arica vs. national labor relations commission, 170 scra 776(1989)]

8/11/2019 Arica vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 170 SCRA 776(1989)]

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776

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arica vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 78210. February 28, 1989.*

TEOFILO ARICA, DANILO BERNABE, MELQUIADES DOHINO, ABONDIO OMERTA, GIL TANGIHAN, SAMUEL

LABAJO, NESTOR NORBE, RODOLFO CONCEPCION, RICARDO RICHA, RODOLFO NENO, ALBERTO

BALATRO, BENJAMIN JUMAMOY, FERMIN DAAROL, JOVENAL ENRIQUEZ, OSCAR BASAL, RAMON ACENA,

JAIME BUGTAY, and 561 OTHERS, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY KORONADO B. APUZEN, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, HONORABLE CONRADO B.

MAGLAYA, HONORABLE ROSARIO B. ENCARNACION, and STANDARD (PHIL-IPPINES) FRUIT

CORPORATION, respondents.

Labor Law; Labor Relations; Waiting Time; The 30-minute assembly time practiced by the employees

of the company (private respondent), cannot be considered waiting time, and is therefore not

compensable.Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecitedcase (Associated Labor Union vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76) where

significant findings of facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter. The Minister of Labor

held: The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of

the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as

waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing

the Labor Code. x x x Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice

of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to

deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to

require the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses

are situated right on the area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does notnecessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In

short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their

failure to

________________


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* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989

777


report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; The principle of res judicata bars not only the

relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues raised, passed upon and adjudicated in the first suit, but

also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been raised in the first,

but was not.This Court has held: In this connection account should be taken of the cognate principle

that res judicata operates to bar not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues squarely

raised, passed upon and adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of

any other issue which could have been raised in the first but was not. The law provides that the

judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could

have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by

title subsequent to the commencement of the action x x litigating for the same thing and in the same

capacity. So, even if new causes of action are asserted in the second action (e.g. fraud, deceit, undue

machinations in connection with their execution of the convenio de transaccion), this would not

preclude the operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Those issues are also barred, even if not passed

upon in the first. They could have been, but were not, there raised. (Vda. de Buncio v. Estate of the late

Anita de Leon, 156 SCRA 352 [1987]).


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Same; Evidence; Findings of Fact; Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded not only respect

but at times, finality as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.Moreover, as a rule, the

findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is

confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are

supported by substantial evidence (Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San

Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 [1983]; Dangan v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 796 [1984]; Phil. Labor Alliance

Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162 [1977]; Mamerto v. Inciong, 118 SCRA 265 [1982];

National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Ople, 143 SCRA 124 [1986]; Edi-Staff Builders

International, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., 152 SCRA 453 [1987]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152

SCRA 219 [1987].

778

778



SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

Labor Law; Labor Relations; Labor Standards; Waiting Time; In view of the restrictions imposed upon

petitioners with respect to the practice of the 30-minute assembly time, said assembly time, has

become, in truth and in fact a waiting time as contemplated in the Labor Code.It is evident that the

Ople decision was predicated on the absence of any insinuation of obligatoriness in the course or after

the assembly activities on the part of the employees. (. . . *T+hey are not subject to the absolute controlof the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify

the company to impose disciplinary measures; supra, 6.) As indicated, however, by the petitioners,

things had since changed, and remarkably so, and the latter had since been placed under a number of

restrictions. My considered opinion is that the thirty-minute assembly time had become, in truth and

fact, a waiting time as contemplated by the Labor Code.


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PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Koronado B. Apuzen and Jose C. Espinas for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission

dated December 12, 1986 in NLRC Case No. 2327 MC-XI-84 entitled Teofilo Arica et al. vs. Standard

(Phil.) Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) which affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos,

NLRC, Special Task Force, Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City dismissing the claim of

petitioners.

This case stemmed from a complaint filed on April 9, 1984 against private respondent Stanfilco for

assembly time, moral damages and attorneys fees, with the aforementioned Regional Arbitration

Branch No. XI, Davao City.

