

In checking our spatial relationship,however, our flank tanks are within1550 meters of the enemy if they re-main stationary throughout the engage-ment. The platoon would have to dis-place to subsequent fighting positionsto retain our 1800 meter space cushionfrom the enemy. This, by definition,changes our mission to a defense insector. A defense in sector would notnecessarily expend more rounds to de-stroy the MRB. It would, however, takelonger, require more battlefield space(depth) for the platoon, greatly limitour platoon’s dispersion within the BPand create C2 problems for us not pre-sent if they attack us as in the originalexample. However, in doing the math,you can see that it is still theoreticallypossible for a digital platoon to destroyan MRB in this formation.

Observations

Our use of smart munitions coupledwith digital C2 enhancements in thismanner allows us to make certain ob-servations, both from our, and the en-emy’s, perspective.

Our Digital Force.

• The mathematics of this theory indi-cates a pronounced correlation be-tween our, and the enemy’s, depthand frontage:

- The greater the enemy’s depthand narrower his frontage, thegreater our BP depth and front-age, and the lesser battlefieldspace we require.

- The shallower the enemy’s depthand wider his frontage, the lesserour BP depth and frontage andthe greater battlefield space werequire.

• For this theory to work, someone orsomething must be able to constantlyspot the enemy, provide BDA, anddownload enemy positions to ourIVIS system.


Fig. 2

• An intelligence asset ‘handing off’targets to our tanks seems to call forthe M1A2 using the POSNAV sys-tem to assist with target acquisition.

• After destruction of the MRB, ourplatoon would have to resupply theircombat load of ammunition.

• By extrapolation of the 11.5:1 kill ra-tio, a tank company can destroy aregiment and a tank battalion a divi-sion. (Once the infantry gets a non-

line-of-site missile, it has the samecapability, except they will needmore time and battlefield space dueto the limited number of missiles theBFV might carry.)

• There are many tactical ramificationsinherent in this theory. I can think ofthe following:

- In fighting his company versus aregiment, the commander needsto be prepared to move up his re-serve platoon in time to cover theappropriate enemy avenue of ap-proach as soon as 2-10 minutesafter destruction of the first twoMRBs. This demands that the

company commander thinks ofhis battlespace as deep as we nowthink for brigades.

- Since some form of intelligence-gathering asset must cover thecompany’s increased battlespace,we either need more scouts or re-motely piloted vehicles (RPVs)forward in sector under the com-pany’s control.

- If the company has RPVs, whocontrols them? TheXO? The first ser-geant? A soldier as-signed to a new dutyposition?

- If a digital platoonforwards a call for in-direct fire because hehas line of sight to theenemy, something isseriously wrong. Thismay mean that artil-lery becomes primar-ily a counter batteryand enemy secondechelon elementfighter if we defend inthis manner.

- CS and CSS elementsneed to be prepared toconduct business overa much wider front-age. Does this meanthat they need to havebeefed-up TO&Es?Do they need moremobile and faster ve-hicles?

The Enemy’s Per-spective.

• Because of the prob-lems it causes us, is

the enemy likely to attack with threeelements forward and none back intheir first echelon?

• Is the enemy more likely to attemptto improve the combat speed of hisvehicles in order to provide themeans to close the distance with ourforces faster?

• Because of the STAFF round’s foot-print, is the enemy less likely tospread out his formations? (Doing somay make targeting his vehicles eas-ier due to less ground clutter or lessof a need to choose between multipletargets within the footprint.)

• Because of the destructive capabili-ties of digital units with smart ammu-nition, will the enemy be encouragedto use more obscurants, directed en-ergy weapons or even weapons ofmass destruction to achieve his aims?

• Because our electronic intelligence-gathering assets are designed in largemeasure to find vehicles, will the en-emy use more dismounted infantry toset up the conditions for success ofhis mechanized forces?

Conclusion

Amazingly, our new digital systemscoupled with the use of smart muni-tions may allow us to defend against anenemy at an 11.5:1 ratio. This is truly atechnological revolution that providesus with several tactical advantages andthe enemy with multiple dilemmas tosolve. I believe the possibilities pre-sented in this article equate to deter-rence. You cannot find deterrence inany of our Mission Training Plans atany level. But deterrence, being a morenoble and much more demanding taskto master, is preferable to the expenseof blood on any battlefield.

Fig. 3


Captain Mike Pryor wascommissioned in Armor fromthe New Mexico Military Insti-tute’s Early CommissioningProgram in 1984. He com-pleted his bachelor’s degreein political science from theUniversity of North Texas. Heis a graduate of AOBC (Cav-alry), SCCC, TCCC (M60A3and M1), TLIC, NBC Defense,IMPC, the III Corps MOUTTrainer’s Course, AOAC andCAS3. He has served as acavalry platoon leader, troopXO, S3 (Air), adjutant andtroop commander with 1-124Cavalry, TXARNG, and as anS3 (Air) with 1-156 Armor,LAARNG. He is currently thecommander of Company C,1-156 Armor, LAARNG.

Over the years, I have seen a numberof articles about the external gun turret(EGT), or external gun mount, in mili-tary magazines. As the saying goes,“There is less to the idea than it ap-pears.” When someone does build onein a one-off experiment, it ultimatelygoes away; whether it be a Tank TestBed, an AMX-ELC, a UDES-19, aSurrogate Research Vehicle, or what-ever. The reason that they go nowhereis because of the very serious limita-tions of the concept:

1. Commander and gunner havebeen removed from the turret andburied in the hull where system sur-vivability is poor due to lack of di-rect vision.

The idea of burying the crew down inthe bowels of the hull, where the com-mander has no direct vision from thetop of the turret, is a very great net lossto survivability! The crew may be bet-ter protected there from a hit, but theloss of the commander’s direct (eye-ball) vision from the highest point ofthe vehicle means that they are muchmore likely to blunder into a disaster;be it a minefield, a steep vertical drop-off not detected by indirect vision(whether it be ‘hard optics’ or elec-tronic sights), an unseen, well-camou-flaged antitank system, or any otherundetected disaster. Even in a conven-tional turret, it is difficult to detectthese hazards on a clear day with 20-20vision from a position 8-9 feet high, es-pecially when moving rapidly. It’sworse if there is heat haze, maybe dustfrom wind and other vehicles, and per-haps smoke from muzzles, explosions,or smoke generators.1

Another bad idea related to the ‘crewburied in the hull’ is placing them in arow, where a single penetrator can take

out all three at once. The designersmay suffer from a death wish, but theyshouldn’t impose it on the crew.

Contemporary thermal imaging sightsare marvels of technology, and Iwouldn’t want to be without them, butthey can’t replace the human eye inthree respects: resolution, field of view(and the combination of both), and itsmarvelous working with the brain. Forexample, try this experiment: focus ona specific point at long distance and try

to remember just where it is. Thenclose your eyes and turn your headaway as far as it will go. Next, withyour eyes still closed, turn your headback to where you think you wereoriginally looking, and open your eyes.You should be looking right where youstarted.

Consider next just how complicated,large, and expensive it would be tomanufacture a sight to do that — andyou already have the capability, ‘fornothing.’ (This has been called ‘kines-thetic orientation,’ which is a great ex-pression, and I wish I knew who cre-ated it.) Remember also that, when youopened your eyes, you had a viewcombining excellent, detailed resolu-tion at the center with a very wide fieldof view. This is what you have now,supplemented by hard optics and elec-

tronic sights. Should you give it up andbe without that eyeball at the top of theturret? Not likely!

I tried for a long time to understandhow such a fundamentally wrong ideaas having the crew buried in the hullcould last for so long; when itshouldn’t have survived the first userconference. I finally remembered that itwas originally sold as part of the earlydays of the Armored Systems Modern-ization (ASM) study, got high levelsupport because of its association withASM, and became an article of faith ina theology that is dubious at best. Onceit became politically correct, whowould challenge so central an elementof orthodox dogma? Certainly notsomeone who wished to remain inbusiness! And certainly not someonewho would like to be promoted at leastonce more.

Since I am now retired, and more po-litically incorrect than ever, I say to theworld: “The emperor has no clothes!”What we should do is to defrock ASM(if not done so already) and let individ-ual ideas compete on their merits.When we have reached that point, dis-senters will no longer run the risk ofbeing accused of blasphemy or heresy,and we can start engineering again.

The winning entry of the 1993 AR-MOR Magazine Tank Design Contest,Western Design Corp., was a clever de-sign that wisely avoided the pitfalls ofthe elevated gun, but still bought intothe bury-’em-in-the-hull syndrome. Toobad! Otherwise, it looked good, exceptfor all those goodies that they claimwill fit inside it. If they can really dothat, and still meet the volume andweight claims, then we should putthem to work on solving the problemof the national debt.


THE EXTERNAL GUN TURRET:“Often a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride”

by Don Loughlin

ON HULL SEATING:

“The crew may be better pro-tected there from a hit, but the lossof the commander’s direct (eyeball)vision from the highest point of thevehicle means that they are muchmore likely to blunder into a disas-ter...”

2. Elevated gun position decreasessurvivability due to high silhouetteand exposed mechanisms.

In a conventional turret, the turretneed not be much higher above the hullroof than the vertical height of the gun.Since the gun breech of an EGT cannot ordinarily drop down below thehull roof (unless a depression is builtinto the top of the chassis, which willneed a cover to keep out water andcontaminants, including dirt and de-bris2), the trunnions must be raised ac-cordingly, which raises the gun height.

The elevated gun position means thatall kinds of mechanisms that would or-dinarily be under turret armor are nowexposed, where they are vulnerable toshot, bullets, blast, fragments, weather,and the occasional tree branch, smalland large. By the time the system is de-tail-designed (as compared to that nice,clean generalized paper concept pic-ture), there will also be all kinds ofreentrant angles and surfaces to accom-modate various sights, coax MGs,hatches, and access doors, etc., thatwill make the turret a mobile shot trapand generalized rain catcher. It will bean especially good rain catcher when itgets on in years, the seals are com-pressed or torn, and the hatches andlatches don’t work that well anymore.Think how well the re-entrant surfaceswill trap and leak CBR contaminants,and how they will then leak into the in-terior. Think about the difficulty of de-contaminating that surface. The causticdecontaminating chemicals will alsoget inside the vehicle, where they willcause their own unique problems.

3. Excessive complexity due to theneed to remote the operation of sub-systems.

As an example, let’s review the coaxMG installation in a conventional turretas compared to an EGT. In a conven-tional turret, a turret crewman can re-plenish the coax ammo supply, cleargun stoppages, change barrels, help toadjust boresight or zero, and do othertasks. But, in an EGT, there is no direct

access, so these operations must beremoted at the expense of increasedcomplexity, accompanied by increasedweight, volume, and cost. And youmay be certain that none of this com-plexity will be revealed in conceptdrawings or magazine articles describ-ing how great the idea is. (A nice fea-ture of concept drawings is that onecan label a component or subsystem asbeing present with a barely existingvolume and weight allowance.) Don’tforget that the complexity will increasethe maintenance and logistic burden, aswell as decrease reliability. The coax isjust one simple system. Now considerall the other subsystems that must beremoted and you will have another rea-son why you don’t see any EGT inproduction.

As another example, let’s look at theturret drives, which must have a man-ual backup mode. An EGT that is re-moted (the gunner and commander are

stationary in the hull, and do not rotatewith the gun) must still have manualturret drive. Manual turret drives forsuch an turret are feasible, but are com-plicated, meaning heavy, bulky, and ex-pensive. Manual turret drives for anEGT that is not remoted are less com-plicated than for the remoted turret, butstill more complicated than for a con-ventional turret.

4. Loss of interior volume andmounting surface area.

These are some of the worst featuresof the EGT, and are, unlike the issuesdescribed above, the only problem ar-eas that I haven’t seen commented onbefore. The EGT proponents say thatwhat we need to do to have an ‘ad-vanced’ vehicle is to get rid of theheavy turret and cram the crew and abunch of other stuff that used to be inthe turret (well, approximately half ofthe turret crew’s volume was in the tur-ret) into the hull. The hull was already


External Guns - Tested and Rejected

Among many vehicles thathave explored the concept ofexternal guns were the Gen-eral Dynamics Armored GunSystem candidate, above,and the HIMAG (High MobilityAgility) vehicle, shown at leftbeing tested in 1980.

crowded, and the alleged advantage ofeliminating the conventional turret bas-ket volume in the hull (with its fic-tional free volume) for the remoted

EGT is an illusory advantage. Thespace in the basket that was previouslyoccupied by seats, ammo, turret drivemotors, pumps, control handles, abunch of electronic control boxes ofvarying sizes all interconnected withcables, and only half of the volume ofthe turret crew’s body, will now haveto accept the volume of all those sameitems (minus the volume of the gunbreech when the muzzle is elevated),plus now the entire volume of the turretcrew’s bodies and a lot of the compo-nentry that used to be in the turret —more control boxes, cables, controlpanels, fire control items, etc. Combinethat complexity with the fact that theEGT will impose its own set of addi-tional complexities. There is just not

enough volume to be able to do all thatand still have a credible design ap-proach.

Another aspect of turret and vehiclesystem design in which the EGT un-necessarily degrades the designer’s op-tions is the lack of turret surfacemounting area, external as well as in-ternal. All those turret control panelsand handles, electronic boxes, andother gadgets listed above must all beattached somewhere; and all that mate-rial shown on the OVE and OVM listsmust be stowed somewhere, inside orout. Where will it go on a vehicle withan EGT? The top of the hull cannot beused, as it would block gun motion. Ona conventional turret, the turret bustlearea is normally used, but its use wouldeliminate many of the claimed advan-tages of an EGT.

The photo above shows a typical M1-series Tank in DESERT STORM, alldressed up and ready for a fight, withall kinds of things on and in it that arenot on the OVE/OVM lists. Note howcluttered the real vehicle is.

Where would we put all that materialon a vehicle with an external gun tur-ret? The proponents of the external gunturret seriously underestimate both theinternal volume needs of any combatvehicle, as well as underestimating theimpact of the loss of turret wall surfacefor mounting all the items they don’ttalk about.

ConclusionDuring the design phase of a new tur-

ret, or a new vehicle system, the expe-rienced designers in the business (thosewho are left) examine many differentapproaches for meeting the user’s re-quirements for performance, reliability,survivability, weight, and cost. TheEGT has not yet passed that test, andthat is why it is still “Often a Brides-maid, Never a Bride.”

Notes

1An experienced turret designer who reviewedthis paper made the comment “...Have you everseen an animal that didn’t have its eyes eitherat, or very near, the top of its head? Even aflounder has both its eyes on the top of itsbody!” A good point.

2The resulting product will probably look andoperate like a poorly designed turret.

All That Stuff Has To Go Somewhere...

An M1A1 crew from 1-35 Armor pauses during Desert Storm. Note the external turret stowage space unavailable in an EGT design.


ON STOWAGE LIMITATIONS:

“The proponents of the externalgun turret seriously underestimateboth the internal volume needs ofany combat vehicle, as well as un-derestimating the impact of the lossof turret wall surface for mountingall the items they don’t talk about.”

Don Loughlin retired from thedefense industry in 1992 after a35-year career as an ordnanceengineer. Prior to that, he was aMarine armor officer for fiveyears. Loughlin holds degreesfrom the University of Pennsyl-vania and Johns Hopkins Uni-versity and is a 1953 graduateof the Armor School. He nowlives in Bellingham, Washington.

“For to win one hundred victories inone hundred battles is not the acme ofskill. To subdue the enemy withoutfighting is the acme of skill.”

-Sun Tzu

Operations Other Than War Is Here Now

Field Manual 7-98, Operations in aLow-Intensity Conflict, opens with theSun Tzu quote above. It then drylycontinues, “The possibility of U.S.troops becoming involved in a low-in-tensity conflict (LIC) is ever increas-ing.” The thousands of American sol-diers currently deployed to Haiti, Tur-key, Macedonia, and countless other“hot spots” around the globe would tellthe author of 7-98 that the possibility isa reality. Thousands more, deploying tothe former Yugoslavia to enforce thepeace treaty recently signed in Paris,will face that “possibility” every day.

The end of the Cold War, and of the“balance of terror” with which the su-perpowers kept national ambitions andethnic rivalries in check for fear of es-calating a local conflict into global war,has completely changed the interna-tional security equation. Soldiers whospent their careers training to fight con-ventional war in Europe, and deployedto fight a conventional war in South-

west Asia, now face the near-certaintythat their next real-world deploymentwill involve something less than all-outground combat. The low-intensity con-flict which American forces will facewill be characterized by “the indirectversus direct application of force,” ac-cording to FM 7-98. The new situ-ations which American combat forceswill face “present a unique challenge.”However, “a disciplined unit, with sol-diers proficient at individual skills whoare operating under a clear expressionof the commander’s intent, can performsuccessfully at the tactical level in thisenvironment.”

Properly trained, equipped, and or-ganized, American combat forces canaccomplish national military objectivesin any level of conflict, as our recentsuccesses in Haiti and our continuingsuccess in Macedonia demonstrates.However, the “increasing possibility”of low-intensity conflict necessitatescertain changes in our training and or-ganization in order to provide ourforces with the best possible chance ofsuccess.

USAREUR, the CMTC, and OOTW

The Combat Maneuver Training Cen-ter at Hohenfehls is in the forefront ofU.S. Army Training for Operations

Other Than War. A ten-day rotation fora tank or mechanized infantry battalionbegins with three days of pure joy:training for Operations Other Than Warthrough the creation and enforcementof a Zone of Separation between twoethnic groups that have recently signeda peace agreement ending a civil war.The Blueforce unit is required to estab-lish a lodgment area, operate check-points regulating passage through theZone of Separation, escort and protecthumanitarian relief convoys, negotiatehostile checkpoints, deal with accred-ited and unaccredited media, establishand run civil-military working groups,and in general deal with many of thesituations which units can be expectedto perform successfully in real-worlddeployments. This training is excep-tionally difficult, putting severe strainon command and control systems andon junior leader initiative and under-standing of the political situation andthe commander’s intent. The purposeof this article is not to detail exactlyhow excruciating this training at theCMTC is, although the authors wouldlike all tank company commanders inCONUS to spend six hours attemptingto negotiate passage of a UN convoythrough one of the belligerents’ check-points before telling him how muchmore challenging an NTC rotation is.“Gunner, HEAT, checkpoint” is not theapproved solution.


Training a Divisional Cavalry Squadronfor Operations Other Than War (OOTW)

by Captain John A. Nagl and Captain Tim Huening

A U.S. soldier on patrol in Grenadaencounters one of those uniquesituations typical of low-intensityconflict.

Training for OOTW at CMTC is sochallenging — and such a realistic por-trayal of what units can expect to facewhen deployed on peacekeeping opera-tions or other LIC missions — that the1st Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry has de-veloped an Operations Other Than WarTactical Standard Operating Procedure(“OOTW TACSOP”) and a challengingOOTW training scenario which hasbeen incorporated into gunnery TableXII. Both the OOTW TACSOP and theCavalry Table XII scenario are con-stantly being revised and updated basedon the results of training at Grafen-wohr, the CMTC, and at home station;however, we feel that the lessons wehave learned in training for OperationsOther Than War may be of benefit toother Army units facing the “increasingpossibility” that they may deploy into aLIC environment.

