University of the Philippines College of LawConsti | Professor Charlie Yu

Case Digest

TOPIC: Proclamation of Martial LawDOCTRINE: CASE Number: CASE Name: Aquino, Jr. vs Military Commission 2Ponente: Justice Antonio

FACTS Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, petitioner was arrested on

September 23, 1972, pursuant to General Order No. 2-A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio in Rizal province

On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus 1 in which he questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention.

This Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it, and required respondents to file their respective answers, after which the case was heard. Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda. Petitioner's last Reply memorandum was dated November 30, 1972. On September 17, 1974, this Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of martial law and the arrest and detention of petitioner.

ISSUE

W/N the military commissions have jurisdiction to try him, alone or together with others, for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)YES. The court opined that respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. In order to preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in General Order No. 8 (September 27, 1972) the Court of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create military tribunals to try and decide cases "of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order No. 12 (September 30, 1972), the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.

Schwartz: "The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in court."