ARE WE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RAILCAR MARKET?Midwest Association of Rail ShippersJuly 2017

Midwest Association of Rail Shippers | J u l y 2 0 1 7

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Forward-Looking Statements Statements in this Presentation not based on historical facts are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and, accordingly, involve known

and unknown risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and could cause our actual results, performance, or achievements to differ materially from those discussed. These statements include

statements as to our future expectations, beliefs, plans, strategies, objectives, events, conditions, financial performance, prospects, or future events. In some cases, forward-looking statements can be

identified by the use of words such as “may,” “could,” “expect,” “intend,” “plan,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “continue,” “likely,” “will,” “would”, and similar words

and phrases. Forward-looking statements are necessarily based on estimates and assumptions that, while considered reasonable by us and our management, are inherently uncertain. Accordingly, you

should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they are made, and are not guarantees of future performance. We do not undertake any obligation to

publicly update or revise these forward-looking statements. The following factors, in addition to those discussed in our other filings with the SEC, including our Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,

2016 and subsequent reports on Form 10-Q, could cause actual results to differ materially from our current expectations expressed in forward-looking statements:

• exposure to damages, fines, criminal and civil penalties, and reputational harm arising

from a negative outcome in litigation, including claims arising from an accident

involving our railcars

• inability to maintain our assets on lease at satisfactory rates due to oversupply of

railcars in the market or other changes in supply and demand

• weak economic conditions and other factors that may decrease demand for our assets

and services

• decreased demand for portions of our railcar fleet due to adverse changes in the price

of, or demand for, commodities that are shipped in our railcars

• higher costs associated with increased railcar assignments following non-renewal of

leases, customer defaults, and compliance maintenance programs or other

maintenance initiatives

• events having an adverse impact on assets, customers, or regions where we have a

concentrated investment exposure

• financial and operational risks associated with long-term railcar purchase commitments

• reduced opportunities to generate asset remarketing income

• operational and financial risks related to our affiliate investments, including the Rolls-

Royce & Partners Finance joint ventures

• fluctuations in foreign exchange rates

• failure to successfully negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the unions representing a substantial

portion of our employees

• improvements in railroad efficiency that could decrease demand for railcars

• the impact of regulatory requirements applicable to tank cars carrying crude, ethanol, and other flammable

liquids

• asset impairment charges we may be required to recognize

• deterioration of conditions in the capital markets, reductions in our credit ratings, or increases in our

financing costs

• competitive factors in our primary markets, including competitors with a significantly lower cost of capital

than GATX

• risks related to international operations and expansion into new geographic markets

• changes in, or failure to comply with, laws, rules, and regulations

• inability to obtain cost-effective insurance

• environmental remediation costs

• inadequate allowances to cover credit losses in our portfolio

• inability to maintain and secure our information technology infrastructure from cybersecurity threats and

related disruption of our business

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Agenda

About GATX

Industry Background

Recent Industry Performance

Current Trends

Looking Ahead

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About GATX

$7.6 billion in assets and interest in 146,000 railcars worldwide Investment-grade ratings from S&P and Moody’s 122,000 railcars and 600 locomotives in North America 6 major railcar maintenance facilities and 5 field repair centers

in North America Industry-leading railcar management capability

As of 12/31/16

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Industry Background: North America Railcar Ownership

52%

10%

19%

20%

RAILROADS (20%) Ownership of railcars has been

declining

In 2000, 53% of railcarswere owned by railroads

Virtually no tank car ownership due to complexities and regulations

Focus of capital investmenton infrastructure

LESSORS (52%) Shift from railroad and shipper owned

railcars to lessor market share

Lessors dominate the tank car segment due to complex services and compliance requirements

UMLER as of April 2017

SHIPPERS (19%) Shipper market share has been

relatively constant since 2008 at ~19%

Alternative focus of capital on core business versus railcar investments

TTX (10%) Fleet is predominantly focused

on intermodal, flat cars, and boxcars

Overall market share has remained steady since 2008 at ~10% of the North American fleet

NORTH AMERICAN FLEETBY CAR TYPE

32% Covered Hopper22% Open Top25% Tank

9% Flat8% Boxcar4% Intermodal

32%

22%

25%

9%

8%4%

Approximately 1.6 million railcars

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Lessor Market ShareLESSOR TANK CARS Approximately 407,500

tank cars in North America– About 80% of tank cars

are owned by lessors, with the balance owned by shippers

GATX is the second largest tank car lessor

UMLER as of April 2017; SMBC counts are estimated post ARL purchase

LESSOR FREIGHT CARS Approximately 1.2

million freight cars in North America– Ownership is more

balanced acrossowner types than tank

43% lessors, 26% railroads, 18% shippers, and 13% TTX

Based on more than 841,500lessor-owned railcars

15%

16%

18%12%

13%

6%

20%

NORTH AMERICANLEASING SHARE

15% GATX16% Union Tank Car18% Wells Fargo12% Trinity

13% CIT6% SMBC

20% Other

Based on approximately 325,000lessor-owned tank cars

19%

38%16%

9%

8%

10%

NORTH AMERICAN TANK CAR LEASING SHARE

19% GATX38% Union Tank Car16% Trinity

9% CIT8% SMBC

10% Other

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Industry Performance:Carload volumes have declined as mix has changed