1-1 Cavalry OOTW TACSOP

The OOTW TACSOP builds on thetactics, techniques, and proceduresfound in FM 7-98 and other sources ofArmy doctrine. It is a derivative docu-ment; its value rests in its small sizeand easy reference for the proper ac-complishment of the critical OOTWtasks identified by the commanders ofV Corps, the 1st Armored Division, the3rd Infantry Division, and the 7thArmy Training Command. The OOTWTACSOP thus provides task, condition,and standard for the following criticaltasks:

• Conduct Patrols• Establish and Operate an Observa-

tion Post• Establish and Operate a Checkpoint• Plan for Media• Conduct Liaison/Negotiate• Escort a Convoy• React to Ambush• React to Indirect Fire• Establish a Lodgment Area• Secure a Route• Mine Clearance• Provide Command and Control

Many of these tasks are inherent inall military operations; in OOTW, theyare accomplished by squad leaders andtank commanders. The OOTW TAC-SOP provides these junior leaders witha ready reference for both training andreal-world performance of the criticaltasks which will determine success orfailure of our next deployment to a LICenvironment. The TACSOP includes

detailed checklists and OPORDS forsuch tasks as convoy linkup, inspectionprocedures, LIC rules of engagement,and weapons control status, which arenot often trained in most units. It hasbeen issued to every tank and BFVcommander in the squadron, and hasproven to be an invaluable document.

Cavalry Table XII: Training for OOTW

The OOTW TACSOP was the basedocument used to create the observer/controller checklists and tasks/condi-tions/standards which 1-1 Cavalrytrains its platoons on as Day 1 of atwo-day Cavalry Table XII scenario.Borrowing heavily from the CMTC, 1-1 Cavalry creates a Zone of Separationin the vicinity of Grafenwohr’s Range301 CALFEX training area. Tank andscout platoons are trained and evalu-ated on their performance of all of theOOTW critical tasks listed above. Thesquadron uses its Lighthorse HumveeScout Platoon as dedicated OPFOR toreplicate the warring ethnic factions,presenting a number of challengingOOTW scenarios to the platoon leadersand section sergeants who would facethem in an actual deployment. It is anintensive exercise in leadership, com-mand and control, and discipline; noneof the evaluated platoon members aresorry to hear that the peace agreementhas broken down as a result of contin-ued Sowenian aggression, requiring theplatoons to move to high-intensity con-flict on Range 301 to restore the peace.

OOTW at Home Station

As in all training, the most importantlessons learned at Cavalry Table XIIare brought out at the AAR. These les-sons — incorporating changes to theOOTW TACSOP, to the organizationand evaluation of Cavalry Table XII,and to internal platoon command andcontrol, organization, and equipment— are further trained and refined athome station. OOTW is the ultimate inSergeant’s Time training: METL-fo-cused and trained at the lowest level ofsupervision, just as the OOTW taskswould be performed on actual deploy-ments. The TACSOP is a great refer-ence for section leaders planning train-ing, given that it is built around thetasks, conditions, and standards fortasks designated as critical to the suc-

cess of the unit in OOTW by the VCorps commander.

Operations Other Than War are in-creasingly likely to be the situationswhich American units face when de-ployed in harm’s way. Disciplined unitscomposed of soldiers who are profi-cient in their basic skills and are oper-ating under a clear expression of thecommander’s intent can succeed in alow-intensity conflict environment.However, it is our duty as leaders toensure that they have the best possibletraining, organization, and equipmentto ensure their success. The OOTWTACSOP and training in OOTW tasks,at training centers, during gunnery, andat home station, are ways to give oursoldiers the edge they deserve so thatthey do not have to fight and win onehundred battles, but can subdue the en-emy without fighting at all.

Copies of the 1st Squadron, 1st U.S.Cavalry TACSOP and the Cavalry Ta-ble XII packet are available from theSquadron S3, 1st Squadron, 1st U.S.Cavalry, CMR 401, APO AE 09076.


Captain John A. Nagl is a1988 graduate of the UnitedStates Military Academy and a1990 graduate of Oxford Uni-versity. He served as a tankplatoon leader and as a tankcompany executive officer inTask Force 1-32 Armor, 1stCavalry Division, and assquadron S4 and ApacheTroop commander in the 1stSquadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry,1st Armored Division. He hasbeen selected to teach interna-tional relations at the U.S. Mili-tary Academy.

Captain Tim Huening is a1992 graduate of Ohio StateUniversity. He has served asscout platoon leader and asassistant S3 in the 1st Squad-ron, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 1st Ar-mored Division, and was theprimary author of the 1-1 CavTACSOP and OOTW TAC-SOP. He recently served asthe squadron S4.

Recently, while watching the news, I was treated to therather nauseating spectacle of seeing M48A5s, M60s, andM60A1s being dropped into the ocean to make “artificialreefs.” Although realizing that these vehicles were obsolete astanks and that we are near to completing M1 transition, itseemed so wasteful.

Instead of dumping the tanks into the ocean, we should belooking at alternate military uses. Specifically, we shouldlook to reconfiguring them as turretless armored personnelcarriers and engineer vehicles, as was done in WWII. In thelast year of the war, the British and the Canadians used tankhulls with the turrets removed as armored personnel carriers(called “Kangaroos”). These APCs afforded their embarkedinfantrymen greater protection than the APC of the day (theM3 halftrack) and were just as mobile as tanks. The Israelishave done much the same thing with old Centurion and Pat-ton hulls. As these vehicles were replaced by Merkava, theirautomotively sound hulls were used for a myriad of func-tions. Their availability solved the problem of an APC’s vul-nerability to RPG and other light antitank weapons fire.

The M60 hulls would be perfect for combat engineer unitsin many respects. They would offer an increased degree ofarmored protection for combat engineer squads engaged inbreaching operations. In addition, they would have a greaterability to breach wire than the current M113. The modifiedM60 hull could also be used to TOW multiple MICLICs andcould also be fitted with mine plows.

The proposed engineer tank hull APC would have hatchesboth on the top and bottom of the hull, allowing for quickdismount over the top of the vehicle or slower but more se-cure dismount through the bottom hatch. The vehicle wouldbe armed with an M2 .50 Cal MG (with the old VietnamACAV turret) and two pintle-mounted 7.62 MGs, as well assmoke grenade dischargers. Stowage bins could be welded onto the hull for engineer equipment. The removal of the turretand ammunition stowage spaces would allow more thanenough room for the nine-man engineer squad. The engineervehicle could have additional armor welded to the front andsides, as well as side skirts over the tracks and drive assem-blies. Each vehicle could also be fitted to take either a bladeor a mine plow.

In addition to duty as a manned engineer vehicle, M60 hullscould also be used for robotic mine and obstacle clearing.With hardened robotic controls, mine plow/dozer blade andincreased armor, the vehicle should be hard to knock out. Aplatoon of such vehicles could be created in the headquarterscompany of each mechanized engineer battalion.

Furthermore, the automotively viable M60 hulls could bestored and used for any number of future requirements. Awhole family of “funnies” could be based on the M60 hull,

not to mention any replacement tracked ADA system (in thesame manner of the ill-fated SGT York). Additionally, all ofthese vehicles could be used as sources of spare parts for theconversion vehicles.

Another possible use for the M60-series tanks is that of OP-FOR vehicles. With the end of the cold war, U.S. forces nowface a plethora of weapons systems, including many of ourown. It will not be uncommon to see M48- and M60-seriesvehicles in the hands of our opponents in some future con-flict. The addition of M60-series vehicles to the OPFORs ofthe NTC, JRTC, and CMTC will reflect this. It would alsohave the advantage of giving the OPFOR a vehicle that manytankers are familiar with and that more PLL exists for thanthe M551 Sheridan.

If nothing else, the tanks currently consigned (but not deliv-ered) to Davy Jones locker could find a more useful end totheir existence as targets. The hard targets on many rangeshave been long shot to pieces. What better way to presentrealistic target arrays than to actually present entire tank com-panies as targets. This would be especially useful on USAFranges in that it would give TACAIR pilots valuable practicein attacking actual large armored formations (albeit stationaryones). If the M48s are too long in the tooth to be effectivelyutilized in either foreign aid or alternative armored vehicledevelopment, then this is by far a more militarily useful endthan pushing them into the ocean in order to look politicallycorrect.

“Waste not, want not” is a philosophy we had better getused to if we are to be successful in the incredible shrinkingmilitary. Pushing automotively viable tank hulls into thewater for what amounts to a photo op is wasteful. These ve-hicles could still provide useful service to the U.S., either asconversions, as OPFOR, or as targets. We are no longer amilitary that can carelessly discard. The time may come inthe not too distant future that we may have a use for ourfishtanks.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton received his Infantrycommission in 1978 from Florida Tech. He served as acompany XO with 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Ft. Ben-ning; rifle and TOW platoon leader with 1-9 Infantry in Ko-rea; assistant G3 staff officer with 9th ID, and commander,D Company, 2-2 Infantry, both at Ft. Lewis, Wash. Heserved as company and S3 observer/controller at the NTCat Ft. Irwin; senior brigade advisor, 2d Saudi National GuardMech Brigade, Hofuf, Saudi Arabia; and as S3, 2-87 Infan-try, Ft. Drum, N.Y. His combat service includes the Gulf Warin 1991 and Somalia, 1992-93. A graduate of the College ofNaval Command and Staff at Newport, R.I., he is currentlyassistant J5 Policy, USCENTCOM.


Fishtanks or Kangaroos?by Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton

The author began riding when he as-sumed his duties as the American Liai-son Officer at The French CavalrySchool. As of this writing, he has notbroken any bones.

Nestled in the magnificent valley ofthe Loire River in northwest France,the School of Application of Armor andCavalry seems at first glance to be acurious blend of old and new.1 TheCavalry School conducts basic and ad-vanced officers courses, reserve OCS,senior NCO courses, and all manner ofspecialized, armor-related technicalcourses. It contains a think-tank for ar-mor doctrine and advanced computersimulations suites. Just across the streetfrom a spanking-new, angular buildingof diamond-shaped steel girders andglass — the new home for instructionon the high-tech, digitalized, third-gen-eration Leclerc main battle tank — isthe riding complex. There one finds

stables for 120 horses, two maneges(indoor riding halls), the carrière (alarge outdoor riding arena), and theChardonnet (an even larger arena). Be-hind the 18th century headquartersbuilding is a special arena for dressage.It has not changed much since the endof the 19th century. The school alsoowns a 100-acre wood and field withtrails for riding. The cadre of theschool — even those who spend theirdays teaching the new Leclerc — oftentouch their roots at 7 a.m., exercisingon horseback. The instructors of theSection Equestre Militaire (SEM) offerdaily classes to student officer cadets,basic and advanced course students, of-ficers, NCOs, and draftees of the cadre,and even cadre spouses and children.In 1993, the SEM taught 4,600 hoursto officer and NCO students, 2,200hours to dependents, and 2,000 hoursto cadre (individual and in groups).Clearly, equitation is the glue that bindsthe diverse organisms of the school, as

much with each other as with the past.More important, the French see thehorse as a training device to teach thespirit of the cavalry, character, andleadership.

To introduce new officers to the spiritof the branch they have selected, theFrench cavalry school requires all basiccourse students to ride.2 Usually, nomore than half of the lieutenants haveever ridden before their arrival in Sau-mur in September. But by the end oftheir 10-month basic course, in July,they perform on horseback during anannual gala called the Caroussel.3 Be-fore 30,000 to 40,000 spectators, theyoung lieutenants jump meter-high bar-riers in unison, and charge full-tilt withlances to snare 12-inch diameter ringsdangling from a platform. Others, car-rying sabres at a gallop, skewer papermaché heads (looking curiously liketheir instructors) planted one foot offthe ground.

À ChevalEquitation as Sport and Trainingat the French School of Armor and Cavalry

by Lieutenant Colonel John Moncure


The course of instruction for lieuten-ants is organized by the Écuyer en ChefLieutenant Colonel Patrick Mozat (theriding master on the faculty of theschool), and conducted by his cadre ofone captain, three NCOs, and eighteenmilitary grooms, all of whom are spe-cially trained at the Military EquitationSports Center at Fontainebleau(CSEM). The curriculum includes 27periods of instruction of one hour, and19 more of two hours each. At the endof the first 25 hours the lieutenantsconduct a raid d’equitation, an over-night exercise including a mountedland navigation event in which they arerequired to fill in a whited-out sectionof a photocopy of a 1:50,000 map.They also practice 40 hours for the Ca-

roussel. More advanced riders may jointhe Club Wattel, named after a formerriding master,4 and enjoy additionalhours of riding instruction to preparethem for competitive events elsewherein France or internationally. By the endof the year, 85 percent of studentsreach the skill-level goal.5 The robust-ness of the program suggests stronglythat the emphasis placed on riding is animportant instrument in the develop-ment of cavalry officers.

The equestrian program serves otherpurposes as well. Of course, riding is asport. A beginning rider (debutant inFrench) who also runs regularly willexperience significant soreness in thefirst few weeks of instruction, even atthe pace of one lesson per week. The

style is “classic” (English) — adaptedto the French mentality, of course.Horsemen use the Danloux saddle6 andall riders are required to wear the rid-ing uniform: britches, riding boots,kepi. They do not actually “ride” asmuch as they become a component ofa centaur: man and horse in a singlebeing. The trot enlevé — rising trot inBritain or posting in the U.S. — re-quires the rider to balance on the stir-rups, perform modified knee bends,and squeeze his calves into the horses’flanks to indicate acceleration, decel-eration, change of pace, change of di-rection, or change of attitude of thehorse (such as an oblique movement).While it is not as demanding in endur-ance as distance running, it requiresconsiderable effort and coördinatedskill.

During that year, the lieutenants notonly get good exercise to supplementtheir other sports, they learn a skillviewed at the school as a measure ofmachismo, and they become confidentin their abilities as well. Frequently,troops of horsemen ride into Saumur orits outlying villages, clattering purpose-fully along the narrow streets, or can-tering through the nearby fields orwoods. Sitting astride a 1200-pound

At left, the opening ceremony in the Car-rousel.

Above, a lieutenant prepares his horse inpreparation for his riding lesson.

On the following page, a platoon of lieuten-ants performing during the Carrousel.


animal with its own mind is a dauntingprospect to anyone who has not doneit. The apprentice rider learns a newway to sit, to stand, to balance himself.He learns a suppleness in the saddlewithout which riding is not only un-comfortable and even painful, but aprecursor to lingering back injuries.Enjoying the view five feet above theheads of pedestrians surely contributesto the value of the horse as an instru-ment of psychological conditioning foryoung cavalry officers. Just as the para-chute badge gives a soldier a sense ofaccomplishment at having faced dan-ger, so does an experienced horsemangain a general sense of presence andmastery from his horseborne feats.

But more than these more obviouspurposes, the physically and psycho-logically demanding exercise of learn-ing to ride a horse gives the young offi-cer a sense of the relationship of theleader and the led. For the duration of aride the horseman gives the horse di-rection, rate of advance, and pace. Thehorse is an enormous creature (muchlarger than it appears in Westerns) witha mind of its own. If it refuses to per-form as requested (usually a conse-quence of inexpert directions by therider) it can be forced. But it can alsoturn on its master when it has hadenough abuse. A more experiencedrider learns to operate in concert withthe horse to defeat the obstacles thatconfront them both. He takes into ac-count the horse’s personality and char-acter, his previous history, his physicalaptitude, and his level of training. Heteaches it with patience and clarity, butalso with firmness. On horseback, inmotion, he must rapidly read, under-stand, and react correctly to both thehorse and the external situation.7 This

description should sound much like aplatoon in the hands of its new lieuten-ant. The cavalry basic course officers— who are not made aware of thesesimilarities — join their first unit withat least a subliminal understanding ofsome of the basic truths of leadership.

Thus, equitation at Saumur is not justa pleasant diversion for the idle rich.The mode of transportation for thepredecessors of today’s armor officershas been pressed into service in a newway. Coming to grips with the horsegives young leaders a hint of the intan-gible qualities that make cavalrymeneffective in modern, high-tech combat.In 1913, the French riding master andauthor Gustave Lebon wrote:

It is interesting to note that the rea-soned dressage of the horse serves thecavalryman as an exercise in intellec-tual gymnastics and character-buildingthat no theoretical instruction couldever replace.8

Most modern armies have relegatedthe discipline of equitation to the con-fines of quaint, anachronistic tradition.By devoting impressive resources oftime, energy, and funds to the sport, theleadership of the French CavalrySchool — and the Army headquartersthat funds it — have demonstrated con-vincingly their recognition of its con-tinuing value in building the armorleaders of the future.

Notes1I wish to thank Captain Dominique Siegwart

for his helpful suggestions during the prepara-tion of this article.

2Several hours of equitation are also requiredat St. Cyr, and offered at several other branch

schools as well. Advanced course and NCOcourse students receive only 8 hours of instruc-tion; thus, the principal thrust of the RidingSection is for the lieutenants.

3This, and other public events, offset the costof horseback riding at the school. The armyspends about $4.00 per lesson for its students.

4After commanding the 2nd Tank Battalion in1918, General Wattel returned to Saumur to beriding master of the famous Cadre Noir. Hetook the business of armored warfare seriously,announcing, “I take the same care of my tanksthat I do of my horses!” Général Decarpentry etJacques Perrier, Les Maitres Écuyers dumanège de Saumur (Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle,1993), p. 95.

5“Activities de la Section Equestre,” unpub-lished document, prepared in 1994 and fur-nished to the author by LTC Mozat.

6The Danloux saddle looks generally like anEnglish saddle, and is named after GeneralWattel’s successor as riding master at Saumur.

7Capitaine Pascal Bayle, “L’Equitation auProgramme de la deuxième division d’instruc-tion de l’Ecole d’Application de l’ArmeBlindée et de la Cavalerie: Tradition onereuseou necessité comtemporaine?” Unpublishedmanuscript [n.d., 1985?], paras. 221, 222.

8Gustave Lebon, L’Equitation actuelle et sesprincipes (1913), 136.


Lieutenant Colonel John Mon-cure is the American liaison of-ficer to the French CavalrySchool. He was commissionedfrom USMA in 1972 and holdsa Ph.D. from Cornell University.He has served in the 2nd, 3rd,and 11th ACRs, taught historyat West Point, and was Profes-sor of Military Science atDavidson College.

A recent article (“Ammunition Load-ing Systems for Future Tanks” bySharoni and Bacon, ARMOR March-April 1995) clearly outlined many ofthe issues associated with automatedloading systems and reduced crews incombat tanks, as well as providing aninformative survey of recent U.S.autoloading concepts and engineeringdemonstrators. The following addi-tional information discusses the relatedsubject of the Armored Gun System(AGS) autoloader (A/L) which will bethe first production autoloader for alarge caliber direct fire weapon systemto be fielded by the U.S. Army.

Let us remember that the interest inautoloaders is a natural progressionflowing from the steady trend towardcrew reduction throughout the historyof armored fighting vehicles. DuringWWI, the British Mark I Male tankhad a crew of eight, while the GermanA7V carried 18 men. WWII and theKorean War-era tanks had five-mancrews. Remember the bow gunner?Those now on active duty or with re-cent tanker experience know the closeknit teamwork of the four that crewM48s, M60s, Sheridans, and Abrams.Now, we are at the point of serious in-vestigation and adoption of automatedammunition handling and loading ca-pabilities in future large caliber weap-ons systems with crews of three andpossibly two members.

