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Arab Environment:Climate Change

EDITED BY

MOSTAFA K. TOLBA

NAJIB W. SAAB

2009 REPORT OF THE ARAB FORUM FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries

© 2009 Arab Forum for Environment and Development (AFED)Published with Technical Publications and Environment & Development magazineP.O.Box 113-5474, Beirut, Lebanon

[email protected]://www.afedonline.org

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronicor mechanical means without permission in writing from AFED.

AFED and respective authors are solely responsible for opinions expressed in this report.The contents are based on best available data. Sponsors and supporting organizationsdo not necessarily endorse the views expressed in this report.

Editors: Mostafa K. Tolba and Najib W. SaabSenior Advisers: Mohamed Kassas and Mohamed El-AshryCopy Editor: William Saab

Graphics and Production Coordinator: Charbel MahfoudCover Design: Loryne AtouiExecution: Jamal AwadaPhotos: Environment & Development magazine archivePrinting: Chemaly & Chemaly, Beirut

ISBN: 9953-437-28-9

V PREFACE

VII EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

XI INTRODUCTIONMostafa Kamal Tolba and Najib Saab

1 CHAPTER 1Arab Public Opinion and Climate ChangeNajib Saab

13 CHAPTER 2GHG Emissions - Mitigation Efforts in the Arab CountriesIbrahim Abdel Gelil

31 CHAPTER 3A Remote Sensing Study of Some Impacts of Global Warming on the Arab RegionEman Ghoneim

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION

47 CHAPTER 4Coastal AreasMohamed El-Raey

63 CHAPTER 5Food ProductionAyman F. Abou Hadid

75 CHAPTER 6Fresh WaterDia El-Din El-Quosy

87 CHAPTER 7Human HealthIman Nuwayhid

Contents

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE IIIIII

101 CHAPTER 8Ecosystems and BiodiversitySalma Talhouk

113 CHAPTER 9InfrastructureHamed Assaf

121 CHAPTER 10TourismAbdellatif Khattabi

129 CHAPTER 11International Negotiations for a Post-Kyoto RegimeMohamed El-Ashry

143 CHAPTER 12Interrelation between Climate Change and Trade Negotiations Magda Shahin

151 CONTRIBUTORS

155 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CONTENTSIIVV

‘Impact of Climate Change on the Arab Countries’ is the second of a series of annu-al reports produced by the Arab Forum for Environment and Development(AFED). The first AFED report, published in 2008 under the title ‘ArabEnvironment: Future Challenges’, covered the most pressing environmental issuesfacing the region, and went beyond to provide a policy-oriented analysis. Thereport was presented to AFED’s annual conference which convened in Manamain October 2008. That conference decided on a set of recommendations thatwere endorsed by national and regional institutions. The report’s findings helpedto raise awareness across the region, and its recommendations resonated in poli-cies and official positions.

The 2009 AFED report has been designed to provide information to govern-ments, business, academia and the public about the impact of climate change onthe Arab countries, and encourage concrete action to face the challenge. Thereport analyzes the Arab response to the urgent need for adaptation measures,and uses the latest research findings to describe the vulnerabilities of natural andhuman systems in the Arab world to climate change and the impacts on each sec-tor of human activity. The systems selected for this study include: coastal areas,food production, fresh water, human health, bio-diversity, in addition to theconsequences on housing, transport, and tourism. In an attempt to help shapeadequate policies, the report discusses options for a post-Kyoto regime and out-lines the state of international negotiations in this regard.

AFED reveals in the report the findings of a pan-Arab opinion survey it conduct-ed in 2009, illustrating public attitudes regarding climate change. Another spe-cial feature is a study carried out for AFED by the Center of Remote Sensing atBoston University, which analyzes various scenarios of impacts of climate change,especially on coastal areas, based on space images of the region.

The report identifies the major sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the Arabworld, found to contribute merely 4.2% to the global emissions. However, theimpact of climate change on the fragile environment of the region and its peopleis expected to be immense, which demands urgent planning for adaptation meas-ures.

Climate change acts directly to change natural weather patterns, but the effectscascade quickly through many sectors. Scarcity of food and water, loss of coastalareas, disruption to ecosystems, and adverse effects on human health are justsome of the direct threats. The economic sector is not immune and disruptionsto infrastructure and tourism, for example, could conceivably cancel their eco-nomic benefits. For this reason, governments of the region have a large stake inmaking adaptation a national priority.

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE VV

Preface

If this report can inform and help shape public policy in the Arab world on cli-mate change, then it would have served its purpose. We also hope that the reportwould provide policy options which will assist Arab countries to be active partiesin the upcoming negotiations for a Post- Kyoto treaty.

The editors wish to thank all those who supported this initiative, specifically Dr.Mohamed Kassas and Dr. Mohamed El-Ashry, who helped in laying down themethodology and appraising of the outcome. Thanks are also due to the authorsand the many experts who contributed to the contents. AFED’s special thanks goto the Environment Agency-Abu Dhabi, official sponsor of the conference tolaunch the 2009 Report and partner to many other AFED activities. AFED alsowishes to thank the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) for itscontinuous genuine support to the Forum’s programmes. Thanks are also due tothe United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and all corporate andmedia partners who made this endeavor possible.

The Editors

PREFACEVVII

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE VVIIII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Arab Environment:Climate ChangeImpact of Climate Change on Arab Countries

2009 REPORT OF THE ARAB FORUM FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (AFED)

The world is once again at a crossroads; as the scientific basis behind climatechange is becoming more solid, the imperative for strong and collective action isbecoming increasingly urgent. This urgency is one shared by all countries andregions of the world, as all will be affected. The Arab region is by no means anexception; in fact, given the very high vulnerability of Arab countries to the pro-jected impacts of climate change, it cannot afford inaction on either the global,regional, or national scales.

Based on the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) and hundreds of references quoted in the 2009 Report of the ArabForum for Environment and Development (AFED), we can categorically statethat the Arab countries are in many ways among the most vulnerable in the worldto the potential impacts of climate change, the most significant of which areincreased average temperatures, less and more erratic precipitation, and sea levelrise (SLR), in a region which already suffers from aridity, recurrent drought andwater scarcity.

Water resources are dwindling. Regardless of climate change, the alreadycritical situation of water scarcity in the Arab world will reach severe levels by2025. A report recently published in Japan has warned that what is known as theFertile Crescent, spanning from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine,would lose all traits of fertility and might disappear before the end of the centu-ry because of deteriorating water supply from the major rivers. Man-made prob-lems, mainly the widespread construction of dams and unsustainable irrigationpractices which waste about half of the water resources, and rates of human waterconsumption which are well above international standards in some Arab coun-tries, are making the situation worse. The expected effects of climate change arelikely to exacerbate this deterioration. With continuing increases in temperatures,water flow in the Euphrates may decrease by 30% and that of the Jordan Riverby 80% before the turn of the century. If this is the case in the Fertile Crescent,how will the situation be in other arid Arab countries? Water management istherefore an urgent issue. We need to improve efficiency, especially in irrigation,and to develop new water resources, including innovative desalination technolo-gies.

Sea level rise (SLR) is likewise a big risk, since the bulk of the Arab region'seconomic activity, agriculture and population centres are in the coastal zone,which is highly vulnerable to sea level rise. This can be in the form of both coastalregion inundation and increasing salinity of soil and available freshwaterresources such as aquifers.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYVVIIIIII

A simulation carried out for AFED by Boston University’s Center for RemoteSensing revealed that a sea level rise of only 1 metre would directly impact 41,500km2 of the Arab coastal lands. The most serious impacts of sea level rise wouldbe in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE.The effects on the region’s agricultural sector would mostly be felt in Egypt,where a 1 metre rise would put 12% of the country’s agricultural land at risk. Itwould also directly affect 3.2% of the population in the Arab countries, com-pared to a global percentage of about 1.28%.

Human health would be adversely affected by higher temperatures, mainlydue to changes in geographical ranges of disease vectors like mosquitoes, water-borne pathogens, water quality, air quality and food availability and quality.Incidence of infectious diseases like malaria and schistosomiasis will increase,mainly in Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. Malaria, which already infects 3 millionpeople annually in the Arab region, will become more prevalent and enter newterritories as higher temperatures reduce the incubation period, spread the rangeof malaria-bearing mosquitoes and increase their abundance. Higher CO2 con-centrations and fiercer and more frequent sand storms in desert areas will increaseallergic reactions and pulmonary diseases all over the region.

Food production would face an increased threat, affecting basic humanneeds. Harsher and expanding aridity and changes in the spans of seasons maycut agricultural yields in half if no alternative measures are applied. Urgent adap-tive measures are required, including changes in crop varieties, fertilizer and irri-gation practices. Higher temperatures, lower rainfall and alteration in the span ofseasons will require developing new varieties that can adapt to the emerging con-ditions. Crops which need less water and can withstand higher levels of salinityshould be developed and introduced on a large scale.

Tourism, an important sector of the economy for a number of Arab countries,is highly vulnerable to climate change. An increase of between 1-4°C in averagetemperature will cause a drastic decline in the index of tourism comfort all overthe region. Areas classified between “good” and “excellent” are likely to become“marginal to “unfavourable” by the year 2080, mainly because of hotter sum-mers, extreme weather events, water scarcity and ecosystems degradation.Bleaching of coral reefs will affect tourism in countries in the Red Sea basin,mainly Egypt and Jordan. Beach erosion and sea level rise will affect coastaltourist destinations, mainly in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Jordan andLebanon, especially in locations where sandy beach stretches are narrow andbuildings are close to the shoreline. Options for alternative tourism, which areless vulnerable to climatic variability, should be explored, such as culturaltourism. Countries with coastal areas highly vulnerable to sea level rise shoulddevelop alternative inland tourist destinations.

Biodiversity in the Arab countries, already deteriorating, will be further dam-aged by intensifying climate change. A 2°C rise in temperature will make extinctup to 40% of all the species. The Arab countries have many unique formationsthat are especially vulnerable to climate change risk, such as the cedar forests inLebanon and Syria, the mangroves in Qatar, the reed marshes of Iraq, the highmountain ranges of Yemen and Oman, and the coastal mountain ranges of theRed Sea.

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE IIXX

Land use and urban planning regulations in the Arab region largelyignore basic adaptation requirements to climate change. An estimated 75% ofbuildings and infrastructure in the region are at direct risk of climate changeimpacts, mainly from sea level rise, higher intensity and frequency of hot daysand storm surges. Reliability of transportation systems, water supply and waste-water networks, and energy generation stations will be at risk. At a time when 42small island-states have established the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) todefend their common interests in the face of the damaging effects of climatechange, we see artificial islands being built in some Arab countries and othersbeing planned. These islands will be among the first to be swallowed by the ris-ing sea level due to their small size and low elevation. Planning requirementsspecifying a minimum distance between permanent structures and the shorelineshould take into account the threat of rising sea level. Choices of constructionmaterials used for buildings and roads should consider the risk of rising temper-atures. Plans for making infrastructure and buildings resilient to climate changeare needed.

This AFED report has found that virtually no work is being carried out to makethe Arab countries prepared for climate change challenges. Specifically, no con-certed data gathering and research efforts could be traced regarding the impactsof climate change on health, infrastructure, biodiversity, tourism, water and foodproduction. The economic impact seems to be totally ignored. Reliable recordson climate patterns in the region barely exist.

Policymaking in the region has displayed, in many respects, deficiencies thatneed to be urgently remedied if Arab countries are to prepare for the potentialnegative impacts of climate change. Those range from sustainable managementof natural resources to risk planning. The Maldives, for instance, has plans to savefunds as an insurance policy to relocate its entire population in case of sea levelrise.

In the face of these urgent challenges and vulnerabilities, this report addresses thekey areas at stake and hopes to serve as a basis upon which informed decision-making, planning, and diplomatic efforts can be built.

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXII

Ours is a habitable planet because of a combination of conditions congenial tolife. Earth’s climate is conducive to life because atmospheric greenhouse gas con-centrations, most notably CO2, trap a portion of the sunlight reflected off its sur-face, thereby warming the planet. Since the Industrial Revolution human activi-ties – in particular, fossil fuel usage, land use patterns, agriculture and deforesta-tion – have increased greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, causingaverage temperatures to rise. That the climate is actually changing is now a glob-ally accepted fact; even the few opponents who still deny that it is man-madeagree that it is happening, but as a manifestation of a natural cycle.

By 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UnitedNations’ scientific body on the issue, stated with high certainty that human caus-es lay behind most of the observed global temperature increases. AtmosphericCO2 concentrations have increased from approximately 280 ppm (parts per mil-lion) in the pre-industrial age to around 430 today. At the level of 550 ppm,which could be reached as early as 2035, global average temperatures may rise bymore than 2°C. Under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, the stock of green-house gases could more than triple by the end of the century, giving at least a50% risk of temperatures rising by more than 5°C during the decades to follow.The scale of such an increase could be illustrated by the fact that the climate ispresently 5°C warmer than in the last ice age, which was over 10,000 years ago.

The amount of carbon held in the oceans has increased, causing gradual butsteady acidification that threatens marine ecosystems. Warmer water tempera-tures have also caused much coral bleaching. Increasing average temperatureshave steadily caused melting of ice in the polar regions as well as of glaciersaround the world. Warming ocean waters may cause the sea level to rise by up to59 cm by 2100 according to IPCC 2007 estimates, or even up to 5 metres if themelting of the Antarctic ice sheet is taken into consideration.

The IPCC predicts that 20 to 30% of species will be made extinct if the temper-ature increases by more than 1°C, which is already virtually unavoidable.Extreme weather events and variability will also likely to ensue.

INTRODUCTION

Arab Environment:Climate Change

Impact of Climate Change on Arab CountriesMain Findings and Conclusions

MOSTAFA K. TOLBA AND NAJIB W. SAAB

2009 Report of the Arab Forum for Environment and Development (AFED)

A number of recent studies suggest that the estimates of the 2007 IPCC FourthAssessment Report were too conservative, and that projections will have to bealtered to reflect stronger impacts. For example, developing world emissions havebeen growing much more quickly than previously thought, and they are nowprojected to surpass those from the developed world by 2010; this crossing pointhad previously been projected for 2020 or even later. The IEA’s ReferenceForecasts of Chinese CO2 emissions, for instance, have been drastically revisedupwards between 2000 and 2007. In September 2009 evidence was found by USscientists that the thickness of the Antarctic ice sheet has declined by 53% sincethe 1980 peak, creating the potential for worse than projected sea level rise.

Christopher Field, an American member of the IPCC and founding director ofthe Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology at Stanford University,said at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement ofScience in February 2009 that the pace of climate change exceeds predictions, asemissions since 2000 have outpaced the estimates used in the IPCC’s 2007report. Lord Nicholas Stern likewise said in 2008 that in his 2006 Review of theeconomic impacts of climate change for the British government, which advocat-ed strong and immediate climate change action, “we underestimated the risks...we underestimated the damage associated with temperature increases... and weunderestimated the probabilities of temperature increases.”

The climate change challenge is one that is global both in its causes and in itssolutions. It is ubiquitous in that almost all human activities contribute to theproblem, and will also be affected by its impacts.

Greenhouse gas emissions are a classical example of what economists call ‘anexternality’: the costs are felt by everyone around the world, not just by the indi-viduals or countries responsible for the emissions. The damage associated withclimate change is not distributed proportionately according to emissions, as theburden is shared by those who contribute least to it. As an extra complication,the most serious damages will be not to present generations but to future ones,which do not have a strong voice at the negotiating table.

Finally, there is the temporal aspect of the problem. The costs of mitigation andadaptation to climate change will be incurred immediately while the benefits willbe in the form of avoided future damages, which are difficult to quantify. Inother words, politicians are finding it difficult to justify immediate costs in orderto yield future benefits.

But the economic consequences of inaction are immense: it is estimated that forevery 1°C rise in average global temperature, economic growth would drop bybetween 2-3%. The World Economic and Social Survey released by the UN in2009 estimates the costs of mitigation and adaptation at 1% of World GrossProduct (WGP), which is small compared to the costs and risks of the impactsof climate change. If action is not taken, or is delayed “by continuing in the pres-ent business-as-usual scenario, or making only marginal change, the permanentloss of projected WGP could be as high as 20%.” These figures would dwarf thelosses of the economic meltdown of 2008-9. The dilemma is that the impacts ofclimate change will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which posses theleast capacity to cope and adapt, both technologically and financially. This makestechnology transfer and appropriate financial packages crucial for any globalagreement or effective action to deal with climate change.

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ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXIIIIII

It is no longer a question of whether or not climate change is happening. Thequestion now is how climate change will manifest itself regionally and locally andwhat can be done about it. For governments, the key issue is balancing short-term economic growth with long-term sustainable development. A complicatingfactor is the scientific uncertainty surrounding climate change: the exact impactsof climate change and their locations cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy,nor can so-called “tipping points” – points beyond which climate changes areirreversible – be fully and accurately predicted.

However, this AFED Report argues that the climate change challenge should betreated like any other decision made in the face of uncertainty: a risk-manage-ment, or insurance, framework. Utilizing the insurance principle, as long as thereis sufficient likelihood of significant damage, we take measured anticipatoryaction, the costs of which are fully justified. What is required is an honest evalu-ation of the level of insurance deemed necessary to protect – with an acceptableamount of certainty – against the impacts of climate change. Uncertainty is notand should not be an excuse for inaction.

As stated previously, effectively battling climate change will require concertedglobal action. The division of responsibilities – “common but differentiatedresponsibilities,” according to the UNFCCC – runs into issues of equity. Howshould the different responsibilities be fairly distributed? Without adequatelyanswering this question, any climate change agreement will be neither acceptablenor sustainable. At the same time, any acceptable and sustainable climate changeagreement will also have to be effective. It will need to be acceptable to all,respected by all, sufficiently ambitious, and flexible enough to adjust to changingscientific and technological information.

While this report endorses the view that developed countries will need to take thelead in global climate change action, developing countries will also need to playtheir part. Moreover, while all countries have a legitimate right to economicdevelopment, this need not necessarily conflict with strategies to reduce emis-sions. With the help of developed countries, developing countries should be ableto reduce their carbon intensity to set them on a path to sustainable develop-ment. This should be achieved through effective mechanisms of technologicaland financial transfers and investment, in a legally binding treaty.

Looking ahead to the negotiations in Copenhagen, it is clear that developingcountries are hesitant to commit to any obligations that place significant restric-tions on their economic growth. They point to their priority responsibilities toprovide employment opportunities and better standards of living for their popu-lations.

At the same time, developed countries, in particular the United States, will notaccept a climate change agreement in which the major emitters among the devel-oping countries are allowed to continue with “business as usual” development.There must be give and take between the two groups, developed and developing.

Since the successful meeting of the Conference of the Parties in Bali in December2007, little progress has been made in the negotiations for a post-2012 agreementon climate change. The Bali Action Plan/Road Map calls for a long-term goalfor global emissions reduction and mitigation actions by developed and develop-ing countries. Besides mitigation, it also includes adaptation, reforestation, tech-

nology cooperation, and finance. With Copenhagen fast approaching, the nego-tiations have stalled and there is little or no agreement on any of these.

Disagreement is not only between developed and developing countries, it is alsoamong developed countries. The G-8 Summits in 2008 and 2009 agreed toreduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2050 and to limit the rise inworldwide temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. Developing coun-tries do not want to support a global target in fear that they will be asked toaccept intermediate targets leading to the 2050 one. In addition, there is dis-agreement among developed countries on near-term sharing of the burden ofemissions reduction. The EU can commit to 20% reduction by 2020 from 1990levels and can go to 30% if others make the same commitment. Similarly, Japanwould reduce their emissions by 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels. On the otherhand, US legislation, if it becomes law, would result in a 17% reduction by 2020from 2005 levels.

Many had hoped that world leaders gathered in New York, on September 22,2009, for a global summit on climate change might move things forward as theydid in 2007 before Bali. Those hopes were dashed. In speech after speech, pres-idents and prime-ministers spoke of the importance and urgency of confrontingclimate change but stopped short of providing specifics of what they were pre-pared to do in Copenhagen and beyond.

While some believe that a strong deal is still possible, others have begun to talkof a “political declaration” rather than a full agreement. Such declaration wouldrecognize actions being taken and/or planned by countries in their own bestinterest (for example, energy efficiency and renewable energy) and continuenegotiations.

The Arab region's minimal contribution to climate change through its limitedgreenhouse gas emissions, at less than 5% of the global figure, is dwarfed by theregion's immense vulnerabilities to climate change. Arab countries have a vestedinterest in pushing forcefully for a strong treaty that incorporates a diversity ofstrict climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and, more important-ly, to ensure financial and technical assistance to those who need it for achievingits targets.

Arab governments, as an indication of their willingness to participate in the glob-al efforts to mitigate climate change, can stress the development of clean energytechnologies, particularly in light of the abundant renewable energy resourcesavailable in the Arab world, specifically solar, wind and hydro. Finally, with aneye on the Copenhagen negotiations in December 2009, Arab countries woulddo well to formulate a unified position on the key issues at stake.

CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION EFFORTS

Arab countries, though not primary contributors to atmospheric greenhouse gasemissions, will have to undertake mitigation efforts as part of global action. Areview of Arab national communications reports to the UNFCCC and currentprojects and initiatives shows that Arab countries are in fact implementing vari-ous climate friendly policies and measures, encompassing both measures toreduce anthropogenic GHG emissions as well as those to enhance carbon sinks.

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ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXVV

Specific examples in the Arab world are the commercialization of wind energy inEgypt; widespread use of solar heating in Palestine, Tunisia, and Morocco; theintroduction of compressed natural gas (CNG) as a transport fuel in Egypt; thefirst concentrated solar power projects in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria;the first two Arab green building councils in The UAE and Egypt; the massiveforestation program in the UAE; Masdar, the first zero-carbon city in AbuDhabi; the pioneering carbon capture and storage project in Algeria; and Jordan’sintroduction of duty and tax exemptions to encourage the import of hybrid cars.However, most of these initiatives are fragmented and do not appear to have beenimplemented as part of a comprehensive policy framework at the national level,let alone at the regional one.

In a particularly promising development, the newly established InternationalRenewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has chosen Masdar City in Abu Dhabi asthe agency's first headquarters. This is not only very important for the develop-ing world as a whole but will hopefully also lead to significant research andinvestments into renewable energy in the Arab region.

Arab-Arab cooperation can also be improved, for example in the areas of energyefficiency and renewable energy, the use of compressed natural gas as a transportfuel, and investing in carbon capture and storage. Given the importance of thefossil fuel industry in the Arab region, Arab countries have a vested interest inhelping develop carbon capture and storage technology to help offset emissionsdue to fossil fuels usage. Ultimately, if this technology can be made sufficientlyviable, it will be an important part of global climate change mitigation strategies.As fossil fuels will remain an important part of the energy mix in any future sce-nario, carbon capture and storage is an important area into which Arab scientistshave to get involved and resources need to be devoted.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE

AFED conducted a pan-Arab survey in order to explore awareness of climatechange among the Arab public, their perceptions of the need to take action, andtheir willingness to personally contribute to climate change mitigation and adap-tation measures.

The results of the survey showed increasing awareness: 98% believed that the cli-mate is changing, and 89% believed this was due to human activities. 51%believed that governments were not acting adequately to address the problem,while 84% believed climate change posed a serious challenge to their countries.Over 94% believed that their countries would benefit from participating in glob-al action to deal with climate change, and 93% pledged to participate in person-al action to reduce their contribution to the problem.

Asked to choose sectors where climate change will have a major impact in theircountries, it was notable that not a single respondent said there would be noeffect at all. The majority, at the regional level, gave priority to health, drinkingwater and food, followed by coastal areas. Those surveyed were also asked tochoose the three most important measures to mitigate the causes and to adapt tothe effects of climate change. Changing consumption patterns, mainly reducingthe use of energy, was the main measure chosen, followed by education andawareness. Ratifying and implementing international treaties came third.

The respondents to the AFED survey revealed a clear desire for their govern-ments to participate and cooperate proactively in order to reach a solution to theproblem of climate change; the Arab public seems ready to accept and be part ofconcrete national and regional action to deal with climate change. The scepticalattitudes which prevailed among some groups on the facts and causes of climatechange, either denying it entirely or limiting it to natural causes, are receding.Government inaction is no longer an option.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD: VULNERABILITIES AND IMPACTCOASTAL AREAS

The Arab region’s coastal zones are of immense importance. The total length ofthe coastal zone in the Arab region is 34,000 km, of which 18,000km is inhab-ited. Most of the region’s major cities and economic activity is in the coastalzones. Vastly fertile agricultural lands are located in low-lying, coastal areas suchas the Nile Delta, and popular tourist activities depend on marine and coastalassets, like coral reefs and associated fauna.

Individual Arab countries will be affected differently under various climatechange related sea level rise projections. Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Tunisia aremost vulnerable in terms of their land mass: 1 to 3 % of land in these countrieswill be affected by a 1 metre SLR. Of these, Qatar is by far the most exposed:under various different SLR projections the figure rises from approximately 3%of land (1m) to 8% (3m), and even up to more than 13% (5m).

As for SLR’s effect on GDP, Egypt’s economy is by far the most vulnerable: forSLR of 1 metre, more than 6% of its GDP is at risk, which rises to more than12% for an SLR of 3 metres. Qatar, Tunisia, and the UAE are also exposed, asover 2% of their respective GDPs are at risk for an SLR of 1 metre, rising tobetween 3 and 5% for SLR of 3 metres.

When it comes to the agricultural sector, Egypt will be most impacted by SLR.More than 12% of Egypt's best agricultural lands in the Nile Delta are at riskfrom SLR of 1 metre, and this figure rises dramatically to 25% (SLR of 3m) andeven almost 35% (extreme SLR of 5m).

HUMAN HEALTH

Increasingly, scientists are beginning to recognize climate change as an emergingrisk factor for human health. A number of projected climate change impacts willhave negative implications for human health. The health effects can be direct,such as extreme weather events like storms, floods, and heat waves, or indirect,such as changes in the ranges of disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes), water-bornepathogens, water quality, air quality, and food availability and quality.Furthermore, the actual health impacts will be different for different Arab coun-tries, according to local environmental conditions, socio-economic circum-stances, and the range of adopted social, institutional, technological, and behav-ioural measures.

The limited research conducted in Arab countries has shown that climate change

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plays an important role in the spread of vector-borne infectious diseases, such asmalaria and schistosomiasis (Egypt, Morocco and Sudan). It also affects the sea-sonal concentrations of some allergens in the atmosphere, causing allergic reac-tions and pulmonary diseases (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and UAE), and worsensthe public health impact of heat waves especially in Arab countries with hot sum-mer climates.

Heat waves are projected to become more intense, frequent, and prolonged dueto climate change. A number of studies in the region have looked at heat-relatedmortality rates, and have consistently found a significant association betweentemperature and mortality.

The link between infectious diseases – which globally kill between 14 and 17 mil-lion people each year – and climatic conditions has been studied extensively.Malaria, for instance, which infects about 3 million people in the Arab regioneach year, may become more prevalent as higher temperatures reduce the dis-ease’s incubation period, spread the range of malaria-bearing mosquitoes, andincrease mosquito abundance.

Indirectly, a number of climate change impacts discussed in various sections ofthis report may also have health ramifications. For instance, sea level rise andcoastal flooding may impact food security and lead to malnutrition and hunger,and reduced precipitation and increased temperatures may aggravate waterscarcity, increasing its negative impact on human health.

Health systems in the Arab world need to be adapted and prepared to respond tothe consequences of climate change.

FRESH WATER

Water is scarce across the region, with available water resources below 1,000 m3per capita per year in all Arab countries except Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.Although the Arab region occupies 10% of the planet, it contains less than 1%of the world’s freshwater resources. The predicted impacts of climate change inthe Arab region, namely increased temperatures as well as reduced and moreerratic precipitation, will exacerbate an already critical state of vulnerability, andplace even more stress on the limited fresh water resources. Both the quantity andquality of fresh water resources are in danger. High population growth rates inthe region, and the high rate of per capita consumption of fresh water, make theproblem chronic and aggravate its impact, with around 80% of fresh waterresources devoted to agriculture.

Climate change is expected to affect the flow of rivers, which could cause watershortages (in case of decreased rainfall) or flooding (in case of periodic increasedrainfall). Water regimes in riparian countries will also affect Arab countriesdependent on rivers originating elsewhere, such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Sudan.

Recommended adaptation measures include changing cropping patterns, adopt-ing water saving techniques, introducing integrated water resource management,developing new varieties of crops that are more resilient to higher temperaturesand soil salinity, and initiating innovative desalination technologies. Finally,Arab countries have to reconsider allocating water for different development

activities based on water use efficiency represented by production per cubic meterof water, rather than production per unit area of land, i.e., optimizing water use,especially in agriculture, which gives maximum economic return per unit volumeof water.

FOOD PRODUCTION

Food security in the Arab world has long been subject to environmental andsocio-economic pressures. The dominant arid conditions, limited waterresources, erratic cropping patterns, intensive grazing, population growth, andlow knowledge and technology levels all affect food production systems in theregion.

The dominant agricultural system in Arab countries is rainfed agriculture; assuch, annual agricultural productivity and food security are highly correlated tothe annual variability of precipitation. Climate change may increase the variabil-ity of rainfall and thus increase incidents of drought.

Projected climate changes may have disastrous effects on agricultural productionin the Arab world. As a number of studies have shown, increased temperaturescause much higher water needs in summer crops. Water scarcity in the Arabregion is projected to increase rather than decrease, and therefore agriculture –and in turn the Arab region’s food security – is highly vulnerable to climatechange, with the risk of 50% decrease in food production if current practicescontinue.

What policies can help adapt the Arab world’s agricultural sector to climatechange? This AFED Report recommends that crop varieties, fertilizer, irrigationand other water management practices should be altered, as necessary, in light ofclimate change vulnerabilities. Also, information on climate variability and sea-sonal climate forecasting need to be improved in order to reduce production risk.

TOURISM

Tourism is important for a number of Arab economies. However, like most sec-tors of economic activity, it is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

The attractiveness of a tourism destination depends to a significant degree on theclimate, although clearly a number of other factors are also important. Using anindex of various climatic factors, the index of tourism comfort measures thedegree of climatic comfort at a given site. With climate change, however, the cli-matic factors change. For example, the arid lands in the Arab region will expand,moving north in North Africa.

The index of tourism comfort will probably decline in the Arab world in thecoming decades. The areas currently classified as "good", "very good" and "excel-lent" will be less favourable by the year 2080, with climate change to blame.Many of the projected climate changes in the Arab region will impact the attrac-tiveness of Arab tourist destinations. Hotter summers, droughts, extreme weath-er events, water scarcity, and ecosystem degradation are examples.

INTRODUCTIONXXVVIIIIII

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXIIXX

Coral reefs are important tourist attractions for Egypt and Jordan, but are at thesame time extremely vulnerable to climatic changes, brought about by increasedtemperatures and ocean acidity, both of which contribute to coral bleaching.Beach erosion is also a risk to the attractiveness of coastal areas. Narrow low-lyingsandy beaches will be badly affected and these stretches would become unsuitablefor sea-goers.

Much will depend on how well the sector can adapt. Future tourism develop-ment must take anticipated changes into account through integrated and inclu-sive planning, such as clearer guidelines on the allowed distance between perma-nent structures and the shoreline. Options for alternative and more sustainabletourism which is less sensitive to climatic variability, such as cultural tourism,should be explored. Finally, more inland and desert tourist destinations shouldbe developed.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Climate change is expected to significantly affect infrastructure across the Arabworld. Transportation infrastructure is generally vulnerable to projected increas-es in the intensity and frequency of hot days, storm activities, and sea level rise.Infrastructure in the coastal zones is particularly vulnerable to SLR and possiblestorm surges. These risks are highest in Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE.

Reliability of water supply systems will be impacted by diminishing fresh watersupplies and higher average temperatures. Wastewater networks are particularlyvulnerable to excessive rainfall events and SLR. Energy generation will be ham-pered by higher ambient temperatures which will reduce the efficiency andcapacity of gas turbines, and reduce the cooling efficiency of thermal plants.Energy distribution and transmission systems will be more prone to failure asextreme weather events become more frequent.

What should be done? Infrastructure should be enhanced to withstand climatechange, design criteria and operations should be upgraded to take it into account,new technologies should be utilized and the public should be brought into thedecision-making process.

BIODIVERSITY

Many plant and animal species in the Arab world already face threats to their sur-vival, and their vulnerability will be exacerbated by the projected impacts of cli-mate change. The number of species in the Arab world is already low by globalstandards, and the general harshness of the arid climate makes the region espe-cially vulnerable to significant species loss. Using the IUCN threat categories,Yemen has by far the highest number of threatened plant species at 159, whileSudan and Somalia have 17 each.

Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen allhave more than 80 threatened animal species, with Egypt topping the list at 108species. Climate change could alter the animal composition of entire ecosystems.

Ornithological diversity is a major asset to the Arab world and is very threatened

by climate change. Many Arab countries lie on important bird migration routes.In particular, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Bahrain are home to millions of migra-tory birds and large breeding colonies.

Unique species that are restricted in their habitat range, and/or are at the marginof their ecological tolerances, are most vulnerable to climate change. In the Arabregion, these habitats include the mangroves in Qatar, the cedar forests inLebanon and Syria, the islands of Djibouti, the marshes of Iraq, the high moun-tain ranges of Yemen and Oman, and the large rivers of the Nile (Egypt andSudan), the Euphrates and Tigris (Iraq and Syria), and Yarmuk (Syria andJordan).

The Arab region as an interlinked geographical entity should develop and imple-ment regional mechanisms for coordinating activities in this field. Species range-shifts and impacts of extreme events often occur on regional scales so an effectiveclimate change strategy must include mechanisms for coordinating conservationactions at the regional level across political boundaries and agency jurisdiction.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the Arab region, the vulnerabilities to the potential impacts of climate changeare high, current capacities and actions are inadequate, and effective strategies formitigating and adapting to climate change are urgently required. The fact thatthe region's contribution to the problem is relatively small does not mean thatpolitical and diplomatic complacency is an option. Arab countries are among themost vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change because of their exist-ing vulnerabilities, notably water scarcity and recurrent drought.

Alarmingly, this report has found that virtually no work is being carried out tomake the Arab countries prepared for climate change challenges. Specifically, noconcerted data gathering and research efforts could be traced regarding theimpacts of climate change on health, infrastructure, biodiversity, tourism, waterand food production. The economic impact seems to be totally ignored. Reliablerecords on climate patterns in the region barely exist. This highlights the need forhigh quality climate information and research, as regional climate predictions arecritical for planning and risk management. Land-use, physical planning andbuilding standards, which take account of climate change, have to be imposed onbuildings and long-lived infrastructure. Government policies that promote low-carbon and efficient goods and services, and endorse sustainable management ofnatural resources and coastal protection, are overdue. The private sector needs tobe brought in by offering the right incentives for implementing effective solu-tions.

This report argues that, in the case of Arab countries, adaptation will providelocal benefits in the short term and provide – as by-products - immediate solu-tions to inherent Arab problems not entirely caused by climate change, such asdrought, water scarcity and air pollution.

There are a number of promising initiatives in the Arab region: Abu DhabiFuture Energy Company (Masdar) is building an innovative zero-carbon cleanenergy hub, and the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology(KAUST) in Saudi Arabia has been established as a centre of excellence on ener-

INTRODUCTIONXXXX

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXXXII

gy studies; both are perfect manifestations of transforming oil income into futuretechnology. There is also AFED’s Arab Green Economy Initiative, an exercise inpublic-private partnership. It is essential that these initiatives become part of anintegrated, large and sustainable development plan.

The Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE)issued a landmark Declaration in 2007, which adopted the scientific consensusthat was reached by the IPCC, accepting that the increase of global temperatureswas mainly due to human activities. The ministers stated their "determination tostrive to achieve" several objectives, including: adopting national and regionalaction plans dealing with climate change issues in order to assess possible impactsand develop mitigation and adaptation programmes; promoting the productionand use of cleaner fuels; making energy use more efficient in all sectors; diversi-fying energy sources in accordance with the prevailing economic and social con-ditions; expanding the use of cleaner production techniques and environmental-ly friendly technologies; and expanding the use of economic incentives to encour-age more efficient products. In the context of adaptation, the declaration focusedon the need for necessary infrastructure to reduce potential risks, including theefficiency of natural resource management and advanced monitoring, controland early warning systems as well as the establishment of climate research andstudy centres.

This comprehensive declaration of intentions constitutes the basis for action thatshould include specific objectives and implementation plans within a fixed time-frame. Delays are no longer an option, especially amid crucial negotiations thatwill define the international position towards climate change for the post Kyotoera.

The challenges facing the Arab world from climate change are immense, but thebleak situation can still be averted if the region acts fast. Inaction is no longer anoption.

2020s RCM

2040s RCM

2070s RCM

INTRODUCTIONXXXXIIII

REGIONAL CLIMATE MODEL PROJECTIONS OFAVERAGE TEMPERATURE CHANGES (ºC) FOR THE2020s, 2040s AND 2070s, RELATIVE TO THE 1990s

REGIONAL CLIMATE MODEL PROJECTIONS OFPRECIPITATION CHANGES (%) FOR 2020s, 2040s,AND 2070s, RELATIVE TO THE 1990s

2020s RCM

2040s RCM

2070s RCM

Source: Hemming D, Betts R, & Ryall D. 2007. Source: Hemming D, Betts R, & Ryall D. 2007.

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE XXXXIIIIII

STABILISATION LEVELS AND PROBABILITY RANGES FOR TEMPERATURE INCREASES

Arab Public Opinion and Climate Change

1

NAJIB SAAB

CHAPTER 1

I. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

A pan-Arab survey conducted by the Arab Forumfor Environment and Development (AFED)found that a resounding majority of 98%believed that the climate is changing, and 89%thought this was due to human activities, includ-ing excessive use of energy and depletion ofresources. 51% of respondents thought that gov-ernments were not acting adequately to addressthe problem. A small portion of 5% at theregional level said they did not understand whatclimate change was, reaching a maximum of 11%in Syria. However, 95% of those who said theydid not understand what climate change was, stillanswered that they believed it was happening.Those who said climate change posed a seriouschallenge to their countries accounted for 84%,reaching 94% in Morocco and 100% in Tunisia.It was remarkable to find that over 94% believedthat their countries would benefit from partici-pating in global action to deal with climatechange, and 93% pledged to participate in per-sonal action to reduce their contribution to theproblem.

Asked to choose sectors where climate changewill have major impact in their countries, it stoodout that not a single respondent said there will beno effect at all. The majority, at the regional

level, gave priority to health, drinking water andfood, followed by coastal areas. Those surveyedwere also asked to choose the three most impor-tant measures to mitigate the causes and adapt tothe effects of climate change. Changing con-sumption patterns, mainly reducing the use ofenergy, was the main measure chosen, followedby education and awareness. Ratifying andimplementing international treaties came third.

It was peculiar that respondents from some coun-tries which face major threats did not fully recog-nize this: 36% in Sudan answered that climatechange did not pose serious problem to theircountry, at a time when a World Bank report putSudan on top of a list of twelve countries classi-fied to be the most affected regarding agricultureand food production. A similar situation appliesto Syria, where 33% of the respondents did notfind that climate change was a serious threat tothe country. In contrast, 100% of Sudanese andSyrian respondents agreed that the climate isglobally changing. This reflects the general trendof approaching climate change in Arab mediaand by politicians as a global issue, with littlebeing discussed about local implications.

The results clearly showed that climate changehas become widely accepted by the public inArab countries as a fact which needs to be

ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND CLIMATE CHANGECHAPTER 12

Age

8%

24%

26%

23%

19%

less than 20

21-30

31-40

41-50

above 50

Gender

74%

26%

Male Female

Education

4%7%

9%

5%

75%

P rim ary

Inte rm ed iate Secondary

Technical

Unive rs ity

Family Income

31%

64%

5%

Above ave rage

Ave rage

Be low ave rage

addressed. Remarkably, the majority of respon-dents from all countries, regions and socio-eco-nomic backgrounds agreed that more should bedone by governments. Moreover, the surveyshowed that the sceptical attitudes which pre-vailed among some groups on the facts and caus-es of climate change, either denying it entirely orlimiting it to natural causes, are receding.

II. DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

The survey on public attitudes in the Arab coun-tries pertaining to climate change was organizedby AFED, as part of its 2009 expert annualreport on the impact of climate change on theArab region. The survey was conducted betweenFebruary-May 2009, on a voluntary basis and

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE 3

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE

without interviewers. The questionnaire was dis-tributed through Al-Bia Wal-Tanmia(Environment & Development) magazine, andeight daily Arabic-language newspapers. Theseincluded Al-Hayat (pan-Arab), An-Nahar(Lebanon), Al-Khaleej (UAE), Al-Qabas(Kuwait), Al-Ayyam (Bahrain), Ash-Sharq(Qatar), Al-Ahdath (Morocco), and Ad-Dustour(Jordan). The survey was also promoted on thepan-Arab Future TV and the Arabic service of

Monte Carlo Dawliya radio and posted on thewebsite of AFED.

Alongside data collection, the questionnaire wasdesigned in a way to make use of the wide reachof partner media outlets to spread awareness onclimate change and its possible consequences on

Arab countries. Starting with general questionsabout the extent of knowledge about what cli-mate change means and whether it is consideredto pose a real threat to the country of the respon-dent, questions moved into details of specifyingsectors affected according to priority, and identi-fying major measures of mitigation and adapta-tion, and classifying the level of response of gov-ernments to deal with climate change.

Responses were received and processed from 19Arab countries. Results were reflected in thereport, as total average as well as per country. Thesample analyzed included 2,322 responses from:Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The listing inthe tables and charts followed sub-regional clus-ters not alphabetical order. The report classifiedcountry clusters as follows:

Levant: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria.Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, SaudiArabia, United Arab Emirates.Arab African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco,Sudan, Tunisia.Other: Libya, Mauritania, Yemen (small samplefor individual statistics for the first 2, and socio-economic/geographical considerations whichdictated to keep Yemen out of clusters).

The majority of respondents replied by mail(53%), while 42% used e-mail, which reflectswider use of electronic media among partici-pants. The remaining 5% replied by fax. As itwas not a requirement to use the original ques-tionnaire, many answered on photocopied sheets.

The answers were sorted and statistically tabulat-ed by Pan Arab Research Centre (PARC), aGallup associate. A data base, including socio-economic data, was prepared. In addition toallowing socio-economic analysis of the sample,it helped to eliminate duplication, as the programdeleted multiple answers received from the sameperson.

The combination of voluntary respondentsthrough a regional environmental magazine andeight leading daily newspapers, reaching bothspecialized readers and the general public, com-bined with internet access and promotion via

Agree I don't know

TOTAL SAMPLEI don't know

2%

Agree 98%

I BELIEVE THE CLIMATE IS CHANGINGFIGURE 2


I UNDERSTAND WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE ISFIGURE 1

TOTAL SAMPLE

Yes95%

No5%

Yes No

radio and TV, ensured a sample from a widerange of social, economic and educational back-grounds, that reflected broad spectrum of views.It is to be noted, however, that the sampleincludes a big segment of educated people; whilethis might reflect more the views of those nearerto decision making, it does not proportionallyreflect the actual population mix.

The respondents have the following major char-acteristics: 75% possess university level educa-tion, 74% are males and 26% females, 42% were

above 41 years old, 8% below 20 and 50%between 21-40 years, Respondents were asked toclassify their income group compared to the pre-vailing level of income in their country; 64% saidthey have average income, 31% above averageand 5% below average. It is to be noted, there-fore, that people with low-income and lowereducation levels were not proportionally repre-sented. But as the sample was analyzed on socio-economic basis, it was possible to track differ-ences in attitudes among different categories.


CLIMATE CHANGE IS PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES (INDUSTRY, TRANSPORTATION,ENERGY GENERATION,ETC.)

FIGURE 3

8968

96100

9290

8872

10086

9883

100100100100

7589

528

3

73

426

91

14

87

74

1

17

83

51

3

174

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

LebanonSyria

JordanPalestine

Saudi ArabiaUAE

KuwaitQatarOman

BahrainEgypt

MoroccoTunis

A lgeriaSudanYemen

Other countriesTotal Sample

Agree D isagree I don't know

CLIMATE CHANGE IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE COUNTRY OF MY RESIDENCEFIGURE 4


8767

888081

85858583

8284

94100

8064

888384

827

71312

76

5

98

3

2021

89

665

778

910

1798

3

1413

87

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

LebanonSyria

JordanPalestine

UAEKuwaitQatarOman

Bahrain Egypt

MoroccoTunis

Algeria SudanYemen

Other countriesTotal Sample

Saudi Arabia

III. ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND CLI-MATE CHANGE SURVEY: DETAILEDANALYSIS

1- Do you understand what climatechange is?

The majority of respondents, 95%, answeredpositively, 5% said they did not understand ordid not know. The highest percentage of thosewho answered ‘yes’ was in Qatar, Oman, Tunisand Palestine (100%). The highest percentages ofthose who said they did not understand what cli-mate change were scored in Syria (11%),Morocco (8%), Lebanon (7%), Saudi Arabia(6%), UAE (4%) and Egypt (3%).

While no major differences were observed among

regional groups (Levant and Egypt, Gulf, NorthAfrica), variations showed among age groups,with the highest level of ignorance of the prob-lem among those below 30-years old (7.5%)compared to only 3% among the over 41 group.Variations also showed within different educa-tion categories, with 10% of the below universi-ty level education group professing not to under-stand what climate change is, compared to 3%for university level respondents. This reflects thefact that higher education brings better awarenessof environmental challenges. However, we wouldhave expected higher awareness among youngergenerations compared to the older groups, whichshowed not to be the case.

2- Do you believe that the climate ischanging?

A resounding 98% answered that they believe theclimate is changing. It was remarkable that thepercentage reached 100% in some countrieswhere the level of understanding of the climatechange issue was the lowest, such as Syria,Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Regional group aver-ages were uniform, and no major disparities wererecorded among different age, education orincome groups. Results show that among the98% who agreed that the climate is changing,between 5-10% did not understand why.

3- Is climate change mainly caused byhuman activities (industry, transporta-tion, power generation, urbanization,etc)?

89% of the total sample agreed that climatechange was primarily caused by human activity.The highest percentage of those who agreed wasin North Africa (93%), followed by the Gulfcountries (89%) and the Levant (86%). It isremarkable that the highest percentage of dis-agreement came from Syria (28% disagree, 4%do not know), followed by Qatar (26% disagree,3% do not know) and Morocco (14% disagree,3% do not know). The percentage of those whothought that climate change was mainly due tohuman activities was highest in Oman, Tunisiaand Palestine (100%), Egypt (98%) and Jordan(96%). In Saudi Arabia, 92% said it was due tohuman activities, while 7% disagreed, comparedto 90% who agreed in UAE and 88% in Kuwait.This clearly shows that the majority of respon-


DO YOU THINK CLIMATE CHANGE WILL AFFECT ANYONE OF THE FOLLOWING SECTORS IN YOUR COUNTRY?(YOU MAY SELECT ANY NUMBER OF OPTIONS)

FIGURE 5

7872

69

5347

39

10

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Health Drinkingwater

Food Coastalareas

Forests Tourism It will notaffect any

sector

No answer

TOTAL SAMPLE

A gree Disagree I don't know

Total Sample3%

3%

Disagree

I don't know

94%A gree

IT IS OF A HIGH IMPORTANCE AND BENEFIT THAT MYCOUNTRY PARTICIPATE IN WORLDWIDE ACTION TOLIMIT CLIMATE CHANGE

FIGURE 6

dents in the Gulf oil producing countries thinkthat human activities are generally considered theprimary cause of climate change. While no majorvariations show between genders and age groups,a disparity was noted between different educationlevels: while 92% of those with university educa-tion thought that climate change was caused byhuman activities, only 80% of those below uni-versity level agreed.

4- Climate change is a serious problemfor the country of my residence.

84% of the respondents thought that climatechange posed a real threat to their country of res-idence. The highest percentage came from Arabcountries in Africa (88%) followed by Gulf coun-tries and the Levant (both 83%). The highestportions of respondents who agreed were inTunisia (100%) and Morocco (94%), while thelowest was in Syria (67%). The highest percent-age of those who said that climate change did notpose a serious problem to their country was inSyria (27% disagreed and 6% said they did notknow).

