aquinas__summa theologica - question 2

8/7/2019 Aquinas__Summa theologica - Question 2

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ST. THOMAS AQUINASSUMMA THEOLOGICA

COMPLETE ENGLISH EDITIONIN FIVE VOLUMES

Translated byFathers of he English Dominican Province

VOLUME ONEt 'QQ. 1-119

WITH SYNOPTICAL CHARTS ANDTHE ENCYCLICAL LETTEROF POPE LEO XIII ON THERESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

CHRISTIAN CLASSICSP.O. BOX 30

WESTMINSTER, MARYLAND 21157


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,! iSumma Theokigica originally published in English 1911. Revised.edition published 1920, London.Reissued in 3 volumes, New Yilrk, 1948. Copyright 1948 by Benziger Brothers, Inc. Reprinted

1981 by Christian Classics, un der a license granted by Benziger, a division of Glencoe PublishingCo., Inc., successor in interest to Benziger Brothers, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

NIHIL OBSTAT:RT. REv. MSGR. JOHN M . FEARNS, S. T.D.,Censor Librorum.

IMPRIMATUR:FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN,Archbishop ofNew York.

New York, 1946 & 1947

Approbatio OrdinisNIHIL aBSTAT:

F. RAPHAEL Moss, a.p., S.T.L.F. LEO MOORE, a.p., S.T.L.

IMPRIMATUR:

1920

F. BEDAJARREIT, a.p., S.T.L., A.M.Prior Provincialis Anglioe

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 81-68580Copyright 1948 by Benziger Bros., New York, NYISBN: CLOTH EDITION PAPERBACK EDITIONVolume I - 0-87061-064-3 0-87061-070-8Volume II - 0-87061-065-1 0-87061-071-6Volume II I - 0-87061-066-X 0-87061-072-4Volume IV - 0-87061-067-8 0-87061-073-2Volume V - 0-87061-068-6 0-87061-074-0Complete Set - 0-87061-063-5 0-87061-069-4Printed in the United States of AmericaChristian Classics, P.O. Box 30, Westminster, Maryland 21157

DEDICATIONdlo the (Blessed Virginmary ilinmaculate8eat 0/ Wi$dom


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QUESTION 2The Existence of God(In Three Articles)

BECAUSE the chief aim of sacred doctrine is toteach the knowledge of God, not only as He is inHimself, but also as He is the beginning ofthings and their last end, and especially ofrational creatures, as is clear from what hasbeen already said, therefore, in our endeavorto expound this science, we shall treat: (1) OfGod; (2) Of the ration al creature's advancetowards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, isour way to God.In treating of God there will be a threefolddivision:-For we shall consider (1) Whatever concernsthe Divine Essence; (2) Whate ver concernsthe distinctions of Persons; (3) Whateverconcerns the procession of creatures from Him.Concerning the Divine Essence, we mustconsider:-(1) Whether God exists? (2) The mannerof His existence, or, rather, what is not themanlier of His existence; (3) Wha tever concerns His operations-namely, His knowledge,will, power.Concerning the first, there are three pointsof inquiry:-(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" isself-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable?(3) Whether God exists?

FIRST ARTICLEWhether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?

mentally is greater than that which exists onlymentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word"God" is understood it exists mentally, it alsofollows that it exists actually. Therefore theproposition "God exists" is self-evident.Obj. 3. Further, the existence of truth isself-evident. For whoever denies the existenceof truth grants that truth does not exist: and,

if truth does not exist, then the proposition"Truth does not exist" is true: and if there isanything true, there must be truth. But Godis truth itself: I am the way, the truth, and thelife (John xiv. 6). Therefore "God exists" isself-evident.On the contrary, No one can mentally admitthe opposite of what is self -evident j as thePhilosopher (Metaph. iv., lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration.But the opposite of the proposition "God is"can be mentally admitted: The fool said in hisheart, There is no God (Ps. lii. 1). Therefore,that God exists is not self-evident.I answer that, A thing can be self-evident ineither of two ways j on ' the one hand, selfevident in itself, though not to us; on theother , selfcevident in itself, and to us. Aproposi tion is self-evident because the predi, .cate is included in the essence of the subject,las "Man is an animal," for animal is contained1in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence.'of the predicate and subject be known to all,'the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is'We proceed thus to the First Article:- clear with regard to the first principles ofObjection 1. It seems that the existence of demonstration, the terms of which are comGod is self-evident. Now those things are said mon things that no dne is ignorant of, such as;to be self-evident to us the knowledge of being and non-being, whole and part , and suchwhich is naturall y implanted in us, as we can like. If, however, there are some to whom thesee in regard to first principles. But as Dam- essence of the predicate and subject is un-,