As a strategically deployable systemfor use by early entry and contingencyforces, the AGS has specialized airtransportability requirements for deliv-ery by airlanding and Low Velocity AirDrop (LVAD) (parachute delivery).Note that air transportability considera-tions tend to drive designs to be“small” and “light,” which is in directcompetition with the tendency to buildarmored vehicles “big” and “heavy.”So, while being small and light, theAGS must be reliable and robustenough to operate in the severe groundcombat environment, as well as supportthe weight and firing shock of a high-pressure 105mm cannon. An autoload-ing system was selected for use in the

AGS, based on the need to build AGSwithin the weight and size envelopesdictated by the capabilities of availableUSAF tactical transport aircraft.

Design specifications for the AGS au-toloader essentially describe a me-chanical assistant to the gunner andcommander that provides capabilitiesfar exceeding the physical performanceof a human loader. An autoloader offersthe sustained rate of fire and systemflexibility permitting a reduced crew ofthree to successfully adapt to and fightin rapidly changing battlefield condi-

tions at least as well as a four-mancrew. A collateral result is that smallercrews minimize the number of person-nel placed in harm’s way, reducing po-tential casualties.

Replacing the fourth crew memberwith an autoloader provided opportuni-ties to optimize the system for rapid,flexible rates of fire. AGS will be oneof the deadliest armored vehicles for itssize, because it can load, fire, and re-load more quickly, over harsher terrainat higher speeds for a longer periodthan vehicles that depend on human


The Armored Gun System (AGS) Autoloaderby Lieutenant Colonel George E. Mauser

loaders. This gives the AGS com-mander the tactical agility to acquire,engage, and defeat multiple targetsvery quickly while stationary or on themove.

Significantly, the space needed for theautoloader is much less than that of afourth crewman, thus the interior pro-tected volume is less. Consequently,less structure and ballistic protection isrequired to protect theautoloader mechanismthan would be requiredto protect a crewman.Another advantage isthe ability to allocateconserved space andweight to increased ar-mor and on-board am-munition or otherstores. The AGS auto-loader provides aweight savings to thetotal design of about 1500 lbs. In termsof volume, the autoloader, with 21ready rounds is equal to a crewman, allof his equipment, and only nine readyrounds.

The autoloader — the “robotic crewmember” — is capable of maintainingthe desired 12-rounds-per-minute rateof fire and allows the commanderand/or gunner to rapidly select the ap-propriate round for the identified targetfrom the mix of standard 105mm mu-nitions loaded in the magazine. TheAGS has demonstrated sustained ratesof fire of 12 rounds per minute. (Practi-cal limitations on rates of fire will stillbe dictated by crew target acquisitionand engagement skills, target obscura-tion and the need to follow basic prin-ciples — mutual support, overwatch,disciplined fire distribution, ammuni-tion conservation, and use of good ter-rain movement techniques, includinguse of cover and concealment, as wellas alternate and supplemental posi-tions.)

The autoloader control system in theAGS provides the crew full flexibilityto select a round from the magazine,load it, unload it, re-stow it as a readyround, and select another in less timethan it takes to describe. Ammunitionselection, loading, firing, and ejectioncommands can be ordered at both thecommander’s and gunner’s weaponscontrol panels, with the commanderhaving the option of final override onall actions from his control panel.Upon firing, the autoloader ejects thespent casing from the vehicle and canload the next round automatically or on

command. Should a misfire occur, theautoloader extracts and ejects the mis-fired round to prepare the gun for an-other round, or extracts and presentsthe round for re-stowage, if desired.Under normal engagement conditions,the crew does not handle ammunitionor empty cases.

Should the autoloader fail, a crewmember can easily get into the auto-

loader compartment and manually loadfrom inside the turret. Manual loadingunder armor provides the crew redun-dant capabilities and reinforces theirconfidence that they will always have ameans of self protection. A positivelock-out at the access door shuts offhydraulic power so that the autoloaderand main gun drive mechanism won’toperate while the crew member is inthe compartment. The door is part of abulkhead that segregates the autoloader,magazine, and gun from the crew com-partment as an added measure of pro-tection for the crew if there is a threatpenetration and a subsequent ammuni-tion detonation or fire. This compart-mentalization is a proven technologyfeature modeled upon that used in theAbrams tank.

The AGS carries thirty 105mmrounds — 21 ready rounds in the auto-loader magazine and nine more in hullstowage below the turret ring. Eachready round is inventoried and its typeand magazine location registered in theautoloader controller and displayed onthe computer control panel during auto-loader replenishment. If necessary, theinventory function can be reviewedduring operations to confirm the typeand location of each ready round or toaccount for rounds manually replen-ished. During a replenishment function,the autoloader control system indexesthe magazine by evenly distributing therounds of each type to ensure a maxi-mum firing rate. A byproduct of this in-dexing is maintenance of an optimumspacing of like rounds to improve sur-vivability and evenly distribute the

weight of rounds. Replenishment of theautoloader magazine with a full com-plement of 21 rounds, including inven-tory entry and verification, has beenregularly accomplished in less than twominutes.

Autoloader status is reported to thegunner’s computer control panel atpower-up and during operations by aBuilt-In Test (BIT) capability through

the autoloader com-puter controller. Au-toloader status isconstantly reportedin a message cue atthe computer con-trol panel. Faultmessages notify thecrew to initiate iso-lation via on-boarddiagnostics to deter-mine whether a sys-tem fault can be

corrected in the turret or if it will affectthe mission.

The primary software developmentchallenge for the management and con-trol of the autoloader was its proper in-tegration with the total vehicle systemunder all combat and training condi-tions, in conjunction with providing on-board diagnostic capabilities.

Design of the autoloader to withstandLVAD without excessive weight pre-sented some very unique challenges. Tobe immediately combat-ready once onthe ground, the autoloader structure hadto be capable of surviving LVAD land-ing forces with up to 10 rounds of105mm ammunition loaded in themagazine. The loading system compo-nents had to be robust enough to han-dle the stresses of parachute landingand yet function reliably. To accom-plish this, all autoloader componentsare designed for, and have demon-strated survival of, a 15G verticalshock — the damped loading impartedto the autoloader upon parachute land-ing. The design underwent extensivestress analysis to ensure maximum per-formance at minimum weight. This re-sulted in numerous structural designchanges for strength and weight reduc-tion and judicious selection of materi-als best suited to the task such as stain-less steel, titanium, and composites. Anautoloader unit alone and also onemounted in an AGS have undergonestatic drops to replicate airdrop shock.On both occasions, the autoloader unitsfunctioned correctly immediately afterthe drops. Automated functions usedafter LVAD include control and meas-


urement of the autoloader hardware in-terfaces, system monitoring throughBIT, automatic recalibration of themechanism without intervention by thecrew, and the ability to step-functionthe system to aid system diagnostics. Ademonstration of LVAD with an actualAGS was conducted in June of lastyear as part of the Early User Test andEvaluation.

The autoloader also had to be de-signed to interface with the govern-ment-provided XM35 gun. This105mm gun, designed by the U.S.Army’s Benet Laboratories for use inlightweight vehicle applications, butnot specifically for use in the AGS, hasto be effectively serviced by the auto-loader without overstressing it. A primeconcern was the gun/autoloader inter-face, in which the autoloader pushesagainst the gun breech operatingmechanism to open the breech and ex-pel the spent case or unload a full

round. Autoloader actions had to betempered to protect the breech mecha-nism from excessive forces while stillproviding consistent operation overmany thousands of operating cycles.This was accomplished by analyzingand tailoring the hydraulic forces andaccelerations applied to the breech andmodifying the gun with a positivebreech stop.

Additionally, the gun and autoloadercombination had to accommodate awide range of available 105mm ammu-nition types with significant variationsin trunnion forces produced, weights,overall lengths, structural robustnessand centers of gravity. The gun and au-toloader combination had to considermany variations in ammunition compo-nents, such as fuzes, primers, warheads,propellants, and metal cases. For safety,positive control of the munitions mustbe maintained by the autoloader duringall phases of ammunition handling. As

the 105mm ammunition family hasbeen designed over almost a 40 yearspan, there is a wide variation in casematerials and projectile designs. Casecrimp design, and, most critically, widevariations in the case crimp yieldstrength, became a significant factorduring development of the autoloader.Traditional ammunition design guide-lines had never envisioned the forcesthat high rate automatic loading wouldgenerate when compared to forces pro-duced by manual loading.

The autoloader incorporates a widevariety of common and innovativetechnologies. The turret electrical con-trol box provides the autoloader with28 volts DC power to the autoloadercontroller (ALC). The ALC is pro-grammed to safely control the loader’sammunition handling and inventoryfunctions. The ALC receives and trans-mits all communications from and tothe fire control computer (FCC) and


the computer control panel (CCP). Theautoloader software currently has12,785 lines of code and has 97.7 per-cent Ada language content.

The AGS autoloader is powered by ahydraulic system that incorporates fea-tures such as linear actuators, a servo-controlled actuator, and solenoid-con-trolled valve blocks found in state-of-the-art hydraulic systems.

All ammunition transfers (magazine-to-breech or breech-to-magazine) areaccomplished via linear actuators. Eachlinear actuator is designed to controlboth the acceleration and the decelera-tion of the mechanism in motion. Addi-tionally, the start and end position ofeach mechanism is exactly the samefor each actuation/de-actuation cycle.The actuators are sized for the heaviestload, which compensates for variationsdue to round size, round weight, shock,vibration, and changes in environ-mental conditions. This approach en-sures round-to-round repeatability andhigh reliability.

The autoloader magazine drive designincorporates a servo-controlled actua-tor. The servo-controlled design incor-porates a servo valve, electrical feed-back circuits, and software to controlthe acceleration, deceleration, velocity,and position of the magazine. This ap-proach was selected to achieve highperformance in positioning the desiredround to the load station from any po-sition in the magazine. The current de-sign permits magazine rotation in eitherdirection and for any distance or dura-tion.

The solenoid control valve blocks in-corporate individual solenoid valvesand “shuttle valves” to transition low-level electrical control signals to highpower hydraulic output drive signals.Each linear actuator and servo actuatorare controlled through these valveblocks. Safety is provided and main-tained by a fail-safe design approach

on the main control valve block, whichincorporates a solenoid that returns toan “Off” or “No Hydraulic PressureApplied” condition upon loss of eitherhydraulic pressure or electrical power.

The design approach selected for thesensors was to use Hall Effect proxim-ity switches and magnet combinationsfor sensing critical positions of the au-toloader mechanisms. The magnet’s fieldis sensed by a proximity switch whenthe two items are aligned within aspecified gap/distance. This approachwas selected because of the high reli-ability of proximity switches and im-proved service life gained by eliminat-ing physical contact to actuate theswitch. This feature makes the switchlargely insensitive to external contami-nation from dust, dirt, and moisture. Itis much more reliable than a standardcontact switch or optical sensor. Addi-tionally, since there are no movingparts internal to the proximity switch,reliability is enhanced. Proximityswitches are also fail-safe since they donot fail in an “On” position. A discon-nected switch is sensed electrically as aswitch out of proximity, signals theelectronic controller that an unusualcondition exists, and halts operationsfor safety.

The autoloader hydraulic actuatorsand servo magazine motors are safetysequenced through logic and timers in-ternal to the autoloader controller. Am-munition can be transferred from themagazine to the breech and from thebreech to the magazine. This is possi-ble because none of the mechanismsare mechanically linked to the next se-quence, but are software-sequencelinked to a specific operation. Sequencediagrams were developed for each de-sired operation (load, unload, eject) andthe logic was programmed in softwareto achieve that result.

This feature of sequencing or syn-chronizing mechanisms to operations

provides for an extremely fast loadingrate as it allows for simultaneous op-erations. For instance, load tray andempty case tray motions can occur atthe same time. This feature also pro-vides for optimization of parts andmulti-function of assemblies. Themulti-function approach lowers weightand heightens reliability as it results infewer parts, and the complexity of thesystem is reduced. A prime example ofa multi-functional assembly is theRammer/Empty Case Tray. This assem-bly actually performs three functions:

• Ramming the round to the breechduring load operations

• Extending the empty case tray forejecting cases or misfired rounds

• Buffering the round during an un-load operation

The autoloader electronic controllersequences the autoloader mechanismsas described above, interfaces to theCCP and FCC, maintains inventory,and performs BITs on the autoloader.

While the controller manipulates thesystem, it also runs ALC backgroundBIT, operational BIT, and operator re-quested BIT. The background BIT isactive whenever electrical power is ap-plied to the ALC and no autoloadermotion is requested. Examples of thisBIT are internal circuit board tests, ca-ble connection tests, and power supplychecks. Any faults found are sent overthe 1553 data bus and displayed on thecomputer control panel.

The operational BIT is active when-ever an autoloader operation is re-quested. Examples of this BIT are “au-toloader stowed” as a condition to start,ammunition inventory checks as a con-dition to perform the desired operation,and proximity switch and solenoidsafety interlock checks as a conditionto complete the requested operation.

The operator-requested BIT is activeor available for fault isolation and cor-rective action. Autoloader informationavailable to the operator includes mo-tion timing, fault history, cycle history,switch status, and solenoid status. TheALC also contains electrical and hy-dromechanical BIT tests that can be re-quested by the operator to help identifya problem, or determine the currentstatus of the system. Options that canbe operator-requested include:

• Electrical test — a test to see if thesystem’s electronics are receivingmessages and power.

Use Model Type

Group A Training M490A1M724A1

TP-TTPDS-T

Group B Primary War Fighting M900M833M456A2

APFSDSAPFSDSHEAT-T

Group C Special Purpose M393A1M393A2M416M456A2

HEP-T (Training)HEP-T (Service)WP-TAPERS-T

105mm munitions undergoing qualification for use in AGS.


• System test — a test to see if thesystem mechanical interfaces areoperating in sequence and unison.

• Ammo hatch door test — a test tosee if the door functions as pro-grammed.

BIT is an integral part of the auto-loading safety and self-protection sys-tem. If the software determines thecondition detected by BIT to be dan-gerous to either ammunition, equip-ment, or personnel, the solenoids willbe held in their last condition and hy-draulic pressure is automatically re-moved from the autoloader. The unsafecondition must be corrected and the au-toloader brought to a stowable condi-tion before continuing operation. Im-mediate action drills have been devel-oped, similar in concept to those usedon automatic weapons such as machineguns, to facilitate quick recovery to fullfightable condition if stoppages do oc-cur.

The functional design of the auto-loader is complete and the contractorhas delivered eight prototypes. The firsttwo prototype autoloaders were deliv-ered as qualification units. One was re-tained by the contractor for compo-nent/environmental qualification testsand the other was sent to AberdeenProving Ground to support ammunitionqualification. The remaining six proto-type autoloaders were delivered toUnited Defense Limited Partnership(UDLP) and are now installed in thesix pre-production vehicles undergoinggovernment technical and operationaltest.

The AGS autoloader environ-mental/component qualification testended successfully in March 1994.Tests evaluated autoloader performanceagainst parameters in the AGS pro-gram’s Critical Item DevelopmentSpecifications (CIDS) to establish theoperational and survivability charac-teristics of the autoloader when sub-jected to external environmental condi-tions. The scope of tests performedconsisted of operations under high tem-peratures, low temperatures, thermalshock, humidity, blowing dust, cleaningwater spray, slope, random vibration,operational/non-operational shock, andair drop shock. Testing replicated themost severe field conditions, includingheavy dust, mud, and moisture con-tamination, and was very successful.Any shortcomings discovered duringthe test resulted in component changesfor subsequent application to the auto-loader assembly and re-testing.

The second qualification autoloader iscurrently at Aberdeen Proving Ground(APG), Maryland, and is being used tosupport ammunition qualification test-ing. The ammunition qualification testis designed to determine the compati-bility between the AGS and currentlyfielded 105mm ammunition types.Qualification testing consists of sixsubtests:

• Autoloader function• Autoloader cycle• Autoloader vibration• Sequential life-cycle• Sequential rough handling• Ammunition airdrop

Each subtest is being conducted oneach ammunition type to be fired bythe AGS. In addition, each qualificationautoloader is used to evaluate any de-sign changes and their impact on am-munition handling. The autoloader un-dergoing government test at AberdeenProving Ground has completed over16,000 cycles (vs. 10,000 cycle designlife) with no major failures or overhaul.Like the Energizer Bunny, “it justkeeps going and going.” Indications arethat the AGS autoloader system willexceed its original design life by awide margin. Testing will continuethrough FY96.


The six pre-production vehicles (PV)are currently being used for technicaltesting, operational experimentation,and logistics demonstrations. Fullyfunctional autoloaders are in each ofthese vehicles. One PV has completedthe contractor 4,000 mile durabilitytest, which includes autoloader cyclingand live ammunition firing. Two PVsare at APG undergoing governmentperformance and reliability testing. An-other two PVs are being evaluated atEarly User Test and Experimentation(EUT&E) now in progress at Ft. Pick-ett, Va. During these tests, the total re-quirements for the AGS are beingevaluated. The remaining PV is cur-rently at United Defense Limited Part-nership (UDLP), the prime system con-tractor, and is being used for logisticsdemonstrations and engineering evalu-ations.

Informal observations shared by theever-expanding population of thosewith exposure to the AGS autoloaderare providing insight into its charac-teristics and suitability. Emerging infor-mation substantially supports the viewthat soldiers can be easily trained tooperate the autoloader. It is simple andsafe to operate; positively controls andsafeguards ammunition; aids crew in-teractions; is robust, reliable, repeatable,and repairable; and meets its specifiedrequirements. Definitive judgment aboutthe autoloader and the AGS must awaittechnical and operational test outcomes

and official assessment by the appro-priate independent evaluation agencies.

The AGS autoloader, designed andbuilt by United Defense Limited Part-nership, Armament Systems Division(UDLP-ASD) of Minneapolis, Minne-sota, is supplied to United DefenseLimited Partnership, Ground SystemsDivision (UDLP-GSD), San Jose, Cali-fornia, for AGS system integration.

Although not a main battle tank, theAGS will be the first U.S. productiontank-like system with a reduced crewof three (commander, gunner, anddriver) and an automatic loading sys-tem (the “robotic” crew member) inplace of the traditional fourth crewman.AGS will provide the Army its first ex-periences in the transition from four-man crews. As such, the AGS will bethe precursor of those future systemsdescribed by the recent article.

AGS is leading the practical adapta-tions to our operational and logisticssupport doctrine (as well as our Armorculture) and will influence future tacti-cal operations with crews of less thanthe accustomed four members. Thisprocess has already started with the ex-posure of Armor soldiers and organiza-tional mechanics from the 3rd Battal-ion, 73rd Armor, XVIII Corps. Hands-on experiences with production-likehardware have occurred during logis-tics demonstrations conducted over thelast two years by soldier crews con-ducting technical testing at Aberdeen

Proving Grounds, Md., and at tacticaland gunnery testing now ongoing.

LTC Foster NickersonProduct Manager, AGS Main ArmamentsSFAE-ASM-AG-A (810) 574-7852OPM AGS DSN 786-7852PEO ASM FAX Ext. 7705Warren, MI 48397-5000

The Lighter Side of AutoloadersLarry Bacon, Director of Graphic Arts at Western Design, a California firm that develops autoloaders and ammunition-handling sys-tems, amuses co-workers and customers with his cartoons when he isn’t designing serious stuff like rammer assemblies and feedchutes. This one is from a humorous briefing entitled “Ammunition Handling Through the Ages.”


Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeE. Mauser was commissionedin Armor in 1974 from VirginiaPolytechnic Institute and hasa masters degree from theUniversity of Redlands, Cali-fornia. He has served in a va-riety of assignments in cav-alry, armor, and mechanizedinfantry units in CONUS andEurope, as well as positionsas a test director at AberdeenProving Grounds, Observer-Controller at the NTC, and onHQ AMC and DA ODCSOPSstaffs. He was recently theProduct Manager, AGS MainArmaments, and is currentlyattending the Army War Col-lege.

One of the most difficult, and prob-ably the least glamorous job, for an ar-mor lieutenant in an armor battalion isthe headquarters and headquarters com-pany executive officer. He is responsi-ble for the maintenance of over 130 ve-hicles of all different types and con-figurations. He is also responsible formonitoring supply matters for a com-pany of over 300 and hundreds ofproperty book lines. I was an HHC XOafter being a tank company XO for 11months. I had a good idea what a tankcompany XO did because I watchedmy XO while I was a platoon leader.The HHC XO job was one that I wasless prepared to take and, therefore, Ilearned a lot on the job.

The first thing I learned was to usethe personnel in the company. A tankcompany is really not that big, so Iused to get away with doing sometasks myself or getting maintenancestatus straight from the tank command-ers. The size of the headquarters com-pany made that impossible. Personnelin the company have a wealth of expe-rience. Your scout platoon leader wasprobably one of the best tank platoonleaders before he took the scouts, so heshould be able to help you keep thescouts squared away. Your support pla-toon leader is usually an experiencedlieutenant who can also help. In somesections, the leader is often occupiedwith other issues, so it is easier to finda point of contact for maintenance andsupply issues. This does not necessarilyhave to be the leader of the section, butit has to be a responsible individualwho can talk intelligently about the in-formation you need. A competent pointof contact in each section will make iteasier to track status of the company.

The second thing I learned was thatan HHC has much more property thana tank company. I was blessed with an

excellent supply sergeant who ran awell organized supply room. If it ispossible, the HHC commander shouldtry and get the best supply sergeant inthe battalion into the HHC supplyroom. If the HHC supply sergeant isovercome by the size of the HHC, then

the XO will have to spend more timehelping with the supply room.

The first step is to organize. Findenough black binders for each sectionthat has a hand receipt. Gather the sec-tion’s hand receipts together and putthem in the binder. Use document pro-tectors to separate the hand receipts inthe binder. Put a number on eachbinder. Next, go through each linenumber in the property book and, nextto the item, put the number of thebinder where the hand receipt is kept.If you ever need to inventory a particu-lar item, look in the property book and

see, by binder number, which sectionsare signed for the items.

The second step is to ruthlessly in-ventory. Using the monthly ten percentinventory is the best way to keep trackof the company property. The XOshould help the commander by organiz-

ing these inventories ahead ofhis arrival, so all he has to dois look at a layout. The XOshould locate all the propertyand set a layout time with thesections being inventoried. Tokeep the company property inorder, the XO must followthrough after the inventoryand account for shortages.This is not the time to lethand receipt holders say,“Give me a few days, I’ll findwhat I lost.” The HHC hastoo much property, and it isvery easy to forget about alost wrench. The biggest sup-ply headaches for the HHCXO are the sets, kits, and out-fits (SKO). A HHC has manyend items with componentlistings that are pages long.Soldiers can even make theequipment operate for yearswithout some parts that were

lost by a previous hand receipt holder.The trouble comes when you try toturn in that end item and the receivingagent wants it complete. Since youhave all the battalion’s mechanics, youalso have all the tool boxes that gowith them. The XO should stress to themechanics to keep accountability oftheir tools or expect to pay for them.After conducting all inventories, updatethe shortage annexes and complete theadjustment documents.

The next thing I learned was thatmaintenance in the HHC is not as easyto perform as in a tank company. A


The HHC XOTips on Organizing a Tough JobWith Responsibility for a Lot of Equipment

by Captain David A. Smith

“Since you have all the battalion’s me-chanics, you also have all the tool boxesthat go with them. The XO should stressto the mechanics to keep accountabilityof their tools or expect to pay for them...”

tank company will have atleast two soldiers per tank topull maintenance. Maintain-ing the tank is part of fight-ing the tank, so plenty oftime is allocated to PMCS.The scout platoon is similarto the tank platoon because ascout also depends on hisvehicle to do his job. The mortar pla-toon’s maintenance problems centeredon the age of their equipment. TheM106s we had were over 25 years oldand some of the mortar tubes were fab-ricated in the 1950s. Also, some mortarsoldiers came from a light divisionbackground and were not familiar withtrack maintenance. The medical pla-toon might also be a problem. Medicsdo not spend very much time on main-tenance training because they, as theyshould, spend more time in medicaltraining. The medical platoon leader inmy HHC admitted that he had only afew hours of PMCS training at his ba-sic course. He was willing to learn, butit was hard to rely on him when itcame to maintenance matters. Thecooks were another problem. Cooks areup early preparing breakfast, and afterthat, they start on lunch. Their real-world mission of feeding the troopsthree meals a day does not leave muchtime to work on their trucks or MKTs.The battalion staff vehicles can be eas-ily neglected. The drivers of the staffvehicles often have other jobs at battal-ion headquarters, so they do not see themotor pool very often. Battalion staffofficers will claim they have morepressing matters for their soldiers to dobesides maintenance. Sometimes this istrue, but they will need their tracks forthe next field exercise, so some mainte-nance needs to be done. Believe it ornot, the worst maintained vehicles inthe battalion are often the maintenanceteam vehicles. The maintenance teamspends all of its time repairing every-one else’s equipment and has little timeto PMCS its own. During commandmaintenance, the mechanics spend allthe time fixing their company’s vehi-

cles, leaving little time for their ownmaintenance.

How do you fix these problems? Firstand most important is a ruthlessly en-forced Command Maintenance. Thebest way we found to control Com-mand Maintenance was to have a bat-talion-level formation at battalion head-quarters and then march the entire bat-talion to the motor pool. Commanderswere the only ones who could author-ize any absence. Command emphasis isextremely important. My battalioncommander would walk through head-quarters on Command Maintenanceday and clear out everyone to the mo-tor pool. This kind of emphasis makesthe XO’s job much easier. Ensure thatduring Command Maintenance, every-one is working on their own vehicles,including the mechanics. This mightcause some friction with line compa-nies, but you must make your mechan-ics off limits to allow them to work ontheir own vehicles. The afternoon ofCommand Maintenance is a good timeto have maintenance meetings. Arrangea time for each section to meet withyou and the maintenance team chief.This is an important face to face meet-ing to work out problems before me-chanic work is scheduled.

The second way to help fix yourmaintenance problems is to go downon your line and look at the vehicles.Take a look at a HMMWV that doesn’tlook like it has been started in months;try and start it. Look at tire pressureand vehicle serviceability. Get a 5988Efor a vehicle and do a PMCS. Check tosee if parts are on order or if parts havebeen in the parts bin for two months.After a few months, you will know

which vehicles are routinely neglected.Give the section a heads-up on the po-tential problems. Sometimes you mightneed help from the battalion XO toforce sections to fix problems, but dothis as a last resort.

The HHC is a huge unit. The best ad-vice I can give is not to be intimidatedby its size and just get to work. After afew weeks, you will know which areasneed more attention. Get to know theplatoon leaders; ask them what theirproblems are, and what help they need.Take advantage of the soldiers fromdifferent MOSs; learn new things fromthem; you will get a chance to see theArmy from their perspective. My bat-talion maintenance sergeant had aquote up in the motor pool that I thinkemphasizes the importance of theHHC. “The HHC might not be thePRIDE of the battalion, but without theHHC the PRIDE DON’T RIDE.” Be-ing the HHC XO is a tough job, but thekind of job that Army officers shouldaspire to.


Captain David A. Smith is a1990 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy with a BS inmechanical engineering. Agraduate of AOBC, AOAC,BMOC, and CAS3, he servedas a platoon leader, tank XO,and HHC XO for 3-64 Armorin Schweinfurt, Germany. Heis currently an assistant train-ing officer for the G3, 4th ID,at Ft. Carson, Colo.

Although the rest of Bravo Bowl wasa quagmire, the unusually sunny Ger-man day had baked the tank trails bonedry. HQ 4 left an enormous dust signa-ture as it sped from the TOC back tothe CTCP. The S4 looked at his watch.It was 1527. After a long morning ofplanning at the TOC, he had justenough time to check what was comingon the LOGPAC, conduct the CSS re-hearsal at the LRP, issue the combattrains order, make the TF rehearsal,conduct a hasty combat trains rehears-al, and hopefully catch a few hourssleep before 0400 stand-to. As hisHMMWV pulled into the combattrains, the S4 mused that all of the or-ders drills back in garrison had madethis all fairly easy, and the task forcewould do well during tomorrow’smovement to contact.

He eased up to the ramp of his M577,and cheerfully greeted his NCOIC.When the S4 asked for the LOGPACchecklist, the blank stare he receivedmade the hair on the back of his neckstand up. After 15 minutes of fumblingthrough what seemed like thousands ofpre-printed forms and duty logs, the S4gave up to leave for the LRP, givingorders to get the track organized beforehe returned with the LOGPAC. At theCSS rehearsal, the S4 sheepishly triedto explain away the probing questionsfrom company 1SGs who gave the S4that look of men who knew they wouldbe eating MREs tonight. The LOGPACarrived within 15 seconds of its ex-pected time. The S4 congratulated thesupport platoon leader on a good joband went to continue his troop-leadingprocedures.

The S4 wrapped up the combat trainsrehearsal just before dark, and decidedto see how the command post was run-ning now. After a few short questions,he realized no one had any idea how todo much more than dutifully log re-ports on the DA Form 1594. The S4comforted himself, knowing he hadseen the LOGPAC arrive himself. Atthat minute, the calls flooded the radio:A Team needed one more fueler; CTeam needed 300 sabot rounds; the en-gineers in B Company ate all of theirMREs for dinner and needed resupply

before morning; the mortars had noWP rounds for tomorrow’s mission;and to top it all off, the generator at theTOC was down. Through careful appli-cation of emergency resupply, and forc-ing his support platoon leader to run amidnight LOGPAC, the S4 correctedall deficiencies.

As he drifted off to a 30-minute nap,the S4 cursed himself for not beingmore involved in Sergeant’s Timetraining back in garrison. These prob-lems could have been avoided if he hadshared more of his knowledge with hissoldiers. Now it was too late. His onlycomfort was that in ten days the rota-tion would be over. The O/Cs couldmake it harder, but they could notmake it longer.

Almost categorically in heavy battal-ions, training in the S4 section is notbattle-focused. Why is it that so oftenS4 sections go to the field and have tolearn their missions as they do them?Certainly it is not the intentional faultof battalion S4s, for no officer wantshis soldiers to go to war untrained. Thesame is true for the noncommissionedofficers in the section. The problemseems to be that, unlike the tank pla-toon, there is no mission training planfor the S4 section. So as a new S4,how do you fix the problem?

Training management in the S4 sec-tion is no mystery. It is managed justlike any other unit or section, exceptthat the S4 must develop the tasks tobe trained. Five steps for training man-agement in the S4 section are:

• Develop a standard logistic systemin the unit

• Develop a section Mission EssentialTask List (METL)

• Develop collective tasks to supportthe METL

• Develop individual tasks to supportthe collective tasks

• Plan the training

A detailed discussion of the steps fol-lows throughout this article, followedby tips for pre-execution checks andtraining execution.

Step 1: Develop a standard logisticsystem in the unit. Although logistic

doctrine is standard in the Army, theactual execution of this doctrine variesfrom unit to unit. An example is Class I(subsistence) requisitions. Doctrinally,this is based on the number of person-nel in the unit. Some units use the Per-sonnel Daily Report to determine thisfigure. Others will use a headcount re-port to determine requirements, callingit a Yellow 1 or a White 2 report forexample. A standard reporting systemis essential in the unit’s tactical SOPand is the basis for all S4 training. Thenew S4 should analyze his unit’s re-porting system, mirroring the brigade’ssystem when possible, and establish asystem in the battalion. These reportsmust cover all routine logistic proce-dures: resupply, maintenance manage-ment, weapons system replacement op-erations, and even casualty evacuation.Once this system is in place, the S4section is ready to determine what totrain.

Step 2: Develop a section METL.Just like a maneuver company, the sec-tion METL is derived from the battal-ion training guidance. Although a com-pany is the lowest unit with a METL, itis unwieldy for HHC to list all of thetasks out of ARTEP 71-2-MTP, MissionTraining Plan for the Tank and Mecha-nized Infantry Battalion Task Force,that the S4 section must accomplish forthe battalion to be successful. Normallythe battalion METL contains “performcombat service support operations.”The new S4 must review the ARTEP71-2-MTP and determine what his sec-tion must do to support this battalionessential task. This might include:

• Perform combat service support op-erations

• Operate the combat trains commandpost

• Operate the personnel administra-tion center

• Establish a command post• Move a command post• Maintain communications

The list is not all-inclusive, nor doesit necessarily constitute a METL thatwould work for all S4 sections. The S4must do his homework and ensure thathis METL supports the battalion, but


Battle-Focused Training in the S4 Sectionby Captain James E. Moore Jr.

remains short enough to be manage-able.

Step 3: Develop collective tasks tosupport the METL. Unlike a regularunit where collective tasks are defined,the S4 must now do some originalthinking and develop the tasks that sup-port his METL. The best method is toanalyze the subtasks and standards ofeach of his METL tasks in ARTEP 71-2-MTP. Although all of the tasks willnot apply to the S4 section, the onesthat do will make up the collective tasklist. What follows is a sample collec-tive task list for the METL task “Per-form Combat Service Support Opera-tions:”

• Coordinate Class I resupply• Coordinate Class III resupply• Coordinate Class IV resupply• Coordinate Class V resupply• Coordinate weapon system replace-

ment operations• Coordinate LOGPAC preparation

with the field trains

The real challenge for the S4 is tonow develop the conditions and stand-ards for each of these tasks. For exam-ple, Coordinate Class III Resupplywould look like this:

TASK: Coordinate Class III ResupplyCONDITION: The section is operat-

ing from the CTCP and has commu-nications with all units, the FieldTrains Command Post, and the Bri-gade Rear Command Post.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS:1. The section receives requests from

units with 100% accuracy2. The section relays requests to the

Field Trains Command post with100% accuracy

3. The section relays requirements tothe Brigade Rear Command Postwith 100% accuracy.

As a final note, the S4 does not haveto develop this all by himself. The non-commissioned officers in the sectioncan provide invaluable experience onS4 operations and should be used toprovide a “common-sense check” onall of the collective tasks.

Step 4: Develop individual tasks tosupport collective tasks. Now that theS4 has developed his collective tasklist, it is time to determine what the in-dividual soldier must do for the sectionto accomplish the task to standard. Thisis the time to integrate the unit’s stand-ard logistic system (see Step 1) into thetraining management process. The indi-vidual tasks must reflect how the unit

plans to conduct logistics. What fol-lows is an example of an individualtask list for Coordinate Class III Re-supply from Step 3, above:

• Receive a BN/TF White 3 report.• Send a BN/TF White 3 report.• Prepare a BDE White 3 report.• Send a BDE White 3 report.• Prepare a LOGPAC checklist from

a BN/TF White 3 report.

Again the S4 must develop conditionsand standards. It is now essential he in-tegrates his noncommissioned officers.They are the ones who will conduct thetraining, and their input is essential tomake standards that are tough and real-istic, while remaining “trainable.”

Step 5: Plan the training. Now thatthe S4 has created a mission trainingplan for his section, training manage-ment is conducted as in any unit. Somespecific points to consider are:

•Provide written training guidance.Although this may seem excessive fora six-man section, all of the day-to-daytraining distracters in the S4 shop makeit very easy to lose focus. The trainingguidance provides a reference to con-tinually plan and focus training.

•Hold weekly training meetings. Thetime of the meeting is dependent on thebattalion and HHC training meetings.The S4 must gather his NCOs, closethe door, and let someone else answerthe phones for one hour. The meetingcannot become a “last week, this week,next week, let’s go to the snack bar”meeting. The S4 must prepare for themeeting, and all must leave with aclear understanding of what, when, andhow training will be conducted.

Pre-execution checks and trainingexecution. What follows are techniquesfor training the S4 section.

•Train the Trainer. ANCOC for MOS92Y does not fully prepare senior non-commissioned officers to run theCTCP. It is possible that the S4 willhave an NCOIC who has never been tothe field with a tactical unit. This givesthe S4 the added responsibility of train-ing his NCOIC to standard and adds tothe training meeting’s importance sothat the NCOIC leaves fully preparedto train his soldiers.

•Incorporate the S1 section and FieldTrains Command Post. In the field, it isimperative that S1 and S4 personnelcan accomplish the other’s role. TheCTCP and FTCP are manned by bothS4 and S1 personnel; the PAC NCOIC

will process resupply requests, and theS4 NCO will submit Personnel DailyReports. By training personnel fromboth sections and using both commandposts, the S4 can more realisticallysimulate what will happen in the field.

•During the crawl and walk phasesof training, send actual reports over theradio from the CTCP and FTCP. Thiscan be done with both CP vehiclesparked in the motor pool. Use the S4’sHMMWV to simulate radio trafficfrom the companies and the brigade.

•To execute the run phase of training,use battalion JANUS and SIMNET ex-ercises to generate traffic that simulateswhat the CTCP could expect during anactual fight. Force first sergeants to re-ceive reports from their units, and sendthese reports to the CTCP. After thebattle, conduct the radio traffic requiredto reconstitute the battalion to thestandards found in the ARTEP 71-2-MTP.

•Incorporate tasks into the trainingschedule as they are complete. For ex-ample, once the tasks, conditions, andstandards are complete for CoordinateClass III Resupply, incorporate it intothe training schedule. Use the slacktime to develop tasks, conditions, andstandards for Coordinate Class V Re-supply.

•The S4 must expect that, to conductbattle-focused training in his section,he will have to work very late. The dayto day missions of the S4 usually keephim in the office past 1800 hours. Theadded requirement of planning trainingwill take longer.

All of this will ensure his section istrained on executing the routine tasksbattalion logistics requires. This freesthe S4 to conduct mission planning atthe TOC, forecast logistic requirementsfor upcoming missions, and focus hisefforts on the innumerable “special” re-quirements that require the S4’s per-sonal involvement.


Captain James E. Moore Jr.has served as a tank platoonleader, support platoon leader,battalion S4, and battalionmaintenance officer. A recentgraduate of AOAC, he is nowassigned to the 2d Brigade, 1stInfantry Division at Ft. Riley,Kan.

The focus of this article is on the ar-mor and mechanized infantry battaliontask force (TF). It is a collection ofideas that worked well for Task Force“DESERT ROGUES,” 1st Battalion,64th Armor, 24th Infantry Division(Mechanized). The purpose for writingis to share techniques that worked dur-ing mounted combat in the Gulf War,enabling great soldiers to do their jobsa little better.