After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers (Annex C, pp. 30-40; Annex D,

Rollo, pp. 41-

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50), Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex E, Rollo, pp. 51-

58) in favor of private respondent STANFILCO, holding that:

Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot but agree with respondent that the pronouncement in

that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-minute assembly time long practiced cannot be considered waiting time

or work time and, therefore, not compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer be

disturbed without doing violence to the time-honored principle of res-judicata.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant complaint should therefore be, as it is

hereby, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 58)

On December 12, 1986, after considering the appeal memorandum of complainant and the opposition

of respondents, the First Division of public respondent NLRC composed of Acting Presiding

Commissioner Franklin Drilon, Commissioner Conrado Maglaya, Commissioner Rosario D. Encarnacion

as Members, promulgated its Resolution, upholding the Labor Arbiters decision. The Resolutions

dispositive portion reads:

Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above-quoted provision of the agreement includes

the long-standing practice and institutionalized non-compensable assembly time. This, in effect,

estopped complainants from pursuing this case.


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The Commission cannot ignore these hard facts, and we are constrained to uphold the dismissal and

closure of the case. WHEREFORE, let the appeal be, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (AnnexH, Rollo, pp. 86-89).

On January 15, 1987, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed by private

respondent (Annex I, Rollo, pp. 90-91; Annex J, Rollo, pp. 92-96).

Public respondent NLRC, on January 30, 1987, issued a resolution denying for lack of merit petitioners

motion for reconsideration (Annex K, Rollo, p. 97).

Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed on May 7, 1987.

780

780



The Court in the resolution of May 4, 1988 gave due course to this petition.

Petitioners assign the following issues:


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1) Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is

compensable under the Labor Code.

2) Whether or not res judicata applies when the facts obtaining in the prior case and in the case at bar

are significantly different from each other in that there is merit in the case at bar.

3) Whether or not there is finality in the decision of Secretary Ople in view of the compromise

agreement novating it and the withdrawal of the appeal.

4) Whether or not estoppel and laches lie in decisions for the enforcement of labor standards (Rollo,

p. 10).

Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the assembly

area is compensable as working time (from 5:30 to 6:00 oclock in the morning) since these preliminary

activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondents benefit.

These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows:

(a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work assignments from the

foreman.

(b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborers Daily Accomplishment

Report during which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the followingday.

(c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.

(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials.

All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish (Rollo, Petition, p. 11).

Contrary to this contention, respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new, the very same claim

having been brought against herein respondent by the same group of rank and file employees in the

case of Associated Labor Union and Standard Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 which

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was filed way back April 27, 1976 when ALU was the bargaining agent of respondents rank and file

workers. The said case involved a claim for waiting time, as the complainants purportedly were

required to assemble at a designated area at least 30 minutes prior to the start of their scheduled

working hours to ascertain the work force available for the day by means of a roll call, for the purpose

of assignment or reassignment of employees to such areas in the plantation where they are most

needed. (Rollo, pp. 64-65)

Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecited case (Associated

Labor Union vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76) where significant findings

of facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter.

The Minister of Labor held:

The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the

parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as


the Labor Code. x x x

Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees,

and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the

time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to

deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the

area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the


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personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not

subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in

the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The CBA does not

contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This, therefore,

demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not primarily intended

for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-

availability for work during every working day. (Annex E, Rollo, p. 57).

782

782



Accordingly, the issues are reduced to the sole question as to whether public respondent National Labor

Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of December 17, 1986.

The facts on which this decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case in this questioned

resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission.

It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very same claim which they filed through the

ALU and which records show had already long been considered terminated and closed by this Court in

G.R. No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners claim is already

barred by res judicata.

Be that as it may, petitioners claim that there was a change in the factual scenario which are

substantial changes in the facts makes respondent firm now liable for the same claim they earlier filed

against respondent which was dismissed. It is thus axiomatic that the non-compensability of the claim


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having been earlier established, constitute the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties and

remains to be the law of the case making this petition without merit.