ascene says (De Fid. Orth. i. 1, 3), the known, the proposition will be self-evident i n ~ knowledge of God is naturally implanted in itself, but not to those who do not know the'all. Therefore the existence of God is self- meaning of the predicate and subject of the'evident. proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethi-Obj. 2. Further , those things are said to be us says (Hebdom., the title of which is:s e l f ~ v i d e n t which are known as soon as the "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there areterms are known, which the Philosopher some mental concepts self-evident only to the(1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first princi- learned, as that incorporeal substances are notpIes of demonstration. Thus, when the nature in space." Therefore I say that this proposiofa whole and of a part is known, it is at once tion, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, forrecognized that every whole is greater than its the predicate is the same as the subject ; bepart. But as soon as the signification of the cause God is His own existence as will be hereword."God" is understood, it is at once seen after shown (Q. 3, A. 4). Now because wethat God exists. For by th is word is signified do not know the essence of God, the proposithat 'thing than which nothing greater can be tion is not self-evident to us; but needs to beconceived. .But that which exists actually and demonstrated by things that are more known

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Q. 2 Art. 2 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 12 13 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Pt. 1 Q. 2 Art. 3to us, though less known in their nature-namely, by effects.Reply Obj. 1. To know that God exists in ageneral and confused way is implanted in usby nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man natura lly desires happiness,and what is naturally desired by man mustbe natura lly known to him. This, however, isnot to know absolutely that God exists; justas to know that someone is approaching is notthe same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine thatman's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, andothers in something else.Reply Obj. 2. Perhaps not everyone whohears this word "God" understands it to signifysomething than which nothing greater can bethought, seeing that some have believed Godto be a body. Yet, grant ed that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signifiedsomething than which nothing greater can bethought, nevertheless, it does no t therefore follow that he understands that what the wordsignifies exists actually, but only that it existsmentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that thereactually exists something than which nothinggreater can be thought; and this precisely isnot admitted by those who hold that God doesnot exist.Reply Obj. 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

SECOI-ID ARTICLEWhether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Existsi'We proceed thus to the Second Article :-Objection 1. I t seems that the existence ofGod cannot be demonstrated. For it is anarticle of faith that God exists. But what isof faith cannot be demonstrated, because ademonstration produces scientific knowledge;

whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. xi. 1).Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that Godexists.Obj. 2. Further, the essence is the middleterm of demonstration. But we cannot knowin what God's essence consists, but solely inwhat it does not consist; as Damascene says(De Fid. Orth. i. 4) . Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.Obj. 3. Further, if the existence of Godwere demonstrated, this could only be fromHis effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and Hiseffects are finite; and between the finite andinfinite there is no proportion. Therefore,since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an

effect not proportionate to it, it seems that theexistence of God cannot be demonstrated.On the contrary, The Apostle says: The in-visible things of Him are clearly seen, beingunderstood by the things that are made (Rom.i. 20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated throughthe things that are made; for the first thingwe must know of anything is, whether itexists.I answer that, Demonstration can be madein two ways: One is through the cause, and iscalled a priori, and this is to argue from whatis prior absolutely. The other is through theeffect, and is called a demonstration a pos-teriori,. this is to argue from what is priorrelatively only to us. When an effect is betteknown to us than its cause, from the effect weproceed to the knowledge of the cause. Anfrom every effect the existence of its propecause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because sincevery effect depends upon its cause, if theffect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Henthe existence of God, in so far as it is not selevident to us, can be demonstrated from thoof His effects which are known to us.Reply Obj. 1. The existence of God another like truths about God, which canknown by natural reason, are not articlesfaith, but are preambles to the articles; ffaith presupposes natural knowledge, evengrace presupposes nature, and perfection suposes something that can be perfected. Nevetheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, wcannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a mattof faith, something which in itself is capablof being scientifically known and demonstrated.Reply Obj. 2. When the existence of a causis demonstra ted from an effect, this efftakes the place of the definition of the cauin proof of the cause's existence. This is espcially the case in regard to God, because, .order to prove the existence of anything, itnecessary to accept as a middle termmeaning of the word, and not its essence, fthe question of its essence follows on the qution of its existence. Now the names givenGod are derived from His effects; conquently, in demonstrating the existence of Gofrom His effects, we may take for the midterm the meaning of the word "God."Reply Obj. 3. From effects not proportiate to the cause no perfect knowledge of tcause can be obtained. Yet from every effthe existence of the cause can be clearly de ,onstrated, and so we can demonstrate the eistence of God from His effects; though frothem we cannot perfectly know God as He.;in His essence.