Task Force Movement

Until the final Operations Order(OPORD) was written and approvedfor release, there were few certaintiesabout the enemy situation other thanthe Iraqi defense on the Kuwaiti bor-der. It was this uncertainty that causedseveral assumptions and decisions to bemade about TF movement and supportstructure.

Field Manual (FM) 71-2, Tank andMechanized Infantry Task Force, out-lines seven movement techniques: col-umn, wedge, V, echelon, line, box, anddiamond. All have advantages and dis-advantages, but terrain is always a fac-tor when selecting a particular forma-tion. The key is to choose one that fits,train it to standard, and rehearse it untilevery vehicle commander understandsit and can execute it regardless of con-ditions.

Task Force Desert Rogues consistedof two tank and two mechanized infan-try companies. The task force com-mander chose task force diamond (Fig-ure 1). The requirement for speed wasthe determinant in selecting this move-ment technique. This formation al-lowed the leadership to develop a fewbasic battle drills that the TF couldquickly execute without losing momen-tum.

The belief that the field trainswould/could not help the TF duringmovement determined their locationwith the forward support battalion(FSB) and consquently the structure ofthe support platoon. The support pla-toon was designed to carry as muchClass I, III(B), III(P), and V as possi-

ble. The platoon was organized forrapid resupply of the TF; more on thesupport package later.

The scout platoon was 4-6 kilometersin front of the task force, spread over a5-7 kilometer front. Each section useda Global Positioning System (GPS) foraccurate position reporting. A tankcompany led the main body withmechanized infantry companies on theflanks and the second tank companytrailing. The mortar platoon followed inthe center, behind the lead tank com-pany. The threat of enemy air was lowbut one Vulcan was with the tacticaloperations center (TOC), and anothermoved with the admin-logistic opera-tions center (ALOC).

The TF commander’s guidance wasto minimize the number of wheeled ve-hicles, except for HEMTTs, in the for-mation. Therefore, only five wheelsmoved forward with the combat ele-ments: two in the support platoon (pla-toon leader and sergeant); one in eachaid station with trauma kits; and onecarrying the Stinger platoon sergeantmoving with the support platoon.

During hours of daylight and goodvisibility, the trail tank company movedin front of the support platoon and re-covery section to facilitate fast battledrills to the front or flanks of the for-mation. At night, the support platoonmoved in front of the trail tank com-pany for greater protection. The recov-ery section always trailed.

Support Platoon

The support platoon was the lifebloodof the task force. Any item required forbattle was on a combat vehicle or inthe support platoon. The field trainscarried all non-essential equipment andtraveled with the forward support bat-talion (FSB). The support platoon wasorganized as shown in Figure 2. Vehi-cle modifications were the first order ofbusiness during Operation DESERTSHIELD. The lead HEMTTs receivedradios.

This allowed the platoon leader orplatoon sergeant to talk to any lead ve-

hicle, which was always commandedby a noncommissioned officer. The twowreckers (5 and 10 ton) already had ra-dios (MTOE authorizations). Sparetires were in the 11⁄2-ton trailers. Welearned this lesson the hard way late inthe ground war after abandoning sev-eral trailers because we had no assem-bled spare tires and no time to stop andrepair them. Pulling trailers with flattires quickly caused damage to theprime mover.

Refuel on the move (ROM) was acritical battle drill rehearsed innumer-able times. This subject warrants aseparate article, but each column of thesupport platoon was designed to sup-port a company during a ROM. Eachcolumn was independent and tailoredto a specific type company (i.e., tank ormech). This was particularly true of pe-culiar Class V and Class III(P) require-ments. However, each column also hadsufficient generic stocks to support anycompany in case of vehicle loss orbreakdown.

Within each column, cargo HEMTTs(M977s) carried tailored Class V pack-ages. The scouts, mortars, and HHC(-)were also supported with specific vehi-cles. Cargo 11⁄2-ton trailers were loadedwith Class III(P) products tailored tothe type of vehicles being supported(Abrams vs. Bradley). Vehicles carry-ing Class III(B) (M978), water, and alimited number of Meals Ready to Eat(MRE) rounded out the supporting col-umn.

The platoon leader and sergeant eachcontrolled two columns. The ALOCkept track of fuel consumption usingreports from the companies. The TOCmonitored the status and plotted futureROM sites. After the commander ap-proved a recommended ROM site, theTOC would issue the order to theALOC, which in turn would order thesupport platoon to execute a ROM. Inhours of daylight, each first sergeant(traveling in the company maintenanceM113) would drop back to the trailtank company, pick up his support col-umn, and guide it forward to his com-pany. At night, they moved to the cen-ter of the diamond formation and metup with their column in the vicinity ofthe TOC. To simplify identification,each column of HEMTTs fixed twocolored glow sticks to the front of eachvehicle, helping the first sergeant findthem; different colors were used for


Task Force Initiativesby Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Boyd


“That smell...That smell like gaso-line....”

I am sure all of us are familiar withthat famous scene from the movie,Apocalypse Now. What a scene! RobertDuvall, the mad air cavalry commanderis kneeling in the sand on a Vietnambeach, extolling the virtues of napalm.

What makes this scene so memora-ble? Was it the topic? Was it the back-drop of exploding napalm? Well, forme it was neither. What I rememberwas the pristine black Cav hat with thegold cord rakishly perched on Duvall’shead!

Others must have felt the same way.When I joined the Army, I frequentlysaw exact copies at clubs and socialevents. Most of the owners assumedthey were wearing a direct copy of a

relic from the Indian Wars. It wasn’tuntil I started doing research on thesubject that it became clear just howmuch Hollywood had created its ownimage of the Cavalry, and in particularthe Cav hat. In fact, from the pictorialand written evidence left to us, therewere very few, if any, pristine-lookingCav hats, the most popular one wasn’tblack, and very few had a gold hatcord!

The true story behind this famouspiece of Army headgear is much lessglamorous than Hollywood has led usto believe. From 1872 to 1912, whenbroad brimmed hats were worn ascombat attire, there were only three of-ficial models. They were the 1872Campaign Hat, the 1876 modificationof the 1872 hat, and the most popular,the 1883 model.

Trial and Error:The 1872 Campaign Hat

In 1872, the Army clothing boardwanted to provide troops with a hatthat was multi-purpose, provided anadequate sun block, and could befolded. To accomplish all this, theArmy approved an elliptical-pattern hatwith an extremely wide brim. The ma-terial was black fur felt, despite theclothing board’s request for light col-ored material to reflect the sun. It wasornamented with an inch-wide silkband around the base of the crown.

Here is how the hat was described:

“The crown of the fatigue hat is madelens-shaped, so as to fold with thecrease in center lengthwise of the hat.The brim turns up at each side and is


The Cav HatFrom John Wayne to Robert Duvall,The “Cav Hat” Has Become a Hollywood Legend...Unfortunately, the Truth Was a Little More Complicated

by Major Mark Farrar

In white hat, yellow bandanna, and yellow suspend-ers — none likely to have been official issue — thelate John Wayne leads the charge against the badguys. He autographed the photo for a staffer on avisit to ARMOR years ago.

hooked at the outer edges in front andrear of body of the hat, thus giving theoutline a sweep nearly semicircularfrom extreme point of front to extremepoint of rear. The brim is flat and is 41⁄2inches wide — outer edges slightlyconcave where the hooks and eyes aresewed.”1

The hat was doomed from the start.The material was so shoddy that thehat literally came apart after only a fewdays in the field, according to troop re-ports. These complaints were not justlimited to the lower ranks. MG Ed-mund Schiver, the Army InspectorGeneral, commented: “Ridiculous indesign and faulty in manufacture....bet-ter suited to a wet nurse than a sol-dier....”2 The condemnation was univer-sal. Less than three years after the 1872model was issued, the QuartermasterGeneral told the Secretary of War:“The campaign hats adopted for theArmy have not been received with fa-vor, and measures are being taken toprocure suitable ones for adoption intheir stead.”3

The 1876 Campaign Hat

One of the weaknesses of the ’72model was its fur felt construction. Af-ter much deliberation, the clothingboard decided that a wool hat would bemore durable. This was the materialused in the 1876 model, which had around brim turned over and stitchedalong the edge, for durability.

It also had a truly novel innovation— crown ventilators, one on each side.It was officially adopted by the Quar-termaster Department on 14 June 1876.The ’76 model had a relatively longlifetime, from 1876 to 1887, when sup-plies ran out. There were few real com-plaints about this model, other than thecolor. Despite the improvement in de-sign, the hat was basically an ugly,utilitarian black hat.

This was the description of the 1876hat in Army specifications:

Mixture - to be of clean wool, of finegrade, equal in quality to XXX fleece.No waste or shoddy to be used in mix-ture.


1883

1876

1872

Evolutionof the “Cav Hat”

Weight: hat bodies to be weighed out,five and one-half (51⁄2) ounces heavy, ofclean wool.

Shape: The 71⁄8 - size to be six inchesdeep to center of tip, and five and one-half (51⁄2) inches deep at front and rear.Other sizes in proportion, varying one-sixteenth (1⁄16) of an inch to each size.

Brim: Edge of brim to be turned overthree-eighths (3⁄8) of an inch on the up-per side, and stitched down with two(2) rows of stitching, and to measuretwo and a half (21⁄2) inches in front andrear and two and five-eighths (25⁄8)inches in width at sides.

Trimming: Trimmed with eight (8)ligne Union Braid, same quality as onsample hat; to be sewed on by sewingmachine.

Sweat to be brown Japanned leather,turned on top, one and three-quarters(13⁄4) inch wide, and sewed in hat bysewing machine. Two of “Bracher’sPatent Ventilators,” one on each sideof crown, three and one-half (31⁄2)inches from brim. The hat to be velvetfinished, soft and pliable, same asstandard sample. Not more that six (6)hats to be packed in each band-box.

Adopted, 1876. M.C. Meigs, Quarter-master General.

The 1883 Model

Despite the durability of the 1876model, criticism continued over thecolor. Troops in the Southwest felt thata lighter colored hat would be morepractical. So, on 14 December 1883,the Army adopted the “Drab” cam-paign hat, which proved to be the mostpopular hat of the three. It remained inservice until 1912, when the Armyadopted the “Montana peaked” hat forgeneral wear, the hat we know as theDrill Sergeant or “Smoky the Bear”hat. Most of the Frederick Remington,Russell, and Schrevogel paintings weredone when the drab hat was popular.Hollywood would later mistake thecolor depicted in these paintings andoutfit the Hollywood cavalry in whitehats. Even the great John Ford madethis mistake.

The 1883 model was worn on someof the last great campaigns of the In-dian Wars, in the Boxer Rebellion, andin the Spanish-American War. It should

be familiar to most readers as the hatworn by “Old Bill” in the Remingtonsketch.

Note that on the 1883 model, theoriginal intent had been for the brim tobe blocked “up” (i.e., brim slightlydipped towards the crown) in the frontand back. The specifications for the hatwere as follows:

Mixture: To be composed of two-thirds best coney (rabbit) and one thirdfine blown nutria.

Weight: hat bodies to be weighed -43⁄4 ounces heavy.

Shape: Block to be 53⁄4 inches deep tocenter of tip.

Brim: To be 23⁄4 inches wide in frontand rear, and 3 inches wide at sides; todouble thickness, and to have two rowsof stitching, as shown on sample.

Color: To be a drab or other suitablecolor, as per sample.

Trimmings: To be trimmed with 8-ligne union band — same quality as onhat — to be sewed on by hand. Sweatto be an imported lined leather, 21⁄4inches wide, sewed to the reed by zig-zag stitch. A wire gauze ventilator to beon each side of the hat, 31⁄4 inches from

brim — to be of size as onsample. To be packed threehats in each bandbox.

Adopted December 14,1883. S.B. Holabird,Quartermaster General,U.S.A.4

Another historical errorfrequently made by Holly-wood costumers concernsthe shape of the Cav hat.As evidenced in Apoca-lypse Now and other films,they seem to think the tra-ditional Cav hat slopeddown in the front andback. Actually, most hats,particularly the 1883model, were originallyblocked so the brim wouldslope towards the crown.The reason was very sim-ple: a hat that slopes downimpedes vision (it is al-most impossible to fire atrapdoor Springfield with ahat in your way). Despitethe best intentions of theArmy to maintain a uni-

form hat block, soldiers would still al-ter their hats from the original shape.

Apparently, things came to a head in1899. On July 10, 1899, the AdjutantGeneral ordered: “The wearing of thesehats (drab campaign hat) in any otherthan their original shape is prohibited.”

Remington’s painting, “A Cavalry-man’s Breakfast,” shows all the sub-jects wearing the 1883 model cam-paign hat. Remington very accuratelyportrayed the condition that the hatcould be reduced to after extensivefield use. All the subjects in this paint-ing are very obviously choosing to en-sure that the brim of their campaignhats are up.

Hat Cord and Letters

Hollywood has perpetrated many cav-alry uniform fallacies, such as the yel-low scarves (which were never issued)and yellow elastic suspenders (whichwere not issued until 1883, and werenot yellow, and only the back strap waselastic!). Another fallacy is the depic-tion of cavalrymen with gold hat cordsand bright gold crossed sabers. It is


A detail from Remington’s “A Cavalryman’s Breakfast”shows troopers wearing the 1883 hat with brims up, themost reasonable mode when firing a rifle. Remington’s“Old Bill,” for many years the symbol of the U.S. ArmorAssociation, also indicates this style of wear was common.

true that yellow hat cords existed, butthey were not popular. This fact is ob-vious in contemporary photographs andpaintings, which seldom show the cord.Two reasons for this might be that thehat cord would have a tendency to falloff, unless it was tied on to the hat (thishappened with the 1912 model), or un-til the Army became firm about thewear of regulation items. In fact, the“cords and tassels” were so unpopularthat the Quartermaster General madethis report in 1887:

“From the requisitions of clothingand equipage received at this officeduring several years past, ...there wasscarcely any demand for hat cords andtassels. Only 3,049 were issued duringthe last fiscal year. It is recom-mended...that those on hand be issuedgratuitously to the enlisted men. Not-withstanding this free issue, there isscarcely any demand for them.”5

The official origin of wearing hatcords and brass letters/insignia on cam-paign hats can be traced to General Or-der No. 128, which required all enlistedmen to wear the campaign hat “of drabcolored felt with worsted hat cordsconforming in color to arm of service,with letter of troop or company andnumber of regiment in front....”

This regulation was issued after theSpanish American War, when the prac-tice had already become the norm.

Other Hats

So, what accounts for the wide vari-ety of campaign hats seen in nineteenthcentury photograps. The fact is that,despite the gratuitous issue of hats,many soldiers chose to buy their own.Most people make the mistake of look-ing at one old photo and assuming thatthe subject is wearing an official hat,but before 1883, many troopers delib-erately went out of their way to avoid

wearing an issue model. Thispractice continued unabated al-most until the twentieth cen-tury.

Also, oddly enough, strawhats were quite popular, sopopular that the Army eventu-ally made it legal to wearthem: “During the warm sea-son department commandersmay authorize an inexpensivestraw hat of such pattern asthey may prescribe to be wornby officers and enlistedmen....”6

Major Reno of 7th Cav fame(or infamy, depending uponwhich side of the argumentyou’re on) wrote this after theBighorn campaign: “Previousto us leaving the mouth of theRosebud, I had been wearing afelt hat, and it was dusty anddirty, and some of the officerswent on a boat to where a

trader sold some broad brimmed strawhats, which we paid 25 or 50 cents for.They had no band, but they were avery shelter from the sun. I wore oneof those.”7

Conclusion

The photographic and historical re-cord regarding the “Cav” hat is quitedifferent from the Hollywood version.Although it may be uncomfortable forsome to acknowledge this fact, the pur-suit of truth and accuracy should al-ways be the primary objective of boththe amateur and professional historian.Even though the campaign hat is just aminor contribution to Army genre, inthis age of revisionism and reinterpre-tation of Army history, the correct de-piction of even small items such as theCav hat is, nonetheless, important.

Notes

1Army Journal, Quartermaster report, 1872.2Comments of Quartermaster General.3Excerpt from Army Journal dated 1876.4Army Journal, 1883.5Army Journal, 1887.6General Orders No. 128, para. 46.7Recollection of Major Reno.

Bibliography

Army Journal, Report of Quartermaster Gen-eral, 1872, Ft. Leavenworth Archives, Ft.Leavenworth, Kan.




General Orders No.128 and circular 47, July 10,1899.

Cavalry Campaign Outfit at the Little Bighorn,James Hutchins, Military Collector and Histo-rian, 1955. Chicago Historical Society, Chi-cago, Ill.

The “Montana Peaked” hat, first issued in 1912, is stillin use in the Forest Service and by drill sergeants.Seen here is Colonel Julien Gaujot, commander ofthe 1st Cavalry, in 1919.


Major Mark A. Farrar, MI, iscurrently the Military Intelli-gence LNO at the MountedBattlespace Battle Lab. Hegraduated with a BA in Historyfrom Moravian College in1981, before enlisting in theInfantry. He has served withthe 3d U.S. Inf (Old Guard)Tomb of the Unknown Soldier,3d ID, 1st Cav Div. as well ascommanding in the 504th MIBde. He is very grateful to theArmy for underwriting the op-portunity that allowed him toresearch this article (FortLeavenworth - while attendingCAS3). He has been active invarious forms of living history(both in the U.S. and Europe)since 1974.

Israel is a country which is still con-stantly at war. According to General Is-rael Tal, there is not a single day whena tank does not fire somewhere in an-ger, a quite unique situation. In fact,over nearly fifty years of conflict intank fighting under ultra-modern com-bat conditions, Israeli tankers have sur-vived to gather combat experience sec-ond to none, although most are not pro-fessional soldiers. Such knowledgecannot be gained better in any otherway, even with the kind of sophisti-cated computer simulations most ar-mies now use to train under near-realis-tic conditions. But, as experienceshows, nothing can replace real com-bat. When the chips are down, thosewho have it under their belts usuallysurvive to live for another day, pro-vided of course, that luck is on theirside.

According to carefully collected sta-tistics, some 32,000 tanks fought eachother in the Arab-Israeli wars. This isan incredible number, surpassing any-thing in former conflicts. Over theyears, some 4,300 tanks were knockedout by fire. In the Yom Kippur War ofOctober 1973, more than 7,000 tanksfought in some of the most viciouscombat action since Kursk, in summer1943. Yet, during the first Arab-Israeliwar in 1948, only 16 obsolete tankswere in action.

Thus, although much has changedover a short period of less than fiftyyears in this region, the arms race goeson relentlessly, with each side aimingto improve not only its arsenal, but alsoto develop sophistication in soldiertraining so as to gain superiority on thefuture battlefield. It is here that Israel ismaking most of its efforts to retain itsedge over its opponents.

It begins by carefully selecting tankcrew candidates and training the basicsin realistic training programs. Gunneryhas, over the years, become top priority

in Israeli tank crews. Israeli tankers, us-ing their high-tech equipment with topefficiency, perform with superb resultson the battlefield and ranges; they aresecond to none among professionalgunners in foreign armies. One mustremember that nearly all Israeli tankcrewmen are either youngsters under20 serving three years compulsoryservice or reservists. But most have atleast some combat experience in sus-tained low-intensity conflicts. Evennow, as the Middle East peace processseems to gain momentum, Israel isconstantly on full alert to any possiblechanges that might turn the political ta-bles in this turbulent region. The entirenation is geared to the national securityeffort, with over 20 percent of the na-tion involved in security matters in oneway or another, be it in active service,industry, or reserves. It is a heavy bur-den, but a compulsory price that asmall nation like Israel — surroundedby hostile elements — must bear tosurvive.