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is clearly violative of the familiarprinciple

of res judicata. There will be no end to this controversy if the light of the Minister of Labors decision

dated May 12, 1979 that had long acquired the character of finalityand which already resolved that

petitioners thirty (30)-minute assembly time is not compensable, the same issue can be re-litigated

again. (Rollo, p. 183)

This Court has held:

In this connection account should be taken of the cognate principle that res judicata operates to bar

not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues squarely raised, passed upon and

adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of any other issue which

could have been raised in the first but was not. The law provides that the judgment or order is, with

respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation

thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the

783


783


commencement of the action x x litigating for the same thing and in the same capacity. So, even if new

causes of action are asserted in the second action (e.g. fraud, deceit, undue machinations in connection

with their execution of the convenio de transaccion), this would not preclude the operation of the

doctrine of res judicata. Those issues are also barred, even if not passed upon in the first. They could


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have been, but were not, there raised. (Vda. de Buncio v. Estate of the late Anita de Leon,156 SCRA 352

[1987]).

Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise

because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even

finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence (Special Events & Central Shipping Office

Workers Union v. San Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 [1983]; Dangan v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706 [1984];

Phil. Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162 [1977]; Mamerto v. Inciong, 118

SCRA 265 [1982]; National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Ople, 143 SCRA 124 [1986]; Edi-Staff

Builders International, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., 152 SCRA 453 [1987]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.

Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]).

The records show that the Labor Arbiters decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex E, Petition) pointedout in detail the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no cogent reason can be found to disturb

these findings nor of those of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the same.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the National

Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

It is my opinion that res judicata is not a bar.

The decision penned by then Minister Blas Ople in ALU v.


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784

784



STANFILCO (NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76) relied upon by the respondents as basis for claims of res

judicata, is not, to my mind, a controlling precedent. In that case, it was held that the thirty-minute

waiting time complained of was a mere assembly time and not a waiting time as the term is known

in law, and hence, a compensable hour of work. Thus:

The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the

parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as


the Labor Code. x x x

Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees,

and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the

time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to

deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the

area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the

personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores.

In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their

failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The

CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This,

therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not


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primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their

availability or non-availability for work during every working day. (Decision, 6.)

Precisely, it is the petitioners contention that the assembly time in question had sinceundergone

dramatic changes, thus:

(a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work assignments from the

foreman.

(b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborers Daily Accomplishment

Report during which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the following

day.

(c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.

785


785


(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials.

(Supra, 4-5.)

The petitioners have vehemently maintained that in view thereof, the instant case should be

distinguished from the first case. And I do not believe that the respondents have successfully rebutted

these allegations. The Solicitor General relies solely on the decision of then Minister Ople, the decision

the petitioners precisely reject in view of the changes in the conditions of the parties. The private


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respondent on the other hand insists that these practices were the same practices taken into account in

ALU v. STANFILCO. If this were so, the Ople decision was silent thereon.

It is evident that the Ople decision was predicated on the absence of any insinuation of obligatoriness in

the course or after the assembly activities on the part of the employees. (. . . *T+hey are not subject to

the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly

time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures; supra, 6.) As indicated, however, by

the petitioners, things had since changed, and remarkably so, and the latter had since been placed

under a number of restrictions. My considered opinion is that the thirty-minute assembly time had

become, in truth and fact, a waiting time as contemplated by the Labor Code.

I vote, then, to grant the petition.

Petition dismissed and decision affirmed.

Note.Findings of fact of administrative agencies like the Ministry of Labor, generally accorded respect,

and judicial review by the Supreme Court is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion

(National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) vs. Ople, 143 SCRA 124.)

o0o

[Arica vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 170 SCRA 776(1989)]

arica vs. national labor relations commission, 170 scra 776(1989)]

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