5- Do you think that climate change willaffect any one of the following sectors

in your country: Food, Health, DrinkingWater, Coastal areas, Forests, Tourism?Will not affect any sector? No answer?

Respondents were asked to choose from amongsix sectors most likely to be affected by climatechange in their country. They could choose anynumber of sectors. It is significant that zero per-cent of participants answered that climate changehad no effect at all on their country. At theregional level, health came on top with 78%, fol-lowed by drinking water 72%, food 69%, coastal


I WILL DO WHAT I CAN TO REDUCE MY CONTRIBUTIONTO CLIMATE CHANGE

FIGURE 7

Total Sample 93

3 40

20

40

60

80

100

A gree Disagree I don't know

MY GOVERNMENT IS ACTING WELL TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGEFIGURE 8

74042

736

4220

6792

1828

3343

2036

3133

30

7842

2680

4445

5628

841

5550

3680

1438

5851

1518

3213

2014

245

411717

21

5031

819

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Lebanon

Syria

Jordan

Pales tine

K.S .A

UAE

Kuwait

Q atar

O m an

Bahrain

Egypt

Morocco

Tunis

Algeria

Sudan

Yem en

O ther countries

Total Sam ple


areas 53%, forests 47%, and tourism 39%.Health was the first choice in all sub-regions.While drinking water was voted as the secondpriority affected sector in Levant and Gulf coun-tries, it was overtaken in Arab African countriesby food. Coastal areas, which scored fourth placein the total sample as well as in Gulf and ArabAfrican countries, were overtaken by forests inthe Levant, apparently driven by the recent forestfires in Lebanon, but also scored high inMorocco, Syria and Jordan.

6- Is it of high importance and benefitthat my country participate in globalaction to limit climate change?

94% of the respondents agreed that their countryshould participate in worldwide action to dealwith climate change challenges, and that thisbrings benefits. At a sub-regional level, 100% ofparticipants from Arab African countries agreed,compared to 95% in the Gulf and 90% in theLevant. At the country level, the percentage ofthose who agreed reached 100% in Oman,Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Palestine andQatar, 95% in UAE and Kuwait, scoring thelowest support in Syria (83%) and Lebanon(89%). No major disparities showed among dif-ferent socio-economic groups.

7- I will do what I can to reduce my con-tribution to climate change.

93% of the respondents agreed to participate in

personal action to help reduce their contributionto the causes of climate change. The highest per-centage of those who agreed was in Africa (98%)with an equal figure in the Gulf and Levant(92%). While the positive response reached100% in Morocco, Oman and Palestine, 98% inJordan and Kuwait and 96% in Tunisia, it hov-ered around 90% in all other countries.

8- My government is acting well toaddress climate change.

Although the majority of the total sample ofrespondents thought that their governmentswere not doing enough to address climatechange (51%), major variations showed amongdifferent sub-regions and countries. 59% in theLevant thought their countries were not doingenough, compared to 49% in Arab Africancountries and 44% in the Gulf group. Thosewho thought their countries were acting well toaddress climate change were 22% in the Levant,32% in Arab African countries and 37% in theGulf. The percentage of those who answeredthat they did not know was high for this ques-tion: 19% for the total sample, and nearly thesame for each sub-region. Those mostly satisfiedwith their governments’ action on climatechange were in Oman (92%), Qatar (67%),UAE and Jordan (42%). The highest percent-ages of those who thought their governmentswere not doing enough were scored in Palestine(80%), Lebanon (78%), Kuwait (56%) andEgypt (54%). While no significant disparities


IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT ARE THE MAIN 3 MEASURES TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSES ANDADAPT TO IT?

FIGURE 9

TOTAL SAMPLE

0%9%

15%

30%40%41%42%

50%

64%

010203040506070

Reduc ec ons um ption

(m ainlyenergy )

E duc at ional and

awarenes sc am paign

Rat ify andim plem ent

internat ionalt reat ies and legis lat ions

E nvironm entalplanning andm onitoring for m ega-projec ts

Fores tsdevelopm ent

and protec t ion

S c ient ificres earc h

Develop c ropsthat need les s

water

Low-ly ingc oas tal areas

protec t ion

No ans wer

9

showed among different education and incomelevels, it was interesting to note that the percent-age of females who deplored the inadequacy ofgovernment action was much higher than thatof males (62% to 47%).

9- In your opinion what are the main 3measures to mitigate climate changecauses and adapt to it? Choose up to 3from: Reduce consumption (mainlyenergy); forest development and pro-tection; ratify and implement interna-tional treaties; educational and aware-ness campaigns; scientific research;protection of low-lying coastal areas;develop crops that need less water;environment planning and monitoringof mega-projects.

Reducing consumption, mainly of energy, wasvoted the number one measure to mitigate cli-mate change, at both the regional level for thetotal sample (64%) as well as in the sub-regions,with minimal variations. Education and aware-ness campaigns followed in second place in totalsample (50%) as well as in the Gulf (54%),while forest development and protection tooksecond place in the Levant (53%), and ratifyingand implementing international treaties scoredsecond place in Arab African countries (52%).The third place at the regional level covering thetotal sample went for international treaties,while at the sub-regional level the third placewas occupied by education in the Levant andthe Arab African countries, and internationaltreaties in the Gulf countries. It is to be notedthat protection of low-lying coastal areas scoredlower than 10% in most sub-regions, while itgot 33% in Qatar, 19% in Saudi Arabia, 17% inSyria and 15% in Egypt. Scientific researchscored remarkably high in Qatar, with 51%.Two results stood out in Oman: environmentplanning and monitoring of mega-projectsscored first at 83% compared to a total averageof 41%, and protection of low-lying coastalareas got zero, in spite of the damage caused byhurricane Gonu in 2007.

IV. CONCLUSION

The outcome of the 2009 AFED survey on Arabpublic opinion regarding climate change reveals

outright recognition of the problem at all levelsand in all countries of the region. The high per-centage of those who thought in 2009 that cli-mate change posed a serious threat to their coun-tries (84%) reveals a sharp increase compared toa pan-Arab survey carried out in 2000 by Al-BiaWal-Tanmia (Environment & DevelopmentMagazine - EDM) when only 42% thought so(Arab Public Opinion and the Environment,2000, EDM, UNEP, CAMRE). The results like-ly reflect the high profile climate change hasacquired in both global political agendas andinternational media.

It is, however, interesting to note that 14% ofthose who agreed that the climate is changingglobally, still did not think that this presentedreal challenges to their own country. This leadsus to conclude that Arab public perception ofclimate change is largely derived from interna-tional media, in the absence of real work in thecountries of the region to identify local andregional ramifications of the climate threat andmake them available to the public. However, thesurvey clearly proves that the general opinion inArab countries recognizes climate change as areality, and largely accepts that it is mainlycaused by human activities. It is significant thatthe majority thought that changing consump-tion patterns every where, mainly sustainableuse of energy, is the prime measure needed tomitigate to the threat.

In conclusion, the Arab public seems to be ripe toaccept and be part of concrete national andregional action to deal with climate change.

ARAB ENVIRONMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE


The survey was carried out between February-May 2009, on voluntary basis and withoutinterviewers. Questionnaires were sorted bythe Pan Arab Research Center (PARC), aGallop associate, which prepared the statisti-cal report.All figures were rounded to the nearest deci-mal.

For statistical purposes, countries weregrouped in the following clusters:

- Levant: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine,Syria.

- Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

- African Arab Countries: Algeria, Egypt,Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia.

- Yemen was kept out of clusters for uniquesocio-economic and geographical consid-erations.

- Other: Libya and Mauritania were notanalyzed individually due to small samples.

Total Sample Levant Gulf Arab Africa Yemen Other% % % % % %

Yes 95 94 96 96 94 100No 5 7 4 4 6 -

I UNDERSTAND WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE IS:QUESTION 1

I BELIEVE THE CLIMATE IS CHANGINGQUESTION 2


Agree 98 98 99 99 94 100I don't know 2 2 1 1 6 -

CLIMATE CHANGE IS PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES (INDUSTRY,TRANSPORTATION, ENERGY GENERATION, ETC.)QUESTION 3

CLIMATE CHANGE IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE COUNTRY OF MY RESIDENCEQUESTION 4


Agree 89 87 89 93 100 75Disagree 7 9 7 5 - 8I don't know 4 5 4 1 - 17


Agree 84 83 83 88 88 83Disagree 9 12 8 7 - 8I don't know 7 6 8 5 13 8

11

I WILL DO WHAT I CAN TO REDUCE MY CONTRIBUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE


Agree 93 92 92 98 100 92Disagree 3 4 4 1 - 8I don't know 4 4 5 1 - -


Health 78 72 84 78 56 83Drinking water 72 68 77 68 81 58Food 69 61 72 76 81 83Coastal areas 53 45 62 52 19 58Forests 47 62 35 42 44 50Tourism 39 41 38 38 13 33It will not affect any sector 0 - 0 - - -No answer 1 1 0 - - -

DO YOU THINK CLIMATE CHANGE WILL AFFECT ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWINGSECTORS IN YOUR COUNTRY? (YOU MAY SELECT ANY NUMBER OF OPTIONS)

QUESTION 5

IT IS OF A HIGH IMPORTANCE AND BENEFIT THAT MY COUNTRY TO PARTICI-PATE IN WORLDWIDE ACTION TO LIMIT CLIMATE CHANGE

QUESTION 6


Agree 94 90 95 100 100 83Disagree 3 4 3 - - 8I don't know 3 6 2 - - 8

MY GOVERNMENT IS ACTING WELL TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGEQUESTION 8


Agree 30 22 37 32 31 33Disagree 51 59 44 49 38 58I don't know 19 20 18 19 31 8

QUESTION 7



Reduce consumption (mainly energy) 64 63 65 65 81 42Educational and awareness campaign 50 51 54 42 63 42Rectify and implement internationaltreaties and legislations 42 35 45 52 31 42Environmental planning and monitoringfor mega-projects 41 41 41 38 31 67Forests development and protection 40 53 31 31 63 33Scientific research 30 22 33 41 31 33Develop crops that need less water 15 17 12 19 - 8Low-lying coastal areas protection 9 7 12 7 - 17No answer 0 1 - - - -

IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT ARE THE MAIN 3 MEASURES TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSES ANDADAPT TO IT?

QUESTION 9

GHG Emissions:Mitigation Efforts in the Arab Countries

13

IBRAHIM ABDEL GELIL

CHAPTER 2

II.. IINNTTRROODDUUCCTTIIOONN

The ultimate objective of the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) is the stabilization of greenhousegas concentrations in the atmosphere at a levelthat would prevent dangerous anthropogenicinterference with the climate system.Accordingly, under Article 4.1(b) of theConvention, all Parties, including the Arabcountries, are required to undertake efforts toreduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions andor enhance GHG sinks (UNFCCC, 1992).

As climate change is a global problem, it callsfor a global solution taking into considerationthe principle agreed upon in the Rio declara-tion in 1992, namely the principle of “com-mon but differentiated responsibilities.” Thisimplies that developed countries, which are his-torically responsible for the largest part of theaccumulated GHGs in the atmosphere, shouldtake the lead in reducing GHG emissions giventheir higher technological and financial capa-bilities. Developing countries, including theArab countries, are requested to do their best toadopt development activities utilizing less ener-gy, less water, and fewer raw materials, and toproduce less waste.

Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce green-house gas emissions and to capture greenhousegases through land use changes such as foresta-

tion or carbon capture and storage in deep geo-logical formations. Policies and measures toreduce greenhouse gas emissions includeimproving energy efficiency to reduce energyconsumption per unit of economic output,switching to low or zero carbon fuels such asswitching from oil to natural gas, and usingrenewable energy sources such as solar andwind energy.

This chapter discusses the efforts undertakenby Arab countries to mitigate GHG emissions.It should be noted that such mitigation effortsare not necessarily undertaken within nationalclimate change policies; rather, in mostinstances they have been adopted to achievecertain economic, social, or environmentalobjectives. This chapter draws mainly on twosources of information, national communica-tions of some Arab countries submitted as partof their obligations within the UNFCCC andinformation available in the public domain. Atpresent, 14 Arab countries have submitted theirinitial national communications; none has sub-mitted their second communications yet.Initial national communications are meant tobe the major source of information on the stepstaken to mitigate climate change. So far, how-ever, they rarely include detailed assessments ofpast and/or ongoing mitigation projects oractivities; they focus instead on projects, activi-ties or programs and measures that are envis-aged for the future. Among the 14 initialnational communications investigated, onlySaudi Arabia’s report does not contain a sectionon mitigation. Most of the initial nationalcommunications have become outdated assome date back to as early as 1997 (Jordan),while the most recent one is that of the UAE(2007) (Table 1).

Apart from the initial national communica-tions, documentations of Arab efforts to reduceGHG emissions are very scarce. Thus, it is like-ly that some of the ongoing or planned activi-ties have been overlooked due to a lack of infor-mation. On the other hand, whenever enoughdata was available, various Arab experiences onspecific mitigation areas are highlighted.

The Council of Arab Ministers Responsible forthe Environment (CAMRE) at its 19th sessionin 2007 adopted the Arab Ministerial

GHG EMISSIONS: MITIGATION EFFORTS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIESCHAPTER 214

FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS OF THEARAB COUNTRIESTABLE 1

First national Communication Country2001 Algeria2005 Bahrain2003 Comoros2002 Djibouti1999 Egypt1997 Jordan1999 Lebanon2002 Mauritania2001 Morocco2005 Saudi Arabia2003 Sudan2001 Tunisia2007 United Arab Emirates2001 YemenSource: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2979.php

Declaration on Climate Change, which consti-tutes the basis for future action and reflects theArab position in dealing with climate changeissues. The declaration stated that “Mitigationprograms shall focus on: the production anduse of cleaner fuels, improving the efficiency ofenergy use in all sectors, diversifying energysources in accordance with the prevailing eco-nomic and social conditions, expanding the useof cleaner production techniques and environ-mental friendly technologies, as well as expand-ing the use of economic incentives to encour-age more efficient products, along with speedyendeavours to conclude negotiations in theWTO to define lists of environmental goods soas to reduce or lift customs restrictions inaccordance, and the utilization of carbon trad-ing and its markets” (CAMRE, 2007).Currently, CAMRE is leading efforts to devel-op an Arab climate change action plan.

IIII.. TTHHEE AARRAABB EENNEERRGGYY SSEECCTTOORR

The energy sector in the Arab region has beenand will continue to play a critical role in theregion’s socioeconomic development. Oil rev-enues, estimated at $419 billion in 2006, havebeen the major source of income in most of theArab countries, especially in the Gulf region.According to the Arab Unified EconomicReport, the oil and gas sector makes up about40% of the total Arab GDP. The same reportestimated that Arab countries hold nearly 58% ofthe world’s oil reserves, and nearly 30% of theworld’s gas reserves. In 2006, the region account-ed for nearly 32% of the world’s oil production,and 12.5% of the world’s gas production (LAS,2007). The Arab countries rely heavily on oil andgas to meet domestic energy demand, they bothaccount for nearly 97.5% of the total Arab ener-gy consumption. The average per capita energyconsumption level in the Arab countries (nearly1.5 tonnes of oil equivalent, or TOE) liesbetween some developing countries such asChina (1.3 TOE), India (0.5 TOE), and Brazil(1.1 TOE), and some developed economies suchas the US (7.2 TOE), Japan (4.3 TOE), andAustralia (5.8 TOE). There are remarkable dis-parities in per capita energy consumptionamongst different Arab countries dependingmainly on income levels, standard of living,degree of urbanization and climatic conditions.

The figure ranges from as low as 0.33 TOE inYemen to as high as 22.07 TOE in Qatar (IEA,2008).

Industry is the major energy consuming sector inthe Arab countries, accounting for about 45% ofthe total consumption followed by the transportsector (32%). The residential, commercial andagricultures sectors make up the rest. This pat-tern of energy consumption determines themajor sources of the GHG emissions, and inmany instances identifies the policy priorities andmeasures needed to reduce such emissions.

Measures to mitigate GHG emissions

Measures to mitigate GHG emissions includethose which reduce GHG emissions from differ-ent anthropogenic activities as well as thosewhich enhance carbon sinks. Major sources ofGHG emissions are the energy sector, industrialsector, and the agriculture sector. In the energysector, measures to mitigate GHG emissionscover the supply and demand sides. Measures inthe supply side include energy efficiency inpower generation and oil refining, use of com-bined heat and power to produce electricity andwater, fuel switching away from carbon fuels,electricity imports though regional electricitynetworks, reduction of losses in transmission anddistribution, and power generation using renew-able energy resources such as wind and solar.

On the demand side, measures to improve ener-gy efficiency in the major consuming sectors suchas industry, transport, and residential and com-mercial sectors, include efficient lighting systems,improving efficiency of cooling and refrigeration,combustion efficiency improvements, recovery ofwaste heat, and many others.

These measures include improving energy effi-ciency throughout the economy, diversifyingaway from fossil fuels, and promoting the use ofrenewable energy alternatives. The national com-munication reports listed a set of planned proj-ects in the energy supply sectors. These are relat-ed primarily to more efficient production and awider adoption of renewable sources. Some ofthe projects proposed were to evaluate the marketpotential of solar, photovoltaic and wind tech-nologies, to decentralize electrification by photo-voltaic systems, and to adopt a combined cycle


expansion of thermal electrical plants which usesnatural gas. Morocco, for example, reported proj-ects for increasing the number of hydropowerunits, encouraging the use of solar water heaters,wind electricity generation, and desalination ofwater using wind energy. Algeria reported a proj-ect for reduction of gas flaring by 50 percent, andreduction of fugitive emissions from oil and gasinstallations (refineries, pipelines). Egypt’s list ofprojects contained the first 140 MW integratedsolar thermal/natural gas power plant.

Based on the submitted initial national commu-nications from 14 Arab countries, the mainmeasures reported are related to enhancement ofelectrical energy efficiency in lighting, cooling,cooking and air conditioning, and implementa-tion of demand-side management programmes.Some other measures were reported to improvefuel efficiency of vehicles and promotion of pub-lic transportation systems. These policies andmeasures are explained here in more detail.

The Transport Sector

In the transport sector, policies and measuresenvisioned by Arab countries are aimed at creatingsustainable transport systems. These include thedevelopment of road transportation master plans,modern efficient traffic management systems toreduce traffic idle time in cities, improvement oftransport infrastructure, imposition of tariffs ortaxes on cars; and application of varied road tolls,discouragement of the use of private vehicles anda concomitant improvement of the public trans-port systems, and improvement of vehicle mainte-nance or replacement of old vehicles.

Technological measures include introduction ofless carbon alternative fuels such as LPG or com-pressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles, introductionof vehicle emission standards, fuel economy stan-dards, and switching from diesel to electric trac-tion on railways. Further, the effect of recentdevelopment of the information and communi-cation technologies (ICT) in the Arab region onreducing demand on transport and thus reducingGHG emissions has not been estimated.

Increasing the use of public transport, a particu-larly promising option, has already been imple-mented or is under serious consideration in sev-eral of the region’s major cities. The construction

of the underground rail system in Cairo, forexample, has eased traffic congestion consider-ably in that city. Plans for light rail systems arealso being considered for Damascus, Amman,Alexandria, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia andDubai. The expectation is that if public transportsystems improve, many people will opt to usepublic transport instead of private cars (ESCWA,2001). At present, policies to develop and pro-mote public transport systems in the GCC arestill in their infancy stage.

In Egypt, mitigating GHG emissions from thetransport sector involves policies aiming toremove old vehicles from the streets, promotingefficient public transport, expansion of theunderground Metro system, introducing alterna-tive fuels such as CNG, and hybrid vehicles. Arecent Global Environment Facility (GEF) sup-ported sustainable transport program has beeninitiated which aims at: integrating sustainabletransport planning principles into urban plan-ning, facilitating modal shift to less pollutingforms of public transportation, promotion ofnon-motorized transport facilities in middle sizecities, traffic management and traffic demandmanagement to discourage individual use of pri-vate cars. Mitigation options for the transportsector outlined in the first national communica-tion included the following:

• Improvement of vehicle maintenance and tun-ing up of vehicle engines;

• Use of compressed natural gas as a vehicle fuelin transport;

• Re-introduction of the electrified railways inintercity and intra-city transport;

• Intensifying the use of environmentally soundriver transport system;

• Extending metro lines to newly developedcities; and Encouraging private sector partici-pation in financing and managing the newmetro lines (Abdel Gelil, 2008a).

A major step in the process of upgrading Cairo’stransport system has been the construction of anunderground metro, the first of its kind inAfrica and the Middle East. The nearly 63 km-long underground metro network links the fivegovernorates comprising the CairoMetropolitan region: Cairo, Giza, Qalyoubia,Helwan and the 6th of October. The networkcomprises two lines: line (1) Helwan - El-Marg


and line (2) Shubra - El-Kheima - Mouneeb.Line (1), which was completed in 2000, has atotal length of 44 km, and it presently carries1.5 million passengers per day. This project alsoincluded the electrification of the existing dieseltrains in parts of the route. The second line’slength is 19 km, and it was completed in 2005.The number of passengers using this line now is1.2 million passengers per day. Future plansinclude building a third line of about 33 km anda design capacity of 2.1 million passengers perday from Cairo International Airport, east ofCairo, to Imbaba in the west. Construction ofthis line is expected to take 13 years to be com-pleted. Three additional lines are also envi-sioned for the year 2022 (Egyptian TunnelingSociety – ETS, 2004).

As per the UAE’s first national communication,the amount of travel in cars and light duty truckscontinues to grow due to increasing populationand economic development. The overall efficien-cy of the passenger transportation system can besignificantly improved through measures thatlimit the growth in vehicle miles travelledthrough land-use and infrastructure investments.

One such investment is a metro system that cansimultaneously relieve urban congestion andreduce GHG emissions. Currently, Dubai hasidentified the need for an urban rail transit sys-tem to supply additional transportation capacityto relieve growing traffic, and support the city’scontinuing development. The first metro line inDubai was inaugurated in September 2009. TheDubai Urban Rail Transit (Metro) will be thefirst such system on the Arabian Peninsula.

In Jordan, in order to improve the fuel efficiencyof vehicles, and to help take old inefficient cars offthe roads, the government encouraged taxi ownersto replace their old cars with modern ones by pro-viding tax and duties exemptions for new import-ed taxis. Additionally, the government is consider-ing the introduction of double-deck buses inGreater Amman and other municipalities toreduce fuel consumption, achieve greater efficien-cy, and reduce GHG emissions. Another mitiga-tion strategy in the transport sector in Jordan wasthe improvement of traffic management to easetraffic congestion through, for instance, buildingbridges and tunnels, and automating traffic lights.Moreover, the Jordanian government has intro-


duced tax exemptions on hybrid cars as an incen-tive to promote their use.

These measures have had considerable effects onreducing road congestion, minimizing idlingtime, and, thus, reducing transport energy inten-sity. Furthermore, the government recognizes theneed for a major upgrading of the road transportsystem. This was realized by establishing a RoadMaintenance Fund through public-private part-nerships and a system of road-user tolls.According to Jordan’s initial national communi-cation, “the rapid construction of the Shidiya railline is critical to the future of the railway sector.The government is considering private financingas part of a concession agreement for privateoperation and maintenance of rail services on thisline.” Other planned priority investment projectsin the transportation sector include restructuringthe public transport and development of a light-rail system. The government envisions that a sub-stantial part of this planned development will befinanced by domestic and foreign private sectors(Jordan, 1997).

In Yemen, the first national communicationreported that energy use in the transport sectorcould be reduced through a number of measuresincluding fuel efficiency improvement, trafficmanagement, improvement of freight transport,switching to less carbon fuels such as LPG, andpublic education (Yemen, 2001).

The transport mitigation strategies in Sudanidentified several priority areas for governmentpolicy: development of transportation infrastruc-ture (roads, telecommunications. etc.), encouragepublic transport and improve traffic flow, applyspeed limits standards and fuel economy stan-dards, and encourage importation of efficientvehicles (Sudan, 2003).

The Industrial Sector

The industrial sector is another major energyconsuming sector in most of the Arabeconomies. Most Arab countries, especiallythose which are highly endowed with hydrocar-bon resources (oil and gas) are mainly depend-ent on those resources to fuel their industries.Energy intensive industries such as oil refining,metal extraction, chemicals and petrochemicalshave been proliferating in the oil producing

countries. This has been a global trend since thefirst world energy crises in 1973. In 2006, theseindustries contributed 49.5% to the Arab GDP(LAS, 2007). Due to the central importance ofthese industries to the GDP, their low levels ofenergy efficiency and the huge capacity of fossilbased desalination plants in the GCC region,the energy and carbon intensities of the GCCcountries are ranked very high by internationalstandards. For instance, in 2005, the energyintensity of Bahrain (0.77 toe/ $1000) wasmore than double the world average (0.32 toe/$1000) and about seven times the Japaneseintensity (0.11 toe/ $1000).

GHG emissions from industry include thoseresulting from burning fossil fuels, indirect emis-sions resulting from the use of electricity, andemissions related to certain industrial processessuch as aluminium smelting, iron and steel,cement, and the food industry.

Several technologies have proved to be technical-ly and economically viable worldwide to improveindustrial energy efficiency. These include indus-trial process control, waste heat recovery,improvement of combustion efficiency, energymanagement systems, combined heat and power(CHP), high efficiency lighting, high efficiencymotors, and many others.

Several Arab countries have adopted successfulprogrammes for improving industrial energy effi-ciency including building national capacities onenergy audits, energy accounting, and energyefficient technologies.

Energy efficiency is an important strategy thathas been adopted and promoted throughout theEgyptian economy. Given the critical energy sit-uation in Egypt, the high level of energy con-sumption and the limited energy resources, it isimperative to conserve energy in the major ener-gy consuming sectors, including the industrialsector which is the second largest consumer ofelectricity (36% of the total) (EEAA, 1999).Industrial energy efficiency measures includedenergy audits which showed an average potentialsaving of about 25% in Egypt mostly in theEgyptian Industries. Measures implementedinclude combustion efficiency improvement,waste heat recovery, power factor improvementand use of efficient lighting systems.


In the UAE, carbon emissions associated withelectricity consumption in the industrial sectoraccounted for about 57% of all energy-relatedgreenhouse gas emissions in 1994. It is expectedthat industrial energy consumption could bereduced by 25 percent or more with good pay-back through a combination of energy-savingmeasures for industrial motors. These includeproper motors sizing to meet demand and usinghigh efficiency motors. Another key energy sav-ing strategy could be to install variable speeddrives (VSDs) on applications of variable loads,in addition to leaks reduction from compressedair systems and high pressure steam systems(UAE, 2008).

The energy bill in the Jordanian economyreached about 800 billion Jordanian dinars in2003 which accounts for nearly 13% of GDPand 45% of exports (NERC, 2008). This burdenmakes clear the urgent need to devise and imple-ment an energy efficiency strategy. The proposedstrategy contains many policies and measures toreduce energy consumption in the industrialactivities, efficient lighting systems, variablespeed drives, and efficient motors.

Lebanon is not an energy producing country, and

imported fossil fuel in Lebanon accounts for97% of the country’s energy bill and totalledaround $1.5 billion in 2004 (nearly 20% of theannual expenditures of the Lebanese governmentor about 7.5% of GDP). Energy consumption inLebanon was responsible for approximately 15.3million tons of carbon dioxide emissions in2002. The Lebanese transport sector is the majorenergy consumer which made up about 42 % oftotal energy consumption in 1999 (WRI, 1999).

In 2002, Lebanon with support from UNDP/GEFstarted a project to reduce GHG emissions byimproving demand side energy efficiency throughthe creation of a multi-purpose Lebanese Centrefor Energy Conservation (LCECP). The Centrewill simultaneously undertake activities to removebarriers to improve energy efficiency and provideenergy efficiency services to the public and privatesectors. There will be a broad range of supportingactivities including technical support, financialincentives, information dissemination, awarenessprograms, policy analysis and program design.Achievements of the LCECP as of now includeperforming energy audits, undertaking trainingand public education activities, and fund raisingfor energy efficiency and renewable energy projects(LCECP, 2008).


Measures to reduce GHG emissions and improveenergy efficiency reported through the firstnational communication include efficientmotors, combustion efficiency improvements ofboilers and furnaces, and improve efficiency ofthe cement industry. As the cement industry isthe single largest source of Lebanese CO2 emis-sions and a major energy user, mitigation meas-ures reported included process modification andcombustion efficiency improvements (Lebanon,1999).

The Building Sector

Energy use in buildings accounts for nearly 40%of global energy consumption and 36% of totalenergy-related CO2 emissions. Half of this ener-

gy consumption occurs in industrialized coun-tries, the remainder is consumed by the rest ofthe world (Price et al., 2005). In general, twomajor strategies have been used to improve ener-gy efficiency in the building sector and thusreduce its GHG emissions. The first strategy is toimprove building envelope energy performance.This is widely known as green building, sustain-able building or energy efficient building con-cepts. The second strategy is to improve efficien-cy of energy consuming equipment used insidethe buildings such as home appliances, lightingsystems, air conditioning systems, computers andother office equipments and the like.

In response to recent environmental, economic,market and regulatory drivers, green buildingconcepts and practices have become widely pro-moted worldwide. The U.S. Green BuildingCouncil has developed a Green Building RatingSystem called the Leadership in Energy andEnvironmental Design (LEED). Today, there aremore than 50,000 LEED-accredited profession-als in the US. Furthermore, the World GreenBuilding Council (GBC) is a union of nationalcouncils. The current member nations of theWorld GBC represent over 50 percent of globalconstruction activity, and touch more than15,000 companies and organizations worldwide(USGBC, 2008).

The UAE is pioneering to apply the LEED certi-fication system in new buildings, and in 2005established the Emirates Green BuildingCouncil, meant to become a model for the Arabregion to follow (Emirates GBC, 2008). Bahrainis also working towards achieving the same goal.Several other Arab countries have similarly beendeveloping energy building codes.

Many Arab countries have already establisheddifferent kinds of building codes. As part of thenational energy efficiency strategy of Jordan,thermal insulation in residential and commercialbuilding in certain zoning areas should beenforced. In addition, the preparation of an“Energy Efficiency Code” is a part of such a strat-egy (Shahin, 2005).

After many efforts to promote green architectureby several Egyptian institutions, Egypt developedresidential building energy efficiency codes in2003, and the new codes will be initially imple-


MASDAR CITYA pioneering initiative in the UAE is the construction of theworld’s first zero-carbon, zero-waste and car-free-city in AbuDhabi, named MASDAR city. The city is planned to host40,000 residents and receive another 50,000 daily com-muters. It is envisioned to be a free zone clean-tech clusterhome to around 1,500 visionary companies and researchcentres. The MASDAR Institute of Science and Technology isthe first comer to the city and will be home to 100 studentsand faculty by fall 2009. Cars will be banned within the city;travel will be accomplished via public mass transit and per-sonal rapid transit systems, with road and railways connectingcommuters to other locations outside the city. The city will bewalled, to keep out the hot desert wind. The lack of cars willallow for narrow, shaded streets that will also improve air cir-culation and reduce demand for air conditioning. The city willbe oriented northeast to minimize the amount of direct sun-light on buildings’ sides and windows. Solar panels and solarcollectors on roofs and elsewhere will generate enough elec-tricity to meet most of the city’s electricity needs. Water will beprovided through a solar-powered desalination plant.Landscaping within the city and crops grown outside the citywill be irrigated with grey water and treated waste water pro-duced by the city. It is planned that MASDAR City will be com-pleted and be fully functional by 2012 (The Economist,2008). Recently, MASDAR City was elected to host the newlyestablished International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA);this is a milestone achievement for Abu Dhabi and marks thefirst time that an Arab city plays host to the headquarters of aninternational organization (MASDAR, 2009)

Sources: The Economist (2008). MASDAR Plan. At http://www.economist.com/science/tq/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12673433MASDAR (2009), http://www.irenauae.com/en/home/index.aspx

mented on a voluntary basis. If enforced, it wasestimated that these codes would save about 20%of building energy consumption. According toJoe Huang (2003), there is little indication thatprevious efforts have succeeded in changing over-all design practices in Egypt towards improvedenergy efficiency. Furthermore, the extent of thecodes’ enforcement and impacts of their imple-mentation on building energy efficiency have notbeen assessed yet.

In Lebanon, a thermal energy standard for build-ing is under development with the support of theADEME of France. In addition, the Lebaneseconstruction law provides economic incentivesfor voluntary thermal insulation of building.However, due to a weak legislative and institu-tional framework, subsidies of energy prices, andthe absence of a national strategy, many energyefficiency projects in Lebanon, especially fundedby donors from the EU, have failed to achievetangible results (Mourtada, 2008).

In Syria, a code of practice of thermal insulationfor buildings is being developed. The aim is toprovide information to consumers regarding theadvantages of building insulation in order toaffect insulation purchase decisions. These guide-lines would provide best practices of recom-mended insulation levels for new and existingbuildings (Zein, 2005).

In Kuwait, where air-conditioning accounts for50% of building energy demand, a code of prac-tice for energy conservation was developed to setlimits for the electrical consumption of air-condi-tioning systems for buildings. The code stipulatesenergy conservation measures and limits for dif-ferent types of buildings.

Achieving sustainable building designs in theArab countries is at its early stages of develop-ment, and only a very limited amount of scholar-ly review to document such efforts has beenundertaken. For the last few decades, urbaniza-tion in the Arab region, especially in the GCC,has been characterized by forms of importedwestern architecture which are far from being inharmony with the Arab social, geographical andclimatic conditions. High rise buildings withlarge areas of glass façade, and huge demand forelectricity for air conditioning can be seen in allnew urban centres such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi,

Doha, and the others. These unsustainabledesigns of residential and commercial buildings,besides being big consumers of energy and water,are massive contributors to GHG emissions.

The second GHG mitigation strategy in thebuilding sector mostly reported in the nationalcommunication reports includes efficient light-ing systems, certification and labelling of homeappliances, and dissemination of improved stovesfor cooking in rural areas. Lebanon, Tunisia,Algeria, Syria, and Egypt have projects for certi-fication of home appliances at different stages ofdevelopment.

The Egyptian government has successfully devel-oped energy efficiency standards and energylabels for the three most market penetrated appli-ances in Egypt, namely room air conditioners,


washing machines and refrigerators. Energy effi-ciency specifications for these selected applianceswere developed and approved by the EgyptianOrganization for Standardization and QualityControl (EOS). A ministerial decree of theMinister of Industry was issued in 2003 concern-ing refrigerators, washing machines, freezers androom air-conditioning. It is mandatory for localmanufacturers and importers of such equipmentsto meet these specifications, as well as to applythe Energy Efficiency Label (CLASP, 2008).

Tunisia has recently implemented a standardsand labelling programme for household appli-ances and other energy-driven equipment. Thisprogramme, which was supported by the GEFand executed by l’Agence Nationale pour laMaitrise de l’Energie (ANME), led to theissuance of energy labelling and minimum ener-gy efficiency standards for refrigerators in 2004.As a result, it is forecasted that by 2030 this pro-gramme will have saved 3.4 Mt of CO2 emissions(LIHIDHEB, 2007).

The development of energy efficiency standardsfor home appliances is part of the NationalEnergy Efficiency Program of the Ministry ofEnergy and Mines in Algeria. The energy effi-ciency law no.99-09 of 1999 and its executiveregulations outlines the general rules concerningthe energy efficiency of home appliances operat-ing on electricity, gas and petroleum products.The law also stipulates that the energy perform-ance requirements of those appliances have to beset by the government (CLASP, 2008).

After the discovery of oil in Sudan, it has beenpromoting a policy of switching from biomass toliquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking.Sudan highlighted the impacts on Sudanese bio-mass stocks that sequester carbon of shifting fromburning biomass to LPG for cooking in rural andurban households. The Khartoum Refinery has acapability of producing 500 tons/day of LPG.Recently, the government has implemented anumber of policies to encourage the increased useof LPG in the household sector: the price washalved and the fees and customs on LPG stoveswere decreased substantially.

Lighting consumes 19% of the global electricityproduction, and is associated with an annual 1.9billion tons of CO2 emissions. Globally more

than 70% of lamps sold are incandescent, whilemuch more efficient (but also more expensive)compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) account forjust over 6% (GEF, 2008). According to theWorldwatch Institute (WWI), the total numberof CFLs in use globally nearly doubled between2001 and 2003 alone, growing from an estimated1.8 billion to 3.5 billion units (WWI, 2008).Energy saving and the associated GHG reduc-tions are correlated to the amount of fuel saveddue to the reduction in electrical energy demandresulting from using low wattage lamps. The eco-nomics of using such efficient lamps dependmainly on the structure of electricity generationin every country, fuel used, and cost of fuels. Oneof the major barriers to the use of these highlyefficient lamps in most Arab countries, as hasbeen the case worldwide, is their high initial cost.One way to overcome that is the exemptions ofthese lamps from customs duties, especiallyimportant given that these types of lamps arerarely manufactured locally in the Arab coun-tries. Another way is to develop innovativefinancing schemes through which end users willbe paying the initial cost from the cost of electric-ity savings.

Though CFLs offer enormous economic andenvironmental benefits, only few Arab countrieshave strategies or national plans to disseminatethem. In most cases, these efficient lamps arebeing distributed at the commercial level throughretailers, or agencies of foreign manufacturerswithout any local government support.According to China Association of LightingIndustry, the volume of CFLs imports by theUAE in 2006 amounted to 65.9 million lamps(China Association of Lighting Industry, 2008).

Some projects funded by multilateral or bilateraldonors have been promoting CFL lamps in someArab countries; examples include Lebanon andEgypt. In 2008, the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), in cooperation with theMinistry of Energy & Water and the LebaneseCentre for Energy Conservation (LCEC),launched a National Campaign for CFLs. Thiscampaign aims to raise public awareness about thebenefits of CFLs. LCEC has implemented variouspilot projects replacing conventional light bulbswith CFLs in different Lebanese villages. As aresult, local savings of around 13% on the totalelectricity bill were achieved.


Lighting accounts for nearly 23% of the totalelectricity consumption in Egypt, half of which isconsumed in the residential and commercial sec-tors. The GEF/UNDP supported “EnergyEfficiency Improvement & Greenhouse GasReduction Project” has undertaken some initia-tives to promote CFLs. These include a study toreduce the custom duties on CFLs from 30% to5% in order to help cut their initial cost, imple-ment a lease program of CFLs by the state-ownedelectricity distribution companies, and encouragelocal manufacturing of CFLs. There is no avail-able information on government’s incentivesused to encourage local manufacturers; however,six local manufacturing plants were established.These activities, together with public educationand marketing campaigns have led to increase themarket size of CFL in Egypt to 4.4 million in2007. It was estimated that the accumulatedCO2 reduction due to those activities up till2007 was nearly 2.3 million tons (GEF/UNDP,2008).

In Tunisia, several projects to disseminate about10 million CFLs during the period 2007-2011are planned under the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.These projects are still under development.According to the ANME, nearly one million tonsof CO2 reduction is projected up to 2012(ANME, 2008).

Fuel switching

Worldwide, natural gas contributed about 17%of the total fuels for electricity generation in2007. It is projected that natural gas will play animportant role in the transition to low-carbonenergy in the near future. This is because it pro-duces less carbon dioxide per unit of energy thanoil and coal do. Statistics show that the world’sconsumption of natural gas has been expandingduring the last decade. The same trend was seenin the Arab region. Switching to natural gas hasbeen a crucial response to many factors includingmitigation of air pollution and GHG emissions.The critical role natural gas is playing and isexpected to play in the global energy market wasemphasized with the recent establishment of the“Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)” in2008, which is hosted in Doha, Qatar. LeadingArab gas producers, namely Algeria, Egypt, UAE,Qatar, and Libya, have joined the forum.

Natural gas represents the second largest pri-mary energy resource used in the Arab countriesat nearly 23% of the final energy consumptionin 2006. Twelve Arab countries are currentlyusing natural gas, in some form, in power gen-eration, industry, the residential and commer-cial sectors, and the transport sector. Arab gasreserves represent nearly 30% of global reserves.Total gas production in the Arab countriesaccounts for about 12.5% of the global gas pro-duction (LAS, 2007). Two regional gas projectsare underway aiming to increase natural gas uti-lization in the Arab region. The first project,named the Arab gas pipeline, aims to connectthe Egyptian gas network to Jordan, Syria, andthen to Turkey with a total length of 1200 km.The second regional project named “Dolphin”will transport Qatari gas to the UAE with a totallength of 370 km. Some other regional gas proj-ects are planned such as a project betweenNorth African Arab countries, and betweenthem and Europe.

In power generation, the switch from petroleumproducts to natural gas was the most commonlyreported activity. For example, the use of naturalgas was increased considerably in a number ofcountries. In Tunisia, most of the thermally gen-erated energy supply comes from natural gas.This has avoided 900,000 t CO2 emissions perannum, relative to a scenario in which oil-basedproducts were used instead. Natural gas is alsoplaying a key role in Egypt’s energy policy. Givenits economic and environmental advantages, nat-ural gas will improve the overall energy efficiencyand environmental quality of Egypt. Switchingfrom oil to gas was identified as a priority meas-ure in the National Action Plan on ClimateChange that was prepared by the EgyptianEnvironmental Affairs Agency in 1999. Theenergy policy of Egypt has been developed topromote the substitution of natural gas in varioussectors. Strategies include: (i) developing gasinfrastructure to expand gas markets and developdomestic gas demand – the market share of nat-ural gas in the total hydrocarbon consumptionhas increased to about 45%; (ii) the substitutionof heavy fuel oil with natural gas in electricitygeneration has made considerable reductions inair pollution; (iii) promotion of CompressedNatural Gas (CNG) as a transport fuel is alsounderway; and (iv) encouraging private sectorinvestments in the gas industry. A number of pri-


vate firms have been formed to participate in theconstruction of gas pipelines, building CNGfuelling stations and converting vehicles to useCNG.

The Egyptian program to use CNG as a trans-portation fuel has proved to be successful; by2008, there were 6 operating CNG companies,116 CNG fuelling stations, and about 100,000CNG vehicles were in use (EGAS, 2008).

A primary key to the CNG industry success inEgypt is a package of incentives offered by thegovernment, including 5-year tax holidays forCNG companies, low-cost conversion chargesfor car owners, and the attractive price differen-tial between CNG and gasoline (Abdel Gelil,2008).

Additionally, more than 90% of the thermal elec-tricity generated in Egypt is based on natural gas.Furthermore, a plan is being implemented toexpand the use of natural gas in the residentialsector, and about 2 million homes have alreadybeen connected.

In Bahrain, all of the power plants are currentlyrunning on natural gas. In Morocco, a 385 MWcombined cycle power plant was commissioned in2004. A similar one with a capacity of 360 MWwas started in Algeria in 2005. Jordan has smallreserves of natural gas used to fuel a small powerplant to meet only about 4% of the country’sneeds. Within the Arab Gas Pipeline project,Egypt will supply gas to power plants and largeindustrial users in Jordan for 18 years. In the UAE,an initiative to develop an action plan to introducenatural gas as a transport fuel is planned.According to the Environment Agency of AbuDhabi (EAD), 20 percent of government-ownedvehicles and taxis in the emirate will be convertedto run on CNG by 2012 (AFED, 2008).

Renewable Energy

The Arab countries have a great potential forrenewable energy, including solar and wind, aswell as hydro and geothermal in specific loca-tions, which are still underutilized. The share ofrenewable energy in the total installed generationcapacity of the Arab countries remains relativelylow, standing at around 7% in 2007, mostlyfrom hydropower in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,

Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, andMauritania. Solar and wind generation of elec-tricity amounts to 257 MW and remains limitedto Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, andPalestine (OAPEC, 2008).

Egypt ranked first in hydropower and wind ener-gy generation in the Arab countries with a totalinstalled capacity of 2,842 MW and 305 MWrespectively in 2007/2008 (EEHC, 2008). Windpower is planned to be increased to 965 MW by2012. In 2007, the Egyptian Supreme EnergyCouncil adopted an ambitious plan aiming toincrease the contribution of renewable to thetotal electricity generated to reach 20% by 2020;12% of this target will be met by wind.

Assessments of wind resources indicate that somelocations in the Arab countries have wind condi-tions that are more than adequate for electricitygeneration. Small and conventional applicationsof wind energy exist in Jordan and Tunisia. OnlyEgypt and Morocco have moved to commercialscale wind energy. In Morocco, installed windcapacity reached 54 MW in 2005 representingnearly 1% of the total installed capacity. Another500 MW of wind farms are currently under con-struction.

Due to their geographic location, the Arab coun-tries are blessed with an abundance of solar ener-gy potential. Solar energy generation using pho-tovoltaic (PV) technology is used in severalstand-alone applications especially for waterpumping, telecommunications and lighting forremote sites. The largest PV program exists inMorocco, where 160,000 solar home systems inabout 8% of rural households are installed with atotal capacity of 16 MW. Photovoltaic pumpingapplications are relatively developed in Tunisiawith a total existing peak capacity of 255 MW(Abdel Gelil, 2008b).

Solar water heaters are achieving different degreesof market penetration, and are currently mostsuccessful in the residential and commercial sec-tors of Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, andLebanon. Table 2 shows that Palestine has thelargest area of solar water heaters in the region.This is due to the current security situation andthe unreliable electricity supply from Israel to theOccupied Palestinian Territories. It should benoted from the same table that solar water heaters



are mostly used in Arab countries with relativelyfew or no hydrocarbon resources.

Several Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) projectswere announced but not completed in NorthAfrican countries, namely Egypt, Morocco andAlgeria. With escalating concerns of climatechange, cost reductions and efficiency improve-ments of this technology, and the introduction ofindependent power producers (IPPs), CSP willplay an important role in the electricity genera-tion mix in those countries in the near future.

A recent plan announced in Algeria in 2007included the building of four gas-CSP plantswith total capacity of 1700 MW of which 250MW will be solar. The four power plants will begradually commissioned through 2015.

Egypt submitted an official request to the GEF tosupport financing the first solar thermal powerplant. Work is underway to implement the firstEgyptian hybrid solar thermal power plant of140 MW capacity of which 20 MW will be solar,while the rest will be gas combined cycle. Theplant is planned to be operational in 2010.

A similar project is under construction inMorocco to build a similar hybrid gas combinedcycle 472 MW solar thermal power plant with asolar component capacity of 30 MW. The proj-ect was initiated in 1994 following a feasibilitystudy of solar thermal power generation. AinBeni Mathar in Eastern Morocco was finallyselected to site the power plant.

Jerusalem District Electricity Company(JDECO) has signed an agreement with anAmerican Company (Nanovo) to establish aconcentrated solar power plant in Jericho,Palestine. The first phase of the project willhave a 3 MW capacity and will cost up to $17million, financed by the American company.The next phase will expand the plant to a 100MW capacity with a total cost of up to $300million (PERC, 2009).

In 2002, Jordan announced plans to build a 130MW solar hybrid power plant. The projectaimed at the development of 100-150 MW solarhybrid power plant assisted with fuel oil or natu-ral gas at Quwairah south of Jordan on a BuildOwn Operate (BOO) basis.

The UAE has chosen a different path to promoteCSP, focusing on promoting R&D through theMasdar Initiative. The UAE has 100 MW ofCSP open for tenders planned to be expanded to500 MW.

Measures to reduce GHG from Non-energy sectors

Some other non-energy sectors and economicactivities are contributing to the global anthro-pogenic emissions of GHGs. Examples are agri-culture activities and solid waste managementpractices.

The Agriculture Sector

Although CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are themajor cause of global climate change, about one-third of the total human-induced warming effectcomes from agriculture and land-use change. Thisis mainly because agricultural activities are themajor source of methane and nitrous oxides whichboth have much higher global warming potential(GWP) than CO2. Agricultural lands occupy 37%of the Earth’s land surface and account for 52%and 84% of global methane and nitrous oxideemissions, respectively (Smith, 2007). On theother hand, the agricultural sector can be part ofthe mitigation strategies by reducing its own emis-sions, offsetting emissions from other sectors byremoving CO2 from the atmosphere (via photo-synthesis) and storing the carbon in soils. Theseprocesses are major parts of the global carbon andnitrogen cycles. Through the adoption of agricul-tural best management practices, emissions ofnitrous oxide from agricultural soils, methanefrom livestock production and manure, and CO2from on-farm energy use can be reduced.