Two main elements still dominate Is-rael’s deterrence. They are airpower,using highly sophisticated weapon sys-tems, and high alert, fast-moving ar-mored forces, working with a well bal-anced combined arms combat team.These are still the only viable tools tosafeguard Israel’s strategic aims underacceptable conditions and with mini-mum loss rates, the latter a dominantconsideration given Israel’s small popu-lation.

To conserve human lives in combat isone of Israel’s top priorities, and hasbeen since the creation of the JewishState in 1948. Following a high lossrate during the first days of tank com-bat in the 1973 War, Israeli tank de-signers have invested relentless effortsto improve survival under the moststringent combat conditions. Realisticdata gathered by countless battle expe-riences became invaluable. Top expertscarefully examined each battle casualty.

Knocked-out tanks, which mostly re-mained in Israeli territory, were sub-jected to close scrutiny and rigoroushigh-tech analysis. The informationthus gleaned by thousands of hours offield work was stored into a computer-ized information bank, which becameinvaluable during the decision-makingprocess that shaped the Merkava pro-ject. It remains one of the most ambi-tious tank designs ever attempted interms of crew survivability. The mas-sive amount of ballistic data compiledby the Israeli experts provided, for thefirst time in military history, a uniqueopportunity to achieve realistic designparameters for safety and combat effi-ciency. General Tal and his highlyskilled team became leading authori-ties, their experience in modern tankdesign going far beyond the borders oftheir realm. In fact, American expertstrying to realistcally assess the resultsof the 100 hours of ground combat inKuwait and Iraq in 1991 consulted Is-raeli tank experts on their assessmentmethods, which made their own fieldwork much more effective. But whilelarge numbers of tanks were destroyedby highly sophisticated weaponry dur-ing the Gulf War, the results gleanedwere of mostly limited value. Most ofthe combat actions were one-sided, andthe real effect of hits by the friendlyfire that destroyed a number of tankswas insufficient to draw wide-rangingtechnical conclusions. While the realcapability of the ultra-modern Russian125-mm tank gun can only be esti-mated, as only single guns fired witheffect at tactical range, General Tal’screw of expert analysts have at theirdisposal ample information from analy-sis of countless wrecks destroyed ordamaged by a large variety of ATGWs,high-velocity tanks guns of all calibers,and ammunition of all kinds.

A lot has been learned since the daysof the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Oneof the first efforts made by Israeli de-


Trends in Israeli Tank Developmentby Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Ret’d)

signers was to find a way to defeat thelethal chemical energy (HEAT) war-heads of shoulder-fired antitank weap-ons and the notorious Russian SAG-GER missiles. At the time, the SAG-GERs seemed to dominate the battle-field in the Sinai during the first fewdays of the war. Later, it was clear thatthe wire-guided missile was not asdeadly as many thought at the time, yetit still represented a considerable threatto conventionally armored tanks of thatperiod. Only a few years later, Israelitechnicians found a remarkably simplesolution — explosive reactive armor —that was to save the lives of many Is-raeli tank crewmen in the 1982 Leba-non war. Israeli M-60 tanks received anadd-on BLAZER suite of reactive ar-mor that provided highly effective pro-tection against the close-in fired RPGand the SAGGER. Losses dropped dra-matically. BLAZER came as a com-plete surprise and was soon copied byother armies, including the Russians,who used it extensively in Afghanistanto survive their own, hitherto lethalweapons! It was only through ill-luckthat Russian experts were able to laytheir hands on one of those BLAZER-fitted Pattons, abandoned by its Israelicrew, and learn the secret, which al-lowed them to copy the system.

The Merkava Mark I model alsofaced its first combat test in the Leba-non War in 1982. It performed withastonishing results under the most strin-gent combat conditions. Its spaced ar-mor provided excellent survivability,even during close-in urban fighting,where engagements were at near-zerorange, and where AT teams fired ontanks from upper floors in buildingsalong narrow streets. Although some50 Merkava Mk1s were hit by variousweapons at different ranges, only ninecrew members were killed, mostlythose working with open hatches. Sur-prisingly, of the 50-odd crewmemberswounded in Merkavas, none wereburned! In any other type of tank, farmore burn injuries could be expectedunder the same conditions.

No wonder that Merkava battalionsbecame the dream assignment of everytank crew in the Israeli armor corps!Very little detail of ballistical data onMerkava is unclassified, but it isknown that not one Merkava was a to-tal loss in Lebanon, and all were re-stored to active service, including onetank that was hit by no less than 20rounds of antitank fire. This is a re-markable feat achieved by Tal’s design

team, and a real morale booster if everthere was one.

Since 1982, the Merkava receivedtwo basic modifications and one com-plete alteration which amounted to anew model of AFV. The Merkava Mk2,the immediate result of the Lebanonexperience, included an improved sur-vival kit. But the Merkava Mk3, whichcurrently makes up the majority oftanks in the active service force, is atotally new design. Although quitesimilar in shape, it embodies a new, ul-tra-modern, modular armor concept,and integrates a new, powerful 120-mmsmooth-bore, high-velocity gun firing aset of indigenous developed ammuni-tion. But the Mk3’s most impressiveasset is its new armor suite, a near-revolutionary design of modular caststeel armor designed especially for thismodel by Tal’s experts. This unique ap-proach to armor protection makes theMerkava highly flexible. Instead ofequipping the tank with a fixed set ofarmor that cannot be exchanged overthe life span of the tank, the modulararmor can be exchanged for new de-

signs, if and when new armor technolo-gies emerge. Using modular compo-nents also makes it easy to replacedamaged parts whenever the needarises, even by crews working underfield conditions. Since this modular ap-proach uses parts that are bolted on, in-stead of welded, an entire armored suitcan be removed and fitted at will.Aside from being highly cost-effective,this method allows a force to reducethe weight of the vehicle for air trans-port, an inherent strategic mobility ad-vantage. Currently, following the de-mise of the Cold War period, mostWestern armies face the challenge ofboth rapid strategic and tactical long-range movements. In most cases, futureout-of-area engagements will have tocope with contingencies which maywell include threats from modern ar-mored forces, even by hostile elementsof the Third World. This threat willhave to be countered by friendly ar-mored elements. Under present circum-stances, it seems highly questionablethat heavy or even medium tanks canbe transported by existing or even fu-ture air assets to provide substantial


Above, General Tal, cen-ter, with two members ofhis staff in front of a newMerkava Mk3, with modu-lar armor suite. The boltsthat anchor the armorpack can be seen on thefront slope.

At left, a closeup of themodular armor sectionsthat protect the front andsides of the Merkava tur-ret.

Photos by the author

Merkava Mk3, with Modular Armor

firepower for engaged ground forces indistant areas. While the problem offirepower can be solved by low-caliberhigh-pressure tank guns or even futureammunition technologies, the problemof armor protection may well persistuntil a complete breakthrough is madein armor metallurgy. Relatively light-weight tanks with high-powered gunscan improve, if not solve, the inter-theater mobility problem, but it ishighly doubtful those tanks will be ableto survive a close-in battle with enemymedium tanks at acceptable loss ratesto their crews. A workable solutioncould be the addition of modular armorto upgrade lighter tanks AFTER theyhave landed at their destinations by air,while the add-on armor packs followseparately by air or by pre-positionedsea assets soon after. A near-revolutionin superior protection can be achievedwith cost effective and logistically flex-ible means without loss of maneuver-ability in the field. While currentmodular armor is entirely passive in itsnature, future technologies could envi-sion active armor packs that could wellrevolutionize armor protection, enhanc-ing the overall protection of the tankfrom all directions, and solving theproblem of TOP ATTACK, which re-mains one of the greatest vulnerabili-ties in most modern tanks today.

One of the Israeli armored force’smost precious assets is the close coop-eration between designers of Tal’s ex-pert team and the men in the field whodepend on his solutions for their virtualsurvival in combat.

Most armies live on “Red Tape,”which is a natural part of any bureauc-racy, but General Tal, who is a soldier’sgeneral, has managed to circumventthis phenomena by establishing a direct

link between his team and the tankersin the field. The result is a unique andremarkable process of decision-makingwhich has already come up with sev-eral modifications which are the imme-diate outcome of tank crews reportingon the performance of their weaponsystems in combat. The Merkava pro-ject is a constantly changing process.With two major upgradings, a largenumber of improvisations have beenincluded in older models at low costand carried out in the field by specialistcrews at battalion level. These short-cuts have already resulted in livessaved. Tank crews are highly apprecia-tive as a result, which encourages fur-ther cooperation at all levels. Thus,General Tal and his team try to remainone step ahead, a constant challengewhich has no equal anywhere. In Leba-non, a savage war of attrition is inprocess daily. The Shiite fanatics useevery conceivable weapon to combatIsraeli troops day and night. Tanks, andespecially the Merkavas, are the cor-nerstones of this fighting.

Survivability is the order of the day,with Israeli forces facing constantthreats from well-placed ambushes anddemolition charges cunningly situatedon narrow tracks and mountain roads.The Merkava has demonstrated re-markable adaptivity to this type of war-fare. Its superior armor protection haswithstood most ground attacks fromdifferent ranges. Scores of antitankrounds, some of them advancedATGWs, failed to penetrate, even whenfired in salvoes. On the other hand, Is-raeli gunners have managed to destroyHezbollah rocket launchers by directfire as the missiles were still in-flight!Accurate tank gunnery more than oncemade the difference between life anddeath.

Tal’s expert team has done more thandesign tanks. The fighting in Lebanon,some of which is done under most dif-ficult conditions, calls for some uniquesolutions to enhance survival. Oldertanks, like the M-60, have been up-graded with modular armor. Armoredpersonnel carriers, such as the M113,have been given advanced armor pro-tection against ATGWs, and now sus-tain most attacks. Obsolete tanks, suchas the Centurion and captured RussianT-55s and T-62s, have been redesignedinto a variety of APCs, armored engi-neer vehicles, and especially up-ar-mored carriers capable of withstandinglarge demolition charges which wouldhave totally destroyed lighter armoredvehicles.

These trends in Israeli armored de-signs will undoubtedly continue, andsome future breakthrough in tank de-sign can certainly be expected over thenext years, as the need will remain toppriority. Israel still very much needs itsArmor Corps, and the Corps needs thebest tools to do its job.


Lieutenant Colonel DavidEshel was born in Dresden,Germany in 1928, and emi-grated to Palestine in 1938. Af-ter serving for a short spell withthe British forces after WWII,he became one of the foundingmembers of the Israeli Ar-moured Corps in 1948 andserved as a career officer withthe Israel Defence Forces for26 years.

Educated at the French Cav-alry School at Saumur, he laterheld various command andstaff assignments, and foughtin all the Arab-Israeli wars upto and including 1973, when heserved as Chief of Signals ofthe Armoured Corps. His lastassignment was lecturer ontactics at the IDF Commandand Staff College. He studiedhistory at Tel Aviv Universityand served for 12 years as edi-tor of an Israeli-German baseddefense journal. He now actsas a freelance journalist anddefence analyst for severalleading American and Euro-pean military journals.

A heavy armored personnel carrier, based on a captured T-55 chassis. The turret has beenremoved, the engine compartment has been redesigned, and a hatch has been added tothe rear for troop access. Other obsolete tanks have been converted to engineer vehicles.

each column. The support platoonleader and sergeant were responsiblefor getting the columns to the twomentioned link-up points. After com-pletion of resupply (task force goal ofone hour), the process was reversed.

Battalion Maintenance Section

This section was leader intensive. Itincluded the battalion maintenance of-ficer (BMO), the battalion maintenancetechnician (BMT), the battalion motorsergeant (BMS), and several of the bestmechanics. Vehicles consisted of threeM88 recovery vehicles and the directsupport (DS) maintenance team M113vehicle equipped with secure, dual netFM and GPS.

Maintenance sections at company andbattalion level, were task organized andtheir equipment and repair parts organ-ized around time lines. The specificitems carried were based on the re-quirement for the mechanics to replaceany item within 15 minutes. If the ve-hicle could not be repaired within thattime, it was left with its crew for theBMO traveling behind the trail tank

company. Each company formation in-cluded its M113 maintenance vehicleand M88 recovery vehicle with severalmechanics. Selected line items fromthe prescribed load lists (PLL) werestored on both vehicles.

Battalion maintenance vehicles alsocarried selected PLL lines. Their time-line for vehicle repair was 45 minutes.If the vehicle still could not be repaired(15 minutes by company and 45 min-utes by BMO), it was left with its crewfor the HHC commander leading thefield trains (part of the brigade supportarea) approximately three to fourshours behind the task force.

Task Force TOCOne modification was done to the

M577 command post carriers in theTOC and ALOC. Four 5-ton cargotruck driver’s seats were installed in allM577s (Figure 3). This initiative was alifesaver to all occupants who traveledthe 370 kilometers into Iraq. They hadcomfortable seats, well positioned topost maps and write reports, and in aposition to catnap when appropriate.Everyone wore a Combat VehicleCrewman (CVC) helmet to monitor anassigned net. This minimized noise andconfusion inside the vehicle and maxi-

mized individual concentration, futureplanning by the second in command,and battle captain battle monitoring.

SummaryThere is nothing magical about any of

the ideas or initiatives performed byTask Force Desert Rogues. Hundredsof innovative techniques were used bymany superb units. The successes ofOperations DESERT SHIELD and DE-SERT STORM are attributable to thosemagnificent units and their leaders andsoldiers.

All the ideas presented in this briefarticle worked. They involved trainingto a standard, a few inexpensive piecesof materiel, and the adherence to estab-lished doctrine.


Task Force Initiatives(Continued from Page 39)

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D.Boyd is currently the U.S. ArmyExchange Officer at the Cana-dian Forces Command andStaff College. He served as theXO of 1st Battalion, 64th Armor,24th ID(M) at Ft. Stewart, Ga.,during Operations DESERTSHIELD/DESERT STORM.

is accepted into Excellence in Armor,his DA Form 2-1 should be annotatedas discussed earlier.

Now for the benefits! Incentives forExcellence in Armor soldiers with ex-ceptional performance are as follows:

•• OSUT commanders may promote10% of their class at the completionof Basic to PV2 and those 10% maybe promoted to PFC at the comple-tion of the Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) specific phase.Statistics show that the greatestnumber of these promotions go toExcellence in Armor soldiers, pri-marily because they have proventhemselves to be overachievers.

•• A sergeant who is a Basic Noncom-missioned Officers Course graduatemay request to take the SCCT/TCCT II through his local TCO orTSO.

It is a comprehensive two-hour test onSkill Level 3 and 4 tasks. If he passeswith a score of 70 or higher, he is eligi-ble to receive 50 promotion points in

Military Education for his SSG promo-tion packet. This is in accordance withArmy Regulation 600-8-19, EnlistedPromotions and Reductions.

•• All senior NCO promotion boardsare briefed that Excellence in Armoridentifies an Armor soldier as a “cutabove.” On the last SFC promotionboard, there were more Excellencein Armor soldiers selected for pro-motion to SFC than any other cate-gory in CMF19. Being an Excel-lence in Armor soldier certainly hasits advantages, not only by increas-ing your chances for promotion, butalso in recognizing you as a cutabove everyone else.

The proof of the program has beenseen in CMF19 promotions. During thefirst year that the original OSUT Excel-lence in Armor enrollee was eligiblefor promotion to SSG and SFC, 75%of SSG promotions and 74% of SFCselections were Excellence in Armor.Commanders are selecting, and promo-tion boards are recognizing, the highestquality soldiers.

But the program cannot survive andflourish without command involve-ment.

Leaders have four responsibilitieswhen it comes to Excellence in Armor:first, identify and challenge incomingExcellence in Armor soldiers; second,establish and support a unit Excellencein Armor program; third, accelerateSPC/SGT/SSG promotions and schoolattendance for Excellence in Armorsoldiers; and fourth, maintain quality inthe program! If a soldier no longermeets the standards, disenroll him.

Finally, if you have any questionsabout Excellence in Armor, you can di-rect them to the following address:

CommanderU.S. Army Armor CenterATTN: ATZK-ARP (SFC Berg/Ms. Graham)Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000

Or call DSN 464-1368/3188 or Commercial(502)624-1368/3188.

Keep Charging!

Driver’s Seat (Continued from Page 5)

During the Vietnam War, commandersstruggled with the role of command andcontrol helicopters. Some battalion com-manders flew over their company com-manders fighting on the ground, directingtheir every move, while brigade and divi-sion commanders flew above the battalioncommander, giving him the benefit of theirexperience. This environment left very littleroom for the company commander to applythe latest battlefield information and accom-plish the battalion commander’s missionand intent. Similarly, enemy tanks firing sa-bot rounds look quite different to soldierson the ground than they do as icons on aSAT terminal. If deliberate control does be-come the standard for command and con-trol on the digital battlefield, then how willthe second lieutenant learn the lessons thatwill prepare him to be a division com-mander?

There is a great deal of excitementacross the Army as it becomes more digitaland fields new systems. While the focuspresently is to gain seamless conductivitybetween systems that were seemingly de-veloped in a “stovepipe” fashion, there re-mains a need for equal emphasis on pre-paring the doctrine, tactics, and leadertraining necessary to fight in the informa-tion-laden environment of the digital battle-field.

ROSS A. BROWNCPT, Armor

Ft. Hood, Texas

Ratings Should Be TiedTo Tank Qualification

Dear Sir:

I think that this letter will start some con-troversy within the Armor community. Thissubject has been avoided for a good num-ber of years.

I want to ask one very simple question:Should a tank commander’s rating (OER orNCOER) be more closely tied to the qualifi-cation of his tank?

Twenty or more years ago (before the M1and master gunners) tank commanderstook a great deal of pride in the fact thatthey knew their weapons, that those weap-ons worked, and that their crew couldshoot. Today, I see tank commanders whoblame their tank for their poor performance.There are tanks that require constant“tweaking” to make them work properly. Isee units where it is much more importantto pull months of red (duty) cycle, than it isfor the unit to properly train and conductgunnery.

This all leads to the tank commander’syearly report card. I wonder, how can arater honestly give an excellence rating incompetence and leadership to a tank com-

mander who cannot qualify his tank. I askthis because I feel that one of the primaryduties of the tank commander is to fight histank and win. One of the traditional meas-ures of that primary duty is Tank Table VIII.

I know that there was a conscious effortto de-emphasize Tank Table VIII in the late1970s. I wonder if that has really served usas well as it should have. I remember in2-81 Armor in 1973 tank commanders likePlatoon Sergeant Cables and SergeantHardy, who really knew their tank and crew.They put lots of time and effort into trainingand preparing their crews to fight the M60tank and to qualify the first time on TankTable VIII.

These tankers did that in a spirit offriendly competition within the companyand battalion. Those few who could notqualify had to suffer through a lot of re-minders about “boloing,” on Tank Table VIII.You can surely bet that they did the workrequired to train their crews up to a fight-and-win standard.