THIRD ARTICLEWhether God Exists?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:-Objection 1. It seems that God does notexist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altog ether destroyed.But the word "God" means that He is infinitegoodness. If , therefore, God existed, therewould be no evil discoverable; but there isevil in the world. Therefore God does notexist.Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to supposethat what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But itseems that everything we see in the world canbe accounted for by othe r principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural thingscan be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reducedto one principle, which is human reason, orwill. Therefore there is no need to supposeGod's existence.On the contrary, I t is said in the person ofGod: I am Who am (Exod. iii. 14).I r:tnswer that, The existence of God can beproved in five ways.The first and more manifest way is theargument from motion. I t is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world somethings are in motion. Now whatever is inmotion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion;whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is inact. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality toactuality. But nothing can be reduced frompotentiality to actuality, except by somethingin a state of actuality. Thus that which isactually hot, as fire, makes wood, which ispotentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the .same thing should be at once inactuality and potenti ality in t he same respect,

but only in different respects. For what isactually ho t cannot simultaneously be potentiallyhot; but it is simultaneously potentiallycold. I t is therefore impossible that in thesame respect and i n. the same way a thingshould be both mOver and moved, i.e., that itsho]lld move itself. Therefore, whatever is inmotion must be put in motion by another. If~ h a t b y which it is put in motion be itself putmm()tiol1, then this also must needs be putin, motion by another, and that by anothera ~ l 1 i I l . B u t t h i s cannot go on to infinity, becalIse,then there would be no first mover, and,consequently, no other mover; seeing that& u h ~ e q l ! e n t movers move only inasmuch ast h e Y t , ~ r t ! , p u t in motion by the first mover; as

the staff moves only because it is put in mo-tion by the hand. Therefore it is necessaryto arrive at a first mover, put in motion by noother; and this everyone understands to beGod.The second way is from the nature of theefficient cause. In the world of sense we findthere is an order of efficient causes. There isno case known (neither is it, indeed, possible)in which a thing is found to be the efficientcause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficientcauses it is not possible to go on to infinity,because in all efficient causes following inorder, the first is the cause of the intermediatecause, and'the intermediate is the cause of theultimate cause, whether the intermediate causebe several, or one only. Now to take away thecause is to take away the effect. Therefore,if there be no first cause among efficientcauses, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes itis possible to go on to infinity, there will be nofirst efficient cause, neither will there be anultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficientcauses; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficientcause, to which everyone gives the name ofGod.The third way is taken'from possibility andnecessity, and runs thus. We find in naturethings that are possible to be and not to be,since they are found to be generated, and tocorrupt, and consequently, they are possibleto be and not to be. But it is impossible for.these always to exist, for that which is p o s s i b l e ~ not to be at some time is not. Therefore, ifleverything is possible not to be, then at oneltime there could have been nothing in eXiSlt.'ence. Now if tl1is were true, even now ther 'would be nothing in existence, because thawhich does not exist only begins to exist b . .something already existing. T h e r ~ f o r e , if a' .one time nothing was in existence, it woul .'have been impossible for anything to have be tgun to exist; and thus even now nothing woulcJIbe in existe nce-whic h is absurd. Thereforeifnot all beings are merely possible, but there'must exist something the existence of which isnecessary. But every necessary thing eitherhas its necessity caused by another, or not.Now it is impossible to go on to infinity innecessary things which have their necessitycaused by another, as has been already provedin regard to efficient causes. Therefore wecannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and notreceiving it from another, but rather causingin others their necessity. This all men speakof as God.The fourth way is taken from the gradation