MARKET SIZE OF SOLAR WATER HEATERS INSELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES

TABLE 2

Country Current market size (m2)Morocco (annual) 130,000Algeria - Tunisia 57,000Egypt 500,000 Palestine 1,630,000 Jordan 825,000 Lebanon 177,993 Syria 200,000 (Source: SOLATERM Project Partners)


Measures reported in the national communica-tions of some Arab countries under agricultureincluded: introduction of new varieties of riceand management of paddies to reduce CH4emissions, rational use of fertilizers to reduceN2O emissions, increase of soil water absorption,and reduction of burning agricultural residues.Measures in the livestock-related operationsincluded changing of cattle fodders to reduceCH4 emissions from enteric fermentation,manure management and management of live-stock population.

The initial national communication of Egyptis nearly the only available report that describesin detail the different options available toEgypt to reduce CH4 emissions from rice pad-dies. These options include: rice cultivation ofshort duration varieties, water management,fertilizer management, and control of soil tem-perature. The same report recommends someactions to reduce CH4 emissions from live-stock by altering fermentation patterns, i.e.altering the composition of fodders. Some ofthese options are already being implemented inEgypt such as cultivation of short durationvarieties, water and fertilizer management withthe aims of water management and reductionof use of agrochemicals.

Additionally, only Mauritania reported projectsconcerning improved water and fertilizer man-agement, and improved efficiency of use of nitro-gen fertilizers.

Waste Management

Waste management practices produce green-house gas emissions in a number of ways. First,the anaerobic decomposition of waste in landfillsproduces methane. Second, open burning orincineration of waste produces combustion gasesincluding carbon dioxide. In addition, combus-tion of fuels used in transportation of waste todisposal sites is another source of GHG emis-sions. Sound waste management practices such aswaste prevention, minimization and recycling,better reduce GHG emissions from the waste sec-tor. These include reduction of methane emis-sions from landfills though diverting organicwastes from landfills to composting or other bio-logical treatment facilities, and reducing emis-sions from incinerators.

Generation of solid waste in the Arab region hasbeen growing for the past few decades. This isattributed to population growth, urbanization,economic growth and rising standards of livingin many countries. However, to different degrees,most of the Arab countries still lack integratedsystems for solid waste management. Per capitageneration of solid waste is normally correlatedwith income, and it reaches high levels in higherincome countries of the GCC. Organic waste stillrepresents more than 50% of the composition ofsolid waste in many Arab countries. This is alarge potential source of methane emissionswhich has been underestimated.

Open dumping is the most common method ofwaste disposal throughout the Arab region.Municipalities usually dump solid wastes in low-lying land, or abandoned quarries rather than atdesignated dump sites, usually named landfills.In addition to being poorly managed, these sitesgenerally lack most of the engineering and sani-tary measures for leachate collection and treat-ment, and methane capture. In many instancesspontaneous fires break out on these sites causingsevere air quality problems. Two demonstrationprojects for capture of landfill gases in Ammanand Kuwait were implemented though no docu-mentations of the results are available.

Incineration and waste-to-energy technologiesare capital intensive and only used in some casesof treating hazardous wastes such as in Bahrainand Egypt, both without energy recovery.Biological systems are either aerobic or anaerobic,but aerobic processes are most common in theArab cities to produce compost. There are manycomposting facilities in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, as well as in otherArab countries.

In the Arab national communication reports,measures reported to mitigate GHG emissions inthis sector represented a wish list of differentsound solid and liquid waste management prac-tices. These included diversion of organic materi-als from landfills to produce compost, recovery ofmethane from landfills to generate electricity,and strengthening the legislative and institution-al framework for better management of solidwaste. In addition, measures frequently reportedincluded education, training and public aware-ness on waste issues. Some of these activities are


underway, but mostly they are in the early stagesof development in many countries.

III. MEASURE OF CARBON SEQUESTRA-TION AND STORAGE

Mitigation of GHG means implementing poli-cies and measures to reduce anthropogenic GHGemissions from sources such as power plants,industrial facilities and the transport sector, aswell as to enhance natural GHG sinks such asforests, land use change and carbon capture andstorage (CCS). This section discusses enhance-ments of carbon sinks through afforestations andCO2 capture & storage.

Land use change: Afforestation

There is a widespread recognition of the poten-tial of forests and land-use changes for offsettingemissions of GHGs. Measures proposed innational communications included promotingprogrammes of conservation, regeneration, refor-estation, and afforestation.

In Sudan, two main groups of mitigation optionswere considered for increasing carbon sequestra-tion and storage. The first group representsafforestation and rehabilitation options. Theseoptions refer to the afforestation and rehabilita-tion of wastelands, together with afforestation of10% of the rain fed land and 5% of the irrigatedagricultural land. The second group representsmanagement options, which involve a naturalresource management approach based on theconservation and rehabilitation of degradedforests and rangelands. Reforestation and bio-mass conservation projects are also key elementsin Djibouti’s proposed programme of action.Tunisia reported on a concerted approach withneighbouring countries, and with the interna-tional community for the implementation of aprogram aimed at combating desertification.Similar projects were also reported inMauritania, Djibouti, and Morocco.

A promising CDM afforestation project is cur-rently being proposed by the EgyptianEnvironmental Affairs Agency. The GreaterCairo Ring Road Afforestation project will helpimprove the air quality of Cairo. The forest thatwill be planted will be irrigated by treated agri-

cultural drainage water and will absorb about100,000 tons of CO2eq annually, helping to off-set the carbon emissions from vehicles, industryand power plants. The project is currently underdevelopment. In addition, Japan Bank forInternational Cooperation (JBIC) conducted apreliminary study on the Egyptian BiofuelIndustry Development in June, 2007. Jatrophatest cultivation was started in 2003 as a part ofEgypt’s afforestation program. The EgyptianJatropha yield turned out to be the highest pro-duction level compared to the Asian and Africannon-irrigated cultivation. Although the primarypurposes of the Egyptian Jatropha model areanti-desertification and beneficial use of treatedwastewater, the high production results caughtthe attention of private biofuel producers. Underthat study, JBIC proposed an integrated strategicplan to realize the new biofuel industry with a“Public Private Partnership” (JDI, 2007).

Another remarkable afforestation experience is inthe UAE. According to the Environmental Agency- Abu Dhabi, “Over the last few decades, over 120million trees have been planted, as well as 25 mil-lion date palms. Over 92,000 hectares have beenplanted with forest trees. These are now helping toreverse the process of desertification and to stabi-lize the sand dunes that once moved inexorablyacross the land. They also provide attractive newhabitats for wildlife, with many species of animalsand birds increasing rapidly in numbers as theycolonise the new areas of vegetation”(Environmental Agency Abu Dhabi, 2006).

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)

CO2 capture & storage (CCS) is a process com-prised of three steps. The first is CO2 capturefrom CO2 point sources such as power plants,industrial facilities, and natural gas wells with highCO2 content emissions. The second step is trans-portation via pipelines to the storage site; and thethird step is geological storage in deep geologicalformations including saline formations, depletedoil/gas fields, coal seams, and enhanced oil or gasrecovery sites. In the combustion processes, CO2can be captured either in pre-combustion modeby treatment of fossil fuels or in post-combustionmode by treatment of the flue gases. Due toeconomies of scale, large point sources of CO2emissions have the highest potential of CO2 cap-ture. These include large industries such as oil and


gas, cement and steel and electric power plants.CO2 has been injected and stored in oilfields as ameans to enhance oil recovery since the late1970s. Currently, the estimated global geologicalstorage potential in depleted oil/gas fields equals900 Gt of CO2 (IEA, 2006). The IPCC SpecialReport on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storagerecently stated that: “CCS has the potential toreduce overall mitigation costs and increase flexi-bility in achieving greenhouse gas emission reduc-tions.” (IPCC, 2005).

The first major location where CO2 was stored ingeological formations as a climate change mitiga-tion option was under the North Sea. In 1996,StatOil, an oil company, started removing CO2from the natural gas and injecting it into a mas-sive saline aquifer located 800–1000 metersunder the North Sea (IEA, 2006).

Algeria hosts one of the world’s three largestdemonstration sites of CCS which is the BP’s InSalah project, where CO2 is captured and storedin a gas field. This demonstration project offers

an opportunity to collect baseline and monitor-ing data that is not associated with enhanced oilrecovery. The project is aimed to ensure thatsecure geological storage of CO2 can be cost-effectively verified, to demonstrate to stakehold-ers that industrial-scale geological storage of CO2is a viable GHG mitigation option, and to setprecedents for the regulation and verification ofthe geological storage of CO2, allowing eligibili-ty for GHG credits in the international carbonmarket. It is worth mentioning here that CCSprojects are not yet eligible under the currentmodalities of the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.

The Algerian project involves separating CO2from natural gas at the In Salah gas facility. TheCO2 is being re-injected into a sandstone reservoirfor permanent storage. In this Gas project, thenatural gas has a high level of CO2 which is cap-tured. The CO2 free gas is processed for distribu-tion as sales gas. About 1 million tons per year ofCO2 is compressed before it enters the CO2pipelines. These pipelines transport the CO2 to


reservoirs which are up to 20 km away. Finally theCO2 is injected into the reservoirs at depths of 1.8to 2 km below the surface (KBR, 2006).

According to the IEA, this project has been stor-ing about 1.2 million ton of CO2 annually since2004 with a cost of $6/ ton CO2 (IEA, 2006).

It is worth noting that the Arab region, especial-ly in the GCC and other hydrocarbon producingcountries, has a great potential of CCS technolo-gy by using depleted oil and gas wells for carbonstorage.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This review indicates that most of the Arab coun-tries are implementing wide varieties of climatefriendly policies and measures. These includepolicies and measures both to reduce anthro-pogenic GHG emissions as well as those toenhance carbon sinks. Though most of thesepolicies and measures are being adopted inresponse to some economic, social, or environ-mental considerations, they would result in a sig-nificant reduction of GHG emissions. Some ofthese activities are well recognized worldwidesuch as commercializing wind energy in Egypt,wide use of solar heating in Palestine, Tunisiaand Morocco, use of CNG as a transport fuel inEgypt, the first CSP projects in Egypt, Morocco,and Algeria, the first green building council inDubai, the massive forestation program in theUAE, the first zero-carbon city in Abu Dhabi,and the pioneering CCS project in Algeria. Asstated earlier, these initiatives are fragmented asthere is little evidence that they have been imple-mented within an integrated policy framework.

In meeting their obligations to the UNFCCC,14 Arab countries have submitted their initialnational communications. None has completedthe second one. The initial national communi-cation of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oilexporter, for unknown reasons, did not containmention of any GHG mitigation efforts. In gen-eral, more efforts are needed to enhance thereporting quality of the national communica-tion reports as they are important vehicles toshowcase the Arab region’s contributions to theinternational efforts to address the climatechange challenge.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above analysis, Arab countries needto enhance the flow and availability of informa-tion on their efforts addressing climate change.This would result in improving policy develop-ment and enhance public awareness. Manypotential areas of Arab-Arab cooperation couldbe identified. These include development of theunder utilized renewable energy resources, use ofCNG as a transport fuel to improve urban airquality while reducing GHG emissions, and tap-ping on the huge potential of carbon sequestra-tion and storage in the oil producing countriesespecially in the GCC. It is recommended thatArab countries commit themselves to adoptnational energy efficiency and renewable energytargets. Most of the Arab countries, especially inthe GCC, need to adopt policies of sustainabletransport. These might include building modernpublic transport systems to improve energy effi-ciency and abate vehicles emissions. The conceptof “green building” should also be promoted andfuture urban expansions should achieve the high-est levels of resources efficiency.


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A Remote Sensing Study of Some Impacts of Global Warming on the Arab Region

31

EMAN GHONEIM

CHAPTER 3

I. INTRODUCTION

Global warming is one of the most serious chal-lenges facing us today. Under the projected cli-mate changes, many parts of the planet willbecome warmer. Droughts, floods and otherforms of extreme weather will become more fre-quent, threatening food supplies, economicassets, and human lives. Plants and animalswhich cannot adapt to the changed weather con-

ditions will die. Sea levels are also rising and willcontinue to do so, forcing millions of people incoastal zones to migrate inland.

This study uses remote sensing techniques todepict the consequences on the Arab world of var-ious climate change impact scenarios, rangingfrom conservative to extreme. It neither attemptsto endorse a specific level of impact, a matter dis-cussed in other chapters of the report, nor attempts

A REMOTE SENSING STUDY OF IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON THE ARAB REGIONCHAPTER 332

SIMULATION OF SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS AT DIFFERENT LEVELSFIGURE 1

to be inclusive of all impacts of climate changewhich can be traced using remote sensing.

In light of the uncertainty surrounding the exactdynamics of climate change and scientific projec-tions, this study takes into account the rangefrom 1 m to 5 m SLR, without ascribing partic-ular likelihoods to any particular value withinthat range; as such, the study seeks more to illu-minate the potential disastrous ramifications of

SLR, whatever the exact SLR will be.

II. IMPACT OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THEARAB COUNTRIES

The past century has witnessed a 17 cm rise inthe sea level (IPCC, 2001) at a mean rate of 1.75mm per year (Miller and Douglas, 2004). TheIPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report published in


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2007 predicted sea-level rise of up to 59 cm by2100, excluding effects of potential dynamicchanges in ice flow (IPCC, 2007). Taking intoaccount the full “likely” range of predictedincreases in temperature, SLR could even beamplified to up to 1.4 m by the year 2100(Rahmstorf, 2007). Other researchers have pre-dicted between 5-6 meters SLR in the event ofthe West Antarctic Ice Sheet collapse (Tol et al.,2006). As an indication of recent upward revi-sion of projected climate change scenarios,Christopher Field, an American member of theIPCC and founding director of the CarnegieInstitution’s Department of Global Ecology atStanford University, said at the annual meetingof the American Association for theAdvancement of Science in February 2009 that

the pace of climate change exceeds predictions, asemissions since 2000 have outpaced the estimatesused in IPCC 2007 report.

Without any doubt, SLR is a global threat. Withvarying predictions on the extent of SLR, basedon different variables which cannot all be fore-seen, there is a near consensus on the need toapply precautionary principles to global warm-ing. This explains why studies of impact, mainlythose carried out by the World Bank, considerSLR scenarios between 1-5 meters. The threatemerges from the fact that a large percentage ofthe earth’s population inhabits vulnerable coastalzones. About 400 million people live within 20km of a coast, worldwide (Gornitz, V., 2000).Worryingly, if the sea level rises by only 1 m, it


SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIO AT 1 METERFIGURE 2

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SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIO AT 2 METERSFIGURE 3

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would affect more than 100 million individuals(Douglas and Peltier, 2002). “The melting orcollapse of ice sheets would eventually threatenland which today is home to 1 in every 20 peo-ple” (Stern, 2006).

The coastal zone of the Arab world is no excep-tion to the threat of SLR. Similar to many partsof the world, capital cities and major towns ofArab countries lie along the coast or on estuaries.Their expansions are extremely rapid and, there-fore, these metropolises are at great risk of SLR.

To view more closely the effect of SLR on theArabian coastline and highlight those countrieswith high potential risk of SLR, a simulation forSLR has been conducted using the Geographical

Information System (GIS) and the Shuttle RadarTopography Mission (SRTM) data. These data,which are widely used in many scientific investi-gations, are considered to comprise the bestDigital Elevation Model (DEM) on a global scalewith consistency and overall accuracy (Suna etal., 2003; Ghoneim and El-Baz, 2007, Ghoneimet al., 2007). Figures 1 to 5 show results of thissimulation.

Under the 1 m SLR scenario, the simulationreveals that approximately 41,500 km2 of the ter-ritory of the Arab countries would be directlyimpacted by the rise of the sea level. Projectedincreases in sea levels will displace a quicklygrowing population into more concentratedareas. At least 37 million people (~11%) will be



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directly affected by SLR of 1 meter. In the case of2, 3 and 4 m SLR scenarios, around 60,000,80,700 and 100,800 km2, respectively, of theArab coastal region will be seriously impacted. Inthe extreme case of 5 m SLR, such impact will beat its highest, as it is estimated that up to 113,000km2 (0.8%) of the coastal territory would beinundated by sea water (Figure 1-5).

Potential impacts of SLR, however, are notuniformly distributed across the Arab region.From Figure 6a it is obvious that the SLRimpact will be particularly severe in some coun-tries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria andMorocco, whereas it will have a lesser impacton others such as Sudan, Syria, and Jordan.

Egypt will be by far the most impacted countryof the Arab world; at least 12 million Egyptianswill be displaced with the 5 m SLR scenario. Infact, approximately one third of the Arab pop-ulation impacted will be from Egypt alone. Atthe nation level, the United Arab Emirates(UAE), Qatar and Bahrain will witness thehighest SLR effect in terms of the percentage ofpopulation at risk from the total country pop-ulation. Here, we project that more than 50%of the population of each country will beimpacted by 5m SLR (Figure 6b). The currentanalysis indicates that Bahrain and Qatarwould experience a significant reduction ofabout 13.4 % and 6.9%, respectively, of theirland as a result of the 5 m SLR scenario.


POPULATION AT RISK AT EXTREME 5 METERS SEA LEVEL RISEFIGURE 6

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III. COASTAL URBANIZATION

There are factors – both human and natural –that might contribute and intensify the impact ofthe SLR. For example, for most parts of the Arabworld, rapid and uncontrolled urbanization isoccurring at a large scale along the vulnerablecoastal areas. Continuation of such urbanizationpatterns will draw still greater populations intothese low-lying hazardous zones and, conse-quently, SLR would most likely have a profoundimpact on the people and on infrastructure devel-opment in the coastal areas of the region.

Monitoring historical changes in urbanizationcan be used to identify future trends in urban

expansion independent from climate change, andtherefore suggest places that will need to betterincorporate climate risks into planning processes.Based on satellite image classification and changedetection analysis of the present study (Figure 7),it is estimated, for example, that in Dubai, urbangrowth (including green areas) has almost tripledits surface area in less than 20 years (between1984 and 2003). With the addition of the newurbanized area of the Dubai Palm Islands project,the percentage of people and infrastructure likelyto be affected by coastal inundation or floodingwill be immense.

In order to estimate the total extent of the areasat risk by SLR in more detail, a Digital


BASED ON SATELLITE IMAGE CLASSIFICATION AND CHANGE DETECTIONANALYSIS, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IN ONE OF THE STUDY SITES IN THE UAE,URBAN GROWTH HAS EXPANDED ALMOST THREE TIMES IN AREA (FROM 78.54KM2 TO 226.11 KM2) DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS (1984 TO 2003). GREEN LANDSOF THE SAME STUDY SITE HAVE ALSO DOUBLED IN THEIR SURFACE AREA (FROM26.62 KM2 TO 47.57 KM2) DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

FIGURE 7

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Elevation Model (DEM), for the coastal zone ofthe three Emirates of Sharjah, Ajman and UmmAl-Quwain, has been constructed from topo-graphic maps. Based on the derived-DEM, itwas found that approximately 332 km2 of theland area of the three Emirates lies below 10 mand is hence highly vulnerable to SLR. Resultsreveal that a projected SLR of 1 m would inun-date approximately 8.1% of the Emirate ofAjman, 1.2% of the Emirate of Sharjah and5.9% of the Emirate of Umm Al-Quwain(Figure 8b). With the 5 meter scenario, theseflooded lands will be increased to reach about24%, 3.2% and 10% for the three Emirates,respectively (Figure 8c).

IV. IMPACT OF SEA LEVEL RISE ONTHE NILE DELTA

In the Arab region, locations that occupy low-lying areas, such as deltaic plains, will face evenmore serious problems due to SLR. River deltasare particularly vulnerable since increases in sealevel are compounded by land subsidence andhuman interference such as sediment trappingby dams (Church et al., 2008). In the Arabworld, the two major deltaic areas are that ofthe Nile River in Egypt and the Tigris and


DIGITAL ELEVATION MODEL OF THE THREE EMIRATES OF SHARJAH, AJMAN ANDUMM AL-QUWAIN WHICH SHOWS THAT A SEA LEVEL RISE OF 1 METER WOULDINUNDATE 1.2% OF SHARJAH, 8.1% OF AJMAN AND 5.9% OF UMM AL-QUWAIN.

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ZERO METER SLRFIGURE 8b

UNDER THE EXTREME CASE OF5 METER SLR SCENARIO, 3.2%OF SHARJAH, 24% OF AJMANAND 10% OF UMM AL-QUWAIN LANDS WOULD BEINUNDATED BY SEA WATER.

FIGURE 8C

Euphrates in Iraq. These locations are highlypopulated areas and among the most importantagricultural lands in the region. As illustratedfrom the computed SLR (see Figure 1), thesetwo areas are regionally the most vulnerable. Infact, impacts will be much bigger when com-bined with increase in the incidence of extremeevents on low-level areas.

The total area of Egypt is slightly over one mil-lion km?, most of which has an arid and hyper-arid climate. Roughly 94% of Egypt’s land massis made up of desert. The fast growing popula-tion, now approaching about 81 million, inhab-its less than 6% of the country’s land area. Thisland area, which is located in the Nile Delta andthe Nile valley, contains the most productiveagricultural land and hence the main foodsource for the entire country. The Nile Delta,which is about 24,900 km2 in area, aloneaccounts for about 65% of Egypt agriculturalland. This delta, once the largest depocenter inthe Mediterranean, is an extreme example of aflat low-lying area at high risk to SLR (El-Raey,1997). The delta is presently retreating due to

accelerating erosion along the coastline. Thishas generally been attributed to both humanand natural factors. The construction of theAswan High Dam (1962) and the entrapmentof a large amount of sediments behind it, inLake Nasser, are major factors causing erosionin the Nile Delta. The entrapment of anotherconsiderable quantity of Nile sediments by theextremely dense network of irrigation anddrainage channels and in the wetland of thenorthern delta has also contributed greatly tothe delta’s erosion (Stanley, 1996). At present,only a little amount of the Nile River sedimentsis carried seaward to replenish the Nile Deltacoast at its northern margin. Even the verysmall remaining amount of the delta sedimentpresently reaching the Mediterranean isremoved by the strong easterly sea currents.

Moreover, the delta’s subsidence of about 1 to5 mm per year (Stanley, 2005), due to both nat-ural causes and heavy groundwater extraction, isinfluencing the coastal erosion tremendously.Such coastal impact is evident in satelliteimages, where coastal erosion can be clearly


LANDSAT SATELLITE IMAGES SHOW VAST COASTAL EROSION IN THE NILE DELTAWITH A RETREATING RATE OF UP TO 100 METERS PER YEAR IN SOME AREAS

FIGURE 9

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seen close to the Rosetta and Damiettapromontories (Figure 9). Analysis of Landsatimages reveals that the promontory of Rosetta,in particular, has lost approximately 9.5 km2 inarea (Figure 9b) and its coastline has retreated 3km inland in only 30 years (1972 - 2003). Thismeans that this part of the delta is retreating atan alarming rate of about 100 m per year.

Under SLR scenarios, much more of the NileDelta will be lost forever. Remote sensing andGIS analysis depict areas of the Nile Delta atrisk of 1 m SLR and the extreme case of 5 mSLR (Figure 10). Based on this figure, it is esti-mated that a sea level rise of only 1 m wouldflood much of the Nile Delta, inundating aboutone third (~34%) of its land, placing importantcoastal cities such as Alexandria, Idku,Damietta and Port-Said at a great risk. In thiscase, it is estimated that about 8.5 % of thenation’s population (~7 million people) will bedisplaced.

In the extreme case of 5 m SLR, more than half(~58%) of the Nile Delta will be facing destruc-tive impacts, which would threaten at least 10major cities (among them Alexandria,Damanhur, Kafr-El-Sheikh, Damietta,Mansura and Port-Said), flooding productiveagricultural lands, forcing about 14% of thecountry’s population (~11.5 million people)into more concentrated areas to the southernregion of the Nile Delta, and thus would con-tribute to worsening their living standards.

V. IMPACT OF URBANIZATION ANDURBAN HEAT ISLAND

The southern part of the Nile Delta is present-ly suffering from the uncontrolled urbanizationof the city of Cairo, the capital city of Egypt.Results of the current investigation show thatthe total built-up area in Cairo has expandedsignificantly over the last few decades. The high


SLR SCENARIOS OF 1-5 METERS IN THE NILE DELTA REGIONFIGURE 10

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economic growth and employment opportuni-ties in this city caused an influx of labour migra-tion. Local increase of population plus migrantscaused the city to expand rapidly and in anuncontrollable fashion. As shown in Figure 11,the Cairo metropolitan area has doubled in sizein less than 20 years (1984-2003). Presently,the city has a population of about 17.5 millionpeople, making it the largest and most populousmetropolitan area in the Arab world.

As Cairo grows outward, a host of problematicissues are raised. The first of these issues is theloss of prime cultivated lands to urban expan-sion and development, due to the increase inhousing demand. Analysis shows that about12% (~62 km2) of the farmland areas in thevicinity of Cairo were lost in 18-year time spanbetween 1984 and 2002 (Figure 12). Manylarge cities of the MENA region (for exampleBeirut, Figures 14 and 15) show the same dis-turbing trend of green cover and agriculturalland loss for urban expansion. Once these landshave been converted to urban use, green areasand agricultural lands are generally lost forever,cutting down the carbon sinks, and in the longterm could cause food scarcity.

Another problematic issue that relates to urban-

ization is the Urban Heat Island effect (UHI),for which the temperatures of central urbanlocations are several degrees higher than thoseof nearby rural areas of similar elevation.


CAIRO METROPOLITAN AREA HAS DOUBLED IN LESS THAN 20 YEARSFIGURE 11

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12% OF THE FARMLANDAREAS IN THE VICINITY OFCAIRO WERE LOST IN 20 YEARS

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RAPID URBAN GROWTH IN CAIRO BETWEEN 1984-2002 CAUSED SIGNIFICANTRISE IN SURFACE TEMPERATURE (SHOWN IN RED COLOR), REFERRED TO ASURBAN HEAT ISLAND (UHI) EFFECT

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Urbanization can have significant effects onlocal weather and climate (Landsberg, 1981),which in turn can contribute greatly to globalwarming. Urban expansion usually arises at theexpense of vegetation cover when open space isconverted to buildings, roads, and other infra-structure. Urban materials used to build thesestructures do not have the same thermal prop-erties as vegetation cover, and consequently, canlargely influence the local urban climate. Theurban geometry of a city can increase surfacetemperatures as well by obstructing air flow andpreventing cooling by convection.

Studies on surface temperature characteristics ofurban areas using satellite remote sensing datahave been conducted primarily using the ther-mal-infrared band from Landsat EnhancedThematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) data. As illus-trated in Figure 13, Cairo shows a significantrise in surface temperature with a general trendof warmer urban areas versus cooler surround-ing cultivated land.

In the future, urban climate change will be ofimportance to a larger and larger number of resi-dents of the Arab world. With such a significantand rising fraction of the Arab world’s populationconcentrated in urban areas, local climatic effectswill be felt by a great number of people.

VI. DUST STORMS IN THE ARAB DESERTS

Aerosol pollution caused by dust storms canmodify cloud properties to reduce or preventprecipitation in the polluted region. Aerosolcontaining black carbon can impact the climateand possibly reduce formation of clouds. Thedecrease in precipitation from clouds affectedby desert dust can cause drier soil, which in turnraises more dust into the air, consequently pro-viding a potential feedback loop to furtherdecrease rainfall. Moreover, anthropogenicchanges of land use exposing the topsoil can ini-tiate such a desertification feedback process.(Rosenfeld et al., 2001)

Urbanization not only increases the local tem-perature but also creates industrial districts thatcause atmospheric pollution and reduce localair quality. With the continuous build-up of cli-mate change emissions in the atmosphere fromunregulated industrial emissions, many desertregions will get hotter and drier in a phenome-non called the amplification effect; that is,already hot and dry places on Earth will becomeeven more so. Consequently, dust storms in thedesert will become more frequent and intense.

Research shows that dust storms are increasing

in frequency in specific parts of the world,including Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Forexample, the annual dust production hadincreased tenfold in the last 50 years in manyparts of North Africa. Dust storms are alsoaccelerating in the Arab region due to the factthat local soil cover is being loosened by off-road vehicles (e.g., the effect of the Iraq wars),livestock grazing, and road development for oiland gas production, particularly in the Gulfregion.


EXPANSION OF URBANIZATION IN COSMOPOLITAN BEIRUT BETWEEN 1984 AND2006: 15.8% OF THE GREEN COVER WAS LOST

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The availability of large and daily coveragesatellite imagery by, for instance, theMODIS Terra and Aqua sensors enable usto monitor dust storms on a daily basis andidentify their main source globally. Forexample, as shown in Figure 16a, a thicksnake of yellowish dust originating from theborder of Iraq with a southwest movingfront can be clearly seen in one of theMODIS-Aqua images (acquired in May2005). This storm is so thick that it hides alarge part of the Red Sea beneath it. Imageclassification accentuates such phenomenaand reveals the mega dimension of such duststorms; Figure 16b shows a storm whichreached up to 1700 km in length. Thisstorm crossed Saudi Arabia and all the waypast the green ribbon of the Nile Valley tothe western desert of Egypt.

Another example of a mega dust-storm iscaptured by a MODIS-Terra image(acquired in May 2004). Here, a thick pallof sand and dust can be seen blown out fromthe Iranian Desert over the Gulf and engulf-ing Kuwait, the eastern coast of SaudiArabia, Bahrain, Qatar and United ArabEmirates (see Figure 16a).


16(a), LEFT: A MODIS-AQUA IMAGERY SHOWS A MEGA DUST STORMORIGINATING FROM IRAQ IN 2005 16(a), RIGHT: A MODIS-TERRA IMAGERYILLUSTRATES A THICK PALL OF SAND AND DUST BLOWING FROM THE IRANIANDESERT IN 2004 16(b): SATELLITE IMAGE CLASSIFICATION DEMONSTRATES THEMEGA DIMENSION OF A DUST STORM THAT REACHED 1700 KM IN LENGTH. THISSTORM CROSSED SAUDI ARABIA PAST THE GREEN RIBBON OF THE NILE VALLEYTO THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

FIGURES

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VII. CONCLUSION

In the Arab world, segments of coastal areas areimportant and highly populated centres of indus-try, manufacturing and commerce. With its near-ly 34,000 km of coastline, the Arab world is sus-ceptible to sea level rise. The potential exposure ofmany of its countries and cities such asAlexandria, Dubai and many more to the impactof sea level rise may be fairly significant, based ontoday’s socio-economic condition in coastal areas.After accounting for future development andpopulation growth in these regions, sea level risehas been shown to pose important policy ques-tions regarding present and future developmentplans and investment decisions.

Notably, urbanized sandy coasts have been exten-sively cited as particularly vulnerable if futuredevelopment is concentrated close to the shore-line and if sensitive ecosystems exist in close prox-imity to these urbanized areas. Such regions willexperience problems such as inundation, coastalerosion and impeded drainage. Moreover, thecontinuing rapid and dense urban developmentof many areas in the Arab world would result in adramatic alteration of the land surface, as naturalvegetation is removed and replaced by non-evap-orating, non-transpiring surfaces. Under such cir-cumstances, surface temperature of these areaswill rise by several degrees. On the long term,such urban Heat Island effect (UHI) could havesevere negative consequences on the local weatherof the Arab region, which in turn would con-tribute significantly to global warming.

Furthermore, the increasing frequency of duststorms is one of the serious environmental chal-lenges facing the Arab region. Such storms wouldinduce soil loss, decrease of precipitation and agri-cultural productivity, dramatic reduction of airquality and ultimately affect humanhealth.Although it seems that we are not totally preparedto face all such destructive effects of the SLR, UHIand dust storms, recent advances in remote sens-ing, increased availability of high resolution spaceimagery and the accessibility to more detaileddatasets of digital elevation, population and landcover-use, have all the potential to provideimproved surveillance of such negative effects andtheir associated impacts on the entire Arab world.Such observational data can then be used as a solidbasis upon which policies could be made.


Church, J.A., N.J. White, T. Aarup, W.S. Wilson, P.L.Woodworth, C.M. Domingues, J.R. Hunter, and K.Lambeck, K. (2008). ‘Understanding global sea levels:past, present and future’. Sustainability Science, 3 (1):1-167.

Douglas, B., R. Peltier, (2002). ‘The puzzle of globalsea level rise’. Physics Today, 55 (3): 35-39.

El-Raey, A. (1997).’ Vulnerability assessment of thecoastal zone of the Nile delta of Egypt, to the impactsof sea level rise’. Ocean & Coastal Management, 37(1): 29-40.

Ghoneim, E. (2008). ‘Optimum groundwater locationsin the northern Unites Arab Emirates’. InternationalJournal of Remote Sensing, 29 (20): 5879-5906.

Ghoneim, E. and El-Baz, F. (2007). ‘The application ofradar topographic data to mapping of a mega-paleodrainage in the Eastern Sahara’. Journal of AridEnvironments, 69: 658-675

Ghoneim, E., C. Robinson, and F. El-Baz, (2007).‘Relics of ancient drainage in the eastern Sahararevealed by radar topography data’. InternationalJournal of Remote Sensing, 28 (8): 1759-1772

Gornitz, V. (2000). Coastal Populations, Topography,and Sea Level Rise. NASA GISS, Science Briefs.

IPCC (2001). Climate Change 2001: Synthesis report,by R. Watson and the Core Writing Team (eds.)Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: The PhysicalScience Basis. Summary for Policymakers. WorkingGroup I of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange.

Landsberg, H.E. (1981). The Urban Climate. NewYork: Academic Press.

Miller, L., and B. Douglas (2004). ‘Mass and volumecontributions to twentieth-century global sea levelrise’. Nature, 428: 406-409.

Rahmstorf, S. (2007). ‘A Semi-Empirical Approach toProjecting Future Sea-Level Rise’. Science, 315: 368-370.

Rosenfeld, F., Y. Rudich, and R. Lahav, (2001).‘Desert dust suppressing precipitation: A possibledesertification feedback loop’. Geophysics, 98 (11):5975-5980.

Stanley, J.D. (1996). ‘Nile Delta: Extreme case ofsediment entrapment on a delta plain and consequentcoastal land loss’. Marine Geology, 129: 189-195.

Stanley, J.D. (2005). ‘Submergence and burial ofancient coastal sites on the subsiding Nile deltamargin, Egypt’. Méditerranée, 104: 65-73.

REFERENCES


Images produced and analyzed for AFED 2009 Reportby E. Ghoneim at the Center for Remote Sensing,Boston University.

NOTE

Stern, Nicholas (2006). Stern Review on theEconomics of Climate Change. Report to the PrimeMinister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on theEconomics of Climate Change. UK.

Suna, G., K.J. Ranson, V.I. Kharuk, and K. Kovac(2003), ‘Validation of surface height from shuttle radartopography mission using shuttle laser altimeter’.Remote Sensing of Environment, 88: 401-411.

Tol, R.S.J., M. Bohn, T.E. Downing, M.L. Guillerminet,E. Hizsnyik, R. Kasperson, K. Lonsdale, C. Mays, andCo-authors (2006). ‘Adaptation to five metres of sea-level rise’, Journal of Risk Research, 9: 467-482.

47

MOHAMED EL-RAEY

CHAPTER 4

Impact of Climate Change: Vulnerability and Adaptation

Coastal Areas

I. INTRODUCTION

Arab countries are situated in a hyper-arid to aridregion with some pockets of semi-arid areas. Theregion is characterized by an extremely harshenvironment, with issues including scarcity ofwater resources, very low precipitation, low biodi-versity, excessive exposure to extreme events, anddesertification.

The Arab region consists of 22 countries who areall members of the League of Arab States (LAS),10 in Africa and 12 in West Asia. It enjoysextended coastal zones on the Mediterranean Sea,the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Atlantic Sea wherelarge percentages of the population live in a num-ber of highly populated economic centres. Inaddition, growth trends of both population andtourism in the coastal areas have been wellobserved (Massoud et al., 2003).

In 2003 the total population of the region

reached 305 million, giving the region 4.7% ofthe world’s population. Over the last two decades,the population grew at an average rate of 2.6%per annum, with an increase in the total urbanpopulation from 44% to almost 54%.Meanwhile, the development and poverty situa-tions in the region are highly uneven and povertyis a serious problem in many Arab countries.Almost 85 million people are below the povertyline of $2/day, accounting for almost 30% of theregion’s total population in 2000 (LAS, 2006).

As a result of increasing populations and theexpansion of tourism, unplanned urbanizationand industrialization of almost all coastal centreshave been observed at high rates. The need forefficient transportation systems and a shortage ofstrategic planning, low awareness and lawenforcement have significantly contributed toincreasing pollution and a deterioration of thequality of life in many population centres.The marine side of the coastal zones of Arab

COASTAL AREAS CHAPTER 448

THE ESTIMATED AREA, COASTLINE AND THE POPULATION WITHIN 100KM OF THE COAST (%)TABLE 1

Sources: Modified after: (WRI/EarthTrend*, 2000); The World Fact Book**, 2006; Encyclopedia Britannica1; POPIN***, 2006, (WRI/EarthTrend,****,2000)

Country Area (Km2)* Coastline Population/1000*** Population Population within (Km)** Growth (%)*** 100 km of coast (%)

in 2000****Bahrain 740 590 753 1.8 100Iraq 435,052 58 28,993 - 5.7Kuwait 17,818 499 2,851 2.5 100Oman 309,500 2,092 4,017 2.2 -Qatar 11,427 563 2,595 1.8 88.5United Arab Emirates 83,600 1,318 4,380 2.3 84.9Saudi Arabia 2,250,000 2,640 24,735 2.4 30.3Djibouti 23,200 370 833 1.6 100Jordan 92,300 26 5,924 3.2 29Somalia 637,657 3,025 8,699 3.1 54.8Sudan 2,505,000 853 38,560 2.1 2.8Comoro 2,236 340 839 2.2 100Yemen 555,000 1,906 22,389 3.1 63.5Egypt 1,002,000 2,450 75,498 1.8 53.1Palestine (Gaza Strip) 27,000 40 841 - 100Lebanon 10,452 225 4,099 1.1 100Syria 185,180 193 19,929 2.4 34.5Algeria 2,381,741 998 33,858 1.5 68.8Libya 1,775,000 1,770 6,160 1.9 78.7Mauritania 1,030,700 754 3,124 2.7 39.6Morocco 710,850 1,835 31,224 1.2 65.1Tunisia 165,150 1,148 10,327 1.0 84TOTAL 14,211,603 22,105 262,628,000

countries is considered rich in its marine biologi-cal resources including a high biodiversity of fish-eries, coral reefs and mangrove ecosystems. As aresult, the coastal zone has been a very importantasset for the attraction of national and interna-tional tourism and an important contributor tonational economies.

The Arab region is therefore considered amongthe world’s most vulnerable regions to the adverseimpacts of climate change; it will be especiallyexposed to diminished agricultural productivity,higher likelihood of drought and heat waves,long-term dwindling of water supplies, loss ofcoastal low-lying areas and considerable implica-tions on human settlements and socioeconomicsystems (IPCC, 2007). Specifically, the impact ofsea level rise (SLR) is considered serious for manyof the Arab countries (e.g. Agrawala et al., 2004;Dasgupta et al., 2007).

Table 2 presents a comparison of the vulnerabili-ty of the coastal zone among various regions ofthe world according to specific indicators(Dasgupta et al., 2007)

While the land area of the Middle East and NorthAfrica region would be less impacted by SLR thanthe developing world generally (0.25% vs. 0.31%

with a 1m SLR), all other indicators suggest moresevere impacts of SLR in this region. In particu-lar, with a 1m SLR, 3.2% of its population wouldbe impacted (vs. 1.28% worldwide), 1.49% of itsGDP (vs. 1.30% worldwide), 1.94% of its urbanpopulation (vs. 1.02% worldwide), and 3.32% ofits wetlands (vs. 1.86% worldwide) (Dasgupta etal., 2007).

On the institutional side, some of the Arab coun-tries have established environmental regulationsfor the protection and preservation of theircoastal resources. However, without buildingstrong capabilities for monitoring, assessment andlaw enforcement, it is expected that the deteriora-tion of coastal resources will continue. Impacts ofclimate change and sea level rise in particular,should be added to the list of deterioration issuesof main concern.

Although some Arab countries such as Lebanon,Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeriaand others have already started assessing their vul-nerability to climate change in cooperation withthe international community, international sup-port is strongly required to include these issues inthe national policies and strategies of all the Arabcountries. The objective of this review is to present a gener-


A COMPARISON OF IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON INDICATORS OF VARIOUSREGIONS, IN PERCENTAGE TERMS

TABLE 2

Source: Dasgupta et al., 2007

World LA MENA SSA EA SAIndicators

1m SLRArea 0.31 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.52 0.29Population 1.28 0.57 3.20 0.45 1.97 0.45GDP 1.30 0.54 1.49 0.23 2.09 0.55Urban extent 1.02 0.61 1.94 0.39 1.71 0.33Ag. extent 0.39 0.33 1.15 0.04 0.83 0.11Wetlands 1.86 1.35 3.32 1.11 2.67 1.59

5m SLRArea 1.21 1.24 0.63 0.48 2.30 1.65Population 5.57 2.69 7.49 2.38 8.63 3.02GDP 6.05 2.38 3.91 1.42 10.20 2.85Urban extent 4.68 3.03 4.94 2.24 8.99 2.72Ag. extent 2.10 1.76 3.23 0.38 4.19 1.16Wetlands 7.30 6.57 7.09 4.70 9.57 7.94LA: Latin America and Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; EA: East Asia;

SA: South Asia.

al survey of the vulnerability of the coastalresources in the Arab region and to identify andexplore the need for proactive policies and meas-ures for adaptation, and institutional capabilitiesfor monitoring, assessment and upgrading ofawareness.

II. MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCESIN THE ARAB REGION

From the coastal point of view, the Arab regioncould be divided into three major sub-regions.The following sections provide a brief overview ofeach.

The Mediterranean North African Sub Region

The Mediterranean is virtually an enclosed seabounded by Europe, Africa and Asia. It has a sur-face area of 2.5 million km2. The total length ofthe Mediterranean coastline is about 46,000km,of which 19,000km represent island coastlines. Itis characterized by a relatively high degree of bio-logical diversity. Its fauna is characterized by

many endemic species and is considerably richerthan that of the Atlantic Ocean for instance. Thecontinental shelf is very narrow and the coastalmarine areas are rich ecosystems. The centralzones of the Mediterranean are low in nutrientsbut coastal zones benefit from telluric nutrientsthat support higher levels of productivity. Amongthe ecosystems that occupy coastal marine areas,the rocky intertidal estuaries, and, above all, sea-grass meadows are of significant ecological value(UNEP, 2007).

In addition to its critical position at the middleof highly populated continents and its pleasantweather during summer, the MediterraneanSea is an important destiny for tourism. Inaddition, being in the middle of trade betweeneast and west it became an important trafficroute for ships. The sandy extended beaches oflow elevation on most of its coasts off of NorthAfrica attract tourism from all over the region.In addition, the gradual development of largeeconomic and industrial centres of Arab coun-tries such as the cities of Alexandria, Port Said,Damietta, Benghazi, Tunis, Casablanca andBeirut helped the development of industry and


POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE OVER THE ARAB REGION. NOTE THE VULNERABILITY OF THENILE DELTA, IRAQ, GULF COUNTRIES AS WELL AS NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

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tourism among Arab and European countriesof the region.

The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Sub-region

The Red Sea has a surface area of about 450,000km2 and varies in width from 30 to 280 kilome-tres. It has an average depth of about 500m, withextensive shallow shelves well known for theirmarine life and corals. The southern entrance atBab-el-Mandab is only 130m deep, whichrestricts water exchange of water between the RedSea and the Gulf of Aden (Gerges, 2002), hencethe sea is vulnerable to increasing pollution byland-based sources from surrounding countries aswell as the heavy shipping traffic through this pas-sage. The Red Sea is also considered a veryimportant water way for oil from the Gulf areathrough the Suez Canal to Europe.

Resources of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are asource of economic, social and cultural prosperi-ty, providing subsistence and commercial foodsupplies, as well as domestic and internationaltourist destinations. They also provide a strategi-cally important transport route for shipping(especially petroleum products) and trading ofrich and varied cultural heritage. Together, theyare also a globally significant repository of marineand coastal biodiversity, having the highest biodi-versity of any enclosed sea.

The Red Sea is a rich and diverse ecosystem. Itcontains fairly distinct faunal species subsets,many of which are unique. Approximately 6.3%of the coral species are endemic to the Red Sea.Mangrove and seagrass communities are animportant feature of the coastal areas and providesignificant productivity and input of nutrients.Inshore, halophytic salt marsh vegetation andsabkhas (seasonally flooded low-lying coastalplains) cover much of the coast (Gerges, 2002).

The Red Sea is characterized by its high biodiver-sity of marine habitats, life, corals and sea grass. Ittherefore attracts tourism from all over the worldall year around. A large number of highly popu-lated resorts and diving centres have been estab-lished with a variety of tourism services. Tourismcentres have been established at many coastalareas along the Red Sea including the Gulf ofSuez and Gulf of Aqaba. In addition, large tourist

and economic cities such as Sharm El Sheikh andHurghada as well as a number of industrial citiessuch as Suez, Jeddah and Aqaba are situated alongits coast.

The ROPME Gulf Sub-region

The ROPME Gulf sub-region has a surface areaof 239,000 km2, a mean depth of 36 m, and anaverage volume of 8,630,000 km3. Because of therelative shallowness and water clarity of thecoastal areas, the Gulf supports highly productivecoastal habitats, such as the extensive intertidalmudflats, seagrass and algae beds, mangroves andcoral reefs (Munawar, 2002). The most pressingenvironmental concerns include the decline ofseawater quality, degradation of marine andcoastal environments, coral bleaching and coastalreclamation (ROPME, 2004).

The sub-region is also extremely rich in terms ofmarine life, and it hosts many good fishinggrounds, extensive coral reefs, and abundant pearloysters. It has come under pressures from fasturbanization and industrialization. In particular,petroleum spillages during the recent wars andconflicts have placed severe stresses on the region.

III. ISSUES OF MAIN CONCERN

The Arab world’s coastal regions suffer from anumber of important environmental problemsincluding:

• Population growth, unemployment andshortage of awareness

Population growth rates in the coastal regions aremuch higher than those in other regions, whichare already high. The shortage of employmentopportunities is the main concern of many of theArab countries not only because of the low capac-ities but also of the shortage of specialized experts.

• Unplanned Urbanization

Many Arab coastal cities are expanding at highrates, without due consideration to planning forfuture needs. Many slum areas are being createdwith associated shortages of adequate sanitationand socioeconomic problems. In addition, theshortage of proper land use planning has createdmany problems of services and overconsumption.


Large scale structures have been built on many ofthe coastal areas without due consideration to thepotential impacts of sea level rise.

• Pollution and water scarcity

Excessive domestic and industrial pollution ischaracteristic of many coastal cities in the Arabregion. Even though there are many laws andregulations against domestic and industrial pol-

lution, very limited control is actually exercisedbecause of the lack of institutional capabilitiesfor monitoring and control.

Moreover, the situation of water scarcity that pre-vails over the region has been a decisive political,geographic and domestic factor in the region’sdevelopment. Contamination of ground waterand impacts of wastewater are widespread inmany rural areas.


A COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON LAND AREASOF ARAB COUNTRIES

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A COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE GDP OFARAB COUNTRIES

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Source: Dasgupta et al., 2007 Note: Countries not mentioned did not provide data

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• Shortage of institutional capabilitiesfor management

This is truly the main problem, as institutionalmanagement capabilities are needed for properassessment and control of pollution as well asother unplanned and illegal activities. There isvery limited information on land subsidence,especially in areas where extraction of petroleumhas been going on for a long time. There is nomonitoring of ground water salinity or soil salin-ity.

• Low elevation land and land subsi-dence

The spreading of low elevation areas on thecoastal zone constitutes a major source for the riskof inundation. This is a common problem in theNile Delta region and many of the coastal touris-tic cities such as Alexandria, Benghazi,Casablanca, Jeddah and Dubai. Land subsidenceincreases this risk, but it is not well monitored inmany of the coastal areas of the Arab coasts wherehuge extractions of oil and gases are taking place.


A COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE WETLANDSOF ARAB COUNTRIES FIGURE 5

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A COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONOF ARAB COUNTRIES

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• Lack of data and information

The near lack of data and information on variousaspects of vulnerabilities along the coastal zone isanother characteristic of the region. Very limitedtime series data are available on extreme events,changing sea level, ground water salinity and landsubsidence in the coastal regions.

IV. VULNERABILITY OF THE ARABCOASTAL ZONE TO IMPACTS OF CLI-MATE CHANGE

Very limited studies of the integrated impactsof climate change on the Arab coastal zones areavailable; however, there are a number of scat-tered studies on some cities (e.g. Sestini, 1991;

El Raey et al., 1995). In addition, many Arabcountries have submitted their initial commu-nications to the UNFCCC with a somewhatpreliminary overview of their vulnerabilities.However, a recent study carried out by theWorld Bank for developing countries hasstressed the vulnerability of the Arab regionand has estimated percentage potential impactsof sea level rise on countries of the region(Dasgupta et al., 2007). Figures 2 through 5present the results of this comparison of vulner-abilities of various sectors of countries of theregion due to a sea level rise of 1m and 5m.While a sea level rise of more than 1m is a mostunlikely scenario (in this author’s point ofview), a comparison of percentage impactsamong certain countries and across sectors inthe region is nonetheless very useful to consid-


COASTAL EROSION CHANGES AS OBSERVED FROM ANALYSIS OF SATELLITE IMAGES MORE THAN 30YEARS.

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Special analysis carried out for AFED Report by E. Ghoneim at the Center of Remote Sensing, Boston University

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er for planning.

The World Bank study clearly shows that Qatarwill be the most impacted country by sea levelrise in terms of the percentage of vulnerable landarea and in terms of the percentage of wetlandaffected by sea level rise. Egypt will be the mostimpacted from the points of view of percentageimpact on GDP and agricultural production.

Some specific sub-regional details are presentedbelow:

Mediterranean Sea countries

The Nile Delta region and the cities ofAlexandria, Rosetta and Port Said and theirvicinity are undoubtedly the most vulnerableareas in the North African region (e.g., El Raeyet al., 1995; El Raey, 1997a). The Nile Deltaregion is vulnerable to the direct risk of inun-dation of low land areas and the coastal areas

already below sea level and it is also vulnerableto salt water intrusion and increasing soil salin-ity of agricultural land. It is estimated that apopulation of over six million people lives inthese vulnerable areas and these may have tomove away and abandon these areas. Notingthat the Nile Delta region produces over 60%of the agricultural production of Egypt and theabove mentioned cities host more than 50% ofthe industrial and economic activities of thecountry, it is expected that the potential lossesin Egypt will be extremely high if no action istaken.

One of the most important coastal problems iscoastal erosion, which is also expected to changedue to alterations of the coastal circulation pat-tern in the region due to climate changes. Figure6 shows the dynamics of coastal erosion in thehighly vulnerable region of Rosetta city and itsvicinity. The rates of coastal erosion of theRosetta promontory, for instance, due to losses of


THE VULNERABILITY OF THE NILE DELTA REGION TO THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OFSEA LEVEL RISE.

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A SEA LEVEL RISE EXPLORER IMAGE ILLUSTRATING THE VULNERABILITY OF MANY OFTHE ARAB GULF STATES AS WELL AS IRAQ TO POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE

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Source: Sea Level Rise Explorer, 2009

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE COASTAL ZONE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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silt after the establishment of the Aswan HighDam, exceeded 50m/year. These rates are expect-ed to increase due to sea level rise.

In addition, negative impacts of climate changeon various aspects of trading in the region such asexport, Suez Canal revenue, migration of poorcommunities and socioeconomic implicationsare also expected.

The deltaic plain of the Medjerda River inTunisia is another example of an area vulnerableto a rising sea level. In addition, there are severalother vulnerable low land areas near the cities ofBenghazi in Libya, Casablanca in Morocco andNouakchott in Mauritania .

The ROPME and Gulf Countries

The Gulf is highly vulnerable at its northern tipnorth of Kuwait and south of Iraq (Shatt elArab). According to results presented in the SeaLevel Rise Explorer (2009) shown in Figure 8, itis clear that despite the limited coastline of Iraqon the ROPME Gulf region, the vulnerable lowland areas extend as far inland as near Baghdad.

The coastal areas of all Arab Gulf states are high-ly vulnerable to the potential impacts of sea level

rise; this is most worrying given that very limitedinformation is available on land subsidence dueto oil and gas extraction in this region. In addi-tion, many of the large and small islands in theGulf region are highly vulnerable to the impactsof sea level rise.

Bahrain is among those highly vulnerable islands.Figure 10 shows the projected impacts of sea levelrise estimated based on analysis of satelliteimages; almost 11% of the land area of the king-dom will be lost due to sea level rise of 50 cm ifno action is taken for protection (Al Janeid et al.,2008).

Red Sea Countries

Encouraged by its oil resources, the attractivemarine life and the favourable climate, major oiland tourist industries have evolved on the coastsof the Red Sea. Tourism here is based mainly onthe coral reef, sea grass, mangrove communitiesand associated rich marine life. Protectorateshave been established by the Egyptian authoritiesin the Sinai Peninsula along the Gulf of Aqabaand huge infrastructure has also been establishedby many countries in the region.

The coastal tourist industry in Egypt is booming

ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF VARIOUS SCENARIOS OF SLR ON THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN FIGURE 10

Source: Al Janeid et al., 2007

and large expanses have been developed intobeach resorts. The most intensively developedtourist areas on the Red Sea are the cities of

Sharm El Sheikh and Hurghada. Significanttourist development has also taken place at manyminor towns on the Gulf of Aqaba coast as wellas at Safaga and Quseir on the Egyptian Red Seacoast, and the northern sector of the Gulf ofSuez. To an extent this has probably exceededcarrying capacities of the area. Evidence of reefdegradation due to tourism and other activities isclear even in areas such as the Ras MohammadNational Park in Egypt (El Shaer et al., 2009).Large recreational cities and centres have beendeveloped in Saudi Arabia along the Jeddahcoastline.

Saudi Arabia lies at the crossroads of three conti-nents, Europe, Asia and Africa. It extends from

the Red Sea on the west with a coast of 1,760 kmlong, to the Gulf on the east with a 650 km longcoast. More than 50 percent of the population ofSaudi Arabia lives within 100 km of the Saudicoastline. The coastal region houses cities, towns,and myriads of factories and processing plants.The interface between the land and sea is themain site for the import and export of goods andservices essential for the wellbeing and economicprosperity of the country. The coastline is thelocation of desalination plants that supply thebulk of the country’s drinking water, oil refiner-ies and petrochemical factories, and a number ofcement plants in addition to a growing recre-ational and tourism industry (Saudi Arabia InitialNational Communication, UNFCCC).

Because of the great length of the Saudi Arabiancoastline, only vulnerable industrial and populat-ed coastal zone cities that could be affected bySLR have been mentioned. On the eastern coastof Saudi Arabia along the Gulf, Dammam, RasTanura, Jubail and Khafji have been selected asthe most vulnerable coastal zone areas. On thewestern coast, along the Red Sea, Jeddah,Rabigh, Yanbu and Jizan have been selected asthe most vulnerable coastal areas.

In general, the coastal zone problems are alreadycritical in many parts of the Red Sea and Gulf ofAden. The potential impacts of the predictedglobal changes will be diverse and important forhuman populations. The major impacts will fol-low from one or more of the following mecha-nisms: shoreline retreat; flooding and flood risk;direct exposure to coastal environment; andsaline intrusion and seepage (Tawfiq, 1994).

It is expected that in the absence of strong insti-tutional systems for monitoring, a shortage ofawareness, and inadequate law enforcementcapabilities, the coastal resources in the Red Seawill continue deteriorating and that the lossesdue to climate changes in the region will be farless than those due to human activities.

V. EXTREME EVENTS

The Arab region is well known to suffer fromextreme events of many types: earthquakes,droughts, flash floods, dust storms, storm surgesand heat waves. The damage associated with


NATURAL PROTECTORATES ESTABLISHED IN THESINAI PENINSULA ON THE GULF OF AQABA ANDGULF OF SUEZ

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many of these extreme events has not been wellquantified. Recently, some areas have beenexposed to volcanic activities (Saudi Arabia), andsome others are exposed to snowing in the mid-dle of the desert (Algeria, private communica-tion). It is also well known that many extremeevents are affected by El Niño and/or the ENSOphenomenon. Two examples of cases with excep-tional floods resulting in extensive material andhuman damage are presented below (e.g.,Agoumi, 2003):

• Climate-related disaster in Algeria inNovember 2001

Extreme rainfall equivalent to an entire month ofrain in several hours was recorded, and windspeeds reached 120 kilometres per hour. Most ofthe damage was concentrated in Algiers wherethis extreme event claimed 751 victims andcaused damage estimated at US$300 million.There were 24,000 displaced persons and morethan 2,700 homes were severely damaged.Between 40,000 and 50,000 persons lost theirhomes and nearly 109 roads were damaged.Despite being forecast by Algerian and foreignweather services the magnitude of the human andmaterial damage was categorized as one of themost severe in the past 40 years.

• Climatic disaster in Morocco inNovember 2002

Morocco experienced some of the worst floodingin its history, with considerable material andhuman damage. Initial estimates put the damageat 63 dead, 26 missing, and dozens wounded,while 24 houses collapsed and 373 were flooded.Hundreds of hectares of agricultural land weredamaged; hundreds of heads of livestock sweptaway, and industrial plants sustained severe dam-age. The most important refinery in the kingdom(SAMIR) caught fire, leading to more thanUS$300 million in losses. This wet, rainy yearfollowed several dry or partially dry years.

Severe dust storms have been well known in theArab region for quite some time. However, theseverity of damage and the frequency of occur-rence have been observed to increase (UNISDR,2009). Figure 13 shows the trajectory of theKhamasin storms of North Africa and Figures 14aand 14b represent examples of satellite images and

ground observations of these dust storms.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate many ofthese extreme events by increasing their severityand frequency. New evidence also suggests thatclimate change is likely to change the nature ofmany types of hazards, not only hydro-meteoro-logical events such as floods, windstorms, anddroughts, but also events such as landslides, heatwaves and disease outbreaks, influencing notonly the intensity, but also the duration andmagnitude of these events. Most of these extremeevents cross coastal boundaries and are known tobe regional in nature.


DISTRIBUTION OF COASTAL CITIES OF SAUDIARABIA ALONG THE RED SEA AND THE GULF

FIGURE 12

TRAJECTORY OF KHAMASIN SAND STORM FROMNORTH AFRICA TOWARDS THE EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN

FIGURE 13

Source: Abdelkader et al., 2009


The output of research suggests that there is goodreason to be concerned about the dynamic, non-linear and uncertain relationships between cli-mate variability, climate change, and extremeevents, and their implications for human securi-ty.

The Arab region is not immune to other extremeevents such as cyclones, hurricanes and tsunamis.The latest events, cyclone Gonu in Oman andthe flood in Yemen, were very recent and clearlyillustrate the importance of development of earlywarning signs that require the adoption of poli-cies and measures for preparedness and riskreduction.

A recent analysis been carried out by Dasgupta etal. (2009) studied the potential impacts ofincreasing frequencies and severities of stormsurges based on best available data of humanpopulation, socioeconomic conditions, the pat-tern of land use and available Shuttle RadarTopography Mission (SRTM) coastal elevationdata. The results indicated that storm surgeintensification would cause additional GDP loss-es (above the current 1-in-100-year referencestandard) in the Middle East and North Africa of$12.7billion. The increase in impact on agricul-tural areas is significant for the MENA region,mainly because Egyptian and Algerian croplandin surge zones would increase from the existingestimated 212 km2 to approximately 900 km2

with SLR and intensified storm surges. The per-centage increase in surge regions for MENAcountries are shown in Figure 15.

VI. ADAPTATION MEASURES

Although the Arab region does not contributemore than 4.5% of world greenhouse gas emis-sions, it is among the most vulnerable regions inthe world to the potential impacts of climatechanges. The Arab countries therefore have tofollow strong programs for adaptation of all sec-tors. Adaptation measures should include at least:

• Carrying out a detailed vulnerability assessmentusing high resolution satellite imagery andrecent Digital Elevation Models (DEM) to assessvulnerable areas and identify vulnerable stake-holders given scenarios of SLR of the IPCC andtaking into consideration land subsidence.

A SAHARAN DUST STORM OBSERVED BY A SATEL-LITE CROSSING THE MEDITERRANEAN ANDIMPACTING THE WHOLE REGION

FIGURE 14(a)

AN EXAMPLE OF A DUST STORM ON A SAUDIARABIAN INDUSTRIAL FACILITY

FIGURE 14(b)

• Establishing an institutional system for riskreduction for integrating and coordinatingresearch and carrying out training on thenational and regional scales.

• Establishing strong monitoring systems forcoastal zone indicators and law enforcement.Developing a database for national and region-al indicators of climate change

• Developing a Regional Circulation Model(RCM) for the impact of climate change onMENA countries and the Red Sea. Buildingcapacities and reducing uncertainties of predic-tions

• Adopting an integrated coastal zonemanagement approach to protect coastalresources with special reference to expectationsof future severities and increasing frequenciesof extreme events

• Adopting a proactive planning approach anddeveloping policies and adaptation programsfor no regret planning, protection of the lowland areas in the coastal region and coastalcities in the Nile Delta, Tunisia, Mauritaniaand Gulf region, exchanging experiences andsuccess stories.

• Upgrading awareness of decision makers onstrategic aspects and developing employmentopportunities for vulnerable groups.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter has shown that the coastal areas in

the Arab region are highly vulnerable to thepotential impacts of climate change. Proactiveaction needs to be taken, both in terms ofexpanding knowledge and cooperation, andimplementing mitigation and adaptation poli-cies. The main conclusions and recommenda-tions are listed below:

• Although all of the Arab countries do not con-tribute more than 4.5% to the total emissionsof GHGs, the coastal zones of most of themare highly vulnerable to the potential impactsof sea level rise and the expected increasedseverity and frequency of extreme events.

• Even though some of the Arab countries haveestablished institutional capabilities for themitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, nonehas established such systems for adaptationand self protection.

• Excluding Tunisia and Morocco, no integrat-ed national strategic action plans have beenestablished for the vulnerable countries.

• A strategic assessment and risk reduction ofclimate change impacts must be carried out asa joint effort through the League of ArabStates.

• An early warning system of tsunamis for theMediterranean and the Gulf regions must beestablished through satellite systems.

• Proactive planning and protection policiesand measures should be initiated for vulnera-ble sectors with particular emphasis on thecoastal zone.


PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF SURGE REGIONS MENAFIGURE 15

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Abdulkader M. A., M. Al Kuisi, H. Abul Khair (2009).‘Characterization of the Khamaseen (spring) dust inJordan’. Atmospheric Environment, 43: 2868ñ2876.

Agoumi, A. (2003). ‘Vulnerability of North AfricanCountries to Climatic Changes: Adaptation andImplementation Strategies for Climate Change’. IISD,Climate Change Knowledge Network.

Agrawala, S., A. Moehner, M. El Raey, D. Conway, M.van Aalst, M. Hagenstad and J. Smith (2004).Development And Climate Change In Egypt: Focus OnCoastal Resources And The Nile. Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development.COM/ENV/EPOC/DCD/DAC(2004)1/FINAL

Al-Janeid, S., M. Bahnacy, S. Nasr, and M. El Raey(2008). ‘Vulnerability assessment of the impact of sealevel rise on the Kingdom of Bahrain’. Mitigation andAdaptation Strategies for Global Change, 13(1): 87-104

Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, C. Meisner, and J. Yan(2007). The impact of Sea Level Rise on DevelopingCountries: A Comparative Study. World Bank PolicyResearch Working Paper 4136, February 2007.

Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, S. Murray and D. Wheeler(2009). Sea-Level Rise and Storm Surges: AComparative Analysis of Impacts in DevelopingCountries. World Bank, Policy Research WorkingPaper 4901.

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El-Raey, M., Y. Fouda and S. Nasr (1997a). ‘GISAssessment of the vulnerability of Rosetta area, Egyptto the impacts of sea level rise’. Journal ofEnvironmental Monitoring, 47: 59-77.

El-Raey, M. (1997b). ‘Vulnerability assessment of thecoastal zone of the Nile Delta, Egypt, to the impacts ofsea level rise’. Ocean and Coastal Management,37(1): 29-40.

El Shaer, H., B. Salem and M. El-Raey (2009).‘Towards evaluating the natural resources to supportland use decisions using remote sensing techniques:Case Study: Ras Mohammed National Park’. Inpreparation

Frihy, O., S. Nasr, M. El Hattab and M. El-Raey(1994). ‘Remote sensing of beach erosion alongRosetta promontory’, International Journal of RemoteSensing, 15: 1649 -1660

Gerges, M. A. (2002). ‘The Red Sea and Gulf of AdenAction Plan ’Facing the challenges of an ocean gate-way’. Ocean and Coastal Management 45: 885ñ903

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Nasr, S., A.F. Abdel Kader, H. El Gamily and M. El-Raey (1997). ‘Coastal zone geomorphology of RasMohamed, Red Sea, Egypt.’ Journal of CoastalResearch 13(1):134-140

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REFERENCES


63

AYMAN F. ABOU HADID

CHAPTER 5


Food Production

I. INTRODUCTION

Food security in the Arab world has experienceda long history of environmental and socio-eco-nomic pressures. The dominant arid conditions,limited water resources, erratic cropping pat-terns, low knowledge and technology levels arethe main factors presently affecting food produc-tion systems in the Arab world.

Most recent assessments have concluded that aridand semi-arid regions are highly vulnerable to cli-mate change (IPCC, 2007a). On the other hand,at a high level conference of the Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) held in Rome inJune 2008, the delegates asserted that agricultureis not only a fundamental human activity at riskfrom climate change, it is a major driver of envi-ronmental and climate change itself. The project-ed climatic changes will be among the mostimportant challenges for agriculture in the twen-ty-first century, especially for developing coun-tries and arid regions (IPCC, 2007a).

By the end of the 21st century, the Arab regionwill face an increase of 2 to 5.5ºC in the surfacetemperature. This increase will be coupled with aprojected decrease in precipitation up to 20%.These projected changes will lead to shorter win-ters and dryer summers, hotter summers, morefrequent heat wave occurrence, and more vari-ability and extreme weather events occurrence(IPCC, 2007b).

II. KEY IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIESOF THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IN THEARAB WORLD

The risks associated with agriculture and climatechange arise out of strong complicated relation-ships between agriculture and the climate system,plus the high reliance of agriculture on finite nat-ural resources (Abou-Hadid, 2009). The inter-annual, monthly and daily distribution of climatevariables (e.g., temperature, radiation, precipita-tion, water vapour pressure in the air and windspeed) affects a number of physical, chemical andbiological processes that drive the productivity ofagricultural, forestry and fisheries systems (IPCC,2007a). In the cases of forestry and fisheries sys-tems, vulnerability depends on exposure and sen-sitivity to climate conditions, and on the capaci-

ty to cope with changing conditions.

The current total cultivated area in the Arabregion makes up about 5% of the total global cul-tivated area, and it represents about 5% of thetotal area of Arab world (FAO, 2008b). Most ofthe Arab region’s lands are classified as hyper-arid, semi-arid and arid land zones (WRI, 2002).The relationship between the cultivated area andthe population is one of the major challenges fac-ing food production in the region. The landshare per capita is decreasing annually as a resultof rapid population growth rates and urbaniza-tion (AOAD, 2008). By 2007, the average agri-cultural land share in the Arab region was about0.23 ha per capita, which is slightly lower thanthe world average of 0.24 ha per capita.

The dominant agricultural system in Arab coun-tries is rainfed agriculture; the total irrigated areain the Arab world is less than 28% (FAO,2008b). Therefore, annual agricultural produc-tivity and food security are highly correlated tothe annual variability of precipitation, which hasexhibited major changes in recent decades(Abou-Hadid, 2006). Irrigated agriculture iswidely represented in the Arabian Peninsulacountries and Egypt, where fully irrigated agri-culture makes up 100% and 95% of the total cul-tivated area, respectively.

The agricultural productivity of most cropsexhibited noticeable increases during recentyears. The per capita food production index(PCFPI) shows the food output, excluding ani-mal feed, of a country’s agriculture sector relativeto the base period 1999-2001 (FAO, 2008b).The PCFPI value of the Arab region increasedfrom 99.8 in 2003 to 112.3 by 2005, an increaseof 13%, whereas the world values of the PCFPIincreased during the same years by 20% (AOAD,2008). The productivities of crops under irrigat-ed agriculture in the Arab region improved dueto switching to new cultivars, applying moderntechnologies and improving management pro-grams; to yield some of the highest productivitiesall over the world in some Arab countries, such asin Egypt and Sudan. On the other hand, themajority of Arab countries have serious problemsin agricultural production as a result of limitedeconomic resources, low levels of technology,limited crop patterns, and environmental limita-tions and pressures (Agoumi, 2001).

FOOD PRODUCTIONCHAPTER 564

The FAO (2005) expects growth rates in worldagricultural production to decline from 2.2%/yrduring the past 30 years to 1.6%/yr during the2000 to 2015 period, 1.3%/yr between 2015and 2030 and 0.8%/yr between 2030 and 2050.This still implies a 55% increase in global cropproduction by 2030 and an 80% increase to2050 (compared with 1999 to 2001). Globally,to facilitate this growth in output, 185 millionha of rain-fed crop land (+19%) and 60 millionha of irrigated land (+30%) will have to bebrought into production. Expanded land useand improved technology are the essential rea-sons contributing to yields’ expected rise. Cerealyields in developing countries are projected toincrease from 2.7 tonnes/ha currently to 3.8tonnes/ha in 2050 (FAO, 2005). Theseimprovements in the global supply-demand bal-ance will be accompanied by a decline in thenumber of undernourished people from morethan 800 million at present to about 300 mil-lion, or 4% of the population in developingcountries, by 2050 (FAO, 2005).Notwithstanding these overall improvements,important food-security problems remain to beaddressed at the local and national levels. Areaswith high rates of population growth and natu-ral resource degradation are likely to continue tohave high rates of poverty and food insecurity(Alexandratos, 2005). Cassman et al. (2003)emphasize that climate change will add to thedual challenge of meeting food demand while atthe same time efforts are in progress for protect-ing natural resources and improving environ-mental quality in these regions.

The production and dissemination of seasonalclimate forecasts has improved the ability ofmany resource managers to anticipate and planfor climate variability (Harrison, 2005).However, problems related to infectious disease,conflicts and other societal factors may decreasethe capacity to respond to climate variability andchange at the local level, thereby increasing cur-rent vulnerability. Policies and responses made atnational and international levels also influencelocal adaptations (Salinger et al., 2005). Nationalagricultural policies are often developed on thebasis of local risks, needs and capacities, as well asinternational markets, tariffs, subsidies and tradeagreements (Burton and Lim, 2005).

Water balance and weather extremes are key to

many agricultural and forestry impacts. MostArab countries are characterized by limitedwater resources and high water demands. Thetotal annual renewable water resources in theArab world are about 460 km3, or about 0.9%of the global annual renewable water resources.Based on annual water resources per capita, allArab countries are facing a vulnerable water sit-uation, except Iraq which has renewable waterresources of more than 2900 m3/capita/year.Lebanon and Syria are currently facing waterstress (1,000 to 1,700 m3/capita/year), whilethe rest of the Arab countries are facing waterscarcity (less than 1,000 m3/capita/year)(AFED, 2008). The agriculture sector uses over80% of the total water resources of the Arabworld. However, the water use efficiency of theagriculture sector in most of the Arab countriesis low (Montazar et al., 2007).


The water situation in the Arab region is threat-ened by both environmental and socio-economicpressures. Many negative impacts of climatechange on freshwater systems are observed inrecent studies. These impacts are mainly due tothe observed and projected increases in tempera-ture, evaporation, sea level and precipitation vari-ability (IPCC, 2007a). Decreases in precipitationare predicted by more than 90% of climatemodel simulations by the end of the 21st centu-ry for the North Africa and Middle East region(IPCC, 2007b).

Changes in annual mean runoff are indicative ofthe mean water availability for vegetation.Projected changes between now and 2100 showsome consistent runoff patterns: increases in highlatitudes and the wet tropics, and decreases inmid-latitudes and some parts of the dry tropics.Declines in water availability are therefore pro-jected to affect some of the areas currently suit-able for rain-fed crops (e.g., in the Mediterraneanbasin and sub-tropical regions) (Christensen etal., 2007).

Climate change will increase consumptive wateruse in key sectors in the future, especially incountries that have limited water resources, highpopulation growth and high development rates

(Medany, 2007). Magano et al. (2007) point outthat irrigation demands will increase and the irri-gation period of supplementary irrigation willbecome longer under projected climate changes.For example, the total annual reference irrigationdemands of Egypt are projected to increase by 6to 16% by the 2100s, due to the increase in ref-erence evapotranspiration values, which will leadto a general increase in the crop-water demands.Figure 1 illustrates the change in crop-waterrequirements of major field and vegetable cropsdue to the change in temperature and CO2 levelsbased on the IPCC SRES A1 and B1 scenariosfor the 2025s, 2050s and 2100s (Medany, 2008).

Smallholder agriculture is used here to describerural producers, who farm using mainly familylabour and for whom the farm provides theprincipal source of income (Cornish, 1998).Pastoralists and people dependent on artisanalfisheries and household aquaculture enterprises(Allison and Ellis, 2001) are also included in thiscategory. Smallholders in most of the Arabcountries are poor and suffer in varying degreesfrom problems associated both with subsistenceproduction (isolated and marginal location,small farm size, informal land tenure and lowlevels of technology), and with uneven andunpredictable exposure to world markets, which


FIGURE 1

Source: Medany, 2008 W: Winter season S: Summer season N: Nili season

CHANGE BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE VALUES (FOR YEARS 2025S, 2050S AND 2100S) AT NATION-AL LEVEL SEASONAL CROP-WATER REQUIREMENTS OF SOME FIELD AND VEGETABLE MAJOR CROPS

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2025 2050 2100 2025 2050 2100

Cro

p-w

ate

rre

quir

em

ent

cha

ng

e(%

)

W heat [W ]

B road B ean [W ]M aize [S ]

M aize [N]

Tom ato [W ] Tom ato [S ]

Tom ato [N] P otato [W ]P otato [S ]

P otato [N]

A1 B1

have been characterized as “complex, diverseand risk-prone” (Chambers et al., 1989). Risksare also diverse (drought and flood, crop andanimal diseases, and market shocks) and may befelt by individual households or entire commu-nities (Scoones et al., 1996). Subsistence andsmallholder livelihood systems currently experi-ence a number of interlocking stressors otherthan climate change and climate variability(Iglesias, 2002). It is likely that smallholder andsubsistence households will decline in numbers,as they are pulled or pushed into other liveli-hoods, with those that remain sufferingincreased vulnerability and increased poverty(Lipton, 2004).

The impacts of climate change on subsistenceand smallholder agriculture, pastoralism and arti-sanal fisheries will include, (i) the direct impactsof changes in temperature, CO2 and precipita-tion on yields of specific food and cash crops,productivity of livestock and fisheries systems,and animal health; (ii) other physical impacts ofclimate change important to smallholders such asdecreased water supply for irrigation systems,effects of sea level rise on coastal areas, increasedfrequency of tropical storms (Adger, 1999), andother forms of environmental impact still beingidentified, such as increased forest-fire risk(Agrawala et al., 2003) and remobilization ofdunes (Thomas et al., 2005); and (iii) impacts onhuman health, like malaria risk .

III. IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ONCROP PRODUCTION

Plant response to elevated CO2 alone, withoutclimate change, is positive and was reviewedextensively in a vast number of studies (see refer-ences). Recent studies confirm that the effects ofelevated CO2 on plant growth and yield willdepend on photosynthetic pathway, species,growth stage and management regimes, such aswater and nitrogen (N) applications (e.g.Ainsworth and Long, 2005). On average acrossseveral species and under unstressed conditions,recent data analyses find that, compared to cur-rent atmospheric CO2 concentrations, cropyields increase at 550 parts per million (ppm)CO2 in the range of 10-20% for C3i crops and0-10% for C4ii crops (Ainsworth et al., 2004;Long et al., 2004).

Some studies using re-analyses of recent FACE(Free Air Carbon Enrichment) have argued thatcrop response to elevated CO2 may be lower thanpreviously thought, with consequences for cropmodelling and projections of food supply (Longet al., 2006). Many recent studies confirm thattemperature and precipitation changes in futuredecades will modify, and often limit, direct CO2effects on plants. For instance, high temperaturesduring flowering may lower CO2 effects byreducing grain number, size and quality(Caldwell et al., 2005). Increased temperaturesmay also reduce CO2 effects indirectly, byincreasing water demand (Xiao et al., 2005).

Future CO2 levels may favour C3 plants over C4(Ziska, 2003), yet the opposite is expected underassociated temperature increases; the net effectsremain uncertain. In particular, since more than


80% of total agricultural land, and close to 100%of pasture land, is rain-fed, general circulationmodel (GCM) dependent changes in precipita-tion will often shape both the direction and mag-nitude of the overall impacts (Reilly et al., 2003).

IPCC (2007a) reported that agricultural produc-tion in many African countries is projected to beseverely compromised by climate variability andchange. Yields from rainfed agriculture in Africacould be reduced by up to 50% by 2020, and theprojected sea-level rise will affect low-lyingcoastal areas with large populations, which willrequire a total cost of adaptation that couldamount to at least 5-10% of GDP.

For the Arab world, the overall conclusion ofmost studies indicates a general trend of reduc-tion for most major field crops. El-Shaer et al.(1997) concluded that climate change could dosevere damage to agricultural productivity if noadaptation measures were taken. Table 1 showsthe impact of climate change on some majorcrops in the Egyptian cropping pattern, indicat-ed in previous studies. By the year 2050, climatechange could increase water needs by up to 16%for summer crops but decrease them by up to 2%for winter crops (Eid and El-Mowelhi, 1998).

On the other hand, there are additional negativeimpacts of increased climate variability on plantproduction due to climate change.Understanding links between increased frequen-cy of extreme climate events and ecosystem dis-turbance (fires, pest outbreaks, etc.) is particular-ly important to quantify impacts (Hogg andBernier, 2005).

Furthermore, CO2 -temperature interactions arerecognized as a key factor in determining plantdamage from pests in future decades, though fewquantitative analyses exist to date; CO2 -precipi-tation interactions will likewise be important(Zvereva and Kozlov, 2006).

For instance, the impact of climate change onpests and diseases was studied for some impor-tant diseases at the national level, such as pearearly blight, potato late blight (Fahim, et al.,2007), and wheat rust diseases (Abo Elmaaty etal., 2007). Importantly, increased climateextremes may promote plant disease and pestoutbreaks (Gan, 2004).

IV. IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON LIVESTOCK AND GRAZING

Pastures comprise both grassland and rangelandecosystems. Rangelands are found on every con-tinent, typically in regions where temperatureand moisture restrictions limit other vegetationtypes; they include deserts (cold, hot and tun-dra), scrub, chaparral and savannas. Pasturesoccupy 33% of the total area of the Arab region.However this area is under risk due to climaticvariability related events (e.g. drought, floods)and desertification (AOAD, 2008).

Pastures and livestock production systems occurunder most climates and range from extensivepastoral systems with grazing herbivores, tointensive systems based on forage and graincrops, where animals are mostly kept indoors.The combination of increases in CO2 concentra-


PROJECTED CHANGES IN CROP PRODUCTION OF SOME MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPTUNDER CLIMATE CHANGE CONDITIONS

TABLE 1

Crop Change in % Sources2050s 2100s

Rice -11% Eid and EL-Marsafawy (2002)Maize -19% Eid et al. 1997b

-14% -20% Hassanein and Medany, 2007Soybeans -28% Eid and EL-Marsafawy (2002)Barley -20% Eid et al. 1997bCotton +17% +31% Eid et al. 1997aFava bean -4.4 to -6.6 +6 to +11% Hassanein and Medany (2009)Potato -0.9 to -2.3% +0.2 to +2.3 % Medany and Hassanein (2006)Wheat -4.8 to -17.2 -26 to-38% Eid et al 1992a, b, Eid et al 1993a, b, c,

Eid 1994, Eid et al 1994a, b, and Eid et al 1995a, b

tion, in conjunction with changes in rainfall andtemperature, is likely to have significant impactson grasslands and rangelands, with productionincreases in humid temperate grasslands, butdecreases in arid and semi-arid regions (IPCC,2007a).

Animal requirements for crude proteins from pas-tures range from 7 to 8% of ingested dry matter,up to 24% for the highest-producing dairy cows.In conditions of very low Nitrogen status in pas-ture ranges under arid and semi-arid conditions,possible reductions in crude proteins under elevat-ed CO2 may put a system into a sub-maintenancelevel for animal performance (Milchunas et al.,2005). The decline under elevated CO2 levels(Polley et al., 2003) of C4 grasses, which are a lessnutritious food resource than C3 (Ehleringer etal., 2002), may also compensate for the reducedprotein content under elevated CO2. Generally,thermal stress reduces productivity and concep-tion rates, and is potentially life-threatening tolivestock. Because ingestion of food and feed isdirectly related to heat production, any decline infeed intake and/or energy density of the diet willreduce the amount of heat that needs to be dissi-pated by the animal. Mader and Davis (2004)confirm that the onset of a thermal challengeoften results in declines in physical activity withassociated declines in eating and grazing (forruminants and other herbivores) activities. Newmodels of animal energetics and nutrition(Parsons et al., 2001) have shown that high tem-peratures put a ceiling on dairy milk yield irre-spective of feed intake. Increases in air tempera-ture and/or humidity have the potential to affectconception rates of domestic animals not adaptedto those conditions. This is particularly the casefor cattle, in which the primary breeding seasonoccurs in spring and summer months. Amundsonet al. (2005) reported declines in conception ratesof cattle for temperatures above 23.4ºC and athigh thermal heat index.

Moreover, impacts on animal productivity due toincreased variability in weather patterns will like-ly be far greater than effects associated with theaverage change in climatic conditions. Lack ofprior conditioning to weather events most oftenresults in catastrophic losses in confined cattlefeedlots (Hahn et al., 2001), with economic loss-es from reduced cattle performance exceedingthose associated with cattle death losses several-

fold (Mader, 2003). In dry regions, there are risksthat severe vegetation degeneration leads to posi-tive feedbacks between soil degradation andreduced vegetation and rainfall, with correspon-ding losses of pastoral areas and farmlands(Zheng et al., 2002). A number of studies inAfrica (Batima, 2003) show a strong relationshipbetween droughts and animal death. Projectedtemperature increases, combined with reducedprecipitation in North Africa would lead toincreased loss of domestic herbivores duringextreme events in drought-prone areas. Withincreased heat stress in the future, water require-ments for livestock will increase significantlycompared to current conditions, so that overgraz-ing near watering points is likely to expand(Batima et al., 2005).

V. IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FISHING AND AQUACULTURE

Aquaculture resembles terrestrial animal hus-bandry and therefore shares many of the vulner-abilities and adaptations to climate change withthat sector. Similarities between aquaculture andterrestrial animal husbandry include ownership,control of inputs, diseases and predators, and useof land and water. Some aquaculture, particular-ly of plants, depends on naturally occurringnutrients, but the rearing of fish usually requiresthe addition of suitable food. Capture fisheriesdepend on the productivity of natural ecosystemsand are therefore vulnerable to climate changeinduced changes affecting production in naturalaquatic ecosystems.

IPCC (2007a) reports a number of key negativeimpacts of climate change on aquaculture andfreshwater fisheries, including (i) stress due toincreased temperature and oxygen demand andincreased acidity (lower pH); (ii) uncertain futurewater supply; (iii) extreme weather events; (iv)increased frequency of disease and toxic events; (v)sea level rise and conflict of interest with coastalprotection needs; and (vi) uncertain future supplyof fishmeal and oils from capture fisheries.Positive impacts include increased growth ratesand food conversion efficiencies, increased lengthof growing season, range expansion and use ofnew areas due to decreases in ice cover.

Temperature increases may cause seasonal


increases in growth, but it may affect fish popu-lations at the upper end of their thermal toler-ance zone. Increasing temperature interacts withother changes, including declining pH andincreasing nitrogen and ammonia, to increasemetabolic costs. The consequences of these inter-actions are speculative and complex (Morgan etal., 2001).

Changes in primary production and transferthrough the food chain due to climate will have akey impact on fisheries. Such changes may beeither positive or negative and the aggregateimpact at the global level is unknown (IPCC,2007a). However, climate change has been impli-cated in mass mortalities of many aquatic species,including plants, fish, corals and mammals, but alack of standardized epidemiological data andinformation on pathogens generally makes it diffi-cult to attribute causes (Harvell et al., 1999).

VI. IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ONFOREST PRODUCTIVITY

Forests cover almost 928 thousand ha or 6.6%of the Arab world’s area. Approximately onethird of this area is located in Sudan. Modellingstudies predict increased global timber produc-tion. Whereas models suggest that global timberproductivity will likely increase with climatechange, regional production will exhibit largevariability, similar to that discussed for crops.Climate change will also substantially impactother services, such as seeds, nuts, hunting,resins, plants used in pharmaceutical and botan-

ical medicine, and in the cosmetics industry;these impacts will also be highly diverse andregionalized. Recent studies suggest that directCO2 effects on tree growth may be revised tolower values than previously assumed in forestgrowth models. A number of FACE studiesshowed average net primary productivity (NPP)increases of 23% in young tree stands at 550ppm CO2 (Norby et al., 2005). However, in a100-year old tree stand, Korner et al. (2005)found little overall stimulation in stem growthover a period of four years. Additionally, the ini-tial increase in growth increments may be limit-ed by competition, disturbance, air pollutants,nutrient limitations and other factors(Karnosky, 2003), and the response is site- andspecies-specific.

A number of long-term studies on supply anddemand of forestry products have been conduct-ed in recent years (IPCC, 2007a). These studiesproject a shift in harvest from natural forests toplantations (Hagler, 1998). Finally, although cli-mate change will impact the availability of forestresources, the anthropogenic impact, particularlyland-use change and deforestation, is likely to beextremely important (Zhao et al., 2005).

VII. ADAPTATION OF AGRICULTURE INTHE ARAB WORLD

In 2001, the IPCC identified ìAdaptationî as anyadjustment in ecological, social, or economic sys-tems in response to actual or expected climaticstimuli and their effects or impacts. This term


refers to changes in processes, practices, or struc-tures to moderate or offset potential damages orto take advantage of opportunities associatedwith changes in climate. It involves adjustmentsto reduce the vulnerability of communities,regions, or activities to climatic change and vari-ability (IPCC, 2001a).

The high vulnerability of the agricultural sectorin developing countries should place it at the topof priority lists of adaptation plans. Although cli-mate change is projected to have serious impactson the agricultural sector in the Arab world, onlymodest efforts and steps are currently being takenin the areas of scientific research, mitigation andadaptation.

Agriculture has historically shown high levels ofadaptability to climate variations. For croppingsystems there are many potential ways to altermanagement to deal with projected climatic andatmospheric changes (Challinor et al., 2007).These adaptations include: a) Altering inputs such as varieties, species, fer-

tilizer, and amounts and timing of irrigationand other water management practices;

b) Wider use of simple technologies; c) Water management to prevent waterlogging,

erosion and nutrient leaching in areas withrainfall increases;

d) Altering the timing or location of croppingactivities;

e) Diversifying income by integrating otherfarming activities such as livestock raising;

f) Improving the effectiveness of pest, diseaseand weed management practices; and

g) Using seasonal climate forecasting to reduceproduction risk.

Many options for policy-based adaptation to cli-mate change have been identified for agriculture,forests and fisheries (Easterling et al., 2004).These can either involve adaptation activitiessuch as developing infrastructure or building thecapacity to adapt in the broader user communityand institutions, often by changing the decisionmaking environment under which management-level, adaptation activities occur. Designing andapplying national adaptation strategies for theagriculture sector faces a group of barriers,including limitations of the existing scientificbase, policy perceptions under current conditionsand pressures, poor adaptive capacity of rural

communities, lack of financial support, and theabsence of an appropriate institutional frame-work.

Medany et al. (2007) conclude that designing anadaptation strategy for the agriculture sectorshould consider the simple and low cost adapta-tion measures that may be inspired from tradi-tional knowledge to meet local conditions and tobe compatible with sustainable developmentrequirements. It is not preferable to use importedsolutions based on high levels of technology andhigh initial costs. Moreover, technology andknowledge transfer activities are encouraged tosupport adaptation strategies. Addressing climatechange mitigation and adaptation in develop-ment strategies means strengthening these strate-gies and increasing their efficiency and durabili-ty.

Medany et al. (2007) recommend the followingto enhance the planning of mitigation and adap-tation strategies for the agricultural sector underEgyptian conditions:

• Improving the scientific capacity should beamong the top priorities of development plan-ning.

• Political and financial adoption of adaptationstrategies.

• The bottom-up approach of planning andimplementing adaptation and mitigationstrategies could be more efficient.

• Developing community-based measures bystakeholders’ involvement in adaptation plan-ning, and improving the adaptive capacity ofthe different human sectors.

• Increasing the public awareness and improvingthe concept of climate and its relation to envi-ronmental and human systems.

• Improving adaptive capacity of the communi-ty should be based on a clear scientific message,and enjoy strong governmental support.

Attaher et al. (2009) studied the farmers’ percep-tion for adaptation planning in Nile Deltaregion, and concluded that farmers have a realinitiative to act positively to reduce the impact ofclimate change. Moreover, although communityengagement in adaptation planning is veryimportant, the scientific evaluation should betaken into account to set a more practical list ofadaptation measures.



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1 C3 carbon fixation is a metabolic pathway forcarbon fixation in photosynthesis. This processconverts carbon dioxide and ribulose bisphosphate(RuBP, a 5-carbon sugar) into 3-phosphoglyceratethrough the following reaction:CO2 + RuBP 2 3-phosphoglycerate This reaction occurs in all plants as the first step ofthe Calvin cycle.

2 C4 carbon fixation is one of three biochemicalmechanisms, along with C3 and CAMphotosynthesis, functioning in land plants to “fix”carbon dioxide (binding the gaseous molecules todissolved compounds inside the plant) for sugarproduction through photosynthesis. Along withCAM photosynthesis, C4 fixation is considered anadvancement over the simpler and more ancientC3 carbon fixation mechanism operating in mostplants. Both mechanisms overcome the tendencyof RuBisCO (the first enzyme in the Calvin cycle) tophotorespire, or waste energy by using oxygen tobreak down carbon compounds to CO2. HoweverC4 fixation requires more energy input than C3 inthe form of ATP. C4 plants separate RuBisCOfrom atmospheric oxygen, fixing carbon in themesophyll cells and using oxaloacetate and malateto ferry the fixed carbon to RuBisCO and the restof the Calvin cycle enzymes isolated in thebundle-sheath cells. The intermediate compoundsboth contain four carbon atoms, hence the nameC4.

NOTES

75

DIA EL-DIN EL-QUOSY

CHAPTER 6


Fresh Water

I. INTRODUCTION

The Arab world is one of the most water stressedregions in the whole world, and climate change,which is projected to increase the frequency andintensity of extreme weather events such asdroughts and floods, as well as decrease precipita-tion, will contribute to even worse water scarcityin the region. It is not only the quantity of freshwater that might be affected by climate change,the quality of groundwater might also be wors-ened, as fresh water supplies might get contami-nated by sea water intruding coastal aquifers,thereby affecting potable water supplies for mil-lions of Arabs.

About two thirds of the renewable waterresources of the Arab world originate outside theregion. Eighty percent of the area of the Arabcountries is barren desert, and therefore theregion is mainly arid with small pockets of semi-arid climatic conditions. The average annualrainfall varies between 0 and 1800 mm while theaverage evaporation rate is more than 2000mm/year.

The area of the Arab world contains almost tenpercent of the dry land on earth while waterresources do not exceed one percent of theworld’s total. Despite this water poverty, eightypercent of the water budget in the Arab world isallocated to agriculture, the highest water con-suming development activity, while industryconsumes 12% and the remaining 8% is allocat-ed to domestic and potable use. Although about2000 billion m3 of rain falls every year on theArab countries, the amount of effective rainfallthat is beneficially utilized is much less than thisfigure; huge quantities are lost in evaporationfrom free water surfaces, evapotranspiration ofaquatic plants in swamps and marches, or lost tothe sea or the ocean.

There are 34 continuously flowing fresh waterrivers in the Arab world; their catchments may beas small as 86 km2 in the case of the Zahrani riverin Lebanon, and 2.8 million km2 in the case ofthe Nile.

The percentage of water used in the Arab worldout of the total available is less than 50%, whichmeans that almost 50% of the renewable waterresources are still unutilized. Nonetheless food

imports to the region make up more than 50% offood consumption and only 25% of arable landis cultivated.

Annual renewable water resources in the Arabregion are about 244 billion m3/year of which204 billion m3/year are surface flows and 40 bil-lion m3/year are renewable groundwater.Withdrawal in some Arab countries exceeds therenewable supplies, while others are just at thelimit.

It is not only the limited water resources thatpose problems; the harsh climatic conditions andthe use of the majority of Arab countries’ waterin water consuming activities like agriculture addto the magnitude of the issue. This is exacerbat-ed by high population growth rates, which add achronic nature to the problem and aggravate itsimpact. If all this is crowned by climate change,the situation might reach an intolerable condi-tion which may ultimately affect the environ-mental, economic, social, political and even secu-rity stability of the region.

One of the major drawbacks of research in andon the Arab region is data availability: regularmeasurements, continuous monitoring and neu-tral evaluation of the water status in the area iseither missing or only available in isolated surveysthat might be separated by long time spans withnon-available records. This adds to the uncer-tainty of the effect of climate change on waterresources in most of the Arab countries. Thischapter is an attempt to shed some light on cli-mate change and climate variability as phenome-na that might affect water availability in the Arabregion and how vulnerable Arab countries canmitigate and adapt to their positive and negativeimpacts.

II. HYDROLOGICAL DIVISION OF ARAB COUNTRIES

The Arab countries can be divided from thehydrologic point of view into the following sub-divisions:• Al Mashrek countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,

Jordan and Palestine.

• Al Maghreb countries: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria,Mauritania and Morocco.

FRESH WATERCHAPTER 676

• Nile Basin countries: Egypt and Sudan.

• Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrainand Yemen.

• Sahel countries: Somalia, Djipouti andComoros Islands.

Each of the above five regions has its distincthydrological characteristics that can briefly beexplained as follows:

Al Mashrek Region

• Iraq and Syria are partially dependant on theTigris and Euphrates rivers, originating fromTurkey. The two countries have rainfall of rea-sonable intensity and groundwater potential inboth countries is relatively high. Syria enjoyssmall flows caused by snow melt from thepeaks of some local mountains.

• Lebanon depends on a number of local riversor rivers shared with one or more of the neigh-bouring countries.

• The per capita shares of water in Lebanon as

well as in Syria and Iraq are the highest amongall Arab countries.

• Jordan and Palestine are the water poorest inthis region since they depend upon the Jordanriver and small quantities of rainfall andgroundwater.

Al Maghreb Region

• All five Maghreb countries depend mainly onrainfall and partially on modest groundwaterreserves.

Nile Basin Region

• The southern part of Sudan enjoys ample pre-cipitation which can meet the prevailing evap-orative demand; however, rain gradually van-ishes north of the capital Khartoum. Followingthe signing of the Nile Water Agreement in1959, Sudan and Egypt divided the averagenatural flow at Aswan (84 billion m3/year) toone quarter for Sudan (18.5 billion m3/year),three quarters for Egypt (55.5 billion m3/year)and the remaining 10 billion m3/year were leftto make up for natural evaporation from LakeNasser.


• The natural flow of the Nile forms 95% of theEgyptian water budget, with the remaining 5%composed of minor quantities of rain whichfalls on the coast of the Mediterranean and RedSeas (about 1.5 billion m3/year) plus modestreserves of groundwater aquifers.

The Arabian Peninsula

• This is the poorest region with respect to waterresources, where rainfall is rare by all standards,groundwater either does not exist or hasalready been depleted and surface water is vir-

tually non-existent. The region depends for itswater needs mainly on the desalination ofwater from the Gulf. Yemen is the only coun-try in the Arabian Peninsula which depends onrainfall and partially on groundwater.