Should crews who cannot qualify be al-lowed to re-fire specific engagements fromTable VIII until they can meet the standard?Should a tank commander who consistentlyfails to qualify his tank be considered forpromotion to sergeant first class?

I would submit that if he cannot train hiscrew and fight his tank, he just might notbe able to train his crew, fight his tank, andmentor other tank commanders to traintheir crews and fight their tanks.

As I said at the beginning of this letter,this might start some controversy within theArmor community. If it does, good! I reallyfeel that a better tank commander cancome out of a discussion of this issue.

CSM HALFORD M. DUDLEY1-66 Armor

Fort Hood, Texas

Computers Won’t SolveCombat Development Problems

Dear Sir:

As usual, your July-August issue waschock-full of fine articles, and what was es-pecially nice to see was the number of arti-cles written by company grade officers, theindividuals who, when the fat is in the fire,have to put the fire out.

They provided some great observationsand experiences based on real day-to-daylife as a tanker that I hope are being read,heard, and understood by our current tech-nologists and acquisition czars. A case inpoint was the fine letter by 1LT Brannon ofC/112 Armor, TXARNG, written in responseto an earlier article on tank main gunautoloaders. His point was very clear, andthat was that four crewmen on a tank havemany tasks to perform in order to keep

their tank operational 24 hours a day, 7days a week, for however long it is in com-bat. It is not just a matter of loading themain gun. More importantly, 1LT Brannonprovided us with a most important part ofthe development process for any newequipment — user input.

Unfortunately, it appears that the Armyhas been caught in the trap, that if weautomate and digitize everything, we canwin the next war from the CP with four sol-diers and a computer. Ah, if this were onlytrue. But, it appears that many in uniformtoday do believe it to be true. I do notmean to imply that automation and digitiza-tion is all bad; but as with every new ideaor technology, one must understand howthat idea or technology fits into the largerpicture as well as many smaller ones.

When TRADOC was formed back in Julyof 1973, its first commander, General Wil-liam DePuy, understood the need to havethe field soldier’s input in the developmentprocess. Therefore, he put the responsibil-ity for combat developments (CD) at a levelin the chain-of-command where such inputwould be most visible and effectively ap-plied — at the individual branch level.

From that year until Desert Storm, theTRADOC combat developers modernizedthe U.S. Army. If you do not believe that,walk around any tank park, motor pool, air-field, supply room, or arms room and countthe percentage of things that predate 1973.Desert Storm was witness to the successof General DePuy’s decentralized combatdevelopment process to the branch level.The ultimate user, the soldier, had direct in-put to the end product. And those workingdirectly in the CD process at the individualbranch centers were green suiters whoalso had lots of field and hands-on experi-ence. Communication lines hummed in alldirections, and coordination from centerlevel to individual action officers within theDA staff took place on a daily basis. Thesame communication opened between in-dustry and the various Army laboratories.

But the lessons of history are soon for-gotten, and that appears to be what is hap-pening today within the Army, and particu-larly TRADOC. Downsizing over the pastfour-five years has about destroyed theCombat Developments functions at eachbranch level. It almost seems as if no oneat the senior leadership levels understandsthe development and acquisition process.

Our future needs will not be solved with acomputer, nor by a half dozen battle labswhich are actually doing nothing more thanwhat was done in the past under the com-bat developer’s charter, the only differencebeing that the battle labs have more com-puters and simulation to assist them in theirstudies. But the acquisition process is stillguided by DOD’s 5000-series regulations.Any proposed new program must still com-ply with these regulations, and the HQ DA,DOD, and Congressional questions, con-


LETTERS (Continued from Page 3)

cerns, and biases must be answered be-fore funding will be forthcoming. Likewise,industry still needs to understand the envi-ronment of the soldier in the field, and thesoldier in the field needs to have a handyconduit to what is being proposed by indus-try. That proven conduit is, and has been,the branch combat developer, the user’srepresentative with industry, DA, DOD, andthe Congress.

Abolishing combat developments, or con-solidating all CD functions at a higher levelthan the individual branch level, is a lose-lose proposition. Lost is the individualbranch interface and understanding with in-dustry and the technology being proposedby industry and the laboratories. Lost, too,is the capability of close, routine coordina-tion, interface, and understanding betweenthe ultimate user in the field and his repre-sentative, the combat developer, and hisboss, the individual branch chief.

Lieutenant Brannon’s comments concern-ing industry and the technologists needingto understand the working environment ofthe soldier, before trying to solve a problemwith technology where a problem may notexist, needs to be raised to the top of theflagpole. We may save a lot of personnelpositions on our TO&Es by great techno-logical ideas on paper today, but the realquestion remains to be answered, and thatis: Will it really save us on the next battle-field or cause us to be less effective? TheArmy and TRADOC un der Genera lDePuy’s foresight saw that the Army wasnot developing the right equipment to winon the next battlefield because the userand his branch chief were not directly in-volved in the process until the item underdevelopment was ready for testing or field-ing. Hence, many of those soon-to-be-fielded items never were, because they didnot meet the operational needs of the realusers in the field. Today, our military muse-ums are filled with many of those greatideas for new military equipment that nevermade it — because in the end it was notthe item that the soldier wanted or neededto accomplish his mission on the battlefield.

CLARK A. BURNETTCOL, Armor, Retired

Adding Vehicles Would DenyLight Forces Their Mobility

Dear Sir:

In “Making the Case for an Airborne In-fantry Fighting Vehicle” (September-Octo-ber 1995), Stanley Crist echoes the viewsof many “heavy” proponents in arguing to“heavy up” the Army’s principal force pro-jection forces — its airborne units. In sodoing, he reveals the same overreliance onour experiences in the Gulf War that hascaptured not only the Army’s mecha-nized/armor communities but much of our

senior leadership as well. We should bevery careful about drawing lessons from adesert war — which showcased and high-lighted our heavy forces in conditions whichoptimized their awesome capabilities —and then applying them to the force as awhole in conditions which do not.

If Crist is right, then our doctrine and oursenior leadership is wrong in stressingheavy-light and light-heavy operations.Light and heavy forces can work well inmany kinds of terrain despite the significantmobility differential. The experience of 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team dur-ing its recent CMTC rotation is one exam-ple.

During the rotation, the ABCT fought apure tank battalion with attached artillery,motor rifle, antitank, and engineer units. 3-325 controlled two tank and two Bradleyplatoons, as well as its organic heavyweapons company (with 20 TOWs) and amechanized engineer platoon. In rolling ter-rain interspersed with wooded and built-upareas, 3-325 killed 60% of the opposingforce in its movement to contact and 70%(including 24 of 29 tanks) in the defense. Inthe attack, the ABCT seized all four of itsassigned assault objectives. In each en-gagement, the combat team’s rifle compa-n ies or HMMWV-mounted TOWs ac-counted for more than 75% of its kills. 3-325 was not supported by any CAS orArmy aviation.

These results are significant because theOPFOR, in addition to its inherent advan-tages, fielded a force with vastly greaterfirepower and mobility. 3-325 offset theseadvantages by moving infantry on helicop-ters and trucks when out of contact and bydenying the OPFOR freedom of movementwith obstacles, pre-planned fires, good useof terrain (including natural choke points),massed fires in pre-selected engagementareas, and extremely aggressive closecombat antitank tactics.

Crist states that “infantry needs the samedegree of mobility as tanks,” and cites COLDonald Elder’s view that “anything lessthan the mounted combined arms team”provides “by no means the most capablecombat force.” These are veiled : and notvery thinly veiled — calls for the mechani-zation of the Army’s force projection forces.

Those of us who have made a career inthose forces are less enthusiastic, for tworeasons. First, we know that we can fightheavy forces successfully in all but themost open kinds of terrain, and that meansmost of the world. Fighting with our stand-ard task organizations, which includesApaches, field artillery, engineers, and airdefense — all supported by CAS — air-borne and air assault forces, which fieldlarge numbers of TOWs and Dragons, areformidable tank killers. Second, we knowthat giving us mechanized vehicles robs usof the very thing that makes us strategicallyuseful, and that is our strategic mobility. Iknow of no one who thinks that mecha-

nized airborne forces can realistically de-ploy by air given the current or projectedstate of our airlift fleet.

Few units are more aware of their limita-tions than the Army’s airborne forces. Werequire the same approach to combinedarms warfare as any other force and thesame kind of intelligent application ofMETT-T as anyone else. But we are morethan riflemen with rocket launchers. Comevisit us on the German plains and you’llsee what I mean.

MAJ R.D. HOOKER, JR.Deputy Commander

3-325 ABCT

Key to the Assault:Suppressing AT Weapons

Dear Sir:

The July-August 1995 edition of ARMORhad an extensive and informative article,“Crisis in Battle” by MAJ David Lemelin,describing techniques for assaulting a pla-toon position. Many excellent points werebrought out in this article, but I think a ma-jor one was missed.

The “crisis” of an assault is not so muchin the actions against the enemy infantryposition being assaulted as against enemyAT weapons and tanks around the objec-tive that can engage the assaulting force —they must be destroyed or suppressed toisolate the objective. If this precondition isachieved, the assault can be relativelyeasy.

A competent defender sets up a com-bined arms defense. Against an armoredforce, a defense is built around tanks andAT weapons sited in depth to continuouslyengage the attacker from multiple direc-tions. Obstacles, infantry positions, and ar-tillery support this defense by protecting ATweapons and by driving and holding the at-tacker in areas where AT fires are effec-tive. AT weapons are the key to this de-fense, not the dismounted infantry.

More attacks fail because of a failure tosuccessfully deal with mutually supportingenemy AT weapons, rather than an inabilityto deal with the defending enemy infantryand BMPs being assaulted. “Tunnel vision”or “target fixation” is a common problem,where the attention of the attacker is fo-cused inward on the position being at-tacked and all-around security is not main-tained.

In the scenario presented in MAJ Leme-lin’s article, a tank-heavy company teamwas given the mission of assaulting a for-ward enemy BMP infantry platoon. In sucha situation, adjacent elements of the taskforce could probably suppress adjacent en-emy positions that would engage the teamas it initially approached the enemy posi-


tion. However, as the assaulting teamcloses with the enemy position, fires fromin-depth enemy AT reserve, company, andbattalion second-echelon and adjacentcompany AT weapons, moved to “switch”positions, can catch the attackers in crossfires. Because many of these fires wouldcome from reverse slope, keyhole, and in-depth positions, initial support by fire posi-tions become less and less effective indealing with them, and the assaulting forceitself becomes more and more isolated.

This aspect of effective protection of theassaulting force from surrounding AT firesis critical, but difficult to achieve. The con-cept and execution of the operation mustfocus on this aspect, and it deserves em-phasis as the key to successful assault.

As a final point, I agree with MAJ Lemelinthat better training on assault techniques isneeded. Once the attacker is in the enemyposition, the fight often breaks down intosmall, close-range fire fights. These are like“dog fights” and close tank-infantry coop-eration, and “quick-draw” type reactionfighting skills in close terrain are neededbut can be gained only by focused, fre-quent practice.

JAMES C. CROWLEYLTC (Ret.), Armor

Peachtree City, Ga.

Once a Master Gunner, Always a Master Gu nner

Dear Sir:

I went to Master Gunner School, Class 5-81, as a young hard-charging SSG. At leastthat’s what the 1SG told me was the rea-son I was selected. I graduated and re-turned to Germany, ready to defeat Graf.Whether I did well or not, two years later, Iwas a master gunner instructor at FortKnox, the best job in the world for a mastergunner with the ability to share his knowl-edge. A short three years later, I am on theborder in the 2ACR as a SFC platoon ser-geant — not a master gunner, a platoonsergeant. We had a young hard-chargingSSG master gunner, who felt like I did sixyears earlier.

For the next seven years, I filled thosepositions talked about in promotion guides,platoon sergeant, first sergeant, and opera-tions sergeant — and yes, the promotionscame. Because I worked hard at beinggood at those jobs, I didn’t have time to bea master gunner also. Then came the sur-prise. After seven+ years of letting thosehard chargers do their jobs as master gun-ners, while I did mine, I arrived at Ft. Hoodat USASMA, class 43 graduate, MSG, andwas told I was going to be a battalion mas-ter gunner! When I went to see the divisionCSM for my interview, I told him the lasttank I was a master gunner on was an M1,and I wasn’t prepared to be a master gun-ner again. I wasn’t snivelling, I was being

honest. Needless to say, I was talked tolike a private, and told if I didn’t want to bea master gunner, I should have droppedmy ASI years ago! Get your #!@ down tothat unit and do your job! So I became amaster gunner again. That was a year ago.Now I am the division master gunner (newdivision CSM). Thanks to some younghard-charging NCOs, I am almost currentagain.

The meaning of this story: After threeyears as a drill sergeant or a recruiter, bothof which get you extra money and a badge(for life), nobody expects you to do that jobagain unless you want to. As a master gun-ner (no money, no badge), you have a life-time commitment, no matter where yourcareer takes you! Attempt to stay current,or you can try to have your ASI removed.The choice is yours — think about it.

SGM JAMES S. SPURLINGDivision Master Gunner

Author Seeks InformationOn Tank Qualification Patches

Dear Sir:

I am writing in the hope you may helpme. I am seeking information on initial useof armor pocket qualification patches. I amtrying to determine when early TCQCpatches were worn, and hope some ArmorAssociation members might be able to helpme.

I am researching the history of qualifica-tion badges and awards so I might use theinformation in a book I am writing on theseprizes. While most of the awards I am re-searching concern individual marksmanshipbadges and prizes from 1880 to the pre-sent, I would like to include some informa-tion above the TCQC and similar pocketpatches. During World War II, the 10th Ar-mored Division had a pocket patch to showtank crew proficiency, and in 1951, thenMajor General Bruce C. Clarke introduceda green and yellow TANKER diamond forwear on the HBT’s in the 1st Armored Divi-sion. I have seen photos of 3d Armored Di-vision members wearing green, black, andyellow pocket patches in about 1961. Iknow of no other awards for tank crew pro-ficiency being worn on fatigue uniforms un-til these 3d Armored Division patches. I amseeking information on when, why, andhow the pocket patches commonly worn inthe 1960s and 1970s came into use. Anyinformation you might provide me would begreatly appreciated.

I hasten to assure you that I am a seriouswriter and researcher. My book on the his-tory of U.S. Army chevrons was publishedby the Smithsonian Institution Press in1982, and my current book on U.S. Armybranch insignia will be published by theUniversity of Oklahoma Press in the springof 1996. I have published over 60 articleson U.S. Army uniforms and insignia in vari-ous magazines over the past 25 years, and

have been a Fellow in the Company of Mili-tary Historians since 1972.

Any assistance ARMOR readers mightgive me concerning the early wear ofTCQC patches would be greatly appreci-ated. Thank you for your time.

WILLIAM K. EMERSONLTC, Armor, Retired

124 Kensington DriveMadison, Alabama 35758

PH: (205) 461-8782

Dashes and Slashes...

Dear Sir:

I was a bit disappointed that the backcover of the September-October 1995 is-sue contains the glaring error in ‘militarygrammar’ of listing our cavalry units as ifthey were companies in battalions or bri-gades in divisions instead of the proudsquadrons of storied regiments as theyshould be. Separating the squadron fromits parent regiment by a ‘-’ vice the ‘/’ is, ofcourse, the correct way to designate unitswhich are affiliated under the Combat ArmsRegimental System, according to FM 101-5-1.

GREG GARDNERLTC, GS

ACofS, G325 ID(L)

LTC Gardner is correct as far as non-regi-mental cavalry goes. However, a carefulreading of the bottom paragraph on page2-73 of FM 101-5-1 indicates that cavalrysquadrons of a regiment are designatedwith the “/,” e.g., 3/3 ACR indicates 3dSquadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.1-4 Cav is the proper notation for the 1stSquadron, 4th Cavalry, which is a divisionalcavalry unit, and 1-8 Cav is the proper des-ignation for the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, atank battalion assigned to the 1st CavalryDivision. We regret the errors on the Sep-tember/October 1995 back cover. - Ed.

Dutch Author Seeks Info onMarmon-Herrington Light Tanks

A Dutch author seeks to correspond withformer U.S. Army personnel who had expe-rience during World War II with Marmon-Herrington light tanks. The series includedthe CTLS-UTAY (T14) and UTAC (T16),CTMS, and MTLS, some of which wereused by the Dutch. He’s interested in for-mer crewmen, testing and arsenal person-nel, and shipping personnel.

Anyone wishing to share information mayget in touch with Hans Heesakkers atAkkerstraat 2, NL-5061 DE Oisterwijk, TheNetherlands.


Closing with the Enemy, by Michael D.Doubler. University Press of Kansas,Lawrence. 1994. 354 pages. $40.00.

After a flood of new books last year onWorld War II, it’s hard to imagine anythingleft unsaid, but this fine book is an excep-tion. It is a history of the the U.S. Army inthat war, but rather than retelling what ourArmy did in conventional narrative, Doublerfocuses on how the Army learned andchanged as the war progressed.

It should be an invaluable book for thoseentrusted with training, as it describes criti-cal shortfalls and how the Army changed tomeet these challenges. In each instance,covered in a chapter each, he describesgaps in preparedness — city combat, forestfighting, river crossings —and the meas-ures taken to rectify weaknesses on theroad to victory.

Incredible as it may seem, the brilliantplanners who mounted the Overlord inva-sion of Normandy failed to anticipate thenext step, the bitter fighting in the bocagehedgerows that stalled the drive eastwardat a cost of thousands of casualties. Onewould think that in the careful invasionplanning, with its emphasis on extensiveaerial reconnaissance of coastal France,someone would have noticed that the bat-tlefield ahead was a series of hundreds ofcompartmented, sunken farm fields, eachseparated from the rest and from neighbor-ing roads by raised, wooded hedgerows —perfect terrain for an experienced Germanarmy on the defense.

Over the centuries, Norman farmers hadencouraged this checkerboard of berms,heavily entangled with trees and bushes tomoderate the winds off the Channel. Eachwooded strip could conceal defenders andstymie the passage of tanks, but more im-portant to an army on the attack, the bermsseparated each unit from others on itsflanks, creating a series of isolated mini-battles where it was impossible to mass ormaneuver.

Men attempting to cross the open fieldswould be mortared and machine-gunned byenemy units in the next hedgerow, andtanks attempting to go over these obstacleswere vulnerable to antitank fire as the bel-lies of the tanks were exposed. Each fieldpresented another identical challenge, cre-ating new casualties and sapping the will ofthe men who, weeks earlier, had triumphedon the beaches. General Omar Bradleycalled the bocage “the damndest countryI’ve seen.”

Blundering into mortar attacks in pre-reg-istered fields, kept down by machine gunfire grazing the tops of the berms, bedev-iled by snipers, and still green in combat,the attackers were blooded by a seeminglyendless series of 300-yard firefights, fieldby field. They hadn’t been trained for this,nor were tank and infantry units comfort-able enough with each other to fight thekind of seamless combined arms combatthat became routine as the same armymoved toward Berlin later in the war. Armorunits, especially, were stymied by this kindof fight: pushing through the fields was im-possible, and outflanking the enemy on thesparse road network made the tankers per-fect targets for long-range antitank guns.

The author proceeds from this point toanswer the question, “Well, how come theystill prevailed?” This is the core of the book— how the American Army developed thetactics, techniques, and procedures thatsolved these problems in the heat of com-bat, discarding doctrine when necessaryand adapting to overcome battle-hardeneddefenders.