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Q. 3 Art. 1 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRiBUTES 14to be found in things. Among beings there aresome more and some less good, true, noble,and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as theyresemble in their different ways somethingwhich is the maximum, as a thing is said to behotter according as it more nearly resemblesthat which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, somethingwhich is uttermost being; for those things thatare greatest in truth are greatest in being, asit is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximumin any genus is the cause of all in that genus;as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is thecause of all hot things. Therefore there mustalso be something which is to all beings thecause of their being, goodness, and every otherperfection; and this we call God.The fifth way is taken from the governanceof the world. W e see that things which lackintelligence, such as natural bodies, ac t foran end, and this is evident from their actingalways, or nearly always, in the same way, soas to obtain the best result. Hence it is plainthat not fortuitously, but designedly, do they

achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless itbe directed by some being endowed withknowledge and intelligence; as the arrow isshot to its mark by the archer. The reforesome intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and thisbeing we call God.Reply Obj 1. As Augustine says (Enchir.xi) : Since God is the highest good, He wouldnot allow any evil to exist in His works, un-less His omnipotence and goodness were suchas to bring good even out of evil. This is partof the infinite goodness of God, that He shouldallow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higheragent, whatever is done by nature must needsbe traced back to God, as to its first cause. Soalso whatever is done voluntarily must also betraced back to some higher cause other thanhuman reason or will, since these can changeand fail; for all things that are changeableand capable of defect must be traced back toan immovable and self-necessary first principle,as was shown in the body of the Article.

QUESTION 3Of the Simplicity of God

(In Eight Articles)WHEN the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question ofthe manner of its existence, in order that wemay know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He isnot, we have no means for considering howGod is, but rather how He is not.Therefore, we must consider (1) How He isnot; (2) How He is known by us; (3) HowHe is named.Now it can be shown how God is not, bydenying of Him whatever is opposed to theidea of Him-viz., composition, motion, andthe like. T herefore (1) we must discuss Hissimplicity, whereby we deny composition inHim; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2 ) His perfection;(3 ) His infinity; (4) His immutability;(5 ) His unity.Concerning His simplicity, there are eightpoints of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body?(2) Whether He is composed of matter andform? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essenceand existence? (5 ) Whether He is composed ofgenus and difference? (6) Whether He is com-

posed of subject and accident? (7 ) WhetherHe is in any way composite, or wholly simple?(8) Whether He enters into composition withother things? FIRST ARTICLEWhether God Is a Body?

We proceed thus to the First Article:-Objection 1. It seems that God is a body.For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the threedimensions to God, for it is written: He ishigher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do?He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thouknow? The measure of Him is longer than theearth and broader than the sea (Job xi. 8, 9) .Therefore God is a body.Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figureis a body, since figure is a quality of quantity.But God seems to have figure, for it is written:Let us make man to our image and likeness(Gen. i. 26). Now a figure is called an image,according to the text: Who being the bright-ness of His glory and the figure, i.e., the image,of His substance (Heb. i. 3). Therefore Godis a body.Obj. 3. Further, whatever has corporealpart s is a body. Now Scripture attributes cor-

15 THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD Pt. 1 Q. 3 Art. 2poreal parts to God. Hast thou an arm likeGod? (Job xl. 4) ; and The eyes of the Lordare upon the just (Ps. xxxiii. 16); and Theright hand of the Lord hath wrought strength(Ps. cxvii. 16). Therefore God is a body.Obj. 4. Further, posture belongs only tobodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: I saw theLord sitting (Isa. vi. 1) , and He standeth upto judge (Isa. iii. 13). Therefore God is abody.Obj. S. Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local ter m wherefrom or where-to. But in the Scriptures God is spoken of asa local term whereto, according to the words,Come ye to Him and be enlightened (Ps.xxxiii. 6), and as a term wherefrom: All theythat depart from Thee shall be written in theearth (Jer. xvii. 13). Therefore God is a body.On the contrary, I t is written in the Gospelof St. John (iv. 24) : God is a spirit.I answer that , It is absolutely true that Godis not a body; and this can be shown in threeways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be pu t in motion, as is evident frominduction. Now it has been already proved(Q. 2, A. 3) , that God is the First Mover,and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear. hat God is not a body. Secondly, because thefirst being must of necessity be in act, and inno way in potentiality. For although in anysingle thing. that passes from potentiality toactuality, the potentiality is prior in time tothe actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; forwhatever is in potentiality can be reduced intoactuality only by some being in actuality.Now it has been already proved that God is theFirst Being. I t is therefore impossible that inGod there should be any potentiality. Butevery body is in potentiality, because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it istherefore impossible that God should be abody. Th irdly , because God is the most nobleof beings. Now it is impossible for a body tobe the most noble of beings; for a body mustbe either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is notanimate precisely as body; otherwise allbodies would be animate. Therefore it s animation depends upon some other thing, as ourbody depends for its animation on the soul.Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should he abody.Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. 1,A: ?), H

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