AAR as of 12/31/16

Based on 2008 carloads of approximately 20.3 million

39%

2%11%5%3%

11%

5%

4%

20%

39% Coal2% Petroleum Products

11% Chemical5% Forest & Paper Products3% Food / Kindred

11% Farm Products5% Auto4% Metals

20% All Other

2008

26%

5%

13%

5%3%

14%

7%

3%

23%

26% Coal5% Petroleum Products

13% Chemical5% Forest & Paper Products3% Food / Kindred

14% Farm Products7% Auto3% Metals

23% All Other

Based on 2016 carloads of approximately 16.9 million

2016

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-

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

1Q08 4Q08 3Q09 2Q10 1Q11 4Q11 3Q12 2Q13 1Q14 4Q14 3Q15 2Q16 1Q17

Quarterly Commodity Carload Traffic, North America

All Other Coal & CokeSand, Stone, Minerals, & Related Products GrainPetroleum Products

Coal and sand are majority of 2017 YTD improvement

Source: AAR (2Q17 Carloads; Pre-Recession Peak excludes Mexican carloads)

Down 0.7MM

All Other (2Q06 Prior Peak)

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-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F

% C

hang

e

Change in NA Carloads

Coal & Coke Sand, Stone, Minerals, & Related Products

Weak comps make coal and sand look impressive

Source: AAR (2013 – 2016), IHS as of 1Q17 (2017 – 2019)

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-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F

% C

hang

e

Change in NA Carloads

All Other (excluding Coal & Sand, Stone, Minerals, & Related Products)

But overall demand fundamentals remain challenged

Source: AAR (2013 – 2016), IHS forecasts as of 1Q17 (2017 – 2019)

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Energy related fundamentals remain weak

Source: IHS as of 1Q17 (2017 onward forecasts), EIA as of January 2017 (Oil), EIA as of June 2017 (Coal)

(120)

(100)

(80)

(60)

(40)

(20)

-

20

2015 2016 2017F 2018F

U.S. Coal Consumption YOY Change (million short tons)

Electric Power Coke Plants Retail & General Industry

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

2012 2014 2016 2018F 2020F

% C

hang

e O

il &

Gas

Ext

ract

ion

WTI

$ /

BBL

NA Oil & Gas Industry Forecast

WTI $/bbl % Change Oil & Gas Extraction

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New car backlogs continue to declinebut are still well off historical lows

Railway Supply Institute as of April 2017

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ’16 ‘17

Tank Freight Mean Backlog Since 1994

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Growth in railcar supply only now turning negative

Low scrap steel prices have failed to spur meaningful attrition

UMLER (comparing 2015, 2016, 2017 fleet counts)

(31)(39)

(11)

79

56

10

48

16

(1)

1/1/2016 vs. 1/1/2015 1/1/2017 vs. 1/1/2016 4/1/2017 vs. 1/1/2017

Attrition & Fleet Growth of NA Fleet (in 000s)

Gross Attrition New Builds Net Fleet Change

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Idle cars are high, but have moderated slightly

Roughly 22% of NA fleet considered idle– Defined as having no

moves in past 60 days

91% stored empty– 35% tank cars– 27% covered hoppers– 15% gondolas

Recent velocity declines activated some cars– ~70k fewer cars

reported idle vs peak in June 2016

Source: AAR as of June 2017

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%Idle North American Fleet

% Idle Mean Since 2010

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Velocity has moderated, but insufficiently to offset demand weakness

Source: AAR & FTR

o For every 1 MPH change in rail velocity, railcar demand changes ~50K carso Trough-peak demand variance implies idling/activation of ~1/6 of the N. A. fleet

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23

24

25

26

27

28

2010Wk1

2010Wk27

2011Wk1

2011Wk27

2012Wk1

2012Wk27

2013Wk1

2013Wk27

2014Wk1

2014Wk27

2015Wk1

2015Wk27

2016Wk1

2016Wk27

2017Wk1

MPH

Weekly Train Speeds, North America

26.8

22.5

23.1

24.0

27.2

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Excess railcar supply impacting NA industry fleet

Source: Umler as of April 2017; AAR carloads as of June 2017; Railinc CLM analysis

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

Jan-

'15

Mar

-'15

May

- '15

Jul-'

15

Sept

-'15

Nov

-'15

Jan-

'16

Mar

-16

May

-16

Jul-1

6

Sep-

16

Nov

-16

Jan-

17

Mar

-17

May

-17

Industrywide Select 3-Month Movement Pct.

Coal 30K Gallon

10

11

12

13

14

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2Q17

Industrywide Implied Carloads/Car

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Weak industry performance has stalled new railcar orders

Source: ARCI (2017A = annualized 1Q17 data)

Orders still remain low with 1Q17 net orders (~4,800) near lowest point since 2009 crisis

-

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

Net Orders Over Time

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Rail loading growth sluggish compared to intermodal and truck

Source: FTR, IHS as of June 2017

-8.0%

-6.0%

-4.0%

-2.0%

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F

% C

hang

e

% Change in Loadings

Carloads Intermodal Truck

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Macroeconomic forecast is mixed

-4.0%

-2.0%

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F

Broad Based Economic Indicators

GDP Growth Manufacturing Growth Housing Starts Growth Light Vehicle Sales Growth

Source: IHS as of 1Q17 (forecast starts 2017)

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Will new developments in 2017 affect the railcar market?

CSXT adopts “precision railroading”Proposed federal infrastructure plans in US and

Canada– What might they be, and will they get done?

New leadership at USDOTChanges in energy markets and (maybe) energy

policy– A “pro-coal” US administration– Pipeline construction– Mexican energy market liberalization

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Has the railcar market bottomed?

Some industry observers assert that the worst of the supply and demand imbalance is over, but market signals are mixed, and backlogs remain high relative to past market bottoms

Coal and sand offer near-term hope, but broad demand picture is uncertain

Customer retention and modal share shift remain longer-term concerns in the carload market

Absent a new demand driver, return to balance in the railcar market will be slow

It is notoriously difficult to call a bottom and time a recovery

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Questions?