Improving tank-infantry cooperation of-fered the beginning of a solution. If thetanks’ cannon fire could be brought to bearon the defenders, the infantry had a betterchance. Several ways were developed to“bust the bocage.” Blade-equipped dozertanks could plunge through smaller berms,but there were only four in each infantry di-vision’s tank battalions. While they waitedfor more, other solutions emerged. The29th Infantry Division experimented withusing explosives to blow gaps in thehedgerows, then perfected a technique toemplace the explosives using their tanks.Six-inch diameter pipes were welded to thefront slopes and the tanks rammed thehedgerow, removing a plug of roots andearth so that explosive charges could beplaced deep in the obstacle. The chargeswere packed into empty 105-mm artilleryshells for easy transport and to maximizethe explosive effect. Another approach wasdeveloped in the 2d AD’s 102nd CavalryReconnaissance Squadron by Sgt. CurtisG. Culin, the sawtooth hedgerow cutterswelded to the front of tanks. Pointing upthe improvisational nature of the fix, thecutters were actually fabricated from steelsalvaged from German beach defenses.The Culin devices had another advantageover explosives — they did not alert theenemy.

Ad hoc improvements in communicationbetween tank crews and accompanying in-

fantry also helped the synergy of combinedarms attacks, specifically the back decktelephone. And aerial forward observerslearned to spot and adjust fire on defend-ers from a vantage point the ground troopswished they had.

While technology and better communica-tions were making a difference, units beganto develop new tactics and procedures, for-malizing lessons bitterly learned. The 29thID, again, pioneered a tank-infantry-engi-neer approach that allowed units to main-tain momentum and kept defenders fromregaining their balance as they retreated.The 3rd AD developed another approach,attacking the two fields adjoining a third,then moving in behind the center field oncethe hedgerows were penetrated.

The overall result, according to theauthor, was that “Forces that crossed theNormandy beaches in June had evolved agreat deal by July. The greatest changestook place in combat units, where tankers,infantrymen, engineers, and artillery FOsbecame close-knit partners in a coordi-nated effort...By the end of July, First Armyused on a routine basis a large number ofcombat techniques and procedures un-heard of in the preinvasion period.”

Each subsequent chapter outlines a bat-tle problem similar to the challenge of theNormandy terrain — the difficulty of rivercrossings, the attack on heavily forestedterrain like the Huertgen Forest, the tech-niques developed to speed attacks in built-up areas, the coordination of the ground-airteam, the attack on the fortresses in East-ern France, and the hurried adaptation tothe defensive at the Bulge.

The theme in each diverse chapter is ad-aptation under combat conditions, and theauthor’s judgment is that this is what wonthe war. Ironically, our advantage was thatwe were an army of individuals from a na-tion that prized individuality and questionedauthority. So, when doctrine failed, the so-lutions came from the bottom up, not thetop down.

The conclusion might make us questionour reliance on teaching doctrine, ratherthan encouraging a flexible, open architec-ture that presumes we will never anticipateeverything, but can adapt to anything.

This is a superb book about warfighting,and everyone in the business of trainingsoldiers ought to read it.

JON CLEMENSARMOR Staff

BOOK ESSAY

Hard LessonsIn the Schoolhouse of War


The Great Battles of Antiquity: AStrategic and Tactical Guide toGreat Battles That Shaped the De-velopment of War by Richard A.Gabriel and Donald W. Boose, Jr.,Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn.,714 pages, $95.00.

There is something romantic and excitingabout the study of antiquity. Whether it isthe study of the culture of ancient Egypt,the rise of the Grecian city-states, or thegrandeur that was the Roman Empire,something always draws me to any bookdealing with the ancient world. I am espe-cially intrigued by any book or author thatexamines ancient military systems and thebattles of antiquity. In our post-Cold Warworld, however, soldiers and the study ofmilitary history, especially ancient militaryhistory, seem relegated to the intellectualtrash heap. In a direct challenge to thisshort-sighted view, Richard A. Gabriel andDonald W. Boose have co-authored TheGreat Battles of Antiquity, a well-writtenbook grand in scope and design, and wor-thy of study by soldiers and statesmenalike.

The authors begin their study with theBattle of Megiddo in 1479 B.C. and endwith the fall of Constantinople in 1453.Their goal is to distill “a number of strategicand tactical lessons that may aid in provid-ing useful insights to the modern-day sol-dier and statesman.” (p. xxv) Thirty-twobatt les and campaigns are analyzedaround four categories. The first category,“Strategic Setting,” covers the political andstrategic context of the battle or campaign,while “The Antagonists” assesses the doc-trine, organization, and leadership of thearmies involved. A detailed account of thebattle(s) is the third category, with the finalcategory, “Lessons of War,” providingguideposts for the modern-day soldier andstatesman. Gabriel and Boose accomplishtheir purpose marvelously throughout thebook.

The breadth and depth of this book isworthy of volumes, but the four-step meth-odology employed by the authors servesthem well in limiting its scope. The physicalconstruction of The Great Battles of Antiq-uity allows readers to “browse” through asingle battle or campaign at their leisure.Each chapter concentrates on a single bat-tle or group of battles (The Campaigns ofHannibal for example), without the need toread the book sequentially. Because eachchapter is constructed identically within thecontext of the four categories of analysis, Iwas able to move smoothly from Alexanderthe Great to the Battle of Hastings.

The analysis in all four categories is su-perb. The authors are meticulous in theirpresentation of the impact of culture onwarfare. For those who eschew the studyof culture and its impact on military and po-litical processes, this book serves as a

primer on how to integrate culture into mili-tary history without diluting the importanceof either in society. The authors are at theirbest when analyzing a series of battles orcampaigns, such as those by Hannibal orAlexander the Great. They also do not suf-fer from the myopia of Eurocentrism, but in-corporate the warfare practiced by the Chi-nese, Koreans, Mongols, and Japanese.

While the four-step analysis processserves Gabriel and Boose well throughoutthe book, they present the final section“Lessons of War,” in the form of bullet com-ments that would be at home on anybriefer’s slide. For all of their effort in thepreceding three sections, they could haveclosed each chapter more effectively hadthey tied their comments together in effec-tive prose. As it is, many of their lessonstake on the appearance of maxims, seem-ingly divorced from the context in whichthey were made. While a “bullet comment”approach works for the military reader, Ifeel it fails the civilian.

There is little doubt that warfare is a so-cial institution among human beings. Re-gardless of the date of the battle or cam-paign, there is one constant — the humanbeing. Although the weapons and tactics ofwarfare have changed and evolved consid-erably from the t ime of the Battle ofMegiddo, the essential human element re-mains constant. Gabriel and Boose effec-tively examine the efforts of our ancestors,and bridge the centuries to show us thetimeliness of the study of ancient militaryhistory. Perhaps instead of looking for theevanescent lessons from the Gulf War, weshould turn to the timeless nature of theproblems encountered by the Great Cap-tains of the past.

ARTHUR W. CONNOR, JR.MAJ, Armor

Ft. Stewart, Ga.

Panthers in the Shadows by ScottHamilton. HPS Simulations, P.O. Box3245, Santa Clara, CA 95055, $59.95.Internet [email protected].

System Requirements: Minimum 386CPU, VGA monitor, 2 MB RAM, DOS.

Panthers in the Shadows is, without adoubt, the most detailed and realistic tacti-cal-level armor simulation currently on thecomputer market. Panthers allows com-puter owners to do something new: applyactual armor tactics to a computer game.Designer Scott Hamilton (an ex-Engineerofficer) of HPS Simulations has done an in-credible job of creating a program that ismore simulation than game.

The strength of Panthers lies in the tacti-cal scale and the rich variety of the weap-ons offered. The simulation has a scale of100 meters per hex and one minute per

turn, with units representing platoons orsections of vehicles, AT guns, mortars, ar-tillery, or infantry platoons. Losses aretaken by individual vehicle and individualinfantryman. There are over 1,000 weap-ons systems in the database, along withover 1,500 types of ammunition. APC,APCBC, HEAT, HE, APCR, smoke, canis-ter, illumination, and a slew of other ammu-nition types are available for use by the ap-propriate weapons. Battles may be foughtat night, in rain or snow, or in a howlingwindstorm, as the program allows for a fullrange of climatic conditions. In addition,there are wire and obstacles, minefields,paratroops and gliders, naval gunfire sup-port, engineers, flamethrowers, and air-strikes. Virtually every armored vehicle andweapon that fought in the Western theaterduring WWII is covered. As I’ve told myfriends, “any simulation with 43 differenttypes of Sherman tanks available is worthinvestigating!”

As an armor officer, the real attractionPanthers has for me is the ability to usereal tactics and doctrine successfully. InPanthers, it pays to use your forces doctri-nally, and to advance with elements inoverwatch. The player who uses a com-bined arms approach and masses hisforces will see definite results with this pro-gram. Using smoke, covered and con-cealed routes to the objective, and coordi-nating artillery missions (which have delaytimes) are reminiscent of miniatures gam-ing, except with computer-driven assis-tance. Miniatures enthusiasts will appreci-ate the fact that Panthers differentiates be-tween front, side, front turret, side turret,and rear armor, and calculates penetrationbased on kinetic energy versus the armorthickness modified by the angle of inci-dence of the strike. Armor enthusiasts willappreciate a computer program that accu-rately depicts the feeling of armored com-bat at the tactical level.

The simulation has three levels of diffi-culty, can be played against an AI oppo-nent or by e-mail against another person,and comes with nine canned scenarios anda scenario builder. The scenario buildercan cover any battle in the Western andNorth African fronts during WWII from 1940to 1945, and includes French, British, U.S.,Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and German forcestructures. Factors such as morale, traininglevel, ammunition dud rate, weather, coun-terbattery fire, air superiority, and visibilityare fully adjustable.

There is really very little negative to sayabout the program, although the sound ef-fects are rudimentary at best and usuallyget turned off quickly. This is in contrast toPanzer General, another currently popularcomputer program. But Panzer General,despite superb sound effects and graphics,is really nothing more than a computergame with a historical backdrop. Panthersin the Shadows, with average sound effectsand graphics, is a superb computer simula-

BOOKS


tion of armored warfare, which can be usedto illustrate the synchronization of forces sonecessary to win. I highly recommend thisprogram for all computer-literate armor offi-cers.

MAJ GREGORY M. SMITHG3 Exercise, 3rd Army

Ft. McPherson, Ga.

Tiger Ace: The Life Story of Pan-zer Commander Michael Wittmannby Gary L. Simpson, Schiffer Publish-ing Ltd., 1994. 394 pages. $35.00,hardcover.

The exploits of Michael Wittmann havetaken on a legendary quality in the annalsof military history. This book lends cre-dence to the title military historians havegiven to Michael Wittmann — that of thegreatest tank commander in World War II.Tiger Ace chronicles the life of a man whowas personally responsible for destroying138 armored fighting vehicles and another132 antitank and artillery pieces during fiveyears of fighting.

Author Gary Simpson begins the bookwith five pages that describe Wittmann’sexperiences growing up on the family farm.It was on the farm that Wittmann learnedthe values of diligence, caring, open-mind-edness, and decisiveness that would servehim well as a military leader. More impor-tantly according to Simpson, MichaelWittmann developed his love and respectfor mechanical vehicles while working onthe farm. Throughout the remainder of thebook, Simpson repeatedly reminds thereader that Wittmann’s actions on the bat-tlefield are directly related to his experi-ences on the farm.

At the age of twenty, Wittmann volun-teered for the German Reichs Arbeitdienst(German Voluntary Labor Service) andserved for six months before enlisting inthe German Wehrmacht as an infantrymanin October 1934. After two years, Wittmannjoined the Leibstandarte, Hitler’s personalbodyguard regiment. Simpson is careful topoint out that Wittmann joined the SS be-cause he wanted to be one of the elite,and not because he shared the same politi-cal philosophy. Wittmann found the trainingto be harder and more realistic than in theregular army, with a greater emphasisplaced on being aggressive on the battle-field. Wittmann served as an armored carcommander during the Polish Campaign in1939 and the German attacks in the Westin 1940. Upon the fall of France, Wittmannwas selected for training and commandingthe new Sturmgeschutz III (StuG III — as-sault gun). He served as a StuG III com-mander during the Balkan Campaign andthe first year of Operation Barbarossa, theinvasion of the Soviet Union. In June 1942,Wittmann attended the SS officer cadetschool. Wittmann’s performance at the

school and on the battlefield enabled himto become one of the first to command thenew Panzerkampfwagen VI ‘Tiger.’

Wittmann assumed command of a Tigerplatoon and fought on the Russian Frontbeginning in January of 1943. He partici-pated in all the major battles on the Rus-sian front from March 1943 to March 1944,to include the recapture of Kharkov, thebattle for Kursk, and the desperate fight todefend Kiev. Wittmann’s Tiger platoon per-formed superbly in all these battles, accom-plishing almost every mission assigned, butit was Wittmann and his crew’s perform-ance over this time period that earnedthem great distinction. During the Battle ofKursk, Wittmann’s tank destroyed 30T34/76 tanks and 29 AT guns in four days.Later, in November 1943, Wittmann’s Tigerdestroyed 16 tanks and 12 AT guns in oneday. By January 14, 1944, Wittmann’s Tigertotaled 88 enemy tanks destroyed, earninghim and his gunner, Bobby Woll, each aKnight’s Cross. That same day, after theawards were presented, Wittmann’s Tigerdestroyed 19 Russian tanks. As a result, onJanuary 30, 1944, Wittmann received theOak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross and apromotion to the rank of Obersturmfuhrer(1st Lieutenant). Simpson’s account of thebattles on the Russian Front try to describethe constant and ferocious fighting, but it isbeyond the author’s limited writing abilities.

In February 1944, Wittmann assumedcommand of the 2nd Company, SS-PzrAbt. 101, a Tiger company within Leiber-standarte’s Tiger Detachment. The entiredivision moved to Belgium to reequip andreorganize after a year of heavy fighting inRussia. It was on the Western Front thatthe world would witness Wittmann’s mostspectacular feat and his controversialdeath. On June 13, 1944, Wittmann andhis crew destroyed 25 armored fighting ve-hicles and stopped the advance of the Brit-ish 22nd Armored Brigade at Villers Bo-cage in Normandy, France. Wittmann re-ceived the Swords to the Knight’s Crossand a promotion to Hauptmann (Captain)for his efforts that day.

On August 8, 1944, Michael Wittmanndied in battle near St. Aignan-de-Crames-nil. Author Gary Simpson’s account of Mi-chael Wittmann’s death is very definite — aSherman Firefly commanded by a BritishLieutenant James. Simpson does not men-tion the current controversy as to howWittmann died and who should receiveclaim. Whether this is a result of Simpson’sresearch or ignorance is unknown due tohis poor documentation.

The book contains numerous previouslyunpublished photographs of MichaelWittmann and his crew. The photographslend credence to the author’s statements ofWittmann as a young, vibrant, and caringleader. Unfortunately, the author does notinclude any maps to assist in his descrip-tion of Wittmann’s military operations, noteven of the route that Wittmann used at

Villars Bocage. Instead, the writer unsuc-cessfully attempts to paint a picture with hisnarrative of each operation.

When I first found Tiger Ace, I anticipateda hard-edged account of the life of MichaelWittmann as a small unit leader. I could nothave been more disappointed. The book ispoorly written and is full of clichés and re-dundancies. Even worse, the atrocious ed-iting makes the book almost too hard toread. Simple grammar rules, like subject-verb agreements and avoiding sentencefragments, are not observed. The poor writ-ing makes me question the scholarship ofthe author. Also, the book unintentionallymakes Wittmann look like a tank com-mander and never a small unit leader. Theauthor usually writes about the commandsthat Michael Wittmann used to fight histank, but rarely mentions any of the tacticsor fire commands that Wittmann used tofight his platoon and company.

The inside cover of the book claims thatGary Simpson conducted extensive re-search and travel in preparation for thisbook. Unfortunately, the majority of the re-search focused on the Battle of Villars Bo-cage, and not on Wittmann’s exploits priorto Normandy. The author documents his in-terviews with Wittmann’s widow, membersof the 22nd Armored Brigade, and Oberst-leutnant Jurgen Wessel (Wittmann’s deputycommander in Normandy) in annexes inthe back of the book, but fails to do so inthe main text. Simpson also used recordedinterviews with the propaganda ministryand personal material that Wittmann’swidow presented to him. Since the majorityof the author’s research focused on theBattle of Villars Bocage, this is the mostreadable and interesting chapter in thebook. Finally, although the publisher claimsthat this is the first comprehensive study ofMichael Wittmann, this is not true. Dr. Gre-gory Jones wrote and published Panzer-held: The Story of Hauptmann MichaelWittmann in 1993 (reviewed in the March-April 1994 ARMOR).

Simpson’s Tiger Ace is a book that fallsfar short of its great potential. Only themost die-hard military historians shouldread this book. Anyone interested in the lifeof Michael Wittmann and the tactics heused is better served by Dr. Jones’ book onMichael Wittmann.

CPT CARL J. HORNFt. Knox, Ky.


Lucky War: Third Army in De-sert Storm by Richard M. Swain(reviewed in our September-Octo-ber 1995 issue) is available fromthe Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, KS66027-6900.

A question that surfaces frequently is: Is it safefor Combat Vehicle Crewmen (CVC) to wear un-derwear made with synthetic fibers under theirNOMEX CVC coveralls?

The answer is, No.

Armor soldiers in the field need to be madeaware that a potential safety hazard may exist ifthese type of synthetic underwear are worn undertheir NOMEX CVC coveralls in the event of a tankfire. Nylon and synthetics such as polyester andpolypropylene melt at about 480 degrees fahren-heit and 300 degrees fahrenheit respectively. Heattransfer through your NOMEX (which is resistantto temperatures up to 700 degrees fahrenheit)could be high enough to melt these synthetic un-dergarments. It also should be noted that yourNOMEX will burn if it’s contaminated with flamma-ble substances such as Petroleum, Oil, and Lubri-cants (POL) products or household starch. Drycleaning or laundering after contact with thesesubstances will restore your NOMEX’s fire retar-dant state.

To restate the importance of wearing proper un-derwear underneath your NOMEX, I’ll use a quotethat CW3 Boyd Tackett III made in a recent flightFAX regarding the experience he had when hisaircraft caught afire. “My chest, back, and buttockswere spared from any burns at all due to the cot-ton underwear that I had on. The burn literallywent to where the underwear was and stopped. IfI hadn’t been wearing my NOMEX protectiveequipment and wearing it properly, there is nodoubt in my mind, that I would very probably haveeither died in the fire or died as a result of theburns I would have received.”

So for your protection, the underwear that youwear should be made of 50% cotton/50% wool or100% cotton. These natural fibers won’t melt un-der heat and will help keep the heat away fromyour body in a flash fire. If your underwear is fabri-

cated of 50% cotton/50% polyester, it’sunsafe to be worn when the possibilityof flame hazard exists. If you have anyadditional question on this subjectplease give us a call (Mr. Larry Hasty)here at Directorate of Force Develop-ment, DSN 464-3662/2176.

PIN: 074283-000

It’s Dangerous to WearSynthetic Fiber UnderwearUnder a NOMEX Suit

armor, january-february 1996 edition

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