Sahel Countries

• Somalia, Djibouti and the Comoros Islands areall dependant on rainfall with modest potentialof groundwater.

The above brief description of the hydrologicalsituation in the Arab countries reveals a numberof important facts:

• The lowest vulnerability to climate change is inthe case of the Arabian Peninsula where theinternal renewable water resources in theregion at the present time are very limited.Whatever happens is not going to reduce thealready very low internal renewable waterresources.

• The four countries largely dependant on riverflows originating outside their boundaries,namely Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Syria are notonly vulnerable to reduced or increased flowscaused by climate change, they are also vulner-able to the actions taken by upstream ripariancountries which may affect river flows down-stream.

• Al Maghreb countries are the most vulnerableto climate change since they are almost fullydependant on rainfall. Libya is an exceptionwith the Great Manmade River now formingthe major source of water to the country. Theriver is fed by pumping water from the NubianSandstone aquifer shared with Egypt, Sudanand Chad. However, the life time of the proj-ect is only fifty years, after which the countrywill have to find other alternatives.

• Djibouti and the Comoros Islands are morethreatened by sinking caused by sea level risethan by high or low natural fresh water flows.

• Jordan and Palestine possess at the present timethe lowest per capita share of water in the Arabworld (100-200 m3 per capita per year). Thevulnerability of sharing their water resourceswith Israel which is expanding in terms of both


space and population appears to outweigh thevulnerability which might be caused by climatechange.

III. CLIMATIC OBSERVATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab region is the poorest area in the worldwith respect to the presence of climatic observa-tion stations. The only cited stations are one atthe northern end of the Red Sea and two stationson the coast of the Atlantic Ocean.

In the meantime, there is no local circulationmodel that has been developed to predict thefuture situation in the region, predicted to have agreenhouse gas emissions-caused increase in sur-face temperatures and the consequent effects onspatial and temporal variability of rainfall andrunoff. The only model under development atthe present time is that prepared by the UnitedKingdom Meteorological Office for the purposeof predicting Nile flows under different climaticscenarios. The model is developed by statisticaland dynamic downscaling from a GlobalCirculation Model (UKMO) and is expected tobe in practical use during the coming 12 to 24months.

The extreme event of the tropical cyclone Gonuwhich hit the coast of Oman in 2007, the snowwhich covered the mountains of the United ArabEmirates, and the extremely low temperatureswhich affected palm trees in the ArabianPeninsula and Jordan, drew the attention of theArab world to the risks of climate change, risksthat might intensify in the future.

In spite of the above, only few countries in theArab world have, in accordance with obligationsto the UNFCCC, issued the first and secondnational communications and prepared a climatechange strategy or framework.

The coastal strip in the Arab world extends for adistance of 34,000 km from the Atlantic Oceanthrough the Mediterranean and the Red Sea(from both sides east and west). The Arabian Seato the Gulf hosts millions of Arabs and a largenumber of development activities. The initiativeof the Saudi King who allocated funds for thepurpose of climate change research was well

received by most Arab scientists and fully appre-ciated by all.

IV. VULNERABILITY OF WATERRESOURCES IN THE ARAB WORLD TO CLIMATE CHANGE

In our investigation of the vulnerability of waterresources in the Arab region to climate change, itwas found more convenient to divide the regioninto the following subdivisions:

1. Mediterranean countries which include:Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, andJordan. Mauritania and Jordan are includedbecause of their close proximity to theMediterranean climate, especially withrespect to the rain patterns. Turkey is includ-ed as the country of origin of the RiversTigris and Euphrates which forms a majorsource of water to Syria and Iraq.

2. Egypt and Sudan as the end users of Nilewater, though Egypt also belongs to thegroup of Mediterranean countries.

3. Syria and Iraq as the end users of RiversTigris and Euphrates.

4. The Arabian Peninsula which includes SaudiArabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Yemen.

5. Somalia, Djibouti and the Comoros Islandsas African Sahel countries.

Each sub-division will now be discussed below.

Vulnerability of MediterraneanCountries to Climate Change

The term Mediterranean climate has been used forthe characterization of other areas which are notnecessarily located on both sides of theMediterranean Sea. This climate is known for itswet and mild winters, and its dry and generallywarm summers. The Mediterranean Basin is con-sidered a transitional region between mid-altitudesand subtropical climate regions, with a divisionline moving seasonally across the basin. TheMediterranean Sea itself exerts important influ-


ences on the environment, climate, economy andculture of the coastal areas providing them with animportant source of moisture and a heat reservoir.

The situation in the Mediterranean region is verycomplex due to large differences between differ-ent areas. While at its northwest coast populationgrowth has practically stopped, a two-foldincrease is expected in North African countriesduring the first three decades of the 21st century,with an even larger growth taking place in Syriaand Palestine, adding more stress to the alreadyscarce water resources. Global projections presentremarkable agreement on the Mediterraneanregion, where warming is expected to be largerthan the global average with a large percentreduction in precipitation and an increase ininter-annual variability (Giorgi, 2006).

Global simulation can not be considered accuratefor the description of the Mediterranean regionand downscaling by statistical methods anddynamic models can, in some situations, be usedto provide better insight and give results withhigher precision. Development of a regionalmodel simulation for the Mediterranean ispresently missing and one needs to be made inthe future. Moreover, room should be left for dif-ferent approaches such as statistical downscalingand other techniques.

Lebanon, taken as one of the advanced countrieswith respect to climate change research, displaysthe following vulnerability issues (Assaf, 2009):

• Chaotic urbanization at the expense of forestsand wood lands.

• Air, water and soil pollution.• Increasing frequency of fires due to prolonged

dry seasons.• Change of water table level due to excessive

pumping and quarrying activities.• Overgrazing of rangelands.• Land fragmentation.

Morocco is another example of an ArabMediterranean country in which climate changeresearch is well advanced. The country has pre-pared its First National Communication to theUNFCCC, and is in the process of developingthe Second National Communication Report.

A map of composite indicators representing the

vulnerability of both agriculture and domesticwater uses to climate stress in the form of longhot and dry spells was generated to identify areasof high vulnerability. The results indicated thatthe ecosystem of the Tensift River Basin is veryvulnerable with various degrees of vulnerabilityin different parts of the region.

Libya has a prevailing Mediterranean climateand a geography characterized by coastal valleysand heights; rainy cold winters and dry hot sum-mers; as well as the seasons of spring andautumn in which the khamasin winds – locallycalled Gebli winds – blow. The country has rat-ified a number of United Nations agreementsand protocols and is treated as one of the LessDeveloped Countries in its mitigation andadaptation measures to climate change. Waterresources in Libya are limited to rainfall in thenorth and modest quantities of groundwater inthe south. Continued abstraction of fossilgroundwater will bring the country’s aquifers toa state of low feasibility by 2050.

If the intensity of rainfall is reduced, as predict-ed by many sources, then the country will haveno other option but to depend heavily on desali-nation or to import surface water from neigh-bouring countries. Both alternatives are fairlycostly especially as the country suffers a popula-tion growth rate which ranges between 2.5 and3%.Syria is vulnerable to climate change because ofthe following reasons:

• More than 75% of the cropped area is depen-dant on rainfall as the main source of water.Therefore, fluctuation in rainfall affects rain-fed agriculture.

• Fluctuation of temperature affects crop yields.• Increased frequency and duration of droughts

affect crop production and food availability.

In Egypt, rain-fed agriculture is limited to thenorth coast and is extended over a distance of1200 km where modest precipitation of 100 –200 mm intensity falls every year, in particularduring the winter months (December -February). If this already limited amount of rainis reduced further, life in these regions willbecome intolerable unless Nile water is con-veyed from the east and west branches of theDamietta and Rosetta branches of the Nile.


If this solution proves to be too expensive, theonly remaining option would be desalination ofsea and brackish groundwater which might bemade cheaper if renewable energy (solar, wind,wave) were used. Alternatively, atomic energy,which is a matter of controversy at the presenttime, would be the ultimate resort.

In general, almost all Arab countries located onthe Mediterranean will be affected by climatechange at different levels. Countries which aremore dependant on rainfall will certainly beaffected most. Other countries which are less

dependant on rainfall will be less affected; how-ever, water has to be made available for areaswhich are going to be indirectly affected due totheir dependence on other water sources inside oroutside the country.

A problem common to all Arab countries locatedon the coast of the Mediterranean is the possibil-ity of having coastal aquifers contaminated if thesea level is increased, particularly in low-lyingareas because of sea water intrusion. Coastalaquifers are very fragile systems of fresh waterlenses sitting above huge bodies of brackish water


of relatively high salinity. Overexploitation offresh water lenses plus the expected intrusion ofsea water in low-elevation areas will certainlyaffect the use of these aquifers and possibly leadto the pollution of soil as well. If parts of thelands parallel to the sea shore are inundated, thenit will not only be groundwater that is going to beaffected, the whole landscape will be changedwith vast areas of land abandoned and large num-bers of citizens displaced.

Nile Basin

The Nile Basin is composed of three main sub-basins:

• Equatorial Lakes sub-basin.• Ethiopian plateau sub-basin.• Bahr El Ghazal sub-basin.

Precipitation on the Ethiopian Plateau comes inone season and takes around 100 to 110 dayslasting from early June to mid-September. Thesub-basin is marked with steep slopes whichcause heavy storms to erode vast areas of land. Inthe Bahr El Ghazal sub-basin, land is fairly flatand precipitation is spread over large areas ofswamps and marches occupied by wild animalsand aquatic plantations. The Equatorial Lakeplateau is flat as well; however, the Nile’s routeallows water to flow downstream inside a regularchannel. Both the Bahr El Ghazal and EquatorialLakes sub-basins experience two rainy seasons,one of them is long (4-6 months) and the otheris short (2-3 months).

Research on the Nile Basin has proved that theriver’s natural flow is very sensitive to precipita-tion which falls on the Ethiopian highlands. Anincrease of 20% in precipitation may increase theNile’s natural flow at Aswan by 80%.Conversely, if precipitation is reduced by 20%,

the natural flow may fall to a mere 20% of theusual average. To a lesser extent, natural flow isalso sensitive to temperature variation, particular-ly in the Equatorial Lakes and Bahr El Ghazalsub-basins. An increase of two degrees Celsius intemperature might cause the natural flow to fallto 50% of the average in these two sub-basins.

These facts lead to the important conclusion thatEgypt and Sudan are both extremely vulnerableto increased or decreased rainfall in the NileBasin as well as to increased temperature levels.Both increased and reduced flows have negativeeffects on the two countries. If the natural flow isconsiderably increased, the storage capacity ofboth water systems might not be sufficient toaccommodate these high flows which mightcause destructive floods. Even if the storagecapacity is adequate, as might be the case inEgypt, the conveyance and distribution networkof canals and drains might not be sufficient. Ifthe opposite happens, i.e. natural flows are sub-stantially reduced, the two countries will facedroughts that might not be tolerable.

The application of Global Circulation Models onthe Nile Basin flows resulted in variable figuresover a very wide range. This uncertainty confirmsthe fact that regional or even local circulationmodels are needed. Unfortunately these types ofmodels are not available at the present time. Theonly attempts cited are the series of studies car-ried out by an Egyptian team of experts to use theUnited Kingdom Meteorological OfficeCirculation Model (UKMO) to produce aregional model on the Nile Basin by downscalingusing statistical and dynamic modelling. Thisprocess needs one to two years to be completedand the results would yield the highest accuracypossible using the best globally available tech-niques at the present time.

Vulnerability of Water Resources in Turkey

In an interesting study on one of the major riverbasins in Seyhan, Turkey, a team of Japanese sci-entists (Fujihara et al., 2008) explored the impactof climate change on the hydrology and waterflows of the river. A dynamic downscalingmethod (pseudo Global Warming MethodPGWM) was used to connect the outputs of twoGeneral Circulation Models (GCMs) namely:


THE WATER EXPLOITATION INDEX (WEI)The Water Exploitation Index is a figure calculated by dividingannual total abstraction of fresh water by the long-term aver-age freshwater resources. It is used as a measure of how sus-tainable a country’s use of fresh water resources is in light ofwater availability.

Source: European Environment Agency

MRI-CGCM2 and CCRS/NIES/FRCGC-MIROC under the SRES A2 scenario. Thedownscaled data covered 10 year time steps cor-responding to the base (1990) and the future(2070). The simulation results for the futurewere compared with those for the present. Theaverage annual temperature change in the futurerelative to the present were projected to be +2.0ºC and +2.7 ºC by MRI and CCRS, respective-ly. Projected annual precipitation in 2070decreased relative to base levels by 157 mm(25%) in MRI and by 182 mm (29%) in CCRS.The annual evapotranspiration decreased by 36mm (9%) in MRI and by 39 mm (10%) inCCRS. This is mainly because of the reduction insoil moisture.

The annual runoff decreased by 118 mm (52%)in MRI and by 139 mm (61%) in CCSR. Theanalysis revealed that water shortages will notoccur in the future if water demand does notincrease. However, if the irrigated area is expand-ed under the expectation of current natural flow,water shortages will occur due to the combina-tion of reduced supply and increased demand.This example is alarming to both Syria and Iraqsince both countries will certainly be affected bywater management regimes in Turkey. Watershortages in the upstream will no doubt have anegative effect on the downstream flows of theTigris and Euphrates Rivers.

Vulnerability of the Arabian Peninsulato Climate Change

The Arabian Peninsula is marked with extremelyhigh summer temperatures, low intensity of rain-fall, and declining groundwater table levels dueto over pumping and obviously high evapotran-spiration rates. The area has more than half of theworld’s proven oil and natural gas reserves whichenable most of its countries to adopt state of theart international technology in the desalinationof sea water.

However, oil and natural gas reserves are not per-manent and the region is under the threat of hav-ing climate change exacerbate the already hightemperatures and low rainfall. Groundwater inmost of the countries in the region is not renew-able according to many sources and, therefore,continuous abstraction increases water tabledepth and in some cases deteriorates water quali-

ty due to sea water intrusion.Clearly, increasing aridity reflects the influence ofclimate change which is felt at a lower extent inthe Dead Sea area where the water level fell bymore than 100 meters due to excessive evapora-tion and decreased rainfall (Jorgensen, 2001). Ingeneral, the Water Exploitation Index in mostArab countries is in or close to the red: 83% forTunisia, 92% for Egypt, 170% for Palestine,600% for Libya, 50% for Syria, 25% forLebanon, 20% for Algeria and 40% for Morocco(Acreman, 2000). Results obtained fromHadCM2 (a well-recognized GCM) suggest thatrainfall is expected to be reduced in North Africaand some parts of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, andJordan by 20 to 25% annually. Temperatures areexpected to increase by 2-2.75ºC; near to thecoast, the expected temperature increase will belower (1.5ºC). Winter rain (October-March)would be decreased by 10-15% but would beincreased over the Sahara by 25%.

However, since the existing rate of rainfall abovethe Sahara is insignificant, the increase would beof insignificant order of magnitude (Ragab et al.,2001). Added to the decline in rainfall, vulnera-bility of imported water through the Nile, Tigrisand Euphrates to climate change is high; whatmight aggravate this vulnerability are the actionstaken by upstream riparians to increase their owndemand and/or change their water managementstrategy.

V. MITIGATION

Although the Arab countries are the world’slargest producers of fossil fuel, mainly oil, con-sumption by the region is lowest in the world.The reason is that the industrial base in almostArab countries is still juvenile. Most of theregion’s energy is used for household consump-tion, mainly lighting, cooling and the operationof household appliances.

The second main energy consuming sector in theArab countries is the automobile sector.However, the contribution of the region togreenhouse gases especially carbon dioxide is verymodest and does not exceed 5% of total worldemissions. Nonetheless, some of the Arab coun-tries are observing the requirements of the inter-national community concerning the reduction of


greenhouse gases emissions and have taken initia-tives in this area. Some of these measures are:Converting petrol-operating vehicles to naturalgas.

• Use of solar and wind energy as a substitute tothermal and steam power plants.

• Reduction of the emissions of methane gas byreducing rice cultivation and livestock manure.

• Promotion of the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM) which enables developingcountries to obtain technical and financial sup-port from industrial countries and to raise thecapacity of individuals to reduce greenhousegas emissions.

• Termination of all sources of subsidies on theprices of fossil fuel.

• Application of carbon taxes on activities thatresult in the emission of greenhouse gases usingthe “Polluter Pays” principle.

• Arranging for national awareness campaigns onthe impact of climate changes targeting schooland university students, as well as the generalpublic.

VI. ADAPTATION

The Arab world will face not only increasingtemperatures but, more importantly, also disrup-tion of the hydrological cycle, resulting in lessand more erratic rainfall that will aggravate evenfurther the already critical state of water scarcityand difficulties with water allocation among dif-ferent development activities.

Most poor residents of rural areas will suffer andwill require a range of coping strategies to helpthem adapt to climate change. Strategies willinclude diversifying production systems intohigher value and more efficient water useoptions. Improved water use efficiency can berealized by following supplementary irrigationtechniques, adopting and adapting existing waterharvesting techniques, conjunctive use of surfaceand groundwater, upgrading irrigation practiceson the farm level and on the delivery side, anddevelopment of crops tolerant to salinity and

heat stress. Water quality should also be main-tained at higher levels by preventing contamina-tion through sea water intrusion.

In addition to the above general water savingmeasures, a number of country specific steps haveto be taken according to each country’s needsand requirements. Some specific examples areoutlined.

For example, the Egyptian Second NationalCommunication, in 2009, calls for:

• Adaptation for uncertainty: this includeschanging the operation of the Aswan HighDam by lowering the storage water level and,thus, allowing more space to receive higherfloods and reduce evaporation from theexposed water surface at the same time, andincreasing the irrigated area in the case of highfloods.

• Adaptation to increased inflow by providingadditional storage structures upstream of theAswan High Dam in order to reduce the risk offlooding downstream.

• Adaptation to inflow reduction by applying thestrategies stated in the country’s NationalWater Resources Plan (NWRP) which can becategorized into three main parts: (i) optimaluse of available resources; (ii) development ofnew resources; and (iii) water quality preserva-tion and improvement.

• Minimizing water losses.

• Change of cropping patterns.

• Increased reuse of land drainage, treatedsewage and industrial effluent.

• Desalination of sea water and brackish ground-water.

The Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture, as anoth-er example, has adopted the following adaptationmeasure (Assaf, 2009)

• Natural adaptation where vegetation andwildlife may acclimatize if climate change isstill within their range of tolerance.


• Cultivation of drought-tolerant crops.

• Reduced habitat fragmentation by means ofcorridors and connections between differentareas.

• Rationalized water and land use to protect wet-lands and riparian habitats.

• Increased area and number of protectorates.

• Rational use of renewable and non-renewablewater resources through the adoption of mod-ern irrigation techniques as a substitute to theconventional systems in the irrigated areas.

The Sudanese authorities have adopted the fol-lowing strategies (Babikr et al., 2009) in theirplans to adapt to climate change:

• Capacity building of relevant stakeholders forbetter understanding of climate change scenar-ios and risk analysis.

• Public awareness on climate change issues andimplications.

• Crisis management.

• Technology transfer including modern irriga-tion systems, water harvesting, desalination,water transport and recycling of waste water.

• Afforestation and reclamation of marginal andwaste land.

• Utilization of cost-effective environment-friendly energy.

• Combat desertification and land degradation.Sustainable and integrated water resource man-agement.

• Construction of water storage facilities.

• Establishment of climate proof projects.

Libya places more emphasis on the followingpoints:

• Preparation of an inventory of activities leadingto the emission of greenhouse gases includingthe energy, transport, industry, agriculture,

health, environment, housing and utilities.

• Combine policies of climate change in thenational policy and update supporting legisla-tion.

• Education and public orientation programs.Data collection, exchange and analysis.

• Study of the extent of exposure of the countryto climate change.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Arab world is located in one of the most aridareas of the world. The area of Arab countriescontains almost 10% of the world’s dry land,while the region’s population is only 5% of theworld population. Alarmingly, water resources inthe Arab countries are very limited, making uponly 1% of the world’s renewable fresh water.Almost two thirds of water in the Arab worldoriginates in non-Arab countries miles away.Almost 80% of water resources are used in theagriculture sector which consumes vast amountsof water due to severe climatic conditions. Fastgrowing population and the need to raise peo-ple’s standard of living increase water consump-tion dramatically. The expected effects of climatechange might aggravate the situation by reducingriver flows and rainfall as well as deterioratinggroundwater quality.

Mitigation of the causes of climate changeincludes: less and efficient consumption of fossilfuel, more production of renewable energy andmore cultivation of forestry and green areas.

Adaptation measures include: protection of low-lying lands and river deltas from inundation andsea water intrusion, change of cropping patterns,adoption of water saving techniques and introduc-tion of integrated water resource management.

Finally, Arab countries have to reconsider waterallocation among different development activitieswhere water use efficiency represented by pro-duction per cubic meter of water overrules pro-duction per unit area of land, i.e., optimizationof water use which gives maximum economicreturn per unit volume of water.



Agrawala, S., A. Moehner, M. El Raey, D. Conway, M.van Aalst, M. Hagenstadand J. Smith (2004). Development and ClimateChange in Egypt. Focus on Coastal Resources and theNile. Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD).

Allen, J.A. (2002). The Middle East Water Question,Hydropolitices and the Global Economy. London andNew York: I. B. Tauris.

Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and DryLands (Damascus), UNESO Regional Office for Scienceand Technology for Arab States (Paris) and theInternational Institute for Hydraulic and EnvironmentalEngineering IHE (Delft). (1988). Water ResourcesAssessment in the Arab Region. IHP, Paris.

Assaf, H. (2009). Climate Change: Potential Impact onWater Resources in the Middle East and AdaptationOptions. Research and Policy Memo #2, Research andPolicy Forum on Climate Change and Environment inthe Arab, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy andInternational Affairs, American University of Beirut(AUB), Lebanon.

Baetting, M.B. (2008). ‘Measuring Countries’Cooperation within the International Climate ChangeRegime’, Environmental Science and Policy, 11:478-489.

Brown, O., A. Hammill, and R. Mcleman (2007).‘Climate Change as the New Security Threat:Implications for Africa’. International Affairs, 83(6):1141-1154.

Chin, J. (2008). ‘Coping with Chaos: The Nationaland International Security Aspects of Global ClimateChange’. The Journal of International Policy Solutions,9:15-26.

European Environment Agency (2009). EnvironmentalTerminology Discovery. At:http://glossary.eea.europa.eu/terminology/

Expert Consultation on National Water Policy Reform inthe Near East Beirut, Lebanon 9 - 10 December1996.

Fagan, B. (2005). The Long Summer, How ClimateChanged Civilization, New York: Basic BookPublishing.

Fujihara, Y., K. Tanaka, T. Watanabe, T. Nagano, andT. Kojiri (2008) ‘Assessing the Impacts of ClimateChange on the Water Resources of the Seyhan RiverBasin in Turkey: Use of Dynamically Downscaled Datafor Hydrologic Simulations’, Journal of Hydrology,353:33-48.

Giorgi, F (2006). ‘Climate change hot-spots’; geophys-ical Resources Letters, 33, L08707.

Haddad, B.M. (2005). ‘Ranking the Adaptive Capacity of

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Nations to Climate Change when Socio Political Goalsare Explicit’. Global Environmental Change, 15:165-176.Halwani, J. (2009). ‘Climate Change and WaterResources in Lebanon’, IOP Conf. Series: Earth andEnvironmental Science, 6.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC(2007). Special Report on the Regional Impacts ofClimate Change and Assessment of Vulnerability.

Jorgensen, D. and W.Y. al-Tikiriti (2002). ‘AHydrologic and Archeologic Study of Climate Changein Al Ain, UAE’. Global and Planetary Change, 35:37-49.

Kouri, Jean (1995). Rainfall Water Management in theArab Region ROSTAS, Cairo.

Personal Communication (2009). Investigating theClimate Sensitivity of Different Nile Sub-Basins,Thirteen International Water Technology Conference,IWTC 13 2009, Hurgada, Egypt.

Ragab R. and C. Prudhomme (2002). ‘Climate Changeand Water Resources Management in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions: Prospective and Challenges for the 21stCentury’. Biosystems Engineering, 81(1):3-34.

Second Expert Consultation on National Water PolicyReform in the Near East, Cairo, Egypt 24 - 25November 1997.

Spiess, A. (2008) ‘Developing Adaptive Capacity forResponding to Environmental Change in the Arab GulfStates: Uncertainties to linking ecosystem conserva-tion, sustainable development and society in authori-tarian rentier economies’, Global and PlanetaryChange, 64:244-252.

Strezpek, K.M., D.N. Yates, and D. El Quosy (1996).‘Vulnerability Assessment of Water Resources in Egyptto Climate Change in the Nile Basin’. ClimateResearch. 6: 89-95.

Thomas, R.J. (2008). ‘Opportunities to Reduce theVulnerability of Dry Land Farmers in Central and WestAsia and North Africa to Climate Change Agriculture’.Ecosystems and the Environment, 126:36-45.

United Nations Environmental Program - UNEP (2005).Facing the Facts: Assessing the Vulnerability ofAfrica’s Water Resources to Environmental Change.

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87

IMAN NUWAYHID, REINE YOUSSEF, RIMA R. HABIB

CHAPTER 7


Human Health

I. INTRODUCTION

Climate change is an emerging risk factor onhuman health. According to theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC), the scientific body of the UnitedNations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC), the health effects can bedirect such in the case of extreme weather events,like storms, “floods, and heat waves, or indirectsuch as “through changes in the ranges of diseasevectors (e.g., mosquitoes), water-bornepathogens, water quality, air quality, and foodavailability and quality” (IPCC, 2007).

The actual health impacts, however, are not uni-form across countries and regions. They vary inextent and nature depending on local environ-mental conditions, socio-economic circum-stances, and the range of adopted social, institu-tional, technological, and behavioural measures(IPCC, 1998; Patz and Kovatz, 2002; WHO2007, WHO, 2008a). This is reflected in theWorld Health Organization (WHO) estimationof the contribution of climate change to the glob-al burden of disease measured in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The Arab regioncomprises 22 different countries, with the major-ity falling under two WHO sub-regional group-ings. The Eastern Mediterranean Sub-Region(EMR-D), which includes Afghanistan,Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan,Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, is estimated to lose213 DALYs per 100,000 people as compared to14 DALYs/100,000 for EMR sub-region B,which groups Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Jordan,Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, SaudiArabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United ArabEmirates. Three Arab countries, Algeria,Comoros and Mauritania are classified under theAfrica sub-region AFR (D). AFR (D) is estimat-ed to lose 207 DALYs per 100,000 people for cli-mate change (WHO, 2002).

Is it climate change? Is it poverty? Or is it the vul-nerability of poor countries to climate change?Most probably it is a combination of these factorswhich explains the wide range of the global eco-nomic value of loss of life due to climate change(US $6-88 billion, in 1990 dollar prices) asreported by the IPCC. The impact is projected tobe greatest in low-income countries. Accordingto the WHO Regional Office of Eastern

Mediterranean (WHO/EMRO, 2008a) theregion is ‘one of the most vulnerable regions toclimate change because of its arid nature andreliance on rain-fed food production’ andbecause of the endemic nature of many diseasesand health problems which are sensitive to pover-ty and climate change, making the impact on thisregion greater than that on the world as a whole(Fankhauser and Tol, 1997).

This chapter reviews the impact of climatechange on human health in general, with a focuson the Arab world. It also suggests selected adap-tation practices within the context of regionalresources and constraints.

II. HEALTH IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The study of the impact of climate change onhealth is rather challenging. In few instances,health problems be it death or injury can bedirectly linked to climate or weather changes suchas drowning due to floods or heatstroke due toheat waves. Even this can be considered as a cycli-cal variation in weather or climate, especially sincemany natural calamities have been reported inpast history. The challenge is even bigger whenindirect health effects are considered. For exam-ple, malaria-ridden countries might be at a higherrisk if the mosquito zones expand or the mosqui-to biting season becomes longer because ofincreased warmth or shorter cold seasons. Thesame is true of mortality and morbidity due to airpollution where climate change adds insult toinjury for overcrowded cities dependent on fossilfuel for energy or transportation. Hence, thestudy of the health impact of climate change is dif-ficult on country or sub-regional level. Reportsthat succeeded in confirming this relationshiphave in most cases zoomed out and looked atwider geographical areas. This has not happenedyet in the Arab world. In fact, studies on the topicof climate change and human health in Arabcountries are rare if not almost nonexistent. Thefew potentially relevant published studies thatwere identified were reviewed to provide regionaldata and indirect evidence. Although clear associ-ations between health and climate change havenot been established through research, there aresome obvious potential effects of climate changeon health in the region.

HUMAN HEALTHCHAPTER 788

Box on page 90 presents a summary of the healthimpact of climate change in Arab countries basedon their national communication reports. The fol-lowing sections review in detail two examples ofdirect effects of climate change on human health(heat waves and floods) and two examples of indi-rect effects (air quality and infectious diseases).

Direct effects of climate change onhealth

i) Heat waves and heat-related impacts onhealth

Health effects associated with exposure toextreme and prolonged heat appear to be relatedto environmental temperatures above those towhich the population is accustomed (McGeehinand Mirabelli, 2001). Elevated temperatures dur-ing summer months are associated with excessmorbidity and mortality. Exposure to extremeand prolonged heat is associated with heatcramps, heat syncope, heat exhaustion, and heat-stroke (McGeehin and Mirabelli, 2001).

Heat waves in certain areas around the globe willbe hotter, more frequent and longer (IPCC,2007). The IPCC Fourth Assessment Reportpredicts that the temperature in the EastMediterranean Region will increase by 1-2O Cby 2030-2050. The frequency of very hot daysand heat waves in the East Mediterranean regionwill increase (WHO, 2008a), presenting an

important threat to health. Mortality and mor-bidity due to heat stress are expected to rise, espe-cially among particularly vulnerable infant andolder populations.

A time-series analysis study (El-Zein andTewtel-Salem, 2004) of mortality and air tem-perature in Greater Beirut, covering the periodbetween 1997 and 1999, reported a significantassociation between temperature and mortality.The authors concluded that heat-related mor-tality may constitute a significant public healthconcern even in temperate to warm climates.These results were reinforced in another studyby the same authors (El-Zein et al., 2004). Anumber of other studies from the region havefocused on heat-related morbidity. A clinicalstudy from Kuwait (Al-Tawheed et al., 2003),covering the period between 1998 and 2001,showed an increase in cases of anuria (kidneyshutdown- no urine) in hot weather. Makhseedet al. (1999), also in Kuwait, reported that theincidence of pregnancy-induced hypertensionwas highest in June (summer) and lowest inMarch (winter). They attributed this finding tohigh temperature and low humidity, althoughthe results were not conclusive. In Abu Dhabi,Shanks et al. (2001) showed that temperatureand humidity are strongly correlated with thenumber of heatstrokes dealt with at the hospitalemergency unit. Maximum temperature alonewas a better predictor of heatstroke than maxi-mum humidity alone.


ii) Hurricanes and floods

Hurricanes and associated floods, such as hurri-cane Katrina in the US in 2005, are expected tobecome more frequent globally and moreintense with climate change. According to lead-ing reinsurance companies, it was found thatnatural catastrophes have tripled in the last 10years (WHO, 2003). These natural catastrophesclaim the lives of many people and injure a lotmore. In addition to these direct effects onhealth, floods displace people, destroy theircrops, and temporarily disrupt their livelihoods.In other words, victims of such floods are at

high risk of malnutrition, diarrhea and otherwater-borne diseases, and diseases caused bycrowding and lack of hygiene (WHO, 2007).Populations with already “poor sanitation infra-structure and high burdens of infectious diseaseoften experience increased rates of diarrheal dis-eases after flood events” (IPCC, 2007). In the1980s, such events killed 692,000 and affected1.34 billion. In the 1990s, these events killed601,000 and affected 1.85 billion (WHO,2003). In some regions of the world, floods andstorms have become a major cause of death. In1999, 30,000 died from storms followed byfloods and landslides in Venezuela.


CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH IN ARAB COUNTRIES AS REPORTED IN NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE UNFCCC

Most of the Arab states have published nationalreports on the adverse effects of climate change inresponse to the request of the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFC-CC). Climate change is projected to increase healthrelated problems in the Arab region.

Climate change is projected to induce sea level riseand coastal flooding which will affect human settle-ments and infrastructure in low-lying coastal areassuch as in Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, UnitedArab Emirates, Egypt, Comoros, Lebanon, Tunisia,Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Comoros’s initial nation-al communication report to the UNFCCC reports anexpected collective food poisoning attributable toincreased consumption of toxic marine organisms.Water availability is expected to decline in the regionparticularly for a number of countries includingBahrain, Sudan, Djibouti, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco,Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Waterscarcity and damaged infrastructure is expected toinflict major health problems such as increased risk ofcholera, predicted for United Arab Emirates, anddysentery. Reduction in water availability will lead toreduced food productivity. Reductions in crop produc-tion in Bahrain, Comoros, Morocco and Saudi Arabiawould increase the potential risks of malnutrition andhunger for millions.

Egypt’s initial national communication to the UNFC-CC reported that climate change will have both direct

and indirect adverse impacts on human health in thecountry. Direct impacts of climate change on humanhealth include physiological disorders, skin cancer,eye cataracts, damage to health infrastructures,deaths and injuries and heat strokes. Indirect impactsinclude factors like demographic displacements,social, economic, ecological and air pollutionimpacts.

Elevated ambient temperatures and humidity are pro-jected to increase vector-borne disease such asmalaria. Sudan, Yemen and Comoros report intensi-fication of malaria whereas Lebanon reportsincreased malaria incidence. Additionally, a projectedincrease in water-borne diseases such as diarrhea,typhoid and hepatitis A is reported for Lebanon.Rainfall decrease and increase in temperature willincrease air pollution and consequently cause anincrease in respiratory illnesses among urban popula-tions, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon and the UnitedArab Emirates. Elevated temperatures could increasethermal stresses and extreme weather disasters result-ing in increased death and injury rates. Desertificationis predicted for northern parts of Sudan, Morocco andSaudi Arabia. Increased sand storms would have neg-ative impacts on health. In Comoros, increased inci-dence of cyclones, storms and flooding would causethe destruction of 17 health centers and 35 nursingstations. Kuwait, Libya, Syria, Oman and Qatar haveno national reports on the adverse outcomes of cli-mate change.

Sources: WHO/EMRO 2008a; UNFCCC 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008

“The predicted trend towards increasingly vari-able rainfall is likely to increase the risk of weath-er-related natural disasters, such as floods... It ispossible that climate change may also change thefrequency of other weather disasters, such aswind storms, but there is less agreement aboutthe nature and magnitude of change. Continuingsea level rise will also contribute, by makingunprotected low-lying populations increasinglyvulnerable to coastal floods...” (Campbell-Lendrum and Woodruff, 2007).

In the Arab region, we occasionally learn of alocal flood or landslide due to heavy rainfall.These events cannot be directly attributed to cli-mate change but obviously warn us of the devas-tating effects of floods if they happen at a largerscale. For example, on 16 May 2007, a flood dev-astated several villages in the Bekaa region inLebanon. Crops were destroyed and people hadto leave their houses because of high water levels.There were no follow up reports on the health,wellbeing, and livelihood of the displaced peoplewhich is not atypical in many developing coun-tries. In addition, there is no proper research ordocumentation in most Arab countries on thefrequency or intensity of such events. Mappingthe effects of a given event may also be useful inidentifying current and future populations atrisk. Maps of flood risk zones can be eventuallyprepared and populations at risk can be warnedin time.

Of more concern and relevance lately are thecyclone (Gonu) that hit Oman on June 6, 2007and the floods that affected Yemen (Hadramout)in 2008. The Cyclone Gonu in Oman was con-sidered one of the strongest in the Arabian Sea.According to the Oman News Agency(Associated Press, 2007), the cyclone killed 49people in the country and around 20,000 peoplewere affected. According to the World HealthOrganization (2008b) the floods in Yemen onOctober 24-25, 2008, left 180 dead and 10,000displaced. The floods destroyed 2,000 homes,damaged water supply networks, and interruptedaccess to telephones and electricity.

Indirect effects of climate change onhealth

The effect of climate change on existing environ-mental and public health problems is difficult todiscern. The challenge is to identify the ‘addi-tionality’, i.e., the increase in health problemsthat can be attributed to climate change as anadditional risk factor. This requires advancedand far reaching research agendas and tools. Notmuch is known about the ‘traditional’ risk factorsand causes of many public health problems in theArab world, let alone the additional effect of cli-mate change. The Arab world unfortunatelyremains one of the least published globally and, ifpublished, in journals and reports that are noteasily accessible by internet or recognized data


bases. For instance, Lebanon still lacks air quali-ty monitoring programs which hampers anyattempt to look at trends in air pollution or tocritically examine its causes. In addition, environ-mental and public health problems are the out-come of the failure of a complex web of political,policy, social, economic, and physical (environ-mental) determinants. In spite of this, it is crucialto document what we know and anticipate thepotential added effect of climate change.

This section will review the impact of air qualityand infectious diseases on health and the poten-tial contribution of climate change to both issues.

Air quality

Air quality, measured using multiple indicators,is primarily determined by the contribution ofdifferent mobile (transportation) and fixed (gen-erators, industry) sources of pollutants. This isfurther affected by the weather elements includ-ing temperature, humidity, and wind. Hence, itis obvious that climate change will have a directimpact on air quality and consequently on thehealth of exposed populations. This sub-sectionwill focus on three indicators of air quality:aeroallergens, ground level ozone, and suspendedparticulate matter.

i) Aeroallergens

Weather determines the direction and magnitudeof winds and consequently the presence, trans-port, and dispersion of dust aeroallergens. Thishas been documented around the world in many

studies which linked climate change to a widerspread of allergenic manifestations and theincrease of reported asthma cases in affected areas(IPCC, 2007). Increases in CO2 concentrationsand in temperatures were associated with anincrease in ragweed pollen production and theprolongation of the ragweed pollen season. Dustfrom Africa has been transported across theAtlantic as far as the Caribbean, where a dramat-ic increase in asthma cases has been reported as aresult (Shinn and Griffin, 2003). It was report-ed that numerous species of bacteria and fungiwell known to cause allergic reactions, pul-monary infections, or skin infections have sur-vived the transatlantic transport (Shinn andGriffin, 2003).

The above findings have serious implications foralmost all Arab countries which are in geographicproximity to deserts or are known for their largedeserts such as in North Africa and the Gulfregion. Changing wind patterns, under certainatmospheric conditions, can contribute to thelong-range transport of desert dust and mouldspores. This can occur over time-scales typicallyof 4-6 days, which can lead to adverse healthimpacts. Interestingly despite the dearth of stud-ies in this field, four out of five identified studieswere conducted in Arab countries with deserts andfrequent sand storms. Al-Frayh et al. (1988) ana-lyzed house dust samples in Riyadh and reportedthe presence of different types of fungal spores,among which many species are known to be aller-genic. Hasnain et al. (1989) identified 32 genericcategories of allergenic fungal spores in the atmos-phere of Riyadh. Of these, Cladosporium wasfound to be highest in concentration. The concen-trations of these spores are also seasonal with anincrease in warmer months and a decline in win-ter. Some indoor air pollutants identified in thisstudy were also linked to asthma. Later, Kwaasi(1998) found that sandstorm dust is a ‘prolificsource of potential triggers of allergic and non-allergic respiratory ailments’ in Riyadh. Griffin(2007) reported an increase of 100% in the num-ber of colony-forming units (CFU) over back-ground levels during dust storms in Saudi Arabia.Dust storms and humidity were among severalenvironmental risk factors associated with theprevalence of asthma in a cross-sectional study of850 schoolchildren in the United Arab Emirates(Bener et al., 1996). A similar kind of study wasconducted in Beirut by Al-Ajam et al. (2005) who


reported a seasonal pattern of mucormycosis, arare fungal infection caused by Mucorales fungi,in 15 out of 16 cases of invasive mucormycosis.Weather patterns analysis, including temperatureand rainfall, revealed clustering of cases at the endof the dry period of September to Novemberrather than the period of May to July where tem-peratures are most favourable to Mucorales. Theauthors noted that this is a regional finding (Al-Ajam et al., 2005).

ii) Other air pollutants

The WHO reports that over 1.1 billion peoplelive in urban areas where outdoor air is unhealthyto breathe. These conditions worsen under cer-tain weather patterns which enhance the forma-tion of urban heat islands which in turn lead toelevated levels of certain pollutants (Morris andSimmonds, 2000; Junk et al., 2003). Two typesof air pollutants will be considered in the follow-ing subsections: ground level ozone and suspend-ed particulate matter.

a) Ground level ozone

Photochemical smog (brown-air smog) is a mix-ture of primary and secondary pollutants formedunder the influence of ultraviolet (UV) radiationfrom the sun. Consequently, hotter days pre-dominantly lead to greater levels of troposphericozone (O3), in addition to nitrogen dioxide(NO2), peroxyacyl nitrates (PANs), and other airpollutants. In urban areas, traffic exhaust is thekey source of nitrogen oxides and volatile organ-ic compounds (VOCs). Temperature, wind,solar radiation, atmospheric moisture, ventingand mixing are all factors affecting the emissionof ozone precursors as well as the production ofozone (Nilsson et al., 2001a,b; Mott et al.,2005). Since its formation depends on sunlight,ozone concentrations are typically higher in thehotter summer months. Tropospheric ozoneconcentrations are projected to increase world-wide (Prather et al., 2003) and concentrations ofground-level ozone are increasing around theworld (Wu and Chan, 2001; Chen et al., 2004).

Exposure to elevated concentrations of ozone isassociated with increased hospital admissions forpneumonia, asthma, allergic rhinitis, other respi-ratory diseases, and premature mortality (Ebi andMcGregor, 2008).

The Arab region is not exempt from this increase,especially in light of the increased use of fossilfuels and population growth in the Gulf coun-tries. Arab cities, especially those with hot cli-mates and frequent urban heat islands, are mostlikely to be affected. Populations of these citieswould probably witness increased respiratory dis-eases as well as increased mortality and morbidi-ty as a result of prolonged exposure to tropos-pheric ozone. Research on the effect of tropos-pheric ozone on human health in the Arab regionis quasi-absent. Hence, the Arab region has tobase itself on currently available internationalmodels and develop its own in such a way to dealwith the many uncertainties that face this issue.These uncertainties include the extent of futureemissions of ozone precursors, the degree towhich future weather conditions could increaseozone concentrations levels, assumptions of pop-ulation growth, energy use, economic develop-ment, regulations, and the implementation ofthese regulations.

b) Suspended Particulate Matter

Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) consists ofa variety of solid particles and liquid dropletssmall and light enough to remain suspended inthe air for long periods. They are well known toaffect morbidity as documented in more than2000 studies published in the last 15 years(American Lung Association, 2004). The mostharmful forms are fine particles (with an averagediameter of less than 10 micrometers) and ultrafine particles (with an average diameter of lessthan 2.5 micrometers) which if inhaled can reachthe deep parts of the respiratory system (bronchi-oles and alveoli). Adverse effects include damageto the lungs, irritation of nose and throat, aggra-vation of asthma, and bronchitis. Toxic particu-lates, such as lead, polychlorinated biphenyls(PCBs) and cadmium, can lead to gene muta-tion, reproductive problems, and cancer. In theUSA, SPM is responsible for 60,000 - 70,000premature deaths a year (EPA, 1999a,b).

Using a modelling approach, Jacobson (2008)compared the health effects of preindustrial ver-sus present-day atmospheric concentrations ofCO2 The study suggested that increasing con-centrations of CO2 led to the increase of tropos-pheric ozone and PM2.5, which increased mor-tality by 1.1% per degree temperature increase


over the baseline. It was found that 40% of thisincrease was attributable to tropospheric ozoneand the rest to SPM.

Despite the known effects of ozone, SPM, andother temperature-enhanced air pollutants onhuman health, research relating to this topic is stillscarce in the Arab region. Anwar (2003) points toair pollution as one of the most important healthand environmental problems in Cairo. TheEgyptian Environment Affairs Agency (EEAA)reports that air pollution is responsible for an aver-age of 3,400 deaths each year in Cairo, in additionto about 15,000 cases of bronchitis, 329,000 casesof respiratory infection, and a large number ofcases of asthma (UNEP, 2007). Increased air pol-lution is also observed in the main cities ofAlgeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine,Tunisia (IPCC, 2007).

Saliba et al. (2006) evaluated the variation of airquality indicators such as CO, SO2, O3 andPM10 over the city of Beirut. Monthly concen-trations for ozone (reported as 23μg m-3 in win-ter and 34 μg m-3 in summer), CO, and SO2were found lower than the United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) airquality standards whereas PM10 levels werefound to be higher. Vehicle-induced emissionand winter heaters were the main sources for ele-vated CO and SO2 levels respectively whereaselevated PM10 and O3 levels were the result ofseveral local and long-range transport phenome-na.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate air pol-lution in the region. Hence, research on thepotential effects of climate change on air quality,and consequently on human health, is needed inthe Arab world.

Infectious diseases

Infectious diseases are major causes of death, dis-ability, and social and economic disruption formillions of people around the world (GlobalHealth Council, 2009). Between 14 and 17 mil-lion people die each year due to infectious dis-eases - nearly all live in developing countries(WHO, 2002). Evidence on the associationsbetween climatic conditions and infectious dis-eases is well established (WHO, 2003).Infectious agents lack a thermostatic mechanism,

making their reproduction and survival highlydependent on fluctuations in climate (Saab,2009). This section will focus on vector-borneinfectious diseases transmitted by arthropods,such as mosquitoes, ticks, sandflies and black-flies, and rodents. These morbidities are climate-sensitive and are the most studied in terms ofrelation with climate change. Other infectiousdiseases such as cholera and other water-borne ill-nesses are not covered in this section. These ill-nesses are also sensitive to climate change mostlydue to lack of access to water and deterioration inquality of drinking water.

i) Malaria

Malaria is endemic to nine countries of theWHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, but with alow risk of transmission in the majority of thecountries. In 2007, the estimated annual numberof malaria cases in the Arab countries of theregion was about 3 million, with the majority ofcases reported in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen andDjibouti (WHO/EMRO, 2007).

Sudan has the highest burden of malaria in theWHO Eastern Mediterranean region with 2.5million cases and 37,707 death cases reported for2006 (WHO/EMRO, 2008b). Children andpregnant women are at a higher risk of contract-ing malaria. Pregnant women are susceptible tomalaria with adverse outcomes of low birthweight, maternal anemia and abortions (Adam etal., 2005; WHO, 2008c). Yemen ranks secondamong Arab countries in incidence of malaria(WHO/EMRO, 2008b). Al-Taiar et al. (2006;2008) report that severe pediatric malaria, whichis endemic to the coastal plain as well as to theinland mountains, is a substantial burden tohealth services in Yemen.

Malaria has long been studied and it is knownthat “geographical diversity determines malariavariability in terms of endemicity, intensity oftransmission and type of malaria”(WHO/EMRO 2008b). Climate change is pro-jected to influence the geographical distributionand intensity of transmission of malaria, due tochanging patterns of rainfall, humidity and par-ticularly seasonal variation of temperature (Sachsand Malaney, 2002; IPCC, 2007). As an exam-ple, the falciparum malarial protozoa takes 26days to incubate at a temperature of 25ºC, while



at a temperature of 26ºC this same protozoa takesonly 13 days to incubate (Epstein 2004). A 2006study done in East Africa has revealed that a 3%increase in temperature in a certain region canmean an increase of 30-40% of mosquito abun-dance (Khamsi, 2006).

Malik et al. (1998) report that in the southwest-ern part of Saudi Arabia transmission of malariaoccurs throughout the year with peaks associatedwith the rainy season and hot summers. Al-Mansoob and Al-Mazzah (2005) investigated therole of climate on the malaria incidence rates inYemen. They found significant associationsbetween climatic factors such as temperature, rel-ative humidity, rainfall volume and wind speedwith incidence of malaria. Similarly, Bassiouny(2001) reported that favourable meteorologicalconditions (i.e., optimum temperature and rela-tive humidity) led to the prolongation of themalaria transmission season to 8 months a year inFayoum Governorate in Egypt. Hassan et al.(2003) confirmed these results and reported how-ever that the most important predictor of risk inthe Fayoum Governorate is hydrogeology. Thestudy reported the spread of specific anophelesvectors in areas where they were previouslyabsent.

In New Halfa, Eastern Sudan, a time-series analy-sis study (Himeidan et al., 2007) showed thattemperature and rainfall are driving forces of thespatial distribution of the malaria vectorAnopheles gambiae. In northern Sudan, surveysof breeding sites of the Anopheles arabiensisrevealed a seasonal pattern for the larval popula-tion which appeared to be linked to the rise andfall of the Nile River level (Ageep et al., 2009).Similarly, Hamad et al. (2002) reported seasonaltransmission of malaria in Eastern Sudan, increas-ing with onset of rainy season and high humidity.

ii) Other infectious diseases

Other infectious diseases transmitted by vectorsare also sensitive to climatic changes. The follow-ing are such examples:

- Dengue (Breakbone or Dandy Fever): This isan acute febrile disease caused by a flavivirus,which is transmitted by the bite of previouslycalled Aedes mosquitoes (now namedStegomyia aegypti). Dengue is endemic

throughout the tropics and subtropics threat-ening approximately one-third of the world’spopulation. Its transmission increases withhigh rainfall, high temperature, and even, assome studies show, by drought (IPCC, 2007).

- Cutaneous leishmaniasis (oriental sore orAleppo Boil): The distribution of the phle-botomine sandfly vector responsible for theinfection with cutaneous leishmaniasis haschanged in the past years. Other sandflies havealso re-emerged in certain parts of the world(IPCC, 2007).

- Schistosomiasis (Bilharziasis): This is a visceralparasitic disease caused by blood flukes of thegenus Schistosoma. The schistosomes thataffect humans are trematodes and they requirefreshwater snails as intermediate hosts.Schistosomiasis also may be affected by climat-ic factors, and there is some evidence that the‘freeze line’ has moved towards the north dueto warmer temperatures (IPCC, 2007). Thiswas supported by Malone et al. (1994) whoused temperature data from satellite imagery toshow that the range of S. mansoni in the Niledelta, Egypt, is expanding in the southern deltadue to new irrigation channels, a more reliablewater supply and the physical-chemical stabili-ty since the completion of the Aswan Dam.These changes have all provided a better fit tothe hydrologic niche of the parasite. Moreover,the Bulinus truncates snail, which is the inter-mediate host of S. haematobium, is now ableto tolerate several months of drought and hightemperatures. The correlation between thedensity of Bulinus truncates with weather vari-ations was monitored by Khallaayoune andLaamrani (1992) in the Attaouia area inMorocco. It was shown that snail populationsfollowed a cyclical pattern where high densityoccurred in summer. Temperature was consid-ered to be the most important factor that influ-enced the fluctuations in snails’ populations.Moreover, snails during the year of study(1987) were active throughout the year, due tothe fact that the mean daily temperature wasabove 10ºC throughout the year.Observations on the pattern of snail infectionrates showed that the maximal rate of infectionhappened in summer where the mean dailytemperature was high and contact with watermost frequent (Khallaayoune and Laamrani,1992).

- Diseases transmitted by rodents: These tootend to increase during heavy rainfall andflooding because rainfall and flooding increasethe number of rodents. A good illustrationwould be the Hantavirus PulmonarySyndrome (IPCC, 2007).

III. ADAPTATION PRACTICES

The vulnerability of human health to climatechange is a function of three factors: sensitivitywhich is a measure of the extent to which health,natural systems, and social systems are sensitive toclimate change as well as the characteristics of thepopulation; exposure to climate related hazards;and adaptation measures which are the measuresapplied to reduce the burden of a specific adversehealth outcome. Arab countries may be low directcontributors to climate change but they are athigh risk of its consequences, especially as itrelates to health risks. Consequently, Arab coun-tries must take adaptive measures to reduce theburden of disease or other related negative healthoutcomes related to climate change (Kovats,2003). Those populations who do not or cannotadapt will be the most vulnerable to climatechange.

Mitigation measures are implemented at multiplelevels to prevent ‘disasters’ or minimize theirimpact. In the case of heat waves, for example,mitigation measures include adopting buildingdesigns that take into consideration future heatwaves due to climate change especially in Arabcities, such as in the United Arab Emirates andthe Sultanate of Oman, which are expanding at avery fast pace. Buildings should limit the frequen-cy, intensity, and duration of high-temperatureepisodes. As cities grow and merge so do theirheat islands. Urban heat islands in large Arabcities can be reduced through urban planning andenvironmental preservation such as reducingautomobile use, enhancing public transportation,planting trees, protecting biodiversity, and thelike. Encouraging more environmentally sustain-able development by reducing dependence oncars, and cutting wasteful resource and energy useis a needed policy. Heat wave warning systems towarn the population about upcoming heat wavesare also recommended. However, the effective-ness of warning systems for extreme eventsdepends on individuals’ awareness and their will-

ingness to take appropriate action. Individualscan reduce their exposure by adjusting outdooractivity, modifying indoor air temperature, ordressing properly. In the case of other hazards orgeographic contexts, such as floods, communityawareness and preparedness becomes very impor-tant if it is technically or financially difficult toconstruct flood embankments or create new floodoverflow routes.

It is necessary that Arab countries implementmeasures at the country and regional levels inpublic health preparedness to face such calami-ties. In fact, such measures are still a priority tothis region regardless of climate change consider-ations. A preparedness plan must address thethree phases of a disaster: pre-disaster phase (e.g.,mitigation; awareness; warning systems), disasterphase (e.g., response; health care facilities), andpost-disaster phase (e.g., rehabilitation; long termimpact; evaluation). At a minimum, the elementsof a public health preparedness system mustinclude the following:

1) Hazard mapping

This is a crucial element of any preparedness planwhere at-risk areas and vulnerable populations areclearly mapped. At-risk areas include arid lands,coastal cities prone to sea-level rise, areas arounddams and irrigation projects, and overcrowdedcities. Vulnerable populations include poor peo-ple who most likely have poor health with highinfant mortality rates and low life expectancies,and tend to reside in areas or houses that are mostvulnerable to climate change. The latter was illus-trated in the latest flooding episode in Yemenwhich mainly affected the poorer populations.Populations in Arab countries that rely on non-irrigated agriculture are also likely to be vulnera-ble to climate change. Nomadic tribes living inthe Sahara in North Africa and the Gulf area arealso likely to be vulnerable to climate change.

Such information will help policy makers deter-mine priorities and decide on the adequate provi-sion and distribution of resources, includinghealth care resources and facilities. GeographicalInformation Systems (GIS) are an important toolin this endeavour. GIS links together geographi-cal information (such as geographic coordinatesof a specific point or the outline of an administra-tive region) to some relevant information about


that location (size of population, availableresources, potential hazards, number of peoplekilled by malaria in a given year). This wouldallow different kinds of information to be linkedfor each time and place, the mapping of modify-ing factors and outcomes in space and time as wellas trends in exposure, and the analysis of these setsof information relating to the same place at agiven time. Such activities would allow Arabcountries to have a robust database within a peri-od of a few years.

2) Research

Research is needed to assess climatic changes andrelated health impacts in the Arab world. Thiswill allow countries to better identify vulnerabili-ties and to evaluate the respective country’s capac-ity to adapt to climate change. It is needed to esti-mate the burden and cost of climate change;information which might be necessary to con-vince governments to allocate budgets for mitiga-tion and adaptation measures and further nation-al research in the field.

Arab scientists are called upon to pool theirexpertise and resources and collaborate in defin-ing a regional research agenda on climate changeand health while accommodating sub-regionaland national priorities. Priority research topicsmay include:

• Heat and health (especially in countries withhot summers): Factors relating to the adaptivecapacity of vulnerable populations and the roleof socio-economic conditions should be investi-gated. Longitudinal studies over extended peri-ods of time may be the preferred type of studiesin this case.

• Aeroallergens: This is especially needed asdesertification is on the rise. Research herecould also focus on the development of earlywarning systems for populations, especially thevulnerable and those with a predisposition.Weather reports could - for example- routinelyinclude an analysis of air pollutants and aeroal-lergens.

• Malaria transmission: Despite the strong associ-ation between malaria expansion and changesin the transmission season (which may becaused by climate change), a number of uncer-

tainties still exist about how climate change willaffect malaria. These uncertainties are mainlyrelated to the complexity of malaria dynamicsand the scarcity of historical data in relation toclimate change, in addition to the role of socio-economic factors and other factors in the devel-opment of disease. So far, in spite of itsendemicity in the region, only little research inthe Arab region exists on the topic. Mappingthe disease in time and space and analyzing pat-terns of presence versus absence is less dataintensive than other methods and can thereforebe used in countries where vector borne diseasesare a health risk and whose research capabilitiesare limited.

• Water quality in coastal cities: The rise in seawater levels and increase of seawater intrusioninto coastal aquifers threaten the quality ofdrinking water. A case in point is the city ofGaza where over-pumping has already causedseawater intrusion into freshwater coastalaquifers (Al-Ghuraiz and Enshassi, 2006).

GIS is an important tool in assessing the impactof climate change on health generally and oninfectious diseases particularly.

3) Adapting health systems

Health systems in the Arab world need to beadapted and prepared to respond to the conse-quences of climate change. Building the capacityof the health sector is a long-term commitmentwhich requires sound technical and managerialprograms. The key issue is not to develop a sepa-rate system for each type of hazard but to buildcapacities within the health sector to face all typesof risks emanating from climate change. Thisrequires that all stakeholders in health (Ministryof Public Health, health-related governmentaland non-governmental organizations, privatehealth facilities, international health agencies andprofessional associations) be involved and pre-pared. Furthermore, preparedness of the healthsystems requires a multisectoral approach andcoordination between all involved sectors, such aspublic works, transport, social services, housing,urban planning, water and electricity, is essential.

4) Capacity building

The above elements of a public health prepared-


ness system require a strong basis of training andcapacity building for policy makers, scientists,and health professionals in disaster management,research, data collection and monitoring, andresponse to health emergencies. It also involvesraising awareness among the general population,especially vulnerable populations.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the deficiency in both data and research,there is growing evidence that climate change iscontributing to the global burden of disease inArab countries. The limited research available hasshown that climate change plays an importantrole in the spread of vector-borne infectious dis-eases, such as malaria and schistosomiasis (Egypt,Morocco and Sudan), in affecting the seasonalconcentrations of some allergens in the atmos-phere, causing allergic reactions and pulmonarydiseases (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and UAE), andin the worsening of the public health impact ofheat waves especially in Arab countries with hotclimates.

Earlier in the chapter, the authors noted thatpoorer Arab countries currently carry the largestburden of the health impact of climate change.Some may question the contribution of climatechange to this burden as compared to that ofpoverty and people’s suboptimal living condi-tions. This delineation of contribution might bean interesting research question but as far as poli-cy is concerned there is enough evidence foraction-oriented policies to counteract the effectsof climate change with special attention to thepoorer populations. This is all the more so sincehealth is central to sustainable development andto the achievement of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). If Arab countriesare to achieve the MDGs and counteract theadverse effects of climate change, then variousadaptation strategies, policies and measures needto be implemented. Reduction in greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions through the shift towardsrenewable energies and increases in energy effi-ciency will yield significant long term benefits forhuman health.

There is no shortage of human resources or glob-al and regional financial resources in the Arabworld. What is needed now is the will to act.


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101

SALMA N. TALHOUK AND MAYA ABBOUD

CHAPTER 8


Ecosystems and Biodiversity

I. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATUSOF BIODIVERSITY IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab world houses a unique biological diver-sity in terms of species and ecosystems represent-ed by arid, semi arid, and Mediterranean biomes(Figure 1). The reported number of species cur-rently harboured in the Arab world is listed infloras, compendiums, and country reports (Table1). The richest countries documented in termsof plant diversity with more than 3000 speciesinclude Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria,Algeria, Tunisia, and Somalia, while animaldiversity is highest with more than 5000 speciesin Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia (CBDnational reports). The density is estimated at1000-2000 plant species per 10,000 km2 inJordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria and lessthan a 1,000 per 10,000 km2 for the remainingArab countries. The density of mammal speciesranges between 21-50 animal species per 10,000km2 in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan,Syria, and Tunisia, with a high range of 51-100in Lebanon and a range of less than 20 in theremaining countries (The Atlas of EndangeredSpecies, 2005).

Many species in the Arab world currently facemajor threats which will be augmented in thefuture due to the repercussions of climate change.With respect to terrestrial biodiversity and morespecifically plant biodiversity, according to the2008 IUCN threat categories (Table 2), Yemenhas the highest number of threatened species at159 while the remaining countries either did notindicate any data or range between 0 to 17

species. With respect to animals, the countrieswith the highest number of threatened speciesaccording to the 2008 IUCN categories includeDjibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen which all have morethan 80 threatened animal species, with a maxi-mum of 108 species in Egypt. An overall status ofthreatened species in the Arab world is summa-rized per specific taxonomic group in Table 3(IUCN, 2008).

Marine biodiversity along the coasts of the Arabworld shows significant threat levels in selectedareas such as the highly threatened dugongs inBahrain whose seagrass foraging grounds aroundthe archipelago form the world’s second largestdugong aggregation (a tightly linked group ofdugongs, large marine herbivorous mammals,occupying the same area) after Australia. In

ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITYCHAPTER 8102

EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC BIOMES IN THE ARAB WORLD FIGURE 1

Main biomes • Desert• Xeric shrubland • Semi desert• Mediterranean

Sub-categories of biomes • Temperate broadleaf and mixed forest with temperate grasslands, savannas and shrubland

in Oman, Jordan and Syria • Mediterranean forest, woodlands and scrub with scattered temperate conifer forest along the

coastline of Morocco and Algeria • Tropical & subtropical grasslands savannas & in southern Mauritania and Sudan • Flooded grasslands& savannas in Egypt and Iraq

Sources: SEDAC-Map client; Biomes and Ecosystems, 2008

addition, dolphins and whales in internationalwaters were classified in 2000 as critically endan-gered, endangered or vulnerable and numberedbetween 11-16 species on the northern coast ofMorocco and between 6-10 species in theMediterranean Basin, the coast of Mauritania,and the southern coast of Morocco (The Atlas ofEndangered Species, 2005).

With the inevitable global phenomenon of cli-mate change, freshwater biodiversity in the Arabworld will be greatly impacted and many of theseprecious resources will not survive. Table 4b out-lines the Arab countries with exceptional largeareas designated as wetlands of internationalimportance in accordance to the RamsarConvention.

Ornithological diversity constitutes a major assetto the Arab world as well as a high risk area interms of climate change impacts. Many Arabcountries lie on important bird migration routes.Djibouti, which is a crossroad in the transconti-nental North-South migration corridor, accom-modates 1 million birds per year. Mauritania ishome to the biggest wader population in theworld and millions of migratory birds come tothe country to stay through the winter months,while the Hawar Islands of Bahrain house thelargest breeding colony of Socotra cormorant inthe world. There are many threatened MarineImportant Bird Areas in the Middle East includ-ing the eastern side of the Red Sea along thecoastline of Saudi Arabia, both Eastern andWestern coastlines of the Persian Gulf, along thecoastline of the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea,along the Mediterranean coastline of Lebanonand Palestine, and within the Gulf of Aqaba. Thenumber of threatened birds classified as criticallyendangered, endangered or vulnerable in 2004ranged between 11 and 30 species in all Arabcountries except for Lebanon, Libya, Qatar,Sudan, and Tunisia which have between 6 to 10species recorded as threatened (The Atlas ofEndangered Species, 2005). The number ofthreatened birds of prey classified as criticallyendangered, endangered or vulnerable in 2000ranged between 5 and 6 species in Saudi Arabia,3 to 4 species in Egypt, Morocco, Sudan,Djibouti, Jordan, Palestine, Syria Lebanon, Iraq,UAE, Kuwait, and Yemen, and in the remainingcountries between 1 and 2 species (The Atlas ofEndangered Species, 2005). In terms of the

number of threatened seabirds classified as criti-cally endangered, endangered or vulnerable in2000 most countries either did not have any dataor reported 0 species except for Iraq, Kuwait,Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Oman,and Yemen which reported between 1 and 2species (The Atlas of Endangered Species, 2005).

II. AGRO-BIODIVERSITY AND SMALLARAB COMMUNITIES

The Arab world is home to several Centres ofOrigin (aka Vavilov Centers of Diversity) whichare geographical areas where a group of organ-isms, either domesticated or wild, first developedtheir distinctive properties. Until today Vavilovcentres are regions where a high diversity of wildrelatives to various crops can be found, represent-ing the natural relatives of domesticated crop


SPECIES NUMBERS ACROSS THE ARAB WORLDTABLE 1

Sources: a) United Nations Environment Programme, 2005 (a) ; b) CBD national reports

Country Plants AnimalsAlgeria 3,164(a) 2,941 (b)Bahrain 195 (b) -Djibouti 826 (b) 1,417 (b)Egypt 2,076 (a) -Iraq - -Jordan 2,100 (a) -Kuwait 234 (a) -Lebanon 3,000 (a) 4,486 (b)Libya 1,825 (a) -Mauritania 1,100 (a) 1,417 (b)Morocco 3,675 (a) -Oman 1,204 (a) -Palestine - -Qatar 371 (b) -Saudi Arabia 2,028 (a) -Somalia 3,028 (a) -Sudan 3,137 (a) -Syria 3,000 (a) 2,518 (b)Tunisia 2,196 (a) 2,244 (b)United Arab Emirates - -

IUCN THREAT CATEGORIES (2008)

TABLE 2

Abbreviation CategoryCR Critically endangeredEN EndangeredVU Vulnerable


THREATENED SPECIES IN EACH COUNTRY BY TAXONOMIC GROUPTABLE 3

Source: IUCN, 2008

Country Mammals Birds Reptiles Amphibians Fishes Mollusks Other Plants Total Invertebrates

Algeria 14 11 7 3 23 0 14 3 75Djibouti 8 7 0 0 14 0 50 2 81Egypt 17 10 11 0 24 0 46 2 110Iraq 13 18 2 1 6 0 15 0 55Jordan 13 8 5 0 14 0 49 0 89Kuwait 6 8 2 0 10 0 13 0 39Lebanon 10 6 6 0 15 0 3 0 40Libya 12 4 5 0 14 0 0 1 36Mauritania 14 8 3 0 23 0 1 0 49Morocco 18 10 10 2 31 0 9 2 82Oman 9 9 4 0 20 0 26 6 74Palestine 3 7 4 1 1 0 1 0 17Qatar 2 4 1 0 7 0 13 0 27Saudi Arabia 9 14 2 0 16 0 53 3 97Somalia 14 12 3 0 26 1 50 17 123Sudan 14 13 3 0 13 0 45 17 105Syria 16 13 6 0 27 0 6 0 68Tunisia 14 8 4 1 20 0 7 0 54UAE 7 8 2 0 9 0 16 0 42Yemen 9 13 3 1 18 2 61 159 266

plants. Vavillov (1951) identified eight WorldCenters of Diversity of cultivated of which theMiddle East is one of the regions identified andit includes interior of Asia Minor, all ofTranscaucasia, Iran, and the highlands ofTurkmenistan. The total number of species inthe Mediterranean region is 84 species which fallsin third place among the other centres after theChinese and the Indian Centers with their 137and 117 species, respectively (Perrino, 1988).The Mediterranean is the centre of origin of twofruit trees, the olive and carob tree, a large num-ber of cultivated vegetables (30), spices (15),oil(6) and many of the old varieties of forage plants(11) (Perrino, 1988).

To ensure the long range success in continuingthe evolution of genetic resources in the Arabworld in response to climate change it is impor-tant to protect the diverse ‘ancestral’ genotypes intheir country of origin from modern agriculturalinterference, in effect by ‘freezing’ the geneticlandscape even to the extent of subsidizing ‘prim-itive’ agro-pastoral systems (Vallianatos, 2006).The responses of small communities to climatechange by consistently constructing their liveli-hoods in a generally sustainable approach some-

times deliberately conserving or enhancingspecies and habitats should be seriously docu-mented and strategically protected. Deliberateconservation of biodiversity by small communi-ties is rarely evident for animal prey, particularlylarge game, whose very mobility often preventslocal control over access and hence diffuses anybenefits from restraint. In contrast most cases ofdeliberate conservation apply to plant resourcesor habitats. Subsistence-based small-scale soci-eties are likely to respond to climate change bypursuing enhancement of the resources neededfor livelihood and allocating subsistence efforts tothe most rewarding areas and resources currentlyavailable. These choices will often have the effectof conserving habitats and biodiversity beingimpacted by climate change but they will notnecessarily be designed to do so and may at timeshave the opposite consequence (Smith andWishnie, 2000).

III. SHIFTS IN SPECIES DISTRIBUTIONRANGES IN RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The Arab world harbours native species that tol-

Animals

7279108558939403549806817279410688685442107

erate strong heat and drought and these are like-ly to respond to climate change by either persist-ing in their current habitats or by shifting theirdistributions to relatively cooler or more humidareas at higher latitudes and/or altitudes. Shiftsin distribution ranges have been recorded univer-sally across a wide range of plant and animalgroups and may be more dramatic for less widelystudied taxa (Hickling et al., 2006).

At a global level, species native to the Arab worldmay expand their distribution ranges into higherlatitudes. For instance, South Mediterraneanspecies which are at the warm end of theEuropean temperature gradient with both medi-um niche breadth and range size are predicted tolose proportionally less suitable habitats and togain a substantial amount of new habitats incooler areas outside the Arab world (Thuiller etal., 2005b). If this is the case, then dispersal abil-ity would become a determining factor because itis the migration of competitive dry land specieswhich may ultimately result in the loss of suitableclimate space for European species in Europe(Rivedi et al., 2008).

At the regional level in the Arab world, both alti-tudinal and moisture gradients are expected toprovide unique refuges for the last remainingpopulations. These refuges are special areasamidst predominantly arid and semi-arid landsthat cater to niche ecosystems and harbour spe-cialized species as well as species that are alreadyat their ecological limit and as such are very vul-nerable to climate change. Given the absence ofpublished climate change prediction models forbiodiversity in the Arab world it is important todraw on existing geo-referenced species distribu-tion data to understand and predict species’response in terms distribution range shifts. In

this case, the use of hierarchical models whichcombine macro climate data including estimatesof species’ thermal and moisture tolerances aswell as micro climate data gradients along whichspecies are distributed is essential; otherwise alti-tude/moisture driven variability in mountainsand near water bodies will not be captured andfindings will be skewed towards documentingresponses of species prevalent in the more com-mon arid and semi-arid biomes (Rivedi et al.,2008).

Species vulnerability to climate change is there-fore expected to be highest for unique speciesthat are restricted in scope, and/or at the marginof their ecological tolerances. Examples of suchunique situations include species that thrive athigh altitudes under conditions of relativelymoderate heat and/or moisture, as well as thosethat thrive near fresh water bodies and alongcoastal zones including islands. There are manyspecies thriving in such unique habitats scatteredwithin each Arab country such as the mangrovesin Qatar, the cedar forests in Lebanon and Syria,the islands of Djibouti, the marshes of Iraq, thehigh mountain ranges of Yemen and Omanreaching 3,700 m and 3,000 m respectively, aswell as the large rivers of the Nile (Egypt andSudan), the Euphrates and Tigris (Iraq andSyria), and Yarmuk (Syria and Jordan).

Specialized species and ecosystem niches at theirecological limits are distributed along the exten-sive coastline of the Arab world, such as the man-groves of Egypt which are highly localized andhave a limited tolerance for ecological pressures.Documented temperature changes in sea water invarious areas along the coasts of the Arab worldhave led to the designation of the coastlines ofOman and Somalia as coral bleaching hotspots


RAMSAR CONVENTION

The Convention on WetlandsAn intergovernmental treatysigned in Ramsar, Iran, in 1971,that provides the framework fornational action and internationalcooperation for the conservationand wise use of wetlands andtheir resources.

WETLAND OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE IN SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES

TABLE 4

Source: Ramsar Convention

Country No of sites Total Area (Ha)Algeria 42 2,959,615Egypt 2 105,700Iraq 1 137,700Mauritania 4 1,240,600Sudan 4 8,189,600Tunisia 20 726,541

(NOAA/NESDIS, 2009). Some areas such asthe lower section of the Red Sea and southernsection of the Gulf have shown an increasebetween 1 to 1.5o C. Other areas have displayedlower but still significant increases between 0.5 to1o C such as the upper section of the Red Sea,Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Oman and theArabian Sea. Increases in temperatures will alsosignificantly affect biodiversity along sandybeaches and coastal sand dunes; for examplemarine turtles that use the beaches of Bahrain,Lebanon, and Oman for nesting will be affectedsignificantly as an increase in soil temperaturewill affect the ratio of females and males and thushave irreversible consequences on the survival ofthe species in these regions. Wetlands may beamong the most sensitive ecosystems in the Arabworld due to significant impacts of climatechange that can be induced from even smalldegrees of change in the amount and seasonalityof rainfall and evaporation.

High altitudes which provide refuges for manyspecialized species and niche ecosystems willundoubtedly witness distribution shifts and insome cases disappearance of species. Two conif-erous tree species, the cedar of Lebanon and thesilician fir reach their southernmost distributionlimit in Lebanon and their distribution range willrecede with increasing temperature to higher lat-itudes and altitudes in the region. Similarly theJuniper woodlands in Saudi Arabia which arecurrently concentrated in a narrow belt about7,600 square kilometres in size at very high alti-tudes ranging between 2000 and 3000 m will be

significantly affected by climate change (NationalReport to the CBD). This impact has been notedwhereby decreased humidity and rainfall hasimpacted juniper trees in the mountains of JibalAsh-Sharah in southern Jordan and HijazMountains in Saudi Arabia; the tips of these treesare drying up and seed regeneration hasdecreased (Al Eisawi, unpublished).

Prediction studies made in other parts of theworld suggest that climate change will make itdifficult for species thriving in unique microcli-matic refuges to persist; in analogy to these pre-dictions it is believed that species adapted to heatand drought and with broad distribution rangesin the Arab world will displace specialized speciesthriving in unique habitats and thus will causethem to lose all suitable climate space (Rivedi etal., 2008). For example, prediction models sug-gest that in South Mediterranean countries,mountain regions would experience a mean of62% species loss and turnover showing a majorchange in floristic composition in time (Thuilleret al., 2005a). Furthermore, modelling studiespredict that species tolerant to aridity will be themost stable and conserve their initial habitatsand/or expand to new suitable habitats whilespecies with narrow tolerance to higher tempera-tures would lose large proportions of habitats(40-60%) or migrate up slope towards newpotential habitats if this is geographically avail-able. Therefore, in contrast to species common-ly adapted to heat and drought in desert andsemi-desert biomes, the persistence of species inecosystems such as riverine habitats, wetlands,


and mountains in the Arab world is constrainedby water availability, temperature, and/or theirsubstrate (Table 1). The potential of theseecosystems to respond to climate change bymigration is therefore limited and their survivalmore doubtful.

IV. ECOSYSTEM COMPOSITION AND SPECIES VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Adaptations to climate change will alter entireecosystems in terms of physical, chemical andbiological features and/or alter species composi-tion forcing species to disperse, adapt or faceultimate extinction. Wherever conditions favourlarge changes in the number of species that co-exist in a given area, or species richness, commu-nities can be expected to undergo major reor-ganization. As a result protection of representa-tive and/or ecosystems currently in existencewill be problematic (Currie, 2001). Sincespecies are generally expected to respond indi-vidually to climate change, there is potential fornovel species combinations to occur, and forpresent day relationships to become increasinglydecoupled (Thuiller et al., 2006). For instancethe loss of the rarest species can be compensatedby increased growth of the dominant species,whereas reductions in the density of the domi-nant species cannot be compensated by rarespecies.

In terms of species richness, although many stud-ies show positive effects of biodiversity on ecosys-tem function, others do not. The reason may berelated to the position of the species most affect-ed by climate change. For instance, if the loss ofspecies is at top trophic levels or a keystonespecies, then it may have particularly strongecosystem effects. On the other hand climatechange induced loss of species at different troph-ic levels or different species groups will be diffi-cult to predict in response to climate change. It isquite possible, however, that over the short term(decades to centuries) species richness willdecrease, even in areas where richness is predict-ed to increase in the long term: as climatechanges, species that are intolerant of local con-ditions may disappear relatively quickly whilemigration of new species into the area may bequite slow (Currie, 2001).

Understanding species dispersal habits becomesessential since, with respect to the timescale con-sidered by climate change predictions, dispersalhabits can range from those that would be unableto disperse significantly to those that could read-ily disperse and establish. For example, specieswith large seeds will not migrate as quickly asspecies with lighter seeds or those seeds that canbe dispersed by animals. Some simulation stud-ies, however, show that many of the specieswhose potential distribution ranges change sig-nificantly will become non-viable because ofdelays in population responses to climate change(Miles et al., 2004). In general, species that cur-rently have a broad distribution range will mostlikely have high dispersal ability while those thatexist in few sites will likely have low dispersalability and be more threatened by climate changedriven disasters such as fires, droughts, and pestoutbreaks. On the other hand, migrating speciescould experience multiple extinctions as theyencounter anthropogenic land transformationsor simply reach the mountain summit or waterbody edges.

Future predictions of species vulnerability willneed to be based on analytical tools such as broadmodelling frameworks that focus on the speciessuitable climate space through the use of biocli-matic envelop models which depend on theanalysis of the complex interactions at differentlevels (Pearson and Dawson, 2003) and/or inte-grative sensitivity analysis modelling whichexamines the effect of climate change on individ-ual species, especially those that are rare, threat-ened and climate sensitive as well as ecologicalprocesses (Hannah et al., 2002).


V. IN SITU CONSERVATION-PROTECTEDAREAS AND THEIR ROLE IN MITIGAT-ING THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The Arab world has made major steps towardsthe designation of protected areas in each respec-tive country (Table 5). Protected areas includeboth national areas which cover various ecosys-tems as well as international designations such asRamsar sites, Man and Biosphere and WorldHeritage Sites.

Protection of unique ecosystems and species attheir ecological limits highlights the importanceof establishing protected areas of adequate spaninto substantial climatic (temperature/rainfall)gradients and to be linked by corridors of natu-ral/semi-natural habitats (Eclcy et al., 1999). Insitu conservation including national parks andbio-reserves are key conservation tools used toprotect species and their habitats within the con-fines of fixed boundaries. In contrast, changes inspecies distribution ranges in response to climatechange are expected to be highly dynamic

encompassing and sometimes sidestepping areasof protection. .

Conservation managers pursuing species richnessas a goal unto itself may not be protecting desiredecosystem functions. Instead targeted strategiessuch as control of invasive species may be moreeasily accomplished by identifying and targetingfunctionally important types of species (e.g. bio-control agents or native competitors) than simplyadvocating increased species richness (Srivastavaet al., 2005). For example national parks situat-ed in desert and xeric shrubland biomes would bemost sensitive to climate change as they will mostlikely experience a decrease in species richness.Protected areas situated in rare, patchy, andunique habitats may show a gain in floristic rich-ness but would experience a change in speciescomposition. If, for instance, habitat structure ischanged due to the loss of keystone species, forexample a tree species, to climate inducedchanges in fire regimes, this will have significantimpact on fauna. Furthermore, the potentialspread of species and their ability to track climatechange beyond the boundaries of protected areasas in the case of the oryx, fox and other mammalspecies, will be unlikely without human interven-tion (Thuiller et al., 2006). For example, inAfrica none of the 277 animal species examinedwere destined to extinction when full migrationability of species across landscape was assumed,and a maximum of 10 species when assuming nomigration as these species would lose 100% oftheir suitable habitats. Furthermore, if a speciesbecomes restricted to a few sites, then local cata-strophic events could easily cause the extinctionof that species; climate change can affect the sus-ceptibility of animals to disease outbreaks, andparticularly anthrax. Life cycles of ticks or otherparasites are also particularly influenced by cli-mate variation and could exacerbate risks ofextinctions.

In situ conservation sites situated in xeric anddesert shrublands are not expected to meet theirmandate of protecting current mammalianspecies diversity within protected boundaries andinstead may face significant losses of speciesdiversity that are not compensated by speciesinfluxes. Even when significant species losses arenot anticipated there may be repercussionsbecause of indirect effects caused by therearrangement of animal communities which


STATUS OF PROTECTED AREAS IN THE ARAB WORLD TABLE 5

Sources: a) United Nations Environment Programme, 2005 b) WDPA, 2009

Country Protected Areas National and as a % of Total International Land Area (2004)a Protected Areasb

Algeria 5.1 104Bahrain - 6Egypt 4.6 32Iraq 0.0 10Jordan 10.2 24Kuwait 0.0 19Lebanon 0.3 20Libya 0.1 26Mauritania 0.2 7Morocco 0.8 81Palestine - -Oman 0.1 7Qatar - 4Saudi Arabia 2.0 128Somalia 0.3 25Sudan 3.5 44Syria - 18Tunisia 0.2 87UAE 0.0 15Yemen - -World Coverage 6.1 -

may alter existing competitive interactions andinfluence trophic dynamics with changes in pred-ator-prey interactions (Thuiller et al., 2006).

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Agricultural activities and urban environmenthave high impacts on the natural environmentand as such the conversion of natural vegetationfor human activity has important ecologicalimplications. The percentage of a country's landarea that has low anthropogenic impact is a meas-ure of the degree to which wild lands that areimportant for biodiversity conservation still existin that country. The percentage of a country'sland area that has high anthropogenic impact is ameasure of the degree to which a country's landarea is dominated by high intensity land-uses.The percentage of land impacted by anthro-pogenic activity in the Arab world has been doc-umented to be the highest in Lebanon with18.08% and Kuwait with 10.47%. Algeria,Egypt, Libya, Mauritania and Oman have thehighest percentages of lands that are only impact-ed by anthropogenic activity to a low degree; the

percentages in these countries are above 70% andreach as high as 93.84 % and 92.46% respective-ly in Mauritania and Libya (Table 6).

The Arab world’s acknowledgment of the seriousimplications of climate change on biodiversityand the status enjoyed by pro-active initiativesundertaken can be deciphered by each country’snational reporting to the United NationsConvention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD).An analysis of two main questions in theUNCBD national reports reveals a bleak situa-tion into the importance given to this issue andthe action taken. On the question dealing withthe implementation of projects aimed at mitigat-ing and adapting to climate change that incorpo-rate biodiversity conservation and sustainableuse, only 4 countries have done so and 5 coun-tries have such projects under development. Theremaining 11 countries have not undertakensuch projects, have not completed a nationalreport to the CBD, or have not reported any-thing on this question.

The second question concerns countries’ coordi-nation efforts to ensure that climate change miti-


DEGREE OF INFLUENCE ON THE TERRITORIES OF ARAB WORLD TABLE 6

Country Percentage of total land area Percentage of total land area(including inland waters) having (including inland waters) having very low anthropogenic impact very high anthropogenic impact

Algeria 84.25 0.58Bahrain - -Egypt 86.37 1.85Iraq 9.51 2.08Jordan 46.61 1.65Kuwait 0.05 10.47Lebanon 0.0 18.08Libya 92.46 0.27Mauritania 93.84 0.02Morocco 17.90 2.04Occupied territories - -Oman 76.24 0.73Qatar - -Saudi Arabia 49.24 0.58Somalia - -Sudan 44.24 0.11Syria 0.21 3.10Tunisia 33.98 3.57UAE 0.46 5.02Yemen 49.09 0.17Source: ESI, 2005


gation and adaptation projects are in line withcommitments made under the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) and the United Nations Conventionto Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Inresponse to this question, 7 countries reportedhaving the relevant mechanisms and 2 countriesstated that these mechanisms are under develop-ment. The remaining 11 countries stated theyhave not implemented such mechanisms, have notcompleted a national report to the CBD, or havenot reported anything on this question.

More action is urgently needed in the Arab worldwith respect to properly and effectively respond-ing to climate change. The number of species inthe Arab world is low in accordance with theirnatural environment with total documented ani-mal and plant species ranging from 9119 speciesin Lebanon to 2243 species in Mauritania.However, regardless of species richness, it is themeasure of the relative changes in species diversi-ty which will give insight into the vulnerability ofa region with respect to climate change(Bakkenes et al., 2002). Although it is possiblethat dry-land species will be able to expand theirdistribution range, this is highly dependent onthe species’ dispersal habits and ability to over-

come natural or human created barriers orhuman caused land transformations.

In addition to studying and projecting speciesreaction to climate change, it is as important topredict which species would maintain their cur-rent distribution as the net species loss in aridand semi-arid areas would lead to collapse ofalready marginal dry-land communities. Assuch, the Arab region which is predominantlyarid (Egypt is 96% arid, while Jordan is 80% aridand 80% of the Abu Dhabi Emirate area isdesert) is especially vulnerable to significantspecies loss. There is no consensus on how tomap environmental consequences of climatechange. Locations affected least and those affect-ed most under different scenarios provide aframework for designing conservation networksto include both areas at least risk (potential refu-gia) and areas at greater risk where the rate of cli-mate change may outstrip the rate at which manyspecies can respond to change resulting in alteredecosystems representing new assemblages thatdid not exist in the past and therefore do nothave past analogues (Saxon et al., 2005). Theimpact of climate change would not solely affectthe species directly but would affect complexassociations such as species mortality from pest


outbreak which in turn may be due to the pestspecies, the amount of genetic variation andadaptability to current weather conditions in thepest population, predation levels for example bybirds on the insects, and whether or not insecti-cides have been applied.

Countries in the Arab region must design andimplement specific and tailored projects for mit-igating and adapting to climate change. In thepast, species survived previous climate changeevents as they were able to track their habitatsthough space. Unfortunately, today this isbecoming extremely and increasingly difficult ashumans have transformed or fragmented the nat-ural world. As such the inhabitants of the Arabworld should deploy significant and immediateefforts in order to provide species with the possi-bility to shift their habitats and adapt to climatechange (Jansson and Dynesius, 2002).

In terms of protected areas management, thereare two main strategies that should be applied ina parallel and complimentary manner in order toensure maximum conservation coverage and effi-ciency. The first strategy is to add new protectedareas to maintain species’ representation targetsand the second strategy refers to the managementof species within protected areas in reference toand in coordination with other protected areas(and not simply to maintain the site’s status quo)(Hannah et al., 2002). In the Arab world, itwould be of significant importance to adopt andapply three main axes in protected areas plan-ning, including the expansion of protected areas,managing outside the protected area and region-al coordination of management actions (Hannahet al., 2002).

Last but not least, the Arab region as an inter-linked geographical entity should develop andimplement regional mechanisms for coordinat-ing activities in this field. Species range-shifts,impacts of extreme events and resources asyn-chronies often occur on regional scales so aneffective climate change strategy must includemechanisms for coordinating conservationactions at the regional level across politicalboundaries and agency jurisdiction (Hannah etal., 2002). In order to tackle a global phenome-non with impacts on many levels and scales,regional coordination is a necessary element foreffective and sustainable results.

Al-Eisawi, D.M. Report on ecosystems and biodiversi-ty. Unpublished.

Al-Eisawi, D.M. (2008). ’Restoration and SavingBiodiversity in Desert Climate’. 2nd World ScientificCongress, Challenges in Botanical Research andClimate Change. 29 June-4 July 2008. Delft, TheNetherlands.

Al-Eisawi, D.M. (2004). ‘Flora and Vegetation ofHawar Islands, Kingdom of Bahrain’. Arabian GulfUniversity. Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain.

Arab Forum for Environment and Development – AFED(2008). Arab Environment, Future Challenges. AFEDAnnual Report 2008. N. Saab and M.K. Tolba (Eds.).Beirut, Lebanon: Technical Publications.

Bakkenes, M. ,J.R.M Alkemade, F. Ihle, R. Leemans,and J.B. Latour (2002). Assessing effects of forecast-ed climate change on the diversity and distribution ofEuropean higher plants for 2050. Global Change biol-ogy. 8: 390-407.

Biomes and Ecosystems (2008). Windows to theUniverse at the University Corporation for AtmosphericResearch (UCAR). ©1995-1999, 2000 The Regentsof the University of Michigan; ©2000-05 UniversityCorporation for Atmospheric Research. At:http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/earth/Life/images/biomes_lg_jpg_image.html

Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD (2007).Biodiversity and Climate Change Biodiversity andClimate Change-International Day for BiologicalDiversity.

Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD. NationalReports. At: http://www.cbd.int/reports/

Currie, D.J. 2001. ‘Projected effects of climatechange on patterns of vertebrate and tree speciesrichness in the conterminous United States’.Ecosystems. 4: 216-225.

Eclcy, H. A. C., M. J. Lawes, and S. E. Piper (1999).‘The influence of climate change on the distribution ofindigenous forest in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’.Journal of Biogeography. 26: 595-617.

Environmental Sustainability Index – ESI (2005).Benchmarking National Environmental Stewardship.Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. YaleUniversity Center for International Earth ScienceInformation Network Columbia University.

Hannah I., G.F. Midgley and D. Millar (2002). ‘Climatechange-integrated conservation strategies’. GlobalEcology and Biogeography. 11: 485-495.

Hickling, R. D. B. Roy, J.K. Hill, R. Fox, and C.D.Thomas (2006). ‘The distributions of a wide range oftaxonomic groups are expanding polewards.’ GlobalChange Biology. 12: 450-455.

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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – IPCC(2007). Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptationand Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II tothe Fourth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [M.L.Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van derLinden and C.E. Hanson (Eds.)], Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,USA.

International Union for Conservation of Nature andNatural Resources – IUCN (2008). At: http://www.iuc-nredlist.org/static/stats

Jansson, R and M Dynesius (2002). ‘The Fate ofClades in a World of Recurrent Climate Change:Milankovitch Oscillations and Evolution.’ AnnualReview of Ecology and Systematics, 33:741-777.

Kapos V., Ravilious C., Campbell A., Dickson B., GibbsH.K., Hansen M.C., Lysenko I., Miles L., Price J.,Scharlemann J.P.W., Trumper K.C. (2008). Carbonand Biodiversity: a Demonstration Atlas. UNEP-WCMC,Cambridge, UK.

League of Arab States, ‘Background paper on ArabRegion State of Implementation on Climate Change’.Technical Secretariat Council of Arab MinistersResponsible for the Environment.

Mackay, R. (Ed.) The Atlas of Endangered Species(2005). Earthscane. Myriad Editions Limited.

Miles, L. A. Grainger, and O. Phillips (2004). ‘Theimpact of global climate change on tropical forest bio-diversity in Amazonia.’ Global ecology and biogeogra-phy. 13: 553-565

National Environmental Satellite Data and Informationservice (NOAA/NESDIS) (2009). At:http://www.osdpd.noaa.gov/PSB/EPS/climo&hot.html

Leary, N. and Kulkarni, J. (2007). Climate ChangeVulnerability and Adaptation in Developing CountryRegions. Draft Final Report of the AIACC Project AGlobal Environment Facility Enabling Activity in theClimate Change Focal Area. Implementing Agency:United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi,Kenya

Olmos, S. (2001). Vulnerability and Adaptation toClimate Change: Concepts, Issues, AssessmentMethods. Prepared for the Climate Change KnowledgeNetwork.

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Rivedi, M.R., P.M.Berry, M.D.Morecroft, andT.P.Dawson (2008). ‘Spatial scale affects bioclimatemodel projections of climate change impacts on

mountain plants.’ Global change biology. 14: 1-15. Saxon, E., B. Baker, W. Hargrove, F. Hoffman, and C.Zganjar (2005). ‘Mapping environments at risk underdifferent global climate change scenarios.’ Ecologyletters. 8: 53-60.

Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity(2003). Interlinkages between biological diversity andclimate change. Advice on the integration of biodiver-sity considerations into the implementation of theUnited Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange and its Kyoto protocol.Montreal, SCBD, 154p.(CBD Technical Series no. 10).

Smith, E. A. and M. Wishnie (2000). ‘Conservationand subsistence in small-scale societies.’ AnnualReview of Anthropology. 29: 493-524.

Socioeconomic data and applications centre (SEDAC)Map client. At:http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/mapviewer/index.jsp

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World Database on Protected Areas – WDPA. At:http://www.wdpa.org/MultiSelect.aspx


Infrastructure

113

HAMED ASSAF

CHAPTER 9

I. INTRODUCTION

Infrastructure is the lifeline that supports all sortsof human activities - domestic, commercial, andindustrial - in urban as well as rural settings.Transportation systems, coastal defence works,water supply and wastewater systems, electricgeneration facilities and oil and gas pipelines rep-resent the bulk of infrastructure, which areexpected to be impacted by impending climaticchanges. Despite the significance of infrastruc-ture, few studies have been conducted world-wide, and very few in the Arab world, to assessthe impact of climate change and explore adapta-tion strategies. Consequently this assessmentstudy is conducted based on reviewing literaturemostly published in developed nations andextrapolating findings by analogy to the Arabregion. The analogies are based on selecting stud-ies pertaining to regions with similar climate,topography and urban settings.

Four categories of infrastructure are consideredin this study: transportation, coastal protectionworks, water supply and wastewater systems, andenergy generation and supply systems. Theassessment looks at the impacts of climate changeon these infrastructure systems and potentialoptions for building and enhancing adaptivecapacity.

II. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Transportation infrastructure includes both net-works such as roads and highways and facilitiessuch as bridges, ports and tunnels (U.S. NationalResearch Council, 2008). The transportationinfrastructure in the Arab world is generallyexposed to prolonged hot and extremely hotdays, sandstorms, thunderstorms and dusty andwindy conditions, and sea surges in the coastalregions. All these climatic conditions are expect-ed to intensify, and to become more frequent andwidespread under projected climate change sce-narios.

The impacts of climate change on the transporta-tion sector can generally be categorized into thoserelated to the structural integrity of infrastructureand those affecting its operation. Adapted fromthe U.S. National Research Council (2008),these impacts can be summarized as shown in

Table 1. The projected increase in intensity andprolongation of very hot days can result in thesoftening of asphalt and consequent degradationof road pavement which affects its operation andincreases risks of traffic accidents. These climaticconditions may lead to excessive expansion ofbridge components and deformation of metalcomponents such as rail tracks and bridge steelelements. Excessive heat decreases the efficiencyof construction and maintenance activities,increases heat-related health risks to constructioncrews and commuters, and poses limits on themaximum loads of trucks and airplanes.

Based on work by the U.S. National ResearchCouncil (2008), Neumann and Price (2009)identify several measures to develop and enhanceadaptive capacity in the transportation sector. Ofrelevance to the Arab region are changes in trans-portation operating and maintenance practices,design strategies, planning of capital investment,control on land use, adoption of new technolo-gies and material, and development of informa-tion base and decision-support tools.

Preparedness to extreme weather conditions andevents should be incorporated into routine oper-ations with an emphasis on closer collaboration

INFRASTRUCTURECHAPTER 9114

with emergency management agencies.Infrastructure, especially critical components,should be designed on more robust standards.Considering the uncertainty in models of climatechange impacts, infrastructure could be designedso as to have a shorter life span, thereby facilitat-ing marginal improvements to provide flexibilityin dealing with changing climatic conditions.

Integrated transportation and land-use planningcan be an effective adaptation strategy in reduc-ing the impact of climate change by restrictingdevelopment and settlement in high-hazardareas. This can be implemented at the level ofplanning of new infrastructure or rehabilitationof those affected by climate change. The successof this approach is expected to vary from onecountry to another depending on the currentlevel of development of hazard prone areas, inte-gration of planning agencies and support forthese changes which may not be popular amongsignificant sectors of the society. Recent advances in monitoring technology,

information management, decision support sys-tems and modelling, and development of newconstruction materials open up new opportuni-ties for managing the impact of climate changeand designing infrastructure elements capable ofwithstanding more extreme climatic conditions.

III. COASTAL PROTECTION

Thermal expansion of sea water and influx offresh water from melted ice sheets and glaciersoccasionally accompanied with local land subsi-dence are destined to increase sea levels by theend of the 21st century to levels estimatedbetween 19-59 centimetres according to IPCCfigures; it should be noted that these predictionsexclude “future rapid dynamical changes in iceflow” and the full “likely” temperature range(IPCC, 2007). Recent evidence of projectedhigher contributions from land-based ice such asthe Greenland Ice Sheet indicates that sea levelrise (SLR) at the end of the century could range


IMPACT OF PROJECTED CLIMATIC CHANGES ON TRANSPORTATIONTABLE 1

Impact on operation of the infrastructure

• Limitation on the maximum load capacity oftrucks and airplanes due to weakening ofpavement.

• Harsh climatic conditions will reduce the effec-tiveness and increase the cost of constructionand maintenance.

• Frequent closure of coastal roads due to seasurges.

• Storm surges may disrupt operations and posehazards to passengers of coastal airports(e.g., Beirut and Manama Airports).

• Intense sandstorms in desert areas across theArab world would cause disruption of roadtraffic and increase frequency of closures andaccidents.

• Disruption of the operation of airports.

Climatic changes

Increases in frequencyand intensity of veryhot days and heatwaves.

Increase in sea waterlevel / sea surges.

Increase in thefrequency andintensity ofsandstorms,thunderstorms, andwindy conditions.

Impact on structural elements of infrastructure

• Excessive expansion in bridge joints and pave-ment surfaces

• Decreased viscosity of asphalt which may leadto traffic-related rutting and displacement ofpavement.

• Deformities in metal components includingrail-tracks, bridge steel elements, etc

• Inundation of coastal transportation elementsincluding roads, bridges, airports, etc.

• Erosion and deterioration of pavement, bridgesupport and its base.

• Costly adjustment in harbour and port facili-ties to accommodate tidal increases and moreintense sea surges.

• Increased damages to road, rails and bridges.• Increased risk of mudslide and rockslide in

mountainous regions, such as in Lebanon.

Sources: Adapted from the U.S. National Research Council (2008).

from 0.5 to 1.4 meters; with some studies show-ing that melting from ice sheets alone could causeSLR of up to 2 meters. Not only would SLRresult in the inundation of highly populated andproductive areas, but it would also accentuate theimpact of sea surges leading to beach degrada-tion, erosion of road bases, instability of bridgesand harbour structures, in addition of posingserious hazards to coastal population.

These projections could have dire consequencesfor the Arab world considering the concentrationof very significant proportions of population andeconomic assets in coastal zones in the majorcities such as Alexandria, Casablanca, Algiers,Tripoli, Tunis, Beirut, Latakia, Jidda, Basra,Kuwait city and Dubai. In a study by theOrganization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) (Nicholls et al., 2008)Alexandria was currently ranked 9th in terms ofexposed population (1.33 million) and 17th interms of exposed assets ($28.46 billion) amongthe world’s portal cities. By 2070, the city is pro-jected to be in the 11th place in terms of exposedpopulation (4.38 million) and 20th in terms ofexposed assets ($563.28 billion).

Despite the gravity of this situation there are veryfew studies carried out assessing the impact ofSLR in the Arab region (e.g., AFED, 2008: 129-131). One of these studies (El Raey et al., 1999)

provided an assessment of the impact of SLR onthe two main coastal directorates in Egypt:Alexandria and Port Said. Current conditionsand those for 0.25, 0.5 and 1 meter projectedSLR were assessed. The study shows that theseareas are highly vulnerable to SLR with thepotential of forcing millions to permanentlymigrate out and result in losses in the billions ofdollars to urban dwellings, recreational facilities,industrial assets and infrastructure.

Al-Jeneid et al. (2008) assessed the impact ofSLR on Bahrain’s archipelago. SLR of 0.5, 1, 1.5,2 and 5 meters were considered. The findingsunderscore the vulnerability of Bahrain to SLReven for the lower SLR of 0.5 meters. This ismainly attributed to the concentration of popu-lation and commercial and industrial activities inthe coastal areas. In particular, key industrial andcommercial parks and infrastructure includingmain roads and highways are situated in low-lying newly reclaimed areas.

One of the dilemmas facing policy makers indealing with the impact of SLR is striking a bal-ance between the costly investment in developingand maintaining coastal protection works on theone hand and the difficulty in controlling andreversing urban and industrial growth in coastalareas on the other. For instance, it is deemed pro-hibitively expensive and socially disruptive to


move millions of inhabitants, recreational facili-ties, commercial and industrial establishmentsout of the coastal areas in Egypt (El Raey et al.1999). Also costly is the development of compre-hensive coastal protection schemes along Egypt’sextended coastal line. In Bahrain, large invest-ments have gone into developing reclaimed areasand few options are available to relocate poten-tially impacted populations and assets to the inte-rior.

El Raey et al. (1999) explore several adaptationoptions including beach nourishment enhancedby groins, breakwaters, land use change and reg-ulation and integrated coastal zone management(ICZM). The first two options represent struc-tural measures with varying costs, while land useand regulation represent “soft” measures aimed atdiscouraging and reversing development in haz-ard-prone areas. The authors recommend adopt-ing the latter option of ICZM which combinesboth measures in addition to raising publicawareness, institutional cooperation and capacitybuilding. The non-structural approaches are alsoemphasized by Kirshen et al. (2008) who con-clude that in addition to being sustainable andenvironmentally friendly, they are flexible, no-regrets and co-benefit policies.

Neumann and Price (2009) emphasize thatalthough coastal defence infrastructure isdesigned to mostly protect private property, it ismore cost effective to plan and develop it at alarge collective scale. They emphasize, however,the importance of integrating coastal protectionwith land-use planning where development inhazard-prone areas is strongly discouragedthrough public awareness, regulation and/orincreasing insurance premiums.

IV. WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATERINFRASTRUCTURE

Although generally under extreme pressure fromrising demand and water scarcity, water supplysystems vary across the Arab region from thosemostly dependant on renewable freshwaterresources such as those in Egypt, Lebanon andIraq to those that are totally dependent on non-renewable fossil groundwater and desalination,namely the Arab Gulf states. Coupled with exces-sive growth in population and rising living stan-

dards, climate change will exacerbate waterscarcity conditions across the Arab world. Mostclimate general circulation models (GCMs) proj-ect that North Africa and the Levant will under-go a persistent reduction in total precipitationcoupled with rising temperatures, which willreduce available water resources (Assaf, 2009).Rising sea levels will increase pressure on coastalaquifers and will accelerate the on-going saliniza-tion in coastal aquifers such as those of Beirutand Gaza city. In Lebanon, climate change isexpected to cause higher winter temperatureswhich will decrease snowfall, which will in turnreduce natural snowpack storage.

Adaptation to these changes is most optimally andsustainably achieved through an integrated watersupply/demand management. Demand manage-ment involves raising public awareness regardingwater conservation, using water pricing as anincentive tool to reduce consumption and rehabil-itating water networks to reduce losses. Studies inthe USA have shown that the reliability of waterresources systems is largely dependent on storagecapacities, which are key factors in maintainingsystem resiliency under the impact of climatechange (Kirshen et al., 2006). Dam reservoirsmake up most of the storage capacity worldwideand in many Arab countries with river systemsincluding Egypt, Morocco, Syria and Iraq. Aquifer


recharge is increasingly being used to take advan-tage of excess winter runoff. It has the added ben-efit of reducing evaporative losses. Treated waste-water represents a valuable water source that canbe tapped to supplement freshwater waterresources. Tunisia and Egypt have invested consid-erably in wastewater treatment facilities and supplynetworks (EUROMED, 2009).

The projected increase in the intensity of rainfallevents combined with reduction in hydraulicefficiency due to SLR in coastal areas is expectedto result in more frequent sewer overflow, withassociated public health problems, and floodingof culverts and roads (Infrastructure Canada,2006). Also, more intense rainfall events andthunderstorms increase peak volume and sedi-ment loading into wastewater treatment plantsleading to inadequate treatment, reduction inefficiency and possible shutdown. Design criteriafor wastewater elements need to be revisited toimprove their resiliency under the impact of cli-mate change.

V. ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLYINFRASTRUCTURE

Although great emphasis is placed on the energysector as the main source of GHG emissions, theimpact of climate change on the energy genera-tion and supply system is much less studied. Oneof the main assessment studies on the impact ofclimate change on the energy sector was commis-

sioned by the US Climate Change ScienceProgram (US CCSP, 2007). The study providesa summary of the current knowledge about theimpact of climate change on consumption, gen-eration and supply of energy in the US.Information gleaned from this report anddeemed relevant to the Arab world is summarizedbriefly in the following paragraphs.

Projected higher summer temperatures willincrease cooling energy requirements, which arealready a major item in the total energy bill ofmost Arab countries. In contrast, projectedwarmer winters will reduce heating energyrequirements. However, these energy savings willbe dwarfed by the increases in cooling energyrequirements. This net increase in energyrequirements will be tempered by savings to begained through technological advances inimproving the efficiency of energy intense equip-ment. A significant share of energy is used acrossthe Arab world in groundwater abstraction,desalination, treatment, transfer and distribu-tion. Projected climate change-induced declinesin fresh water supplies and increase in demand inthe region would increase energy requirementsfor all these activities.

Projected increases in average air and water tem-peratures and limited availability of adequatecooling water supplies are expected to affect boththe efficiency, operation and the development ofnew power plants. The performance of gas tur-bines is particularly sensitive to ambient temper-


ature and pressure. A 30ºC increase in ambienttemperature, which is typical of diurnal changesin desert areas, can result in a 1 to 2% reductionin efficiency and a 20 to 25% decrease in poweroutput; as these results are linear, smaller increas-es will likewise have considerable effects on effi-ciency and output (Davcock et al., 2004).Consequently, overall warming is expected todecrease total power capacity available and pro-duction cost. Increased water temperature willplace strains on thermal plants.

Climatic changes are expected to impact renew-able energy infrastructure. Decreased riverrunoffs will reduce hydroelectric output. This isparticularly significant for countries such asEgypt, Syria and Iraq with large hydroelectriccapacity. Changes in wind conditions will affectthe performance and reliability of current andplanned wind farms. Solar energy production issensitive to cloudiness, which is expected tochange across the region.

Projected increases in the activity of extremeweather events could lead to more downing ofpower transmission towers and lines, as well asdisruptions in the operation of power plants andrefineries. It could also impact trucking or ship-ping of fuel supplies, which disproportionatelyimpact remote areas and small countries with nolocal energy resources such as Lebanon. Manypower plants in the Arab region are placed only afew meters above sea level making them particu-larly vulnerable to damage from sea level rise andwave surges.

Enhancing the adaptive capacity of the energyinfrastructure could be achieved through an inte-grated approach that involves utilizing techno-logical advances to improve power plant efficien-cy, demand management, decentralization ofpower generation to spread climate change riskover a larger area, storm planning for powerplants and refineries, and building strategic fuelreserves to manage disruptions to fuel supply anddeliveries (Neumann and Price, 2009).

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Climate change is projected to significantlyimpact infrastructure across the Arab world.

Transportation infrastructure is generally vulner-able to projected increases in the intensity andfrequency of hot days, storm activities, and sealevel rise (SLR). Reliability of water supply sys-tems will be impacted by expected reductions infresh water supplies and higher average tempera-tures. Wastewater networks are particularly vul-nerable to excessive rainfall events and SLR.Energy generation will be hampered by higherambient temperatures which will reduce the effi-ciency and capacity of gas turbines, and reducecooling efficiency of thermal plants. Energy dis-tribution and transmission systems will be moreprone to failure due to increase extreme weatherevents.

Integrated land use and infrastructure planning,water and energy demand management, theenhancement of the resiliency of infrastructurecomponents to withstand climatic change,upgrading of design criteria and operations toincorporate the impact of climate change, utiliza-tion of new technology, and engagement of thepublic in the decision making and raising theirawareness of climate change are key recommen-dations for developing and enhancing the adap-tive capacity of infrastructure in the Arab world.


Al-Jeneid, S., Bahnassy, M., Nasr, S. and El Raey, M.(2008). ‘Vulnerability assessment and adaptation tothe impacts of sea level rise on the Kingdom ofBahrain’. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies forGlobal Change. 13(1):87-104.

Assaf, H. (2009). Climate Change: Potential Impact onWater Resources in the Middle East and AdaptationOptions. Research and Policy Memo #2, Research andPolicy Forum on Climate Change and Environment inthe Arab, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy andInternational Affairs, American University of Beirut(AUB), Lebanon.

Davcock, C., R. DesJardins, and S. Fennell (2004).“Generation Cost Forecasting Using On-LineThermodynamic Models”. Proceedings of ElectricPower, March 30-April 1, 2004, Baltimore, MD.

El Raey, M., K. Dewidar, and M. El Hattab (1999).‘Adaptation to the impacts of sea level rise in Egypt’.Climate Research, CR Special issue 6, Inter Research,12(2, 3):117ñ128.

EUROMED (2009). Identification and Removal ofBottlenecks for Extended Use of Wastewater forIrrigation or for other Purposes.

Infrastructure Canada (2006). Adapting Infrastructureto Climate Change in Canada’s Cities andCommunities: A Literature Review. Ottawa, ON:Infrastructure Canada, Research & Analysis Division.

Kirshen, P., R. Matthias, and W. Anderson (2008).‘Interdependencies of urban climate change impactsand adaptation strategies: a case study ofMetropolitan Boston USA’. Climatic Change.86:105ñ122.

Kirshen, P., M. Ruth, and W. Anderson (2006).‘Climate’s Long-term Impacts on Urban Infrastructuresand Services: The Case of Metro Boston’. In RegionalClimate Change and Variability: Impacts andResponses, edited by M. Ruth, K. Donaghy, and P.Kirshen. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 190?252.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC(2007). Climate Change 2007: The Scientific Basis,Summary for Policymakers - Contribution of WorkingGroup I to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007.

Neumann, J.E., and J.C. Price (2009). Adapting toclimate change, the public policy response - publicinfrastructure, Resources for the Future (RFF).

Nicholls, R.J., S. Hanson, C. Herweijer, N. Patmore,S. Hallegatte, J. Corfee-Morlot, J. Ch‚teau, and R.Muir-Wood (2008). Ranking Port Cities with HighExposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes:Exposure Estimates. OECD Environment WorkingPapers, No. 1. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environment Directorate.

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4.5, Effects of Climate Change on Energy Productionand Use in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S.Climate Change Science Program (CCSP).

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121

ABDELLATIF KHATTABI

CHAPTER 10


Tourism

I. INTRODUCTION

Tourism in the Arab world is becoming increas-ingly important given the natural, cultural andhistoric tourism potential of the region’s coun-tries. Tourism can be considered as a drivingforce for local economies and a source of foreigncurrency, particularly for countries whose energyresources are limited such as Morocco, Tunisiaand Lebanon. Tourism could also be a lastingsubstitute for those countries that haveeconomies based on non-renewable energyresources. However, like most other sectors ofeconomic activity, the tourism sector is vulnera-ble to climate change impacts and might alsocontribute to or exacerbate it.

In fact, tourism is regarded as one of the econom-ic sectors most sensitive to the potential impacts ofclimate change, as are the agricultural, environ-ment and water sectors (Wilbanks et al., 2007).

This chapter highlights some issues related totourism and climate change in the Arab world,and how these might impact these countries’economies. It also suggests some mitigative andadaptative actions which need to be taken eitherin the short, medium and long term, to lessen thevulnerability of this sector.

II. TOURISM IN THE ARAB WORLD

According to statistics compiled by the WorldTourism Organization (2008), internationaltourist arrivals at the borders of the Arab coun-tries in 1995, 2000, and 2005 were as depicted inFigures 1 and 2.

Five Arab countries are among the top 50 mostvisited countries in the world. Saudi Arabia isranked 21st, followed by Egypt (23rd) andMorocco (31st). Tunisia occupies the 34th posi-tion and Bahrain the 45th position. As SaudiArabia is ranked the first destination in the Arabregion, we have to clarify that the visitors toSaudi Arabia are almost exclusively pilgrims.

Figures from the World Tourism Organizationon the evolution of international tourism receiptsin the Arab countries are given in Table 1.

Five Arab countries are also among the top 50 interms of tourism receipts. The first among themis Egypt which occupies the 27th position, fol-lowed by Morocco (31st) and Saudi Arabia(38th). Lebanon ranked 41st and the UAE occu-pies the 42nd position.

III. THE TOURISM SECTOR AND THECHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The relationship between tourism and climatehas been studied for a long time, but it is verycomplex and remains difficult to define. Theinterest in the connection between tourism andclimate change is quite new in the literature, buthas been getting special attention in the last twodecades, as the sector is simultaneously very vul-nerable to climate change and is among themajor sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-sions. This duality refers on one side to the miti-gation challenge and on the other side to vulner-ability and adaptation issues.

The climate is a fundamental attribute of atourism destination. It is a strong factor of moti-vation and satisfaction. However, the relation-ship between climate and tourism is very com-plex: the perception of what constitutes ìgoodweather’ depends among others factors on thedestination, the type of activity envisaged, andthe tourist (age, health, etc.).

Several more or less successful initiatives aimed atmodelling this relationship have been developed,one of which is the index of tourism comfort. Itcombines data on the average temperature, themaximum temperature, precipitation, sun andwind conditions, and humidity, to assign anindex to a site, which reflects the degree of cli-

TOURISMCHAPTER 10122

TOURIST ARRIVALS IN THE ARAB WORLDFIGURE 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1995 2000 2005

(Mil

lio

ns)

Source. U.N.W.T.O, 2008

matic comfort that a tourist feels at a given site(Billé, 2007).

With reference to the evolution of the climatein the Arab region, several reports tend to high-light a trend of warming associated with areduction in precipitation for most of the Arabcountries. This trend is accompanied by inten-sification of extreme weather events such asdroughts, storms, and heat waves (FAO, 2008).In Morocco, for example, it is expected that thearid part of the country will expand towards thenorth and northeast as was shown by the aridi-ty index of De-Marton, computed on a set ofstations all over the country for two differentperiods 1961-1985 and 1986-2005 (DMN,2008) and a Statistical Downscaling Model ofIPCC scenarios A2 and B2. Data showedincreases of mean temperature, droughtlengths, and the number of hot days, as well asa diminishing rate of rainfall (Driouech andKasmi, 2008).

Moreover, according to the predictions of theIPCC (2007), the rate of climate change will‘most probably’ accelerate with the continuationof GHG emissions at current or higher rates.Even using the most optimistic estimates, theannual volume of rainfall will decrease by 30%by the year 2050, the ocean average surface tem-perature will increase by 1.8ºC to 4.0ºC by theend of the 21st century, and the mean sea levelwill rise by approximately 3.1mm annually(IPCC, 2007).

The biological and physical reactions to this con-tinuous warming of the oceanic temperatures, towater deficiency and to sea level rise can reflecton the index of climatic comfort (Ceron andDubois, 2008).

Many Arab countries, including those belongingto the top 50 most visited countries in the worldmay witness the numbers of tourists diminishingand by consequence their tourism receiptsdecreasing, with Saudi Arabia being a likelyexception as most of the tourists are pilgrims andare motivated by religious duty rather thantouristic attractions.

Vereczi (2007) has shown the potential implica-tions of climate change on Mediterranean desti-


SHARE OF TOURISTS’ ARRIVALS IN THE ARABWORLD FOR THE PERIOD 2005-2007

FIGURE 2

M orocco15%

Egypt21%

Saudi Arabia22%

O thers8%

Syria5%Bahrain

6%

Jordan8%

Tunisia15%

Source. U.N.W.T.O, 2008

INTERNATIONAL TOURISM RECEIPTS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIESTABLE 1

Country International tourism receipts(billion U.S dollars)

1995 2000 2005 2006 2007Saudi Arabia - - 5.4 4.961 5.228Egypt 2.7 4.345 6.9 7.591 9.303Morocco 1.3 2.039 4.6 5.967 7.264Lebanon - - 5.5 5.000 -United Arab Emirates 0.6 1.100 3.2 5.000 -Tunisia - 1.682 - 2.275 2.555Bahrain - 0.573 - 1.048 1.105Jordan - 0.723 - 2.060 2.312Sudan - - - 0.252 0.262Kuwait - 0.098 - 0.203 0.222Source. U.N.W.T.O, 2008

nations which involve a large portion of the Arabworld. Table 2 gives some of the implicationsidentified and how the market will react to adapt.There also exists a high sensitivity of coral reefecosystems to climate change and for some areasin Egypt and Jordan, for example, this may havegrave negative implications for these populartourist attractions.

Figure 3 shows that there will likely be a declineof the index of tourism comfort in the Arabworld in the coming decades. The areas current-ly classified as “good”, “very good” or even“excellent”, will be either “marginal” or“unfavourable” categories by the year 2080.

IV. VULNERABILITY OF THE TOURISMSECTOR TO THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATECHANGE IN THE ARAB WORLD

The direct potential consequences of climatechange will be increases in average temperaturesof the sea and the air, of the sea level, of the fre-quency and intensity of heat waves, of droughts,and of extreme temperatures, and a decrease inprecipitation. The indirect consequences will becoastal erosion, submersion of coastal zones,increased stress on ecosystems, salinity of theunderground water table, droughts, soil erosionand landslides.

The vulnerability of the tourism sector to direct

and indirect climate change effects will be differ-ent from one part of the world to another, andwill vary also with tourism practices. The climatedetermines the length and the quality of thetourism season and plays an important role in thechoice of the destination and the expenditure oftourists (Scott, 2006).

In the Arab world, the direct impacts of climatevariation on the tourism sector will be important(Becken, 2007), mainly because this region willbe subject to an increase in the frequency ofextreme weather events (e.g. droughts, heatwaves) (IPCC, 2007), and the tourism sector isvery sensitive to the variability and change of theclimate.

The climate has effects on many environmentalresources which constitute important assets fortourism development, such as biodiversity, land-scape, level of water quality and quantity, snowconditions, etc. (Gossling and Hall, 2006). Inmany Arab countries, tourism is closely associat-ed to these natural assets, some of which areseverely impacted in various ways by climate vari-ability and change. In coastal areas of northernAfrica and the Middle East, there are also landand sea interactions that magnify dangerous heatconditions (Diffenbaugh et al., 2007).Summertime sea surface temperatures in theMediterranean are expected to increase and makethe region more suited to tropical cyclone devel-opment (Gaertner et al., 2007).


EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MEDITERRANEAN DESTINATIONSTABLE 2

Source: Adapted from Vereczi, 2007

Climate change effects at the place of destination

•Winters milder and wetter• Summers warmer anddrier• Changes more pro-nouncedin the EasternMediterranean•Increase of heat index•More days above 40°C•More arid landscapes•Impacts of sea level riseexacerbated by the low tides

Implications for the destination

•More severe risks of droughtsand fires•Increasing water shortages•Increased personal exposureto heat•Beach degradation and lossof habitats due to sea levelrise•More vulnerability to tropicaldiseases (e.g. malaria)•More flash flooding•Poor air quality in cities

Possible reactions of the market

•Improvement of summers inNorthern Europe generatesmore domestic holidays•Less incentive to spend sum-mer holidays in theMediterranean•Increased incentive for spend-ing holidays in theMediterranean during the inter-mediate seasons•Increased incentive for south-erners to travel to the North

Water resources

North Africa and the Middle East are almost uni-versally recognized as the driest and least endowedwith water resources regions of the world(Constantino, 2009). This situation consequentlyaffects the economic and social development ofthe majority of the countries of this region. Theaverage availability of water per capita approaches7,000 m3 annually per capita at the global level,whereas it is less than 1,000 m3 annually per capi-ta in this region (El Naggar, 2007).

The expected potential evolution of the climatewould have a significant impact on both thedemand and supply sides of water.

The aggregated consumption of water for thetourism sector is not precisely known, but it iswell recognized that the per capita consumptionof water of a normal tourist is higher than that ofa permanent resident. The tourism sector is oneof the most demanding for water consumption,either for drinking and sanitation or for sustain-ing other services such as swimming pools, golfcourses, and green spaces. This consumptionvaries according to the type of tourism activitiesand the level of comfort demanded.

The way in which this sector could be con-strained and impacted by the regressive evolutionof water resources and water scarcity could be feltat different levels of value chain. The pressure oftourism development on water resources can leadto conflicts of uses, mainly when diverting waterfrom agriculture which ensures food security forlocal dwellers to an industrialized tourism activi-ty, which is mostly profitable to tour operatorsand big companies.

The reduction of water flows and water stocks inlakes will lead to diminishing water quality byeutrophication and pollution. This situation willinduce diminishing recreational value and willalso lead to an increasing risk of water-borne dis-eases. With temperatures changing, new virusesor microbes will have a potential for developmentin the new environment, and this might affectthe tourism flow and the economic importanceof the sector.

Projections based on observations since thebeginning of the 20th century in the northeast of

Morocco point out a further increase of waterscarcity due to climatic and human pressures;sustainable long term development seems to be achallenge, in particular with regard to wateravailability and coastal tourism (Tekken et al.,2009).

Coastal zones and sea level rise

The speed of sea level rise is neither uniform inthe world, nor within the Arab world.Observations and future projections establishedon the basis of climatic models created by manyresearchers, including the IPCC (2007), indicatea potential increasing sea level in theMediterranean by about 88 cm between the years1990 and 2100.

Therefore, the Arab world countries located onthe Mediterranean coast will be strongly threat-ened by sea level rise which could be acceleratedby high tides and violent storms. Large coastalareas would disappear because of sea waterimmersion and coastal erosion (for example ofthe Nile delta and all low topography zones), andthe salinity of coastal aquifers and rivers wouldincrease (Fiona, 2004).

Letizia et al. (2008) have shown through a mete-orological marine analysis of the MoroccanMediterranean coast that the prevalent wavescoming either from 270ºN or 60ºN can hit thecoast at heights approaching 5m. The mostthreatened zones in the area include coastal wet-lands, sandy beaches, a river mouth, basic infra-structure, harbours, a leisure port, habitationsand one important seashore tourism resort com-prising more than 27,000 beds.

The vulnerability of the Arab world’s tourismsector is obviously related to that of the beachesand the infrastructure which constitute the basisof most presently promoted tourism in the area,mainly for the North African countries.

Analysis of shoreline evolution on the EasternMediterranean coast of Morocco, using aerialphotos, has shown that in two pilot sites, thebeaches were subject during the last two decadesto continuous erosion at an average rate of 0.5m/year (Amini et al., 2008). Each of the two sitescontains a wetland of international importance.These ecosystems are vulnerable either to beach


erosion or to sea level rise (Amini, 2008;Bellaghmouch, 2008). Boubekraoui (2008) andEzzaher (2008) have evaluated the cost of thepotential loss by immersion by sea level rise usingthe IPCC A2 scenario and have shown that mostof the existing infrastructure and human settle-ments including the biggest newly built tourismresort in Morocco are at risk.

Biodiversity, desertification and eco-tourism

The landscape as well as environmental assetsand amenities are essential for the sustainabledevelopment of the tourism sector. However,climate change could have an immense effect onthe region’s natural ecosystems and might wors-en their state as a result of changes in tempera-

ture and precipitation which are expected toaffect considerably the growth, strength, func-tion and survival of these ecosystems (Laouina,2008).

Moreover, vulnerability of the semi-arid and aridenvironments of the Arab world to the changeinduced either by climate or by land allocation, isexpected to be critical and will be accompanied byan increase of the hydraulic stress and ecosystemsdegradation leading to desertification (Coelho etal., 2000). According to the 2008 AFED annualreport, Arab Environment: Future Challenges, thecost of environmental degradation, includingeffect of climate change, in the Arab world will bearound 5% of its GDP (AFED, 2008).

The Metap program (2006) of the World Bank


THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDEX OF TOURISM COMFORT IN THE WORLDFIGURES 3(a,b)

a) Index of tourism comfort - Summer 2008

b) Index of tourism comfort - Summer 2080

Source: Ceron and Dubois, 2008

has estimated the cost of environmental degrada-tion in coastal zones of four Arab countries,Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. In makingthe calculations, the local GDP per person at thelocal level was considered equivalent to thenational average. This study concluded that thetotal annual cost related to environmental dam-age of a coastal zone in Egypt (Alexandria bay) isaround $232-355 million, which is 5.0 to 7.5%of the total GDP of the study area; in Morocco,it was estimated to be $14-18 million, which is3.7-4.7% of GDP in the region where the studywas conducted (Lagoon of Nador area); inAlgeria it was found to be $22-53 million, whichamounts to 3 to 7% of the GDP of the Algiersbay; and in Tunisia it was assessed to be $38-72million, or 1.3-2.3% of the GDP of the Soussaregion. Some of these costs were attributed to aloss in tourism activity resulting from environ-mental degradation.

Some plant flora and fauna species of the Arabworld may not be able to adapt to the accelerat-ing rate of climate change which is exacerbatedby the changes induced in ecosystems by theover-harvesting of natural resources or by varioustypes of pollution. Some species might respondby migrating either in latitude or in altitude, butsome might be condemned to extinction.

It is known that a change of the average temper-ature by only one degree will imply a radical dis-turbance of natural ecosystems. This will be duenot only to the direct effect of temperatureincrease but also to the hydrous stress and otherphenomena which may result from this tempera-ture variation such as forest fires and intensiveevapotranspiration (IPCC, 2007). The integrityof all types of biodiversity (genes, species, ecosys-tems and landscapes) will be impacted signifi-cantly, potentially even leading to chaotic situa-tions. The ecotourism and in fact any tourismbased on the natural environment in the Arabworld will therefore be affected by climatechanges.

Tourism and local products

A number of tourism activities in Arab countriesare dependent on local products derived from theexploitation of natural resources. Climate changecan, beyond a certain threshold, lead to the rar-efaction of these resources, and might lead to

changes of local and indigenous practices for theproduction of local goods.

V. ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE

To date, there are only a few exploratory studiesrelated to the relationship between tourism in theArab world and the potential impacts of climatechange. Research initiatives remain limited and itis necessary to better prepare this economic sec-tor to face the challenges of climate change.There is the need to address many essentialpoints which encompass a deep knowledge oftourism requirements and needs for climate andenvironment, and weather conditions; how dif-ferent tourism products and services are sensitiveand vulnerable to climate change; and a mappingof potential risks and threats with respect to cli-mate change scenarios in different regions of theArab world. This last point includes downscalingof IPCC scenarios, vulnerability assessment andadaptation options.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Arab world’s tourism sector is closely relatedto the landscape, environmental and culturalcharacteristics of the area and is by its naturestrongly sensitive to the variability and change ofthe climate, either directly or indirectly.Destinations and preferences might be influ-enced by potential modifications from the nor-mal conditions (hotter summers and winters,droughts, dryness and droughts, extreme weatherevents, scarcity of water, ecosystems degradation,etc.). The potential disturbances of tourism flowsand destinations will result in large economiclosses, primarily for countries whose economiesare tourism-based. It must be noted that theexact trajectory of the changes and impacts isrelated to large uncertainties about tourists’behaviour. Serious efforts should be expended inorder to identify other sustainable means oftourism which might be less sensitive to climatechange and its effects such as cultural tourism.The capacities for adaptation of tourism destina-tions and actors will be highly variable (Ceronand Dubois, 2008) from one area to another andintegrated and inclusive planning is a must forenhancing the chances of success for any coursefuture tourism development might follow.


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REFERENCES


International Negotiations for a Post-Kyoto Regime

129

MOHAMED EL-ASHRY

CHAPTER 11

I. INTRODUCTION

Addressing climate change is one of humanity’smost pressing environmental challenges, requir-ing urgent and concerted action. It is a complex,long-term problem, more than 200 years in themaking. It is ubiquitous - there are few humanactivities that do not directly or indirectly con-tribute to it or are not affected by its impacts.Emissions anywhere cause warming everywhere;mitigation action anywhere helps everywherealso. Postponing mitigation action increasesboth damage costs and the costs of action thatwill have to be taken. While piecemeal effortshelp, the scale of response required for an ulti-mate solution is so large that widespread collec-tive action is essential.

This chapter is written with the target of givingthe Arab negotiators as clear as possible a pictureof what is happening and is likely to happen inthe global negotiations of the post-Kyoto agree-ment, to help them take, if possible, unified posi-tions at the Copenhagen negotiations.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

We owe the discovery that greenhouse gasesblock infrared radiation to the Irish-British scien-tist John Tyndall. In 1859, he was the first tosuggest that changes in their atmospheric con-centrations could lead to changes in climate. Theremarkably original Swedish scientist SvanteArrhenius, who won the Nobel Prize forChemistry in 1903, was the first to publish (in1896) estimates of how much increasing levels ofatmospheric carbon dioxide would warm theatmosphere. He also developed a theory toexplain earth’s ice ages and other climaticchanges.

For the next 60 years or so, the significance ofArrhenius’s calculations remained by and largeunrecognized. Painstaking scientific work forthree decades and several scientific assessmentsled to the October 1985 InternationalConference on the Assessment of the Role ofCarbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases inClimatic Variations and Associated Impacts,organized by the International Council ofScientific Unions, the World MeteorologicalOrganization (WMO), and the United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP) at Villach,Austria. This conference reiterated the consensusamongst scientists about the inevitability of glob-al warming. The discovery that other trace gasesadd to the warming caused by carbon dioxidemeant that significant changes could be expectedwithin a lifetime rather than in some distantfuture. Abandoning their characteristic caution,scientists from 29 countries at this conferenceconcluded that “human releases of greenhousegases could lead in the first half of the 21st centu-ry to a rise of global temperature ... greater thanany in man’s history”. They also urged ‘activecollaboration between scientists and policymak-ers to explore the effectiveness of alternative poli-cies and adjustments.’

WMO and UNEP decided in 1988 to establishthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC), as a joint program to provide policy-rel-evant but not policy-prescriptive advice. TheIPCC published its first report two years later in1990, establishing that emissions of greenhousegases resulting from human activities were sub-stantially increasing their atmospheric concentra-tions and that under a business-as-usual scenario,the 21st century would witness an increase inglobal mean temperature greater than any seen inthe past 10,000 years. This Assessment stronglysupported the recommendation of the 1988International Climate Conference to the UNGeneral Assembly to negotiate a convention todeal globally with the problem of climate change.The UN negotiating committee was establishedby the General Assembly in December 1990.This committee negotiated the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).More than 140 countries with differing interestsparticipated in 16 months of difficult negotia-tions. It was signed by 154 heads of states, gov-ernments and delegations at the Earth Summit inRio in 1992, including the United States, andentered into force in 1994. To date, 189 coun-tries have ratified the Convention.

The framework convention does not mandatespecific reductions in greenhouse gases-it onlyobliges the industrialized countries to ‘adoptnational policies and take corresponding meas-ures’ with the ‘aim of returning’ emissions by2000 to their 1990 levels. In the negotiationsleading to the convention, developing countriesargued, and rightly so, that the primary responsi-

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR A POST-KYOTO REGIMECHAPTER 11130

bility for action on climate change falls on theshoulders of the industrialized countries, whichwith only 20% of the world’s population, havecontributed about 75% of total CO2 emissions.

As we now know, very few countries adopted thenecessary policies and measures called for by theconvention and greenhouse gas emissions contin-ue to increase. Because energy consumption is sovital to industrialized countries, the barriers, botheconomic and political, to adopting the necessarypolicies and measures have been very high.

With implementation of voluntary measures fal-tering, the first Conference of the Parties to theConvention in Berlin agreed to negotiate aProtocol to define more precisely the emissionsreduction commitments of developed countries.It took two years to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol(1995-97) and another 8 years for it to come intoforce, when countries representing 55% of thedeveloped country emissions had ratified. TheUS declared its intention not to ratify theProtocol in 2001. The Kyoto Protocol set an ini-tial target and a time table for reducing emissionsby industrialized countries. Industrialized coun-tries were to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by5.2% below 1990 levels during the first commit-ment period of 2008-2012. For the U.S. it wasa commitment of 7%.

While the Kyoto Protocol was intended as a firststep in implementing the climate change conven-tion, it would not have materially altered thelong-term atmospheric concentrations of green-house gases. And for the U.S., emissions in 1997were already 12% above 1990 levels.Accordingly, the reductions by the U.S. wouldhave amounted to almost 20%.

As was expected, the chances of the U.S. ratifyingthe Kyoto Protocol became zero. What was notexpected, however, was the BushAdministration’s outright rejection of the KyotoProtocol and the global concern over climatechange. Rejecting Kyoto’s provisions as theyapply to the U.S. and proposing viable alterna-tives is one thing, taking several steps backwardand arguing that we do not know enough to takeaction is another. The Administration’s positionwas taken in spite of the IPCC’s 2001 assessmentreport, which concluded that: ‘there is new andstronger evidence that most of the warming

observed over the last 50 years is attributable tohuman activities,’ and the US National Academyof Sciences report in the same year saying that“Greenhouse gases are accumulating in theEarth’s atmosphere as a result of human activi-ties, causing surface temperatures to rise. Thereis general agreement that the observed warmingis real and particularly strong within the past 20years”.

III. POLICY-MAKING AND UNCERTAINTY

Much complexity and uncertainty surround cli-mate change. Despite significant gains in the sci-entific understanding of climate change, uncer-tainties remain. Climate models are not usuallydesigned to tell us anything about the evolutionof the climate system in the short-term; rather,they are designed to simulate long-term (20-30years) behaviour as accurately as possible. Also,while climate models can make reliable projec-tions about change in global climate, their pro-jections about change in regional climate are lessreliable.

The key question, however, is no longer whetherclimate change is already happening and shouldbe a central global concern. The key question ishow climate change will manifest itself regional-ly and locally and what can be done about it. Asgovernments prepare to meet the challenge of cli-mate change they need to address the tradeoffsbetween near-term economic development andlong-term sustainable development. They alsoneed to devise effective strategies for dealing withclimate change in the absence of full knowledgeof regional impacts and the unsettling prospect ofreaching irreversibility or tipping points of noreturn. The uncertainty associated with climatechange projections is often cited as the reason forpeople’s failure to accept the need to adapt to cli-mate change. In the face of urgent short-termpriorities such as hunger, poverty and disease,poor countries and communities find it particu-larly challenging to focus on adaptation measureswhen the predictions of impacts from climatechange are not unequivocal. Uncertainty shouldnot, however, be an excuse for inaction.

Decisions are regularly made in the face of uncer-tainty (e.g., investment decisions). Water-


resource managers are accustomed to planningand operating water facilities under conditions ofuncertainty about future availability, weathervariability, and projected water demand. In theface of documented evidence of long-term globalclimate change, water-resource managers havebegun revising their long-term planning.Deciding on the need for, and type of, adapta-tion to climate change should be approached in asimilar manner, and can involve using appropri-ate risk management approaches.

To respond to the climate change issue, gov-ernments at various levels must make a range ofdecisions about the appropriate level anddesign of mitigation and adaptation, and thefunding level of research across many relateddisciplines. In a political world where decisionsare often short-term and where leaders cherisha clear roadmap for action, the ‘uncertain cer-tainty’ of climate change has hampered thetranslation of scientific findings into policyactions. In some countries, like the United

States under the Bush presidency, uncertaintyregarding climate change was used as a basis forpostponing action, which is usually identifiedas being ‘costly’. But this idea is almost uniqueto climate change. In other areas of public pol-icy such as terrorism, inflation, or vaccination,an ‘insurance’ principle seems to prevail. Inother words, if there is sufficient likelihood ofsignificant damage, we take some measuredanticipatory action.

IV. THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORKCONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

The United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC) is the only umbrel-la treaty negotiated amongst countries to respondto the threat of global climate change. It took 16months to negotiate (1990-1992), and two yearsto ratify (1994). About 140 countries participat-ed in the negotiations that led to the treaty, and189 countries have ratified it.


Objective

The ultimate objective of the Convention(Article 2) is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gasconcentrations in the atmosphere at a level thatwould prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-ence with the climate system.’ The Conventiondid not define or quantify what is meant by dan-gerous, nor did it specify a time period for action,except to say that the level should be achievedwithin a time frame sufficient:

1. to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to cli-mate change;

2. to ensure that food production is not threat-ened; and

3. to enable economic development to proceedin a sustainable manner.

Principles

Several principles were negotiated and enshrinedin Article 3 of the Convention. We list themhere in the order they appear in the Convention.

Equity, Responsibility and Capability (Article3.1): Countries are to ‘protect the climate sys-tem . . . on the basis of equity and in accordancewith their common but differentiated responsi-bilities and respective capabilities.’ A strictapplication based on responsibility and capabil-ity would require a few countries to take mostof the action. This principle led to a commit-ment by developed countries on providingfinancial resources.

Cost-effectiveness (Article 3.3): ‘Policies andmeasures to deal with climate change should becost-effective, so as to ensure global benefits atthe lowest possible cost.’ This principle led tothe so-called flexibility mechanisms under theKyoto Protocol (see below).

Comprehensiveness (Article 3.3): ‘Policies andmeasures should . . . be comprehensive, cover allrelevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of green-house gases and adaptation, and comprise all eco-nomic sectors.’ Avoided deforestation andafforestation should be part of any solution.

Commitments: Based on the above principles,several commitments were negotiated and agreedupon. The following merit special attention:

Emission Targets (Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b)):Developed countries are to adopt policies andmeasures ‘with the aim of returning . . . to their1990 emissions levels these anthropogenic emis-sions of carbon dioxide and other greenhousegases’. These articles did not specify a time frameover which this return was to be accomplishedand were superseded by the Kyoto Protocol.However, for those countries that did not ratifythe Protocol but have ratified the Convention,this commitment still stands.

Technology Assistance: In Article 4.1(c), allcountries agreed to ‘promote and cooperate inthe development, application and diffusion,including transfer, of technologies, practices andprocesses that control, reduce, or prevent anthro-pogenic emissions of GHGs’. This provision wasvery important to developing countries duringthe negotiations. It is reiterated in at least 8 dif-ferent articles of the Convention and in three dif-ferent articles of the Kyoto Protocol.

Financial Resources: In Article 4.3, developedcountries agreed to ‘provide the new and addi-tional financial resources . . . needed by develop-ing countries to meet the agreed full incrementalcosts of measures covered under Article 4.1’.Since ratification, however, these funding flowshave been a tiny fraction of the amount neededto ‘green’ the energy sectors of developing coun-tries.

V. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Kyoto Protocol took two years to negotiate(1996-97) and eight years to ratify (2005). Itspurpose was to define more precisely the emis-sions reduction commitments of developedcountries because those in the Convention werethought to be ‘vague.’ It has been ratified by 171countries. The United States is the principalexception.

Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol required devel-oped countries to reduce their collective emis-sions of greenhouse gases by at least 5% belowtheir 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.However, this provision applies only to 35 ratify-ing countries and the European Union, repre-senting less than two-thirds of the developedcountry emissions. Thus, successful implemen-


tation of the Protocol will reduce developedcountry emissions by only 3%, and global emis-sions by less than 2%.

To reduce the burden of compliance on devel-oped countries, the Kyoto Protocol created threedifferent ‘flexibility mechanisms’: a project-basedmechanism within developed (‘Annex 1’) coun-tries, also known as Joint Implementation (JI); aproject-based mechanism involving developingcountries - the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM); and international emissions tradingamongst Annex I countries. The EuropeanUnion started an Emissions Trading Schemeeven before the Protocol was ratified to gainexperience with carbon trading.

VI. MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS

Market-based mechanisms are generally favouredby economists and welcomed by industry, as theytend to reduce the costs to industry (or countries)of complying with targets. However, effectivetrading approaches require an overall cap onemissions. Analysts are discovering that theadministrative difficulties of implementation andenforcement of cap-and-trade systems amongstcountries are not trivial. There have been pub-lished accounts of the weaknesses in the carbonoffsets market with buyers paying either forreductions that do not take place or for reduc-tions that would have taken place anyway. Partlyfor these reasons, some economists prefer thelevying of taxes on activities that lead to the emis-sions of greenhouse gases.

Carbon taxes are easier to implement than cap-and-trade schemes, economically efficient, butpolitically difficult to legislate in some democrat-ic regimes. A carbon tax would reduce carbonemissions and increase revenues. Substantialbenefits could be gained from carbon taxes in allcountries based on the ‘common but differentiat-ed’ principle. In addition to emissions reduc-tions, they would generate resources for thedevelopment of clean energy sources as well as forthe cost of adaptation in poor developing coun-tries.

The CDM was created to support low-carboninvestment in developing countries. It allowsboth the private sector and governments to invest

in projects that reduce emissions (as compared toemissions that would occur in a baseline sce-nario) in developing countries, and provides oneway to support links between different regionalemissions trading schemes. However, it hasencountered administrative and technical hur-dles, and its future is clouded because of theuncertainty about the post-2012 regime. InitialCDM projects have been limited to a few coun-tries, and a few gases, and have been plagued bybureaucratic procedures, with little contributionto sustainable development.

With its limited targets, timeframe, and partici-pation, the Kyoto Protocol was never seen as afinal solution to the climate problem. It wasmeant to be a first step, preparing for the broad-er engagement that will be necessary and estab-lishing the legal, technical and institutionalgroundwork for future regimes, especially ininternational emissions trading.

Time and experience, however, have also revealedthe limitations in the agreement - coverage ofsome but not all of the developed world’s emis-sions, and inadequate provisions for monitoringand enforcement.

VII. LAGGING NEGOTIATIONS

Because the Kyoto Protocol covered only theperiod from 2008 to 2012, it specified that nego-tiations for a second “commitment period”should begin seven years in advance - i.e., in2005. However, the progress to date has beenminimal. For example, the discussions at theSecond Ministerial Meeting of the GleneaglesDialogue on Climate Change in Monterrey,Mexico, in October 2006 pointed to the urgencyof early action but failed to decide on a processfor reaching a new agreement. Likewise, at theNovember 2006 Conference of the Parties to theUNFCCC in Nairobi, governments were unableto agree on a timetable for negotiating a post-2012 future despite widespread consensus on thediagnosis of the problem. This lack of progressincreases the risk of failure in reaching an agree-ment to govern the post-2012 period. Thosewho have witnessed the glacial pace of thesenegotiations (and the North-South divide thatappears to be widening) have identified severalfactors that may be contributing to this impasse.


Possible Reasons for the Impasse

1. Democratically elected governments are heldaccountable for declines in economic per-formance (which might be caused by actionstaken to mitigate climate change) but not foradverse impacts caused by even catastrophicclimate-related events, which can always beblamed on natural variability. The classicasymmetry of future benefits vs. present costsposes difficulties for public officials.

2. In what are perceived to be zero-sum games,there is a tendency amongst all negotiatorsfor brinkmanship-to wait until the last possi-ble moment to come to an agreement, withthe expectation of striking the best possibledeal for one’s side.

3. Any appreciable dent in the problem willrequire a significant (although manageable)amount of additional resources in the near-term (~1% of gross world product), some ofwhich will necessarily flow from the Northto the Global South.

4. There is a perception in northern countriesthat the countries of the Global South havechanged from being appropriate aid ‘recipi-ents’ to near-term competitors. There ispolitical resistance to large North-South orWest-East subsidies or resource transfers.

5. There is a perception in southern countriesthat there have not been good-faith effortson the part of the Global North to deliver onprinciples and financial commitments thatwere negotiated and agreed upon previously.

6. Not all impacts of climate change will benegative, at least initially. There will bemany losers but also some who might bene-fit. These countries are unenthusiastic aboutmeasures to mitigate climate change.

VIII. CRITICAL ISSUES

Fairness - Differentiated targets andtimetables

The principle stated in Article 3.1 of theFramework Convention, concerning ‘common

but differentiated responsibilities and respectivecapabilities,’ requires that these must be based onequity. Article 3.1 also asserts that ‘developedcountries should take the lead in combating cli-mate change.’

It is clear that any climate change agreement willbe acceptable and sustainable only if it is per-ceived by all participating countries to be equi-table or fair. The challenge has been that there isno broad agreement on the definition of equityor its dimensions. Some argue that it is unfair torequire emissions reductions in some countriesbut not others. However, most observers say thatrequiring all countries to achieve the same per-centage reduction in emissions in the same timeframe would be grossly unfair. These observersadd that those who have contributed to thebuildup of greenhouse gases in the past 100 yearsshould either have less entitlement going forwardor should compensate the rest of the global com-munity in some way.

‘There is no single formula that captures alldimensions of equity, but calculations based onincome, historic responsibility, and per capitaemissions all point to rich countries takingresponsibility for emissions reductions of 60-80% from 1990 levels by 2050’ (Stern Review).It is feared by some, however, that limitinggreenhouse gas emissions in developed countriesmay simply shift economic development andemissions growth to developing countries.

The concept of ‘differentiation’ continues to be animportant one. For example, when the EU appor-tioned emission rights amongst its member statesunder its Kyoto obligation, the poorest countries,Greece and Portugal, were allowed increases of25% and 27% respectively, much larger than oth-ers’. However, avoidance of ‘dangerous anthro-pogenic interference with the climate system’ can-not be achieved by developed countries alone.Limiting atmospheric concentration to 500-550ppm (i.e., projected temperature rises of 2.5-3ºC)will require a 60% reduction in global emissionsby 2050, but compared to 1990 levels. Even an80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in allOECD countries by 2050 would not achieve thisgoal without emission reductions by today’s devel-oping countries. To date, the most ambitiousdeclared targets have been by the EU: reducingGHG emissions by 20% by 2020 over 1990 levels.


The EU would agree to a 30% target should otherdeveloped countries commit themselves to compa-rable emission reductions and more advanceddeveloping countries adequately contribute inaccordance with their responsibilities and respec-tive capabilities.

All countries have a legitimate right to economicdevelopment, but that need not conflict withstrategies to reduce emissions. Developing coun-tries could vigorously promote measures toincrease energy efficiency or decrease the carbonintensity of production (GHG releases per unitof GDP) and adopt renewable energy wherever itis the least-cost alternative. Carbon intensity ofnon-OECD countries has already been decliningin the past 20 years at an average annual rate of~1.42% per year (as compared to a world averageof 1.25% and an OECD average of 1.1 %), part-ly because services make up an increasing fractionof their economies. Despite carbon intensitydeclines, with economies growing at much fasterrates, total emissions from developing countrieswill keep increasing. Increasing the rates of car-bon intensity declines beyond recent historicalrates would moderate this growth in emissionswhile enabling developing countries to continueto pursue their sustainable development objec-tives.

Adaptation

While the developed world is largely responsiblefor the accumulation of greenhouse gases in theatmosphere, and some rapidly growing develop-ing countries are adding to the burden, develop-ing countries in general are the most vulnerableto climate change and least able to bear the con-sequences. Early climate efforts largely focusedon mitigation; the next phase must also addressadaptation. The most recent IPCC Report point-ed out that vulnerability to climate change can beexacerbated by the presence of other stresses thatare frequently present in developing countries.

Because the costs incurred for adaptation werethought to provide largely local benefits, weresuspected to be large, were difficult to distin-guish from ‘regular’ development, andsmacked of compensation awarded for dam-ages, industrialized countries have been reluc-tant to agree to substantial amount of funds(through the Global Environment Facility

(GEF), for example) for adaptation. But sinceany conceivable level at which GHG gases canbe stabilized will be greater than the pre-indus-trial level, some amount of climate change isinevitable, which will impede developmentefforts, frustrate poverty alleviation programs,and exacerbate migrations from water-logged,water-scarce or food-scarce regions. It is thatlink to development and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals that prompts someobservers to call for a significant role for devel-opment assistance (ODA) in financing adapta-tion measures (see below).

Technology Transfer

There is an urgent need for developing countriesthat are growing at a rapid rate like India andChina to do so in a climate-friendly manner.The infrastructure created in coal-fired powerplants and energy-intensive industries has a longlife (on the order of 40-50 years). However, thecosts of more efficient and cleaner technologiesare much higher (as much as $100 million ormore for an average 1 GW coal-fired powerplant). In addition, issues of competitiveness andintellectual property rights have impeded theconsideration of concessional terms for the trans-fer of clean technologies to developing countries,and the full utilization of knowledge. Yet it isimportant to all countries that clean energy tech-nologies are made as widely available as possible(like generic medicines for HIV-AIDS, for exam-ple). It may also be beneficial to conductresearch and demonstrate technology such assolar thermal and coal gasification in the South.A global research and development fund couldeither pay for patents or for licensing fees toenable cleaner technologies to be deployed in theSouth.

Finance

The costs of adequately addressing the risk of cli-mate change, according to the Stern Review, areof the order of 1% of gross world product(around $620 billion). Some of that investmentwill be additional, and some will come from redi-recting existing flows. Some funds will berequired for increased assistance to developingcountries for the adoption of energy efficiencyand clean energy technologies, including bio-energy. Funds will be required, both in devel-


oped and in developing countries, for greeningenergy sectors, for adaptation, increased R&Dand deployment of technologies.

Net North-South Flows

The net public and private resource flows from alldeveloped countries to developing countries(including loans) amounted to about US$ 280 bil-lion in 2005, increasing from about $150 billionin 2004 (see Figure 1 below). The increase camemainly because of an increase in private flows,which besides being fickle are concentrated in justa few countries. Official Development Assistance(ODA) amounted to just 0.25% of gross nationalincome in 2005 (see Figure 2 below).

Energy-Related North-South Flows

Most of the resources for energy development(~60%) are raised locally within developingcountries. Energy-related flows (see Table 1below) have averaged about $7 billion a yearbetween 1997 and 2005. This amount contrastswith a need of ~$300 billion a year in developingand transition economies, as estimated by theIEA. According to the World Bank, this sum of$300 billion would need to be augmented by $34billion a year to support ‘green’ energy develop-ment. The Stern Review similarly estimates theincremental amount at ~$20-30 billion per year.Some of these funds could also finance the trans-fer of technology.


TOTAL NET FLOWS BY TYPE OF FLOWFIGURE 1

Source: Prepared from DAC data, OECD website

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

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19

92

19

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00

20

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20

04

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06

Year

USD

bil

lio

n

OD A To ta l N e t Flow s Priva te Flow s

ODA AS PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOMEFIGURE 2

Source: Prepared from DAC data, OECD website

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

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19

92

19

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19

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00

20

02

20

04

Year

Per

cen

tG

NI

IX. ALTERNATIVE PATHS- COMPREHEN-SIVE AGREEMENT OR PIECEMEAL SOLU-TIONS?

It is possible that new leadership emerging in sev-eral countries in the next two years will end theglobal impasse. However, there is considerabledissatisfaction with the existing format of negoti-ations. As a result, those who despair at theprospect of getting an agreement amongst 190countries have been both exploring alternativeforums to discuss substantive issues, and propos-ing less comprehensive agreements amongst alimited set of players to begin reducing emissionsimmediately.

One such forum is the Gleneagles Dialogue onClimate Change, Clean Energy and SustainableDevelopment, launched at the G8 summit in July2005 as an instrument whereby innovative ideasand measures to tackle these issues could be dis-cussed informally among G8 and key developingcountries outside the formal structure of theUNFCCC. The Dialogue involves 19 countries -the G8 plus Australia, Brazil, China, India,Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Spain, SouthAfrica, and South Korea, plus the EuropeanCommission. By 2012 these countries will repre-sent between 75-80% of all global emissions.

Many different proposals have been made forpartial or early solutions that would not require a

comprehensive, overarching agreement. Theseproposals can broadly be characterized as:

1. Country-based2. Sector-based3. Policy-based and4. Measures-based

The following table gives a few examples of thenarrower ‘systems boundaries’ being consideredin these proposals.

Such proposals can involve multiple categories.For example, the Asia-Pacific Partnership onClean Development and Climate includes sixcountries of the Asia-Pacific region (Australia,China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US)and the following sectors: power generation andtransmission, steel, aluminium, cement, coalmining, buildings and appliances. It alsoincludes an agreement to work toward promot-ing renewable energy. Thus, it combines ele-ments of country-based, sector-based, and meas-ures-based strategies.

Country-based approaches offer a simplernegotiating process and the potential to addressa large share of the world’s emissions - but theyrisk the creation of a two-tier world, dividingthe world into those who have a seat at thetable from those who do not; and breedingresentment and hostility.


Sector-based approaches can avoid competitive-ness concerns by negotiating emissions targets forparticular industries, including those located indeveloping countries - but like the otherapproaches offer only a partial solution.

Emissions-based approaches offer countries theflexibility to design emission reduction strategiesthat are most appropriate to their national circum-stances. Smaller agreements offer the potential ofearly action-not waiting until 2012 for effectiveresponses to begin, but starting on whatever is fea-sible now. If successful, these partial agreementscould also be included at a later date under anumbrella of a climate change agreement.

X. BALI ROAD MAP

In Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, theConference of the Parties to the Convention onClimate Change (COP 13) concluded withagreement on the ‘Bali Action Plan.’ The plancreates a process and a set of principles, with fewspecifics, for negotiating a post-2012 agreement.It calls for a long-term goal for global emissionsreductions and various mitigation actions fordeveloped and developing countries. Besidesmitigation, it also includes adaptation, deforesta-tion, technology development and transfer, andfinance.

Mitigation

In the Bali Action Plan, the Conference of theParties (COP) recognized that ‘deep cuts in glob-al emissions will be required to achieve the ulti-mate objective of the Convention’ and empha-sized the urgency of action, ‘as indicated in theFourth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.’The COP did not move forward on targets andtimetables for emission reductions, but decidedto seek agreement by 2009 on ‘a shared vision forlong-term cooperative action, including a long-term goal for emission reductions’ to preventdangerous anthropogenic interference with theclimate system.

Decision 1(b)(i) calls on all developed countriesto consider:

Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally

appropriate mitigation commitments or actions,including quantified emission limitation andreduction objectives, while ensuring the compa-rability of efforts among them, taking intoaccount differences in their national circum-stances.

For developing countries, Decision 1(b)(ii) callsfor the consideration of:

Nationally appropriate mitigation actions in thecontext of sustainable development, supportedand enabled by technology, financing and capac-ity-building, in a measurable, reportable and ver-ifiable manner.

Unlike for developed countries, there is no men-tion of quantified emission limitation or reduc-tion objectives for developing countries.

Adaptation

Decision 1(c) of the Bali Action Plan calls forenhanced action on adaptation, including con-sideration of:

(i) International cooperation to supportimplementation of adaptation actionsincluding through vulnerability assess-ments, prioritization of action, financialneeds assessment, capacity-building andresponse strategies, integration of adapta-tion actions into sectoral and nationalplanning, specific projects and pro-grammes, means to incentivize the imple-mentation of adaptation actions, andother ways to enable climate-resilientdevelopment and reduce vulnerability ofall PartiesÖ;


PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL SOLUTIONSTABLE 1

Approaches ExamplesCountry-based Agreements between the top-emitting countries

in the world, or alternatively, smaller geographic groups Sector-based Agreements on emissions reductions in specific

categories – e.g., power, transportation, aluminium,steel, cement, appliances, buildings, forestry

Policy-based Agreements to impose harmonized carbon taxes orreduce emissions intensity

Measures-based Agreements on specific emissions reductions strategies– e.g., energy efficiency, renewable energy, development finance, land use regulation


(ii) Risk management and risk reduction strate-gies, including risk sharing and transfermechanisms such as insurance;

(iii) Disaster reduction strategies and means toaddress loss and damage associated with cli-mate change impacts in developing coun-tries that are particularly vulnerable to theadverse effects of climate change;

(iv) Economic diversification to buildresilience.

Four of the six articles of Decision 1(e) of theBali Action Plan called for enhanced action oninvestment in adaptation, including considera-tion of:

(ii) Positive incentives for developing countriesfor the enhanced implementation ofnational mitigation strategies and adapta-tion action;

(iii) Innovative means of funding to assist devel-oping countries that are particularly vulner-able to the adverse impacts of climatechange in meeting the cost of adaptation;

(iv) Means to incentivize the implementation ofadaptation actions on the basis of sustain-able development policies;

(vi) Financial and technical support for capaci-

ty-building in the assessment of the costs ofadaptation in developing countries, in par-ticular the most vulnerable ones, to aid indetermining their financial needs.

In addition, the Conference of the Parties (COP)established an Adaptation Fund to finance proj-ects and programs in developing countries. TheFund will complement other United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) funds managed by the GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF), as well as theStrategic Priority on Adaptation mechanism,which is part of the GEF Trust Fund.

The Adaptation Fund will be financed with a 2percent share of the proceeds from the sale of cer-tified emissions reductions under the CleanDevelopment Mechanism (CDM), a formulathat is expected to yield between US$80 andUS$300 million per year until 2012. TheAdaptation Fund will be supported by a secretari-at (the GEF) and a trustee (the World Bank).The Fund will be supervised and managed by a16-member Adaptation Fund Board whosemembers will be balanced regionally and betweendeveloped and developing countries.

Technology Development and Cooperation

In a last-minute decision, some developing-coun-try negotiators at the Bali Conference of theParties proposed wording in the Bali Action Planthat links mitigation action by developing coun-tries to ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’support by developed countries for technology,finance, and capacity-building.

Decision 1(d) of the Bali Action Plan calls forenhanced action on technology development andtransfer to support action on mitigation andadaptation, including consideration of:

(i) Effective mechanisms and enhanced meansfor the removal of obstacles to, and provi-sion of financial and other incentives for,scaling up of the development and transferof technology to developing countries inorder to promote access to environmentallysound technologies;

(ii) Ways to accelerate deployment, diffusion


and transfer of affordable environmentallysound technologies;

(iii) Cooperation on research and developmentof current, new and innovative technology,including win-win solutions;

(iv) The effectiveness of mechanisms and toolsfor technology cooperation in specific sectors.

Finance

Decision 1(e) of the Bali Action Plan calls for‘enhanced action on the provision of financialresources and investment to support action onmitigation and adaptation and technology coop-eration’ including consideration of the followingfor developing countries:

(i) Improved access to adequate, predictable andsustainable financial resources and technical sup-port;

(ii) Positive incentives for enhanced implementa-tion of national mitigation strategies and adapta-tion action;

(iii) Innovative means of funding to assist partic-ularly vulnerable countries meet the costs ofadaptation to the adverse impacts of climatechange;

(iv) Means to incentivize the implementation ofadaptation actions on the basis of sustainabledevelopment policies;

(v) Mobilization of public- and private-sectorfunding and investment, including facilitation ofcarbon-friendly investment choices;

(VI) Financial and technical support forcapacity-building in the assessment of the costs ofadaptation.

XI. POZNAN

The 14th Conference of the Parties was con-vened in December 2008 in Poznan, Poland.Expectations for the meeting were not high,thanks to the global financial crisis, the lack ofleadership from the US, and the weakening ofearlier commitments by the EU. While some

observers, mainly UN officials, argued thatPoznan has set the stage for next the 2009 talksin Copenhagen, most of the major issues-mitiga-tion targets and time-tables, funding for adapta-tion and technology transfer, and tropical defor-estation-were pushed to Copenhagen.

Despite the lack of progress toward a comprehen-sive, post-Kyoto agreement, there was one prom-ising development-the pledge by some majordeveloping countries to reduce their carbon emis-sions-a shift from past positions. Brazil pledgedto cut its annual deforestation rate by 70% by2017, which could reduce the country’s carbonemissions by 30-45% over the next decade.Mexico would reduce its emissions by 50% from2002 levels by 2050 and South Africa’s emissionswould plateau between 2020 and 2025 and beginto decline between 2030 and 2035. Similarly,China will reduce its ‘energy intensity’ by 20%by 2010 and India will boost solar energy pro-duction. These pledges are voluntary and theirimplementation is largely dependent on theextent of financial assistance and technologytransfer by developed countries.

Whether this, and the agreement on structuringthe (small) Adaptation Fund, will pave the waytoward a new global treaty remains to be seen.The core questions-how much developed coun-tries will reduce their greenhouse gas emissions,what will the rapidly industrializing countrieslike China and India actually do to control theirrapidly growing emissions, and how the poorercountries will be assisted in their adaptationefforts and in pursuing low-carbon development-remain untouched.

Many observers believe that the success ofCopenhagen in 2009 hinges on the new leader-ship in the US. President Obama has said that hewants to return to 1990 emission level by 2020.He also believes that a US energy strategy to tack-le climate change would contribute to improvingthe economy, and has called for a $150 billioninvestment to create 5 million ‘green’ jobs in thenext 10 years.

XII. CONCLUSION: THE ROAD TOCOPENHAGEN

Since December 2008, there is little agreement

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CCD (2009). Closing the Gaps. International Task

Force On Climate Change and Development, May

2009. At: www.ccdcommission.org

Global Leadership for Climate Action - GLCA (2007).

Framework for a Post-2012 Agreement on Climate

Change. September 2007. At http://www.globalcli-

mateaction.org


Framework for a Post-2012 Agreement on Climate

Change - 2008 Update. September 2007. At:

http://www.globalclimateaction.org


Facilitating an International Agreement on Climate

Change: Adaptation to Climate Change. Global

Leadership for Climate Action, June 2009.

Institute for Public Policy Research (2009). Fairness in

Global Climate Change Finance, March 2009.


(2007). Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation

and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to

the Fourth Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [M.L.

Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der

Linden and C.E. Hanson (Eds.)], Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,

USA.

Stern, Nicholas (2006). Stern Review on the

Economics of Climate Change. Report to the Prime

Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the

Economics of Climate Change. UK.

World Resources Institute - WRI (2008). From

Positions to Agreement: Technology and Finance at

the UNFCCC. December 2008.

REFERENCES


on the key issues that have divided North andSouth negotiators so far, and scepticism that acomprehensive post-2012 treaty will be reachedis growing. What is now clear is that develop-ing countries will not accept commitments thatimply significant restrictions on their economicgrowth. Such countries as China and Indiapoint with justifiable satisfaction to the rapidgrowth they have achieved in the recent past andthe rise in living standards that has resulted.They support their position by pointing to thelarge percentages of their populations still livingin extreme poverty and their need for rapidexpansion in employment to absorb theselabour surpluses. Developing countries believethat their economic growth must be supportedby increases in energy use, although acceptingthe possibility that energy use per unit of pro-duction can continue to decline, as it has doneup to now.

Therefore, despite pressure from developedcountries, developing countries are highly unlike-ly to accept binding restrictions or national capson greenhouse gas emissions comparable to thosein the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I countries.Those will be seen as almost certain to restricteconomic growth, because the base of renewableenergy generation is small and both China andIndia are very dependent on coal for electricpower generation. In the event these countriesshould prove willing to accept future nationalemission ceilings, they would insist that thosecaps would become binding only well into thefuture. In either case, a strategy that can lead toimmediate action is sorely needed.

At the same time, the Annex I countries will notaccept that the world’s other major emitters con-tinue with ‘business as usual’ as the underlyingprinciple. Not only would this risk substantialleakage of emissions to the developing world, itwould also imply major financial transfers fromNorth to South, whether under the CleanDevelopment Mechanism, a global emissiontrading system, or another cooperative arrange-ment. As the U.S. government made clear dur-ing the pre-Kyoto negotiations, it will not incursignificant mitigation costs unless the majordeveloping countries agree to undertake signifi-cant actions as well. If the United States refusesto act, other industrialized countries will be lim-ited in their commitments as well.

Interrelation between Climate Change andTrade Negotiations

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MAGDA SHAHIN

CHAPTER 12

I. INTRODUCTION

It is now generally accepted that climate changeis the result of increasing concentrations of car-bon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and othergreenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere(IPCC, 2007). Arab countries collectively con-tribute less than 5% of the total world emissionsof GHGs.i The Middle East and North Africa(MENA) region is the world’s largest oil produc-ing region, and oil, along with other fossil fuelsgas and coal, is the largest GHG emitter.According to the International EnergyAssociation (IEA), the world’s energy needs standto increase by over 45% above present needs by2030, indicating an annual increase of approxi-mately 6%. Carbon-intensive fossil fuels willcontinue to dominate the energy sector with oilremaining the primary energy source if businessas usual is the prevailing scenario (IEA, 2007).

In December 2009, environment ministers andofficials from 192 countries will meet inCopenhagen to attempt to negotiate a new inter-national regime to battle the urgent threat of cli-mate change. The existing framework, the KyotoProtocol, has not yet succeeded in realizing thereductions commitments made by its Parties, andcalls for incorporating climate change initiativesinto the international trade framework havegrown louder. While Kyoto has not been anoverall success, it does provide Parties withenough flexibility to choose policy instrumentsto meet their commitments. Most importantly,Kyoto establishes positive measures to achieve itsgoals, namely technology transfer through theclean development mechanism (CDM), financialand technical assistance through joint implemen-tation (JI), capacity building, and market basedincentives, such as emissions trading.

Given the limits of the international trade regimewhich is not mandated to establish positive meas-ures, a balanced multilateral environmentalagreement (MEA) with its own tools and with itsown dispute settlement mechanism for enforce-ment, taking guidance from the WTO frame-work, may be the ideal forum in which to navi-gate the climate change crisis. This chapterasserts that it is not solely through punitive regu-latory mandates that climate change should beaddressed, but also and inevitably through acombination of technology transfer and partner-

ships between industrial, oil-producing and otherdeveloping countries. Only a multilateralapproach to climate change, outside the WTO,wielding both carrots and sticks, will allow theseissues to be properly addressed.

II. POST-KYOTO PROTOCOL AND WTO RULES

The Kyoto Protocol has drawn on the UnitedNations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) and Rio Principle 7ii tobuild its foundations, clearly defining UNFCCCAnnex I countries as developed countries thatmust carry the sole responsibility for climatechange mitigation during the first phase (2008-2012) of implementation. As long as trade meas-ures in the Protocol do not breach the relevantcriteria of the WTO, fulfilling the necessity test,effectiveness and least trade restrictive require-ments in addition to the proportionality aspect,iiisuch measures will not be challenged by WTOmembers. Furthermore, reviewing WTOjurisprudence, such as the 1998 Shrimp-Turtlecase,iv the organization’s flexibility to accommo-date national environmental protection policiesbecomes apparent, as well as the organization’srefusal to sanction the imposition of unilaterallyconceived measures extra-territorially. In theimplementation of Kyoto, compatibility has beenachieved with the rules and disciplines of theinternational trade regime, and a balancebetween its disciplines and those set out in Kyotohas been and should continue to be successfullycultivated. Any post-Kyoto agreement shouldaim for a similar design. It is important toemphasize that such a balance will at no rateinevitably compromise climate change mitigationmeasures.

Although the relationship between MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements (MEAs) and theWTO as such has been relegated to the marginsof the negotiating agenda of the Doha develop-ment round, proponents of negative measures tocombat climate change continue to press for thecreation of specific WTO rules to accommodatethe environment. For the Arab world, this pushbecomes particularly dangerous when energy,which has largely been a marginal issue in theWTO, comes under scrutiny directly throughthe occasional promotion by some of an interna-

INTERRELATION BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONSCHAPTER 12144

tional accord on renewable energy trade withinthe WTO, and indirectly through the introduc-tion of environmental goods and services (EGS),and through a call to legitimize the regulation ofprocess and production methods (PPMs).

III. ENERGY AS AN EMERGENT ISSUE INTHE WTO SYSTEM

It is well known that oil, as well as coal, have longbeen kept outside the purview of the GATT andsubsequently the WTO trading system. This wasnot at the behest of the Arab oil-producing coun-tries, the majority of which were not members inthe GATT, and later, were certainly not dealmakers or breakers in the WTO. The produc-tion of energy per se and its impact was never anissue in negotiationsv for multiple reasons: themultilateral system was more concerned withaddressing import barriers rather than exportrestrictions; such negotiations would fall victimto the politicization of oil as a strategic product;

and perhaps most convincing, negotiating energyin the trading system never constituted an inter-est to the developed countries, which were unilat-erally setting the trade agenda. The developedcountries were neither keen on exchanging con-cessions amongst themselves in oil or oil prod-ucts, nor was it in their interest to pry open mar-kets for oil. As such, the lack of interest on thepart of the developed countries in subjectingenergy to multilateral rules and regulations wasthe predominant factor in keeping oil and coaloff the trade agenda.

Another attempt to address the related issues ofoil and coal—the “Natural Resource-BasedProducts” group established at the beginning of1987—was also a non-starter. The expectationsof the group were overwhelming as it was man-dated with a range of non-negotiable issues, suchas the problems of dual pricing, access to sup-plies, restrictive business practices, subsidies inthe coal sector and export restrictions leading totrade distortions. Moreover, energy production


and transport markets were dominated by trans-nationals and subject to heavy restrictive businesspractices (RBPs). It was taboo in the multilateraltrading system to deal with the trans-nationals.As long as the WTO continues to shy away fromregulating the practices of trans-nationals, it ishard to perceive how the energy sector is going tobe monitored.

At present, calls for the creation of a multilateralagreement on energy within the framework ofthe WTO are being made. However, it is not theoil sector which is being scrutinized in thisrespect (ostensibly oil and coal remain trivial inWTO negotiations); it is rather the related issuesof new and renewable sources of energy. Low-carbon energy sources—wind, biomass, solar—and their associated products are highly attractiveto developed countries interested in seeking newmarket access.

The more developed countries invest in low-car-bon energy sources, the greater their interest willbe to negotiate them under environmental goodsand services in the WTO and the more selectivethey will be in their trade of so-called non-greengoods and services. This will have a direct bear-ing on the Arab world as a developing and an oilproducing region. Despite the Arab world’s min-imal contribution to climate change throughGHG emissions, Arab countries still have a vest-

ed interest to be part of any debate related to theinterface between the WTO and the promulga-tion of rules and regulations on trade in energy,or on trade in new and renewable sources of ener-gy directed at mitigating climate change.

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ANDSERVICES AND PPMS : THE ARAB PER-SPECTIVE VI

Given the diversity of positions among Arabcountries with regard to environmental goodsand services and the related process and produc-tion methods (PPMs), it is vital to draw attentionto the underlying complexities of the issue. Theentire spectrum of new and renewable sources ofenergy lies within its context.

Environmental Goods

The Doha Ministerial Declarationvii paragraph31-(iii) calls for “the reduction or, as appropriate,elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers toenvironmental goods and services.” It is underthis banner of environmental goods and servicesand the push to include EGS in Doha negotia-tions that new and renewable sources of energy,and by default, traditional energy sources, arecropping up. Due to the nature of agreementswithin the WTO, countries have the flexibility to


decide which environmental services should betargeted for liberalization at the national level ina country’s schedule of commitments.viii This isnot the case for environmental goods where tariffreductions would need to be applied to a com-mon set of environmental goods agreed to by allWTO members.ix

Negotiation on the liberalization of environmen-tal goods in the Doha round faces enormouschallenges and to date its outcome remains unde-termined, be it within the overall package of theDoha round or – if ventured by some – a stand-alone or plurilateral agreement within the WTO.No agreement has yet been reached on a bound-ary for EGS.

The extent to which energy will be incorporatedinto the trading system through the negotiationof EGS – if these negotiations are to see the lightof day – depends upon how environmentalgoods’ boundaries will be defined, and more pre-cisely, whether end-use criteria and PPMs shouldbe required to define environmental goods.x It isthe prospect of the inclusion of PPMs in the def-inition of environmental goods coupled with theemergence in the developed countries of environ-mental policies, higher standards and regulationsin value added energy sectors (chemicals and fer-tilizers, plastics, aluminium, and cement), andincreasing levels of investment in renewable ener-gy that is of particular interest to the Arabworld.xi

PPMs

PPMs, which refer to the way in which a productis made, have long been a controversial feature of

the trade and environment debate. In spite ofGATT precedents that the ‘likeness’xii of prod-ucts (a litmus test to protect against discrimina-tion) should not be determined on the basis ofthe method of production or production process-es, xiii environmentalists have fought against thisview, noting that PPMs are fundamental to min-imizing the environmental impact of a productduring its life-cycle.xiv As it stands, trade rulesallow for distinctions between products solely onthe basis of the end uses and characteristics of theproducts themselves. The introduction of PPMsinto the definition of environmental goods aimedat climate change mitigation would then reversethis, allowing like products whose end uses andcharacteristics are the same to be treated differ-ently. This would pose a significant challenge tothe Arab world, whose production is dominatedby carbon-intensive activity. Moreover, theintroduction of PPMs here will certainly openthe backdoor for member states to challenge‘likeness’ elsewhere, essentially erecting trade bar-riers on the basis of loosely related productionfactors.

For the Arab economies, in addition to beingreliant on carbon-intensive activities and tradi-tional energy production, almost all are netimporters of ‘clean technologies’ and their associ-ated goods. In principle, trade measures are animportant channel for the diffusion of climatemitigation goods. In reality, however, adaptingsolely trade measures aimed at carbon reductionwill have significant adverse impacts upon tradi-tional energy producers and fossil fuel exports,given the absence of positive measures designedto stimulate diversification, development, growthand transition toward low-carbon production


that vulnerable economies could negotiate in apost-Kyoto framework.

It would also be baseless to argue for a splitbetween the negative and the positive measuresin regard to climate change mitigation, as thiswill undermine the entire balance of a holisticapproach, which is critical to our priority issue.

The Arab region has the most renewable energyresources in the world. If Arab countries only use5% of their deserts to build concentrated solarpower plants, they can actually satisfy the energyneeds of the world. Arabs could export clean andnon-exhaustible energy to the world as an alter-native to oil and as a viable solution to climatechange (Hmaidan, 2007). Significant technolog-ical and financial barriers, including transporta-tion of energy from the desert and the huge-up-front costs for building the facilities to produceall this power, however, constitute immense chal-lenges. Prospects of investment in co-operationwith the developed markets are already on thehorizon. It is important for the Arab region tocapitalize on this new market but doing so willtake time and the right combination of incen-tives, which will require the right regime.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDA-TIONS

Thus far, negotiations in the WTO have beenrooted in a consensual framework designed tofacilitate the liberalization of international tradein an equitable manner. Achieving a consensuson the role of the environment in general and cli-mate change mitigation in particular through theWTO regime has proven to be a highly complextask. As we have seen, negotiating environmen-tal goods and services is fraught with danger andultimately can effect more damage than good. It is difficult to imagine an agreement on a basiclist of goods for cleaner technology and energysources when PPMs are in tow and directlyundermine the interests of the Arab world andmost developing countries. Moreover, theabsence of provisions in the WTO to aid devel-oping and least developed countries to transitionfrom unsustainable to environmentally friendlytechnologies and PPMs in fact undermines effec-tive climate change mitigation by giving prefer-ence to those already equipped with such tech-nologies. For the Arab countries today, time is of the essence;the urgency and imminent risks of climate change


do not allow for complacency. The Arab region’sminimal contribution to climate changing GHGemissions is dwarfed by the region’s immense vul-nerability to climate change, be it through risingtemperatures, water scarcity, desertification, sealevel rise, or even conflict (AFED, 2008). Likemany other countries, Arab countries have a vestedinterest to push forcefully for an independent envi-ronmental system that houses a diversity of climatechange mitigation policies and offers a mixture ofpositive and negative measures to achieve its ends.The following are recommendations for the Arabstates to consider as they cooperate with othercountries in the development of a new climatechange mitigation framework:

• In addition to the well-known tools of trade poli-cies, measures such as access to technology andfinance and building of infrastructural capacitiesare essential for a fair and equitable outcome.These measures should be negotiated within theframework of a separate post-Kyoto MEA out-side the purview of the WTO.

• Access to affordable clean technology to reduceemissions should be negotiated along the lines ofthe clean development mechanism (CDM) inthe Kyoto Protocol, e.g. developed countriescould provide financing for the mitigation andadaptation measures of the developing countries.

• Developing clean energy technologies should bea top priority; the abundance of alternative ener-gy sources in the Arab world should be harnessedto facilitate climate change mitigation as well aseconomic development.

• Arab countries will also have to be very careful toensure that any trade measures incorporated inthe post-Kyoto Protocol are in conformity withthe rules and disciplines of the internationaltrade regime, i.e. fulfilling the relevant criteria ofthe WTO.

• It is essential for Arab states to reach a consensusamongst themselves on a unified position regard-ing the ongoing negotiations in the WTO onenvironmental goods and services as well asPPMs.

• Ultimately, the Arab world should seek todemarcate the boundary between a post-KyotoMEA and the WTO.


REFERENCESArab Forum for Environment and Development – AFED(2008). Arab Environment, Future Challenges. AFEDAnnual Report 2008. N. Saab and M.K. Tolba (Eds.).Beirut, Lebanon: Technical Publications.

Hmaidan, Wael (2007). “Climate change will not sparethe Arab World.”http://www.mectat.com.lb/metopics/climate/climat.htm [accessed February 12, 2009].

International Energy Agency – IEA (2007). WorldEconomic Outlook (WEO) 2007.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – IPCC(2007), Summary for Policymakers. In: ClimateChange 2007: The Physical Science Basis.Contribution of Working Group I to the FourthAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z.Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L.Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

UNEP, IISD (2000). Environment and Trade: aHandbook. United Nations Environment Program,International Institute for Sustainable Development,Canada.

World Trade Organization - WTO (1998). UnitedStates-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain

Shrimp Products, AB Report, WT/DS58/AB/R(12 October 1998).

(i) Compared to OECD countries whose share ofemissions is 41.9%. See UNDP (2007/2008),Human Development Report: UAE, UnitedNations Development Program, New York.Available at:http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ARE.html , accessed March 12,2009.

(ii) UN Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992on Environment and Development. Principle 7stipulates that “In view of the differentcontributions to global environmentaldegradation, States have common butdifferentiated responsibilities.”

(iii) Report presented to Singapore 1st MinisterialMeeting (December 1996) paragraph 174 (i, ii,iii, iv, v)

(iv) In the shrimp-turtle dispute case, the AppellateBody went as far as it could in trying to identifywith the US’ ‘unilateral’ ban on shrimp labelingit “as an appropriate means to an end”, yetstopped short of giving its blessing for theerroneous application of the measure whichproscribed the use of a specific fishing methodin order to conserve sea turtles. It not only

NOTES

criticized the measure as being ‘unilateral’without any attempt on the part of the US toreach a consensual solution for the protectionand conservation of sea turtles, but also foundthe measure to be ‘discriminatory’ as it favoredCaribbean countries over Asian nations. See:United States—Import Prohibition of Shrimp andCertain Shrimp Products, AB Report,WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998).

(v) Even in the aftermath of the oil crisis after theME 1973 war, when the US pushed to place theissue of export restrictions on the agenda ofTokyo round, it was resisted as a generic issuefor its wider implications. See: UNCTAD (2000).Annual Report. United Nations Conference onTrade and Development, Geneva and New York.

(vi) The Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) has broadly defined envi-ronmental services as “services capable ofmeasuring, preventing, limiting or correctingenvironmental damage such as pollution ofwater, air soil as well as waste and noise-relat-ed problems. Source: OECD (1996). The GlobalEnvironmental Goods and Services Industry.Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, Paris. Environmental goods mayencompass a wide array of products and tech-nologies required to successfully perform theabove environmental services. Available onlineat:(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/10/2090577.pdf)

(vii) http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/,om01_e/mindecl_e.htm

(viii) In accordance with the General Agreement onTrade in Services (GATS).

(ix) Gulf countries have been at the forefront in pri-vatization and trade liberalization of the environ-mental services sectors. To varying degrees,these countries have deregulated and privatizedtheir water, energy and solid waste manage-ment sectors. While trade liberalization has thusfar been effected on a unilateral basis, severalGulf countries (Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia andUAE) have opened up to foreign investment mul-tilaterally under the GATS. These countriesinclude Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, SaudiArabia and the United Arab Emirates. To a morelimited extent, Jordan has partially opened itsenvironmental services market, although not yetin the areas of water treatment and solid wastemanagement. Certain member states, such asChina and India, have proposed a similar treat-ment of EGS to that of services, wherein liberal-ization could follow a request and offerapproach, or take place in the context of specif-ic projects.

(x) Statement by the Chairperson of the SpecialSession of the Committee on Trade andEnvironment to the Trade Negotiations


Committee. TN/TE/2 (July 2002).

(xi) ESCWA (2007). The Liberalization of Trade inEnvironmental Goods and Services in theESCWA and Arab Regions. United NationsEconomic and Social Commission for WesternAsia, New York. E/ESCWA/SDPD/2007/WP.1.The study was presented at the ‘Expert Meetingon Trade and Environment Priorities in the ArabRegion’ held from 11-13 November, 2007 inCairo.

(xii) In the past, GATT legal rulings on ‘likeness’have been varied, and the construction of ‘like-ness’ has not been the same in all rulings, how-ever, generally distinctions of ‘likeness’ aremeasured on the basis of:

1) physical similarity, 2) whether they are separated or classified as

together in international customs tariffs 3) whether consumers treat them as inter-

changeable (relating to consumer tastes, pref-erences, and habits)

4) whether they have the same end uses.

(xiii) In 1991 a GATT panel ruled against a U.S. regu-lation that barred the importation of tuna fromcertain fishing nations. The panel noted that theU.S. was distinguishing between tuna based onthe method by which it was caught, favoring theproduct that had comparatively less impact ondolphins. The panel determined that the treat-ment of the tuna must be the same regardlessof how it was harvested. See: GATT, DisputeSettlement Panel Report on US Restrictions onImports of Tuna, (1991) 30 I.L.M. 1594 [Tuna I].GATT, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on USRestrictions on Imports of Tuna, (1994) 33I.L.M. 839 [Tuna II].

(xiv) An end product usually goes through a numberof stages before it actually reaches the market.For example: making paper requires trees to begrown and harvested, the wood to beprocessed, and the pulp to be bleached, and soon. The various processes will have differentsorts of environmental impacts—on biodiversity,on forest-based streams and wildlife, on humanhealth from chemical pollution of waterways, orin terms of air pollution and energy use. Otherpaper may be made from post-consumer waste,a different process involving a different set ofenvironmental impacts. The end products willbe the same—paper—but the production meth-ods will have completely different environmentalimpacts. In cases where different productionmethods actually lead to different products, i.e.the papers must be used, handled, or disposedof differently, they are referred to as ‘product-related’ PPMs See: UNEP, IISD (2000).Environment and Trade: a Handbook. UnitedNations Environment Program, InternationalInstitute for Sustainable Development, Canada.For our purposes PPMs will refer to non-productrelated unless otherwise noted.

DR. IBRAHIM ABDEL GELILAcademic Chair of Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan AI Nahayan, and Director of theEnvironmental Management Programme at the Arabian Gulf University inBahrain. He was the CEO of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency(EEAA), and the chairman of the Egyptian Organization for Energy Planning(OEP). He authored and co-authored around 70 publications on energy and envi-ronment.

DR. AYMAN ABOU HADIDDirector at the Ministry of Agriculture in Cairo, Egypt of the Central Laboratoryfor Agricultural Climate (CLAC). He established the Arid Land AgricultureResearch Institute at the University of Ain Shams and was the Executive Directorof the Egyptian environmental Affairs Agency. He has over 250 published papers,and is coordinator of various research projects on agriculture and climate change.

DR. MOHAMED EL-ASHRYSenior Fellow at the UN Foundation. He previously served as CEO & Chairmanof the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Prior to joining the GEF, he servedas Director of the Environment Department at the World Bank, as Senior Vice-President of the World Resources Institute, and as Assistant Professor of Geologyat Cairo University. He also served as a member of several high-level internation-al commissions and has received a number of awards, including the 2006Champions of the Earth Award.

DR. HAMED ASSAFProfessor of civil and environmental engineering at the American University ofBeirut (AUB). In addition to teaching courses in hydrology, water resources plan-ning and management, information technology and GIS, he is actively involvedin research focusing on the implications of climate change on water resources andadaption options with particular emphasis on the integrated water resources man-agement (IWRM) approach.

DR. EMAN GHONEIMGeomorphologist with a primary interest in the application of GeographicalInformation System (GIS), remote sensing and space technology in the study ofarid environment, natural disasters, and water resources in desert regions. She isassistant research professor at the Center for Remote Sensing, Boston University,USA. She has many papers to her credit.

DR. ABDELLATIF KHATTABIProfessor at Ecole Nationale Forestière d’Ingénieurs in Morocco, where he teach-es courses related to environmental impact assessment, environmental andresource economics and sustainable management of natural resources. His main


Contributors

research area is rural development and environmental management, includingadaptation to climate change mainly in coastal and wetlands areas.

DR. IMAN NUWAYHIDProfessor of occupational and environmental health and Dean of the Faculty ofHealth Sciences at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He is AmericanBoard Certified in Occupational Medicine. He has led efforts in Lebanon and theArab region to promote an Ecosystem Approach to Human Health, and hisresearch focuses on the impact of environmental and work-related hazards on thehealth of children and working people.

DR. DIA EL-DIN EL-QUOSYChairman of Water Resources and Irrigation Committee at the Academy ofScientific Research and Technology, Cairo, Egypt. He is lecturer at manyEgyptian universities and consultant to international organizations.

DR. MOHAMED EL-RAEYProfessor of Environmental Physics and Dean of the Institute of Graduate Studiesand Research at the University of Alexandria, Egypt. He has published manyresearch papers on climate change, mainly covering the subject of coastal areas andsea level rise, and contributed as expert to IPCC reports.

NAJIB SAAB (CO-EDITOR)Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Al-Bia Wal-Tanmia (Environment &Development), the leading Arabic magazine on sustainable development, andFounding Secretary General of the Arab Forum for Environment & Development(AFED). Architect, university lecturer and writer, he is a 2003 laureate of theUnited Nations Environment Programme’s Global 500 Award for environmentalachievements.

DR. MAGDA SHAHINDirector of the Trade-related Assistance Center at the American Chamber ofCommerce in Egypt. She has had a long career in the Egyptian diplomacy, lastlyas an Ambassador in Athens. A member of the Egyptian delegations to numerousUnited Nations and WTO Conferences, and contributor to various symposiumsand workshops organized by WTO, UNCTAD, and ESCWA.

DR. SALMA TALHOUKProfessor of Landscape Horticulture at the American University of Beirut. She isthe Chair of the Department of Landscape Design and Eco-system Managementand the Director of IBSAR, nature conservation center for sustainable futures.Her research activities focus on the characterization and conservation of plantgenetic resources and native flora.

DR. MOSTAFA KAMAL TOLBA, (CO-EDITOR)President of the Board of Trustees of the Arab Forum for Environment andDevelopment (AFED). In 1972, he led Egypt’s delegation to the StockholmConference on the Human Environment, thus starting a long-life commitment toenvironmental issues. He was nominated, immediately after Stockholm, as theDeputy Executive Director of the newly-established United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP). Within two years, he became UNEP’sExecutive Director - a post he held until retiring at the end of 1992.

CONTRIBUTORS152

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE(Members of AFED Board of Trustees)

Dr. Mostafa Kamal Tolba, former Executive Director of UNEP (Chairman)

Dr. Mohamed Kassas, Professor emeritus at Cairo University and formerPresident of IUCN

Dr. Mohamed El-Ashry, former CEO & Chairman of the Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF) and Senior Fellow at the UN Foundation.

Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Awadi, Executive Secretary of the Regional Organizationfor the Protection of Marine Environment (ROPME) and former Minister ofHealth in Kuwait

Najib Saab, Secretary General of AFED and Editor-in-Chief of Environment &Development (Coordinator)

WILLIAM SAAB, COPY EDITOR

William Saab holds a BA in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridgeand an MA in International Relations and International Economics, with a specialization inInternational Energy and Environment Policy, from the Johns Hopkins School of AdvancedInternational Studies (SAIS).


ABSP Agricultural Biotechnology Support Programme

ACSAD Arabic Centre for the Studies of Arid Zones and Drylands

AEPC African Environmental Protection Commission

AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

AEWA African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement

AFED Arab Forum for Environment and Development

AGERI Agricultural Genetic Engineering Institute

AIA Advance Informed Agreement

AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

AMCEN African Ministerial Conference on the Environment

AMU Arab Maghreb Union

AoA Agreement on Agriculture (WTO Uruguay Round)

AOAD Arab Organization for Agricultural Development

AU African Union

AUB American University of Beirut

BCH Biosafety Clearing House

BMP Best Management Practices

BOD Biological Oxygen Demand

BU Boston University

CAB Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences

CAN Competent National Authority

CAMP Coastal Area Management Project

CAMRE Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment

CBC Community-Based Conservation

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CBO Community-Based Organization

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage

CDM Clean Development Mechanism

CDRs Certified Emissions Reductions

CEIT Countries with Economies in Transition

CEDARE Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe

CERES Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics

CFC Chloro-Fluoro-Carbon

CFL Compact Fluorescent Lamp

CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

CH4 Methane

CHP Combined Heat and Power

CILSS Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

CLRTAP Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution

CMS Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals


Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS156

CNA Competent National Authority

CNG Compressed Natural Gas

CO2 Carbon Dioxide

CO2eq CO2-equivalents

COD Chemical Oxygen Demand

COP Conference of the Parties

CPB Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

CRS Center for Remote Sensing

CSD Commission on Sustainable Development

CSP Concentrated Solar Power

CZIMP Coastal Zone Integrated Management Plan

DALYs Disability-Adjusted Life Years

DEM Digital Elevation Model

DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs

EAD Environment Agency AbuDhabi

EEAA Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency

EGS Environmental Goods and Services

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

EMS Environmental Management System

ENSO El Niño-Southern Oscillation

EPA US Environmental Protection Agency

ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

EPI Environment Performance Index

ESBM Ecosystem-Based Management

ESI Environment Sustainability Index

EU European Union

EU ETS European Union Emission Trading System

EVI Environmental Vulnerability Index

FACE Free Air Carbon Enrichment

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

G7 Group of Seven: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States

G8 Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States

GAPs Good Agricultural Practices

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GBC Green Building Council

GBIF Global Biodiversity Information Facility

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GCM General Circulation Model

GCOS Global Climate Observing System

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GECF Gas Exporting Countries Forum

GEF Global Environment Facility

GEMS Global Environment Monitoring System

GEO Global Environment Outlook

GHGs Greenhouse Gases

GIS Geographical Information Systems

GIWA Global International Waters Assessment

GLASOD Global Assessment of Soil Degradation


GLCA Global Leadership for Climate Action

GM Genetically Modified

GMEF Global Ministerial Environment Forum

GMO Genetically Modified Organism

GNI Gross National Income

GNP Gross National Product

GRI Global Reporting Initiative

GRID Global Resource Information Database

GWP Global Water Partnership

HACCP Hazardous Analysis and Critical Control Points

HDI Human Development Index

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

ICAM Integrated Coastal Area Management

ICARDA International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas

ICC International Chamber of Commerce

ICGEB International Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

ICM Integrated Coastal Management

ICT Information and Communication Technology

ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management

IEA International Energy Agency

IFA International Fertilizer Industry Association

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMO International Maritime Organization

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPF Intergovernmental Panel on Forests

IPM Integrated Pest Management

IPR Intellectual Property Rights

ISO International Organization for Standardization

IUCN World Conservation Union (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources)

IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management

IWMI International Water Management Institute

JI Joint Implementation

LADA Land Degradation Assessment of Drylands

LAS League of Arab States

LEED Leadership in Environmental Design

LDCs Least Developed Countries

LMBAs Land and Marine Based Activities

LMEs Large Marine Ecosystems

LMG Like Minded Group

LMO Living Modified Organism

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

MAP Mediterranean Action Plan

MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

MCM Million Cubic Meters

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreement

MECTAT Middle East Centre for the Transfer of Appropriate Technology

MEMAC Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MPA Marine Protected Area

Mt Megatonnes

MW Megawatt

NBC National Biosafety Committee

NBF National Biosafety Framework

NEAP National Environmental Action Plan

NFP National Focal Point

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPK Nitrogen, Phosphates and Potash

NPP Net Primary Productivity

OAU Organization for African Unity

ODA Official Development Assistance

ODS Ozone-Depleting Substance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PACD Plan of Action to Combat Desertification

PCB Polychlorinated biphenyls

PCFPI Per Capita Food Production Index

PERSGA Protection of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

PICs Pacific Island Countries

POPs Persistent Organic Pollutants

PPM Parts Per Million

PPM Process and Production Methods

PTSs Persistent Toxic Substances

PV Photovoltaic

RA Risk Assessment

RBP Restrictive Business Practices

RCM Regional Circulation Model

REMPEC Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea

RM Risk Management

ROPME Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the sea area surrounded by Bahrain, I.R. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

RSA Ropme Sea Area

RSGA Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

SAP Strategic Action Program

SCP Sustainable Consumption and Production

SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment

SLR Sea Level Rise

SoE State of the Environment

SPM Suspended Particulate Matter

SRES Special Report on Emission Scenarios

TOE Tonnes of Oil Equivalent

TRAFFIC Trade Records Analysis for Flora and Fauna in International Commerce

TRI Toxics Release Inventory

TRIPs Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights

UHI Urban Heat Island

UN United Nations

UNCBD United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity

UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (now UN-Habitat)

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS158

159

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCOD United Nations Conference on Desertification

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICE United Nations Children’s Fund

UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization

US United States

USCCSP United States Climate Change Science Program

USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

UV Ultraviolet (A and B)

VOC Volatile Organic Compound

WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development

WCED World Commission on Environment and Development

WCD World Commission on Dams

WCP World Climate Programme

WCS World Conservation Strategy

WDPA World Database on Protected Areas

WEF World Economic Forum

WEI Water Exploitation Index

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization

WMO World Meteorological Organization

WRI World Resources Institute

WSSCC Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council

WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development

WTO World Trade Organization

WWAP World Water Assessment Programme

WWC World Water Council

WWF World Wide Fund for Nature


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